

**Chapter 1 : SparkNotes: Meditations on First Philosophy: Sixth Meditation, Part 1: Cartesian body**

*Book I, Chapters Summary. The first chapter opens with the famous phrase: "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains." These "chains" are the constraints placed on the freedom of citizens in modern states.*

Life and Works Lucius Annaeus Seneca c. Seneca had a highly successful, and quite dramatic, political career. Even a brief and by necessity incomplete list of events in his life indicates that Seneca had ample occasion for reflection on violent emotions, the dangers of ambition, and the ways in which the life of politics differs from the life of philosophy—among the topics pursued in his writings. Seneca creates a literary persona for himself. The writings that we shall primarily be concerned with are: Among the Moral Essays, the only one we can date with some certainty is *On Mercy*, an essay in which Seneca directly addresses Nero in the early days of his reign 55 or In this article, we do not consider his tragedies, but only his prose writings. Some recent work on Seneca suggests that one should see his prose writings and his tragedies as complementary sides of his thought Wray The tragedies are arguably darker than the prose writings, and topics on which Seneca seems to have a consoling philosophical view are explored in rather less consoling ways. But in the tragedies, death can appear as a transition to even greater sufferings, or, equally bad, the dead seem to demand ever new deaths, to provide them with fresh companions in the underworld Busch Partly, this reaction may reflect prejudices of our training. The remnants of a Hegelian and Nietzschean, and Heideggerean narrative for philosophy are deeply ingrained in influential works of scholarship. On this account, the history of ancient philosophy is a history of decline, the Roman thinkers are mediocre imitators of their Greek predecessors, and so on Long Such prejudices are hard to shake off; for many centuries watered-down versions of them have shaped the way students learnt Latin and Greek. In recent years, however, many scholars have come to adopt a different view. They find in Seneca a subtle author who speaks very directly to modern concerns of shaping ourselves and our lives. Seneca does not write as a philosopher who creates or expounds a philosophical theory from the ground up. Rather, he writes within the track of an existing system that he is largely in agreement with. At other times, Seneca dismisses certain technicalities and emphasizes the therapeutic, practical side of philosophy. Rather than call Seneca an orthodox Stoic, however, we might want to say that he writes within the Stoic system. Seneca emphasizes his independence as a thinker. In *On the Private Life*, he says: Seneca sees himself as a philosopher like the older Stoics. Seneca integrates ideas from other philosophies if these seem helpful to him. As he explains, he likes to think of philosophical views as if they were motions made in a meeting. One often asks the proponent of the motion to split it up in two motions, so that one can agree with one half, and vote against the other Letter For example, Seneca thinks that there is something salutary in Platonic metaphysics Boys-Stones ; Donini , ; Reydam-Schils ; Sedley ; Setaioli While he dismisses the theory of Forms, he still holds that studying it can make us better. It acquaints us with the thought that the things which stimulate and enflame the senses are not among the things that really are Letter Seneca also adopts metaphors or images that are associated with other philosophical schools, such as Platonically inspired images of the body as prison of the soul e. But invoking such images need not commit Seneca to holding the theories in which they originate. Seneca, educated by Roman philosophers, is genuinely thinking in Latin. In order to see the force of this point, let us compare Seneca to Cicero. Cicero conscientiously tells his readers which Greek term he translates by which Latin term. Seneca is, at many points, not interested in mapping his terminology directly onto the Greek philosophical vocabulary. Like other late Stoics, Seneca is first and foremost interested in ethics. Although he is well versed in the technical details of Stoic logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, and ontology, he does not devote any significant time to these fields Barnes , ; Cooper Seneca steps back from a format in which a philosopher justifies a theory in a step-by-step argument Long , ; on the question of why Seneca chooses to write letters, see Inwood , xiv-xv. This engaging style views the reader as a participant in philosophical thought Roller ; Schafer Seneca thinks that in order to benefit from philosophy, one cannot passively adopt insights. One must appropriate them as an active reader, thinking through the issues for oneself, so as then to genuinely assent to them Letter It has often been noted that later Stoics, including Seneca, seem to lose interest in the ideal agent—the sage or wise

personâ€”who figures so prominently in early Stoic ethics. The early Stoics spell out what knowledge or wisdom is by explaining what a knowledgeable or wise person would do how she assents, how she acts, etc. We need precisely what Seneca offers: We need to learn how to overcome our own residual tendencies, despite our better intentions, to suffer such failures. They, too, are letters, and, as Williams argues, Seneca in them transforms the genre of philosophical consolation into his own mode of therapy. Seneca uses his exile as a metaphor, and ultimately addresses what he takes to be a many-faceted condition in human life: As this example shows, his consolations are thus rather independent of his particular situation, and of the particular addressee. Still, we might want to note that at times, in consoling his mother for his exile, or, in *ad Marciam* To Marcia, a woman for the loss of her child, Seneca discusses virtue with a view to gender. In her life up to now, he tells his mother, she has moved beyond the ordinary faults of women; her virtue was her only ornament. In accordance with this, she should now try not to fall into grief in the way women tend toâ€”excessively. By holding on to virtue, it seems, his mother can transcend typical, yet merely contingent features of female life. This is not a Stoic distinction. Seneca is not committed to the view that the life of theory is a different life from the life of practice. But the Aristotelian way of framing the question helps him describe choices which he and some of his addressees face in life: In *On the Private Life* and in *On Peace of Mind*, Seneca addresses this very question of how to choose between the active life of politics, and a life devoted to philosophy. The choice is, for Seneca, partly about the right kind of balance. How much do we need to retreat in order to be at peace with ourselves? Philosophy has two functions. We need philosophical insight on which to base our actions. But we also need to devote time specifically to reflecting on such truths as that only virtue is good, and thus restore our peace of mind cf. *On Peace of Mind* 2. Both philosophy and politics are spheres in which we can benefit others *On Peace of Mind* 3. The contrast between the life of theory and the life of politics helps Seneca spell out his version of Stoic cosmopolitanism. We should not think of the choice between philosophy and politics as a choice between theory and practice. Rather, philosophy and politics represent two worlds that we simultaneously belong to. The world of politics is our local world; the world of philosophy is the whole world. By pursuing an active career in politics, we aim to do good to the people in our vicinity. By retreating into philosophy we choose to live, for a while, predominantly in the world at large. By studying, teaching, and writing philosophy, Seneca thinks, we help others who are not necessarily spatially close to us. While Seneca takes it for granted that cosmopolitanism is concerned with the idea that it is good to benefit others, he does not seem to think that cosmopolitanism burdens us with the unfeasible task of helping everyone. Rather, cosmopolitanism liberates us. As things may play out in our individual lives, we may be in a better position to benefit others as philosophers than as Roman senators; and since both are good things to do, we can in fact be content with our lives either way. Cosmopolitanism creates a beneficial form of life that a narrower political picture may not accommodate: Williams, 10â€”11 and 19â€”

In *On the Private Life* 3. The Stoics see human beings as parts of a whole, namely as parts of the cosmos Vogt, chapter 2. Seneca fully embraces this idea. Discussion of this issue is, to his mind, somewhat academic, and thus not as salutary as the elevating themes about virtue that he often prefers. But Letter explains why we must think of the soul as a body. Only bodies act on anything, cause effects; therefore, the soul must be a body cf. Letter on the good being a body. Traditionally, Stoic philosophy is considered to have three phases: This periodization importantly hangs on a possible development in the philosophical psychology of the Stoicsâ€”the question of whether Panaetius and Posidonius move away from so-called psychological monism. According to psychological monism, there is no non-rational part or power of the soul. Rather, the soul is one insofar as its commanding faculty is one, and rational. It is a difficult question whether middle Stoicism departs from psychological monism. The view that it did was for a long time widely accepted. However, this traditional picture has recently been contested in influential studies Cooper; Tieleman. Perhaps early and middle Stoicism are more in agreement than it was previously thought. Accordingly, some recent studies of Seneca proceed on the assumption that we need not attempt to figure out whether Roman Stoicism agrees with monistic early or with pluralistic middle Stoicism Inwood. But Seneca may agree with psychological monism insofar as he does not distinguish between rational and non-rational powers of the soul as in fact, arguably neither did the middle Stoics and still modify a related aspect of the early Stoic account of the soul.

