

DOWNLOAD PDF A DEMONSTRATION OF THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

Chapter 1 : Samuel Clarke - Wikipedia

A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God was published in and is one of the most famous attempts at proving the existence of God. It is a very clear exposition of the Cosmological Argument, which seeks to show that the existence of the world necessarily entails that of its maker.

A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God Section X It is impossible to prove that if one thing can be self-existent, others cannot The self-existent being, the supreme cause of all things, must of necessity have infinite power. This proposition is evident and undeniable. For since nothing as has been already proved can possibly be self-existent besides himself, and consequently all things in the universe were made by him and are entirely dependent upon him, and all the powers of all things are derived from him and must therefore be perfectly subject and subordinate to him, it is manifest that nothing can make any difficulty and resistance to the execution of his will, but he must of necessity have absolute power to do everything he pleases with the most perfect ease and in the most perfect manner at once and in a moment, whenever he wills it. The descriptions the Scripture gives of this power are so lively and emphatic that I cannot forbear mentioning one or two passages. Thus Job, ix, 4 [ff. Which shaketh the Earth out of her place and the pillars thereof tremble. Which commandeth the Sun, and it raiseth not; and seaeth up the stars. Which alone spreadeth out the heavens and treadeth upon the waters of the sea. Which doth great things past finding out, yea and wonders without number. He stretcheth out the North over the empty place, and hangeth the Earth upon nothing He bindeth up the waters in his thick clouds, and the cloud is not rent under them. The Pillars of heaven tremble and are astonished at his reproof. He divideth the sea with his power and by his understanding he smiteth through the proud. Lo, these are part of his ways, but how little a portion is heard of him? But the thunder of his power, who can understand? So likewise, Isaiah, xl, 12 [ff. Behold, the nations are as a drop of the bucket and are counted as the small dust of the balance; behold, he taketh up the isles as a very little thing. All nations before him are nothing, and they are counted to him less than nothing, and vanity. To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness will ye compare unto him? It is sufficiently evident from reason that the supreme cause must of necessity be infinitely powerful. The only question is what the true meaning of what we call infinite power is, and to what things it must be understood to extend, or not to extend. Now in determining this question, there are some propositions about which there is no dispute, which therefore I shall but just mention, as: Firstly, that infinite power reaches to all possible things, but cannot be said to extend to the working [of] anything which implies a contradiction, as that a thing should be and not be at the same time; that the same things should be made and not be made, or have been and not have been; that twice two -should not make four, or that that which is necessarily false should be true. The reason whereof is plain, because the power of making a thing to be at the same time that it is not, is only a power of doing that which is nothing, that is no power at all. Secondly, infinite power cannot be said to extend to those things which imply natural imperfection in the thing to whom such power is ascribed, as that it should destroy its own being, weaken itself or the like. These things imply natural imperfection, and are by all men confessed to be such as cannot possibly belong to the necessary self-existent being. There are also other things which imply imperfection of another kind, viz. But some other instances there are in the question about the extent of infinite power wherein the principal difference between us and the atheists next to the question whether the supreme cause be an intelligent being or not does in great measure consist. Firstly, that infinite power includes a power of creating matter. This has been constantly denied by all atheists both ancient and modern, and as constantly affirmed by all who believe the being, and have just notions of the attributes, of God. The only reason why the atheists have or can pretend to allege for their opinion is that the thing is in its own nature absolutely impossible. But how does it appear to be impossible? Why, only because they are not able to comprehend how it can be. For to reduce it to a contradiction, which is the alone real impossibility, this they are by no means able to do. For to say that something which once was not may since have begun to exist is neither directly, nor by any

