

**Chapter 1 : American War and Peace Cycles, to Present von Dennis J. Foley (E-Book) â€“ Lulu DE**

*If we take as our starting point the first significant war of the last yearâ€”the American Revolution of â€”we may then proceed along the lines of following a definite rhythmic cycle of war and peace.*

The fieldwork and analysis that preceded the actual writing of this study took four years, but the genesis of the project dates back to the early s. Between and I worked as a development diplomat in Central America, spending a great deal of time in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, I advised the Sandinista government and, afterwards, the government of Violeta de Chamorro, on mass employment and social reconstruction. In Guatemala I worked with the Social Investment Fund, which addressed the problem of mass unemployment during the peace talks in that country. Shortly after the peace agreements were signed in El Salvador, I served as an adviser to the Secretariat of National Reconstruction. During these years, I became acquainted with the personalities and institutions directly involved in the peace negotiations and the post-war reintegration process. Utrecht University provided the funding for the research that resulted in this book. I received invaluable suggestions from my colleagues and my Ph. Most of the fieldwork for this study was carried out between and Ruben Zamora was exceptionally generous in offering me free and unlimited access to his private archive of the wartime and post-war FMLN. In Guatemala, both Rodrigo Asturias and Julio Balconi also afforded me access to their private archives and provided a helping hand in scheduling appointments and interviews. Their assistance is greatly appreciated. I am especially thankful for the collaboration of Margarita Vannini, director general of this fine facility. Maritza Blanco was of inestimable assistance in scheduling appointments. Manuel Ortega Hegg Universidad Centroamericana offered dispassionate and incisive interpretation of election campaigns and outcomes. Marion and Mayela Fleuren, my research associates, supplied great help in documenting and cross-checking references, and in scheduling and rescheduling appointments. Ellen McKinlay convinced me of the advantages of a thematic rather than a historical analysis of the guerrilla wars. Robert Forstag did sterling work in editing all the English and translating all the Spanish during the prepublication phase. More of the same? The conflicts that broke out in quick succession in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala became the subject of descriptions, analyses and narratives. Emotion and immediacy were all the rage. Analytical publications with theoretical heft were also written as part of the effort to understand the history of Central American societies. The contribution of such scholars was highly regarded, especially when their works were published in Spanish. The book introduced by the present essay belongs to that small group of works that aim to capture the reality of our region not only through the passions engendered by human solidarity but through the clarifying lens afforded by healthy distance and the FOREWORD xi exercise of sober analytical thinking. The last of the conflicts discussed in this volume ended more than ten years ago. As I write the text of this foreword, the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Esquipulas Agreements â€” known as Esquipulas II â€” is being observed. Guerrillas is most emphatically not more of the same. It is not merely a tired rehash of what is already known. Instead, it is more of something else â€” of what has until now either remained partially obscured or, in some cases, never seen the light of day. In stark contrast to those who write about a country after a single brief visit, Dr Kruijt is a social scientist with long years of experience in Central America. This is far from being the case with the present author. I know this because I have witnessed it personally. I have also attempted to steer the same course that Dr Kruijt has successfully navigated: The way that Dr Kruijt has managed to accomplish this is highly instructive, and might serve as a model for those â€” foreigners and native-born alike â€” who would hope to attain a profound understanding of our region. He managed to accomplish this by employing a number of different strategies. We have co-authored various studies; I was the editor of two of his books; we have taken part in a succession of academic events, and we have eaten numerous meals together â€” meals that were always accompanied by fine wine. Last but not least, we have shared many of the same deep yet transient passions during our respective life journeys. Without any false modesty, I can claim to have read almost everything that has been published about the great crises of the region during the s. Moreover, it is the first book on the region that was conceived in Dutch, written in English and â€” let us hope â€” will soon be

