

DOWNLOAD PDF ALFRED MAHAN THE INFLUENCE OF SEAPOWER UPON HISTORY

Chapter 1 : Alfred Thayer Mahan Quotes (Author of The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, -)

In , Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a lecturer in naval history and the president of the United States Naval War College, published The Influence of Sea Power upon History, , a revolutionary analysis of the importance of naval power as a factor in the rise of the British Empire.

May 12, Alfred Thayer Mahan: Navy, but throughout the broader American and overseas political, economic, and industrial system. Secretary of War Henry L. To the well-trained Navy mind, it is like living with the law of gravity. Hmmm—Imagine if gravity worked other than the way that it does. The American Navy pays homage to many of the ancient customs and traditions of the sea, but institutionally, it does not now and never has worshipped false idols. And it would be several generations after Stimson before God would be forced out of public life in the United States, let alone out of its Navy. Navy, about whom we write today. Mahan was commissioned in the U. The young Ensign Mahan served on the Union side during the Civil War, learning his naval profession by working on ships that supported the Northern blockade of the Southern ports. After the war, Mahan spent the next two decades making his career in the sea service. In , Mahan, by then a captain, was appointed as an instructor of naval history and tactics at the newly created Naval War College. And the rest is history, if you know it. It was reviewed and discussed in every major journal of commentary, news magazine, and newspaper of the time. He had written a book about years of naval history and about what that naval history meant to the rise and relationships of state power in the world. The United States was born of British maritime colonies located on the Eastern seacoast. From a maritime standpoint, the sea brought immigrants to the shores of the new nation and served as a base for outward trade with the world at large. Military Academy at West Point, N. The central military conflict for the United States and its people during the 19th century was its Civil War , for the most part a land-based conflict. This is not to neglect the efforts of the U. Navy during the period, but rather to put things into the larger perspective. Of that, we will speak another time. But by , the American frontier was coming to an end, as no less a historian than Frederick Jackson Turner would note in his groundbreaking analysis published in , The Significance of the Frontier in American History. Or one might also say that in , Capt. Mahan told a lot of people exactly what they wanted to hear. The End of the Inner Frontier In another way of viewing things, the inner frontier of the United States was coming to a distinct end. This is the root concept of modern U. Among other eager readers of Mahan in the early s was a relatively young, but ambitious and up-and-coming, New Yorker named Theodore Roosevelt, who absorbed the book as did another man named Roosevelt, many years later. The older Roosevelt and Mahan became close acquaintances and would correspond extensively over the years. Within a year of publication, it was translated into French, German, Spanish, Italian, Russian, and Japanese, among other languages. The theories of Mahan are credited or blamed for providing intellectual and political impetus for a naval armaments race among European powers that contributed, almost a quarter century later, to the outbreak of the Great War. On the far side of the planet, starting in the early s, the Japanese were then in the process of developing rapidly from a feudal society into a first-rank industrial power unlike China, which would not make that leap until a century later. The Japanese modeled their entire naval strategy and order of battle upon the theories of Mahan. By , these newly converted but ardent adherents of the American Navy captain from Newport were able to establish in the northwest Pacific the maritime supremacy of the Rising Sun after its defeat their utter annihilation, really of the Russian fleet at Tsushima. This month, May , marks the th anniversary of that epic battle. What was this magic elixir of sea power that Mahan described? Any limitation of, or challenge to, U. Any victory of U. Mahan prompted deep, critical thinking about the ability of any given nation to protect itself from attack from the sea and about how to fight upon and command the oceans, when necessary, distant from home shores. Mahan reviewed and examined the year history of construction and employment of naval vessels by Britain, Holland, France, Spain, and Portugal. He discussed the rivalries at sea of these nations and their respective quests over two centuries for dominion over far-distant waves and

