

Chapter 1 : Ideology | Definition of Ideology by Merriam-Webster

An ideology is a collection of normative beliefs and values that an individual or group holds for other than purely epistemic reasons.. The term was coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in , who conceived it as the "science of ideas".

References and Further Reading 1. Introduction What is a concept? But what is the concept of being a star? This general question raises a host of other questions. Is there just one concept of being a star, or do individual agents have their own concepts of being a star that might be distinct from one another? Or are concepts not mental entities at all? Or perhaps the set of stars themselves? Or is the concept of being a star an abstract entity in some sense? And if so, what sort of abstract entity is it? And what makes the concept of being a star distinct from other concepts? These are metaphysical questions. But there are epistemological questions about concepts as well. For instance, concepts seem to be the sorts of things that get grasped, possessed, or understood in coming to have beliefs and ultimately knowledge about the world. But the nature of concept possession is itself a bit mysterious. Is there just one way to possess a given concept, or might there be many such ways? Does possession of the concept of being a star require some sort of complete understanding of that concept or not? And how does one first come to grasp the concept of being a star? For instance, one can consider Polaris, the sun, Jupiter, and the Andromeda galaxy, and one can categorize those things as being stars or not. Performing such sorting behavior accurately is a prerequisite for various sorts of knowledge, thus categorization is of interest to philosophers working in epistemology, and explaining how such behavior happens is of interest to psychologists. Tasks for an Overall Theory of Concepts As the preceding questions imply, there are a wide variety of tasks for an overall theory of concepts to accomplish. Various theories of concepts handle some of them, but few claim to handle them all. But what should such an overall theory of concepts provide? The question is a useful one for three reasons: First, answering it will make as clear as possible just what issues about concepts a given view addresses and which it does not. Thus it will be clearer what else must be added to the view in question in order to provide a complete account of concepts. Second, the demands on a theory of concepts are logically related to each other, and such relationships themselves serve to raise problems for various candidate theories of concepts. For instance, a Platonistic view of the metaphysics of concepts takes concepts to be abstract entities that are neither physical nor spatiotemporal. But such a metaphysical commitment as to the nature of concepts has consequences with respect to the right conditions on concept possession. For instance, one sort of objection faced by a Platonist is that Platonism about concepts would render concepts unpossessible. That is, if concepts are nonspatiotemporal, it is difficult to see how beings like ourselves could ever be related to concepts in such a way as to possess or understand them. So identifying at least some of the requirements on an overall theory of concepts makes the task of evaluating a given view of concepts easier. If a view of concepts is such that it would then be impossible to satisfy one or more of the other requirements of an overall theory of concepts, then the view fails. Finally, if there are candidate requirements on an overall theory of concepts that turn out on further inspection not to be requirements of such a theory at all, then no theory of concepts should be faulted for failing to satisfy that requirement. A complete theory of concepts should provide: An account of the metaphysics of concepts An answer to the problem of universals, treating the problem of what concepts are as a special case An account of concepts as universals with concepts distinguished from other sorts of universals An account of the identity conditions for concepts An account of the distinction between simple and complex concepts An account of analysis for concepts An account of the satisfaction conditions for being in the possible-worlds extension of a given concept An account of logical constitution for concepts An account of the distinction between primitive and complex concepts Specific conditions on correct analyses An account of the epistemology of concepts An account of concept possession An account of concept acquisition An account of categorization The following sections are devoted to a more detailed discussion of the requirements themselves. The Metaphysics of Concepts Metaphysical issues involving concepts include what their status is as universals and also as distinct from other sorts of universals , whether they are mind-dependent or mind-independent entities, what their identity conditions are, and whether they are metaphysically simple or complex. First, concepts are universals.

Distinct verbal expressions such as distinct predicates, for instance may nevertheless express the same concept. The public character of concepts is further evidence that concepts are universals. That is, concepts can be understood by different agents, so it seems that the very same concept can be represented in many different minds at once, much as pain a type of mental state can be had by many different agents at the same time. Even if each agent has a pain that is her own, there is still something that all of those agents share—“they all are in pain. Similarly for concepts—“there is something we all share in virtue of possessing the concept of being a star, for instance, even if precisely speaking, what is present in each of our minds may not be exactly the same. There are many instances of the concept of being a star, for instance, since there are many stars. It is noteworthy that some authors, e. Yet even if concepts are not identical to linguistic meanings of some kind, the publicity and multiple-exemplifiability of concepts serves as evidence that they are universals. As with other universals such as properties, relations, and propositions, the available theories include various versions of realism and nominalism. Realism about concepts is the view that concepts are distinct from their instances, and nominalism is the view that concepts are nothing over and above, or distinct from, their instances. Ante rem realism or Platonism about concepts is the view that concepts are ontologically prior to their instances—that is, concepts exist whether they have instances or not. Conceptualism with respect to concepts holds that concepts are mental entities, being either immanent in the mind itself as a sort of idea, as constituents of complete thoughts, or somehow dependent on the mind for their existence perhaps by being possessed by an agent or by being possessible by an agent. Conceptualist views also include imagism, the view dating from Locke and others that concepts are a sort of mental image. Finally, nominalist views of concepts might identify concepts with classes or sets of particular things with the concept [star] identified with the set of all stars, or perhaps the set of all possible stars. Platonists about concepts would of course include Plato himself, and modern Platonists include both Chisholm and Bealer Aristotle is the most well-known in re realist, though it is somewhat unclear what his view of concepts, construed as linguistic meanings, would be. Most of the early moderns, including Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, seem to espouse some version of conceptualism, and the views of most contemporary cognitive scientists and psychologists imply a commitment to either conceptualism or some sort of nominalism. Quine, is one of the more recognizable nominalists about universals, though he is also a skeptic about linguistic meaning generally. Other views deny such claims, holding instead that concepts are mind-independent entities. Conceptualist views are examples of the former view, and Platonistic and some nominalistic views are examples of the latter view. The issue of the mind-dependence of concepts carries a great deal of importance with respect to which if any of the currently available views of concepts is correct. Such evidence might be of great importance to theorizing about our grasp or understanding of concepts, but not as important to the metaphysics of concepts themselves. The distinctions above can cut across one another. The resulting view would be an example of type linguistic nominalism that nevertheless treats concepts as in the mind, and thus as essentially mind-dependent. Still another task for an overall theory of concepts is to distinguish concepts from other sorts of universals, and the most straightforward way of doing this is to provide an account of the identity conditions for concepts. For example, if it turns out that concepts and properties have different identity conditions, then they must be distinct sorts of entities. And providing an account of the identity conditions for concepts is necessary for another reason too. If concepts are taken to be linguistic meanings, then some account must be given for what holds true when two distinct verbal expressions express the same concept, as well as what holds true when two verbal expressions do not express the same concept. An account of the identity conditions for concepts would be of great assistance here. As a final matter of significance with respect to the metaphysics of concepts, it might be wondered whether concepts are themselves simple or complex. As with the other metaphysical requirements on an overall theory of concepts, there are a number of options to pursue. The distinction is considered further below. Analysis of Concepts Concepts also seem to be the targets of analysis. One of the traditional tasks of analytic philosophy is that of providing analyses of concepts, but an important question is that of what an analysis itself is, and whether or not there are such things. At the very least, an analysis of a concept should specify the conditions satisfied by those things that are instances of that concept—an analysis of [star] should say what makes a star a star. One might call such conditions the metaphysical satisfaction