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consequence whatsoever, to assert that that which is not can be while it is not; or that that which is can not-be while it is. It is true; we, who have been used to converse only with generations and corruptions and never saw anything made or created but only formed or framed, are apt to endeavor to conform our idea of creation to that of formation, and to imagine that, as in all formations there is some pre-existing matter out of which a thing is formed, so in creation there must be considered a pre-existing nothing out of which, as out of a real material cause, a thing is created; which looks indeed very like a contradiction. Whereas the true notion of creation is not a forming something out of nothing as out of a material cause, but only a bringing something into being that before had no being at all, or a causing something to exist now that did not exist before, or which, without this cause, would not have existed. Which no man can ever reduce to a contradiction any more than the formation of anything into a shape which it had not before can be reduced to a contradiction. But further, the creation of matter is a thing not only not impossible in itself but what moreover, even by bare reason, is demonstrated to be true. For it is a contradiction, as I have shown above, to suppose matter necessarily existing. Do all atheists deny free will? Secondly, it is possible to infinite power to create an immaterial cogitative substance endowed with a power of beginning motion, and with a liberty of will or choice. This also has been always denied by all atheists. And because it is a proposition of the greatest consequence to religion and morality, therefore I shall be particular in endeavoring the proof of the several parts of it. Men are cogitative conscious substances Firstly, it is possible to infinite power to create an immaterial cogitative substance. Further, that if there be or can be any such thing as immaterial substances, then it is most reasonable to believe that substances as are endowed with consciousness and thought properties the farthest distant from the known properties of matter, and the most unlike them that can possibly be imagined are those immaterial substances, this also will, I think, be granted by all men. The only point, therefore, that remains to be proved is that immaterial substances are not impossible, or that a substance immaterial is not a contradictory notion. Two things are not exactly matter - energy, and Now whoever asserts that it is contradictory must affirm that whatever is not matter is nothing, and that to say anything exists which is not matter is saying that there exists something which is nothing. Which in other words is plainly this, that whatever we have not an idea of, is nothing and impossible to be. For there is no other way to reduce "immaterial substance" to a contradiction but by supposing "immaterial" to signify the same as having no existence. And there is no possible way to prove that but by saying we have no idea of it, and therefore it neither has nor can have any existence. By which same argument "material substance" will in like manner be a contradiction, for of that also viz. But supposing it were true as it is indeed most false that we had a clearer idea of the substance of matter than we have of immaterial substance, still, by the same argument wherewith an atheist will prove immaterial substance to be impossible, a man born blind may demonstrate irrefragably that light or color is an impossible and contradictory notion because it is not a sound or a smell. For the power of seeing light or color is to a man born blind altogether as incomprehensible and absolutely beyond the reach of all his ideas as either the operations and perceptions, or even the simple essence, of a pure immaterial substance or spirit can be to any of us. A blind man, they will say, has testimony of the existence of light. So also have we of the existence of immaterial substances. But there is this further advantage on our side in the comparison, that a blind man accepting the testimony of others finds not by any reasoning within himself the least likelihood or probability, no not in the lowest possible degree, that there can be any such thing as light or color. But we, besides testimony, have great and strong arguments both from experience and reason that there are such things as immaterial substances, though we have no knowledge of their simple essence, as indeed of the substance even of matter itself its simple substance, considered as abstract from and as the foundation of that essential property of solidity we have no idea. For to say that extension is the substance of matter is the same way of thinking as to say that existence, or that duration, is the substance of matter. We have, I say, great and strong arguments both from experience and reason that there are such things as immaterial substances, though we have no idea of their simple essence. Even the very first and most universal principle of gravitation itself in all matter, since it is ever proportional not at all to the surfaces of bodies or of their particles, in any