Psychological monism implies that there is no distinction between practical and theoretical reason. Knowledge bears directly on action. Indeed, all philosophical knowledge is needed for good decision-making. Seneca brings to bear this aspect of Stoic thought in his own way. For him, studying the arguments for a particular claim will not bring us peace of mind. At the outset of Letter 85, Seneca goes so far as to swear that he does not take pleasure in producing proofs for a piece of doctrine that looms large in his Letters: His addressee, Lucilius, is presented as urging him to put forward all arguments and objections that are relevant to this issue, and in response, Seneca discusses some of them in Letter

**Chapter 2 : Summary & Explanation of Rene Descartes's™ Meditations " SchoolWorkHelper**

*Summary. The Meditator reflects that he has often found himself to be mistaken with regard to matters that he formerly thought were certain, and resolves to sweep away all his pre-conceptions, rebuilding his knowledge from the ground up, and accepting as true only those claims which are absolutely certain.*

He begins his meditations by rejecting all his own opinions and relying on basic principles which can form any belief. He does so to find a reason for doubt. Doubt is required when forming a theory in order to be sure that one is not being deceived. Once Descartes had demolished his opinions, he began pure thinking. First, he analyzed what is universal " he is a human with a body which has mass, size and numbers, location and time. If something is unknown then how can it be certain? Mathematics is not innate. Mathematical facts, formulas, and theorems were created by man in order to describe the world we live in [3]. Man is flawed, therefore what man creates is also flawed " mathematics is doubtable simply because it is man made. When considering counter arguments to this, one could propose that man has created everything we have come to know, therefore everything would be flawed. I would have to say that I do believe that nothing is ever perfect, therefore everything can and will be flawed in some way. Descartes continues to meditate, moving onward to the existence of God. Descartes becomes absorbed into the perception that there must be more to a person than just a body. These logical operations include deductions, inference, and association. All of these are variables of thinking. Deductions include the mathematical way we think. Inference is the act of processing information. Lastly, association involves the ability to associate previously known ideas and linking them with new or old ideas. When he uses the word I, he is using it in what seems to be the third person. When speaking of ones self in third person, the name given to such person should be used. The more appropriate title for this thinking thing is mind, soul or intellect. Meditations on First Philosophy. Revised by Johnathon Bennett.

**Chapter 3 : Charles Taylor's The Ethics of Authenticity (Chapters ) – Seoul Philosophy Club**

*Sixth Meditation, Part 1: Cartesian body Summary. The Sixth and final Meditation is entitled "The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body," and it opens with the Meditator considering the existence of material things.*

**Mind-body problem** The mind-body problem concerns the explanation of the relationship that exists between minds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes. Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli that arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world, and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties. It begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical. He was therefore the first to formulate the mind-body problem in the form in which it still exists today. If asked what the mind is, the average person would usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity. They would almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic, or simply unintelligible. So, for example, one can reasonably ask what a burnt finger feels like, or what a blue sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like to a person. But it is meaningless, or at least odd, to ask what a surge in the uptake of glutamate in the dorsolateral portion of the prefrontal cortex feels like. Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events "qualia" or "raw feels". There are qualia involved in these mental events that seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical. David Chalmers explains this argument by stating that we could conceivably know all the objective information about something, such as the brain states and wavelengths of light involved with seeing the color red, but still not know something fundamental about the situation – what it is like to see the color red. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One possible explanation is that of a miracle, proposed by Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche, where all mind-body interactions require the direct intervention of God. Another possible argument that has been proposed by C. Lewis [33] is the Argument from Reason: Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if monism is correct, there would be no way of knowing this – or anything else – we could not even suppose it, except by a fluke. The zombie argument is based on a thought experiment proposed by Todd Moody, and developed by David Chalmers in his book *The Conscious Mind*. Since none of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be by definition described scientifically via physics, the move from conceivability to possibility is not such a large one. Seth has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing that has no spatial extension. He also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties. A child touches a hot stove physical event which causes pain mental event and makes her yell physical event, this in turn provokes a sense of fear and protectiveness in the caregiver mental event, and so on. Many contemporary philosophers doubt this. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Occasionalism is not shown. Psychophysical parallelism[ edit ] Psychophysical parallelism, or simply parallelism, is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another. Instead, they run along parallel paths mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events and only seem to influence each other. Although Leibniz was an ontological monist who believed that only one type of substance, the monad, exists in the universe, and that everything is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties such as beliefs, desires and emotions inhere in some physical bodies at least, brains. How mental and physical properties relate

causally depends on the variety of property dualism in question, and is not always a clear issue. Sub-varieties of property dualism include: Emergent materialism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way i. They are dependent on the physical properties from which they emerge, but opinions vary as to the coherence of top-down causation, i. A form of emergent materialism has been espoused by David Chalmers and the concept has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years, [46] but it was already suggested in the 19th century by William James. Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine first formulated by Thomas Henry Huxley. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products i. The ontological stance towards qualia in the case of non-reductive physicalism does not imply that qualia are causally inert; this is what distinguishes it from epiphenomenalism. Panpsychism is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, since it regards everything as having both mental and physical properties. However, some panpsychists say that mechanical behaviour is derived from the primitive mentality of atoms and molecules—as are sophisticated mentality and organic behaviour, the difference being attributed to the presence or absence of complex structure in a compound object. So long as the reduction of non-mental properties to mental ones is in place, panpsychism is not a strong form of property dualism; otherwise it is.

Dual aspect theory[ edit ] Dual aspect theory or dual-aspect monism is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance. Thus it is a mixed position, which is monistic in some respects. Various formulations of dual-aspect monism also require the mental and the physical to be complementary, mutually irreducible and perhaps inseparable though distinct. An example of these disparate degrees of freedom is given by Allan Wallace who notes that it is "experientially apparent that one may be physically uncomfortable—for instance, while engaging in a strenuous physical workout—while mentally cheerful; conversely, one may be mentally distraught while experiencing physical comfort". This philosophy also is a proponent of causal dualism which is defined as the dual ability for mental states and physical states to affect one another. Mental states can cause changes in physical states and vice versa. However, unlike cartesian dualism or some other systems, experiential dualism does not posit two fundamental substances in reality: Rather, experiential dualism is to be understood as a conceptual framework that gives credence to the qualitative difference between the experience of mental and physical states. Experiential dualism is accepted as the conceptual framework of Madhyamaka Buddhism. Madhyamaka Buddhism goes even further, finding fault with the monist view of physicalist philosophies of mind as well in that these generally posit matter and energy as the fundamental substance of reality. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the cartesian dualist view is correct, rather Madhyamaka regards as error any affirming view of a fundamental substance to reality. In denying the independent self-existence of all the phenomena that make up the world of our experience, the Madhyamaka view departs from both the substance dualism of Descartes and the substance monism—namely, physicalism—that is characteristic of modern science. The physicalism propounded by many contemporary scientists seems to assert that the real world is composed of physical things-in-themselves, while all mental phenomena are regarded as mere appearances, devoid of any reality in and of themselves. Much is made of this difference between appearances and reality. In the Madhyamaka view, mental events are no more or less real than physical events. In terms of our common-sense experience, differences of kind do exist between physical and mental phenomena. While the former commonly have mass, location, velocity, shape, size, and numerous other physical attributes, these are not generally characteristic of mental phenomena. For example, we do not commonly conceive of the feeling of affection for another person as having mass or location. Mental phenomena are, therefore, not regarded as being physical, for the simple reason that they lack many of the attributes that are uniquely characteristic of physical phenomena. Thus, Buddhism has never adopted the physicalist principle that regards only physical things as real. Hylomorphism Hylomorphism is a theory that originates with Aristotelian philosophy, which conceives being as a compound of matter and form. Monist solutions to the mind-body problem[ edit ] In contrast to dualism, monism does not accept any fundamental divisions. The fundamentally disparate nature of reality has been central to forms of eastern philosophies for over two millennia. In Indian and Chinese philosophy, monism is integral to how

experience is understood. Today, the most common forms of monism in Western philosophy are physicalist. Another form of monism, idealism, states that the only existing substance is mental. Although pure idealism, such as that of George Berkeley, is uncommon in contemporary Western philosophy, a more sophisticated variant called panpsychism, according to which mental experience and properties may be at the foundation of physical experience and properties, has been espoused by some philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead [54] and David Ray Griffin. Such a view was briefly adopted by Bertrand Russell and many of the logical positivists during the early 20th century. The mental and physical would then both be properties of this neutral substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza [9] and was popularized by Ernst Mach [56] in the 19th century. This neutral monism, as it is called, resembles property dualism.

