

Chapter 1 : Kent Bach - Wikipedia

Can we preserve our pre-Fregean innocence while relying on an ostensibly Fregean notion? Does Davidson successfully invoke the concept of samesaying without committing himself to notion of "sense"? I'd be curious to hear some others' thoughts on this resemblance, and how it bears, if at all, on the force of Davidson's conclusion.

Frege presents his puzzle as one about the relationship between the cognitive value of expressions and their ordinary reference, arguing that the two must be distinct. Similar puzzles arise with other propositional attitude verbs. See the supplementary document: So, we would ordinarily accept the following sentences as true. Without propositional attitude attributions, one might hope for a simpler semantics, in which only the referent of a name is relevant to the evaluation of sentences that contain it. For consider the following pair of sentences. Indeed, it is plausible to insist further that the two sentences have the same modal profile. Even if Lois and others do not realize it, these sentences, given their meanings, must have the same truth-value. So their objective semantics can be the same: However, if we expect semantics to account for the difference in cognitive value of 5 and 6 Lois accepts 5 but not 6, we must recognize a semantic difference in the contribution of the two names. We can get to the same conclusion by a different route. The trip, although somewhat lengthy, is worth taking. Lois is disposed to sincerely, reflectively, and competently accept 5 while denying 6. Lois is, presumably, also disposed to accept the following sentence. The Disquotation principle, so-called by Saul Kripke in his , does just that. If an agent A sincerely, reflectively, and competently accepts a sentence *s* under circumstances properly related to a context *c*, then A believes, at the time of *c*, what *s* expresses in *c*. Why relativize to context and time? But if both 2 and 4 are true, then, it would appear, Lois believes a proposition and its negation and would thus be guilty of irrationality. Intuitively, however, she is not irrational. If an agent A sincerely, reflectively, and competently denies or withholds acceptance from a sentence *s* in a context *c*, then A does not believe, at the time of *c*, what *s* expresses in *c*. Converse Disquotation and the fact that Lois denies 6 entail that 3 is true. But if both 1 and 3 are true, then, it would seem, we should not allow substitution of co-designating singular terms within the scope of propositional attitude verb, or the threat of contradiction we saw above will be brought home to us, the ascriber. If both 1 and 3 are true, then, one would think, 1 and 4 must say different things. In distinguishing these two arguments we follow Kripke. In summary, Frege calls our attention to two problems, i the problem of the apparent difference in truth-value of corresponding belief attributions such as 1 and 4, and ii the problem of the difference in the cognitive significance of sentences composed in the same way of elements with the same reference such as 5 and 6. If distinct belief attributions indicate differences in cognitive value of the sentences in their that-clauses, then these two problems are really a single problem, presumably with a single solution. Those same expressions as they occur in 1 and 4, however, refer to different ways that Lois has of representing the man Superman. According to Frege, this difference in reference explains the difference in truth-value of 1 and 4. The ordinary sense of an expression "the way that the expression indicates its referent" becomes a part of the truth-conditions for a sentence in which the expression occurs, if that expression is used within a belief context. Frege unifies these theses by maintaining that the ordinary sense is a way of representing an object. Thus he can explain the difference in truth-value between 1 and 4. Propositional attitude verbs induce a shift in reference; occurrences of expressions within their scope refer to what Frege called their customary sense. Within the scope of an attitude verb expressions refer to what they express when outside the scope of an attitude verb. Although the truth-value of a sentence depends on the referents of terms, the cognitive value depends on the senses attached to the terms. The view is attractive "some would say wonderful. If only it were true. Some accuse it for violating semantic innocence. Davidson is the locus classicus of this complaint; Barwise and Perry develop the charge. Proponents of semantic innocence see an expression as having the same reference in a wide body of linguistic environments. Sometimes semantic innocence is just taken as a raw datum, directly intuited perhaps. But one might also substantiate the claim by considering anaphora across attitude verbs. For more, see the entry on anaphora. Sentence 8 tells us nothing about how Jack represents Jill. Soames presents a similar argument against the Fregean solution,