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possible supposition, but exactly to the solid content of bodies, it is evident it cannot be caused by matter acting upon the surfaces of matter, which is all it [i. Animals are self-moving automata , beyond mere physical deterministic forces But in animals, which have a power of self-motion, and in the more perfect sorts of them, which have still higher faculties, the thing is yet more evident. For we see and feel, and observe daily in ourselves and others, such powers and operations and perceptions as undeniably evince themselves either to be the properties of immaterial substances; or else it will follow that matter is something of whose essential powers as well as of its substance itself we have altogether as little idea as we have of immaterial beings. And then, how are immaterial substances more impossible than material? But of this more hereafter. From what has been said on this head, it will be easy to answer all the objections that have been brought by any atheists against the notion of human souls being immaterial substances and distinct from body. For, since it is possible there may be such things as immaterial substances, and since if any such substances can be, there is all the reason in the world to believe that conscious and thinking substance is such these properties being the most remote from the known properties of matter that are possible to be conceived , the foundation of all the objections against the immateriality of the soul is entirely taken away. I shall not here tarry to consider the objections in particular which have been often and wholly answered by learned pens, but shall only mention one on which all the rest depend and to which they may all be reduced. And it is this: Now, besides that these very senses or perceptions, however they may be obstructed by bodily indisposition and so do indeed depend upon the organs of the body as to their present exercise , yet in their nature are really entirely distinct powers and cannot possibly, as has been before shown, be absolutely founded in, or arise from, any of the known properties or qualities of matter “ besides this, I say, of him that thus argues I would only ask this one question. Nothing physical is by - logical - necessity Are our five senses, by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing, all and the only possible ways of perception? And is it impossible and contradictory that there should be any being in the universe endowed with ways of perception different from these that are the result of our present composition? Or are these things, on the contrary, purely arbitrary, and the same power that gave us these may have given others to other beings, and might, if he had pleased, have given to us others in this present state, and may yet have made us capable of different ones in another state? If they be purely arbitrary, then the want of these does by no means infer a total want of perception. But the same soul which in the present state has the powers of reflection, reason, and judgment, which are faculties entirely different from sense, may as easily in another state have different ways even of perception also. But if anyone will contend that these senses of ours are necessarily the only ways of perception, still the soul may be capable of having these very same ways of perception at any time restored to it. For as that which sees does not cease to exist when in the dark all objects are removed, so that which perceives does not necessarily cease to exist when by death all organs of perception are removed. But what reason can any man allege why he should imagine these present senses of ours to be necessarily the only ways of perception? Is it not infinitely more reasonable to suppose that this is a mere prejudice arising from custom, and an attending to bare sense in opposition to reason? And would they not then have thought sight to have been an impossible, chimerical, and merely imaginary power, which is absolutely the same reason as they now presume the faculties of immaterial beings to be so, that is, with no reason at all? One would think men should be ashamed, therefore, to be so vain as, from their own mere negative ignorance, without any appearance or pretence of any positive argument, to dispute against the possibility of the being of things which excepting only that they cannot frame to themselves an image or notion of them there is a concurrence of all the reasons in the world to persuade them that such things really are. And then, as to the difficulty of conceiving the nature and manner of the union between soul and body, we know altogether as much of that as we do of the nature of the union or cohesion of the infinitely divisible parts of body, which yet no man doubts of. And therefore, our ignorance can be no more an argument against the truth of the one than it is a bar to our belief of the other. This is constantly denied by all atheists because the consequence of it is a liberty of will, of which I shall have occasion to speak presently. But that the proposition is true, I thus prove. If the power of beginning motion be in itself a possible

thing, and also possible to be communicated, then a creature may be endowed with that power. Now that the power of beginning motion is in itself a possible thing, I have already proved by showing that there must necessarily be somewhere a power of beginning motion because otherwise motion must have been from eternity, without any external cause of its being, and yet it is a thing that has no necessity of existence in its own nature. So that if there be not somewhere a principle or power of beginning motion, motion must exist without any cause or reason at all of its existence either within itself or from without which, as I have before shown, is an express contradiction. Wherefore a principle or power of beginning motion, there must of necessity be somewhere or other, and consequently it is not in itself an impossible thing. The reason is plain, because no powers are impossible to be communicated but only those which imply self-existence and absolute independence. That a subordinate being should be self-existent or absolutely independent is indeed a contradiction. But it is no contradiction to suppose it endowed with any other power whatsoever separate from these. I know the maintainers of fate are very confident that a power of beginning motion is nothing less than being really independent, or being able to act independently from any superior cause. But this is only a childish trifling with words. For a power of acting independently in this sense, communicated at the pleasure of the supreme cause and continued only during the same good pleasure, is no more a real and absolute independency than the power of existing which I suppose the defenders of fate are not so fond to make a continual creation, as they are to make the power of self-motion a continual external impulse, or than the power of being conscious, or any other power whatsoever can be said to imply independence. In reality, it is altogether as hard to conceive how consciousness or the power of perception should be communicated to a created being, as how the power of self-motion should be so, unless perception be nothing else but a mere passive reception of impulse, which I suppose is as clear that it is not, as that a triangle is not a sound or that a globe is not a color. Yet no man doubts but that he himself and all others have truly a power of perception. And therefore in like manner, however hard it may be to conceive as to the manner of it, yet, since as has been now proved it can never be shown to be impossible and expressly contradictory that a power of self-motion should be communicated, I suppose no considering man can doubt but that he actually has also a power of self-motion. For the arguments drawn from continual experience and observation to prove that we have such a power are so strong, that nothing less than a strict demonstration that the thing is absolutely impossible and that it implies an express contradiction can make us in the least doubt that we have it not.