published in Spanish. I will not attempt to write a methodological critique of the present book. Instead, I merely wish to emphasize what seems to me a substantive technique designed to do justice to the complex texture of a social phenomenon: As Dr Kruijt puts it, he has had the opportunity to meet, speak and debate with many of the persons who have made Central American history. The testimonial method is very powerful but also very dangerous. The author needs to be wary that an interviewee may lie, and thus must know what kinds of questions to ask. To live through an event is something different from remembering that same event. Boldness, joy, pain and fear are emotional filters through which personal actions are viewed. The former writes from within the history of the events recounted, whereas the latter writes from a perspective distant from those same events. It is for this reason that the relationship between actor and author needs to be treated carefully by both parties. Dirk is without question an expert when it comes to both asking questions and discriminating fact from fiction. The interview method, as well as the discerning use of that method, lends weight to his research, for it is rich in detail, specific facts, anecdotes and quotations that clarify the familiar official version of events. Conducting ninety interviews is no mean feat. The book sets out to examine one particular aspect of the history of civil war or armed conflict in three different countries. In short, this is a book about guerrilla fighters and their comandantes. It therefore is a book that discusses their lives, their dreams, their struggles and their failures. The testimonial value of the work is complemented by other primary and secondary reference material. There is a certain wisdom in the careful balance that Dirk is able to strike between analytical objectivity and an unmistakable sympathy. When one writes about this kind of subject, complete neutrality and disinterestedness are as out of place as blatantly partisan advocacy. In this work, there is a balance between facts and their meaning, and between references cited and their supporting documentation. But it is useful to examine a number of features that illustrate the value of the information presented within these covers. There are three features of this book that seem to me to constitute innovations, and that serve to complement the contributions of previously published research. There is, first of all, remarkable information presented regarding the genesis of radical opposition movements: This latter feature represents an important contribution to the understanding of revolutionary movements in the region. Bias in the present volume is, apparently, inevitable, and seems to function as a salutary corrective to what among many past historians has been a negative bias towards the Sandinistas. Presented in that chapter are the conversations held with some of the most experienced political and military cadres – conversations that are as notable for their informative value as they are for their emotional intensity. As an old wise man once said: But, rather than being a criticism of what is missing, the mention here of omissions is rather an indirect acknowledgement of the comprehensive treatment accorded in this book to the subjects that he has chosen to focus on. In studying civil wars in Central America, it is impossible to ignore the pervasive and multifaceted influence of the United States. The documentation supporting this thesis is overwhelming. In the armed conflicts of the region, the involvement of ethnic groups, either as passive bystanders or as active participants, was far from insignificant. This involvement helped bring about the Atlantic Coast Autonomy Statute. In Guatemala, important Mayan communities pushed for inclusion in two of the insurgent groups: The particular way in which peace was achieved in each nation is also open to question. In Nicaragua, a serious socio-economic crisis –90 imposed limits on policy and forced the Sandinista government to the negotiating table: In El Salvador, military stalemate made negotiations unavoidable, which in turn allowed the modernization of the political system, introducing changes in the army, the establishment of a Truth Commission, and other reforms. Conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of civil wars in these countries. The most important conclusion is that these revolutions xvi GUERRILLAS did not bring about revolutionary change, and that they represented the uprisings of desperate people who had nearly lost all hope. The countries of Central America have had the experience of political democracy for the past two decades. For the first time, a generation has been born and educated without being subject to the dangers of state violence or the chaotic effects of civil strife. It is not possible here to address the question of whether democracy was born from the barrel of a gun. What we do know is that the deep structural causes that in part led to armed revolts are still with us, perhaps to a greater degree than was previously the case. Dirk devotes extensive space to a discussion of the legacies and ambiguities of the rebel leaders in each nation, and to other matters that are central to his

stated purpose: Another conclusion has to do with the changes experienced by oligarchic groups that formed the undisputed leadership of these nations for more than one hundred years. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, there were agrarian reforms and important attempts to foster participation of the masses in the political process, efforts that were aimed at creating vigorous civil societies. This explains why there are today powerful leftist political forces in these two nations. This is not what happened in Guatemala. This is the country where the war was the longest and most brutal, and where the conflict yielded the fewest dividends in terms of engendering political democracy. Land ownership did not change, and civil society was not strengthened. Finally, rebus sic stantibus, I agree with Dirk: AFA packet In Nicaragua, the government-supplied family food ration of rice, beans and sugar in Spanish: In the pre period in Nicaragua, each of the three FSLM wings was headed by three leading comandantes; this meant that the FSLN leadership was a collective of nine members. The most influential members of this committee also acted as guerrilla negotiators during the peace talks. Their main supply lines and military bases were established in Honduras. In fact, the real guerrilla leadership in El Salvador and Guatemala was formed by the comandancia general. EAP Economically active population persons aged between 14 and Grupo de los Doce Group of Twelve: Many cabinet members and high-ranking government officials were recruited from this group between and Guardia Nacional National Guard: US-created militarized police forces, the pillar of the Somoza regime Nicaragua. Juventud Sandinista 19 de Julio Sandinista youth association Nicaragua.

