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Chapter 1 : Corruption and Collective Action

In that sense, the first collective action problem is the recognition that people do share interests. The more homogenous the group, the easier it is to discover any shared preferences, the fewer the cross-cutting cleavages, and, thus, the fewer the sources of conflict within the group.

Perceived injustice[edit] Examining collective action through perceived injustice was initially guided by relative deprivation theory RDT. RDT focuses on a subjective state of unjust disadvantage, proposing that engaging in fraternal group-based social comparisons with others may result in feelings of relative deprivation that foster collective action. Group-based emotions resulting from perceived injustice, such as anger, are thought to motivate collective action in an attempt to rectify the state of unfair deprivation. An important psychological development saw this research instead directed towards subjective expectations and beliefs that unified effort collective action is a viable option for achieving group-based goals “ this is referred to as perceived collective efficacy. Empirically, collective efficacy is shown to causally affect collective action among a number of populations across varied contexts. For example, when disadvantaged groups perceive intergroup status relationships as illegitimate and unstable, collective action is predicted to occur, in an attempt to change status structures for the betterment of the disadvantaged group. Meta-analysis results also confirm that social identity causally predicts collective action across a number of diverse contexts. Additionally, the integrated SIMCA affords another important role to social identity “ that of a psychological bridge forming the collective base from which both collective efficacy and group injustice may be conceived. Public good[edit] The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of public goods and other collective consumption through the collaboration of two or more individuals, and the impact of externalities on group behavior. It is more commonly referred to as Public Choice. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups , is an important early analysis of the problems of public good cost. Besides economics, the theory has found many applications in political science , sociology , communication , anthropology and environmentalism. Collective action problem[edit] Main article: Collective action problem The term collective action problem describes the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but has an associated cost making it implausible that any individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. The ideal solution is then to undertake this as a collective action, the cost of which is shared. This may also encourage the under-production inefficient production of the public good. Institutional design[edit] While public goods are often provided by governments, this is not always the case. Various institutional designs have been studied with the aim of reducing the collaborative failure. The best design for a given situation depends on the production costs, the utility function, and the collaborative effects, amongst other things. Here are only some examples: Joint products[edit] A joint-product model analyzes the collaborative effect of joining a private good to a public good. For example, a tax deduction private good can be tied to a donation to a charity public good. It can be shown that the provision of the public good increases when tied to the private good, as long as the private good is provided by a monopoly otherwise the private good would be provided by competitors without the link to the public good. Clubs[edit] Some institutional design, e. If the costs of the exclusion mechanism are not higher than the gain from the collaboration , clubs can emerge. Buchanan showed in his seminal paper that clubs can be an efficient alternative to government interventions. Government would then be the manager of this club. Federated structure[edit] In some cases, theory shows that collaboration emerges spontaneously in smaller groups rather than in large ones see e. This explains why labor unions or charities often have a federated structure. In philosophy[edit] Since the late 20th century, analytic philosophers have been exploring the nature of collective action in the sense of acting together, as when people paint a house together, go for a walk together, or together execute a pass play. These particular examples have been central for three of the philosophers who have made well known contributions to this literature: In Gilbert and subsequent articles and book chapters including Gilbert , chapter 7 Gilbert

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argues for an account of collective action according to which this rests on a special kind of interpersonal commitment, what Gilbert calls a "joint commitment". Rather, it is a single commitment to whose creation each participant makes a contribution. Thus suppose that one person says "Shall we go for a walk? Gilbert proposes that as a result of this exchange the parties are jointly committed to go for a walk, and thereby obligated to one another to act as if they were parts of a single person taking a walk. Joint commitments can be created less explicitly and through processes that are more extended in time. In Gilbert a she discusses the pertinence of joint commitment to collective actions in the sense of the theory of rational choice. In Searle Searle argues that what lies at the heart of a collective action is the presence in the mind of each participant of a "we-intention". Searle does not give an account of we-intentions or, as he also puts it, " collective intentionality ", but insists that they are distinct from the "I-intentions" that animate the actions of persons acting alone. In Bratman Bratman proposed that, roughly, two people "share an intention" to paint a house together when each intends that the house is painted by virtue of the activity of each, and also intends that it is so painted by virtue of the intention of each that it is so painted. That these conditions obtain must also be "common knowledge" between the participants. Discussion in this area continues to expand, and has influenced discussions in other disciplines including anthropology, developmental psychology, and economics. One general question is whether it is necessary to think in terms that go beyond the personal intentions of individual human beings properly to characterize what it is to act together. The question of whether and how one must account for the existence of mutual obligations when there is a collective intention is another of the issues in this area of inquiry. Spontaneous consensus[edit] In addition to the psychological mechanisms of collective action as explained by the social identity model , researchers have developed sociological models of why collective action exists and have studied under what conditions collective action emerges. Common examples can be found from domains as diverse as biology flocking , shoaling and schooling , and general collective animal behavior , economics stock market bubbles , and sociology social conventions and norms among others. Consensus is distinct from the collective action problem in that there often is not an explicit goal, benefit, or cost of action but rather it concerns itself with a social equilibrium of the individuals involved and their beliefs. And it can be considered spontaneous when it emerges without the presence of a centralized institution among self-interested individuals.

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Chapter 2 : Collective action problem | www.nxgvision.com

Institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas arise from the division or partitioning of authority in which decisions by one government in one or more specific functional area impacts other governments and/or other functions. The focus on externalities of choice in fragmented systems integrates.