although he does not use it to argue for semantic innocence directly. The point is related to the more general worry whether or not Fregean accounts can make sense of *de re* belief. The Fregean should not be terribly perturbed by these considerations. Frege pulled off the last insight by claiming that propositional attitude verbs induce a reference-shift. But there are other ways to get the same result. The example is from Quine. So, substitution fails but not because the substitution affects the reference of the terms. Similarly, a neo-Fregean might claim that expressions have their customary references and senses whether inside or outside the scope of a propositional attitude verb, thus ensuring semantic innocence, but insist that the propositional attitude verbs themselves are in some way sensitive to the senses of the expressions within their scope and not merely their references. Then substitution of co-referring singular terms within the scope of an attitude verb is blocked, as such substitution affects the semantic value of the attitude verb itself, but innocence is preserved. See Forbes , for development of a similar idea. Furthermore, it is far from clear that semantic innocence must be accepted. We cannot directly intuit that an occurrence of a proper name in the scope of an attitude verb has the same reference as an occurrence of that name outside the scope of that attitude verb. That is too theoretical to simply intuit. If it is to be accepted, it must be supported by argument. We can ask whether the problem of cross-attitudinal anaphora supports semantic innocence. There is reason to think that it does not. In his Kaplan taught us how we can be Fregeans and allow quantifying into attitude verbs. A sentence like 8 would then be read as something like: But its mere presence shows two things. First, one needs an argument for the claim that a proper treatment of cross-attitudinal anaphoric relations is possible only if semantic innocence is accepted. And that argument will have to show what is wrong with a view like the one suggested by Kaplan, as that view promises to show how a reference-shifting view can accommodate the phenomena. Second, and relatedly, one cannot refute the Fregean claim that proper names have both a sense and a reference and that propositional attitude ascriptions are sensitive to sense and not just reference simply by producing sentences like 8. The simple Fregean solution, however, faces other, more serious, problems. The account seems to fail when we try to extend it to other types of propositional clauses that can occur in belief contexts. It is difficult to accommodate the use of such terms with a Fregean theory that requires that the mode of presentation is the semantic value of a singular term in a propositional attitude clause. See Perry , and Kaplan , pp. For more recent attempts, see Heck. These two claims seem to get the wrong results for propositional attitude reporting sentences with indexicals in their complement clauses. Consider, for example, the following sentence. Suppose that McKay utters *If there is such a first-person mode of presentation, then this is what it is for Alice to believe that she herself will solve an important problem in physics, which is not what McKay was saying in uttering* Only the referent, not its mode of presentation, seems relevant with ordinary uses of indexical expressions. The problem is that the perspective connected to a use of an indexical in an attitude report is not typically intended to match the perspective of the target of the report. A related problem involves attributions of a common belief to many people. Like the problem of indexicals, this problem highlights the problematic nature of the Fregean claim that a belief attribution indicates the way in which the believer represents an individual in belief. It seems plausible that different people associate different modes of presentation with the same name. If so, the following sort of sentence seems to prove difficult for the Fregean. See Richard for a development of the variability problem. See Forbes , for an attempt to solve it. Let us pause to briefly and inadequately present a line of response to the problems of indexicals and of variability. But, as Fregeans, we want these reports to require more than merely having beliefs with the relevant referential content. To pull this off we might attempt to construct a similarity class of senses. Presumably a Fregean would want the similarity class to be defined more narrowly than just in terms of co-reference. Finding such a middle ground between identity of sense and mere co-reference may well prove to be difficult indeed. However, much of what Mark Richard says in his discussed below in Contextualist theories about restrictions on correlation functions can be employed by the Fregean to try to find this middle ground. Related to the above problems facing a Fregean view is the problem of intuitive entailment-successes. Then, intuitively, there is something such that Bill said it and Lois believes it. But it is hard to see how the Fregean can account for such apparent entailment-successes, precisely because of the way in which the account explains intuitive entailment-failures like 1 and 4. While the case is not incontrovertible, many have taken the problems presented above to show