*It contains an American military history, from the s to the present, as analyzed by Dennis J Foley in cycle or 'time fractal' format. It is one of a kind research. The pivotal turning times from peace periods to war periods and back to peace periods, they confirmed by peace treaties, are shown in detail.*

Turchin is serious about it though, offering a semi-mathematical framework for historical analysis he calls cliodynamics, which borrows methodologically from statistical mechanics and nonlinear dynamics. In English, that means he models the rise and fall of empires using equations that treat people as groups, and also account for chaotic behavior as well. Once that edifice has been built to a certain point, the scaffolding can be stripped away, leaving only plain English behind. I would have liked more detail on the non-European empires like Persia, China, the various Indian empires, or anything in the Western Hemisphere, but I think those would only bolster his thesis. He finds that empires typically arise on what he calls a "metaethnic frontier", in other words a boundary between two relatively different cultures cf. This is similar to how the Romans fought off the Gauls, Phoenicians, etc by gradually assimilating similar tribes like that Samnites and so on. Every good theory of how empires rise should also be able to explain how empires fall, and his asabiya concept seems to do a decent job of explaining "imperiopathosis" as well. Something that Turchin finds over and over again in history is that incredibly successful civilizations, after having built their empires, seem to be inherently unstable and prone to decay through loss of asabiya. Basically, in a mature empire that no longer feels compelled to expand, the number of elites starts to slowly increase, both due to lower chances of dying in wars and due to the higher reproductive rate that being rich in an agricultural society allows for. The differing fates of north and south Italy are discussed towards the end of the book, why north Italy, while fairly rich, still has a social capital deficit compared to countries like France or Germany, while low-trust south Italy is an "asabiya black hole", as demonstrated by the presence of groups like the Mafia. The typical successful Italian company is a family-owned business with perhaps a hundred employees in Milan or Bologna. They occupy a variety of niches from fashion to high-precision machinery, and they are extremely successful at what they do. But they cannot break into certain international markets because they lack the advantage of size. And they cannot grow to a large size, because the Italians, even northern ones, can cooperate only in medium-sized groups. Is this why northern Italians historically could not get beyond medium-sized states? The First Three Thousand Years, with its endless tales of violent disputes over completely arbitrary doctrinal issues like the filioque clause or if icons are kosher or whether to make the sign of the cross with two fingers or three, this seems very true to me. This is true - Diamond might be able to explain the ultimate outcome, but how would that explain, for example, the asabiya-induced paralysis and chaos of the Incans after Atahualpa was captured? Climate change in our own day might have significant effects on political stability as well. I wonder if you could correlate intra-society violence to asabiya shifts. For example, the US right after WW2 was infamously homogenous and group-centered, with low levels of crime. Is crime a good proxy for asabiya e. The parallels between pre-Revolutionary France or ancient Rome to the modern US in terms of the power of the wealthy are numerous and disturbing, although of course only valid up to a point. Still, how would a conservative or a liberal, for that matter apply the implications of this book to our current economic condition? Overall this is a really interesting book, a definite Big History champion, and is also full of great factoids. This pattern is just what we expect in a pre-industrial society where a substantial proportion of women died in childbirth. In noble families, however, the pattern was reversed—there were only 85 males per females. In other words, there were 28 percent fewer noble males than we would expect if their mortality patterns were the same as commoners The wills studied by Lorcin allowed her to calculate that during the second half of the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth, the proportions of noble girls becoming nuns were 40 and 30 percent, respectively. Only in the second half of the fifteenth century did this proportion decline to 14 percent. The first two Tudors, Henry VII and Henry VIII, employed judicial murder with great effect, systematically exterminating all potential claimants to the English throne, who also happened to be among the richest landowners. When one of her subjects became too wealthy, she invited herself to his castle along with her

whole court. After some weeks of dining and wining the queen and hundreds of her followers, the unfortunate host was financially ruined for many years to come, and was too busy paying off his debts to contemplate rebellion. One chapter seeks to bolster this theory by reviewing group-selection theory from evolutionary biology. This group-selection argument fails: Turchin actually skips over without explaining how a pro-social mentality can out-compete an ego.