See Article History Collective action problem, problem, inherent to collective action, that is posed by disincentives that tend to discourage joint action by individuals in the pursuit of a common goal. Collective action occurs when a number of people work together to achieve some common objective. However, it has long been recognized that individuals often fail to work together to achieve some group goal or common good. The origin of that problem is the fact that, while each individual in any given group may share common interests with every other member, each also has conflicting interests. If taking part in a collective action is costly, then people would sooner not have to take part. If they believe that the collective act will occur without their individual contributions, then they may try to free ride. David Hume pointed out the problem in , when he said in A Treatise of Human Nature that, although two neighbours may agree to drain a common meadow, to have a thousand neighbours agree on such a project becomes too complex a matter to execute. The challenges of common goods The problems of collective action were popularized by the American political economist Mancur Olson , who wrote in that coercion or some other device must be present in order for a group of individuals to act in their common interest. Olson suggested that collective action problems were solved in large groups by the use of selective incentives. These selective incentives might be extra rewards contingent upon taking part in the action or penalties imposed on those who do not. However, in order for positive selective incentives to work, individuals who take part in collective action must be identified; and for negative selective incentives, those who do not take part must be identified. Either way, a good deal of organization is required. Game theory One aspect of the collective action problem is that posed by collective or public goods. A collective good is one that is economically infeasible to exclude people from using. Hence, if a collective goodâ€”such as collective wage bargaining for an industryâ€”is provided by an organization such as a trade union , then the fruits of that bargaining will be enjoyed by all workers, not only the trade unionists. Other workers in the industry who gain the wage increases and better working conditions provided by that bargaining will not have to pay the union dues and will free ride upon the activities of the union. In order to encourage workers to join unions, most also provide a whole host of private excludable services, such as legal advice and help during individual disputes with employers, pension schemes, holiday deals, and other such activities. Of course, setting up a union in the first place is also a collective act, and Olson suggested that setting up such organizations requires the activities of entrepreneurs who also see private benefits such as paid employment or a political career from forming the union in the first place. Of course, altruistic individuals may also play a part in collective action. Collective action problems have often been represented by simple game theory. It would be in the interests of both players to cooperate, but they end up not cooperating because they can see the advantages of free riding and fear the dangers of being taken for a ride. It is well known among game theorists that once the two-person game is repeated over and over again, there is a multiplicity of stable equilibriums , of which some involve cooperation and some do not. If the game is played by more than two people and network effects are allowed that is, players can see how others are playing with third parties , then one should expect both cooperation and free riding. Thus, game theory shows that collective action is indeed a problem. People do not automatically work together to promote their collective interests, but neither is it impossible. Indeed, depending on the conditions, one should expect varying levels of collective action. In other words, there is not a single collective action problem but a host of collective action problems that share common features. Therefore, as one would expect, there are numerous ways in which people learn to overcome the particular collective action problems they face in order to work together. The tedium of organizing a school fete is not the same as the dangers inherent in taking part in collective protest or

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revolution, but both are collective acts subject to free riding. Described below are the types of demand-side problems that arise in collective action and the sorts of supply-side solutions that are adopted to overcome them. It will be seen that both the problems and the solutions are interlinked and interrelated. The free-rider problem occurs wherever there is a collective good giving nonexcludability. Nonexcludability entails the free-rider problem because a person can enjoy the benefits of the good without having to pay for it as long, of course, as the good is provided. A supply-side response is to attempt to convince would-be free riders that if they do not contribute, they will not receive the good, not through exclusion but because the good will not be provided at all. In economic theory it is usually assumed that people have well-defined preference orderings and, hence, know their own interests. But a great deal is spent on the supply side convincing people that something is in their own interest. In that sense, the first collective action problem is the recognition that people do share interests. The more homogenous the group, the easier it is to discover any shared preferences, the fewer the cross-cutting cleavages, and, thus, the fewer the sources of conflict within the group. Homogeneity in another sense may work in the opposite direction. If the group is heterogeneous in terms of wealth, then it may be easier to secure collective action, because the rich members may provide the goods and allow poorer members to free ride. Incentives and disincentives of collective action The relative costs of taking part in collective action are important. This argument depends crucially upon the nature of the production function. Furthermore, it depends upon actors relating the extra increment of the good supplied with the contribution they make toward its provision. The richer each member of the group, the lower the relative costs. It is also worth noting that, typically, consumers assign parts of their expenditure to different types of good: They may be thought to assign some part for gifts, some for charitable donations, and some toward group aims. One should expect the assignments to be dependent, in part, upon the needs items being provided first. Thus, one should expect large asymmetries in amounts set aside for group aims across social classes. Most agree that smaller groups are easier to organize than larger ones. However, the impact of group size has perhaps been exaggerated, as other factors about groups may override this component. Group size is important in two senses. First, the larger the group, the less important an individual contribution may appear to group success. This dynamic increases the temptation to free ride. Second, the size of the group also alters the actual importance of any given contribution. The degree of perceptibility is more dependent upon interactiveness than size as such. The degree of interaction between group members is more important than group size per se. Face-to-face interaction among a small group of people may lead to subgroup mobilization, no matter how large the wider group, thus overcoming the perceptibility problem. The fact of a rival group organizing itself successfully can act as a spur to collective action. But opposing groups can also act to stultify the mobilization in the early stages. They can exploit cross-cutting cleavages within the group to try to break up the coalition of interests and can try to move the preferences of the group away from the common interest. They may also make the costs of mobilizing higher by numerous strategies, depending upon the relationship between the rival forces. The number of other demands is also important to any specific group mobilization. Individuals have a large number of interests and causes they support. Organizations try to encourage members to pay by direct debit or standing orders to lock in that contribution. A finding in experimental psychology suggests that individuals have an S-shaped utility curve. This means that losses of a given amount matter more than gains of a similar amount. This seems to lead to the finding that it is easier to mobilize people when interests currently being satisfied are threatened than to promote interests not yet satisfied. One important aspect of the production function is created by the nature of the collective good. Mobilization requires an action to provide the good, and, once the good has been supplied, the action is over. Goods in continual supply require continuous collective action, which may be harder to sustain in the long run. Coordinating activities is a key issue. The degree to which coordination is required is in part dependent upon many of the previously mentioned factors. A small group, where there are few cross-cutting cleavages and costs are small, may only require coordination of activities. Larger groups, with a greater heterogeneity and relatively high costs, may require much greater coordination. The coordination is a demand-side problem that provokes various