conditions for concepts, where such conditions specify all possible conditions on which the concept being analyzed would apply. Note that such a set of conditions might differ from what an agent believes the satisfaction conditions of a given concept to be, and both sets of conditions might vary from what an agent might use to sort or categorize things as being instances of that concept or not. Specification of such metaphysical satisfaction conditions is necessary for providing an account of the identity conditions for concepts. For example, if two predicate expressions differ in their possible-worlds extension, then the concepts expressed by those predicates must be distinct. And in order for two predicate expressions to express the same concept, they must share the same possible-worlds extension. So analyses should provide the metaphysical satisfaction conditions for the concept being analyzed. There may be many ways of accomplishing such a task. Another way of putting this general point about analyses is that analyses specify a logical constitution for the concept being analyzed. For instance, a classical analysis accomplishes this in virtue of specifying a number of concepts related by entailment or logical consequence to the concept being analyzed, and that collection of concepts is a logical constitution for the concept being analyzed. To say that concepts are related by entailment is just to say the following: What of prototype views? Such theorists usually speak fairly strongly against concepts having conceptual analyses, but in the classical sense. But such views could hold a different view of analysis, where such a view holds that concepts have logical constitutions, but the logical relationship between the concept being analyzed and the concepts in its constitution is a statistical relation, rather than entailment. Finally, atomistic views of concepts have a thesis with respect to the logical constitution of concepts: Such views claim that there are no such logical relations among concepts at all. But even so, one still faces the task of defending a thesis with respect to whether complex concepts have logical constitutions or not. And if one does claim that concepts have logical constitutions, one must defend a claim as to the nature of those logical relations between complex concepts and the members of their logical constitutions. If at least some concepts have logical constituents, then there must be some stock of concepts that are such that they have no logical constituents themselves. That is, there must be some stock of concepts that might appear in the analyses of various complex concepts, but have no analyses themselves. One then wonders what sort of character such primitive concepts have. Various empiricist philosophers such as Locke and Hume, for instance have held that primitive concepts are derived immediately from sensation, and thus that all complex concepts are such that their full analyses all the way down to the primitives are in terms of sense impressions only. Other views might include such a story for some concepts, but add that there are other primitive concepts not derived from sense impressions. For instance, the concepts of justice and goodness may well be analyzable, but not fully in terms of sense impressions. Various other concepts in philosophy and mathematics have been offered as other candidates, such as the concepts of belief, mind, free action, truth, inference, set, function, and number. What primitive concepts such complex concepts might ultimately be analyzable in terms of, if not in terms of sense impressions, remains something of a mystery. Also mysterious is how one might grasp such primitive concepts initially, especially if one seeks to avoid commitments to innate possession of such concepts. For there is a difference between claiming that a given concept has proper parts or literal constituents and claiming that a given concept has logical constituents or that there are other concepts logically related to that concept.

Chapter 2 : Introduction to Karl Marx, Module on Ideology

The most distinctive aspect of Gramsci's concept of ideology is, of course, his notion of "organic ideology." Clearly, ideology was defined in terms of a system of class rule, i.e. hegemony, in which there was an organic arrangement of all ideological elements into a unified system.