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Chapter 2 : Samuel Clarke - A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God

Other articles where A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God is discussed: Samuel Clarke: sets of lectures, published as A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God () and A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion ().

Classification[edit] Many Reformed theologians distinguish between the communicable attributes those that human beings can also have and the incommunicable attributes those that belong to God alone. The attributes of God may be classified under two main categories: His personality attributes, like holiness and love. Eternity[edit] The eternity of God concerns his existence beyond time. Drawing on verses such as Psalm Goodness[edit] The goodness of God means that "God is the final standard of good, and all that God is and does is worthy of approval. Many theologians consider the goodness of God as an overarching attribute - Louis Berkhof , for example, sees it as including kindness, love, grace, mercy and longsuffering. Graciousness[edit] The graciousness of God is a key tenet of Christianity. The descriptive of God in this text is, in Jewish tradition, called the " Thirteen Attributes of Mercy ". Holiness[edit] The holiness of God is that he is separate from sin and incorruptible. Noting the refrain of " Holy, holy, holy " in Isaiah 6: Sproul points out that "only once in sacred Scripture is an attribute of God elevated to the third degree The Bible never says that God is love, love, love. It is thus contrasted with his transcendence , but Christian theologians usually emphasise that the two attributes are not contradictory. To hold to transcendence but not immanence is deism , while to hold to immanence but not transcendence is pantheism. According to Wayne Grudem , "the God of the Bible is no abstract deity removed from, and uninterested in his creation". Herman Bavinck notes that although the Bible talks about God repenting, changing his purpose, and becoming angry, "Scripture testifies that in all these various relations and experiences God remains ever the same. Prominent adherents of open theism include Clark Pinnock , John E. Sanders and Gregory Boyd. Impassibility[edit] The doctrine of the impassibility of God is a controversial one. The Westminster Confession of Faith says that God is "without body, parts, or passions". Although some take this to mean that God is "without emotions whether of joy, sorrow, pain or grief", most interpret this as meaning that God is free from all attitudes "which reflect instability or lack of control. Carson argues that "although Aristotle may exercise more than a little scarcely recognized influence upon those who uphold impassibility, at its best impassibility is trying to avoid a picture of God who is changeable, given over to mood swings, dependent on his creatures. Carson affirms that God is able to suffer, but argues that if he does so "it is because he chooses to suffer". It means that God is unable to sin, which is a stronger statement than merely saying that God does not sin. Robert Morey argues that God does not have the "absolute freedom" found in Greek philosophy. Acatalepsy The incomprehensibility of God means that he is not able to be fully known. Louis Berkhof states that "the consensus of opinion" through most of church history has been that God is the "Incomprehensible One". Berkhof, however, argues that, "in so far as God reveals Himself in His attributes, we also have some knowledge of His Divine Being, though even so our knowledge is subject to human limitations. Infinity permeates all other attributes of God: The relationship between the infinity of God and mathematical infinity has often been discussed. Trinity and love and omnibenevolence 1 John 4: Carson speaks of the "difficult doctrine of the love of God ," since "when informed Christians talk about the love of God they mean something very different from what is meant in the surrounding culture. The love of God is particularly emphasised by adherents of the social Trinitarian school of theology. Wright argues for a biblical basis for Mission that goes beyond the Great Commission , and suggests that "missionary texts" may sparkle like gems, but that "simply laying out such gems on a string is not yet what one could call a missiological hermeneutic of the whole Bible itself. Jesus says in Matthew Lewis clarifies this concept: You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to his power. Omniscience[edit] The omniscience of God refers to him being "all knowing". Berkhof regards the wisdom of God as a "particular aspect of his knowledge. Oneness[edit] The oneness, or unity of God refers to