**Chapter 3 : The War and Peace Cycle | Gold Eagle**

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It seems, however, that opportunities to go to war are seized upon when certain conditions are in place, and one such condition is a sharp decline in the money supply growth rate. On a related matter, studies of long-term cycles by the famous Russian economist Kondratieff and others have shown that both the frequency and amplitude of military conflicts tend to increase after commodity prices have hit major secular lows and turned higher. Further to the above, in his interesting and controversial book "War Cycles Peace Cycles" Richard Kelly Hoskins correlates secular commodity price trends, war, peace, and the practice of borrowing money into existence. The secular up-trends for commodity prices were hence termed "war cycles" and the downtrends termed "peace cycles". However, if the low for commodity prices turns out to be THE major bottom then we are presently in the fourth year of a "war cycle" that is likely to last at least 20 years. According to Hoskins, an important driver of the cyclical behaviour illustrated above is the practice of charging interest on money because this practice leads to the total of all obligations to pay money being greater than the total supply of money. Such a scheme is inherently unstable, meaning that a system-threatening crisis is inevitable at some point. Furthermore, under our current monetary system the problem is magnified because almost ALL money comes into existence as the result of a loan. This means that new money must be created at a fast enough pace to enable existing debts to be paid off, but then each new dollar borrowed into existence just adds to the problem. At some point the pool comprising all existing and potential borrowers becomes unwilling, or unable, to increase its debt burden. When this happens the money supply stops growing or even begins to contract, making it impossible for many borrowers to get hold of enough money to pay their debts. The result is that these borrowers lose a lot of what they worked hard to accumulate and the social mood, in turn, becomes more conducive to war. During previous long-term cycles, the production of commodities represented a substantial portion of the economy in countries such as the US. This meant that money-supply growth rates and commodity prices were well-correlated, that is, periods of rising money-supply growth generally coincided with periods of rising commodity prices and periods of falling money-supply growth generally coincided with periods of falling commodity prices. As such, major peaks and troughs in money-supply growth always roughly coincided with major peaks and troughs in commodity prices. And after prices and money-supply growth hit rock bottom a new long-term upward trend, propelled in part by the borrowing of money into existence to finance war, would begin. Note that "upward trend", in this context, refers to the commodity-price level and the money supply growth rate, not the real economic growth rate. We say this because it is normal for commodities, stocks and real estate to bottom at around the same time during the transition from the "peace cycle" to the "war cycle" the stock market tends to do well throughout much of the "peace cycle", but eventually falls prey to a combination of its own over-valuation and the falling money-supply growth trend. Clearly, neither stock prices nor real estate prices were remotely close to important lows when commodity prices were bottoming over the past few years. For example, in the past the money-supply growth rate has fallen off a cliff shortly after a major stock market bubble has burst, but the US money-supply growth rate continued higher for 2 years after the bursting of the most recent stock market bubble.

**Chapter 4 : Episode 3: War and Peace | Latino Americans | PBS**

*The pivotal turning times from peace periods to war periods and back to peace periods, confirmed by peace treaties, are shown in detail. History's dated events are used as 'data' and since the Cycle projections have been proven correct.*