**Chapter 4 : Descartes' Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the [www.nxgvision.com](http://www.nxgvision.com) mind-body problem is a paradigm issue in philosophy of mind, although other issues are addressed, such as the hard problem of consciousness, and the nature of particular mental states.*

Sixth Meditation, Part 1: Cartesian body Summary The Sixth and final Meditation is entitled "The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body," and it opens with the Meditator considering the existence of material things. The Meditator accepts the strong possibility that material objects exist since they are the subject-matter of pure mathematics, the truths of which he perceives clearly and distinctly. He then produces two arguments for the existence of material things, one based on the faculty of the imagination, the other based on the senses. He first distinguishes between imagination and pure understanding. In the case of a triangle, he can perceive that a triangle is three-sided and derive all sorts of other properties using the understanding alone. However, the weaknesses of the imagination become clear when he considers a thousand-sided figure. The pure understanding, however, dealing only in mathematical relations, can perceive all the properties of a thousand-sided figure just as easily as it can a triangle. The imagination cannot be an essential property of his mind, since the Meditator could still exist even if he could not imagine. Therefore, the imagination must rely on something other than the mind for its existence. The Meditator conjectures that the imagination is connected with the body, and thus allows the mind to picture corporeal objects. In understanding, the mind turns inward upon itself, and in imagining, the mind turns outward toward the body. The Meditator admits that this is only a strong conjecture, and not a definitive proof of the existence of body. The Meditator then turns to reflect on what he perceives by means of the senses. He perceives he has a body that exists in a world, and that this body can experience pleasure, pain, emotion, hunger, etc. He thinks it not unreasonable to suppose that these perceptions all come from some outside source. They come to him involuntarily, and they are so much more vivid than the perceptions he consciously creates in his own mind. It would be odd to suggest that he can involuntarily create perceptions so much more vivid than the ones he creates voluntarily. And if they come from without, it is only natural to suppose that the source of these sensory ideas in some way resemble the ideas themselves. From this point of view, it is very easy to convince oneself that all knowledge comes from without via the senses. Analysis What Descartes understands by "body" is somewhat counter-intuitive and is closely linked to his physics, which is not made readily apparent in the Meditations. This section of commentary will depart a bit from the text it comments on in order to clarify some concepts of Cartesian physics. The entirety of Cartesian physics rests on the claim that extension is the primary attribute of body, and that nothing more is needed to explain or understand body. We should recall that Descartes was also a great mathematician, and invented both analytic geometry and the coordinate system that now bears his name.

**Chapter 5 : SparkNotes: Meditations on First Philosophy: Summary**

*"Descartes and Malebranche on Thought, Sensation, and the Nature of the Mind," Journal of the History of Philosophy, Markie, Peter, "The Cogito and Its Importance," In The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.*

**Historical Antecedents** The identity theory as I understand it here goes back to U. Place and Herbert Feigl in the 1950s. Place and H. Feigl nevertheless mention should be made of suggestions by Rudolf Carnap, p. Reichenbach and M. Reichenbach said that mental events can be identified by the corresponding stimuli and responses much as the possibly unknown internal state of a photo-electric cell can be identified by the stimulus light falling on it and response electric current flowing from it. In both cases the internal states can be physical states. However Carnap did regard the identity as a linguistic recommendation rather than as asserting a question of fact. Avowals were thought of as mere pieces of behaviour, as if saying that one had a pain was just doing a sophisticated sort of wince. Smart hoped that the hypotheticals would ultimately be explained by neuroscience and cybernetics. They would dangle from the nomological net of physical science and should strike one as implausible excrescences on the fair face of science. The Nature of the Identity Theory Place spoke of constitution rather than of identity. We find out whether this is a table in a different way from the way in which we find out that it is an old packing case. We find out whether a thing is lightning by looking and that it is a motion of electric charges by theory and experiment. This does not prevent the table being identical to the old packing case and the perceived lightning being nothing other than an electric discharge. Feigl and Smart put the matter more in terms of the distinction between meaning and reference. Of course these expressions could be construed as referring to different things, different sequences of temporal stages of Venus, but not necessarily or most naturally so. There did seem to be a tendency among philosophers to have thought that identity statements needed to be necessary and a priori truths. We had to find out that the identity holds. Aristotle, after all, thought that the brain was for cooling the blood. Descartes thought that consciousness is immaterial. It was sometimes objected that sensation statements are incorrigible whereas statements about brains are corrigible. The inference was made that there must be something different about sensations. Place, influenced by Martin, was able to explain the relative incorrigibility of sensation statements by their low claims: One should deny anything other than a relative incorrigibility. Place As remarked above, Place preferred to express the theory by the notion of constitution, whereas Smart preferred to make prominent the notion of identity as it occurs in the axioms of identity in logic. So Smart had to say that if sensation X is identical to brain process Y then if Y is between my ears and is straight or circular absurdly to oversimplify then the sensation X is between my ears and is straight or circular. Of course it is not presented to us as such in experience. Perhaps only the neuroscientist could know that it is straight or circular. The professor of anatomy might be identical with the dean of the medical school. A visitor might know that the professor hiccups in lectures but not know that the dean hiccups in lectures. **Phenomenal Properties and Topic-Neutral Analyses** Someone might object that the dean of the medical school does not qua dean hiccup in lectures. Qua dean he goes to meetings with the vice-chancellor. This is not to the point but there is a point behind it. This is that the property of being the professor of anatomy is not identical with the property of being the dean of the medical school. The question might be asked, that even if sensations are identical with brain processes, are there not introspected non-physical properties of sensations that are not identical with properties of brain processes? How would a physicalist identity theorist deal with this? If you overheard only these words in a conversation you would not be able to tell whether the conversation was one of mathematics, physics, geology, history, theology, or any other subject. Thus to say that a sensation is caused by lightning or the presence of a cabbage before my eyes leaves it open as to whether the sensation is non-physical as the dualist believes or is physical as the materialist believes. This sentence also is neutral as to whether the properties of the sensation are physical or whether some of them are irreducibly psychical. To see how this idea can be applied to the present purpose let us consider the following example. Suppose that I have a yellow, green and purple striped mental image. That is I would see or seem to see, for example, a flag or an array of lamps which is green, yellow and