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shores. Big Ships with Big Guns From a purely military standpoint, Mahan set forth a workable, if not workmanlike, theory of naval war fighting. Yes, I know what you are probably thinking—but just try to command the seas with a little fleet composed of small ships armed with small guns. The doctrine calls for a fleet to move forward to meet the opponent and, when circumstances dictate, to use defensive naval operations as the basis for offense. But if Mahan had merely presented a better way for naval fleets to fight it out with other naval fleets, to blast away at each other and wage violent battles upon the water for absolute sea control, his book would not have had the monumental success that it did. Mahan offered something else to his worldwide readership. Mahan looked at what was required within a nation, its economy, its politics, and its people to support naval power. In his book, Mahan identified specific social and industrial policies that a nation required in order to be successful at sea and, by extension, to earn and keep its place in the world. Mahan illustrated his central point by explaining what happened to Portugal and Spain. Both nations rose to prominence by virtue of their explorations of the seas and were powerful naval states in the 16th and 17th centuries, with significant military capabilities. This was the seed of their eventual decline and downfall. Mahan stated the following: All manufactures fell into insane contempt. Mahan further explains that as a result of their sale of goods to the Iberian countries, British and Dutch manufacturing grew: And the next step, according to Mahan, for was Britain and Holland to build powerful navies to protect their merchant ships. So according to Mahan, sea power goes hand in hand with commerce and trade. Commerce and trade should provide, and must support, a nation and its economy with the ability to produce goods and to make things that others in the world want to obtain. With the ability to produce goods for trade comes the need and the ability to produce the vessels necessary to carry that trade. But Mahan also provides a cautionary note: In the course of writing about naval history and its related military affairs, of sea battles long ago, with broadsides blazing and cannonballs whistling between wind-powered men-of-war, the American naval officer had articulated a political and economic theory for the modern age. Within each nation, industrialists constructed their empires of business. Coal, steel, railroads, refining, heavy machinery, chemicals, food processing, and more became distinct industrial features of emerging modern economies. Mahan and his theories provided the governing classes of these emerging industrial nations with a national security requirement to justify harnessing these empires of business. Here was a modern justification, rooted in principles of state security, for bringing these empires of business into a politically controlled, military-industrial system that would support the business of empire. This was, in its own way, pure ambrosia to the proponents of expanding national industrial, economic, and military power and political control. So the story of Mahan is not just one of his writing about naval history, interesting as it is, nor the development of naval technology, fascinating as that may be. A Theory of Economy and Industry The central part of this story is about an influential Navy man who created and popularized a theory of economy and industry that formed the foundation for much of what now passes for modern political governance. Manufacturing supports trade, domestic and foreign. Trade supports international commerce. International commerce is the basis for a nation protecting its interests overseas. Mahan described a formula for national power, if not greatness, but it was and remains a formula that must be followed. Mahan made a profound point of describing what happens to a nation that fails, for whatever reason, to nurture its basic productive sectors. In one passage, Mahan describes the plight of Portugal: Instead of exporting those precious metals, today the United States exports dollars. But dollars are at root mere debt instruments, an elastic currency created in inflationary excess by the Federal Reserve, which is institutionally captive of its interest-rate paradigms and unshackled by any real, let alone external and independent, mechanism to restrain the growth of the U. The modern United States, fundamentally through its monetary mismanagement, has moved away from, if not forgotten, the underlying lessons of Mahan. Having shrugged off, if not forgotten, the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the United States sails slowly, but steadily, on a path to monetary ruin and inexorable decline. Until we meet again! May 12, P. Navy has named four ships after Alfred Thayer Mahan. The second vessel to bear the name was also a destroyer DD serving from and earning five battle stars in World War II before being sunk by Japanese kamikaze aircraft. Profit when the

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Chapter 2 : Alfred Thayer Mahan | United States naval officer | www.nxgvision.com

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: is a history of naval warfare published in by Alfred Thayer Mahan. www.nxgvision.com details the role of sea power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and discussed the various factors needed to support and achieve sea power, with emphasis on having the largest and most powerful fleet.

