

Chapter 1 : Reform of the civil service – today’s White Paper – A dragon's best friend

Civil Service Reform sets out a series of specific and practical actions for reform which is leading to real changes for the Civil Service. CSR is part of the Civil Service. Read more about what.

See Telegraph article here too. The White Paper on the reform of the civil service published today has been long overdue. I think so anyway. There are a myriad of reasons as to why a substantial and coherent plan has not been put forward – not least the constant ministerial churn under both Blair and Brown. The financial crisis and the election. Both of these are acknowledged as drivers in the reform. Minor cost-cutting encourages salami-slicing of budgets. Drop a post here or an initiative there, save on biscuits or training courses – but carry on business as usual. There is then the impact of the election and the formation of the Coalition. Chances are had Cameron won outright, there would have been a few more reshuffles. Coalition makes this harder. Cameron cannot simply pick who he wants to be in whichever department he likes – he has to account for Nick Clegg, and in particular whether his ministers will get on with their Liberal Democrat counterparts. The Coalition too has been put together with a mindset of lasting all the way through to the extent that it has a number of stabilisers built into it. One of the informal ones was around reducing the number and scale of ministerial reshuffles. As a result, ministers went into their posts knowing that the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister were going to give them several years in post scandals aside to try and implement the reforms concerned. As far as Cabinet Office was concerned, this gave Francis Maude breathing space to plan not just for this reform but also his work on all things digital. Two less high profile drivers: Social Media and the Institute for Government? During my final years in the civil service I wondered why no steps had been taken to fill the gap left by the now defunct Royal Institute for Public Administration. What was left of it was absorbed by Capita, with everything else either finding its way into the National Archives or shredded. The IfG has been a very useful sounding board for improving public administration. Essentially it has been a critical friend to the civil service, taking a longer term view about public administration at a safe-enough distance from the furnace of Whitehall just around the corner from its splendid settings. Jill Rutter did exactly this when the miserable Beecroft report was published. On social media, the pressure of people using it and using it effectively has forced the hand of government on one side, while incentivising it on the other. I started looking at this while I was still in the civil service. On the politics side a critical mass of MPs are now using social media in a manner that is helping them scrutinise government far more effectively than in recent years. There is also the fact that many MPs that were elected in were already using social media when they took office. What of the reforms themselves? There is actually a lot of really good stuff in there. Unlike the Beecroft report referred to above, clearly a huge amount of work and imagination has gone into this. For a start, the proposals strengthen and make more accountable the role of a permanent and impartial civil service. On accountability, I have previously called for more senior civil servants to face greater levels of scrutiny for the work that they do – in particular those on six-figure salaries. This clarity I hope will make it easier for Parliament to hold the executive to account – making it clear where there is policy failure from ministers and delivery failure from officials. This for me makes sense because things that are printed on paper have a habit of becoming obsolete very quickly. Perhaps a reflection why as far as White Papers go, this one is relatively short. I was one of them that was frustrated. In my early days stuck as a junior administrative officer I was limited in what I could do and which meetings I could attend. The recommendations on management information systems is welcome – this is something that Maude mentioned at a recent seminar at the Institute for Government. This will make it easier for Parliament to hold governments and the civil service. It will put a greater focus on evidence-bases as being the under-pinning of policy development. Keep an eye out on the October date when the plans are expected to be in place. Hence it was not surprising to me when Sir Bob Kerslake was appointed. Again in days gone by, I wondered why at policy level there were not more people with direct delivery experience working in policy teams. More people with teaching experience in education policy, local government officers in DCLG, more former police officers in the Home Office. The reason being that departments have a habit of changing names regularly, at great cost.

Far better and smoother to have some sort of consistency, as well as a greater ability to share expertise. Social media networks and the use of, I hope, will assist in this. One of the things that I love about the Teacamp network is that it brings together people from across Whitehall and beyond, from a range of different backgrounds to learn and problem solve—and drink tea—and beer. Will we see more of such grassroots networks elsewhere? I helped form one in Cambridge — Teacamps! Concerns — I have a few. The main concerns I have are around maintaining integrity around policy-making. Simon Parker gave one view and I gave another on open-sourcing vs outsourcing. If the Government wants to go down those routes, it needs to ensure it properly deals with the risks that both Simon and I have outlined. Given that Maude has said there will be a greater amount of commissioning from the private sector, one of the things I would like to see the Public Administration and Public Accounts Select Committees do is to hold an inquiry into maintaining proper accountability as the public sector fragments. Margaret Hodge has spoken at length on civil service accountability. This specific aspect of accountability — contractual accountability that I blogged about here is something that needs looking at as more of the functions of the public sector are delivered by outside organisations. Understandably they have focused on pay and conditions. The risk as they see it is that buried in the plans are worsening terms and conditions. One of the things that attracts high calibre people to the civil service — in particular women — is its far better record on flexible working and childcare compared to the private sector. As a result it is able to employ and keep hold of high calibre staff in the way the private sector would not. As an aside, what I hope the trade unions will do is to take on some of the learning on digital and social media to improve their relationships with their members. Interestingly one of its sections — the ARC Union — has one. I hope that the reforms work out and lead to improvements for all concerned — in particular those on the front line delivering public services. That helps no one. Will we see fewer Whitehall departments? Simon Parker tipped off Puffles on this one — the power of Twitter. With the shrinking of the state, I would be surprised if the number of ministers and departments remained as is.