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his being one and only. This means that Christianity is monotheistic , although the doctrine of the Trinity says that God is three persons: Father , Son , and Holy Spirit. Yahweh our God, Yahweh is one. The Apostle Paul also affirms the oneness of God in verses like Ephesians 4: Providence[edit] While the providence of God usually refers to his activity in the world, it also implies his care for the universe, and is thus an attribute. A notable occurrence of the word is in Romans 1: Martin Luther grew up believing that this referred to an attribute of God - namely, his distributive justice. More recently , however, scholars such as N. Wright have argued that the verse refers to an attribute of God after all - this time, his covenant faithfulness. It is thus related to the unity of God. Grudem notes that this is a less common use of the word "simple" - that is, "not composed of parts". It refers to God being in complete control as he directs all things - no person, organization, government or any other force can stop God from executing his purpose. This attribute has been particularly emphasized in Calvinism. The Calvinist writer A. Pink appeals to Isaiah For this is what the high and exalted One says - he who lives forever, whose name is holy: God is understood to be a unity of Father , Son , and the Holy Spirit. Greg Bahnsen says, Only with an inerrant autograph can we avoid attributing error to the God of truth. An error in the original would be attributable to God Himself, because He, in the pages of Scripture, takes responsibility for the very words of the biblical authors. But again he listened to me. In the New Testament , Jesus says in John 3:

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Chapter 3 : A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God

The Being and Attributes of God Samuel Clarke 4. The essence of the self-existent Being is incomprehensible 17 5. The self-existent Being must be eternal

He took his B. In that same year, Clarke befriended William Whiston, who probably introduced Clarke into the Newtonian circle. The middle years of his career mark his greatest philosophical contributions, beginning with the Boyle lectures delivered and The first, an attempt to prove the existence of God, along with all divine attributes, was published as A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and the second, a continuation intended to establish all fundamental moral truths and most religious doctrine, as A discourse concerning the unchangeable obligations of natural religion, and the truth and certainty of the Christian revelation They both went through many editions and were often published together. These lectures, established by Robert Boyle to promote natural religion based on the latest scientific developments, were closely watched, and Clarke instantly became one of the most well known philosophers in England. Also in , his association with Newton became official when he translated the Opticks into Latin. In the meantime, he had been introduced to Queen Anne, who made him one of her chaplains in , and three years later he was elevated to the rectory of St. After the Hanoverian accession, Clarke developed a close relationship with Caroline of Anspach, the Princess of Wales and future queen. His prominence as a philosopher drew him into a series of very public exchanges of letters. The most notable of these were the letters to Anthony Collins " and the letters to Leibniz " see below. In the later years of his life, Clarke published popular works of theology, notable translations of Caesar, and a royally appointed translation of the Iliad. Each of his major publications went through multiple editions, often with substantial revision. He died in after a very short illness, consistent with a stroke Sykes , He was survived by his wife Katherine and five of his seven children. Clarke was a polite and courtly man, vivacious with his friends, and reportedly fond of playing cards. Leibniz did not join her in England, and they corresponded across the channel. In one of these letters he attacked prominent views in England that Leibniz considered dangerous to natural religion. After mentioning materialism and Lockean doubts about the soul, Leibniz chastises Newton twice. Newton and Leibniz had sparred earlier over the priority of discovery of the calculus. A series of five letters passed through Caroline between Leibniz and Clarke over a wide range of issues. Caroline is significant not only for her contributions to framing the debate for each correspondent but also as an important context for understanding the letters Meli She continued to challenge Clarke and pledge loyalty to Leibniz until his death, but starting around the time of the third letter, it seems that Clarke had won her over at least to the existence of the vacuum, which would be difficult to maintain without going for the rest of the Clarkean-Newtonian picture Brown , 93" This point is not easily decidable, in part because Newton and Clarke were neighbors and thus almost no correspondence survives between them, presumably since they would meet in person. In reading the letters to Leibniz, it is helpful to remember that the views being defended might not belong only to Clarke or only to Newton, so attribution to a single figure might be misguided. In some cases, we can see links to other publications by Newton and Clarke. Newtonianism, anti-naturalism, and rationalism. In private correspondence, such as the letters to Bentley of December 10, , and January 17, , he entertains views similar to those that Clarke would later proclaim. However, it is also possible that Clarke influenced Newton. On scientific, philosophical, and especially theological grounds, Clarke believed Newtonian natural philosophy to be superior to all alternatives. Clarke saw in Newtonianism a world that could only exist by a free act of God. Matter is dispersed sparingly throughout empty space, gravity is universal to matter but not inherent in it, and the universe is ordered according to rules that are neither absolutely necessary nor chaotic. Clarke concluded that the laws of nature do not describe the powers of matter, which is just dead mass constantly pushed around, but modalities of operation of the divine power. Matter has no power of self-motion, so to explain motion, one must appeal to immaterial souls divine and human. Thus, nature is not a self-sufficient system;