Overview[edit] Mahan formulated his concept of sea power while reading a history book in Lima , Peru. Mahan began the book with an examination of what factors lead to a supremacy of the seas, especially how Great Britain was able to rise to its near dominance. He identifies such features as geography, population, and government, and expands the definition of sea power as comprising a strong navy and commercial fleet. Mahan also promotes the belief that any army would succumb to a strong naval blockade. Although his history was relatively thin he relied on secondary sources , the vigorous style and clear theory won widespread acceptance of navalists across the world. His ideas decisively shaped Japanese naval doctrine, especially in the fleet actions of World War II. Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters and minimized strength in distant seas, while Fisher reversed Mahan by utilizing technological change to propose submarines for defense of home waters and mobile battle cruisers for protection of distant imperial interests. Castex enlarged strategic theory to include nonmilitary factors policy, geography, coalitions, public opinion, and constraints and internal factors economy of force, offense and defense, communications, operational plans, morale, and command to conceive a general strategy to attain final victory. The Man and his Letters. Books That Changed the World Rev. Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: American Seapower Comes of Age. Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan. The Journal of Military History. Kelly, "Militarism in a Global Age: From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: Naval War College Review. Retrieved 7 May The Debate over Maritime Strategy, September 24, Asada, Sadao. Clarendon Press, Downs, Robert B. New York, NY, Argues that key Europeans were already set to expand their navies and that Mahan crystallized their ideas and generate broad support.

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Chapter 3 : The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, - by Alfred Thayer Mahan

Alfred Thayer Mahan, published The Influence of Sea Power upon History, in Mahan's writings and lectures greatly influenced Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and other world leaders, including German Emperor Wilhelm II, shaping global policy based on sea power at the beginning of the 20th century.

In an age of technological change, these ideas began to seem obsolete to an influential group of American naval leaders. Luce established the Naval War College in 1845. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan was assigned there. The book brought Mahan fame in his lifetime and ever since. In the context of late 19th Century during times of peace as well as war. This had understandable appeal to industrialists, merchants interested in overseas trade, investors, nationalists, and imperialists, and peacetime America. Mahan provided a powerful argument for achieving and preserving sea power. The decline of the U. Navy ended about 1815, and by 1880, a renaissance was in full swing. The essence of Mahan from a naval viewpoint is that a great navy is a mark and prerequisite of national greatness. A great navy is one designed to fight an enemy in fleet engagements in order to win command of the sea, not one designed for commerce raiding or guerre de course. Mahan said strategic principles "remain as though laid on a rock. Geographic position; Physical conformation; Extent of territory; Number of population; Character of the people; Character of the government. Tactics were conditioned by changing types of naval armaments. Tactics were aspects of operations occurring after the beginning of combat. While Mahan recognized clearly that tactics were fluid due to changes in armaments, he did not view strategy in the same way. He did not realize the extent to which technology would affect, for instance, the validity of some of his six elements of sea power. Mahan identifies some important "strategic questions": What are their objectives? Where should the coaling stations needed to support them be established? At geographic "choke points" e. What is the value of commerce destruction, and should this be a primary or secondary goal of naval action? It cannot win wars, e. Alabama; it can only be a secondary goal of naval action. Mahan perceived colonies as valuable locations for coaling stations for a steam-driven battleship Navy. Mahan viewed the possibility of an isthmus passage later to be realized in the form of Panama Canal as necessary for U. Navy is a "two-ocean" Navy.

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Chapter 4 : The Influence of Sea Power upon History - Wikipedia

*The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, (Dover Military History, Weapons, Armor) [A. T. Mahan] on www.nxgvision.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. First published almost a century ago, this classic text on the history and tactics of naval warfare had a profound effect on the imperial policies of all the major powers.*