On the history of the term from Destutt de Tracy to Marx. Destutt de Tracy introduced the term "ideology" in as a philosophical and anthropological term. It is difficult or impossible to say what he intended to express by the term, but it seems that as a first approximation to a definiens formulation, the following may be useful. Thus used, the term was scarcely intended as a name for particular doctrines about ideas, for instance, those of Destutt de Tracy. The term seems, however, to have been closely associated by the public with the particular methods and approaches which Destutt de Tracy represented within philosophy, pedagogics and other humanistic disciplines. This would account for the fact that not only the public but also Destutt and his followers later called themselves "the ideologists". Destutt wrote in about his term as follows: Historians of ideas have only discussed the first concept. The second, narrow, concept we have not found mentioned in any historical or linguistic work, including the most comprehensive dictionaries. Two other instances of the use of "ideology" by Destutt deserve to be quoted: It is probable that Destutt de Tracy liked his main key term for its own sake and that he esteemed highly the truth-value and significance of his doctrines about ideas, that is, his particular ideology in his own terminology, sense No. Such a positive evaluation is not accepted here as a sufficient criterion of an eulogism. In view of the prevalent confusion in this matter, we shall mention some distinctions of importance to research on slogans: A term may have an intensively positive emotional charge within a group of persons and yet have a fairly precise cognitive meaning within that group. Among new members of a parliament, the expression "Member of Parliament" may well be positively charged, but it may still have a neutral cognitive meaning. The object designated by a term may be so highly evaluated that the term itself may elicit pleasant feelings. Its positive charge is a direct function of positive attitudes towards designated objects. A term may be used solely of positively evaluated objects, not because of its positive emotional hue, apart from its connotation, but just because of the objects covered by its connotation. Thus, the expression "positively evaluated by me " normally is used of positively evaluated objects. Similarly, "good", "excellent", "just" and other explicit adjectives of praise. On the other hand, terms like "democracy" and "liberty" may be used not to express well-delimited cognitive meanings, but to express and elicit positive attitudes towards something. This function can be carried out fairly independently of delimited connotations of a term. It is in that case a eulogism in the terminology here proposed. In the terminology of Destutt, the term "zoology", as used in his assertion that ideology is a part of zoology, furnishes an illustration of still another function: If not, how can general grammar and logic be part of zoology? Destutt does not mention in what sense he uses "zoology", but the statement that ideology is part of zoology is highly suggestive: It implicitly favours naturalistic tendencies in contrast to metaphysical or theological ones. In this respect Destutt follows Condillac. By classing "ideology" as defined by Destutt, as a fairly neutral technical term, it is implied here that its function is primarily to convey a definite connotation to the reader, and not to express or elicit an attitude of strong positive or negative import towards objects by means of more or less vague associations connected with the term among the public. If this latter function were prevalent, we should tend to class it as a eulogism or dyslogism. No new cognitive meaning seems to have been given to the latter term. It turned into a dyslogism, as interpreted by the general pro-bonapartist public. Roucek speaks of a "popular connotation of the term as visionary moonshine". In that case the term would have changed from being a term with a neutral connotation into one connoting a negative evaluation of some specific kind. But in the new usage of Bonaparte no moderately clear connotation seemed to have been involved. The predominant use was turned into that of a derogatory term, not of a term with a connotation representing a negative value. The neutral technical use and interpretation persisted, however. The use by de Bonald seems so far to have escaped the attention of historians of those terms. Few definitoid statements are made by de Bonald, but some use occurrences are rather suggestive a: From the context it is clear that de Bonald is strongly opposed to those philosophers whom

Destutt strongly recommends, and to the trend of philosophy in general which is tentatively based upon analysis of ideas in Lockian senses and language. He is thus politically an antagonist of Destutt. A quotation he makes is of interest here: The difference between the two need not be related to difference in connotation, it is primarily one of difference in appreciation of one of the same things. Whereas Destutt estimates positively the contents of the representative treatises on ideology, de Bonald is negative in his appreciation. In summing up the earliest history of the term "ideology" and "ideologist" and closely related terms, the following survey is useful: The first may be suggested by the designation "total mass of ideas of mankind or of another zoological species", the latter by the designation "general doctrine about the total mass of ideas of mankind or of another zoological species. The connotation represents positive values in the opinion of this man. The doctrines are used by the author to prove and justify his own doctrines and plans of action in the sphere of education and politics and those of others. The advocates of the doctrines are called "the ideologists". In later phases of his career the man of power changes his policy and his opinions. He finds himself in opposition to the political doctrines of the ideologists. He starts a campaign of denunciation against the ideologist and also against what he calls "ideology" now scarcely used as a term to connote any definite kind of doctrine or subject matter. Not only the Ideologist I, but a broader category of opponents are denounced by use of the terms. As a consequence of the campaign, the terms "ideologist" and "ideology" acquired emotional and volitional elements of meaning, let us call them Ideology III and Ideologist III, whereas the original cognitive connotational meaning fades out or recedes into the background. Occurrences are few and mostly obscure. The strongly developed elements with emotional and volitional meaning correlated with definite political systems and events. Definitions explicitly related to the occurrences in the works of Destutt de Tracy were to hand but as far as is known no normative or descriptive definitions relating to the other occurrence could be found. The use of the term "ideology" by Marx. Marxian doctrines have exerted a strong influence on causal analysis of cultural production.. This explains the fact that their use of "ideology", "ideologist" and "ideological" as important terms in polemic formulations, has deeply influenced contemporary usages. It is therefore indispensable to the understanding of their present role and to some of the factors that will influence their future use, to study the use of the term in Marxist literature. In this work we shall limit the study to Marx himself. It is generally accepted that the use Marx made of the term "ideology" follows the pattern of Napoleon and Chateaubriand rather than that of Destutt de Tracy. It is even asserted that the Marxian usage is more or less the same as that of Napoleon, namely as a derogatory, dyslogistic term analagous to "visionary moonshine", "airy speculation" etc. In the following pages an attempt at the formulation of a more painstaking account will be made. In the works of Marx with the main heading Die Deutsche Ideologie, the term "Ideologie" is used about 50 times, but no normative, descriptive or real definition is given. Most of the occurrences are such that little can be inferred with a high degree of certainty as to which connotations were intended by the author, if any. The term has no central position in his terminology and we may expect that the depth of his intention was comparatively shallow. The works gathered under the heading Die Deutsche Ideologie are excessively polemic and lacking in the scientific aspiration of Das Kapital. The first problem we shall take up may be formulated thus: Does Marx use "ideology" consistently in such a sense that an ideology by definition is something of negative value, e. Or does he use a concept of ideology such that the properties of being illusions etc. The difference alluded to is of a terminological importance that may be made clear by the following illustration: Suppose two persons P1 and P2 both declare about something, x: P2 uses "ideology" for a neutral concept, but evaluates negatively the denotata "the things subsumed under the concept. Now, if both make statements about ideologies, negative evaluations are of very different interest to the reader. P1 has right from the beginning selected things for study which he evaluated negatively. His general statement "Ideologies are of negative value" is tautological "it only repeats something deliberately put into the adopted meaning of the word "ideology". If P1 includes such a statement in his doctrine, it cannot be of any interest to a reader who remembers the definition adopted by P1. P2 has used a neutral criterion of a selection of things to study, namely the conceptual characteristics of his neutral concept of ideology. After a study of denotata, he concludes with a negative evaluation of them. He pretends to have found out something about so-called ideologies. If, among the denotata subsumed under his neutral concept, there are things very highly