Usury had acted as a rope which had been strangling the West. As soon as it was banned, the West broke forth into a flowering which could not have been imagined earlier. Italian merchants became wealthy enough to travel to China with their goods. Spanish and Portuguese explorers were financed and uncovered continents with which to trade. Money for the development of inventions became available. The Michelangelos, Rembrandts, Shakespeares, and Newtons were supported by the growing wealth of the West, and they did their thing - and made it profitable. This was an era free of interest! Circulating Money "Tallies" were a very important part of the economic system of the Middle Ages. Anyone who had the power could issue them. The Hansiatic League was a confederation made up of scores of independent German cities. They had the power to issue tallies - and they did. So did virtually every county and large city in Europe. The hard pocket money was gold and silver coins. Many of these coins were in poor condition, being worn, clipped, and some counterfeited. This seemed to make as little difference then as it did in Roman days. People cheerfully accepted them in payment for goods and services. The government accepted a clipped coin as readily as a full weight coin for taxes. Not so the foreign merchants. When they made a transaction, they wanted payment in full weight gold coins. Thus we have two kinds of coins - "discount coins" for the citizens and "trade coins" for the merchants. Paper money of large denomination was simply a gold deposit receipt. A bank had, in the manner of the Templars, taken in a store of gold and issued a paper to that effect. The paper bore the stamp and guarantee of the bank. The gold belonged to whoever presented the paper. Few people will carry around five pounds of silver coins or two pounds of gold coins in their pocket when a piece of paper which is light and portable will serve the same purpose. Of course, the peasants always wanted their one or two coins in hand instead of a piece of paper. Since "interest" was not present, there was no compelling reason to issue more "gold certificates" than there was gold reserve. In addition to gold deposit receipts there were other kinds of large denomination money. It might take the form of a deed to a house, a business, a ship or some other sort of debt-free equity which had an accepted value in the market place. To make this "paper money" more readily acceptable, it was often guaranteed by a bank that had investigated and found that this boat or that house was indeed worth so much money on a certain day and in public recognition of that fact attached their seal for a small fee. This deed was used as paper money and had worth. It was not a mere "promise to pay". He would go to a bank and ask for money, say pounds. The bank would buy the boat and hire him as captain with a salary. If the bank thought he was doing a poor job, they might fire him and hire another captain. If the boat sank, insurance covered it. The bank got a fee for its services. Not a large fee either. Another way to handle the same boat contract was on a "rental" basis. The buyer kept all the profits and paid rent to investors. There might be an option to "buy" the boat. The type of contract which could be drawn was limited only by the imagination. One thing - it had to be fair! In the way illustrated above, in ten years the buyer could own his own ship without having to put up any money of his own. Of course, the 10 year contract is given only as illustration. Practically there were no such contracts that went past 7 years: At the end of every seven years thou shall make a release cancellation of debts. And this is the manner of the release: Of a foreigner Heb: The House Buyer If a man wanted to buy a house, the same sort of business arrangement could be made. He might have 10 pounds of his own for a down payment. He would go to the bank and ask for a loan for the balance. The bank would send out an appraiser to find out if the house was really worth the discussed purchase price of perhaps pounds. If it was, a deal could be struck. The buyer also paid rent. Each year the bank allowed him to buy more of the house. In time he owned it all. Being kicked out did not deprive him of what was already his. What is fair or not fair is much easier determined when one does not have wild market swings brought about by interest-caused inflation or deflation, i. In that day they had nothing comparable to the booms and busts that are the rule today. It is said that the price of bread remained the same for four centuries in the Hansiatic League. Determining Usury Contracts In a no-interest contract there is always risk for both partners. If the risk

factor is all on one side, the church determined whether it was a usury or non- usury contract. The usury contract makes one side risk-free and eventually ruins the borrower as it was designed to do. The no- interest contract shares the risk. Both parties rise or fall together. This is one of the oldest rules of Canon Law in determining whether or not a contract was a usury contract - "equal risk". Early Bank Failures For many years the private bankers did most of the business for merchants and kings - practically all of which was interest free. If the king politely requested a private banker to make a loan to him, the private banker did - or came under his displeasure. The problem was compounded if the king rode off to war and got himself killed. In these cases the debt was seldom paid and the private banker was ruined. On other occasions the private bankers might allow good merchant customers to borrow from him to cement their relationship. During one forty-two year period following the expulsion of the Jews from England and France, the following Italian banks were ruined for lack of specie to honor their obligations:

**Chapter 5 : Guerrillas: War and Peace in Central America - PDF Free Download**

*In a controversial book titled "War Cycles Peace Cycles," Richard Kelly Hoskins correlated secular commodity price trends with war, peace, and the manipulation of money supply by governments.*