without direct and constant divine physical intervention planets would fly away from their orbits and atoms would break into their components. Thus, the naturalist attempt to describe the world solely by the arrangement and matter in motion is doomed to failure on scientific and metaphysical grounds and must give way to a world with an active God. Clarke is also an ethical rationalist. Ethical truths are discoverable through reason and correspond to necessary and eternal relations among things in the world. Furthermore, true Christian doctrines are neither mysterious nor self-contradictory, and nearly all can be comprehended by human beings. Most importantly, the Demonstration makes great use of the principle of sufficient reason, which motivates the cosmological argument, and he explicitly and repeatedly avows it in the correspondence with Leibniz C 3. It is not mentioned in the correspondence with Collins, but he there adopts principles that can be derived from it. This was a major source of contention in their correspondence. This involves two claims. First, in cases of complete indifference such as God choosing where to place the world in the infinite expanse of absolute space, God is capable of acting even if there is no reason to prefer one option over another. Second, a free will is able to refrain from acting on what reason presents to it as best to do. As a consequence of these, Clarke denies the identity of indiscernibles. Clarke may also have felt the need to accommodate indiscernible atoms, which Newton seemed to allow. Clarke defends atomism in the letters to Leibniz, but in his other works he claims that all matter is infinitely divisible. Against the Deists, who generally expected all necessary moral and religious truths to be discoverable by reason, Clarke asserted that revealed religion also called special revelation provided information necessary for salvation W 2. Space is also not an aggregate of its parts but an essential whole preceding all its parts. Absolute space was allegedly demanded by Newtonian physics. Space is an entity in which things are, and not the mere absence of matter. All finite beings occupy an absolute position in space and time that we may or may not be able to establish because we have no direct access to absolute space and time. Although space is not sensible, Clarke rejected its identification with nothingness, since space has properties: Law, 10 objects that this makes no more sense than saying that darkness has qualities because it has the property of receiving light. Clarke apparently thought that what has a boundary must be bounded by something else. If so, the argument was not well taken because a sphere, for example, has a boundary which stems from its own nature, not by the presence of something external bounding it Vailati, For more on the relationship of God to space, see Section 4. He also argues that because existence or being is a perfection, existing in more places is a greater perfection, so God as the most perfect being must exist in all places W 1. Another possible solution is to appeal to the principle of sufficient reason: In his philosophical writings, he argues that freedom of the will involves a libertarian power of self-determination. Clarke does not explicitly reconcile these incompatibilist and compatibilist approaches. One way to do so is to make the libertarian power of self-determination a necessary condition for the compatibilist understanding of freedom as following reason without restraint. Clarke also entertains a third notion of freedom: The ability to begin motion marks freedom as a power only held by non-material agents, because matter has no power of self-motion. In order to will, one must have a judgment about what to do and the power to choose in accordance with that judgment. This power to choose is provided by the will. The will is not to be identified with the last judgment of the understanding nor is it a volition caused by a judgment. Those like Hobbes who thought so were guilty of basic philosophical errors. Because the moral motive is simply an abstract object a proposition and abstract objects are causally inert, the moral motive cannot cause anything. Against Descartes, Clarke insisted that judging, i. But what is passive cannot cause anything active. In general, there is no causal link between previous non-volitional mental states, all of which are passive, and any volition Vailati, 82â€” Jonathan Edwards, â€” argued that Clarke was committed to an infinite regress of volitions. Because each volition is active, it must be caused by something active; but every other purported motivation is passive, so each volition is caused by a previous volition, and so on ad infinitum. However, Clarke did not believe that each volition was caused by a previous volition, but rather each volition is caused by the will itself. This raises a different problem, noticed by Leibniz: Clarke never provided a satisfactory response to this charge; his best attempt is his claim that to deny this account would lead to accepting passive

