

DOWNLOAD PDF CHANGING MARRIAGE PATTERNS IN SOUTH KOREA

MINJA KIM CHOE

Chapter 1 : April 5 Program

MINJA KIM CHOE *Curriculum Vitae* May Minja Kim. "Changing Marriage Pattern in South Korea." Pp. in Mason, Choe, Minja Kim, and I. H. Park.

Tsuya University of Wisconsin, Madison Keio University Japan, unlike most Western countries, has not experienced several components of the second demographic transition, including cohabitation, widespread use of childcare centers, unmarried childbearing, and nonmarriage. Yet there is evidence that Japan is ripe for change in such family behaviors. This article examines a set of innovative questions related to knowing individuals who have engaged in these behaviors by type of relationship sibling, other relative, friend, and coworker respondent has to such individuals. We find that a large proportion of the Japanese population knows someone who has cohabited, used childcare, had a nonmarital birth, or plans to remain unmarried. This knowledge is patterned by both relationship domain and social structural variables. There is a strong positive association between knowing someone who has engaged in one of these behaviors and attitudes toward nontraditional family behavior; suggesting pathways by which micro-level interpersonal interactions may be linked to macro-level social change. While the components of this "second demographic transition" van de Kaa ; Direct correspondence to Ronald R. Rindfuss, University of North Carolina. Sidney Westley provided editorial assistance. Lesthaeghe vary substantially from country to country, common elements include increasing education and delayed entry into full-time work, increasing participation of women in the paid labor force, delayed marriage or nonmarriage, delayed parenthood or childlessness, and increasing levels of cohabitation, nonmarital births, divorce, and single-parent families. Use of childcare centers has facilitated the combining of work and family roles, and is, by extension, part of this second demographic transition. These various changes have transformed the life course of individuals and the societies in which they live. The onset, pace of change, and levels of these behaviors have varied widely across countries. Although active opposition continues in many countries, these behaviors have become so common that it is easy to forget how shocking they once were. For instance, the cohabitation of a Columbia College undergraduate with a Barnard College coed appeared in a series of 15 news reports in the New York Times, some on the front page, over a 6-month period Rindfuss and Stephen Even though this second demographic transition has occurred in numerous societies, we know little about how new family and fertility behaviors became accepted, or at least tolerated. Social-network processes such as imitation and persuasion were likely central. But the behavior may be increasingly regarded as tolerable or even desirable with increased knowledge of and contact with those who have engaged in it. This has likely been key in the dramatic shifts in attitudes toward innovative family behaviors in many countries for the United States, see Bumpass ; Pagnini and Rindfuss Japan provides an important case with respect to the second demographic transition. Similar to many Western countries, age at marriage has increased dramatically, the stability of marriages is decreasing, and fertility levels are very low. But many of the other components of the second demographic transition have not yet occurred. In this paper, we use Japanese data with unique measures to examine knowledge of family-behavior innovators, and the relationship between knowing innovators and attitudes toward such behaviors. We argue that conditions in Japan are ripe for change in a number of family behaviors, but also note that given the striking dissimilarities in history and culture between Japan and the West, it is possible that some components of the second demographic transition may not occur in Japan. We use the term innovation rather than deviance to emphasize that new forms of behavior are spreading in a society; we take no position as to whether such new behavior ought to spread. Our data address using childcare centers, never marrying, cohabiting, and unmarried childbearing—all strongly discouraged under traditional Japanese family values. We provide evidence that the overwhelming majority of the Japanese population know someone who has engaged in one or more of these behaviors. We document the extent of personal knowledge of innovators of various types, and the type of relationship domain e. We then show that this knowledge varies along important social dimensions,