It seems, however, that opportunities to go to war are seized upon when certain conditions are in place, and one such condition is a sharp decline in the money supply growth rate. On a related matter, studies of long-term cycles by the famous Russian economist Kondratieff and others have shown that both the frequency and amplitude of military conflicts tend to increase after commodity prices have hit major secular lows and turned higher. Further to the above, in his interesting and controversial book "War Cycles Peace Cycles" Richard Kelly Hoskins correlates secular commodity price trends, war, peace, and the practice of borrowing money into existence. The secular up-trends for commodity prices were hence termed "war cycles" and the downtrends termed "peace cycles". However, if the low for commodity prices turns out to be THE major bottom then we are presently in the fourth year of a "war cycle" that is likely to last at least 20 years. According to Hoskins, an important driver of the cyclical behaviour illustrated above is the practice of charging interest on money because this practice leads to the total of all obligations to pay money being greater than the total supply of money. Such a scheme is inherently unstable, meaning that a system-threatening crisis is inevitable at some point. Furthermore, under our current monetary system the problem is magnified because almost ALL money comes into existence as the result of a loan. This means that new money must be created at a fast enough pace to enable existing debts to be paid off, but then each new dollar borrowed into existence just adds to the problem. At some point the pool comprising all existing and potential borrowers becomes unwilling, or unable, to increase its debt burden. When this happens the money supply stops growing or even begins to contract, making it impossible for many borrowers to get hold of enough money to pay their debts. The result is that these borrowers lose a lot of what they worked hard to accumulate and the social mood, in turn, becomes more conducive to war. During previous long-term cycles, the production of commodities represented a substantial portion of the economy in countries such as the US. This meant that money-supply growth rates and commodity prices were well-correlated, that is, periods of rising money-supply growth generally coincided with periods of rising commodity prices and periods of falling money-supply growth generally coincided with periods of falling commodity prices. As such, major peaks and troughs in money-supply growth always roughly coincided with major peaks and troughs in commodity prices. And after prices and money-supply growth hit rock bottom a new long-term upward trend, propelled in part by the borrowing of money into existence to finance war, would begin. Note that "upward trend", in this context, refers to the commodity-price level and the money supply growth rate, not the real economic growth rate. We say this because it is normal for commodities, stocks and real estate to bottom at around the same time during the transition from the "peace cycle" to the "war cycle" the stock market tends to do well throughout much of the "peace cycle", but eventually falls prey to a combination of its own over-valuation and the falling money-supply growth trend. Clearly, neither stock prices nor real estate prices were remotely close to important lows when commodity prices were bottoming over the past few years. Then again, perhaps the real difference this time around is that the strategies that have previously only been attempted in response to a system-threatening crisis have been brought into play prior to such a crisis in an effort to prevent, or postpone, the inevitable crisis. For example, in the past the money-supply growth rate has fallen off a cliff shortly after a major stock market bubble has burst, but the US money-supply growth rate continued higher for 2 years after the bursting of the most recent stock market bubble. In other words, we appear to be seeing a number of pre-emptive strikes designed to dampen the cyclical oscillations caused by the use of unsound money.

**Chapter 6 : America in War and Peace: United States Invaded Our Pretty Little Garden**

*"America's War and Peace Cycles to the Present, With Projections", by Dennis www.nxgvision.com This Cycle Study includes virtually every significant War and Peace event in America's Military www.nxgvision.com regular cycles of War and then abruptly of Peace, are Cycle Charted; with trend projections.. A long term Cycle of Imperilism and Isolationism is Cycle www.nxgvision.com post war 'Kill the Chief Syndrome's.*