Chapter 2 : The Human Connection | Civil Service World

This report by Reform demonstrates the potential of data sharing to transform the delivery of public services and improve outcomes for citizens. It explores how government can overcome various challenges to 'get data right' and enable better use of personal data within and between public-sector organisations.

Linda Nyland for the Guardian A world-class civil service is critical for delivering world-class public services and efficient, effective government. It forms the bedrock of our democracy: Neither is it perfect. This is the approach we advocate in our alternative white paper, *Delivering for the Nation: Securing a World-Class Civil Service*. All too often, the debate about modernising the civil service is framed within negative headlines. There have been suggestions of obstructionism, and a considerable part of the recent parliamentary debate has focused on the accountability of the most senior officials. Meanwhile, in the real world, the civil service is made up of dedicated and highly skilled public servants committed to delivering for the nation. Across the UK, civil servants are operating in an exceptionally challenging environment of diminishing resources, radical change, and pay levels that have fallen dramatically behind the market. Civil servants are not faceless bureaucrats, but real people striving every day to serve the government and the public. They include those who stop tax evasion, prosecute criminals, improve the performance of schools, represent our national interests abroad and protect our borders. These are just a few of the key public service roles the FDA represents. The FDA is keen to ensure there is a longer term, more strategic debate about reform of the civil service; one that is built on a shared analysis of the challenges it faces and which looks at building political consensus. By matching resources to workload will be profoundly challenging. The civil service must have the skills it needs for a changing environment and expectations, but there must also be clarity on what it is expected of it. Our alternative white paper proposals advocate a considered evolutionary approach based on three core principles, which we hope can secure support across all political parties: We also make recommendations on improving the skills of ministers as well as civil servants, on better ways to hold the government and civil servants to account, and on improving the morale and performance of senior public servants. The white paper is only the first step in our campaign. The FDA will continue to present evidence and recommendations to inform and influence the debate on how a world-class civil service can be secured and, critically, to ensure that reform is influenced by those whose commitment and professionalism deliver the services on which the public relies. Email us at public. To get our articles on policy and leadership direct to your inbox, sign up to the Guardian Public Leaders Network now. Looking for your next role? See our Guardian jobs site for senior executive jobs in government and politics.

The White Paper on the reform of the civil service - published today - has been long overdue. I think so anyway. I think so anyway. There are a myriad of reasons as to why a substantial and coherent plan has not been put forward - not least the constant ministerial churn under both Blair and Brown.

Major Issues Summary Australia has long been engaged in the process of public service reform, the pace of which quickened during the 1980s and early 1990s. The public face of the Australian Public Service APS, the way in which work is organised and services delivered and the utilisation of technology in supporting changed work methods and increased productivity, have all changed markedly since the early 1980s. Some of the initiatives pursued in this country were adapted or adopted from overseas; some Australian approaches to reform have been considered overseas. Since the election of the Howard Government in March 2001, public service reform is again on the agenda. The PEPE will compete for contracts to deliver employment placements with private and community sector providers. Commercialisation and privatisation, including the sale of the Department of Administrative Services DAS business units is proceeding. Proposed legislation to replace the Public Service Act has been introduced. With this package of reforms in train, it is opportune to examine the scope of overseas reform, the successes and some of the issues emerging from both reform processes and outcomes. It is critical that the Australian quest for reform not overshadow or extinguish areas of excellence or best practice in the APS and the wider Commonwealth sector simply for the sake of change. For example, the APS has long prided itself on the maintenance of high standards of ethics in delivering services to the public. Successes of this kind need to be built on so that the Commonwealth public sector can deliver services in an efficient, effective and responsive manner. The relative emphasis given to these ideas varies amongst OECD countries. Many of the characteristics of the paradigm have been in evidence in the public sector reforms which have occurred at Federal and State level in Australia since the early 1980s, and underpin many of the recommendations made by the National Commission of Audit. This paper focuses on the reform processes adopted in New Zealand, Britain, Canada and the United States which have been characterised by the separation of policy and operations and have involved both structural and functional changes. A common thread in the approach to reform has been the relative insignificance of the central people-management agencies to leadership of the reform process and the ascendancy of Treasury voices. A reduction in the size of the core public service has been a uniform trend in the countries being examined. The reform processes adopted in New Zealand, Britain and Canada have reduced the size of departments of state principally through the creation of agencies charged with service delivery responsibilities. The effect on employment equity has not been consistent, but is a cause of concern in most countries and must be given due consideration in the reform process. Differences in the way in which the process of reform has occurred, and the relationship between reform of the public service and partisan political imperatives, have proved to be significant. Visible political support for public service change is a vital key in the success of the reforms; but once the direction or course of the reform process has been set by political leaders, the intrusion of political considerations into the details of the reform strategy can work to undermine, contradict or limit the scope of reform. The New Zealand reforms have been underpinned by a clear intellectual framework. Whilst the application of these principles to the wider public sector was largely successful and non-contentious in the eyes of commentators, the application of the same principles to the core public service has been controversial because it has seemed to lose sight of the multitude of factors which underpin sound strategic policy making. Britain, Canada and the United States have lacked such an easily identifiable framework for change. In an increasingly contractual service delivery environment, the ability to accurately and specifically prescribe the performance standards required, be they of a program or ethical nature, is becoming increasingly important, and there is a need to distil the ethical principles from the civil service cultural environment and determine whether they have continuing relevance. Where there has been a change from staffing based on tenure to the use of contracts, a further issue involves a perceived weakening of the professional ethic of public service. Closely related to this is the notion of accountability, and a concern that short-term focus on the impact of policies on the client may inhibit long-term vision and an