and that these differences are structured in ways consistent with the nature of the behaviors and the organization of social networks. Finally, we show a strong, positive association between knowledge of innovators and attitudes relevant to these nontraditional patterns of family behavior, arguing that this is an important pathway linking social relations and family behavioral change, with the causality likely operating in both directions. This paper draws heavily on the theory, orientation, and methods of the social-networks literature. As such, it continues a tradition within social demography of incorporating social-network approaches. Both saturation samples sometimes called complete network designs and egocentric approaches have been used to examine the spread of HIV and AIDS. For theoretical and methodological reviews see Casterline and Morris. Particularly significant is its history of a strong Confucian influence on family values and behavior, with an emphasis on filial piety. Aruga ; Otake. The traditional Japanese family system, called *ie*, dating from at least the Meiji era was based on patrilineal descent, patriarchal authority, and patrilocal residence. Fukutake ; Ishihara. The importance of patrilineal descent is seen in the acceptability of adopting a son *yoshi* when there is no male heir. Befu ; Lebra ; Taeuber. The governmental system for registering legal residence *koseki* keeps track of lineages, and children born to unmarried mothers are still officially referred to as "illegitimate children" *hi-chakushutsu-shi*, a stigma with negative consequences for children. As a context for social change, it likely matters that Japan is relatively homogenous with respect to ethnicity, language, and religion. Buddhism and Shintoism have long been part of the society and permeate Japanese life, but their influence is different in character than religion in Western societies. While religion is important as a homogenizing influence, it does not have, per se, a direct influence on the family behaviors of interest here; nor is there competition among religious perspectives, as is common in many Western societies. On the other hand, Japan shares many of the pressures that have contributed to family change in Western societies. It is an urbanized, postindustrial society with an excellent transportation and communication infrastructure. Housing can be expensive, and the demand for a wide variety of consumer products is as intense as in North America or Western Europe. Some would say that the Japanese *ie* system dates back at least to the Tokugawa era in the sense that it had been the family system of samurai warrior class. The proportion of women ages with higher education increased from 10 percent in 1950 to 51 percent in 1990, reaching a par with men in the same age group. National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. a: The structure of the Japanese labor market tends to differentiate sharply between jobs for women and those for men. Women are more likely to be in part-time non-career-type jobs. paato. Men tend to be in regular full-time jobs with career and promotion prospects, and with the expectation that salarymen will put in long hours on the job and socialize with coworkers after work. Brinton ; Choe, Bumpass, and Tsuya. Mothers continue to be the principal childcare providers and many women discontinue employment, or reduce their employment hours, when they become mothers. Choe, Bumpass, and Tsuya. Nevertheless, almost one out of three mothers of children under age four in 1990 were in the labor force. Japan Ministry of Labour. The extent to which married Japanese couples live with a parent has been declining. Ogawa and Retherford. Still, in contrast to most Western postindustrial societies, intergenerational coresidence is common, especially among firstborn sons. Rindfuss et al. Further, coresidence of never-married young adults with their parents is the norm. In 1990, 82 percent of single individuals ages 18-24 were living with their parents. Tsuya, Mason, and Bumpass. Because they tend not to pay for room and board, unmarried young adults residing with their parents have considerable disposable income. Raymo and Ono ; Yamada, a factor that may play a role in delayed marriage. At the same time, these changes are filtered through the cultures in which they occur. It is exactly for this reason that Japan, as a modern non-Western country, provides an important case for the confrontation of traditional family patterns with the forces of a modern economy. There is considerable tension between the demands of an urban, postindustrial society and the traditional package associated with marriage in Japan. We use "package" to highlight the culturally and temporally specific set of norms, values, and expectations that define marriage in Japan. Coleman ; Rindfuss. Marriage, childbearing, childrearing, and frequently care for elderly parents are linked. When women marry, they are expected to assume these other roles and marriage is expected to be a life-long commitment.