purple striped. Suppose also, as seems plausible, that there is nothing yellow, green and purple striped in the brain. Thus it is important for identity theorists to say as indeed they have done that sense data and images are not part of the furniture of the world. This move should not be seen as merely an ad hoc device, since Ryle and J. Austin, in effect Wittgenstein, and others had provided arguments, as when Ryle argued that mental images were not a sort of ghostly picture postcard. He characterizes this fallacy Place. Of course, as Smart recognised, this leaves the identity theory dependent on a physicalist account of colour. His early account of colour was too behaviourist, and could not deal, for example, with the reversed spectrum problem, but he later gave a realist and objectivist account Smart. Armstrong had been realist about colour but Smart worried that if so colour would be a very idiosyncratic and disjunctive concept, of no cosmic importance, of no interest to extraterrestrials for instance who had different visual systems. Prompted by Lewis in conversation Smart came to realize that this was no objection to colours being objective properties. One first gives the notion of a normal human percipient with respect to colour for which there are objective tests in terms of ability to make discriminations with respect to colour. This can be done without circularity. Then Smart elucidated the notion of colour in terms of the discriminations with respect to colour of normal human percipients in normal conditions say cloudy Scottish daylight. This account of colour may be disjunctive and idiosyncratic. Anthropocentric and disjunctive they may be, but objective none the less. Hilbert identifies colours with reflectances, thus reducing the idiosyncrasy and disjunctiveness. A few epicycles are easily added to deal with radiated light, the colours of rainbows or the sun at sunset and the colours due to diffraction from feathers. John Locke was on the right track in making the secondary qualities objective as powers in the object, but erred in making these powers to be powers to produce ideas in the mind rather than to make behavioural discriminations. Also Smart would say that if powers are dispositions we should treat the secondary qualities as the categorical bases of these powers, e. Let us return to the issue of us having a yellow, purple and green striped sense datum or mental image and yet there being no yellow, purple and green striped thing in the brain. The identity theorist Smart can say that sense data and images are not real things in the world: Sentences ostensibly about the average plumber can be translated into, or elucidated in terms of, sentences about plumbers. So also there is having a green sense datum or image but not sense data or images, and the having of a green sense datum or image is not itself green. So it can, so far as this goes, easily be a brain process which is not green either. Thus Place, p. When we describe the after-image as green Quoting these passages, David Chalmers, p. Of course a lot of things go on in me when I have a yellow after image for example my heart is pumping blood through my brain. However they do not typically go on then: Of course to be topic neutral is to be able to be both physical and mental, just as arithmetic is. Armstrong emphasise the notion of causality. My argument is this: The definitive characteristic of any sort of experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since these physical states possess the definitive character of experiences, they must be experiences. Similarly, Robert Kirk has argued for the impossibility of zombies. If the supposed zombie has all the behavioural and neural properties ascribed to it by those who argue from the possibility of zombies against materialism, then the zombie is conscious and so not a zombie. Words for colours, smells, sounds, tastes and so on also occur. One can regard common sense platitudes containing both these sorts of these words as constituting a theory and we can take them as theoretical terms of common sense psychology and thus as denoting whatever entities or sorts of entities uniquely realise the theory. Then if certain neural states do so too as we believe then the mental states must be these neural states. In his he allows for tact in extracting a consistent theory from common sense. One cannot uncritically collect platitudes, just as in producing a grammar, implicit in our speech patterns, one must allow for departures from what on our best theory would constitute grammaticality. A great advantage of this approach over the early identity theory is its holism. Two features of this holism should be noted. One is that the approach is able to allow for the causal interactions between brain states and processes themselves, as well as in the case of external stimuli and responses. Another is the ability to draw on the notion of Ramseyfication of a theory. Take the terms describing behaviour as the observation terms and psychological terms as the theoretical ones of folk psychology. Then Ramseyfication shows that folk psychology is compatible with

materialism. This seems right, though perhaps the earlier identity theory deals more directly with reports of immediate experience. The causal approach was also characteristic of D. Parts I and II of this book are concerned with conceptual analysis, paving the way for a contingent identification of mental states and processes with material ones. See Medlin , and including endnote 1. Armstrong thought of perception as coming to believe by means of the senses compare also Pitcher This combines the advantages of Direct Realism with hospitality towards the scientific causal story which had been thought to have supported the earlier representative theory of perception. Armstrong regarded bodily sensations as perceptions of states of our body. Of course the latter may be mixed up with emotional states, as an itch may include a propensity to scratch, and contrariwise in exceptional circumstances pain may be felt without distress. However, Armstrong sees the central notion here as that of perception.

**Chapter 6 : Philosophy of mind - Wikipedia**

*Summary. Chapter 1. Bud, a ten-year-old boy, and the other children at the Home are waiting in line for breakfast when they hear a caseworker come in.*

Indeed, a friendly observer of the past years of the philosophy of mind might be forgiven for saying that *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, despite all our efforts with Dualism, Materialism, Idealism, and now the Mind Brain Identity Theory, have held us at bay. He is also the leader of the Institute for Biocomplexity and Informatics IBI which conducts leading-edge interdisciplinary research in systems biology. Kauffman is also an emeritus professor of biochemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, a MacArthur Fellow and an external professor at the Santa Fe Institute. Both postulates are testable in principle. If mind depends upon the specific physics of the mind-brains system, mind is, in part, a matter for physicists. Since Descartes invested the Western mind with *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, the seemingly insurmountable philosophic and scientific questions his dualism posed have stalked us. In the present essay I propose to broach new ground that I hope may help solve five fundamental problems in the philosophy of mind and the evolution of consciousness: More, I hope to make inroads on a fundamental fourth problem, 4 Whence a responsible free will. But there is a further issue I want to discuss: All the above questions are deeply familiar, and the subjects of massive efforts by philosophers 1, 2, 3 , neuroscientists 5,6 , physicists 7 and others. I propose to state each of these problems, then tackle them with two physical hypotheses: First, the mind is a quantum coherent-reversibly decohering-recohering system in the brain. Penrose 8 , I believe that consciousness is a problem, at least in part, of the physical basis subtending it. In this view I sharply differ from those who hope for an emergence of consciousness in a computational mind 3 , whether comprised of chips, neurons, or water buckets. The second physical hypothesis is scientifically and philosophically radical. All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, thus, Socrates is a mortal. This identity of efficient cause with deduction leads directly to the reductionist view held by Weinberg and others. As Weinberg famously says 10 , the explanatory arrows all point downward, from societies to people to organs to cells to biochemistry to chemistry to physics and ultimately to particle physics and General Relativity, or perhaps String Theory Turing-Church-Deutsch holds precisely the same view - it is algorithms all the way down so entailment all the way up. In this view, the universe is a formalizable machine, and we who live in it are TCD machines. Then we, robot-like can use the inputs from our sensors and calculate all we need to flourish, machines afloat in a machine universe. But then, unfortunately, there is no selective advantage to conscious experience. Why then, did it evolve? I will present four lines of reasoning and candidate evidence suggesting that reductionism is very powerful, but powerfully inadequate. In such a world, the evolutionary advantages of consciousness may be stunning, for if we cannot, in principle, calculate the behavior of a universe, biosphere, animal and human life that is partially lawless yet wonderfully non-random then there may be a profound advantage to conscious experience. It is one way we can understand a partially lawless, non-random, hence non-calculable, universe, biosphere, and free willed human life, and flourish in it. I note at the outset that I think the scientific grounds for a quantum mind are presently weak, that it is, at present, an improbable scientific hypothesis, but that it is definitely not ruled out, as we shall see 4. This article is organized in the following sections. Section 1 discusses dualism and its standard philosophy of mind problems. Section 2 discusses some facts about quantum mechanics needed for my discussion. Section 3 proposes answers to how the mind acts on the brain and mind, that appear to be solved by assuming the mind-brain system is quantum coherent, reversibly decohering to classicity for all practical purposes, FAPP, and returning to a quantum state. Section 4, I take a first inadequate step towards a free will, it is free but not responsible. Section 5, sketches a physical theory for a quantum decohereing-recohering mind-brain system rather analogous to other theories which, however, do not consider reversible decoherence and recoherence. Section 6 is about possible steps towards a responsible free will. Section 7, I consider several reasons why both reductionism and the Turing-Church-Deutsch principle is inadequate, that open the conceptual door toward partial lawlessness, yet non-random becoming. Other scientists seem to be exploring similar ideas, as I describe 14, I will in Section 8 use lawlessness yet non-randomness as a hoped for avenue to a responsible free