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supply-side answers. Therefore, the characteristics of the group affect its ability to mobilize its members to secure common aims. Different groups in society have different powers simply by virtue of group characteristics. Some of these characteristics are properties of the individuals that compose the group, but others are properties of the group itself rather than its individual members. Groups that are more sociable and have greater networking and interlinked subgroup organizations find overcoming collective action problems much easier than groups without those qualities. Conversely, groups that are too hierarchical may find grassroots organizing more difficult. For example, even controlling for other features, Roman Catholics in the United States seem to participate and collectively organize for non-Catholic interests to a lesser extent than non-Catholic groups. One possibility is that the Catholic church is more hierarchical, and so the civic skills needed to organize are less developed, as churchgoers rely more on the church to work on their behalf. In order to overcome coordination difficulties, some actor or set of actors may need to step in. Such political entrepreneurs may show a profit potential in coordinating collective action. This may be related to their other activities. Dennis Chong argued that leaders of African American churches found themselves drawn into the civil rights movement in the 1950s in order to secure the continued support of their parishioners. Church leaders who were vocal in organizing for civil rights drew greater congregations than those who were silent. The competition for congregations thus led church leaders into becoming civil rights leaders too. Generally speaking, charismatic leadership is important for revolutionary activity. Many organizations provide selective incentives on top of the collective good, but selective incentives cannot be the main motivation of members of an organization primarily devoted to lobbying. One important source of mobilization occurs through joint action, where one group supports another. An organization may see benefits in creating another organization with convergent interests. Sears, Roebuck and Company, once a major U.S. retailer, was a major force in the quality of food is to the advantage of the larger food manufacturers. Here consumer rights may be promoted as a by-product of the interests of large food manufacturers, though some would argue that such regulatory capture is, overall, against consumer interests. The incentives vary for activists on the supply side. Some may be entrepreneurial, setting up organizations largely for personal gain, much as entrepreneurs engage in economic activity in the private sector. Such political movers may prefer that some other actor perform the coordination role, but they take it on when they see that the role is not going to be performed and, therefore, the good not produced.

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Chapter 3 : Collective action - Wikipedia

1 Development as a collective action problem Addressing the real challenges of African governance David Booth Synthesis report of the Africa Power and Politics Programme www.nxgvision.com

Many of the communities targeted by collective action practitioners and grassroots activists comprise people who have known and interacted with each other consistently, over long periods of time. In other words, these repeated interactions allow individuals to gain information about each other and then use this information to plan their own course of action. Where individuals engage in complex sets of interactions with each other - individuals living in the same neighborhood for example engage with each other on a daily basis in a variety of ways - information gained from one set of interactions may influence behaviors in a different context altogether. Thus individuals that work collectively to solve a problem at the local resource may cooperate to a greater extent if they trust each other to carry out their designated responsibilities, yet this trust may stem from the numerous, small interactions that themselves are influenced by a number of other social and cultural contextual factors[6]. From this above discussion then, one might be led to believe that the best way for promoting cooperation and assuring the success of a collective action initiative is to allow individuals within that collective to engage with each other repeatedly, both over a period of time as well as in a variety of contexts. But grassroots activists and collective action practitioners need to approach these assumptions with a healthy dose of skepticism and place these theoretical insights into a real world context. Upon doing so, questions such as the following emerge. What happens when there are inequities within the group such that prevent certain members participating in this communal conversation? Does taking governance to the communal or local level ensure that hitherto marginalized and underprivileged groups will now be included in decision-making and be given their fair share of the benefits from the resource or activity? Are inequities no longer perpetuated when one implements a more localized, grassroots approach to social and political governance? These questions remain a puzzle for policymaking, perhaps because it is difficult to agree upon the definition and implications of such inequity[7]. For example, is it more important to ensure that no one in the community is systematically excluded from participating in local governance or is it more important to focus on ensuring that the local government - even when controlled by the local elite - allows everyone equal access to welfare benefits? Baraja village, Orissa India: All the material for building the homes in this photo comes from the surrounding forest and land. Material for thatching the roofs and making the fences comes from the forest. The walls are made of handmade mud bricks and the photo shows women making these bricks. On my most recent trip to the rural areas of the state of Orissa in India, a large, completely unused, privately owned field caught my eye. Land usually represents wealth in the rural, developing world so I was puzzled when I found that the landowning family was actually struggling with poverty. Yet, the other landowning households in the same village were farming their land and seemed wealthier. Further interviews revealed more details to this puzzle. First, while this household had land, it did not have access to high quality seeds, fertilizers or irrigation for a consistent supply of water, which meant it could not farm profitably. Further, the individuals of this particular household belonged to a tribal indigenous group while the farming households mentioned above were mainly Hindus from a different social caste. This difference in social and religious identity led to differing family-labor related norms and different economic opportunities. The Hindu women of this village faced strict restrictions on their interactions with the outside world, and it was unacceptable for them to engage in farming activity. In this case, the wife of the tribal landowner had the opportunity to work as a wage laborer on the farm of one of the Hindu landowners in the village while her husband earned income from working in a nearby town. She was earning far less than she would be if she were farming her own land and selling surplus farm output. Yet given her limited access to farm inputs, it was the more profitable - if inefficient - choice. The women of Baraja. Some of these women come from tribal households while others belong to various non-tribal sociocultural groups. The outcome above is inefficient