evaluated by most people – religions, systems of law, doctrines of national honour etc. The conclusion of P2 is a kind of denunciation of the most sweeping character ever made, whereas that of P1 is a terminological triviality. P1 may of course have important things to say, but his general statement on the negative value of ideologies cannot be included in them. If P1 subsumes a system of law under his concept of ideology, it is of interest to know how he manages to do so. He may have interesting doctrines of positive systems of law which justify the subsumption under a negative value judgment. Once subsumed, however, it is of trivial importance that he values them negatively in his general statement on ideology. If a pig is labelled "Third Class" in a slaughterhouse, this subsumption may arouse our vivid interest if we have bred the pig ourselves and have always considered it of superb quality. But the fact that third-class pigs are not first-class pigs does not interest anybody except, perhaps, logicians. Now, is Marx to be compared with P1 – a comparison that is generally suggested by reference to Bonapartist usage – or rather with P2? Are his general negative judgments of ideologies trivial because they are deductions derived from a definition, or do they represent far-reaching generalizations on the basis of observation? But there are symptoms that – at least sometimes – he actually intended to produce concepts of ideology, at least closely related to – if not very similar to – the broad concept of Destutt de Tracy. It seems that "idea" as used by Marx at least occasionally stood for something resembling "ideas" in the terminology of philosophers such as Locke, Condillac and Destutt de Tracy. Both concepts are fairly neutral. Let us consider the use of "idea" by Marx in *Die deutsche Ideologie*. Das Vorstellen, Denken, der geistige Verkehr der Menschen erscheinen hier noch als direkter Ausfluss ihres materiellen Verhaltens. The use of the term "Idee" is here consistent with that of Destutt de Tracy. For Destutt, ideology was part of zoology, for Marx it was part of the products of "real", "material", life.

Chapter 3 : List of philosophical concepts - Wikipedia

Ideology is a system of concepts and views which serves to make sense of the world while obscuring the social interests that are expressed therein, and by its completeness and relative internal consistency tends to form a closed system and maintain itself in the face of contradictory or inconsistent experience.

Dictionary Concepts The world is full of innumerable entities. Without the ability to generalize -- forced to approach the world as if every entity were entirely unique and different -- you would waste all of your time grasping fundamentals over and over again. Life would be impossible. A concept is a mental abstraction which allows generalization and the extension of knowledge from some known objects to others unknown. It integrates two or more particulars into a common mental unit. For example, the concept "book" subsumes all particular books. It does so based on the essential characteristics of multiple pieces of paper or pages combined into a bound stack. A concept is formed by taking a number of similar entities and deciding what makes them similar in an important way. The differences and the unessential similarities are not important and are abstracted away from the newly created mental entity. Each concept serves a particular purpose and is created to allow higher-level thinking. People do not waste their time forming arbitrary concepts. While concepts integrate particulars, concepts can also act as particulars. Higher level concepts can also allow more complicated combinations that are not possible by trying to integrate lower level particulars. The concept wife is not possible without the concept marriage, the concept relationship, and so on down a long tree of complex concepts. Although a concept is built from particular entities, it is not tied to those specific entities. If those entities were changed or destroyed, the concept would still be intact, but would no longer include those particulars. The concept combines any entities with those particular characteristics. It encompasses any entity with those particular characteristics, past, present, or future. There are two essential tools to complete the concept formation. The first is a definition. This is the method of specifying the essential characteristics of the concept, or what is the basis of the integration. It also specifies the method of differentiation, which distinguishes it from everything not encompassed by the concept. The second tool is a word. A word is a cognitive trigger for the concept. It is the method by which the concept is stored away and referenced later. Without such a trigger, the act of integrating each concept would have to be redone every time it was used.

Chapter 4 : Ralph Dumain: "The Autodidact Project": Jorge Larrain: "The Concept of Ideology"

P2 uses "ideology" for a neutral concept, but evaluates negatively the denotata "the things subsumed under the concept. Now, if both make statements about ideologies, negative evaluations are of very different interest to the reader.

Concepts as mental representations The first of these views maintains that concepts are psychological entities, taking as its starting point the representational theory of the mind RTM. According to RTM, thinking occurs in an internal system of representation. Beliefs and desires and other propositional attitudes enter into mental processes as internal symbols. For example, Sue might believe that Dave is taller than Cathy, and also believe that Cathy is taller than Ben, and together these may cause Sue to believe that Dave is taller than Ben. Her beliefs would be constituted by mental representations that are about Dave, Cathy and Ben and their relative heights. What makes these beliefs, as opposed to desires or other psychological states, is that the symbols have the characteristic causal-functional role of beliefs. RTM is usually presented as taking beliefs and other propositional attitudes to be relations between an agent and a mental representation *e*. Many advocates of RTM take the mental representations involved in beliefs and other propositional attitudes to have internal structure. For theorists who adopt the mental representation view of concepts, concepts are identified with these more basic representations. Early advocates of RTM *e*. But modern versions of RTM assume that much thought is not grounded in mental images. The classic contemporary treatment maintains, instead, that the internal system of representation has a language-like syntax and a compositional semantics. According to this view, much of thought is grounded in word-like mental representations. This view is often referred to as the language of thought hypothesis Fodor In addition, the content of a complex symbol is supposed to be a function of its syntactic structure and the contents of its constituents. The mental representation view of concepts is the default position in cognitive science Pinker and enjoys widespread support in the philosophy of mind, particularly among philosophers who view their work as being aligned with research in cognitive science *e*. They maintain that concepts and structured mental representations play a crucial role in accounting for the productivity of thought *i*. Dennett also notes that computing systems can lack representations corresponding to the explanations we cite in characterizing and predicting their behavior. Rather, concepts are abilities that are peculiar to cognitive agents *e*. The concept CAT, for example, might amount to the ability to discriminate cats from non-cats and to draw certain inferences about cats. One of the most influential arguments along these lines claims that mental representations are explanatorily idle because they reintroduce the very sorts of problems they are supposed to explain. For example, Michael Dummett cautions against trying to explain knowledge of a first language on the model of knowledge of a second language. In other words, the mental representation itself is just another item whose significance bears explaining. Either we are involved in a vicious regress, having to invoke yet another layer of representation and so on indefinitely or we might as well stop with the external language and explain its significance directly. Not surprisingly, critics of the abilities view argue in the other direction. They note difficulties that the abilities view inherits by its rejection of mental representations. One is that the view is ill-equipped to explain the productivity of thought; another is that it can say little about mental processes. And if proponents of the abilities view remain neutral about the existence of mental representations, they open themselves to the criticism that explication of these abilities is best given in terms of underlying mental representations and processes see Fodor and Chomsky for general discussion of the anti-intellectualist tradition in the philosophy of mind. Concepts are said to be the constituents of propositions. For proponents of this view, concepts mediate between thought and language, on the one hand, and referents, on the other. Similarly, the same referent can be associated with different expressions *e*. Senses are more discriminating than referents. Each sense has a unique perspective on its referent "a unique mode of presentation. Differences in cognitive content trace back to differences in modes of presentation. Philosophers who take concepts to be senses particularly emphasize this feature of senses. Christopher Peacocke, for example, locates the subject matter of a theory of concepts as follows: In other words, C and D embody differing modes of presentation. To avoid terminological confusion, we should note that Frege himself did not use the term "concept" for senses, but rather for the referents of predicates.