will. In section 9, I discuss why the failure of Turing-Church-Deutsch gives a powerful selective advantage to consciousness. If we and the universe are not TCD, then we cannot compute what will happen. Consciousness seems a sufficient evolutionary solution and is thus selectively advantageous. In Section 10, I confess that none of the above helps understand the hard problem of qualia in themselves. I hope the ideas in the article open new philosophic and scientific ground for our considerations. We have held to the efficient cause view of the material world from Descartes to Newton to the present. As noted it is the logical basis of reductionism and TCD. The immediate issue that arose for Descartes and all who have followed was: How does mind act on matter? The standard form of this problem depends upon causal closure in the material world of efficient causes. Any event classical physical event must have a sufficient classical physical efficient cause. Thus there can be no first cause, and causal closure is required. Given this view, and the current Mind-Brain Identity theory, the standard concern is that brain events are sufficient causes of later brain events, and there is nothing left over for mind to do to affect the brain. They are identical by hypothesis. Yes, we can say the words, but we all experience qualia, inter alia with respect to other minds. How can our experiences act on matter on any view at all, including the Mind-Brain identity theory? As philosopher Michael Silberstein told me Silberstein, M. Now how does the mind act on the brain? The response to this apparent impasse is a retreat to epiphenomenalism: Mind does nothing, in fact, it does not act on brain, it is an epiphenomena of brain. It is fair to say that no one likes this view. The third problem, assuming classical matter for the brain and causal closure, is free will. Then we cannot have free will in truth. And since all our behaviors are determined, we cannot have morally responsible free will. One response to this problem now prevalent is an appeal to deterministic chaos in the brain and the thought that only a tiny subset of neurons underpin conscious experience 5,6. Then infinitesimal alterations in initial conditions will lie on divergent trajectories with positive Lyapunov exponents, the butterfly will flap energetically, and we will have the illusion of free will. This view may well be true. But I want to argue that we do not need it. This view of quantum mechanics is, as we all know, fully acausal. Beyond Copenhagen, we all know the Bohm and Many World interpretations of quantum mechanics, which few hold in favor. This has been well established in work by Leggett with a quantum system interacting with a quantum oscillator bath More, decoherence is a well established experimental fact in quantum computing, where it destroys the quantum coherence needed for such computation Sanders, B. These interactions yield the famous interference effects of quantum mechanics that defy classical explanation. The central idea is that quantum phase information is lost from the system to the environment, so the system loses the capacity to exhibit quantum characteristic interference phenomena. The system can approach classicity FAPP, or for some physicists, a classical mixed state of classical probabilities not quantum probabilities that superimpose. It is essential to the discussion below that quantum decoherence, the loss of phase information, is not a causal process in any sense. Rather phase information, the heart of quantum possibility waves on Copenhagen and Born, is lost acausally from the system to the environment and typically cannot, in any practical way, be recovered. The central implication of this is that decoherence constitutes the passage from the quantum world of possibilities to the actual classical FAPP world of physical events, and there is nothing causal in this passage. Below I will explain possible physical embodiments of my hypothesis that the mind is quantum coherent, but reversibly locally passing to decoherence and recoherence repeatedly. More, Briegel has published two recent papers showing just such reversible passage from quantum entangled to classical and back repeatedly 22, Reversibility of the coherent to decoherent-classical to recoherent quantum states are essential to my hypothesis for I wish the brain to be undergoing such reversible transformations all the time. If we imagine the coherent spatially extended regions of the brain, as discussed below, to be pink, and the decoherent regions to be increasingly grey as decoherence sets in, I imagine a 3 dimensional volume in the brain where each pixel- volume waxes and wanes pink to grey to pink somewhat like an fMRI temporal image. This question, which seems deeply difficult to answer for a classical brain, becomes easy to answer in the current framework: The quantum coherent-decohering-recohering mind does not act on the brain causally at all. Rather, by decohering to classical FAPP states, the quantum coherent mind has acausal consequences for the classical "meat" of the brain. No causality from res cogitans to res extensa is needed. Mind acausally has consequences for the classical states of the brain. We may or may not hold a

quantum theory of the mind-brain system to be scientifically plausible at this stage. It does not act on the brain causally. It decoheres and this alters the classical state  $s$  of the brain. Many, notably Dennett 2, in *Freedom Evolving*, would disagree strongly with the need for such a quantum decoherent account. Next, how does the either purely quantum mind, or quantum coherent-decohering-recohering mind-brain system act on mind? Mind propagates quantum coherent time dependent Schrodinger waves unitarily. As we will see this is actually not sufficient for a responsible free will, but it is a start, allowing mind to have acausal consequences for the temporal behavior of mind. With this, we are freed from a retreat into the mind as purely epiphenomenon. Because we do not have to answer the familiar classical physics question of how mind acts efficient causally on brain, the issue of epiphenomenalism does not arise. In the older Copenhagen interpretation, the wave function collapses from all its possible values to a unique classically measured value. This is a start, but not adequate. The inadequacy of this start of a theory of free will is that this free will is not responsible. Here is the issue: If the mind causally and deterministically determines the brain and our actions, then we do not have free will. Conversely, if the determination of our actions by an acausal quantum mind is simply randomly probabilistic, then again, we are not responsible for our actions.

**Chapter 7 : Meditations on First Philosophy - Wikipedia**

*Summary & Explanation of Rene In Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy, he is trying to explain and theorize that humans are more than just a shape with mass. He does so by creating the concept of the 'I' - or ego.*

While distinguishing rigorous knowledge scientia and lesser grades of conviction persuasio, Descartes writes: I distinguish the two as follows: But since I see that you are still stuck fast in the doubts which I put forward in the First Meditation, and which I thought I had very carefully removed in the succeeding Meditations, I shall now expound for a second time the basis on which it seems to me that all human certainty can be founded. First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: Replies 2, AT 7: As my certainty increases, my doubt decreases; conversely, as my doubt increases, my certainty decreases. It has also a distinctively epistemic character, involving a kind of rational insight. Yet they raise questions about the extent to which his account is continuous with other analyses of knowledge. Prima facie, his characterizations imply a justified belief analysis of knowledge "or in language closer to his own and where justification is construed in terms of unshakability, an unshakable conviction analysis. Many will balk at the suggestion. It might therefore seem clear, whatever else is the case, that Descartes conceives of knowledge as advancing truth. Thus construed, to establish a proposition just is to perceive it with certainty; the result of having established it "i. Truth is a consequence of knowledge, rather than its precondition. What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? On a quite different reading of this passage, Descartes is clarifying that the analysis of knowledge is neutral not about truth, but about absolute truth: Harry Frankfurt defended such an interpretation in his influential work, *Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen*. Yet, in a follow-up paper he retracted the view: I now think, however, that it was a mistake on my part to suggest that Descartes entertained a coherence conception of truth. The fact is that there is no textual evidence to support that suggestion; on the contrary, whenever Descartes gives an explicit account of truth he explains it unequivocally as correspondence with reality. A definitive interpretation of these issues has yet to gain general acceptance in the literature. What is clear is that the brand of knowledge Descartes seeks requires, at least, unshakably certain conviction. Arguably, this preoccupation with having the right kind of certainty "including its being available to introspection "is linked with his commitment to an internalist conception of knowledge. For he holds that ideas are, strictly speaking, the only objects of immediate perception, or conscious awareness. More on the directness or immediacy of perception in Section 5. This assumption is tantamount to requiring that justification come in the form of ideas. An important consequence of this kind of interpretation "namely, a traditional representationalist reading of Descartes "is that rigorous philosophical inquiry must proceed via an inside-to-out strategy. This strategy is assiduously followed in the *Meditations*, and it endures as a hallmark of many early modern epistemologies. Philosophical inquiry is, properly understood, an investigation of ideas. The methodical strategy of the *Meditations* has the effect of forcing readers to adopt this mode of inquiry. He wants knowledge that is utterly indefeasible. Sceptical doubts count as defeaters. This indefeasibility requirement implies more than mere stability. A would-be knower could achieve stability simply by never reflecting on reasons for doubt. But this would result in mere undoubtedness, not indubitability. Before jumping to this conclusion, we should put the indefeasibility requirement into context. Descartes is a contextualist in the sense that he allows that different standards of justification are appropriate to different contexts. This is not merely to say the obvious: This example is potentially misleading, in that Descartes appears loath to count mere empirical evidence as knowledge-worthy justification. But upon ramping up the standard to what he finds minimally acceptable, the standard admits of context dependent variation. For Descartes, clarity contrasts with obscurity, and distinctness contrasts with confusion. But he regularly characterizes defeasible judgments at this level of certainty using terminology e. In the context of inquiry at play in the *Meditations*, Descartes insists on indefeasibility. Better to have a standard that excludes some