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because while land is a scarce and very valuable commodity in much of the developing world, those who own the land may not be able to use it productively because they lack access to complementary farm inputs. Now if they could sell or rent the land to those with access to such inputs, the outcome would be optimal since it would also allow the poor, landowning household a means to alleviate its poverty. As the case above illustrates, one barrier to an optimal outcome is the way the property rights institution is designed. In many parts of the developing world only the male head of a household is given formal land rights, and allowed to rent, lease or sell the land to another individual. Women are responsible for managing the farmland while the men are away, but without formal ownership rights, are not allowed to manage the transfer of the land to someone who has enough resources to profitably farm the land. Research into other empirical studies reveals that this is actually a commonly documented scenario[8], an unfortunate outcome in a climate of growing land scarcity and global food insecurity. This story would seem to have a simple solution - allow women joint formal land rights. Access to land via formal ownership rights is an important tool of poverty reduction because individuals can use land as collateral to access credit loans that they can invest into other employment opportunities, education and so on[9]. On the other hand, allowing women such formal access to land means enabling them to participate in economic markets to a much greater extent than might be socially acceptable in many places. Thus even when formal institutional structures of land ownership make opportunities of welfare improvement available to women in many parts of the world, informal institutions manifested through social taboos may prevent women from making use of these available opportunities[10]. Further, in many parts of the world, a lack of education regarding legal rights means that many reforms fail to create their intended impact on the ground[11]. As issues such as these begin to be recognized, a number of NGOs and governments are working on creating policies that bring about not only land reform that targets women, but also enabling women to then make profitable economic use of that land based on available resources in order to access other welfare benefits education, higher income and health [12]. Allowing individuals ownership rights over an economic resource such as land can also have political ramifications. In parts of India where both land reforms and political reforms in the form of decentralization of governance down to the village level have been relatively successful, it has been suggested that simultaneously redistributing land and giving political powers to local governments enhanced political participation by previously marginalized sections of village society who lacked both social and economic powers. At the same time, emphasizing political participation by marginalized groups has also appeared to have benefits for poverty alleviation of these groups[13]. The field lies unused, while the household usually practices small-scale farming in the adjoining forest by clearing small parts of it. Problems related to achieving equitable outcomes can occur at any governance level, from local to central[14]. Literature suggests that complementary institutions be designed so as to help overcome cooperation problems between various groups at any one level. Such external supporting institutions may be important to ensuring that collective action institutions at the local level include all stakeholders rather than excluding groups that may have traditionally been marginalized. The permanent link to this article is <http://>

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Chapter 4 : Characteristics of Effective Collective Action - Guide to Water-Related Collective Action

Collective action refers to action taken together by a group of people whose goal is to enhance their status and achieve a common objective. It is a term that has formulations and theories in many areas of the social sciences including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science and economics.

Overall demand for water worldwide has increased steadily over the last century and is expected to continue to do so. Increasing water demand, limited supplies, pollution, inadequate infrastructure and lack of management capacity have led to water scarcity in many regions. Overallocation of surface water has led to insufficient instream flows and therefore damage to important riparian habitats and aquatic systems. Growing cities struggle to build infrastructure that keeps pace with population growth, while those in rural communities do not have enough water to fuel their livelihoods or must travel many miles to access clean water, exposing them to harm and hindering their economic productivity. Historically, access to water has been an important strategic concern for many businesses. However, recent global trends suggest increased threats to the supply, quality and reliability of water services as well as changing stakeholder expectations, thereby making water a much greater risk to business viability than in decades past. Growing demand and competition mean that there may not be enough of the key resource to maintain production. Water pollution is significantly increasing the cost of pre-treatment for numerous industries. Aging infrastructure and a lack of government management capacity are leading to insufficient and inconsistent water deliveries, sometimes stalling industrial activity. As these challenges and demands escalate, governments tighten controls on water use and wastewater discharge as a means of mitigating depletion and degradation of resources, while communities and civil society groups are more likely to hold companies accountable for unsustainable practices. At the same time, governments and civil society are having great difficulty in effectively advancing the goals of integrated, sustainable water resources management for the public good due to lack of resources and political will, particularly in the Global South. Both public and private actors have begun to recognize that solving global water challenges is not a solitary endeavour. This awareness has led to increased interest in undertaking coordinated, collective action that leverages the technical strengths, resources, and convening power of the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, academics, communities and others, to achieve more sustainable water management. This process has resulted in notable water savings and pollution reduction, mitigating environmental and social impacts and often reducing water and related costs. However, while wasteful or polluting operations certainly create risk for companies, water-related business risks are driven as much, if not more, by unsustainable watershed conditions over which companies have limited influence, such as water scarcity, pollution, or weak water governance. For example, the hydrologic context is perhaps, not surprisingly, a key factor in determining water risks. As water scarcity becomes more pronounced, there is less water supply to meet the range of human demands as well as the instream flows needed to support aquatic habitats. The sociopolitical context and the extent to which people have access to water services is another key component of corporate water risk. An industrial facility with plentiful water allocations and an area where marginalized communities do not have sufficient water services can lead to challenges for the company. Failures in water policy and its implementation can lead to insufficient or inconsistent water deliveries to industry, among other challenges. As such, many companies are seeking to encourage and facilitate improved water management by: Encouraging and underwriting efficient water use practices across a watershed. Working with communities to improve access to water services. Establishing or engaging in participatory platforms and other democratic processes for water governance decision-making or oversight. Advocating for or contributing to the development of effective and equitable policy and regulations. Advancing public awareness of water resource issues. However, many companies are realizing that such projects are most efficient and transformative when conducted in collaboration with governments, civil society, communities and others. Companies seek out partnerships with other organizational actors in order to gain other perspectives, build on internal

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competencies, increase leverage, enhance credibility and pool resources to address shared water risks. Specifically, from a business perspective, collective action allows for: Clear articulation of problems, shared ownership of solutions, and clarity of joint purpose. More informed decision-making by the business initiator and other parties to the engagement. Broader scope and depth of motivation and momentum in support of water-related improvements. An expanded pool of expertise, capacity, or financial resources focused on fostering change. More durable outcomes with strong support by the engaged parties. Establishment and maintenance of credibility and legitimacy with critical interested parties resulting in a stronger social licence to operate across all aspects of community relationships. Stronger, more sustainable water governance by engaging multiple stakeholders. From the perspective of non-corporate actors, collaboration with the private sector on shared water goals can offer many advantages such as technical expertise, significant monetary resources, improved data, heightened visibility and access to decision-making, and state-of-the-art technology. As a result, Intel teamed up with the city of Chandler to devise a comprehensive and collaborative approach to water management. Since , this strategy has replenished more than 4 billion gallons of water into the aquifer. Sasol, a global integrated energy and chemicals company with its main production facilities in South Africa, has recognized water security as a material challenge to its operations, which are highly reliant on the inland Vaal River system. Sasol uses about 4 per cent of the catchment yield, while municipalities use approximately 30 per cent, of which water losses can be as high as 45 per cent due to the aging infrastructure. Sasol approached municipalities to implement water conservation initiatives. One such project used Sasol funds to repair pressure management with a township, thus reducing water use and boosting water supply. Suez Environnement has sponsored and moderated efforts in several watersheds to convene a wide range of stakeholders in discussions about water quality, water quantity and overall watershed health. Included in these discussions, among others, were agricultural operators, a community of stakeholders not previously engaged by Suez Environnement. Initial discussions focused on the substantial monitoring data collected by Suez Environnement. This information pointed to the critical role agricultural operations played in water quality in the affected watersheds and identified a set of agricultural practices that could lower water-quality impacts. For example, while the system as a whole benefits from water allocations that prevent wasteful use, specific actors have an interest in maximizing their allocation in relation to other users. Indeed, these short-term conflicts have informed many corporate water strategies and policies for the last several decades, leading to widespread scepticism of corporate motivations and criticism of undue corporate influence on water policy decisions, despite the potential benefits of such strategies. An exhaustive presentation of how companies can work to responsibly engage with external interests on shared water challenges can be found at <http://> While these potential conflicts are certainly very real, emerging practices from leading companies have suggested that companies are increasingly pursuing water strategies that prioritize long-term viability by investing in sustainable water management over short-term profit.

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Chapter 5 : Resource conflict, collective action, and resilience: an analytical framework

Collective Action and Forest Management: Institutional Challenges for the Environmental Agrarian Reform in Anapu, Brazilian Amazon
Action collective et gestion forestière: défis institutionnels pour la réforme agraire environnementale à Anapu, Amazonie Brésilienne.

Introduction In developing countries where access to and use of renewable, common-pool resources essential to rural livelihoods are highly contested, improving cooperation in their management is increasingly seen as an important element in strategies for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and longer-term social-ecological resilience. While this rationale is not altogether new among advocates of public policy support for and investment in natural resources management Tyler , it is gaining traction in international development circles e. DFID , as well as in the environmental conservation and peacebuilding communities Feil et al. Research on the causal links between competition over natural resources and violent conflict Carius and Lietzmann ; Homer-Dixon ; Le Billon ; Le Billon and Springer ; Rustad et al. By contrast, conflict over the renewable natural resources that underpin rural livelihoods in agricultural landscapes “ the subsistence use of land, water, fisheries, and forests ” has received far less attention from the environmental security community, though this trend is now shifting Kok et al. There is an important distinction here. Conflict over non-renewable resources is in many respects a zero-sum game “ while the benefits from gem mining, for example, can certainly be more equitably shared, the underlying resource is finite. Several trends are contributing to a sharpened focus on the challenges of managing conflict over renewable resources. Climate change, with its associated shifts in resource productivity and migration patterns, the emergence of new markets for carbon offsets for forest and land management, and investment in biofuel production have highlighted additional sources of competition and potential conflict in renewable resource management Barnett and Adger ; RRI Lastly, increased recognition of the particular challenges of rebuilding livelihoods in the wake of civil war and other violent conflicts has prompted analysis of the role of renewable resource management in peacebuilding Young and Goldman What explains patterns of conflict and cooperation in response to natural resource competition? As summarized in Figure 1 , different research traditions addressing the commons have focused on distinct parts of this problem. Political economy analysis of resource conflict is principally concerned with the top arrow in the diagram “ from competition to conflict e. Homer-Dixon ; Le Billon , ; Collier and Hoeffler ; Humphreys ; the same is true for the political ecology literature, which emphasizes the positive potential of conflict to spawn social movements or institutional changes that lead to more socially equitable forms of resource use e. Most of the work on the emergence of institutions for collective action and self-governance is concerned with the bottom arrow “ from competition to cooperation e. Ostrom ; Lubell et al. The applied literature on conflict resolution and on intervention strategies for post-conflict reconstruction is concerned principally with the arrow on the right side of the diagram “ from conflict to cooperation e. This paper introduces an analytical framework that draws on insights from each of these research traditions. Our aim is to provide a shared conceptual language to guide research on the role of collective action in cooperative management of renewable natural resources, conflict, and social-ecological resilience. While some degree of competition and conflict over environmental resources can be considered inevitable, the focus of our attention is finding ways to divert the progression from competition over common-pool resources essential to rural livelihoods into broader social conflict, including but not limited to violent conflict. The commons literature, while centrally concerned with the dynamics of cooperation and competition, often does not make these linkages explicit; our intent in this review is to fill that gap. Building on the institutional analysis and development IAD model Ostrom , and incorporating principles from the sustainable livelihoods approach and resilience theory, the framework is applicable across multiple scales of analysis, linking local stakeholder dynamics to the broader institutional and governance context. Accounting for both formal and informal relationships of power and influence, as well as values and stakeholder

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perceptions alongside material interests, the framework aims to provide insight into the problem of rebuilding legitimacy of resource management institutions in conflict-sensitive environments. By offering criteria to evaluate the outcomes of patterns of conflict and cooperation, moreover, we hope to embed the specific analysis of such patterns of interaction within the broader assessment of progress towards social-ecological resilience. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the framework. This is followed by more detailed treatment of its main elements: the context section 3, the action arena section 4, patterns of interaction section 5, and outcomes section 6. Section 7 provides a discussion of the distinctive features of the framework and the way this draws on distinct research traditions on the commons. The framework in overview

The framework elaborated below builds on the institutional analysis and development IAD model Ostrom ; Ostrom ; Poteete et al. We selected the IAD model as the foundation because it is highly adaptable, having been applied to a wide range of institutional analyses across different resource systems, and because it enables analysis of divergent outcomes, even if historically it has primarily been applied to understand the sources of cooperation. The framework has four main elements: As a dynamic framework, outcomes, in turn, feedback into and influence the context and action arena in future rounds see Figure 2. The context incorporates three broad sets of factors: Each of these factors of context can be broken down into much more detailed elements depending on the particular situation examined Poteete et al. For each factor, we assess how particular characteristics shape the incentives for collective action to manage contested renewable resources cooperatively or, alternatively, how they increase the incentives for broader social conflict and violence. An action arena can be a village, a court, even a single meeting any stage for social bargaining on which different actors may choose to cooperate or not di Gregorio et al. Ostrom characterizes action arenas as composed of an action situation and participants. Di Gregorio et al. We find this latter characterization useful for considering the dynamics of interactions that lead to either conflict or cooperation. The action arena concept invites stakeholders to reflect on what can be done, and how to shift the action resources available so that disadvantaged groups can indeed influence decision-making more effectively in pursuit of equitable outcomes. Patterns of interaction refer to the bargaining processes among actors in which they exchange resources, devise new rules, and demand action from other stakeholders di Gregorio et al. Of specific concern for our purposes, these patterns of conflict and cooperation influence the institutional and ecosystem characteristics that either contribute to social-ecological resilience or increase livelihood vulnerability and conflict risk. Key contextual factors

In our modified IAD framework, context encompasses three types of factors: In applying this framework to understanding the links between natural resource management and conflict or cooperation, we assess how each set of factors shape the incentives for collective action to cooperatively manage contested natural resources or, alternatively, how they increase the incentives for broader social conflict and violence. Attributes of the resources Scarcity supply relative to demand of any resource renewable or not creates pressure on a resource. Dispersed resources are more difficult to exclude others from using as compared to those that are highly concentrated. Even for a very high-value resource like diamonds, dispersed secondary diamonds from alluvial deposits are much harder to control, compared to primary diamonds found in underground diamond-bearing kimberlite pipes. This is one reason that the alluvial diamonds in Sierra Leone are more associated with looting and illicit trade that funded conflict, compared to diamonds from mines in Botswana, which are much easier to regulate Lujala For renewable common-pool resources, however, the spatial and temporal distribution of the resource also matters. Many studies indicate that the more predictable the resource, the easier it is to build institutional arrangements for its management Agrawal ; di Gregorio et al. At the same time, in many dry land areas with fluctuating rainfall, the erratic physical environment has created pressure for people to develop higher-level institutional arrangements such as reciprocal land and water access in pastoral areas e. Ngaido and Kirk Similarly, water shortages in Bali prompted efforts to get the traditional subaks irrigation groups to federate and negotiate with each other for water allocation along a shared river Sutawan With climate change, hydrologic flows are likely to become even less reliable in many areas, creating additional pressures on sharing arrangements. Thus, both

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long-term trends of ecosystem change and short-term shocks are relevant. Observability of resource use is another factor that contributes to conflict mitigation by increasing transparency and reducing suspicion. Activities such as night patrols of irrigation systems or fishing grounds are done to improve monitoring and build trust that rules governing the resource are observed. Small size of resource units and well-defined boundaries of the resource “ factors identified by Agrawal , Ostrom , and Wade as facilitating collective action “ similarly increase observability and reduce the costs of monitoring resource use, so are likely to reduce conflicts. In addition to scarcity, spatial and temporal distribution, and observability, there is a long list of biophysical conditions hypothesized to facilitate coordination in resource management see Baland and Platteau ; Agrawal ; Poteete et al. The relevant categories of resource traits will vary depending on the resource, region, and other contextual factors. Attributes of the resource users Among attributes of resource users, socioeconomic characteristics such as ethnicity, education, and wealth are particularly relevant for analysis as potential cleavage lines along which conflicts may form. This is particularly the case where these different attributes are highly correlated, as, for example, when ethnicity is associated with different and competing uses of a resource, such as between pastoralists and farming communities. Where multiple types of property rights institutions or claims overlap, there are increased opportunities for disjuncture among various social groups, especially where each group appeals to a different type of customary or religious law as the basis for their claims. Research on factors affecting management of shared resources e. Wade ; Ostrom ; Baland and Platteau ; Agrawal posits that bounded groups with a shared identity and history of cooperation are more likely to engage in effective resource management. Although social capital is often assumed to increase cooperation, it is not always straightforward. Bonding social capital social cohesion within groups based on ethnicity, location, religion, shared values, reinforced by working together may reduce conflicts at the most local level, but may contribute to conflict with other groups. Bridging social capital structural relationships or networks that cross social groupings, involving coordination or collaboration, social support, or information sharing can reduce conflict between communities. Linking social capital ability to engage with external agencies, especially between poor groups and those in authority, to draw resources or influence policy may be important to mitigate broader social conflicts Pretty Another key attribute of resource users is their assets. The sustainable livelihoods approach stresses the importance of a range of tangible and intangible assets: Natural resource assets may, at first, seem part of the biophysical context, but we consider it part of the characteristics of the users, because property rights are inherently social relationships. To be an asset, there must be some form of property rights that connect that resource to a person or group. Secure property rights are often a crucial element in creating clear expectations and thereby reducing conflict. But the distribution of property rights also matters. Other types of assets are also relevant for conflict and cooperation. Human capital includes education and health, as well as bodily strength. Physical capital such as roads can connect people or bring them into contact and hence conflict. Weapons are themselves a type of physical capital. The sustainable livelihoods approach links these assets to the implementation of livelihood coping strategies to manage risks and shocks. It also draws attention to the importance of livelihood vulnerability, which comprises the elements of exposure to risk, severity of risk, and capacity to adapt Adger ; Deligiannis Governance arrangements The final set of contextual factors in the framework relates to the patterns of decision-making on issues of public importance, including natural resource allocation, management, and use. In this modified framework, governance arrangements include mechanisms of representation of diverse groups in decision-making, distribution of power and mechanisms of accountability Agrawal and Ribot ; Lemos and Agrawal These are mediated by formal statutory legal and political structures as well as customary and informal institutions. Whereas much attention in the natural resources management literature has focused on governance arrangements specific to the resource sector at hand, we argue that considering broad governance characteristics such as state capacity and legitimacy, rule of law, freedoms of expression and political organization, and protections on human rights is essential in conflict-sensitive environments. Rules that specify which actions are required, permitted or prohibited are generally nested. That is, it is typical for one set

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of rules to define how other sets of rules can be changed. Ostrom distinguishes three types of rules: In this way, the broader governance arrangements influence the character of collective action institutions that emerge, as well as the attributes of different user groups in terms of natural resource access but also voice in decision-making. Each of these types of rules can be a source of cooperation, or they can be a source of conflict. Widespread and violent conflict such as civil war can rupture the institutional structures for constitutional choice, causing lower order rules to also become less effective. The institutions of collective action for resource access and use, such as water user groups, forest management committees, community fishery organizations, and farmer cooperatives, to name a few, embody collective choice rules, and help to set operational rules for resource use. In some instances where local sources of legitimacy for these institutions remain strong, they can endure and remain functional even amidst a more generalized breakdown in governance Adhikari and Adhikari While in some highly aggregated frameworks e. Ostrom these are grouped as a component of the governance system, we have flagged them separately in the modified framework to draw attention to the particular role of such collective action institutions see Figure 2. Quantitative analysis across multiple country cases confirms the importance of resource governance for reducing the likelihood and intensity of conflict and as an investment in peace maintenance Franke et al. Our premise is that institutional innovations that enable diverse stakeholders to assess and manage resource competition equitably can help build resilience, including the capacity to adapt not only to current sources of conflict but also to future risks. The challenge is to identify how development interventions in the natural resource sectors can link with complementary efforts to strengthen the underlying role of equitable governance and secure rights as a foundation for resilient livelihoods Ratner By probing the interactions between generalized governance arrangements, ecosystem integrity, and the livelihoods and rights of resource users, progress can be made in deriving lessons for both conflict prevention and recovery.

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Chapter 6 : Drape's Takes: Quotes & Questions - Chapter 6: Collective Action and Institutional Challenges

Functional Institutional Collective Action Functional collective action (FCA) problems within a single government arise from fragmented authority across multiple functional agencies when the connectedness of services, objectives, or resource systems produce externalities.

Characteristics of Effective Collective Action This section describes a set of collective action characteristics for you to tailor as necessary to your specific effort. These characteristics are intended to instill a positive and powerful process structure, increase the likelihood of success in meeting goals, and help reduce or eliminate common collective action risks, such as divergent expectations among participants. Create Clarity Collective action engagements move you into a realm where knowledge, experience, lexicon, needs, interests, and perspectives can vary greatly and can quickly lead to miscommunication about or misinterpretation of your goals or intentions. This drives a need to establish clarity among all participants regarding the scope, goals, roles, decision processes, and time and resource commitments of the engagement. Ensuring that all parties involved clearly understand and agree to these expectations up front is critical for a successful process. Formalizing the expectations in some manner drives further clarity and enables the convener or neutral facilitator, if needed, to fall back on them if concerns arise during the engagement. The degree of formality will differ depending on the level of engagement, with informative and consultative engagements typically requiring substantially less formality than collaborative or integrative ones. You can use a variety of mechanisms to establish clarity, including explicitly worded expectations taking the form of ground rules; or a group charter, memorandum of understanding, or a legal contract.

Support Interaction and Responsiveness Effective, engaged dialogue among participants requires careful cultivation and attention to process-related details. By creating forums in which the engaged parties can interact comfortably, the convener will continue to build a sense of candid information sharing and trust with the participants. At the outset of your effort, you should explore with participants their preferred modes of ongoing communication and interaction. Ongoing communication must be tailored to the avenues through which participants are accustomed to receiving information, and this likely will vary by participant types. Included in communications considerations are cultural and language needs that may require producing materials in response to specific participant differences. Group interactions can be sensitive to time and venue, with certain participants more or less available depending on the time of day and more or less comfortable with the setting for meetings. Particularly early in the collective action, you must be very sensitive to the potential need for a neutral ground in selecting venues for meetings. Finally, at the outset of the engagement, you should anticipate the need to provide education and background information to ensure that all collective action participants are on the same page in terms of their knowledge of the issues. This will help to create a common knowledge base from which to work.

Establish Transparency and Accountability Transparency and accountability should work in support of effective interaction and responsiveness. Transparency focuses on making collective action activities easily known to all directly engaged parties and general community members, as well as making the information used and produced by collective action participants available in a timely manner. Typically, collective actions that will involve a series of ongoing meetings will establish a communications plan to guide activities in support of transparency. Methods typically include notifications, updates, reports, question forums, and social media or other online approaches. If community members are related to or have an interest in the collective action, they should also have the opportunity to obtain information about the process through education forums and other public events. A final element is the inclusion of a structured grievance mechanism. Typically needed only for more engaged forms of collective action, the mechanism provides an agreed-upon process for collective action participants and outside parties to make known their concerns. A structured process helps to avoid anecdotal and secondhand criticisms, which could undermine the credibility of the collective action, as well as its ability to function effectively while

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providing a straightforward avenue to acknowledge and address concerns. Build in an Ability to Adapt

Collective actions rarely evolve as anticipated. New information, changes in perspectives, the introduction of new challenges, changes in the composition of participation, or changes in the surrounding institutional and political context will likely require alterations to objectives, process approach, or timing. Additionally, informative or consultative collective actions can cause participants to recognize opportunities for deeper levels of engagement, inspiring the participants to move from very independent approaches to challenges and solutions to a greater degree of joint action. Establish expectations for the need for flexibility at the outset of your process, and collective action participants will be better equipped to adapt as the need arises.

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Chapter 7 : Water and Collective Action - Guide to Water-Related Collective Action

The institutional design and collective action models focus on the construction of institutional arrangements, whereas the institutional adaptation and institutional diffusion models focus on the reproduction of institutional arrangements among institutional actors through evolutionary and adaptive processes.

Freshwater management has certain multifaceted and unique characteristics that shape collective action. Water is required for life; it supports community livelihoods and sustains ecosystems. It is also viewed by many as a commodity that enables economic production and consumption. Water is therefore seen as a public good that requires active management for its protection, development, and use as a resource. The use of water is inherently subject to public-good expectations and can easily raise sociopolitical tensions, particularly when a use or waste discharge has, or is perceived to have, negative impacts on local communities or ecosystems. Water infrastructure such as dams, pipelines, and treatment works have been built around the world to supply water to expanding irrigation and provide services to urban areas, with a substantial increase in this activity since the mid-th century. When ample water is available or perceived to be available in a region, these water development efforts generally do not raise much concern. The main challenges in such contexts are related to the financial and institutional capacity of water managers to reliably and equitably maintain the water supply and treat wastewater discharges from these areas. If the growing use of water resources is not managed well, competition for water will intensify, and pressures on water-related ecosystem services e. Social dissent can escalate quickly. These situations require cooperation—and sometimes compromises—among interested parties. They create a need for improved protection and control of water use to achieve economic efficiency, social equity, and ecological sustainability. As the level and complexity of water use increases, so too does the need for sophisticated management institutions and rules, as well as the need to openly engage water users with potentially diverse interests. As depicted in Figure 3, your company and its suppliers reside at a key nexus in the water resource management cycle. Any deficiencies in the water governance, management, or infrastructure that allow water scarcity or conflict to emerge can create a risk for your company or other participants in the catchment. The public sector, supported by an engaged civil society and private sector, has the primary role of making sustainable water management a priority. When the public sector functions effectively, companies with an interest in sustainable water management may share information or consult on decisions through existing multi-interest platforms. However, because the public sector may suffer from inadequate financial resources, a lack of institutional capacity, inadequate governance mechanisms, or other deficiencies, water-related challenges can arise and escalate, creating conditions that may pose unacceptable risks to your company or the catchments in which you operate. Such situations require internal actions in production or supply chains to mitigate these risks. In many cases, they will also require collective action among water users and other interests. Water Resource Management Cycle Collective action that emerges from such contexts will need to be driven by objectives tied to catchment-level outcomes, as this is the scale at which water-related risks and sustainability opportunities manifest. Such action may include cooperation with a group of companies across operations and supply chains to reduce the overall water demand or wastewater discharge. At times, a business may seek engagements at the regional, national, or global level to create an enabling context for successful catchment-level initiatives.