that the only semantically relevant value of a singular term in the scope of a propositional attitude verb is its reference. So, if we suppose that the sole semantically relevant value of a singular term is always its reference, what is there to say about the intuitive difference between 1 and 4 and the arguments that they differ in truth-value? Russell proposed what we might call an acquaintance-based theory of thought, according to which some of our thoughts are directly about the individuals they concern. We shall follow Kaplan in calling such propositions singular propositions. A proposition is singular with respect to an object o just in case it is about o in virtue of having o as a direct constituent. It is general with respect to o , on the other hand, just in case it concerns o but only in virtue of having a proxy of o that determines, either by satisfaction conditions or otherwise, o . Russell maintained that there are logically proper names, which contribute only their referents to the propositions expressed by sentences that contain them in subject position. He thus maintained that sentences containing logically proper names express singular propositions.

Chapter 2 : Modal Concerns - Oxford Scholarship

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Please help by adding reliable sources. Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced must be removed immediately, especially if potentially libelous or harmful. Such attributions or reports take the form A believes that p where A is the subject to whom a belief is attributed and p represents the sentence, proposition or, more vaguely still, content that is supposed to be believed by A . This is basically the idea that the "that"-clauses of belief reports "that William will take the train tomorrow", "that the sun will rise tomorrow morning" specify i . Bach suggests that "that"-clauses do not specify but merely "describe" or "characterize" what a person believes. He argues his thesis by first invoking several classic puzzles which have confounded philosophers of language since the time of Frege. The first type of puzzle is a variation on the classic problem of the substitution of co-referential terms in the context of attitude attributions. A simple illustration is the following pair of sentences: Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is a wimp. Lois Lane believes that Superman is a wimp. The simple substitution of one co-referring term for another would seem to transform the truth-value and hence the content of the sentence from true to false. But this should be impossible if we are faithful to a few simple and reasonable assumptions that are commonly accepted among philosophers: Direct reference is the principle that singular terms contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences which contain them. Compositionality is the idea that the meaning of a composite expression is derived from the parts which make it up. Semantic innocence is the principle that "embedding" a term or name in a "that" clause should not change its semantic value. Given these basic assumptions how is it possible that the truth value of a sentence in the context of an attribution can change - that is, how is semantic opacity possible? Bach sketches four historical approaches to the resolving the problem and demonstrates each of their inadequacies. The first approach is that of Frege himself. Frege claimed that the reference of a term in the context of a belief report or any other attitude attribution was no longer its "customary" reference but rather its sense see sense and reference. While this proposal maintains compositionality, however, it obviously violates the aforementioned principle of semantic innocence. Terms do not have the same reference in attitude attribution contexts that they do in ordinary sentence contexts. Bach illustrates why this is a problem by providing an example sentence that involves anaphora and that leads to serious problems for the Fregean view: Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is a wimp, but he is not. Here, the pronoun he is being used, as linguists say, anaphorically: It seems clear, then, that the "he" used in this sentence refers and quite directly to Clark Kent. Bach next considers what he calls, the metalinguistic or sententialist view. On this view, a sentence embedded in a "that"-clause refers to some sort of sentence, whether the sentence itself or a sentence in some language of thought depends on the specifics of the theory. However that may be, this view also violates the principle of semantic innocence: The so-called hidden indexical theory maintains that the difference in truth value and content between sentences 1 and 2 above has nothing to do with what they say about what Lois Lane believes, but with what they implicitly say about how she believes it. There is no syntactical place in the sentence A believes that G is F for some "unarticulated constituent" or "hidden indexical". He also points out that sentences such as "Joe is ready" and "Fred has finished", which are missing an argument, are not necessarily sentences that express propositions with unarticulated constituents. They may simply be semantically incomplete and hence not express propositions at all. The last position that Bach considers is the so-called neo-Russelian theory. Neo-Russelians attempt to solve the problem by rejecting the "anti-substitution intuition". They insist that sentences such as 1 and 2 actually have the same contents and that there is no transformation in truth values at all. Similarly, if the Joker realizes that Bruce Wayne is rich is true, then it is also true that the Joker realizes that Batman is rich; if the Joker doubts that Bruce Wayne is a threat is true, then so is the statement that the Joker doubts that Batman is a threat and so forth. These consequences make the neo-Russelian theory seem extremely awkward and counterintuitive. He further