Similarly, it is worth noting that Frege uses the term "thought" to stand for propositions, so for Frege thoughts are not psychological states at all. The view that concepts are Fregean senses, like the abilities view, is generally held by philosophers who are opposed to identifying concepts with mental representations. Just this proposal is made by Margolis and Laurence, Mental representations that are concepts could even be typed by the corresponding possession condition of the sort I favour. This seems to me an entirely legitimate notion of a kind of mental representation; but it is not quite the notion of a concept. It can, for instance, be true that there are concepts human beings may never acquire, because of their intellectual limitations, or because the sun will expand to eradicate human life before humans reach a stage at which they can acquire these concepts. If concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, on the other hand, there is no problem about the existence of concepts that will never be acquired. They are simply concepts whose possession conditions will never be satisfied by any thinkers. Critics of the sense-based view have questioned the utility of appealing to such abstract objects Quine One difficulty stems from the fact that senses, as abstract entities, stand outside of the causal realm. The question then is how we can access these objects. But grasping here is just a metaphor for a cognitive relation that needs to be explicated. Moreover, though senses are hypothesized as providing different modes of presentation for referents, it is not clear why senses themselves do not generate the mode of presentation problem Fodor For instance, one might maintain that concepts are mental representations that are typed in terms of the Fregean senses they express. Perhaps this is because they associate their own theories of concepts with large-scale commitments about the way that philosophers should approach the study of mind and language. These differences in perspective remain present once a more fine-grained terminology is adopted. Previously, these issues would have found expression by posing the question of whether concepts are mental representations. However, if we adopt the proposed new terminology, much the same set of issues would arise concerning the nature and existence of the various more fine-grained categories—concepts₁, concepts₂, and concepts₃. The structure of concepts Just as thoughts are composed of more basic, word-sized concepts, so these word-sized concepts—known as lexical concepts—are generally thought to be composed of even more basic concepts. According to the classical theory, a lexical concept C has definitional structure in that it is composed of simpler concepts that express necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under C. According to the classical theory, lexical concepts generally will exhibit this same sort of definitional structure. Much of its appeal comes from the way it offers unified treatments of concept acquisition, categorization, and reference determination. In each case, the crucial work is being done by the very same components. Concept acquisition can be understood as a process in which new complex concepts are created by assembling their definitional constituents. Categorization can be understood as a psychological process in which a complex concept is matched to a target item by checking to see if each and every one of its definitional constituents applies to the target. These considerations alone would be enough to show why the classical theory has been held in such high regard. But the classical theory receives further motivation through its connection with a philosophical method that goes back to antiquity and that continues to exert its influence over contemporary thought. This is the method of conceptual analysis. Paradigmatic conceptual analyses offer definitions of concepts that are to be tested against potential counterexamples that are identified via thought experiments. Conceptual analysis is supposed to be a distinctively a priori activity that many take to be the essence of philosophy. To the extent that paradigmatic conceptual analyses are available and successful, this will convey support for the classical theory. The classical theory has come under considerable pressure in the last thirty years or so, not just in philosophy but in psychology and other fields as well. For psychologists, the main problem has been that the classical theory has difficulty explaining a robust set of empirical findings. For instance, apples are judged to be more typical than plums with respect to the category of fruit, and correspondingly apples are judged to have more features in common with fruit. There are many other findings of this kind. One other is that more typical items are categorized more efficiently. For example, subjects are quicker to judge that apples are a kind of fruit than to judge that plums are. In philosophy, the classical theory has been subjected to a number of criticisms but perhaps the most fundamental is that attempts to specify definitions for concepts have a poor track record. The huge literature on the analysis of knowledge is representative of the state of things. But no one can seem to agree on what the correct definition is. Despite the