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agency, which is a contradiction. Divine freedom raises new problems for Clarke. Against the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will, Clarke objected that because knowledge does not affect the thing known, our free choices are unaffected by divine omniscience D 75â€™78, W 2. A second problem is that God always does what is best, so God cannot refrain from acting on his judgment of what is best, and thus acts necessarily, which Clarke claims is a contradiction D 83â€™86, W 4. In other words, it is a moral necessity and not a metaphysical necessity. A third and related problem is that when God created the world, he did what was best to do, but had a choice among an infinite number of equally best ways of creating the world because he could place the world anywhere in space and could create it at any time. Although this bothered Leibniz because it conflicts with his account of the principle of sufficient reason, Clarke fails to see any problem C 4. The laws of nature are thus not absolutely necessary but only morally necessary, continuing as they do only because of the unchanging will of God. Leibniz, in his correspondence with Clarke, denies this reading of Newton that makes no metaphysical commitment to gravity as force, suggesting two importantly different readings of Newton. While Newton would not speculate publicly on metaphysical matters, Clarke argued that this effect could not be the work of body. The claim was radical for the time and elicited many responses. Unlike the occasionalists, Clarke does not claim that God is the real cause of interactions between finite minds and matter. He assumes throughout that if the soul is immaterial then it is immortal. In response, the freethinker Anthony Collins defended the position that consciousness can be an emergent property of matter, opening the door for a materialist theory of mind. Clarke clearly endorsed the following: The third category includes magnetism and gravity, which are properly descriptions of a different substance in this case, divine activity and not matter. The second category are the traditional secondary qualities; the discussed example is the smell of a rose. Consciousness falls in the first category, but, unlike the other members of that category such as magnitude and figure, it does not divide or sum. Clarke is not clear on what exactly it is about consciousness that requires this unity Rozemond , 2001. Strictly, the Homogeneity Principle only applies to the first category of qualities Rozemond , 2001. William Uzgalis finds versions of the Homogeneity Principle in Cudworth and Bayle, and in all three cases it is used to argue that thought or consciousness cannot arise from motion or figure because they are not of the same kind. Collins, following Locke, argued for a memory theory of personal identity.

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Chapter 4 : Samuel Clarke - Christian Classics Ethereal Library - Christian Classics Ethereal Library

A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. how comes our bare want of ideas to be a demonstration of the impossibility of the being of immaterial.