truths, than one that justifies some falsehoods. Descartes maintains that though atheists are quite capable of impressive knowledge, including in mathematics, they are incapable of the indefeasible brand of knowledge he seeks: But I maintain that this awareness [cognitionem] of his is not true knowledge [scientiam], since no act of awareness [cognitio] that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge [scientia]. Now since we are supposing that this individual is an atheist, he cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which seem to him to be very evident as I fully explained. Distinguish particularist and methodist responses to the question. The particularist is apt to trust our prima facie intuitions regarding particular knowledge claims. These intuitions may then be used to help identify more general epistemic principles. The methodist, in contrast, is apt to distrust our prima facie intuitions. The preference is instead to begin with general principles about proper method. The methodical principles may then be used to arrive at settled, reflective judgments concerning particular knowledge claims. Famously, Descartes is in the methodist camp. Were we to rely on our prima facie intuitions, we might suppose it obvious that the earth is unmoved, or that ordinary objects as tables and chairs are just as just as they seem. Yet, newly emerging mechanist doctrines of the 17th century imply that these suppositions are false. Such cases underscore the unreliability of our prima facie intuitions and the need for a method by which to distinguish truth and falsity. But such pre-reflective judgments may be ill-grounded, even when true. The dialectic of the First Meditation features a confrontation between particularism and methodism, with methodism emerging the victor. In response and at each level of the dialectic, Descartes invokes his own methodical principles to show that the prima facie obviousness of such particular claims is insufficient to meet the burden of proof. Knowledge of the nature of reality derives from ideas of the intellect, not the senses. An important part of metaphysical inquiry therefore involves learning to think with the intellect. The Fifth Meditation meditator remarks "having applied Cartesian methodology, thereby discovering innate truths within: Elsewhere Descartes adds, of innate truths: All geometrical truths are of this sort" not just the most obvious ones, but all the others, however abstruse they may appear. Hence, according to Plato, Socrates asks a slave boy about the elements of geometry and thereby makes the boy able to dig out certain truths from his own mind which he had not previously recognized were there, thus attempting to establish the doctrine of reminiscence. Our knowledge of God is of this sort. This storehouse includes ideas in mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Interestingly, Descartes holds that even our sensory ideas involve innate content. On his understanding of the new mechanical physics, bodies have no real properties resembling our sensory ideas of colors, sounds, tastes, and the like, thus implying that the content of such ideas draws from the mind itself. But if even these sensory ideas count as innate, how then are we to characterize the doctrine of innateness? Importantly, the formation of these sensory ideas "unlike purely intellectual concepts" depends on sensory stimulation. This characterization allows that both intellectual and sensory concepts draw on native resources, though not to the same extent. Relatively little attention is given to his doctrines of innateness, or, more generally, his ontology of thought. On the internalism-externalism distinction, see Alston and Plantinga For a partly externalist interpretation of Descartes, see Della Rocca For a stability interpretation of Descartes, see Bennett On the indefeasibility of Knowledge, see Newman and Nelson On contextualism in Descartes, see Newman On the methodism-particularism distinction, see Chisholm and Sosa On analysis and synthesis, see Smith

Foundationalism and Doubt Of his own methodology, Descartes writes: Throughout my writings I have made it clear that my method imitates that of the architect. When an architect wants to build a house which is stable on ground where there is a sandy topsoil over underlying rock, or clay, or some other firm base, he begins by digging out a set of trenches from which he removes the sand, and anything resting on or mixed in with the sand, so that he can lay his foundations on firm soil. In the same way, I began by taking everything that was doubtful and throwing it out, like sand

Replies 7, AT 7: His method of doubt is intended to complement foundationalism. The two methods are supposed to work in cooperation, as conveyed in the above quotation. Such an edifice owes its structural integrity to two kinds of features: A system of justified beliefs might be organized by two analogous features: Euclid begins with a foundation of first principles "definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions" on which he then bases a superstructure of further propositions. Those long chains composed of very simple and easy reasoning, which geometers customarily use to arrive at

their most difficult demonstrations, had given me occasion to suppose that all the things which can fall under human knowledge are interconnected in the same way. Discourse 2, AT 6: It would be misleading to characterize the arguments of the Meditations as unfolding straightforwardly according to geometric method. Though the component finds no analogue in the method of the geometers, Descartes appears to hold that this component is needed in metaphysical inquiry. In contrast, metaphysical inquiry might have first principles that conflict with the senses: The difference is that the primary notions which are presupposed for the demonstration of geometrical truths are readily accepted by anyone, since they accord with the use of our senses. Hence there is no difficulty there, except in the proper deduction of the consequences, which can be done even by the less attentive, provided they remember what has gone before. Admittedly, they are by their nature as evident as, or even more evident than, the primary notions which the geometers study; but they conflict with many preconceived opinions derived from the senses which we have got into the habit of holding from our earliest years, and so only those who really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal things, so far as possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them. Such mistakes in the laying of the foundations weaken the entire edifice.

**Chapter 8 : Seneca (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*The Phenomenology of Spirit is structured in two stages: A-historical approach: the adventures of consciousness and the transition to self-awareness (Chapters ) The historical approach: the realization of reason, through the spirit, religion and absolute knowledge (Chapters ).*

Theory-Theory Social psychologists have investigated mindreading since at least the s. When asked to report what they saw, the participants almost invariably treated these shapes as intentional agents with motives and purposes, suggesting the existence of an automatic capacity for mentalistic attribution. However, attribution theory is a quite different way of approaching our mentalistic practice. Heider took commonsense psychology in its real value of knowledge, arguing that scientific psychology has a good deal to learn from it. During the s one or other form of TT was seen as a very effective antidote to Cartesianism and philosophical behaviorism. In this context, TT was taken as the major premise in the standard argument for eliminative materialism see Ramsey In its strongest form, eliminativism predicts that part or all of our folk-psychological theory will vanish into thin air, just as it happened in the past when scientific progress led to the abandonment of the folk theory of witchcraft or the protoscientific theories of phlogiston and caloric fluid. This prediction rests on an argument which moves from considering folk psychology as a massively defective theory to the conclusion thatâ€”just as with witches, phlogiston, and caloric fluidâ€”folk-psychological entities do not exist. According to Lewis, the folk theory of mind is implicit in our everyday talk about mental states. In this perspective, mindreading can be described as an exercise in reflective reasoning, which involves the application of general reasoning abilities to premises including *ceteris paribus* folk-psychological generalizations. He said that P; he could not have done this unless he thought that Q; he knows and knows that I know that he knows that I will realize that it is necessary to suppose that Q; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that Q; so he intends me to think, or is at least willing for me to think, that Q Grice Since the end of the s, however, primatology, developmental psychology, cognitive neuropsychiatry and empirically-informed philosophy have been contributing to a collaborative inquiry into TT. On this perspective, the inferential processes that depend on the theory have an automatic and unconscious character that distinguishes them from reflective reasoning processes. But the developmental research on mindreading took off only under the thrust of three discoveries in the s see Leslie First, normally developing 2-year-olds are able to engage in pretend play. Lastly, children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders are especially impaired in attributing mental states to other people. Sally returns to the room, and the child onlooker is asked where she will look for her toy, in location A or in location B. Now, 4- and 5-year-olds have little difficulty passing this test, judging that Sally will look for her toy in location A although it really is in location B. These correct answers provide evidence that the child realizes that Sally does not know that the toy has been moved, and so will act upon a false belief. Many younger children, typically 3-year-olds, fail such a task, often asserting that Sally will look for the toy in the place where it was moved. The finding that mentalistic skills emerge very early, in the first years, and in a way relatively independent from the development of other cognitive abilities, led some scholars for example, Simon Baron-Cohen, Jerry Fodor, Alan Leslie to conceive them as the end-state of the endogenous maturation of an innate theory-of-mind module or system of modules. This contrasted with the view of other researchers for example, Alison Gopnik, Josef Perner, Henry Wellman , who maintained that the intuitive theory of mind develops in childhood in a manner comparable to the development of scientific theories. They argue that the body of knowledge underlying mindreading has all the structural, functional and dynamic features that, on their view, characterize most scientific theories. One of the most important features is defeasibility. The child-scientist theory inherits from Piaget not only the constructivist framework but also the idea that the cognitive development is a process that depends on a domain-general learning mechanism. A domain-general or general-purpose psychological structure is one that can be used to do problem solving across many different content domains; it contrasts with a domain-specific psychological structure, which is dedicated to solving a restricted class of problems in a restricted content domain see Samuels Another theory-theorist who endorses a domain-general conception of cognitive development is Josef Perner Children are situation theorists by the