He then studied at Columbia for two years, where he was a member of the Philolexian Society debating club. Against the better judgment of his father, Mahan then entered the Naval Academy, where he graduated second in his class. In 1877, he was promoted to lieutenant commander, and then to commander, and captain. Mahan as a captain. While in actual command of a ship, his skills were not exemplary; and a number of vessels under his command were involved in collisions, with both moving and stationary objects. He had an affection for old square-rigged vessels rather than the smoky, noisy steamships of his time; and he tried to avoid active sea duty. Luce pointed Mahan in the direction of writing his future studies on the influence of sea power. During his first year on the faculty, he remained at his home in New York City researching and writing his lectures. Though he was prepared to become a professor in 1880, Luce was given command of the North Atlantic Squadron, and Mahan became President of the Naval War College by default June 22, 1880–January 12, 1881, July 22, 1881–May 10, 1882. Mahan stressed the importance of the individual in shaping history and extolled the traditional values of loyalty, courage, and service to the state. Mahan sought to resurrect Horatio Nelson as a national hero in Britain and used his biography as a platform for expressing his views on naval strategy and tactics. Laughton saw Mahan as a theorist while Mahan called Laughton "the historian". British naval superiority eventually defeated France, consistently preventing invasion and an effective blockade. Mahan emphasized that naval operations were chiefly to be won by decisive battles and blockades. Mahan also believed that in peacetime, states should increase production and shipping capacities and acquire overseas possessions, though he stressed that the number of coal fueling stations and strategic bases should be limited to avoid draining too many resources from the mother country. Control of the sea could be achieved not by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet. Such a strategy called for the concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships, not too large but numerous, well-manned with crews thoroughly trained, and operating under the principle that the best defense is an aggressive offense. He also believed that naval supremacy could be exercised by a transnational consortium acting in defense of a multinational system of free trade. His theories, expounded before the submarine became a serious factor in warfare, delayed the introduction of convoys as a defense against German U-boats during World War I. By the 1930s, the US Navy had built long-range submarines to raid Japanese shipping; but in World War II, the Japanese, still tied to Mahan, designed their submarines as ancillaries to the fleet and failed to attack American supply lines in the Pacific. Mahan believed first, that good political and naval leadership was no less important than geography when it came to the development of sea power. Third, his economic ideal was free trade rather than autarchy. Fourth, his recognition of the influence of geography on strategy was tempered by a strong appreciation of the power of contingency to affect outcomes. Mahan believed that if the British blockaded the eastern ports, the US Navy should be concentrated in one of them, preferably New York, with its two widely separated exits, and employ torpedo boats to defend the other harbors. This concentration of the US fleet would force the British to tie down such a large proportion of their navy to watch the New York exits that other American ports would be relatively safe. Although his history was relatively thin, based as it was on secondary sources, his vigorous style, and clear theory won widespread acceptance of navalists and supporters of the New Imperialism in Africa and Asia. Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters with minimized strength in distant seas. Fisher instead decided to use submarines to defend home waters and mobile battlecruisers to protect imperial interests. United States[edit] Mahan believed that if the United States were to build an isthmian canal, it would become a Pacific power, and therefore it should take possession of Hawaii to protect the West Coast. He returned to lecture at the War

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College and then, in , he retired from active service, returning briefly to duty in to consult on naval strategy during the Spanish-American War. At the outbreak of World War I , he published statements favorable to the cause of Great Britain, but in an attempt to enforce American neutrality, President Woodrow Wilson ordered that all active and retired officers refrain from publicly commenting on the war. For instance, late in life he strongly opposed revision of the Book of Common Prayer. In later life, Mahan often spoke to Episcopal parishes. In , at Holy Trinity Church in Brooklyn , Mahan emphasized his own religious experience and declared that one needed a personal relationship with God given through the work of the Holy Spirit. Thoughts on the Life of the Christian, which was "part personal testimony, part biblical analysis, part expository sermon. Mahan died in Washington, D. Mahan Elementary School and A. A former mission school in Yangzhou , China was named for Mahan.

Chapter 5 : The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, - Alfred Thayer Mahan - Google Books

The Influence of Sea Power upon History: is practically a historical document. The book's first copyright was in by Alfred Thayer Mahan. The copyright was transferred to Ellen Lyle Mahan in which eventually fell to the publisher who has published twelve editions of this book.

Chapter 6 : The Influence of Seapower Upon History (Audiobook) by Alfred T. Mahan | www.nxgvision.com

Although not as well known, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, written by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and published in , was a groundbreaking study that explained how the British Empire.

Chapter 7 : Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan - The Daily Reckoning

The Influence of Sea Power upon History, () online edition Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, (2 vols.,) online edition.

Chapter 8 : Mahan & The Influence of Sea Power Upon History

Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history " • Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, -

Chapter 9 : Alfred Thayer Mahan: Proponent of American Naval Power

In Mahan published his college lectures as The Influence of Sea Power upon History, In this book he argued for the paramount importance of sea power in national historical supremacy.