assessment of the relevance of policies to the achievement of government goals; and whilst privatisation may be attractive, such a transfer of functional responsibility may not absolve government from ensuring that quality services are provided. While overseas experience indicates that major reform can be achieved, and that public sector employment relationships can be decentralised relatively quickly, it also emphasises the importance of multi-party support, a reasonably coherent framework of ideas and achievable objectives, early demonstration of positive results, improvement in the quality and flow of information, and a need to align departmental management initiatives with the collective interests of government. Experience has also shown the necessity for improved systems of accountability to go with decentralisation or transfer of managerial authority, and for financial management reform to be integrated with overall management reform. On the negative side, there is the potential for high fiscal and social costs due to restructuring, and the need to be aware that the costs of public sector downsizing include redundancy entitlements, loss of institutional memory, widespread anxiety, disrupted careers and employee suspicion of management. Ironically, the change process may be managed more effectively by adopting considered steps coupled with periodic reflection. This report brought together a review of the reforms implemented by OECD countries in public sector management, and it identified common themes in approaches to reform and issues that still needed to be resolved. The report noted that, for the public sector to remain responsive to the needs of those it serves, governments: Governments must be willing and able to learn. The relative emphasis given to these ideas varies amongst OECD countries⁴, and those countries most influenced by managerialism appear to be those of the English-speaking group. Australia has been engaged in the process of public service reform since the mid s, but the pace and scope of change quickened during the s and early s. Since the early s there have been marked changes in the public face of the Australian Public Service APS, the way in which work is organised and services delivered, and the utilisation of technology to support changed work methods and increased productivity. Some of the initiatives pursued in this country were adapted or adopted from overseas experience, and some Australian approaches have been considered overseas. With the package of reforms initiated by the Howard Government in train, it is opportune to examine the scope of overseas reform, the successes, and some of the issues emerging from both reform processes and outcomes. This will assist in evaluating the trend and pace of reform in Australia. Whilst the above characteristics may be taken to define the paradigm, the methodology by which different countries have sought to introduce and sustain programs of reform within their different political structures, and the relative emphasis given to each of the characteristics as goals of reform, has been anything but uniform. This paper will explore some of the themes emerging from the reform process in Canada, the USA, Britain and New Zealand, and will explore their relevance for reform in Australia. The themes in which country experiences are reviewed include: However, there are characteristics or indicators of change which are common to the process—for example, changes to the size of the public service—and it is helpful to begin with a review of the characteristics. Concepts in Public Service Reform Public choice theory rests on the assumption that the behaviour of people individually and collectively, is driven by self-interest. This means that departments and agencies will act to ensure their continued viability and survival. It follows therefore, that such bodies should not both advise the government on policy directions and implement agreed policy. Consequently, in the reform process, policy advising functions and policy implementation service delivery functions are to be separated, usually with service delivery agencies being removed from departments of state. The first party, the principal, enters into a contract with another party, the agent, by which the agent agrees to undertake various functions on behalf of the principal in return for an agreed reward. Consequently, considerable importance attaches to the negotiation and monitoring of contracts to ensure that services are being provided by the agent to the quality, cost and timeliness standards required by the principal. Contestability is a strategy to promote cost efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of goods and services. Traditionally, public service agencies have been the sole supplier of goods and services and advice to the government. Characteristics of the Reformed Public Services One of the key reasons for reform of the public service has been economic, and is associated with ideas that the public service has become bloated, inefficient and unresponsive to the needs of clients. One of the strategies to address this has been to adopt business methodologies used in the private sector, including the

wider use of information technology, in some cases coupled with an active privatisation program, transferring jobs from the public sector to the private sector. These reform strategies pursued in English-speaking countries have caused a significant reduction in the size of the core public service in each country. The reform processes adopted in New Zealand, Britain and Canada have been characterised by the separation of policy and operations, involving both structural and functional changes. This split has acted to reduce the size of the departments of state, principally through the creation of agencies outside the core public service that are charged with service delivery responsibilities. Public Expenditure as a Share of GDP Despite the rhetoric about smaller government, Governance in Transition found that no country for which internationally comparable data are available has been able to reduce its expenditure share public expenditure as a percentage of GDP below the level 8. Within this context and compared to other countries, Australian public expenditure measured at 37 per cent of GDP in is one of the lowest in the OECD. It is close to, but lower than, that recorded by the other English-speaking countries. Size of the Public Service A reduction in the size of the public service has been a uniform trend in the different countries being examined. In New Zealand, for example, many functions were transferred from departments of state to Crown corporations set up to undertake commercial activities as state-owned enterprises on behalf of the New Zealand government, and many of these corporations have subsequently been privatised. This transfer accounts for most of the drop in public service numbers. In , there were 84 staff employed in the New Zealand Public Service, but by this figure had fallen to 34 staff permanent, temporary and wage -a drop of 59 per cent. In the case of some departments, the reform process has been dramatic: Between and , the number of permanent staff in the British Civil Service has dropped from to , a reduction of 34 per cent. This reduction in numbers has been mainly caused by the movement of staff out of departments of state and into executive or Next Steps agencies from where privatisation was likely to follow. Approximately 72 per cent of Civil Service staff are currently employed in Next Steps agencies, and this percentage is expected to rise to 75 per cent over with the conversion of 39 agency candidates into Next Steps agencies. Britain represents a positive outcome. In November , the Cabinet Office released a report on progress in implementing equal employment opportunity in the British Civil Service which indicated despite a fall in the number of civil servants, increasing proportions of them were disabled people, people from ethnic minorities and women. On the other hand, in Canada, New Zealand and the United States there is some evidence that employment equity outcomes are eroding. The Canadian Treasury Board reported that despite a reduction of 7. This has been attributed to the disproportionate effect of downsizing on particular job classifications. In New Zealand, under the State Sector Act there is considerable emphasis on organisations being good employers and on applying equal employment opportunity principles. Whilst agencies are required to report progress to the State Services Commission the central personnel authority , achievement appears to lag behind rhetoric. Using personnel data for cited in Boston et al , all EEO groups are greatly under-represented in management positions, although the representation of women in the public service is higher than in the labour market generally. In addition, the retention rate for women and Maori is poor. The numbers of women who are appointed to the public service is similar to the number who separate, but the number of Maori who separate is greater than the number being appointed. All employees in the EEO groups were appointed on salaries below the public service average. Hispanics are under-represented in 38 of 40 federal agencies, women in 17 agencies and blacks in four. Key Themes in the Reform Process Level of Political Involvement in the Reform Process Amongst the countries being reviewed in this paper, there have been significant differences in the way in which the process of reform has occurred, and the relationship between reform of the public service and political imperatives. In the case of Britain, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher drove the reform of the Civil Service over the s, and her active and sustained involvement and leadership has been well documented. Small specialist units such as the Efficiency Unit and the Next Steps Unit were established within Number 10 Downing Street to spearhead change and overcome the perceived inertia of the Civil Service, and this hands-on approach to the reform process has been a hallmark of the British process. The day after Prime Minister Brian Mulroney took office in Canada in , he announced the formation of a task force to report on improving government program efficiency. In December , in his second term, Mulroney launched PS to promote service to the public, innovation,

accountability and improved personnel management in the public service. It was a process that involved 10 task forces chaired by deputy ministers departmental secretaries and was primarily an internal process. Although PS was personally launched by Prime Minister Mulroney, neither he nor any of his ministers continued that political involvement. There was no linkage between the launch and the projects being promoted by senior departmental management and therefore PS was not seen as a key government initiative. The net result was that what had been intended to be a major vehicle for reform delivered only a limited number of useful changes. The contrast between the high profile promotion of reform by Margaret Thatcher and the hands-off approach of Brian Mulroney could not have been more marked, and the difference is also clearly evident in the scale and pace of reform in their respective countries. The lesson for reformers would appear to be that visible political support for public service change, demonstrating the value placed upon the change process and on desired outcomes, is a vital key in the success of the reforms. Without this support it becomes altogether too easy to slip backwards into minor change around the edges of the civil service comfort zone. On the other hand, once the direction or course of the reform process has been set by political leaders, the intrusion of political considerations into the details of the reform strategy can work to undermine, contradict or limit the scope of reform. For example, in the UK there is evidence that political limitations have been imposed on the reform processes which agency chief executives can pursue within their agencies. The Public Accounts Committee reported that: One example given at the time was the use of automated payments of benefits, generally accepted as the most secure and cost-effective means of delivery and preventing fraudulent misuse of conventional instruments of payment encased throughout post offices. This kind of contradiction needs to be dealt with in a structured fashion: Level of Coherence of Reform Package New Zealand has the distinction of having pursued the most dramatic and radical path of reform of all the English-speaking countries, but this in part derives from its having the most antiquated delivery arrangements until Post, telecommunications, forestry, life assurance and electricity, for example, were all provided through departments of state. New Zealand did not experience the movement to transform such enterprise functions into corporate bodies which had recently happened in Britain and had been happening in Australia, Canada and the US for a century or more.

Chapter 4 : AllGov - Departments

1 MDGD- Civil Service Reform Paper TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Executive Summary Introduction I. Concepts and Contextual Issues A. The Meaning, Scope and Functions of a Civil Service.

Office of Personnel Management Overview: The office also manages all benefits programs, including health insurance, available to federal employees. Civil service rules have long been the subject of debate and proposed reforms, some of which have been implemented. Others, like those pushed by the Bush administration in creating the new Department of Homeland Security, have not been as successful. This law placed most federal employees on the merit system and forced some government jobs to be filled on the basis of competitive exams. Arthur and was passed partially in response to the recent assassination of President James A. Garfield by one of his own speechwriters, Julius Guiteau. The law also prohibits the solicitation of campaign donations on federal government property. The law applied only to federal jobs, not the state and local jobs that were bartered for political influence. This meant that few jobs were actually covered at the outset. But as outgoing presidents nominated their own appointees, these jobs could be converted to civil service jobs. By the beginning of the 20th century, most federal jobs were under civil service. This led to greater expertise in civil service positions. This law allowed for agency heads to move career senior executives into any position for which they are qualified. As the old U. This information is also available to federal workers and the general public through the Internet. In May , the OPM launched a Hiring Reform Initiative , by which the office supported federal agencies with training sessions in 66 cities for 17, people involved in the hiring process. In July the agency reconfigured the database, making improvements particularly in the area of privacy. The OPM also created a Strategic Plan that details annual activities and ongoing performance review. In August , the OPMâ€”along with three other federal agenciesâ€”received an executive order signed by President Barack Obama directing them to design a strategy for increasing workplace diversity in the federal government. In July , an analysis of statistics in the OPM database revealed that job security in the federal government is extremely high 0. The conclusion reached was that employees of many federal agencies are more likely to die of natural causes than to get fired. Another OPM data analysis showed that the number of U. Responding to an executive order, the OPM announced in August its plan for a redesigned internship and entry-level federal hiring system called the Pathways Programs , which would streamline the former Federal Career Intern Program, among others, and offer improved transparency. The agency promotes civil services and advocates for the members of the federal workforce. Its work sometimes brings it into contact with the Federal Labor Relationship Authority , which oversees the collective bargaining rights of federal employees, and the Merit Systems Protection Board, which is responsible for conducting studies of the federal civil service and hearing appeals from federal employees who have been disciplined or fired. The OPM was originally divided into 13 individual subcomponents, but was restructured in January to include the following divisions: Office of Communications and Public Liaison deals with the press and with requests from media and the general public for information about the agency. It advises government agencies in understanding and carrying out civil service responsibilities and meeting the merit system principles. The office also provides civil service-related legal assistance to members of the public. Federal Investigative Services is used by federal security offices that submit investigation requests to OPM, or follow OPM guidance on security and suitability programs. Employee Services leads the design, development and implementation of HR policies. Office of the Inspector General conducts independent audits, investigations, and evaluations relating to OPM programs and operations. It is responsible for administrative actions against health care providers that commit sanctionable offenses with respect to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program FEHBP or other federal programs. The OIG keeps the director and Congress informed about problems and deficiencies in the administration of agency programs and operations and the necessity for corrective action. Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee helps to determine the prevailing federal rates for minimum wage. Human Resources Solutions partners with agencies to transform them into high performing organizations. It recovers costs of operations by managing tens of thousands of dollars in agency reimbursable agreements from over

federal customers, which is achieved by providing competitively priced programs and services. Office of Diversity and Inclusion develops comprehensive strategies to help build a diverse and inclusive workforce, respecting individual and organizational cultures, while complying with merit principles and applicable federal laws. Facilities, Security, and Contracting is responsible for a variety of services such as acquiring goods and services for the OPM central office, facilities management, leasing and new construction oversight, providing contracting policy oversight and guidance to OPM field locations, conducting suitability and national security clearance determinations for its personnel, Personal Identity Verification card issuance and management, emergency management and continuity activities, physical security oversight, and countermeasure installation and maintenance. Executive Services provides executive direction and leadership, legal advice and representation, public affairs, legislative liaison, equal employment opportunity management, contracting and administrative management, security and emergency services, planning and policy analysis, and rent and centrally funded items.

The Civil Service Reform Plan and job losses provide a challenging background to reform, but that should make us more determined to remove the daily frustrations wherever we can.

The Case of Georgia Charles W. Gossett Review of Public Personnel Administration ; 22; 94 The online version of this article can be found at: Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. The role of the central personnel office changed from that of a regulating agency ensuring that merit principles were followed to a consulting service organization designed to encourage best practices. The need for change is well established. Although the [merit] system is out of date. It is necessary to clearly draw the line between the baggage of merit and the essentially sound principles that the system should support government wide. The need for a public management system that is fair and equitable, that addresses issues of recruiting, rewarding, and managing a committed and qualified workforce, and that serves the public and elected officials productively and effectively remains central to good government. Advocates of reform argued that selecting candidates for government positions based on job-related criteria rather than on patronage considerations would lead to a more technically competent and efficient government administration. The author would like to thank Pama Caraway and Donna Scott for research assistance on this article. Review of Public Personnel Administration, Vol. The advocates of reform won that battle and for approximately the next century, American national, state, and local governments tended to focus on ways to limit the interference of political considerations in the management of public personnel. By , President Jimmy Carter, who had been elected in part on his claims of having reformed the state bureaucracy while serving as governor of Georgia from , succeeded in getting the Civil Service Reform Act of CSRA passed. Managerialism, as described by Pollitt , pp. With such authority comes an ability to achieve specific goals and to hold managers accountable. Some authors have argued that the CSRA is based on this managerialist ideology Pollitt, ; Thayer, , but a close examination of merit system principles listed in the CSRA reveals a series of requirements more focused on controlling and limiting the scope of action managers can take with respect to individual employees. Thayer , for example, pointed out the contradiction between various elements of the act designed to increase managerial discretion and those designed to strengthen the merit system. In the legislative process leading to the CSRA, one can note the tension between retaining at least some semblance of the principles of the merit system while introducing elements of the managerialist ideology focused on increased productivity e. Whereas many authors have written about the role managerialist ideology has played in shaping civil service reform efforts, most have focused on national-level bureaucracies. What follows is a case study of the adoption of a program of civil service reform in Georgia. Implementation of these reforms is discussed in more detail by Condrey [this issue]. The extent to which the managerialist ideology guided reform will become apparent. Additionally, however, the unwillingness of policy makers to give up certain types of control over public servants that had emerged during the preceding decades under the merit system will also become apparent. Adoption was largely the result of federal pressure to establish merit systems whenever states were required to administer federal programs or use federal grant monies. The merit system law was rewritten and employee protections and the scope of coverage under the system were expanded by the General Assembly in the s. In words that echo former President and former Georgia governor Jimmy Carter, Governor Zell Miller a used his annual State of the State address to call for merit system reform: I will also bring you [the General Assembly] legislation to revise the State Merit System which was established more than 50 years ago to create a professional workforce that was free of political cronyism. And at that time, that was a valid and important goal. But too often in government, we pass laws to fix particular problems of the moment, and then we allow half a century to roll by without ever following up to see what the long term consequences have been. Folks, the truth of the matter is that a solution in is a problem in The problem is governmental paralysis, because despite its name, our present Merit System is not about merit. It offers no reward to good workers. It only provides cover for bad workers. According to the legislation, which became effective July 1, , Downloaded from [http: Official Code of Georgia Acts \[OCGA\]](http://Official Code of Georgia Acts [OCGA]), The language sounds a lot like the language used in

preambles to laws defining merit systems in other states although the use of the words loyalty and morality perhaps reflect particular concerns of Georgia legislators, but the approach the act takes to achieving these goals differs substantially from what the term merit system probably suggests to most students of civil service reform. Some indication of the difference can be foretold by looking at the language that was stricken from the statement of purpose in the previous act: It is the purpose of this article to establish in the state a system of personnel administration based on merit principles and scientific methods governing the classification of positions and the employment, conduct movement, and separation of public officers and employees. It is also the purpose of this article to build a career service in government which will attract, select, and retain the best employees based on merit. That process is all but gone now. The Merit System Reform Act prospectively eliminates the classified service by making all employees hired after July 1, 1993, unclassified. Any new positions created after that date become unclassified. Classified employees already in the Georgia state civil service before July 1 retain their status and positions. Those positions that were classified before July 1 also will remain as such. This means an employee with classified status can keep his or her status by remaining in the current position or by taking a new position that still retains classified status. If a classified employee moves to a newly created position. If a new employee occupies a position that has classified status, he or she does not become a classified employee. Once a classified employee accepts an unclassified position, he or she can never regain classified status; likewise, once a position is occupied by an unclassified employee, it can never be returned to the classified service. As you know, the Merit System Reform Act changes the employment conditions for all new employees hired on and after July 1, 1993, to impartial selection of the best qualified person for government service by means of competitive tests which are fair, objective, practical, and predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the position or positions for which such persons are being evaluated. Impartial selection of the best qualified person for government service by means of competitive tests which are fair, objective, practical, and predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which compose or are relevant to the position or positions for which such persons are being evaluated. A statement that employees should be pro-

Downloaded from <http://www.gsa.gov>: The mood of the times was that government needed to be shaken up. The Democratic administration in Washington was busy reinventing everything, including the federal personnel system. The Olympics were coming to Atlanta. Governor Miller was entering the last 3 years of his term-limited time in office and was attempting to leave several substantial marks on the way state government operated, most notably a major effort at privatizing a number of government services. Tanner was a former commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources DNR in two gubernatorial administrations and the elected state labor commissioner for 6 years. At the same time, the DNR had a reputation as a well-run agency and even senior staffers at the Merit System offices agree that Tanner was a professional and fair administrator who did not allow abuses of personnel practices for political or personal reasons. F. Daley, personal interview, June 30, 1993; S. Pope, personal interview, June 30, 1993. Nevertheless, Tanner stated his position while supporting the governor in the following terms: And it needs to be changed. Why should government be any different? Although there was some discussion of scrapping the merit system altogether for both current and future employees, the original draft of the bill produced by the committee provided that employees who stayed in their current positions could retain their existing merit system protections. D. Russell, personal interview, June 30, 1993. Opponents, particularly the Georgia State Employees Union, fought the bill. The union was successful in clarifying that classified employees could move from their current position to another classified position. Freeman, telephone interview, June 26, 1993. However, on the floor of the Senate, an amendment seeking to provide a right to appeal adverse actions was proposed but soundly defeated by a 3-to-1 margin. The Senate then went on 5 minutes later to pass the bill overwhelmingly, picking up three of the senators who had supported the losing effort to add an appeals amendment. In only about 1 hour of debate, the Senate voted to abolish the merit system for new employees. Wooten, In the House of Representatives, the story was similar. Again, this amendment met resounding defeat and the bill went on to passage by a 4-to-1 margin Georgia House of Representatives. In analyzing the vote, a couple of interesting patterns appear that reflect the same trends as in the Senate: However, the act went even further and

decentralized almost every basic personnel function from the central offices of the merit system to the individual agencies. This strengthening of the ability of agency heads to control classification and compensation, hiring, affirmative action, and employee grievances is consistent with managerialist ideology. Classification and Compensation The Merit System is still tasked with developing position descriptions for certain common job functions such as secretaries and other clerical positions, but agencies are free to identify any of their positions as unique and assume responsibility for classifying the position themselves. For years, politicians have justified lower than market rate salaries for public sector employees on the grounds that their benefit packages and, most important, substantial job security more than compensated for the disparity between public and private sector salaries. Unintentionally, the reform act originally made state employment even more unattractive because there were no provisions for annual, sick, or personal leave for unclassified employees. Rather than afford individual agency heads or managers complete discretion over leave for such employees, the governor issued an executive order requiring that all unclassified employees receive the same leave benefits as classified employees Miller, c. In a practice consistent with managerialism, Georgia introduced a merit pay plan for employees shortly before the reform act was adopted. This pay-for-performance plan, called GeorgiaGain Georgia Merit System, gave agencies the ability to set differential pay increases a choice of four Downloaded from [http:](http://) However, consistent with problems noted in other public sector pay plans, the lack of adequate funding for merit pay resulted in either an overall reduction in the size of the awards so more people could receive them or the imposition of a quota on the number of employees who could receive a particular rating so that the funds would support the full increases allowed. Job insecurity among government employees could have a number of consequences based on historical experience with at-will government employment systems. If a pattern is established that a change in political leadership leads to dismissal of public servants, one should anticipate that employees will use their government positions as opportunities to position themselves for their next job. Although such an attitude can be healthy and admirable, it must be recognized that there is a significant difference between grooming oneself for a position in a career system such as a merit-based civil service system and getting ready to move to another organization. Organizational loyalty, attention to the unique features of the organization, and efforts to ensure effective cooperation among organizational units are not characteristics that one should expect to see in ambitious employees of an at-will employment system with a history of periodic staffing changes. Of course, if the tradition develops that political party change in the elected executive offices does not significantly affect public employees, the advantages of a merit-based career service may be secured. A number of private companies, prior to the era of downsizing, essentially guaranteed lifetime employment for people meeting job expectations, although they, like governmental entities, always reserved the right to dismiss nonperformers, albeit with fewer procedural hurdles to taking adverse actions. The most that the Merit System is able to do is insist that any agency that does not want to list jobs with them at least provide the name of a contact person to whom they can refer inquiries Georgia Merit System, d. Agencies are free to choose a selection method for hiring into any of their positions. Written tests may or may not be used. For example, it is clearly not consistent with legislative intent for managers to abolish a classified position and recreate it as a new unclassified position solely to prevent classified employees from remaining in the classified service upon accepting a promotion. Georgia State Merit System of Personnel Administration, a The concern here was that agency managers would discriminate against current employees whenever they had a vacancy in a classified position because if they filled the position with a new hire, they could remove the position from the roll of classified positions. What is implied in the language reminding managers that they should continue to select the best candidate is that they might decide to make selections on some other basis, such as political or personal connections. Although written and performance tests were no longer required, many agencies were expected to continue to use them, particularly when they had to hire a large number of employees at a number of different locations across the state. The Merit System office continues to test employees for such positions but in the past sent only a restricted listing of the highest scorers to agencies seeking to fill a particular vacancy. Agencies are free to hire anyone from anywhere on the list, although, of course, they may be called to defend Downloaded from [http:](http://) A special class of hiring is promotions. Under the changes adopted by the

Georgia legisla- ture, however, many possible career moves that would have been viewed by an employee as overwhelmingly positive now have an element of risk not present previously.

Chapter 6 : Civil Service (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia

This paper surveys World Bank experience in civil service reform, and begins to assess the progress made. Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service () National Commission on the Public Service.

Initially, as in other countries, they were little more than secretariats for their leaders, who held positions at court. They were chosen by the king on the advice of a patron, and typically replaced when their patron lost influence. In the 18th century, in response to the growth of the British Empire and economic changes, institutions such as the Office of Works and the Navy Board grew large. Each had its own system and staff were appointed by purchase or patronage. By the 19th century, it became increasingly clear that these arrangements were not working. The purpose of this college was to train administrators; it was established on recommendation of officials in China who had seen the imperial examination system. The civil service, based on examination similar to the Chinese system, was advocated by a number of Englishmen over the next several decades. A permanent, unified and politically neutral civil service, in which appointments were made on merit, was introduced on the recommendations of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853, which also recommended a clear division between staff responsible for routine "mechanical" work, and those engaged in policy formulation and implementation in an "administrative" class. The report was not implemented, but it came at a time when the bureaucratic chaos in the Crimean War demonstrated that the military was as backward as the civil service. A Civil Service Commission was set up in 1855 to oversee open recruitment and end patronage. Prime Minister Gladstone took the decisive step in 1870 with his Order in Council to implement the Northcote-Trevelyan proposals. The Northcote-Trevelyan model remained essentially stable for a hundred years. This was a tribute to its success in removing corruption, delivering public services even under the stress of two world wars, and responding effectively to political change. The Northcote-Trevelyan model was characterised by a hierarchical mode of Weberian bureaucracy; neutral, permanent and anonymous officials motivated by the public interest; and a willingness to administer policies ultimately determined by ministers. This bequeathed a set of theories, institutions and practices to subsequent generations of administrators in the central state. There was a concern illustrated in C. The times were, moreover, ones of keen respect for technocracy, with the mass mobilisation of war having worked effectively, and the French National Plan apparently delivering economic success. And there was also a feeling which would not go away, following the war and the radical social reforms of the Labour government, that the so-called " mandarins " of the higher civil service were too remote from the people. He found that administrators were not professional enough, and in particular lacked management skills; that the position of technical and scientific experts needed to be rationalised and enhanced; and that the service was indeed too remote. His recommendations included the introduction of a unified grading system for all categories of staff, a Civil Service College and a central policy planning unit. He also said that control of the service should be taken from the Treasury, and given to a new Department, and that the "fast stream" recruitment process for accessing the upper echelons should be made more flexible, to encourage candidates from less privileged backgrounds. But, whether through lack of political will, or through passive resistance by a mandarin class which the report had suggested were "amateurs", Fulton failed. The Civil Service College equipped generalists with additional skills, but did not turn them into qualified professionals as ENA did in France. Recruits to the fast stream self-selected, with the universities of Oxford and Cambridge still producing a large majority of successful English candidates, since the system continued to favour the tutorial system at Oxbridge while to an extent the Scottish Ancient universities educated a good proportion of recruits from north of the border. The younger mandarins found excuses to avoid managerial jobs in favour of the more prestigious postings. The generalists remained on top, and the specialists on tap. Many of her ministers were suspicious of the civil service, in light of public choice research that suggested public servants tend to increase their own power and budgets. She immediately set about reducing the size of the civil service, cutting numbers from 1,000,000 to 700,000, over her first seven years in office. This led to the Financial Management Initiative, launched in September 1998. Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service Cmnd as an umbrella for the efficiency scrutiny programme and with a wider focus on corporate planning,

efficiency and objective-setting. Progress initially was sluggish, but in due course MINIS-style business planning became standard, and delegated budgets were introduced, so that individual managers were held much more accountable for meeting objectives, and for the first time for the resources they used to do so. Performance-related pay began in December , was built on thereafter, and continues to this day, though the sums involved have always been small compared to the private sector, and the effectiveness of PRP as a genuine motivator has often been questioned. This envisaged a new approach to delivery featuring clear targets and personal responsibility. Without any statutory change, the managerial functions of Ministries would be hived off into Executive Agencies , with clear Framework Documents setting out their objectives, and whose chief executives would be made accountable directly in some cases to Parliament for performance. Agencies were to, as far as possible, take a commercial approach to their tasks. However, the Government conceded that agency staff would remain civil servants, which diluted the radicalism of the reform. The approach seems somewhat similar to the Swedish model, though no influence from Sweden has ever been acknowledged. The Next Steps Initiative took some years to get off the ground, and progress was patchy. Significant change was achieved, although agencies never really achieved the level of autonomy envisaged at the start. Already in the late s, some common services once set up to capture economies of scale, such as the Property Services Agency and the Crown Suppliers , were being dismantled or sold off. Next, shortly after Thatcher left office, in July , a new programme of market-testing of central government services began, with the White Paper *Competing for Quality Cm* Five-yearly or three-yearly policy and finance reviews of all agencies and other public bodies were instituted, where the first question to be answered the "prior options exercise" was why the function should not be abolished or privatised. But there was still a perception of carelessness and lack of responsiveness in the quality of public services. This sought to empower the service user, by setting out rights to standards in each service area, and arrangements for compensation when these were not met. An Office of Public Service and Science was set up in , to see that the Charter policy was implemented across government. By , 42 Charters had been published, and they included services provided by public service industries such as the health service and the railways, as well as by the civil service. The programme was also expanded to apply to other organisations such as local government or housing associations, through a scheme of "Chartermark" awards. The programme was greeted with some derision, and it is true that the compensation sometimes hardly seemed worth the effort of claiming, and that the service standards were rarely set with much consumer input.

Chapter 7 : International Themes in Public Service Reform – Parliament of Australia

The next president should make civil service reform a priority and begin the process (in cooperation with the House and the Senate, unions, and other appropriate parties) of crafting a set of.

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Chapter 9 : Welsh Government | Public Health White Paper

They say the reports and white papers on these issues have been piling up over the years. But 40 years later, much of the federal community says it now seems to agree on what's wrong with today's civil service system.