enormous amount of effort that has gone into the matter, and the dozens of papers written on the issue, we are still lacking a satisfactory and complete definition. It could be that the problem is that definitions are hard to come by. But another possibility—one that many philosophers are now taking seriously—is that our concepts lack definitional structure. A non-classical alternative that emerged in the 1980s is the prototype theory. The prototype theory is especially at home in dealing with the typicality effects that were left unexplained by the classical theory. One standard strategy is to maintain that, on the prototype theory, categorization is to be understood as a similarity comparison process, where similarity is computed as a function of the number of constituents that two concepts hold in common. Likewise, this is why apples are judged to be a kind of fruit faster than plums are. The prototype theory does well in accounting for a variety of psychological phenomena and it helps to explain why definitions may be so hard to produce. But the prototype theory has its own problems and limitations. One is that its treatment of categorization works best for quick and unreflective judgments. Yet when it comes to more reflective judgments, people go beyond the outcome of a similarity comparison. If asked whether a dog that is surgically altered to look like a raccoon is a dog or a raccoon, the answer for most of us, and even for children, is that it remains a dog see Keil, Gelman for discussion. Another criticism that has been raised against taking concepts to have prototype structure concerns compositionality. One general solution that addresses all of these problems is to hold that a prototype constitutes just part of the structure of a concept. In addition, concepts have conceptual cores, which specify the information relevant to more considered judgments and which underwrite compositional processes. Of course, this just raises the question of what sort of structure conceptual cores have. This is the view that concepts stand in relation to one another in the same way as the terms of a scientific theory and that categorization is a process that strongly resembles scientific theorizing see, e.g., the theory theory. The theory theory is especially well-suited to explaining the sorts of reflective categorization judgments that proved to be difficult for the prototype theory. For example, theory theorists maintain that children override perceptual similarity in assessing the situation where the dog is made to look like a raccoon, claiming that even children are in possession of a rudimentary biological theory. Another advantage of the theory theory is that it is supposed to help to explain important aspects of conceptual development. Conceptual change in childhood is said to follow the same pattern as theory change in science.

A. A priori and a posteriori; Absolute; Absolute time and space; Abstract and concrete; Adiaphora; Aesthetic emotions; Aesthetic interpretation; Agathusia and aschimothusia.

Antoine Destutt de Tracy The term "ideology" was born during the Reign of Terror of French Revolution , and acquired several other meanings thereafter. The word, and the system of ideas associated with it, was coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in , [3] while he was in prison pending trial during the Terror. The coup that overthrew Maximilien Robespierre allowed Tracy to pursue his work. He devised the term for a "science of ideas" he hoped would form a secure foundation for the moral and political sciences. He based the word on two things: He conceived "Ideology" as a liberal philosophy that would defend individual liberty, property, free markets , and constitutional limits on state power. He argues that among these aspects ideology is the most generic term, because the science of ideas also contains the study of their expression and deduction. In the century after Tracy, the term ideology moved back and forth between positive and negative connotations. He describes ideology as rather like teaching philosophy by the Socratic method , but without extending the vocabulary beyond what the general reader already possessed, and without the examples from observation that practical science would require. Taine identifies it not just with Destutt De Tracy, but also with his milieu, and includes Condillac as one of its precursors. Destutt de Tracy read the works of Locke and Condillac while he was imprisoned during the Reign of Terror. The term "ideology" has dropped some of its pejorative sting , and has become a neutral term in the analysis of differing political opinions and views of social groups. Some have described this kind of analysis as meta-ideologyâ€”the study of the structure, form, and manifestation of ideologies. Recent analysis tends to posit that ideology is a coherent system of ideas that rely on a few basic assumptions about reality that may or may not have any factual basis. Ideas become ideologies that is, become coherent, repeated patterns through the subjective ongoing choices that people make, serving as the seed around which further thought grows. According to most recent analysis, ideologies are neither necessarily right nor wrong. Believers in ideology range from passive acceptance through fervent advocacy to true belief. This accords with definitions, such as by Manfred Steger and Paul James , that emphasize both the issue of patterning and contingent claims to truth: Ideologies are patterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas and concepts, including particular representations of power relations. These conceptual maps help people navigate the complexity of their political universe and carry claims to social truth. Charles Blattberg offers an account that distinguishes political ideologies from political philosophies. Minar describes six different ways the word "ideology" has been used: As a collection of certain ideas with certain kinds of content, usually normative As the form or internal logical structure that ideas have within a set By the role ideas play in human-social interaction By the role ideas play in the structure of an organization As meaning, whose purpose is persuasion As the locus of social interaction For Willard A. Mullins an ideology should be contrasted with the related but different issues of utopia and historical myth. An ideology is composed of four basic characteristics: Terry Eagleton outlines more or less in no particular order some definitions of ideology: In his work, he strove to bring the concept of ideology into the foreground, as well as the closely connected concerns of epistemology and history. In this work, the term ideology is defined in terms of a system of presentations that explicitly or implicitly claim to absolute truth. In the Marxist economic base and superstructure model of society, base denotes the relations of production and modes of production , and superstructure denotes the dominant ideology religious, legal, political systems. The economic base of production determines the political superstructure of a society. Ruling class-interests determine the superstructure and the nature of the justifying ideologyâ€”actions feasible because the ruling class control the means of production. For example, in a feudal mode of production , religious ideology is the most prominent aspect of the superstructure, while in capitalist formations, ideologies such as liberalism and social democracy dominate. Hence the great importance of the ideology justifying a society; it politically confuses the alienated groups of society via false consciousness. Some explanations have been presented. Antonio Gramsci uses cultural hegemony to explain why the working-class have a false ideological conception of what are their best interests. Marx argued that "The class