age of around 2 years. Thus Perner suggests that children first learn to understand the properties of public pictorial and linguistic representations; only in a second moment they extend, through a process of analogical reasoning, these characteristics to mental representations. On this perspective, then, the concept of belief is the product of a domain-general metarepresentational capacity that includes but is not limited to metarepresentation of mental states. But for criticism, see Harris, who argues that pretence and belief are very different and are readily distinguished by context by 3-year olds. Inside the module the body of information can be stored as a suite of domain-specific computational mechanisms; or as a system of domain-specific representations; or in both ways see Simpson et al. Studies of children and adults in diverse cultures, human infants, and non-human primates provide evidence for at least four systems of knowledge that serve to represent significant aspects of the environment: The question arises, then, whether the domain-specific body of information that subserves mentalistic abilities is the database of either a domain-specific or domain-general computational system. In some domains, a domain-specific computational mechanism and a domain-specific body of information can form a single mechanism for example, a parser is very likely to be a domain-specific computational mechanism that manipulates a domain-specific data structure. The outputs of ToMM are descriptions of psychological states in the form of metarepresentations or M-representations, that is, agent-centered descriptions of behavior, which include a triadic relation that specifies four kinds of information: Children suffering from this neurodevelopmental disorder exhibit a triad of impairments: This hypothesis was investigated in an experiment in which typically developing 4-year-olds, children with autism 12 years; IQ 82, and children with Down syndrome 10 years; IQ 64 were tested on the Sally and Ann false-belief task. In support of this hypothesis, he cites inter alia his analysis of pretend play that would show that month-old children are able to metarepresent the propositional attitude of pretending. This analysis results, however, in an immediate empirical problem. If the ToMM is fully functional at 18 months, why are children unable to successfully perform false-belief tasks until they are around 4 years old? Since, by default, the ToMM attributes a belief with content that reflects current reality, to succeed in a false-belief task this default attribution must be inhibited and an alternative nonfactual content for the belief selected instead. In contrast, autistic children are at or near ceiling on the non-mental metarepresentational tests but fail false-belief tasks. Normal 4-year-olds can succeed in all these tasks. If this were right, then autistic children should have difficulty with both kinds of representations. And in fact Perner suggests that the autistic deficit is due to a genetic impairment of the mechanisms that subserve attention shifting, a damage that interferes with the formation of the database required for the development of a theory of representation in general. In support of this interpretation, fMRI studies showed that activity in the right temporo-parietal junction is high while participants are thinking about false beliefs, but no different from resting levels while participants are thinking about outdated photographs or false maps or signs. Leslie recruits new data to support his claim that mental metarepresentational abilities emerge from a specialized neurocognitive mechanism that matures during the second year of life. First-Person Mindreading and Theory-Theory During the s and s most of the work in Theory of Mind was concerned with the mechanisms that subserve the attribution of psychological states to others third-person mindreading. In the last decade, however, an increasing number of psychologists and philosophers have also proposed accounts of the mechanisms underlying the attribution of psychological states to oneself first-person mindreading. For most theory-theorists, first-person mindreading is an interpretative activity that depends on mechanisms that capitalize on the same theory of mind used to attribute mental states to other agents. However, when explicitly asked about the motivations causes of their actions, the subjects did not hesitate to state, sometimes with great eloquence, their very reasonable motives. Nisbett and Wilson explained this pattern of results by arguing that the subjects did not have any direct access to the real causes of their attitudes and behavior; rather, they engaged in an activity of confabulation, that is, they exploited a priori causal theories to develop reasonable but imaginary explanations of the motivational factors of their attitudes and behavior see also Johansson et al. In developmental psychology Alison Gopnik has defended a symmetrical account of self-knowledge by arguing that there is good developmental evidence of developmental synchronies: For example, since TT assumes that first-person and third-person mentalistic attributions are both subserved by the same theory of mind, it predicts that if the theory is not yet equipped to

solve certain third-person false-belief problems, then the child should also be unable to perform the parallel first-person task. See also the above-cited Wellman et al. Data from autism have also been used to motivate the claim that first-person and third-person mentalistic attribution has a common basis. The study showed marked qualitative differences in introspection in the autistic subjects: Thus, evidence from social psychology, development psychology and cognitive neuropsychiatry makes a case for a symmetrical account of self-knowledge. However, insofar as Nisbett and Wilson do not propose any hypothesis about this alleged direct self-knowledge, their theory is incomplete. In order to offer an account of this supposedly direct self-knowledge, some philosophers made a more or less radical return to various forms of Cartesianism, construing first-person mindreading as a process that permits the access to at least some mental phenomena in a relatively direct and non-interpretative way. The inside access view comes in various forms. Mentalistic self-attribution may be realized by a mechanism that processes information about the functional profile of mental states, or their representational content, or both kinds of information see Robbins. Moreover, both the attribution of a mental state and the inferences that one can make about it can be referred to oneself or other people. Thus, we get four possible operations: Since the MM theory assumes that first-person mindreading does not involve mechanisms of the sort that figure in third-person mindreading, it implies that the first capacity should be dissociable, both diachronically and synchronically, from the second. For example, children are capable of attributing knowledge and ignorance to themselves before they are capable of attributing those states to others Wimmer et al. The MM theory provides a neo-Cartesian reply to TT and especially to its eliminativist implications inasmuch as the mentalistic self-attributions based on MMs are immune to the potentially distorting influence of our intuitive theory of psychology. However, the MM theory faces at least two difficulties. To start with, the theory must tell us how MM establishes which attitude type or percept type a given mental state belongs to Goldman. A possibility is that there is a separate MM for each propositional attitude type and for each perceptual modality. But then, as Engelbert and Carruthers. However, the hypothesis of such a massive dissociability has little empirical plausibility. Moreover, Carruthers has offered a book-length argument against the idea of a direct access to propositional attitudes. But the system receives no input from the systems that generate propositional attitude events like judging and deciding. Consequently, the mindreading system cannot directly self-attribute propositional attitude events; it must infer them by exploiting the perceptual input together with the outputs of various memory systems. Our only form of access to those events is via self-interpretation, turning our mindreading faculty upon ourselves and engaging in unconscious interpretation of our own behavior, physical circumstances, and sensory events like visual imagery and inner speech. Simulation-Theory Until the mids the debate on the nature of mindreading was a debate between the different variants of TT. In Alvin Goldman and Paul Harris began to contribute to this new approach to mindreading. In , Goldman provided the most thoroughly developed, empirically supported defense of a simulationist account of our mentalistic abilities. According to ST, our third-person mindreading ability does not consist in implicit theorizing but rather in representing the psychological states and processes of others by mentally simulating them, that is, attempting to generate similar states and processes in ourselves. Thus, the same resources that are used in our own psychological states and processes are recycled usually but not only in imagination to provide an understanding of psychological states and processes of the simulated target. In order for a mindreader to engage in this process of imaginative recycling, various information processing mechanisms are needed. The mindreader simulates the psychological etiology of the actions of the target in essentially two steps. First, the simulator generates pretend or imaginary mental states in her own mind which are intended to at least partly correspond to those of the target. Hence follows one of the main advantages ST is supposed to have over TT namely its computational parsimony. According to advocates of ST, the body of tacit folk-psychological knowledge which TT attributes to mindreaders imposes too heavy a burden on mental computation. In the early years of the debate over ST, a main focus was on its implications for the controversy between intentional realism and eliminative materialism. Gordon and Goldman suggested that by rejecting the assumption that folk psychology is a theory, ST undercuts eliminativism. For ST does not deny the evident fact that human beings have intuitions about the mental, and neither rules out that such intuitions might be systematized by building, as David Lewis suggests,