Household tasks within marriage are extremely gender segregated, with the burden falling overwhelmingly on the wife Ishii-Kuntz and Maryanski ; Tsuya and Bumpass , This marriage package is at odds with demands of a modern economy, creating conflict for many young women who want to capitalize on their education in the paid labor force. In the context of such tensions, Japan may be on the cusp of major changes in family behavior for two related reasons. Rising educational levels for women, increasing female labor-force participation, and a rising desire for career-type jobs among some women exacerbate work and family conflicts that already exist. Japan has traditionally had extremely high proportions marrying. Between and , only 2 to 3 percent of women and men ages had never married National Institute of Population and Social Security Research The proportion of women ages who had never married more than doubled from 21 to 54 percent between and National Institute of Population and Social Security Research a: Relatively little is known about cohabitation in Japan. The consensus among Japanese demographers has been that it is low compared to Western countries, although there are hints that it may be increasing Mainichi Newspapers ; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research b. The postponement of marriage and decline in period fertility rates may indicate that Japanese women are reluctant to take on the traditional marriage package. If this speculation is true, it may be that cohabitation will begin to appear attractive. We know from studies on the United States that cohabiting unions are more egalitarian than marriages, or at least attract more egalitarian individuals Brines and Joyner ; Kaufinan and are much less constrained by traditional expectations for married behavior. Japanese fertility has declined to one of the lowest levels in the world. The total fertility rate dropped from 4. At the same time, unlike most Western societies, unmarried childbearing has been virtually absent. For at least the past 40 years, about 1 to 2 percent of all Japanese births occur outside of marriage National Institute of Population and Social Security Research a: Is it then plausible that unmarried childbearing may also increase dramatically in Japan? Finally, Japan is likely poised to make more extensive use of childcare. First, even though the number of slots for preschool children in day-care centers has increased the number of children on waiting lists has increased even faster Miura , reflecting pent-up demand. Second, government policies have changed from encouraging mothers to stay home to providing maternity leave benefits Shimoebisu ; Maeda Childcare makes it easier for women to combine the worker and mother roles, which, in turn, could influence aspects of marriage and fertility patterns. Included are an increased demand for highly educated workers, a decrease in agricultural and other jobs more compatible with childrearing, increased educational attainment and associated job prospects for women, an increased taste for a wide variety of consumer items, and increased discretionary income among unmarried young adults. We use the phrase "conditions favorable for change" in the same manner as a seismologist might say that changing tension between tectonic plates has made conditions favorable for an earthquake. Change is likely, but not inevitable. Traditional norms and behavior may successfully restrain the force of strong pressures for change. The processes through which such resistance might be overcome would likely involve the following: The following subsections discuss these four components from the perspective of family innovation. Innovation can take a variety of forms. It can be a completely new technology or product see the classic medical sociology study Coleman, Katz, and Menzel It can be a new protest or political party as is seen in the social-movements literature e. It can also be a preexisting behavior, idea, or product that is used in a new way, which is the case for the behaviors under consideration here. Such rare behaviors against the cultural grain of the prevailing family system are likely to have occurred for idiosyncratic reasons. The important point is that there have been examples, but they were viewed as deviants. Hence the issue is the following: For example, a young woman might repeatedly postpone marriage because she thoroughly enjoys being single. On the other hand, using a daycare center might be the only option available to a mother who is working out of financial necessity. Second, there have to be bridges between the innovators and the rest of society.

DOWNLOAD PDF CHANGING MARRIAGE PATTERNS IN SOUTH KOREA

MINJA KIM CHOE

Chapter 2 : Values and Demographic Behavior | www.nxgvision.com

Contents: Family formation in Japan, South Korea, and the United States: an overview / Shunichi Inoue -- Changing marriage patterns in South Korea / Minja Kim Choe -- Changing significance of marriage in the United States / Larry L. Bumpass -- Time allocation between employment and housework in Japan, South Korea, and the United States / Noriko.