illustrates the problems associated with this assumption by way of another famous philosophical puzzle: In fact, they are one and the same person. Since the "that"-clauses do not specify what the two things are that Peter believes they do not refer to one specific object, then they are not necessarily the same thing. The condition for the truth of a belief report is that the believer must believe something such that the proposition expressed by the "that" clause turns out to be true. Attempts have been made to resolve the Paderewski puzzle by suggesting that the "that"-clauses involved are not sufficiently specific and that if all contextually relevant information were provided in detail, then we could eventually determine exactly what it is that Peter believes and disbelieves. However, as Bach shows, this leads to an infinite regress. We could add information to the sentences a and b which further specifies that Peter believes that Paderewski "the pianist" has musical talent and Peter disbelieves that Paderewski "the statesman" has musical talent. But let us suppose that Peter hears a recording of Paderewski playing Mozart and is impressed with the performance. Later, he hears a recording of Paderewski playing Keith Jarrett and is disgusted by the performance. Given that we have the same individual Paderewski and that Peter still does not know that it is the same individual in the two cases, we would have to say that Peter believes that Paderewski the "classical pianist" has musical talent and that Peter disbelieves that Paderewski the "jazz pianist" has musical talent. This specification might not suffice either. Suppose that Peter now hears Paderewski play Beethoven and is not impressed. We would have to say Peter believes that Paderewski "the classical pianist playing Mozart" As Bach puts it, "[that clauses] are not inherently capable of specifying their contents fully". Bach admits that there is meaning in utterances beyond the semantic content of a sentence, but he maintains that context does not determine speaker meaning but rather constrains how a speaker can expect to be understood and helps the hearer understand what is said. Bach argues that the reasoning method employed by humans is default reasoning, which is to say that when humans reason, many steps in their reasoning are taken by default- i. Given this, Bach holds that the internalist is expecting too much for a belief to be justified, since expecting reasoning to be evaluated in every step would mean denying justification to the large majority of beliefs since they are formed via default reasoning. Bach therefore holds that if internalism cannot provide a solid argument against the default reasoning model of human cognition, then they must be satisfied in defining what a justified believer is, leaving the question of justified belief to the externalist. Fodor claims that there is no lexical structure to such verbs as "keep", "get", "make" and "put". He suggests that, alternatively, "keep" simply expresses the concept KEEP Fodor capitalizes concepts to distinguish them from properties, names or other such entities. This concept presumably locks on to the unique external property of keeping. Whether or not the differing interpretations of "fast" in these sentences are specified in the semantics of English, or are the result of pragmatic inference, is a matter of debate. A philosophy of self-awareness, Wadsworth Pub.

Chapter 3 : Causing Actions - Paul M. Pietroski - Oxford University Press

Chapter 2 ('Fregean Innocence') develops a neo-Fregean semantics of opaque contexts which treats complementizers as referring to Fregean thoughts but aims to preserve semantic innocence.

Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - Causing Actions (review)

In Ch. 2, 'Fregean innocence' (), P discusses German philosopher Gottlob Frege's principle that 'every meaningful linguistic expression has a semantic value (Bedeutung) and a sense (Sinn)' (55; 'Sense and reference', Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege, trans. by P. Geach and M. Black, Oxford.

Chapter 5 : Personal Dualism - Oxford Scholarship

Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons: we deliberate and choose among options, based on our beliefs and desires. However, bodily motions always have biochemical causes, so it can seem that thinking and acting are.

Chapter 6 : Anaphora and Semantic Innocence | Journal of Semantics | Oxford Academic

Hence, the Fregean could challenge (1) in the exact same way that the objector challenges (2), and the Argument from Anaphora loses its force. We have no principled basis to adjudicate this debate and reach stalemate.

Chapter 7 : Propositional Attitude Reports (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Given the view urged in Chs. 3 to 5, a bodily motion (say, the rising of someone's arm) can have mental causes distinct from any of its biochemical causes. But effects of mental causes are not overdetermined, in any objectionable way, given a proper understanding of the relevant counterfactuals.