Cliff Droke June 21, The created universe in which we live is manifestly governed by the principle of continuous revolution, commonly known as the cycle. Most are cognizant of the cyclic motions which govern prices in the realm of economics and finance, but few are aware of how cycles of even larger degrees connect those financial fluctuations to the extremely important human endeavors of war and peace. On this score, it is our contention that a definite and predictable cycle governing times of war and times of peace can be isolated and used to forecast times of significant socio-military and economic turmoil. Moreover, this "War and Peace cycle," if you will, is a direct consequence of activity within the realm of gold production and trading. A corollary to cycle theory is that every cycle—irrespective of degree or significance—contains its own unique rhythm cycle theorist P. Wall terms this an "interior rhythm". For instance, an average year Kondratieff commodity cycle typically subdivides into either 15 or 20 component Kitchin or "business" cycles each one of year average duration, and each of these Kitchin cycles further subdivide into an average of nine week Wall cycles so named after its discoverer. Each set of nine week Wall cycles possesses its own unique rhythm. For instance, each one of the nine Wall cycles within a given Kitchin cycle may be of the 3-month or 4-month variety, and occasionally even of the 5-month variety. Now that we have explained the concept of interior rhythm, we can proceed to outlining the existence and attributes of the War and Peace cycle. If we take as our starting point the first significant war of the last year—the American Revolution of—we may then proceed along the lines of following a definite rhythmic cycle of war and peace. This was followed a further 13 years later by the "Decemberist Revolt" in Russia, which was followed 23 years later by the various revolutions in Europe. This period was followed 13 years later by the American Civil War. This thread of military history forms the following time cycle: This forms an average interior rhythm of Under this cyclic parameter, we may reasonably expect the next significant military conflict in which the U. It is commonly and erroneously assumed that war serves as a stimulus to both the economy and to productivity. While this may indeed be the case over the short-term especially if the country involved happened to be in a recession prior to the outbreak of war, it is anything but the case over the long-term. War requires a tremendous output in production, resources, money and time. War is never paid for up front; rather, it is financed with debt, which must be repaid over a period of many years, along with interest payments. The citizens of the debtor nation regardless of whether they were "victorious" in battle are the ultimate losers. War debts make up a large part of the gargantuan and ever-growing U. Now that we have seen the impetus behind post-war monetary manipulation, we proceed to outline a further attribute of our War and Peace cycle, namely that besides containing an identifiable internal rhythm in terms of time, it also contains a definite internal rhythm in terms of character. The War and Peace cycle typically alternates between inflation and deflation, inflation and deflation, etc. And since the last significant war was followed by deflation albeit of a mild variety, we may reasonably expect the next war to be accompanied or followed by inflation. But now we come to an even more fascinating discovery in our examination of the War and Peace cycle: It is no coincidence that at least the last 10 major wars were fought against lands that happened to be extremely rich in natural resources. But even more significantly, gold production is a major factor behind most wars. This observation was made by the great economist Edward Beach Howell, as printed in the July, edition of the "Atlantic Monthly. A new country is opened, as the Rand in South Africa. There is the usual rush to that region. Presently there are large additions to the money metal of the world. But perhaps more subtly, it is interesting to note the forecasting role that the price of gold has served in anticipating these periods of tumult and socio-economic activity. How even more remarkable that gold has retained its ability to forecast economic and even military machinations today, when the metal is so terribly out of favor among the investing public. We noted above that the next period of military conflict

involving our nation should occur within the next one to four years”how interesting that in terms of price, gold bottomed late last year and has been rising with the force of trading volume behind it ever since. Is not this a reasonable warning of the storm brewing on both the military and economic horizon? Clif Droke is editor of the weekly Leading Indicators newsletter, covering the U. He is the author of the recently published book, Technical Analysis Simplified. For a free sample issue of Leading Indicators, send name and mailing address to cdroke aol. Leading Indicators, Easley St. Clif Droke is the editor of the three times weekly Momentum Strategies Report newsletter, published since , which covers U. The forecasts are made using a unique proprietary blend of analytical methods involving cycles, internal momentum and moving average systems, as well as investor sentiment.

**Chapter 7 : War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations by Peter Turchin**

*War Cycles And Peace Cycles By Steve Saville - May 05, , AM CDT In previous commentaries we've explained why the US Government could be expected to do everything in its power to prevent the current downward trend in the money supply growth rate from continuing.*

Dewey reported that each economist to whom he spoke gave him a different answer and he lost faith in the current economic methods. He received and took advice to study how business behaviour occurred rather than why. Therefore, his views are generally regarded as inconsistent with mainstream economics. In , Edward R. Dewey learned of a Canadian conference on biological cycles held at Matamek. The foundation was set up with a board that included distinguished scientists and industrialists to act as a central clearing house of cycles studies from diverse areas. Together with author Og Mandino , Dewey published a book entitled *Cycles*: He also said that there were many cycles with periods that were related by powers or products of 2 and 3. This is illustrated in the table below. To construct this table starting from the period Dewey reported that the underlined numbers are commonly occurring periods in years: In these reports there is a tendency for certain periods of cycles to be reported more commonly. These common periods include the underlined periods above and some other periods such as 9. Dewey further said that: More than different phenomena in 36 different areas of knowledge have been found to fluctuate in rhythmic cycles. The Science of Prediction which argued the United States economy was driven by four cycles of different length. Milton Friedman dismissed their theory as pseudoscience: *The Science of Prediction* is not a scientific book: Like most modern advertising, the book seeks to sell its product by making exaggerated claims for it [ Joseph Schumpeter also put forward the idea that there were four economic cycles: Kitchin, Juglar, Kuznets and Kondratieff. Nothing at all, he replied. It is therefore impossible for several or numerous independent cycles to coexist as self-contained units. It is precisely the characteristic of a business cycle that it permeates all market activities. To the extent that such varying cycles such as the year "building cycle" or the seventeen-year cicada cycle may exist, however, they are irrelevant to a study of business cycles in general or to business depressions in particular. What we are trying to explain are general booms and busts in business. It was incorporated in the State of Connecticut by Edward R. It has published *Cycles* magazine and recorded the work of Dewey and many other cycles researchers through the years. The FSC also holds conferences and publishes its proceedings. The Foundation consists of four interrelated groups: Cycles, the Science of Prediction. Foundation for the Study of Cycles. Cycles Classic Library Collection 4 volumes.