Family Change in Asia and the United States share Throughout most of the industrial and post-industrial world, changes in marriage, fertility, and child rearing over the past half century have had profound effects on public policy and family life, ranging from the fiscal viability of government-run old-age pension schemes to the well-being of children. These family behavioral changes have occurred in a context of major structural changes in economies, education systems, and other institutions. Researchers in this collaborative project examine attitudes and behavior in areas of education, marriage and cohabitation, divorce, childbearing, childcare, employment, and relationships with parents and children, using national survey data from Japan, South Korea, other Asian countries, and the United States. A major component examines patterns of rapid diffusion of innovation among young adults in Japan, based on National Surveys on Family and Economic Conditions. This study explores the diffusion of selected innovative family behaviors that are rare in Japan today, including childbearing outside of marriage, cohabitation without marriage, remaining unmarried throughout the childbearing years, and use of childcare centers for very young children. A high level of acceptance of non-traditional behaviors can reinforce the diffusion of such behaviors. The project examines how attitudes toward non-traditional behaviors may be changing by examining differences in attitudes among age cohorts and other groups. The attitudes examined relate to marriage, parenthood, and gender roles. The project also examines the patterns of change in family behavior and the relationship to changes in economic conditions, education systems, and other institutions in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Behaviors including marriage, childbearing, divorce, cohabitation, gender division of labor, and intergenerational relationships are examined through analyses of recent national survey data. The project is partially funded by a grant from the U. In addition to East-West Center staff members, project researchers include: Low fertility, institutions, and their policies: Variations across industrialized countries. Diverse paths to low and lower fertility: Rindfuss and Minja Kim Choe, eds. Springer International Publishing, pp. The emergence of two distinct fertility regimes in economically advanced countries. Population Research and Policy Review. Academy of Korean Studies Press. Low and lower fertility: Variations across developed countries. Diversity across low-fertility countries: Bumpass, and Emi Tamaki Do low survey response rates bias results? Lowest-low fertility in the Republic of Korea: Variations by locality, Choe, Minja Kim, Larry L. Tsuya, and Ronald R. Non-traditional family-related attitude trends in Japan: Macro and micro determinants. Population and Development Review. Employment and housework tasks of Japanese couples, Estimating the effects of education on later marriage and less marriage in South Korea: An application of a mixture survival model with proportional piecewise constant hazard. Journal of Applied Statistical Science. Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong Province, China, Tsuya, and Larry L. Work and family trajectories in Japan. Advances in Life Course Research. The institutional context of low fertility. Choe, Minja Kim, and Robert D. Rindfuss, and Toshiko Kaneda Variation in the structure of social ties. American Journal of Sociology. Modernization, gender roles and marriage behavior in South Korea. Transformations in Twentieth Century Korea. Fertility decline in South Korea: Forty years of policy-behavior dialogue. Korea Journal of Population Studies 29 2: Is the gender division of work changing in Japan? Asian Population Studies 1 1: Bumpass, and Noriko O. Social networks and family change in Japan. American Sociological Review Marriage, work, and family life in comparative perspective: Japan, South Korea, and the United States. University of Hawaii Press. Factors associated with low fertility in South Korea and policy implications in Korean. In Seung Kwon Kim, ed. Study on the development of population policies

DOWNLOAD PDF CHANGING MARRIAGE PATTERNS IN SOUTH KOREA
MINJA KIM CHOE

and programs in responses to low fertility. Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, pp. The changing institutional context of low fertility. Westley, and Robert D. Tradition and change in marriage and family life. The future of population in Asia. Annual Review of Sociology

Minja Kim Choe of East-West Center, Honolulu with expertise in Quantitative Social Research. Read 97 publications, and contact Minja Kim Choe on ResearchGate, the professional network for scientists.

Some argue that individual behavior is driven by values. This position considers values to be an essential part of the micro-level processes that connect macro forces with individual action. Thus behavior cannot adequately be explained without knowledge of the underlying values that motivate individuals to make particular decisions. Others argue that values are really part of the behavior that needs explanation, so invoking values as an explanation is not useful. For example, it is circular to say that fertility is high in a population because individuals value large families. The underlying disagreement revolves around the question of whether values arise out of economic, political, and social institutions, or whether values, at least to some extent, are autonomous from institutional contexts and thus have an independent effect on behavior.

Defining Values What are values? A useful discussion of values must begin with a clear understanding of what this term means. There is some confusion, however, because the term is used in various ways by different authors. Sometimes the term is used simply as a synonym for preferences or attitudes. For example, preferences for sons over daughters or negative attitudes toward women working in the labor force are sometimes referred to as values that influence fertility behavior. Sometimes a norm e. A more restrictive definition of values states that they are "evaluative concepts that are internal, durable, and general" Casterline, , p. This approach emphasizes that values are strongly-held general principles that are applicable to a wide range of situations, and that particular values may be linked to form value systems. When values are conceptualized as unobservable, internal principles, researchers face the challenge of how to measure them.