a theory that implies them. One of the main objections that theory-theorists raise against ST is the argument from systematic errors in prediction. Now, TT can easily explain such systematic errors in prediction: It is no surprise that a folk theory that is incomplete, partial, and in many cases seriously defective often causes predictive failures. But this option is obviously not available for ST: More recently, however, a consensus seems to be emerging to the effect that mindreading involves both TT and ST. Now, theory definitely plays a role in high-level mindreading. In a prediction task, for example, theory may be involved in the selection of the imaginary inputs that will be introduced into the executive system. In this case, Goldman And it is right to say that now the debate aims first of all to establish to what extent and in which processes theory or simulation prevails.

**Chapter 9 : The Mind/Brain Identity Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*In philosophy of mind, dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical. What is the difference between medieval and modern perspective?*

A discussion group about ideas, for everyone. Authenticity only makes sense against an interpersonal background of values and significances, so any discourse on self-fulfilment based on shutting out society is self-defeating. There is a sense in modern culture that impersonal social relationships as well as intimate relationships are valuable insofar as they aid self-fulfilment, but this notion is self-defeating. Three Malaises There is a general sense that contemporary civilizations is sick, that it has lost something since maybe the mid-Twentieth Century or maybe since the 17th Century. Among the many complaints made, Taylor finds three dominant malaises: In modernity, laws and morals have sprung up to protect individuals against large collective forces, such as oppressive cultural traditions, overreaching government powers, etc; in fact, many would argue the project of individualism is not yet finished. However, the downside of breaking out of old hierarchies is a loss of meaning. By assigning a place to each thing and person, hierarchical societies made the world meaningful: Aside from making us more narcissistic, sweeping away old social orders disenchant the world and leaves everything as a resource to be appropriated for our projects. The fear is that we will use cost-output calculations to measure things that deserve a better standard of evaluation: The importance of instrumental reason also explains the prestige of technology and its increased proliferation into areas of life where it is not optimal, such as the emotional care of patients. While social structures push us toward increased use of instrumental reason, Taylor is careful to assert that we are not fully determined—we have a reserve of rational power that can be used to change the world. A loss of freedom. In addition, we lose freedom by being too self-concerned. Taylor wants to share in their criticism to some extent, but he also faults such critics for failing to account for the appeal of this new culture. At any rate, he will spend the bulk of the book talking about the first malaise and then broach the other two near the end. While critical of a number of features of the individualism of self-fulfillment, he argues that critics tend to miss something fundamental about this individualism as a moral position. That is, critics like Alan Bloom, Daniel Bell, and Christopher Lasch [1] interpret this individualism as a retreat from moral positions, but Taylor wants to understand it as a moral ideal with its own compelling force: What we need to understand here is the moral force behind notions like self-fulfilment. Once we try to explain this simply as a kind of egoism, or a species of moral laxism, a self-indulgence with regard to a tougher, more exigent earlier age, we are already off the track [. Something like this has perhaps always existed. Other factors contribute to this inarticulacy: The expansion of this line of thought in and beyond the social sciences is another example of the prestige of instrumental reason contra communicative reason. This mode of thought entails translating moral positions into non-moral ones, and one of the characteristics of our time is the depreciation of morality as a means of evaluating choices. This history sketched out briefly here basically goes to show that authenticity is in fact a valid ideal with philosophical and literary precursors going back centuries. The Making of Modern Identity. Inescapable Horizons This chapter is an affirmation of claim 2 from the end of chapter II: How do we do that? But what about adherents to the culture of authenticity? How do we argue with someone who refuses to justify their preferences? For one, we see that they have not achieved their ideal so much as they strive toward it, and this opens the space to talk about how well they live up to. Instead, we are introduced to them by others: Moreover, this dialogic character continues past genesis throughout our lives: We are expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances to things, to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with important issues, such as the definition of our identity. We define this always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our significant others want to recognize in us. The narcissistic aspect of the ideal of authenticity denies this dialogism, but Taylor wants to argue that in so doing, it in fact contradicts the ideal of authenticity: He deals with b first and leaves a to the next chapter. The problem with denying demands emanating from something more or other than human desires or aspirations: Self-definition means figuring out

what significantly differentiates me from others. The soft relativism of authenticity would officially deny this social character of significance, but it tends to sneak in through the back door. People cannot just up and decide what is important without explanationâ€”choice does not in and of itself bestow value. All things have their importance against a horizon of significance, but it is just this horizon that the contemporary ethos veils. In trumpeting the supreme value of choice as a formal capacity, all content of what is actually chosen goes unexamined. This discourse denies the horizon of significance, and in so doing it makes homosexuality as frivolous as, say, a sexual orientation in which one only takes blonde sexual partners, or only tall partners. Once sexual orientation comes to be assimilated to these, which is what happens when one makes choice the crucial justifying reason, the original goal, which was to assert the equal value of this orientation, is subtly frustrated. Difference so asserted becomes insignificant. Asserting the value of a homosexual orientation has to be done differently, more empirically, one might say, taking into account the actual nature of homo- and heterosexual experience and life. Authenticity cannot be defended in a way that does away with the horizon of significance. This unequal distribution of significance is not of my choosing: The Need for Recognition The contemporary culture of authenticity frequently sees intimate relationships primarily as tools for self-development, and as a result such relationships are deemed worthy only insofar as they serve that end; once they stop, the relationship is void and can be terminated. One such notion is the idea of universal right: In strongly hierarchical societies, recognition takes the form of honourâ€”the bestowing of distinctions on people. Modern society is more interested in dignity, a universal, innate, and egalitarian form of recognition. In hierarchical societies, the relationship of honor to identity is relatively straightforwardâ€”I am defined largely by the social position I am in with little pressure or opportunity to modify that identity. In the case of a dignity-based society, I am compelled to grapple with my identity and to create it through my action. On the social plane, recognition shows up in politics of equal recognition [4] â€”so much so that being denied recognition is understood to inflict damage. To come full circle: If men and women are equal, it is not because they are different, but because overriding the difference are some properties, common or complementary, which are of value. They are beings capable of reason, or love, or memory, or dialogical recognition. To come together on a mutual recognition of differenceâ€”that is, of the equal value of different identitiesâ€”requires that we share more than a belief in this principle; we have to share also some standards of value on which the identities concerned check out as equal. There must be some substantive agreement on value, or else the formal principle of equality will be empty and a sham. It is just these relationships that in fact form identity, so it is not possible for them to be merely instrumental to a pre-given identity. However denying the self-forming role of relationships flies in the face of actual authenticity: