

## Chapter 1 : Political Science Donald Trump Theory Myths - POLITICO Magazine

*Description Theories of Mythology provides students with both a history of theories of myth and a practical 'how-to' guide to interpreting myth, the most elementary form of narrative.*

Continue to article content Late last semester, a student showed up during my office hours. She sat down across from me, looking worried. I assumed she wanted to discuss her upcoming paper, but she had something else in mind. Now, I can point to a much more viscerally compelling piece of evidence; His name is Donald Trump. If you are taking the time to read this article, then your political opinions probably have something in common with those of my students, along with those of most journalists and academics: They are, on the whole, ideologically consistent. For example, a liberal who supports gay marriage probably also supports government spending on social programs and protecting the environment. These competing interests can result in internal party conflict as partisans struggle to define which issues will define their party. His views are sometimes in direct contradiction with the GOP platform, but for a huge swath of voters, this is actually a strength — they themselves do not follow Republican orthodoxy and are not ideologically consistent. Survey data show that compared with other Republicans, Trump supporters are less opposed to abortion, more skeptical of trade, and substantially more anti-immigration. Because the United States has a two-party system, it is impossible for every voter to have a political party with views that match their particular combination of stances on the issues. But unlike Trump, Sanders is not the presumptive nominee of his party. Gaffes and negative coverage can change the race. But none of the outrageous things he says or does seem to have much of an impact at the polls. Why is he immune? Pundits have suggested that this is something special about Trump — a testament to his Teflon-like durability. Political scientists have seen this dynamic at play before. As John Sides and Lynn Vavreck demonstrate in their book on the election, *The Gamble*, the truth is that this immunity is the rule, not the exception. Indeed, most so-called gaffes matter very little in the long term. The amount of media coverage Trump has received dwarfs that of other Republican candidates. But this near-constant coverage sends a message to voters, especially those paying only tangential attention to the race: Trump is a viable candidate worth serious consideration. American politics is no longer driven by race. Racial fault lines run deep in American life, and for generations, presidential candidates have carefully tiptoed around the topic. From the beginning of his campaign, he has loudly declared such tiptoeing to be part of the problem, choosing instead to make issues of race and identity a centerpiece of his political strategy. Rather, it has tapped a set of beliefs already held by many Americans: Most political events have a single, elegant explanation. These explanations are hugely appealing — and, almost by definition, wrong. This semester, I am teaching two courses: Much of social science including political science is about understanding causation, from targeted questions do campaign ads increase turnout? One of the most important lessons I teach my research design students is that most of these questions have no single correct answer.

**Chapter 2 : Classical Theory of Concepts, The | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy**

*The political good is justice, and justice is the common benefit. Everyone thinks justice is some sort of equality, and hence to some extent they all agree with the philosophical discussion in which we have determined these ethical questions.*

History[ edit ] The classical economists produced their "magnificent dynamics" [3] during a period in which capitalism was emerging from feudalism and in which the Industrial Revolution was leading to vast changes in society. These changes raised the question of how a society could be organized around a system in which every individual sought his or her own monetary gain. Classical political economy is popularly associated with the idea that free markets can regulate themselves. Smith saw this income as produced by labour, land, and capital. With property rights to land and capital held by individuals, the national income is divided up between labourers, landlords, and capitalists in the form of wages , rent , and interest or profits. Their ideas became economic orthodoxy in the period ca. Henry George is sometimes known as the last classical economist or as a bridge. The economist Mason Gaffney documented original sources that appear to confirm his thesis arguing that neoclassical economics arose as a concerted effort to suppress the ideas of classical economics and those of Henry George in particular. Other ideas have either disappeared from neoclassical discourse or been replaced by Keynesian economics in the Keynesian Revolution and neoclassical synthesis. Some classical ideas are represented in various schools of heterodox economics , notably Georgism and Marxian economics " Marx and Henry George being contemporaries of classical economists " and Austrian economics , which split from neoclassical economics in the late 19th century. In the mid-20th century, a renewed interest in classical economics gave rise to the neo-Ricardian school and its offshoots. Classical theories of growth and development[ edit ] Analyzing the growth in the wealth of nations and advocating policies to promote such growth was a major focus of most classical economists. However, John Stuart Mill believed that a future stationary state of a constant population size and a constant stock of capital was both inevitable, necessary and desirable for mankind to achieve. This is now known as a steady-state economy. In political economics, value usually refers to the value of exchange, which is separate from the price. Market prices are jostled by many transient influences that are difficult to theorize about at any abstract level. Natural prices, according to Petty, Smith, and Ricardo, for example, capture systematic and persistent forces operating at a point in time. Market prices always tend toward natural prices in a process that Smith described as somewhat similar to gravitational attraction. The theory of what determined natural prices varied within the Classical school. Petty tried to develop a par between land and labour and had what might be called a land-and-labour theory of value. Smith confined the labour theory of value to a mythical pre-capitalist past. Others may interpret Smith to have believed in value as derived from labour. Ricardo also had what might be described as a cost of production theory of value. He criticized Smith for describing rent as price-determining, instead of price-determined, and saw the labour theory of value as a good approximation. Some historians of economic thought, in particular, Sraffian economists, [14] [15] see the classical theory of prices as determined from three givens: From these givens, one can rigorously derive a theory of value. But neither Ricardo nor Marx, the most rigorous investigators of the theory of value during the Classical period, developed this theory fully. Those who reconstruct the theory of value in this manner see the determinants of natural prices as being explained by the Classical economists from within the theory of economics, albeit at a lower level of abstraction. For example, the theory of wages was closely connected to the theory of population. The Classical economists took the theory of the determinants of the level and growth of population as part of Political Economy. Since then, the theory of population has been seen as part of Demography. In contrast to the Classical theory, the determinants of the neoclassical theory value: Classical economics tended to stress the benefits of trade. Its theory of value was largely displaced by marginalist schools of thought which sees " use value " as deriving from the marginal utility that consumers finds in a good, and " exchange value " i. Ironically, considering the attachment of many classical economists to the free market, the largest school of economic thought that still adheres to classical form is the Marxian school. Monetary theory[ edit ] British classical economists in the 19th century had a

well-developed controversy between the Banking and the Currency School. This parallels recent debates between proponents of the theory of endogenous money, such as Nicholas Kaldor, and monetarists, such as Milton Friedman. Monetarists and members of the currency school argued that banks can and should control the supply of money. According to their theories, inflation is caused by banks issuing an excessive supply of money. According to proponents of the theory of endogenous money, the supply of money automatically adjusts to the demand, and banks can only control the terms *e*. Debates on the definition[ edit ] The theory of value is currently a contested subject. One issue is whether classical economics is a forerunner of neoclassical economics or a school of thought that had a distinct theory of value, distribution, and growth. The period 1750–1875 is a timeframe of significant debate. Karl Marx originally coined the term "classical economics" to refer to Ricardian economics – the economics of David Ricardo and James Mill and their predecessors – but usage was subsequently extended to include the followers of Ricardo. The period between and the s would then be dominated by "vulgar political economy", as Karl Marx characterized it. Georgists and other modern classical economists and historians such as Michael Hudson argue that a major division between classical and neo-classical economics is the treatment or recognition of economic rent. Georgists and others argue that economic rent remains roughly a third of economic output. Sraffians generally see Marx as having rediscovered and restated the logic of classical economics, albeit for his own purposes. Others, such as Schumpeter, think of Marx as a follower of Ricardo. Another position is that neoclassical economics is essentially continuous with classical economics. To scholars promoting this view, there is no hard and fast line between classical and neoclassical economics. There may be shifts of emphasis, such as between the long run and the short run and between supply and demand, but the neoclassical concepts are to be found confused or in embryo in classical economics. To these economists, there is only one theory of value and distribution. Alfred Marshall is a well-known promoter of this view. Samuel Hollander is probably its best current proponent. Still another position sees two threads simultaneously being developed in classical economics. In this view, neoclassical economics is a development of certain exoteric popular views in Adam Smith. Ricardo was a sport, developing certain esoteric known by only the select views in Adam Smith. This view can be found in W. Stanley Jevons, who referred to Ricardo as something like "that able, but wrong-headed man" who put economics on the "wrong track". The above does not exhaust the possibilities. John Maynard Keynes thought of classical economics as starting with Ricardo and being ended by the publication of his own *General Theory of Employment Interest and Money*. Some, such as Terry Peach, [18] see classical economics as of antiquarian interest.

**Chapter 3 : Classical Theory “ The Political Frame ” gcdisthinkingoutloud**

*The political theories of both philosophers are closely tied to their ethical theories, and their interest is in questions concerning constitutions or forms of government. Herodotus sketches a fascinating debate by proponents of three forms of government: democracy, monarchy, and oligarchy.*

Is that where all our problems stem from? The idea that the few, wealthy oligarchs are constantly at odds with the disadvantaged masses is nothing new. Besides, civil conflict and struggle arise between the common people and the prosperous. The result is that the side that happens to beat the opposition does not establish a system that all can share in fairly, but grabs the top place in a political system as a prize of victory. His understanding of a political society, as a result, is slightly skewed from our own. For starters, there were not countries as we understand them today. Rather there were insulated city-states polis that acted as autonomous nations, independent of any larger governing body. The Politics, by Aristotle Classical Wisdom Weekly edition Additionally, Aristotle constructed his idea on political justice with the assumption that there were those in a society who were, inherently, unequal women and slaves. For these reasons we must approach The Politics cautiously, humbly. So, where were we? Aristotle portrayed the never-ending battle between the haves and have-nots in terms of oligarchs vs. You can imagine the oligarchs and democrats in terms of classical society, farmers and laborers vs. However, we could just as easily recast this fight in the 21st century. Picture young lefties fresh out of their liberal arts college picketing outside some prestigious Wall Street hedge fund where the traders wear Brooks Brothers suits and winter in the Hamptons. All disagreements stem from inequality! The combatants, Aristotle says, disagree on the true meaning of justice. For everywhere conflicts arise because of inequality, whenever unequals do not receive their proportionate amounts. The oligarchs see equality in terms of proportions; those who contribute more deserve to have more. The consequence of such an altercation is that each party will vie for political control. The oligarchs, should they have control, will tighten the purse strings; make sure they hold on to as much as they can. Aristotle, to his credit, does not seem to have a dog in this fight. He does his part as a, mostly, impartial observer. He comes to the conclusion that both sides have their merits. The problem stems from the confusion that what appears just to us, represents, unequivocally, true Justice. What seems good to us must therefore be Good. Redistributing wealth might seem like justice to the poor, but this leads to conflict between the citizens. True justice, since it is a virtue, would never lead to such strife. The only justification then seems to be that such actions appeared to be just to those in power. When you get right down to it, Aristotle seems to be saying that both parties are aiming in the right direction, but neither one have hit the mark. The fight for the soul of political justice In order to really grasp why any of this matters, we must first understand what Aristotle believed to be the goal and ultimate end of a political society. The currency in such a state was justice, true justice, which would lead to the larger goal- a happy and virtuous life for the citizens. The conflict between the oligarchs and the democrats, therefore, is significant because they are both fighting for the soul of political justice, an integral part of achieving the ultimate function of the political state. The political good is justice, and justice is the common benefit. Everyone thinks justice is some sort of equality, and hence to some extent they all agree with the philosophical discussion in which we have determined these ethical questions. They say that what is just is relative to the people involved and that it must be equality for equals. Pick a side and batten down the hatches? Abandon all hope and go along with the claptrap?

**Chapter 4 : Classical Myth | The Art(s) of Ideology**

*Classical economics or classical political economy is a school of thought in economics that flourished, primarily in Britain, in the late 18th and early-to-mid 19th century. Its main thinkers are held to be Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, and John Stuart Mill.*

References and Further Reading 1. In the Euthyphro, for instance, Socrates seeks to know the nature of piety: Yet what he seeks is not given in terms of, for example, a list of pious people or actions, nor is piety to be identified with what the gods love. Instead, Socrates seeks an account of piety in terms of some specification of what is shared by all things pious, or what makes pious things pious—that is, he seeks a specification of the essence of piety itself. The Socratic elenchus is a method of finding out the nature or essence of various kinds of things, such as friendship discussed in the Lysis, courage the Laches, knowledge the Theaetetus, and justice the Republic. That method of considering candidate definitions and seeking counterexamples to them is the same method one uses to test candidate analyses by seeking possible counterexamples to them, and thus Socrates is in effect committed to something very much like the classical view of concepts. One sees the same sort of commitment throughout much of the Western tradition in philosophy from the ancient Greeks through the present. Particular examples of classical-style analyses abound after Aristotle: For instance, Descartes in Meditation VI defines body as that which is extended in both space and time, and mind as that which thinks. The classical view looks to be a presumption of the early analytic philosophers as well with Wittgenstein being a notable exception. The classical view is present in the writings of Frege and Russell, and the view receives its most explicit treatment by that time in G. Moore gives a classical analysis of the very notion of a classical analysis, and from then on the classical view or some qualified version of it has been one of the pillars of analytic philosophy itself. One reason the classical view has had such staying power is that it provides the most obvious grounding for the sort of inquiry within philosophy that Socrates began. If one presumes that there are answers to What is F? The nature of knowledge, for example, is that which is shared by all cases of knowledge, and a classical analysis of the concept of knowledge specifies the nature of knowledge itself. So the classical view fits neatly with the reasonable presumption that there are legitimate answers to philosophical questions concerning the natures or essences of things. As at least some other views of concepts reject the notion that concepts have metaphysically necessary conditions, accepting such other views is tantamount to rejecting or at least significantly revising the legitimacy of an important part of the philosophical enterprise. The classical view also serves as the ground for one of the most basic tools of philosophy—the critical evaluation of arguments. For instance, one ground of contention in the abortion debate concerns whether fetuses have the status of moral persons or not. If they do, then since moral persons have the right not to be killed, generally speaking, then it would seem to follow that abortion is immoral. The classical view grounds the natural way to address the main contention here, for part of the task at hand is to find a proper analysis of the concept of being a moral person. If that analysis specifies features such that not all of them are had by fetuses, then fetuses are not moral persons, and the argument against the moral permissibility of abortion fails. But without there being analyses of the sort postulated by the classical view, it is far from clear how such critical analysis of philosophical arguments is to proceed. So again, the classical view seems to underpin an activity crucial to the practice of philosophy itself. In contemporary philosophy, J. Katz, Frank Jackson, and Christopher Peacocke are representative of those who hold at least some qualified version of the classical view. There are others as well, though many philosophers have rejected the view at least in part due to the criticisms to be discussed in section 4 below. The view is almost universally rejected in contemporary psychology and cognitive science, due to both theoretical difficulties with the classical view and the arrival of new theories of concepts over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Concepts in General The issue of the nature of concepts is important in philosophy generally, but most perspicuously in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Most generally, concepts are thought to be among those things that count as semantic values or meanings along with propositions. There is also reason to think that concepts are universals along with properties, relations, etc. Whether concepts are mind-dependent or mind-independent is another

such issue. Finally, concepts tend to be construed as the targets of analysis. If one then treats analysis as classical analysis, and holds that all complex concepts have classical analyses, then one accepts the classical view. Other views of concepts might accept the thesis that concepts are targets of analysis, but differ from the classical view over the sort of analysis that all complex concepts have. Concepts as Semantic Values As semantic values, concepts are the intensions or meanings of sub-sentential verbal expressions such as predicates, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. The intension or meaning of a sentence is a proposition. The intensions or meanings of many sub-sentential entities are concepts. Concepts as Universals Concepts are also generally thought to be universals. The reasons for this are threefold: This can occur in several different ways. Most English speakers possess the concept [white], and while many possess [neutrino], not many possess that concept to such a degree that one knows a great deal about what neutrinos themselves are. Many distinct things are white, and thus there are many exemplifications or instances of the concept [white]. There are many stars and many neutrinos, and thus there are many instances of [star] and [neutrino]. Moreover, distinct concepts can have the very same instances. The concepts [renate] and [cardiate] have all the same actual instances, as far as we know, and so does [human] and [rational animal]. Distinct concepts can also have necessarily all of the same instances: As universals, concepts may be treated under any of the traditional accounts of universals in general. Realism about concepts considered as universals is the view that concepts are distinct from their instances, and nominalism is the view that concepts are nothing over and above, or distinct from, their instances. Ante rem realism or platonism about concepts is the view that concepts are ontologically prior to their instances—that is, concepts exist whether they have instances or not. Conceptualism with respect to concepts holds that concepts are mental entities, being either immanent in the mind itself as a sort of idea, as constituents of complete thoughts, or somehow dependent on the mind for their existence perhaps by being possessed by an agent or by being possessible by an agent. Conceptualist views also include imagism, the view dating from Locke and others that concepts are a sort of mental image. Finally, nominalist views of concepts might identify concepts with classes or sets of particular things with the concept [star] being identified with the set of all stars, or perhaps the set of all possible stars. Other views deny such claims, holding instead that concepts are mind-independent entities. Conceptualist views are examples of the former, and platonic views are examples of the latter. The issue of whether concepts are mind-dependent or mind-independent carries great weight with respect to the clash between the classical view and other views of concepts such as prototype views and theory-theories. Concepts as the Targets of Analysis Conceptual analysis is of concepts, and philosophical questions of the form What is F? For instance, the classical view holds that all complex concepts have classical analyses, where a complex concept is a concept having an analysis in terms of other concepts. Alternatively, prototype views analyze concepts in terms of typical features or in terms of a prototypical or exemplary case. For instance, such a view might analyze the concept of being a bird in terms of such typical features as being capable of flight, being small, etc. So-called theory-theories analyze a concept in terms of some internally represented theory about the members of the extension of that concept. Neoclassical views of concepts preserve one element of the classical view, namely the claim that all complex concepts have metaphysically necessary conditions in the sense that, for example, being unmarried is necessary for being a bachelor, but reject the claim that all complex concepts have metaphysically sufficient conditions. Finally, atomistic views reject all notions of analysis just mentioned, denying that concepts have analyses at all. The Classical View and Concepts in General The classical view claims simply that all complex concepts have classical analyses. As such, the classical view makes no claims as to the status of concepts as universals, or as being mind-dependent or mind-independent entities. The classical view also is consistent with concepts being analyzable by means of other forms of analysis. Yet some views of universals are more friendly to the classical view than others, and the issue of the mind-dependence or mind-independence of concepts is of some importance to whether the classical view is correct or not. For instance, if concepts are identical to ideas present in the mind as would be true on some conceptualist views, then if the contents of those ideas fail to have necessary and sufficient defining conditions, then the classical view looks to be false or at least not true for all concepts. Alternatively, on platonic views of concepts, such a lack of available necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the contents of our own ideas is of no

consequence to the classical view, since ideas are not concepts according to platonic accounts. Other classical theorists deny that all classical analysis specify jointly sufficient conditions, holding instead that classical analyses merely specify necessary and sufficient conditions. II A classical analysis must specify a logical constitution of the analysandum. Other suggested conditions on classical analysis are given below. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Consider an arbitrary concept [F]. A necessary condition for being an F is a condition such that something must satisfy that condition in order for it to be an F. For instance, being male is necessary for being a bachelor, and being four-sided is necessary for being a square. Such characteristics specified in necessary conditions are shared by, or had in common with, all things to which the concept in question applies. A sufficient condition for being an F is a condition such that if something satisfies that condition, then it must be an F. Being a bachelor is sufficient for being male, for instance, and being a square is sufficient for being a square. A necessary and sufficient condition for being an F is a condition such that not only must a thing satisfy that condition in order to be an F, but it is also true that if a thing satisfies that condition, then it must be an F. That is, a thing must be a four-sided regular plane figure in order for it to be a square, and if a thing is a four-sided regular plane figure, then it must be a square. The conditions of being four-sided and of being a regular figure are each necessary conditions for being a square, for instance, and the conjunction of them is a sufficient condition for being a square. In an analysis, it is the logical constituents that an analysis specifies, where a logical constituent of a concept is a concept entailed by that concept. A concept entails another concept when being in the extension of the former entails being in the extension of the latter. For a logical constitution specified by a classical analysis, a logical constitution of a concept [F] is a collection of concepts, where each member of that collection is entailed by [F], and where [F] entails all of them taken collectively. Most complex concepts will have more than one logical constitution, given that there are different ways of analyzing the same concept. Among them are the following: III A classical analysis must not include the analysandum as either its analysans or as part of its analysans. That is, a classical analysis cannot be circular. While the latter sentence is true, it does not express an analysis of [four-sided regular figure]. The concept [four-sided regular figure] analyzes [square], not the other way around. VI A classical analysis does not include any vague concepts in either its analysandum or its analysans. The last two conditions concern vagueness. Testing Candidate Analyses In seeking a correct analysis for a concept, one typically considers some number of so-called candidate analyses. A correct analysis will have no possible counterexamples, where such counterexamples might show a candidate analysis to be either too broad or too narrow. This candidate analysis is too broad, since it would include some things as being squares that are nevertheless not squares. Counterexamples include any trapezoid or rectangle that is not itself a square, that is. Assuming for sake of illustration that squares are the sorts of things that can be colored at all, a blue square counts as a counterexample to this candidate analysis, since it fails one of the stated conditions that a square be red. It might be wondered as to why correct analyses have no possible counterexamples, instead of the less stringent condition that correct analyses have no actual counterexamples. The reason is that analyses are put forth as necessary truths.

**Chapter 5 : Myth Theory and Criticism**

*This week, we are working to lay important intellectual foundations for our class by introducing the classical theories of Aristotle (on the subject of tragedy) and the recent scholarship of Joseph Campbell (on the "monomyth" and the mythical hero).*

Organisation politics are concerned with the nature of power and who controls the decision making processes Wirt and Kirst, For example, educationalists who hold fundamentally differing perspectives on implementation methods of a specified teaching resource may form alliances in order to protect their individual levels of autonomy. Existing alliances lose leverage positions and new alliances form to compete for access. Within an international context, the ability of a private school board to form alliances with local government authorities is essential for ongoing success. The ability to anticipate changes in external conditions adds considerable advantages an organisation Hayden and Thompson, Both formal and informal power structures can align themselves in support or in opposition of reform. Shafritz and Ott make the point that reform will ultimately win, however the political alliances made by the leader can aid a smooth transition, or create increased levels of conflict. For example, the implementation of a new mathematics program within a school district will create new coalitions. Some may see advantages and provide support, not doubt siding with those on more formal positions of power. Other may view implementation as unproven, making the implementation more challenging. The role of the leader is not to remove the conflict, rather to manage the conflict in a way the benefits the organisation Owens, Although it is agreed that too much conflict can be troublesome, the complete removal of conflict is equally problematic Bjork, b. This creates conflict within organisations and when managed well can help an organisation to remain at its cutting edge. Conflict also ensures organisations attract and maintain the most competitive and motivated managers, with individuals honing their skills in order to win top positions Zaleznik , Competitive skills may win a position of authority, however once there coalitions are the tool that keeps them there. Through developing powerful coalitions a leader can effectively leverage their influence throughout the organisation. Political difficulties are rampant in many organizations as individuals seeking power trample on the dreams and careers of others in order to win recognition Zaleznik , Individuals who are driven to win top positions have the ability to leave a wake of destruction, concerning themselves more with personal agendas then organisational goals of productivity Zaleznik , Coalitions require individuals with diverse perspectives to come together on issues. Such coalitions can fail when it is perceived that progress is slow on their shared agenda. Innovation is constant, budgets are large and positional movement in the higher levels of management and leadership is minimal. It is this element of this stability that heightens the political environment within the school. Scarce resources are usually not physical, rather valued resources include the ability to have influence and initiate innovation. At the same time a complex web of positional play is taking place between other stakeholders. Each is watching the other for a sign of momentum they can support and benefit from, as reputation is everything. As new innovations emerge, these players shift their alliances. An examples has been the innovation of Learn through Play in the lower elementary years. This is currently a fashionable topic and top stakeholders are weary of taking a position as the ultimate income is yet uncertain. Educators in my organisation all claim to hold a strong moral purpose, to educate children in line with our organisation mission and vision, and within the framework of the IB curriculum and philosophy Dempster, ; International Baccalaureate Organization, We place differing levels of emphasis on areas of the curriculum according to our competencies and our experiences and coalitions are sometimes formed around these differences. Every staff member receives an annual professional allowance, however there are also numerous other professional development opportunities available from other budgets. Educators who successfully present themselves as being most worthy of extra development are able to best utilize access to it. Educators who push initiatives and are seen as supportive are more likely to be selected. When individuals form coalitions around such initiatives, it can be easier to gain recognition. Internal promotions within middle management are not uncommon in my organisation. Appointments are often predictable through the coalitions they have developed. Members of a year level teams who have developed



excellent working relationships with others both within their own team and across other teams often have access to promotion. Individuals who have been tactical in their conversations, strategic in showing withholding support and formed formal and informal coalitions win administrator attention, gaining access to organisational agendas. Most often positive conflict arises when coalitions successfully recognise and support administrator initiatives. Individuals, year level teams, technology coaches, media coaches and administrators all formed a strong coalition that the school board could not ignore. Once iPads were in place, individual teams competed informally for recognition as the most innovative iPad. This sparked a healthy level of continued innovation. As individual teams presented the best apps for learning, funding support was given, along with informal recognition of their success. As a group of educators we are able to maintain this goal, bargaining and negotiating with community stakeholders, even government coalitions who approach with other agendas. School leaders have created this united front through a series of strategies that have increased their personal power, giving them permission to set organizational direction and challenge those who oppose it. As in all schools, there are periods of greater stability and times of greater change. Differing categories of power have varying levels influence according to organisation conditions and high levels of personal power can create stability in schools when used for organisational good. I have observed the advantages of securing high levels of personal and reverent power through strategically utilising other power sources, expert, coercive, reward, and legitimate power. By identifying small advantages I would continue to leverage my expertise, each time subtly publicising my achievements to increase expert credibility. To gather political support in my role, I would identify trends within the school environment and determine where most popular and influential actors play. By spending time with these actors I would seek to determine how their agendas could assist me in establishing credibility. Agendas closely align with the wider school mission and values would be beneficial to helping me further establish my expert knowledge. By repeating this process among different groups I would aim to build coalitions across the school. Utilising a network of coalitions around points of agreement would allow me to strategically develop my powerbase. Ongoing connections with key members of each coalition would help me to read the climate of my growing power base, making adjustments to the terms of the various coalitions as necessary Watkins, Change is inevitable and is the greatest risk to existing coalitions. Through coaching coalition members to understanding that they will be disadvantaged by holding an existing position, and given advantage by taking hold of a new position, my power bases can be maintained through change. Politics in Organizations [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from University of Kentucky Canvas site. The basis of Social Power. Fundamentals in Education Planning: International Schools Growth and Influence. Retrieved from International Baccalaureate Organization. Program Standards and Practices. Is Sharing or Accumulating Power the Answer? Journal of Applied Business Research, 9 3 , Retrieved from Watkins, M. The first 90 days: Proven strategies for getting up to speed faster and smarter.

**Chapter 6 : Plato's Myths (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*In this book, originally published in , Chiara Bottici argues for a philosophical understanding of political myth. Bottici demonstrates that myth is a process, one of continuous work on a basic narrative pattern that responds to a need for significance.*

Myth Theory and Criticism Myth criticism designates not so much a critical approach in literary studies as the convergence of several methods and forms of inquiry about the complex relations between literature and myth. So heterogeneous are these inquiries, connecting with so many disciplines and interdisciplinary issues, that it is perhaps best to think of myth criticism as the locus for a series of complex, if powerfully suggestive, questions. Is myth embedded in literature, or are myth and literature somehow coextensive? Is myth from Greek mythos, "tale, story" inescapably narrative in form? Is all literature susceptible of myth criticism? How self-conscious are literary artists in the use or incorporation of myth? How does myth in, or as, literature evolve historically? Does a single governing myth, a "monomyth," organize disparate mythic narratives and dominate literary form? What tasks, besides a simple cataloging of putative mythic components, fall to the myth critic? And most fundamentally, what does "myth" mean in the context of literary criticism? The divergence in answers to this last question has been so great, recourse to different disciplines philosophy, anthropology, psychology, folklore so various, that the question becomes an inevitable terminus a quo for a survey of myth criticism. A characteristic Romantic and post-Romantic tendency in defining myth is the denial of euhemerism, the theory that myths can be explained historically or by identifying their special objects or motives. The resistance to such reductionism is perhaps strongest in the work of the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, whose monumental *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* is given over in its second volume to the proposition that "myth is a form of thought. But unlike language, or at least the language of philosophy, myth is nonintellectual, nondiscursive, typically imagistic. It is the primal, emotion-laden, unmediated "language" of experience. This literal, as opposed to representational, quality of myth suggests that literature that taps into the recesses of mythic consciousness will reveal in powerful fashion the "dynamic of the life feeling" 2: Myth, understood in this honorific rather than pejorative sense, has profoundly influenced numerous literary critics and theorists. Isabel MacCaffrey, for example, insists in her study of *Paradise Lost* that the Christian myth at the center of the epic is not for Milton an oblique representation but rather the "direct rendering of certain stupendous realities now known only indirectly in the symbolic signatures of earthly life" It was for this reason, she feels, that Milton was obliged to give up earlier allegorical plans for the poem: Two other highly influential, nonreductionist theories of myth come from the fields of anthropology and psychology see *Anthropological Theory and Criticism*. In other words, the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction. Thus the mythopoeic mythmaking imagination, its structure and operations, is reflected in the structure and symbols of actual myths. See *Semiotics and Structuralism*. For literary criticism perhaps the most productive anti-euhemerist has been the psychologist and one-time disciple of Sigmund Freud , C. These find expression in characteristic forms--the Earth Mother, the divine child, the wise old man, the sacrificial death--of the god, the mandala, the satyr or man-animal monster, the cross, the number which provide the primordial elements in the myths and narrative constructions of widely different cultures. By entitling the third essay of *Anatomy of Criticism* "Archetypal Criticism: Theory of Myths," Frye suggests a conceptual means of drawing individual and apparently unrelated archetypal images--the fundamentals of psyche and culture--into a coherent and ultimately hierarchical framework of "mythoi," one organizing not only individual literary works but the entire system of literary works, that is, literature. The abstract and conventional qualities Frye attributes to the mythic mode in literature are ultimately reflective of the irreducible and inescapable place of myth itself; so conceived, Western literature, massively funded by the powerful myths of the Bible and classical culture, might be thought of as having a "grammar" or coherent structural principles basic to any critical organization or account of historical development. That Frye ultimately identifies the "quest-myth" in its various forms as the central myth mono-myth of literature and the source of literary genres is at once the logical conclusion of his approach to myth criticism and the source of

ongoing debate. His four "mythoi," or "generic narratives" spring: And his conviction that the "total mythopoeic structure of concern" extends beyond literature to religion, philosophy, political theory, and history suggests how myth criticism may ultimately connect with a larger theory of culture. Having succeeded so well in opposing mythos to logos, however, Fiedler comes perilously close to paralyzing criticism. His own critical project survives chiefly with his notion that literature comes into being only with the imposition of a "Signature" upon mythic materials, a "Signature" being the "sum total of individuating factors in a work" 1: The insistence on both signature and myth, or archetype, with the pre-dominance of each varying in individual literary works, creates a useful critical spectrum. Many other modern myth critics and theorists, from the Cambridge Ritualists down to the present, have suggested productive ways of speaking about myth in literature and the connections between literary mythopoeia and the materials explored by other disciplines in our intellectual culture. Even in so effectively establishing connections between ritual and myth on the one hand and tragic drama on the other, however, Girard is at pains to acknowledge the distinctively literary qualities of the plays, what he calls the "essentially antimythical and antiritualistic inspiration of the drama" Although "myth criticism" no longer enjoys its earlier vogue, its legacy is powerful. This seems to be particularly true for studies of modernist and American literature. It is likely that the future of literary myth criticism will be determined by the vitality of mythography as a concern in other related or allied fields, as well as by the heuristic power of the questions such criticism can generate. One of the most important of these questions asks about the degree of mythic "self-consciousness" in literary texts. Is literature mythopoeia or mythology? The nineteenth-century philologist and student of myth F. And subsequently many critics have insisted on the very different ways in which myth is conceived and appropriated by Homer and Sophocles; Virgil and Milton; T. The peculiarly self-conscious and individual myth systems of poets such as William Blake and W. Yeats also point up the critical question sharply. In turn, other critics have asked how the Western myth tradition has underwritten canon formation and how, for example, black and feminist literatures are to be understood in relation to, and in conscious rebellion against, this tradition. If one accepts that the proposition "myth is literature" is itself an aesthetic creation and hence defines further creative possibilities as does, for example, the Americanist and myth critic Richard Chase , then the question of mythic self-consciousness becomes particularly exigent. In short, complex critical and theoretical questions about myth and literature continue to be asked. The susceptibility of literature to forms of myth criticism depends upon the persuasiveness of answers to such questions, as well as upon the success of literary theorists in appropriating the empirical and conceptual investigations of myth by other disciplines. Langer, ; Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, vol. Willard Trask, ; Leslie A. Brill, ; Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: R, F, C, Hull, , rev. Emerson Buchanan, ; John Vickery, ed. Contemporary Theory and Practice Topics Index Cross-references for this Guide entry:

**Chapter 7 : Classical Mythology - Wikiversity**

*Myth Theory and Criticism: Myth criticism designates not so much a critical approach in literary studies as the convergence of several methods and forms of inquiry about the complex relations between literature and myth.*

These ideas were transmitted beyond the confines of the classical polis as the Greek city-states came under the suzerainty of larger kingdoms after an initial Macedonian conquest at the end of the fourth century B. C; those kingdoms in turn were eventually conquered and significantly assimilated by the Roman republic, later transmuted into an empire. Philosophers writing in Latin engaged self-consciously with the earlier and continuing traditions of writing about philosophy in Greek. Neither the transformation of the republic into an empire in the first-century BCE, nor the eventual abdication of the last pretenders to the Roman imperial throne in the Western part of the empire in CE, prevented continued engagement with this Greek and Roman heritage of political philosophy among late antique and later medieval scholars and their successors writing in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew. At the same time, because the Greeks also invented other genres widely recognized today—among them, history, tragedy, comedy, and rhetoric—no understanding of their thought about politics can restrict itself to the genre of political philosophy alone. While that argument is contentious, it rests on an important broader point. This article therefore begins by surveying political practices and the reflective accounts to which they gave rise in the classical Greek period of the independent polis. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. It continues to Hellenistic Greek thinkers before considering the main currents and roles of political philosophy in the Roman republic. See the entry on medieval political philosophy. The city was the domain of potential collaboration in leading the good life, though it was by the same token the domain of potential contestation should that pursuit come to be understood as pitting some against others. Political theorizing began in arguments about what politics was good for, who could participate in politics, and why, arguments which were tools in civic battles for ideological and material control as well as attempts to provide logical or architectonic frameworks for those battles. Such conflicts were addressed by the idea of justice, which was fundamental to the city as it emerged from the archaic age, sometimes reflected in Homer, into the classical period. Justice was conceived by poets, lawgivers, and philosophers alike as the structure of civic bonds which were beneficial to all rich and poor, powerful and weak alike rather than an exploitation of some by others. So understood, justice defined the basis of equal citizenship and was said to be the requirement for human regimes to be acceptable to the gods. The ideal was that, with justice as a foundation, political life would enable its participants to flourish and to achieve the overarching human end of happiness *eudaimonia*, expressing a civic form of virtue and pursuing happiness and success through the competitive forums of the city. This became the major political faultline of the Greek fifth century BCE. The exclusion of women from active citizenship in Athens was more consciously felt, giving rise to fantasies of female-dominated politics in Aristophanic comedy *Lysistrata*, *Assemblywomen* and to tortured reflection in many tragedies consider the titles of *Medea*; *Phaedra*; *Trojan Women*. Among equals, however defined, the space of the political was the space of participation in speech and decision concerning public affairs and actions. That invention of the political what Meier calls *The Greek Discovery of Politics* was the hallmark of the classical Greek world. Citizens, whether the few usually the rich or the many including the poorer and perhaps the poorest free adult men, deliberated together as to how to conduct public affairs, sharing either by custom, by election, or by lot—the latter seen in Athens as the most democratic, though it was never the sole mechanism used in any Greek democracy—in the offices for carrying them out. Rhetoric played an important role especially, though not only, in democracies, where discursive norms shaped by the poor majority were hegemonic in public even over the rich Ober. At the same time, politics was shaped by the legacy of archaic poetry and its heroic ethos and by the religious cults which included, alongside pan-Hellenic and familial rites, important practices distinct to each city-state. This was a polytheistic, rather than monotheistic, setting, in which religion was at least in large part a function of civic identity. It was a world innocent of modern bureaucracy and of the modern move to intellectual abstraction in defining the state: This broadest sense was initially most evident to the Athenians when they looked at the peculiar customs of Sparta, but Plato taught them to recognize that

democratic Athens was as distinctive a regime Schofield Most of the wise men sophoi and students of nature physikoi who appeared in this milieu thought within the same broad terms as the poets and orators. Justice was widely, if not universally, treated as a fundamental constituent of cosmic order. Some of the physikoi influenced political life, notably the Pythagoreans in southern Italy. Others held themselves aloof from political action while still identifying commonalities between nature and politics. Most of the sophists argued the latter, though they did so along a spectrum of interpretation for which our evidence rests heavily on Plato, who portrays Socrates arguing with a considerable number of sophists: This nomos-phis debate raised a fundamental challenge to the ordering intellectual assumptions of the polis, even though the sophists advertised themselves as teaching skills for success within it, a number of them being employed as diplomats by cities eager to exploit their rhetorical abilities. If Greek political thinkers presupposed justice, in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE many of them also increasingly problematized it. Should philosophers act politically and if so, should they engage in ordinary politics in existing regimes, or work to establish new ones, or should they abstain from politics in order to live a life of pure contemplation? There was likewise a question as to whether philosophers should think politically: Philosophy might have to address the political but its highest calling soared above it. While one influential approach to the history of political thought takes its bearings from what a thinker was trying to do in and by what he or she said or wrote, it is important to recognize that the founders of ancient political philosophy were in part trying to define a new space of doing as philosophizing, independent of ordinary political action. This is not to say that they did not also have ordinary political intentions, but rather to stress that the invention of political philosophy was also intended as a mode of reflection upon the value of ordinary political life. Socrates and Plato According to Cicero, Socrates "BCE was the first to bring philosophy down from heaven, locating it in cities and even in homes Tusc. A humbly born man who refused the lucrative mantle of the sophistic role as a professional teacher, yet attracted many of the most ambitious and aristocratic youth of Athens to accompany him in his questioning of them and their elders as to the nature of the virtues they claimed to possess or understand, he left no philosophical writings. See the entry on Socrates. As depicted by Plato, the search for such definitions led invariably to a concern with knowledge of how best to live, as not only one of the conventional virtues in the form of wisdom but also as underpinning, even constituting, them all. That elevation of knowledge in turn led Socrates to militate against the practices of rhetoric and judgment which animated the political institutions of Athens—the law-courts, Assembly and Council. The notion of political knowledge limited to one or a few experts, as opposed to the embedded and networked knowledge produced and exercised by the whole demos of Athens in their judgments and deliberations, struck at the central premises of Athenian democracy and those of Greek politics more generally in oligarchies, wealth rather than knowledge was the relevant criterion for rule; in tyrannies, sheer power. The relation between politics and knowledge, the meaning of justice as a virtue, the value of the military courage which all Greek cities prized in their citizens, all seem to have been central topics of Socratic conversation. The Political Philosophy of Citizenship That engagement with political philosophy was dramatically intensified when Socrates was, at the age of seventy, arraigned, tried, and sentenced to death by an Athenian court. Brought in the usual Athenian way by a group of his fellow citizens who took it upon themselves to prosecute him for the sake of the city, the charges against him were three-fold: Each of these had a political dimension, given the civic control of central religious cults mentioned earlier, and the broad political importance of educating the young to take their place in the civic order. Socrates had played his part as an ordinary citizen, allowing his name to go forward for selection by lot to serve on the Council, and serving in the army when required. He went so far as to claim that as a civic benefactor, he deserved not death but the lifetime free meals commonly awarded to an Olympic champion 36ea. Socrates here depicts himself as a new kind of citizen, conceptualizing the public good in a new way and so serving it best through unprecedented actions in contrast to the conventionally defined paths of political contest and success Villa The first two recalled political incidents: The third is a hypothetical remark. Particularly in Anglophone twentieth-century scholarship, these remarks have engendered a view of Socrates as endorsing civil disobedience in certain circumstances, and so have framed the question of civil disobedience and the grounds for political obligation as arising in Plato. A significant debate on these matters took shape in the United States

in the s and s at the time of widespread civil disobedience relating to civil rights and the Vietnam War: That debate has had to confront the fact that Socrates did not actually disobey his own death sentence with which his trial concluded: Before that moment, Plato imagines Socrates being visited in prison by his friend Crito in a dialogue which bears his name , and urged to escape for the sake of his friends and family, a practice which was tolerated in Athens so long as the escapee fled into exile. He begins his examination of them by recalling principles to which he and Crito had in the past agreed, including the principle that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it Cri. On any reading, it is important to bear in mind that Socrates is choosing to obey a jury verdict that has commanded him to suffer what is arguably an injustice but not to commit one. The contract is unequal: The meaning of this clause and its relevance to civil disobedience is again much debated Kraut remains a landmark. In the Republic, by contrast, a dialogue in which Socrates is also the main character and first-person narrator but in which the views he advances go beyond the tight-knit pattern of debates in the dialogues discussed in section 3. See the entry on Plato. The Republic is, with the Laws, an order of magnitude longer than any other Platonic dialogue. Readers today are likely to think of the Republic as the home par excellence of political philosophy. But that view has also been challenged by scholars who see it as primarily an ethical dialogue, driven by the question of why the individual should be just Annas This section argues that the ethical and political concerns, and purposes, of the dialogue are inextricably intertwined. Near the beginning of the dialogue, a challenge is launched by the character Thrasymachus, mentioned above, asserting that all actual cities define justice in the interest of the rulers. He takes this to mean that the ethical virtue of justice which their subjects are enjoined to cultivateâ€”traditionally seen as the necessary bond among citizens and the justification for political ruleâ€”is in fact a distorted sham. See the entry on Callicles and Thrasymachus. Socrates then launches a speculation as to the origins of cities: However, this origin already gives rise to a proto-ethical dimension, first insofar as the members of the primitive city each do their own work the structure of what will emerge as the virtue of justice , which is fleshed out when political rulers are established who are able to use their wisdom to help their subjects maintain a psychological balance in their souls that approximates, if it does not fully embody, the virtues of moderation and justice and so enables them to enjoy a unified rather than a divided soul. The question of why the individual should be just, figured at the outset by the contrast with the putatively happy tyrant, is resolved eventually by demonstrating that the tyrant is at once maximally unjust and maximally unhappy. That resolution rests on the division of the soul into three parts by which the Republic places moral psychology at the heart of political philosophy. In the soul and city respectively, the rational part or class should rule; the spirited part or class should act to support the rule of that rational part; and the appetitive part of the soul and producing class in the city should accept being governed by it. Both soul and city are therefore in need of, and capable of exhibiting, four virtues ea. Two of these pertain to individual parts: Two however are defined by relations between the parts: A just soul will indeed reliably issue in traditionally just actions, such as refraining from theft, murder, and sacrilege contra Sachs , who argues that Plato has simply abandoned the usual domain of justice. To be an effective agent at all, one must be just, moderate, courageous and wise. The just person enjoys psychic health, which is advantageous no matter how he is treated fairly or unfairly by gods and men; correspondingly, the just society enjoys civic unity, which is advantageous in being the fundamental way to avoid the assumed supreme evil of civil war. In contrast, all other cities are characterized as riven by civil war between the rich and the poor; none of them counts as a single, unified city at all see Rep. In particular, Book V of the Republic suggests that a sufficiently unified regime can be achieved only by depriving its guardian-rulers of private property and of private families, instead making them live in austere communal conditions in which they are financially supported by their money-making subjects and allowed to procreate only when and with whom will best serve the city. Aristotle and Cicero would deplore what they construed as this abolition of private property, and even those following and radicalizing Plato on property advocating the abolition of property for all the citizens, rather than only deprivation of it for the rulers, as would the sixteenth-century More , were generally opposed to if not scandalized by the suggestion of procreative communism. The Republic initiates a further tradition in political philosophy by laying out a template for the integration of ethics and political philosophy into a comprehensive account of epistemology and metaphysics. In the Republic, the knowledge required for rule is

not specialized, but comprehensive: The rulers are philosophers who take turns over their lifetime in exercising collective political authority. To that extent the Republic presents a paradox: The discussion is interrupted but ultimately enriched by a story or myth in which politics is shown to be a matter of humans ruling other humans in place of living under divine guidance. That human expertise of statecraft is ultimately distinguished from its closest rivals—strikingly, the arts of rhetoric, generalship, and judging—by its knowledge of the correct timing *kairos* for the exercise and cessation of these other arts Lane The statesman is wholly defined by the possession of that knowledge of when it is best to exercise the other arts and its exercise in binding the different groups of citizens together, a knowledge which depends on a broader philosophical grasp but which is peculiarly political. Here, political philosophy operates not just to assimilate politics to a broader metaphysical horizon but also to identify its specificity. Here politics still aims at virtue, and at the virtue of all the citizens, but those citizens all play a part in holding civic offices; the ordinary activities of politics are shared, in what is described as a mixture of monarchy and democracy. Another influential aspect of the *Laws* is its concern with the nature of law itself as a topic proper to political philosophy. Some scholars have found that to be a distinctively democratic and liberal account of law Bobonich ; see also the entry on Plato on utopia. That arguably goes too far in a proceduralist direction, given that the value of law remains its embodiment of reason or understanding *nous* , so that while adding persuasive preludes is a better way to exercise the coercive force of law, no agreement on the basis of persuasion could justify laws which departed from the standard of *nous*. Nevertheless the emphasis on all citizens as eligible, and so presumptively capable, to hold offices, differs significantly from the Republic, where the only offices mentioned seem to be monopolized by the philosopher-rulers and the auxiliary guardians who assist them. The Statesman however reserves a special extraordinary role a higher office, or perhaps not an office as such for the statesman whenever he is present in the city. Has Plato in the *Laws* given up on his earlier idealism which rested on the possibility of the philosopher-king, or on the idea of the perfectly knowledgeable statesman?

**Chapter 8 : A Philosophy of Political Myth : Chiara Bottici :**

*A classical myth is a story that, through its classical form, has attained a kind of immortality because its inherent archetypal beauty, profundity, and power have inspired rewarding renewal and transformation by successive generations.*

Who was his readership? A very good survey of this topic is Yunis from which I would like to quote the following illuminating passage: Other scholars, such as Morgan, have also argued that Plato addressed in his writings both philosophical and non-philosophical audiences. It is true that in the Republic Plato has the following advice for philosophers: This interpretation is too extreme. For him philosophy has a civic dimension. The one who makes it outside the cave should not forget about those who are still down there and believe that the shadows they see there are real beings. The philosopher should try to transmit his knowledge and his wisdom to the others, and he knows that he has a difficult mission. But Plato was not willing to go as far as Socrates did. He preferred to address the public at large through his written dialogues rather than conducting dialogues in the agora. He did not write abstruse philosophical treatises but engaging philosophical dialogues meant to appeal to a less philosophically inclined audience. The participants are historical and fictional characters. Plato wanted his dialogues to look like genuine, spontaneous dialogues accurately preserved. How much of these stories and dialogues is fictional? It is hard to tell, but he surely invented a great deal of them. References to traditional myths and mythical characters occur throughout the dialogues. His myths are meant, among other things, to make philosophy more accessible. Sometimes he modifies them, to a greater or lesser extent, while other times he combines them—this is the case, for instance, of the Noble Lie Republic 359d, which is a combination of the Cadmeian myth of autochthony and the Hesiodic myth of ages. There are also in Plato myths that are his own, such as the myth of Er Republic 10 and the myth of Atlantis Timaeus 26e4. Many of the myths Plato invented feature characters and motifs taken from traditional mythology such as the Isles of the Blessed or the judgment after death, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish his own mythological motifs from the traditional ones. The majority of the myths he invents preface or follow a philosophical argument: Plato refers sometimes to the myths he uses, whether traditional or his own, as *muthoi* for an overview of all the loci where the word *muthos* occurs in Plato see Brisson ff. However, *muthos* is not an exclusive label. The myths Plato invents, as well as the traditional myths he uses, are narratives that are non-falsifiable, for they depict particular beings, deeds, places or events that are beyond our experience: Myths are also fantastical, but they are not inherently irrational and they are not targeted at the irrational parts of the soul. Strictly speaking, the Cave is an analogy, not a myth. Most argues that there are eight main features of the Platonic myth. Most acknowledges that these eight features are not completely uncontroversial, and that there are occasional exceptions; but applied flexibly, they allow us to establish a corpus of at least fourteen Platonic myths in the Phaedo, Gorgias, Protagoras, Meno, Phaedrus, Symposium, Republic X, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias and Laws IV. Dorion concludes that the Oracle story is not only a Platonic fiction, but also a Platonic myth, more specifically: Who invented the examination of the opinions of others by the means of *elenchus*? We have a comprehensive book about the people of Plato: Nails; now we also have one about the animals of Plato: Bell and Naas. Anyone interested in myth, metaphor, and on how people and animals are intertwined in Plato would be rewarded by consulting it. They are used to portray not just Socrates [compared to a gadfly, horse, swan, snake, stork, fawn, and torpedo ray] but many other characters in the dialogues, from the wolfish Thrasymachus of the Republic to the venerable racehorse Parmenides of the Parmenides. Myth as a means of persuasion For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do. But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children cf. In the Republic the Noble Lie is supposed to make the citizens of Callipolis care more for their city. Philosophy, claims Schofield, provides the guards with knowledge, not with love and devotion for their city. There is some truth in them. But Simmias confesses that he still retains some doubt 382b, and then



Socrates tells them an eschatological myth. The myth does not provide evidence that the soul is immortal. It assumes that the soul is immortal and so it may be said that it is not entirely false. The myth also claims that there is justice in the afterlife and Socrates hopes that the myth will convince one to believe that the soul is immortal and that there is justice in the afterlife. Myth represents a sort of back-up: The myth blurs the boundary between this world and the other. To believe that soul is immortal and that we should practice justice in all circumstances, Gonzales argues, we have to be persuaded by what Socrates says, not by the myth of Er. Myth as a teaching tool The philosopher should share his philosophy with others. But since others may sometimes not follow his arguments, Plato is ready to provide whatever it takes—“an image, a simile, or a myth”—that will help them grasp what the argument failed to tell them. The myth—“just like an image, or analogy”—may be a good teaching tool. Myth can embody in its narrative an abstract philosophical doctrine. In the *Phaedo*, Plato develops the so-called theory of recollection 72e—“78b. The theory is there expounded in rather abstract terms. The *Phaedrus* myth of the winged soul, however, does. In it we are told how the soul travels in the heavens before reincarnation, attempts to gaze on true reality, forgets what it saw in the heavens once reincarnated, and then recalls the eternal forms it saw in the heavens when looking at their perceptible embodiments. The *Phaedrus* myth does not provide any proofs or evidence to support the theory of recollection. Since this theory the myth embodies is, for Plato, true, the myth has pace Plato a measure of truth in it, although its many fantastical details may lead one astray if taken literally. Myth in the *Timaeus* The cosmology of the *Timaeus* is a complex and ample construction, involving a divine maker assisted by a group of less powerful gods, who creates the cosmos out of a given material dominated by an inner impulse towards disorder and according to an intelligible model. The standard interpretation is promoted by, among others, Cornford, 31ff. The *Timaeus* cosmology, Cornford argues, is a *muthos* because it is cast in the form of a narration, not as a piece-by-piece analysis. But also, and mainly, because its object, namely the universe, is always in a process of becoming and cannot be really known. The cosmology, Brisson argues, is a non-verifiable discourse about the perceptible universe before and during its creation. The standard alternative is to say that the problem lies in the cosmologist, not in the object of his cosmology. It is not that the universe is so unstable so that it cannot be really known. It is that we fail to provide an exact and consistent description of it. A proponent of this view is Taylor, *The Demiurge*, Burnyeat claims, works with given materials, and when he creates the cosmos, he does not have a free choice, but has to adjust his plans to them. Although we know that the Demiurge is supremely benevolent towards his creation, none of us could be certain of his practical reasons for framing the cosmos the way he did. But why does Plato call it a *muthos*? No cosmologist can deduce these reasons from various premises commonly accepted. He has to imagine them, but they are neither fantastical, nor sophistic. The cosmologist exercises his imagination under some constraints. He has to come up with reasonable and coherent conjectures. And in good Socratic and Platonic tradition, he has to test them with others. This is what *Timaeus* does. They are highly skilled and experienced philosophers: The judges, however, says Plato, have to be tolerant, for in this field one cannot provide more than conjectures. It may be argued that its creationist scenario was meant to make the difficult topic of the genesis of the realm of becoming more accessible. In the *Philebus*, in a tight dialectical conversation, the genesis of the realm of becoming is explained in abstract terms the unlimited, limit, being that is mixed and generated out of those two; and the cause of this mixture and generation, 27b—“c. But the *Timaeus* aims at encompassing more than the *Philebus*. It aims not only at revealing the ultimate ontological principles accessible to human reason, cf. These reasons are to be imagined because imagination has to fill in the gaps that reason leaves in this attempt to disclose the reasons for which the cosmos was created the way it is. Myth and philosophy In the *Protagoras* a distinction is made between *muthos* and *logos*, where *muthos* appears to refer to a story and *logos* to an argument. This distinction seems to be echoed in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. And later on, at c4, Socrates calls a *muthos* the teaching according to which active and passive motions generate perception and perceived objects. By calling all those philosophical doctrines *muthoi* Plato does not claim that they are myths proper, but that they are, or appear to be, non-argumentative. In many dialogues he condemns the use of images in knowing things and claims that true philosophical knowledge should avoid images. He would have had strong reasons for avoiding the use of myths: The eschatological myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*, for

instance, are tightly bound with the philosophical arguments of those dialogues cf. Some other times he uses myth as a supplement to philosophical discourse cf. One time, in the *Timaeus*, Plato appears to overcome the opposition between *muthos* and *logos*: It is difficult to say which one of these two readings is a better approximation of what Plato thought about the interplay between myth and philosophy. The interpreter seems bound to furnish only probable accounts about this matter. Fowler surveys the *muthos*–*logos* dichotomy from Herodotus and the pre–Socratic philosophers to Plato, the Sophists, and the Hellenistic and Imperial writers, and provides many valuable references to works dealing with the notion of *muthos*, the Archaic uses of *mythos* words, and ancient Greek mythology; for the *muthos*–*logos* dichotomy in Plato see also Miller , 76 He might have used a myth or two in his early dialogues, now lost.

**Chapter 9 : Political Theory/Ancient Greece - Wikibooks, open books for an open world**

*classical myth A classic myth is a story that, through its classical form, has attained a kind of immortality because its inherent archetypal beauty, profundity, and power have inspired rewarding renewal and transformation by successive generations.*

No one definition can satisfactorily embrace all the various kinds of stories that can legitimately be classed as myths on the basis of one criterion or another. The attempt to define myth in itself, however intractable a proposition, serves to highlight the very qualities of the stories that make them so different from one another. Its main function is entertainment, but it can also educate with all sorts of insights. Under this rubric may be classed fairytales, which are full of supernatural beings and magic and provide a more pointed moral content. Rarely, if ever, do we find in Greek and Roman mythology, a pristine, uncontaminated example of any one of these types of story. As opposed to the discoveries of science, whose truths continually change, myth, like art is eternal. Myth in a sense is the highest reality, and the thoughtless dismissal of myth as fiction or a lie is the most barren and misleading definition of all. Myth serves to interpret the whole of human experience and that interpretation can be true or fictitious, valuable or insubstantial, quite apart from its historical veracity. No mythologist has been more eloquent than Mircea Eliade in his appreciation of the sacredness of myth and the holy and timeless world that it embodies. Thus narrowly defined, etiology imposes too limiting and rigid a criterion for definition. On the other hand, if one broadens the concept of the aitia of a myth to encompass any story that explains or reveals something or anything, an etiological approach offers one of the most fertile ways of interpreting myth, although it cannot really define it. What story can avoid offering some kind of explanation or revelation? Is the best general definition of myth, after all, a traditional story? He claimed that the gods were great men of old who had become deified. The allegorical approach to mythology is favored by the anti-rationalists, who interpret the details of myth as symbols of universal truth. Some Greek and Roman myths, but by no means all, are concerned with nature. Dreams Freud saw dreams as the expression of repressed or concealed desires. In this regard, symbols of dreams can work in much the same way as the symbols of myths. Similarly, other kinds of concept are to be classified among the many and varied types of Jungian archetype embedded in our mythic heritage, e. Frazer and Jane Harrison Sir J. Similarly, the works of Jane Harrison are of seminal importance. Both Frazer and Harrison provide a wealth of comparative data, and both may be subjected to the same critical reservations about the validity of their ritualistic interpretations and their analogies between myths of primitive tribes and classical myths. Yet both established fundamental approaches that endure to this day. Robert Graves The justly renowned novelist and poet Robert Graves has written an influential treatment of Greek myths, full of valuable factual information, accompanied by dubious and idiosyncratic interpretations. He definition of true myth as a kind of shorthand in narrative form for ritual mime is far too restrictive. He separates myth from tales of other kinds by wisely focusing upon the literary distinctions to be found in a variety of stories. One of the principal aims of myth is to negotiate between binary pairs or pairs of opposites e. In this pattern Propp identified 31 functions or units of action, which have been termed motifemes. All these motifemes need not be present in one tale, but those that are will always appear in the same sequential order. The girl leaves home. She becomes pregnant by god. She is rescued and gives birth to a son. The understanding of classical mythology can be made both easier and more purposeful if underlying structures are perceived and arranged logically. The recognition that these patterns are common to stories told throughout the world is also most helpful for the study of comparative mythology. Walter Burkert Walter Burkert has attempted a synthesis of various theories about the nature of myths, most important being those having a structuralist and a historical point of view. To support his synthesis, he has developed four theses: Myth belongs to the more general class of traditional tales. The identity of a traditional tale is to be found in a structure of sense within the tale itself. Tale structures, as a sequence of motifemes, are founded on basic biological or cultural programs of actions. Myth is a traditional tale with secondary, partial reference to something of collective importance. Many insist that a true myth must be oral and anonymous. The tales told in primitive societies are the only true myths, pristine, timeless, and profound. The written word brings

contamination and specific authorship. We disagree with such a narrow definition of mythology. Myth need not be just a story told orally. It can be danced, painted, and enacted, and this is, in fact, what primitive people do. Myth is no less a literary than an oral form. Despite the successive layers that have been grafted onto Greek and Roman stories and their crystallization in literary works of the highest sophistication, comparative mythologists have been able to isolate the fundamental characteristics that classical myths share with other mythologies, both oral and literate. A comparative mythologist, perhaps best known for his series of PBS interviews with Bill Moyers, Campbell did much to popularize the comparative approach to mythology. Though his attention was largely devoted to myths from other traditions, many of his observations, as he himself was well aware, can be profitably applied to classical mythology. Feminism, Homosexuality, and Mythology

Feminist critical theory focuses upon the psychological and social situation of female characters in terms of the binary nature of human beings, especially in the opposition or complementary relationship of female and male. Feminist scholars have used the critical methods of deconstruction to interpret myths from their points of view about political, social, and sexual conflict between men and women in the ancient and modern world. Their conclusions are sometimes determined by controversial reconstructions of two major topics: Women in Greek Society Here are four out of many observations that could be made about the treatment and position of women in Greek society: They did not have the right to vote. No woman anywhere won this democratic right until The role of women in religious rituals was fundamental; and they participated in many festivals of their own, from which men were excluded. The cloistered, illiterate, and oppressed creatures often adduced as representative of the status of women in antiquity are at variance with the testimony of all the sources: The Theme of Rape What are we today to make of classical myths about ardent pursuit and amorous conquest? Are they love stories or are they all, in the end, horrifying tales of victimization and rape? The Greeks and the Romans were obsessed with the consequences of blinding passion, usually evoked by Aphrodite, Eros, or Dionysus and his satyrs, and of equally compulsive chastity, epitomized by a ruthless Artemis or one of her nymphs. The man usually, but by no means always, defines lust and the woman chastity. Often there is no real distinction between the love, abduction, or rape of a woman by a man and of a man by a woman. Stories about abduction, so varied in treatment and content, have many deeper meanings embedded in them, e. The supreme god Zeus may single out a chosen woman to be the mother of a divine child for a grand purpose, and the woman may or may not be overjoyed. Thus the very same tale may embody themes of victimization, sexual love, and spiritual salvation, one or all of these conflicting eternal issues or more. Everything depends on the artist and the person responding to the work of art: Romantic critics in the past sometimes chose not to see the rape; many today choose to see nothing else.

Homosexuality Homosexuality was accepted and accommodated as a part of life, certainly in Athens. There were no prevailing hostile religious views to condemn it as a sin. Yet there were serious moral codes of behavior, mostly unwritten, that had to be followed to confer respectability upon homosexual relationships and individuals who were homosexual. Homosexuality may be found as a major theme in some stories, e. Thus Greek and Roman mythology embraces beautifully the themes of homosexuality and bisexuality but, overall, it reflects the dominant concerns of a heterosexual society from the Olympian family on down. Female homosexuality in Greek and Roman society and mythology is as important a theme as male homosexuality but it is not nearly as visible. Sappho, a lyric poetess from the island of Lesbos sixth century B. It should be remembered that no one theory suffices for a deep appreciation of the power and impact of all myths. Certainly the panorama of classical mythology requires an arsenal of critical approaches. It may be that a sensitive study of the subsequent art, literature, drama, music, dance, and film, inspired by Greek and Roman themes and created by genius, offers the most worthwhile interpretative insights of all. A classical myth is a story that, through its classical form, has attained a kind of immortality because its inherent archetypal beauty, profundity, and power have inspired rewarding renewal and transformation by successive generations.