Fertility There is little agreement among demographers about the role that values play in fertility behavior. This is evident in the essays on the topic assembled in the edited volume, *Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change* Leete In the general literature on theories of fertility change, three different positions can be identified. One argument emphasizes the importance of changes in social and economic institutions as the catalyst for changes in fertility. For example, John Caldwell argues that the rise of compulsory education in the nineteenth century increased the cost of children. More recently, when educational and work organizations instituted policies allowing women to participate on an equal footing with men, opportunity costs of bearing children increased and existing gender roles in the family were challenged. In both the historical and recent contexts, individuals responded to the social changes by having fewer children and by shifting values related to children. In other words, the same forces that affect fertility affect values, and so it is more reasonable to view values as a rationalization of behavior than a cause of that behavior. A second position argues that underlying values are important because they influence how fertility behavior responds to changes in social and economic institutions. Indeed, values may not need to change in order to influence fertility patterns. For example, in some situations it appears that an effort to maintain existing values in the face of social change produces declining fertility. Also, cultural differences in values could explain why similar social changes do not have the same impact on fertility behavior in all societies. In a study, Peter McDonald suggests that social changes providing women opportunities approximately equal to those of men has led to greater fertility reduction in southern Europe than in northern Europe because of regional differences in preference for traditional, male dominated family systems. Surprisingly, fertility is lower in countries preserving traditional family values because of the incompatibility this creates between families and other modern institutions. The third position argues that value changes play a direct and critical role in changing fertility behavior. The way that this is seen to occur is through cultural diffusion. As secular individualism, liberalism, and freedom from religious authority are imported to a society that does not traditionally hold these values, individuals begin to alter their fertility behavior. High fertility cannot be maintained in a society when individuals adopt values that fail to support this behavior.

Mortality The clearest example of a value that may affect mortality patterns is the

DOWNLOAD PDF CHANGING MARRIAGE PATTERNS IN SOUTH KOREA

MINJA KIM CHOE

cultural value of preferring sons over daughters. In most populations, age-specific mortality rates are higher for males than females at every age. However, in South Asia death rates are higher for girls than for boys. Roy note that in India in the s and early s, child mortality ages one to four was 43 percent higher for girls than boys. The most plausible explanation for this exceptional mortality pattern in South Asia is the strong preference for or value attributed to sons over daughters. Studies suggest that under these conditions daughters experience higher death rates than sons because they receive less effort in disease and accident prevention and less medical attention when sick. When this occurs, the sex ratio at birth normally about males to females can be greatly distorted. Rates well exceeding males to females have been reported recently in China and South Korea , and in some states in India. Migration As in fertility theories, values enter the migration literature primarily when the focus is on micro-level models of decision-making. The most explicit formulation of a theoretical model of migration focusing on values is the value-expectancy model, presented by Gordon F. De Jong and James T. The underlying assumption of this model is that individuals are motivated by personal goals and values, and that they rationally calculate how best to achieve them. Multiple values may be involved, each requiring a subjective assessment of well-being attained through migration or nonmigration. In deciding whether or not to undertake a particular move, an individual will make a "cognitive calculus" involving the expectancy that the move would produce a net gain in valued outcomes. Little empirical migration research has utilized the value-expectancy model, perhaps because of the complexity of operationalizing and measuring all of the relevant values and collecting data on subjective expectations. However, aspects of this approach are included in studies of migration that investigate place preferences of individuals. Conclusion Individuals in modern society tend to believe that they have significant freedom to choose their own life course path, and they have no difficulty in invoking values to explain their choices. Social scientists generally have been skeptical of these explanations, arguing that powerful, unrecognized social forces constrain and direct the behavior of individuals. But many social scientists also want to provide a place for human agency in their theories of behavior. Do individuals choose values that then independently influence their demographic behavior? Or, are values byproducts of the social conditions that shape the behavior? A lively debate regarding the place of values in explaining demographic behavior persists among population researchers. De Jong, Gordon F. De Jong and Robert W. Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change. Peter Uhlenberg Pick a style below, and copy the text for your bibliography.

Chapter 4 : Marriage, Work, and Family Life in Comparative Perspective: Japan, South - Google Books

Family formation in Japan, South Korea, and the United States: an overview / Shunichi Inoue --Changing marriage patterns in South Korea / Minja Kim Choe --The changing significance of marriage in the United States / Larry L. Bumpass --Time allocation between employment and housework in Japan, South Korea, and the United States / Noriko O. Tsuya.

Chapter 5 : Refworld | Republic of Korea: Prevalence and acceptance of common-law relationships

By Karen Oppenheim Mason, Noriko O. Tsuya and Minja Kim Choe. an overview / Shunichi Inoue -- Changing marriage patterns in South Korea / Minja Kim Choe.

Chapter 6 : Changing family in comparative perspective : Asia and the United States - CORE

Changing marriage patterns in South Korea / Minja Kim Choe The changing significance of marriage in the United States / Larry L. Bumpass Time allocation between employment and housework in Japan, South Korea, and the United States / Noriko O. Tsuya, Larry L. Bumpass.