The Newtonian theologians used the Boyle Lectures to attack opponents Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza, deists and freethinkers in particular. These books were later published together. The former is not a purely a priori argument, and it was not presented as such. The intelligence, for example, of the self-existence and original cause of all things is, he says, "not easily proved a priori," but "demonstrably proved a posteriori from the variety and degrees of perfection in things, and the order of causes and effects, from the intelligence that created beings are confessedly endowed with, and from the beauty, order, and final purpose of things. In order to establish his sixth thesis, Clarke contended that time and space, eternity and immensity, are not substances, but attributes: The principal focus of the correspondence was the possibility of a materialist theory of mind. Collins defended the materialist position that consciousness was an emergent property of the brain, while Clarke opposed such a view and argued that mind and consciousness must be distinct from matter. The correspondence also inquired into the origins of consciousness, personal identity, free will, and determinism. Clarke published a refutation of the views of Henry Dodwell, and this drew in Collins, who wrote a Letter to Mr Dodwell in his defence. He took the degree of doctor in divinity in 1704, [4] defending as his thesis the two propositions: *Nullum fidei Christianae dogma, in Sacris Scripturis traditum, est rectae rationi dissentaneum,* and *Sine actionum humanarum libertate nulla potest esse religio.* The first contains a collection and exegesis of texts in the New Testament relating to the doctrine of the Trinity; in the second the doctrine is set out, and explained as a set of propositions; and in the third passages in the liturgy of the Church of England relating to the doctrine of the Trinity are considered. Clarke in any case took no notice of any Whig qualms. He looked at biblical texts, and rejected the comma Johanneum. He made a more careful case than Whiston. He was reacting to issues that had been raised elsewhere in Europe, by Petavius, by Christopher Sandius and Daniel Zwicker for the Socinian camp, and the Arminians. Clarke and Waterland had definite differences on the theology of consubstantiality and aseity. Clarke drew up an apologetic preface, and then gave explanations which satisfied the Upper House of Convocation. He had strong supporters among the bishops. Hawarden returned to the subject in Answer to Dr. Leibniz-Clarke correspondence In and Clarke had a discussion with Gottfried Leibniz on the principles of natural philosophy and religion, which was cut short when Leibniz died. A collection of the papers which passed between them was published in 1717. He refused the post. It caused his death on the Saturday following, in London. The system of Rohault was based on Cartesian principles, and was previously known only through the medium of a crude Latin version. Four editions were issued, the last being that of 1717. It was translated into English in 1717 by his younger brother John, dean of Salisbury. Three years after his death appeared also the last twelve books of the Iliad, published by his son Samuel Clarke, the first three of these books and part of the fourth having, as he states, been revised and annotated by his father. They were subsequently printed together in two volumes and passed through several editions. He revised them, and left them ready for the press. He held that in relation to the will things possess an objective fitness similar to the mutual consistency of things in the physical universe. This fitness God has given to actions, as he has given laws to Nature; and the fitness is as immutable as the laws. A similar form of moral rationalism is developed by the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth. Influence[edit] Clarke had an influence on Enlightenment philosophers including Lord Monboddo. Samuel Clarke, and other liturgical works. Lockwood of Little Massingham, Norfolk. They had seven children, of whom five survived him.

Chapter 5 : Samuel Clarke (Author of A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God)

Physico-theology, Or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God from His Works of Creation: Being the

DOWNLOAD PDF A DEMONSTRATION OF THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

Substance of Sixteen Sermons Preached in St. Mary-le-Bow Church, London, at the Honourable Mr. Boyle's Lectures, in the Years , and with Large Notes, and Many Curious Observations.

Chapter 6 : physicotheology - Wiktionary

The Resource Astro-Theology or, a demonstration of the being and attributes of God, from a survey of the heavens. Illustrated with copper-plates. By W. Derham, late Canon of Windsor, Rector of Upminster in Essex, and F. R. S.

Chapter 7 : A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God: And Other Writings by Samuel Clarke

A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God More Particularly in Answer to Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza, and Their Followers; Wherein the Notion of Liberty Is Stated, and the Possibility and Certainty of It Proved, in Opposition to Necessity and Fate by Samuel Clarke.

Chapter 8 : Samuel Clarke (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

1 Lecture Notes Samuel Clark[e], A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God () Keith Burgess-Jackson 14 September 1. Preface. Clarke confines himself to "one only method or continued thread of arguing."

Chapter 9 : A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God | work by Clarke | www.nxgvision.com

Astro-theology: or a demonstration of the being and attributes of God, from a survey of the heavens or a demonstration of the being and attributes of God, from a.