**Chapter 8 : Edward R. Dewey - Wikipedia**

*War Cycles/Peace Cycles. chapter twelve. THE RENAISSANCE. The universal prohibition of interest unleashed the mighty Western Renaissance. Usury had acted as a rope which had been strangling the West.*

The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, - nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New. The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others, - Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of politics, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling [. Europe consists of the densest aggregation of population in the history of the world. This population is accustomed to a relatively high standard of life, in which, even now, some sections of it anticipate improvement rather than deterioration. In relation to other continents Europe is not self-sufficient; in particular it cannot feed itself. Internally the population is not evenly distributed, but much of it is crowded into a relatively small number of dense industrial centers. This population secured for itself a livelihood before the war, without much margin of surplus, by means of a delicate and immensely complicated organization, of which the foundations were supported by coal, iron, transport, and an unbroken supply of imported food and raw materials from other continents. By the destruction of this organization and the interruption of the stream of supplies, a part of this population is deprived of its means of livelihood. Emigration is not open to the redundant surplus. For it would take years to transport them overseas, even, which is not the case, if countries could be found which were ready to receive them. The danger confronting us, therefore, is the rapid depression of the standard of life of the European populations to a point which will mean actual starvation for some a point already reached in Russia and approximately reached in Austria. Men will not always die quietly. For starvation, which brings to some lethargy and a helpless despair, drives other temperaments to the nervous instability of hysteria and to a mad despair. And these in their distress may overturn the remnants of organization, and submerge civilization itself in their attempts to satisfy desperately the overwhelming needs of the individual. This is the danger against which all our resources and courage and idealism must now co-operate. On the 13th May, , Count Brockdorff-Rantzau addressed to the Peace Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers the Report of the German Economic Commission charged with the study of the effect of the conditions of Peace on the situation of the German population. So long as she was an agricultural State, Germany could feed forty million inhabitants. As an industrial State she could insure the means of subsistence for a population of sixty-seven millions; and in the importation of foodstuffs amounted, in round figures, to twelve million tons. Before the war a total of fifteen million persons in Germany provided for their existence by foreign trade, navigation, and the use, directly or indirectly, of foreign raw material. An enormous part of German industry will, therefore, be condemned inevitably to destruction. The need of importing foodstuffs will increase considerably at the same time that the possibility of satisfying this demand is as greatly diminished. In a very short time, therefore, Germany will not be in a position to give bread and work to her numerous millions of inhabitants, who are prevented from earning their livelihood by navigation and trade. These persons should emigrate, but this is a material impossibility, all the more because many countries and the most important ones will oppose any German immigration. To put the Peace conditions into execution would logically involve, therefore, the loss of several millions of persons in Germany. This catastrophe would not be long in coming about, seeing that the health of the population has been broken down during the War by the Blockade, and during the Armistice by the aggravation of the

Blockade of famine. No help however great, or over however long a period it were continued, could prevent these deaths en masse. Those who sign this Treaty will sign the death sentence of many millions of German men, women and children. The indictment is at least as true of the Austrian, as of the German, settlement. This is the fundamental problem in front of us, before which questions of territorial adjustment and the balance of European power are insignificant. Some of the catastrophes of past history, which have thrown back human progress for centuries, have been due to the reactions following on the sudden termination, whether in the course of nature or by the act of man, of temporarily favorable conditions which have permitted the growth of population beyond what could be provided for when the favorable conditions were at an end.

## Chapter 9 : America in War and Peace

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