which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production. Moreover, Mannheim has developed, and progressed, from the "total" but "special" Marxist conception of ideology to a "general" and "total" ideological conception acknowledging that all ideology including Marxism resulted from social life, an idea developed by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. A number of propositions, which are never untrue, suggest a number of other propositions, which are. In this way, the essence of the lacunar discourse is what is not told but is suggested. For example, the statement "All are equal before the law," which is a theoretical groundwork of current legal systems, suggests that all people may be of equal worth or have equal "opportunities". This is not true, for the concept of private property and power over the means of production results in some people being able to own more much more than others. This power disparity contradicts the claim that all share both practical worth and future opportunity equally; for example, the rich can afford better legal representation, which practically privileges them before the law. Althusser also proffered the concept of the ideological state apparatus to explain his theory of ideology. His first thesis was "ideology has no history": For Althusser, beliefs and ideas are the products of social practices, not the reverse. His thesis that "ideas are material" is illustrated by the "scandalous advice" of Pascal toward unbelievers: Ideology and the Commodity in the works of Guy Debord[edit] The French Marxist theorist Guy Debord , founding member of the Situationist International , argued that when the commodity becomes the "essential category" of society, i. Relevant discussion may be found on Talk: Please help to ensure that disputed statements are reliably sourced. July Learn how and when to remove this template message The German cultural historian Silvio Vietta described the development and expansion of Western rationality from ancient times onwards as often accompanied by and shaped by ideologies like that of the "just war", the "true religion", racism, nationalism, or the vision of future history as a kind of heaven on earth in communism. He said that ideas like these became ideologies by giving hegemonic political actions an idealistic veneer and equipping their leaders with a higher and, in the " political religions " Eric Voegelin , nearly God-like power, so that they became masters over the lives and the deaths of millions of people. He considered that ideologies therefore contributed to power politics irrational shields of ideas beneath which they could operate as manifestations of idealism. The proselytizing zeal of propagandists derives from "a passionate search for something not yet found more than a desire to bestow something we already have. Hoffer asserts that violence and fanaticism are interdependent. Without the leader, there is no movement. Often the leader must wait long in the wings until the time is ripe. He calls for sacrifices in the present, to justify his vision of a breathtaking future. The skills required include: Original thoughts are suppressed, and unity encouraged, if the masses are kept occupied through great projects, marches, exploration and industry. Results indicate that where people live is likely to closely correlate with their ideological beliefs. In much of Africa, South Asia and the Middle East, people prefer traditional beliefs and are less tolerant of liberal values. Protestant Europe, at the other extreme, adheres more to secular beliefs and liberal values. Alone among high-income countries, the United States is exceptional in its adherence to traditional beliefs, in this case Christianity.

Chapter 6 : The Concepts of Ideology, Hegemony, and Organic Intellectuals in Gramsci's Marxism

Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. Consequently, they are crucial to such psychological processes as categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making.

In the first place, they at best examined only the ideological motives of the historical activity of human beings, without grasping the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations. All constituent features of a society social classes, political pyramid, ideologies are assumed to stem from economic activity, an idea often portrayed with the metaphor of the base and superstructure. The base and superstructure metaphor describes the totality of social relations by which humans produce and re-produce their social existence. The base includes the material forces of production, that is the labour and material means of production and relations of production, i. Conflicts between the development of material productive forces and the relations of production provokes social revolutions and thus the resultant changes to the economic base will lead to the transformation of the superstructure. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes". Accordingly, Marx designated human history as encompassing four stages of development in relations of production: Criticism of capitalism Further information: Exploitation has been a socioeconomic feature of every class society and is one of the principal features distinguishing the social classes. The power of one social class to control the means of production enables its exploitation of the other classes. In capitalism, the labour theory of value is the operative concern; the value of a commodity equals the socially necessary labour time required to produce it. Under that condition, surplus value the difference between the value produced and the value received by a labourer is synonymous with the term "surplus labour", thus capitalist exploitation is realised as deriving surplus value from the worker. In pre-capitalist economies, exploitation of the worker was achieved via physical coercion. In the capitalist mode of production, that result is more subtly achieved and because workers do not own the means of production, they must voluntarily enter into an exploitive work relationship with a capitalist in order to earn the necessities of life. However, the worker must work or starve, thus exploitation is inevitable and the "voluntary" nature of a worker participating in a capitalist society is illusory. Alienation is the estrangement of people from their humanity German: Gattungswesen, "species-essence", "species-being" , which is a systematic result of capitalism. Under capitalism, the fruits of production belong to the employers, who expropriate the surplus created by others and so generate alienated labourers. Social classes See also: Social class , Class conflict , Classless society , and Three-component theory of stratification Marx distinguishes social classes on the basis of two criteria: Following this criterion of class based on property relations, Marx identified the social stratification of the capitalist mode of production with the following social groups: They subdivide as bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie. Petite bourgeoisie are those who work and can afford to buy little labour power i. Marxism predicts that the continual reinvention of the means of production eventually would destroy the petite bourgeoisie, degrading them from the middle class to the proletariat. Having no interest in international or national economics affairs, Marx claimed that this specific sub-division of the proletariat would play no part in the eventual social revolution. Class consciousness denotes the awareness of itself and the social world that a social class possesses and its capacity to rationally act in their best interests, hence class consciousness is required before they can effect a successful revolution and thus the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without defining ideology , [23] Marx used the term to describe the production of images of social reality. According to Engels, "ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces". In The German Ideology, he says "[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i. In Marxism, political economy is the study of the means of production, specifically of capital and how that manifests as economic activity. Marxism taught me what society was.

Through working class revolution, the state which Marxists see as a weapon for the subjugation of one class by another is seized and used to suppress the hitherto ruling class of capitalists and by implementing a commonly-owned, democratically controlled workplace create the society of communism, which Marxists see as true democracy. An economy based on co-operation on human need and social betterment, rather than competition for profit of many independently acting profit seekers, would also be the end of class society, which Marx saw as the fundamental division of all hitherto existing history. Marx saw work, the effort by humans to transform the environment for their needs, as a fundamental feature of human kind. Additionally, the worker is compelled by various means some nicer than others to work harder, faster and for longer hours. While this is happening, the employer is constantly trying to save on labor costs: This allows the employer to extract the largest amount of work and therefore potential wealth from their workers. The fundamental nature of capitalist society is no different from that of slave society: Through common ownership of the means of production, the profit motive is eliminated and the motive of furthering human flourishing is introduced. Because the surplus produced by the workers is property of the society as whole, there are no classes of producers and appropriators. Additionally, the state, which has its origins in the bands of retainers hired by the first ruling classes to protect their economic privilege, will disappear as its conditions of existence have disappeared. According to orthodox Marxist theory, the overthrow of capitalism by a socialist revolution in contemporary society is inevitable. While the inevitability of an eventual socialist revolution is a controversial debate among many different Marxist schools of thought, all Marxists believe socialism is a necessity, if not inevitable. Marxists believe that a socialist society is far better for the majority of the populace than its capitalist counterpart. Prior to the Russian revolution of 1917, Lenin wrote: "This conversion will directly result in an immense increase in productivity of labour, a reduction of working hours, and the replacement of the remnants, the ruins of small-scale, primitive, disunited production by collective and improved labour".

