

DOWNLOAD PDF A POLITICAL INTEREST THEORY OF CORPORATE CO-EVOLUTION.

Chapter 1 : Corporatism - Wikipedia

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Operations research[edit] The idea that human behavior can be usefully analyzed mathematically gained great credibility following the application of operations research in World War II to improve military operations. Then it was pointed out that "seeing the most submarines" depended not only on the number of submarines present, but also on the number of eyes looking; i. Making an allowance for patrol density showed that patrols were more efficient " that is, found more submarines per patrol " in other areas. Making appropriate adjustments increased the overall effectiveness. Flood and Melvin Dresher [7] takes its name from the following scenario: Fortunately for you, most of the evidence was shredded, so you are facing only a year in prison. But the prosecutor wants to nail someone, so he offers you a deal: Which sounds good, until you learn your associate is being offered the same deal " which would get you five years. So what do you do? The best that you and your associate can do together is to not squeal: So what is the best strategy to minimize your incarceration aside from going straight in the first place? To cooperate, or not cooperate? This simple question and the implicit question of whether to trust, or not , expressed in an extremely simple game, is a crucial issue across a broad range of life. Fig wasps collectively limit the eggs they lay in fig trees otherwise, the trees would suffer. Yet sharks, fig wasps, and villagers all cooperate. It has been a vexatious problem in evolutionary studies to explain how such cooperation should evolve, let alone persist, in a world of self-maximizing egoists. Species are pitted against species for shared resources, similar species with similar needs and niches even more so, and individuals within species most of all. Such success has reinforced notions that life is in all respects a war of each against all, where every individual has to look out for himself, that your gain is my loss. In such a struggle for existence altruism voluntarily yielding a benefit to a non-relative and even cooperation working with another for a mutual benefit seem so antithetical to self-interest as to be the very kind of behavior that should be selected against. Yet cooperation and seemingly even altruism have evolved and persist, including even interspecific cooperation and naturalists have been hard pressed to explain why. Social Darwinism[edit] The popularity of the evolution of cooperation " the reason it is not an obscure technical issue of interest to only a small number of specialists " is in part because it mirrors a larger issue where the realms of political philosophy, ethics, and biology intersect: On one hand, the so-called " Social Darwinians " roughly, those who would use the "survival of the fittest" of Darwinian evolution to justify the cutthroat competitiveness of laissez-faire capitalism [11] declaim that the world is an inherently competitive "dog eat dog" jungle, where every individual has to look out for himself. The writer Ayn Rand damned " altruism " and declared selfishness a virtue. Huxley and Herbert Spencer. What they read into the theory was then read out by Social Darwinians as scientific justification for their social and economic views such as poverty being a natural condition and social reform an unnatural meddling. We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment; the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of the few; and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential to the future progress of the race. Carnegie While the validity of extrapolating moral and political views from science is questionable, the significance of such views in modern society is undoubtable. The social contract and morality[edit] On the other hand, other philosophers have long observed that cooperation in the form of a " social contract " is necessary for human society, but saw no way of attaining that short of a coercive authority. As Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan: Hobbes , p. Rousseau , p. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free We cannibals must help these Christians. Where government does not exist or cannot reach it is often deemed the role of religion to promote prosocial and moral behavior, but this tends to depend on threats of hell-fire what Hobbes called "the terror of some power" ; such inducements seem more mystical than rational, and philosophers have been

hard-pressed to explain why self-interest should yield to morality, why there should be any duty to be "good". As early as the Russian naturalist Petr Kropotkin observed that the species that survived were where the individuals cooperated, that "mutual aid" cooperation was found at all levels of existence. Yet cooperation is prevalent, seems beneficial, and even seems to be essential to human society. Explaining this seeming contradiction, and accommodating cooperation, and even altruism, within Darwinian theory is a central issue in the theory of cooperation. It has had a powerful appeal, but has not been fully persuasive, in part because of difficulties regarding cheaters that participate in the group without contributing. The classic example is the social insects, where the workers "which are sterile, and therefore incapable of passing on their genes" benefit the queen, who is essentially passing on copies of "their" genes. This is further elaborated in the "selfish gene" theory of Richard Dawkins, that the unit of evolution is not the individual organism, but the gene. In a paper [24] Robert Trivers demonstrated how reciprocal altruism can evolve between unrelated individuals, even between individuals of entirely different species. As Trivers says, it "take[s] the altruism out of altruism. It does not matter why the individuals cooperate. The individuals may be prompted to the exchange of "altruistic" acts by entirely different genes, or no genes in particular, but both individuals and their genomes can benefit simply on the basis of a shared exchange. In particular, "the benefits of human altruism are to be seen as coming directly from reciprocity "not indirectly through non-altruistic group benefits". Not only can it replace group selection, it also predicts various observed behavior, including moralistic aggression, [28] gratitude and sympathy, guilt and reparative altruism, [29] and development of abilities to detect and discriminate against subtle cheaters. The benefits of such reciprocal altruism was dramatically demonstrated by a pair of tournaments held by Robert Axelrod around 1980. The results of the first tournament were analyzed and published, and a second tournament held to see if anyone could find a better strategy. Axelrod analyzed the results, and made some interesting discoveries about the nature of cooperation, which he describes in his book [30] In both actual tournaments and various replays the best performing strategies were nice: Many of the competitors went to great lengths to gain an advantage over the "nice" and usually simpler strategies, but to no avail: To obtain the benefit "or avoid exploitation" it is necessary to be provokable to both retaliation and forgiveness. When the other player defects, a nice strategy must immediately be provoked into retaliatory defection. Overdoing the punishment risks escalation, and can lead to an "unending echo of alternating defections" that depresses the scores of both players. But real life is not zero-sum. Our best prospects are usually in cooperative efforts. In fact, TFT cannot score higher than its partner; at best it can only do "as good as". Yet it won the tournaments by consistently scoring a strong second-place with a variety of partners. But some strategies try to find ways of getting a little more with an occasional defection exploitation. The competition in each round becomes stronger as weaker performers are reduced and eliminated. The results were amazing: As cooperation became general the non-provokable strategies were exploited and eventually eliminated, whereupon the exploitive non-cooperating strategies were out-performed by the cooperative strategies. In summary, success in an evolutionary "game" correlated with the following characteristics: Clarity is essential for others to cooperate with you. Curiously, rationality and deliberate choice are not necessary, nor trust nor even consciousness, [43] as long as there is a pattern that benefits both players. Often the initial mutual cooperation is not even intentional, but having "discovered" a beneficial pattern both parties respond to it by continuing the conditions that maintain it. This implies two requirements for the players, aside from whatever strategy they may adopt. First, they must be able to recognize other players, to avoid exploitation by cheaters. The "futility of isolated revolt". Even a small group of individuals with nice strategies with infrequent interactions can yet do so well on those interactions to make up for the low level of exploitation from non-nice strategies. What follows are therefore only a few selected highlights. Axelrod has a subsequent book, *The Complexity of Cooperation*, [50] which he considers a sequel to *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Other work on the evolution of cooperation has expanded to cover prosocial behavior generally, [51] and in religion, [52] other mechanisms for generating cooperation, [53] the IPD under different conditions and assumptions, [54] and the use of other games such as the Public Goods and

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Ultimatum games to explore deep-seated notions of fairness and fair play. Axelrod discusses this in chapter 8; in a later paper he and Rick Riolo and Michael Cohen [58] use computer simulations to show cooperation rising among agents who have negligible chance of future encounters but can recognize similarity of an arbitrary characteristic such as a green beard. When an IPD tournament introduces noise errors or misunderstandings TFT strategies can get trapped into a long string of retaliatory defections, thereby depressing their score. In a paper Nowak listed five mechanisms by which natural selection can lead to cooperation. Cooperation depends on a reliable history being projected from past partners to future partners. Network reciprocity relies on geographical or social factors to increase the interactions with nearer neighbors; it is essentially a virtual group. Group selection [63] assumes that groups with cooperators even altruists will be more successful as a whole, and this will tend to benefit all members. Where punishment is costly there is a second-order dilemma amongst cooperators between those who pay the cost of enforcement and those who do not. In the resulting networks cooperators will be more centrally located than defectors who will tend to be in the periphery of the network. But parochial altruism could have evolved if parochialism promoted intergroup hostilities and the combination of altruism and parochialism contributed to success in these conflicts A crucial open research question, thus, is how realistic the assumptions are which these simulation models are based on. He was "not advocating a morality based on evolution", [71] and even felt that "we must teach our children altruism, for we cannot expect it to be part of their biological nature. While this does not yet amount to a science of morality , the game theoretic approach has clarified the conditions required for the evolution and persistence of cooperation, and shown how Darwinian natural selection can lead to complex behavior, including notions of morality, fairness, and justice. It is shown that the nature of self-interest is more profound than previously considered, and that behavior that seems altruistic may, in a broader view, be individually beneficial. Extensions of this work to morality [75] and the social contract [76] may yet resolve the old issue of individual interests versus group interests.

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Chapter 2 : Corporate Co-Evolution - John Child, Suzana B. Rodrigues - Ressources professionnelles

Corporate Co-Evolution is a work of major scholarship that develops broad macro-economic principles of corporate strategy by examining and analyzing the history and growth of Telemig, a major Brazilian telecommunications company.

Introduction Numerous social scientists have examined how political power is distributed in the United States. However, class conceptions of political power i. From this perspective, there is no single ruling elite. The state is a neutral entity that solves conflict between groups; no particular group controls the state Lindblom According to pluralism, public opinion is the result of a combination of interests Polsby All individuals have the capacity to become politically organized and achieve their political interests Polsby Individuals and groups cannot be involved in every issue. This creates a low potential for unity among elites Dahl Since political effectiveness requires a high potential for both control and unity, elites do not have the power to dominate the political process Dahl Pluralism studies political power by examining the individuals involved in the decision making process. By tracing the concrete decision making process, pluralists examine the extent to which a power structure exists. Confronting mounting evidence of the political power of corporate elites, pluralism II attempts to account for the disproportionate influence of corporations. According to pluralism II, corporate political domination still fits within the pluralist model because the corporate enterprise is a social collective Manley Key class conceptions of political power include elite theory and class theory. Both class conceptions of political power claim the interests of the capitalist class control the political process. As modern bureaucracies have developed, power has become increasingly centralized and concentrated. As a result, the structural possibilities for collusion between the major spheres of society significantly increases. Members of the inner circle of the upper class share positions of power in major social institutions. Corporate elites share social networks and are able to use their social networks to shape public opinion and political outcomes Domhoff According to elite theory, the dominant class is able to control political outcomes due to shared class consciousness i. Class consciousness is achieved through the dominant ideology Abercrombie and Turner However, the dominant ideology is not the ideology of the working class. Class theory differs from elite theory in two respects: On the other hand, class theory examines how the ruling class is able to use political power to reproduce class relations Thernborn From this perspective, the state is a superstructure related to the economic structure of society Marx On the other hand, class theory focuses on the entire capitalist class. From this perspective, the state is related to the entire capitalist structure i. In short, elite theory examines the structure of an elite group of the capitalist class, and class theory examines the structure of entire capitalist class. According to pluralism, the capitalist class is not unified. However, as explained by class theory, class unity is not necessary for elite interests to be achieved. Furthermore, elite theorists, such as Mizruchi demonstrate class unity varies over time and is not necessary for elites to influence the political process. As such, elite theory overcomes pluralist critiques. Pluralist theorists claim elite theory is problematic because it is not falsifiable. According to Dahl As a result, pluralist theory is limited. By controlling information processes, conflict is able to be avoided while achieving group interests over the interests of others. Ideology influences the way individuals understand the world in which they live and ideology is related to capitalist reproduction Marx Class conceptions assume the state is representative of the interests of the capitalist class. According to elite theory, the inner circle of power elites in dominant political, economic and cultural institutions are able to control the policy formation process. In short, class conceptions of political power contradict pluralist assumptions of the impartial state by showing how the state is representative of economic interests. Conclusion Pluralism is a critical response to class conceptions of political power which assume a dominant class controls political outcomes in the United States. However, by ignoring the empirical reality that power is not evenly distributed in society, pluralist critiques fail to adequately explain the empirical world. On the other hand, key class conceptions of political power are better able to explain empirical events. Power, Politics and Social Change. The Myth of Liberal Ascendancy: Domhoff, William and

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Thomas Dye eds. *Power Elites and Organizations*. Jenkins, Craig and Teri Shumate. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. Mintz, Beth and Michael Schwartz. *The Power Structure of American Business*. University of Chicago Press. *The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite*. I hate it because they use their power for evil and not for the betterment of the welfare of the people. They abuse the power that was given to them by the people. They were elected because the people believed that they can help them to help society. Instead, they disappoint the people when they show their true colors and show people that they will be using their power for their own personal benefit.

Chapter 3 : The Evolution of Cooperation - Wikipedia

"The concept of corporate co-evolution illuminates the dynamics of organizational change within the business environment." "Corporate Co-evolution is one of the first works in the Organization and Strategy research series of books on business.

Chapter 4 : Political Theory - Department of Politics at Princeton University

The Political Dynamics of Corporate Co-Evolution: Replicating a new perspective in organization theory began to intensively self-interest behavior" (Hardy & Clegg, , p.

Chapter 5 : interest group | Definition & Facts | www.nxgvision.com

Inputs from both theory and from a case study of the life history of a major state Brazilian telecommunications company - Telemig - from to when it was acquired by private investors provide the basis for a model of co-evolution that looks into multidimensional changes and explores their connection with articulation of political.