Classical Marxism "Classical Marxism" denotes the collection of socio-economic-political theories expounded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The Great Misunderstanding argues that the source of such misrepresentations lies in ignoring the philosophy of Marxism, which is dialectical materialism. In large, this was due to the fact that *The German Ideology*, in which Marx and Engels developed this philosophy, did not find a publisher for almost one hundred years. Gordon Childe Marxism has been adopted by a large number of academics and other scholars working in various disciplines. The theoretical development of Marxist archaeology was first developed in the Soviet Union in 1929, when a young archaeologist named Vladislav I. Ravdonikas published a report entitled "For a Soviet history of material culture". Within this work, the very discipline of archaeology as it then stood was criticised as being inherently bourgeois, therefore anti-socialist and so, as a part of the academic reforms instituted in the Soviet Union under the administration of Premier Joseph Stalin, a great emphasis was placed on the adoption of Marxist archaeology throughout the country. Gordon Childe, who used Marxist theory in his understandings of the development of human society. During the 1920s, the Western Marxist school became accepted within Western academia, subsequently fracturing into several different perspectives such as the Frankfurt School or critical theory. Due to its former state-supported position, there has been a backlash against Marxist thought in post-communist states see sociology in Poland but it remains dominant in the sociological research sanctioned and supported by those communist states that remain see sociology in China. Marxian economics refers to a school of economic thought tracing its foundations to the critique of classical political economy first expounded upon by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Although the Marxian school is considered heterodox, ideas that have come out of Marxian economics have contributed to mainstream understanding of the global economy. Certain concepts of Marxian economics, especially those related to capital accumulation and the business cycle, such as creative destruction, have been fitted for use in capitalist systems. Marxist historiography is a school of historiography influenced by Marxism. The chief tenets of Marxist historiography are the centrality of social class and economic constraints in determining historical outcomes. Marxist historiography has made contributions to the history of the working class, oppressed nationalities, and the methodology of history from below. Marxist historiography suffered in the Soviet Union, as the government requested overdetermined historical writing. While some members of the group most notably Christopher Hill and E. P. Thompson are

considered the founding fathers of Marxist historiography. Today, the senior-most scholars of Marxist historiography are R. Panikkar , most of whom are now over 75 years old. Marxist criticism views literary works as reflections of the social institutions from which they originate. According to Marxists, even literature itself is a social institution and has a specific ideological function, based on the background and ideology of the author. Marxist aesthetics is a theory of aesthetics based on, or derived from, the theories of Karl Marx. It involves a dialectical and materialist , or dialectical materialist , approach to the application of Marxism to the cultural sphere, specifically areas related to taste such as art, beauty, etc.

Chapter 7 : How are concepts of ideology related to cultures

Though ideology originated as a serious philosophical term, within a few decades it took on connotations of impracticality thanks to Napoleon, who used it in a derisive manner. Today, the word most often refers to "a systematic body of concepts," especially those of a particular group or political party.

What is the relation between organisational culture and culture? What is important and what cause problems? Organisational culture consist of a complex set of ideologies, symbols, and values that are shared throughout the organisation and that influence the way the firm conducts its business. Organisation culture helps regulate and control employee behaviour, and strategic leaders must develop and nurture an appropriate corporate culture, one that promotes focused learning and human development, the sharing of skills and resources among different functions in the firm. HR sales and production. An appropriate corporate culture can encourage foster and facilitate a long-term vision, and create an emphasis on strategic actions linked with the manufacture of high-quality goods and services.. It is useful to conceive of the culture of an organisation as consisting of three layers.. They might include a belief that the company should not trade with particular country, or that professional staff should not have their professional actions appraised by managers. The paradigm is maintained and reinforced by the take-for granted ways of doing things in the organisation. Culture as a concept has had a long and checked history. It has been used by the lay person as a word to indicate sophistication. In this context managers speak of developing the "right kind of culture" or a "culture of quality", suggests that culture is concerned with certain values that managers are trying to indicate in their organisation. Also implied in this usage is the assumption that there are better or worse cultures, stronger or weaker cultures, and that the right kind of culture will influence how effective organisations are. Culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin, in that leaders first create culture, when they create groups and organisation. Once culture exist, they determine the criteria for leadership and thus determine who will or will not be a leader, but if culture becomes dysfunctional, it is the unique function of the leadership to perceive the functional and dysfunctional elements of the existing culture and to manage cultural evolution and changing in such a way that the group can survive in a changing environment. To manage culture well and implement and preserve it in a professional way, managing change will be easy and there will be less or no resistance to change. The change process needs a cultural structure that can resist to any problems. Firms with an effective corporate culture are reluctant to make major changes with strategic leaders.. Organisation is interested in these dynamic processes of culture creation and management are the essence of leadership and make one realize that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin. Culture begins with leaders who impose their own values and assumptions on a group. Culture refers to the customers and rituals that societies develop over the course of their history. In the last decade or so it has been used by some organisational researchers and managers to indicate the climate and practices that organisations develop around their handing of people or to refer to the espoused values and credo of an organisation. In this case managers speak of developing the right kind of culture or a culture of quality, which ump lied in this usage is the assumption that there are better or worse cultures, stronger or weaker cultures, and the right kind of culture will influence how effective organisations are. What does the concept of Ideology contain in it? Ideology is a set of beliefs, values and ideas of a group and a nation. It is deeply ingrained in the social consciousness of the people. It is a set of principles, a framework of action and guidance system that gives order and meaning to life and human action.. Ideology emphasizes on some particular principles, ideals and blueprint for the future. It is a review of the existing political, social and economic arrangements that create consciousness based on its principles. It legitimizes or illegitimizes certain actions and philosophies. Ideology gives nation a direction and worldview and its implementation is the responsibility of the concerned people. What does the concept of ideology contain it? A concept of Getting new state like as Muslims made their own state the name of Pakistan this concept contain in it in this question.

Chapter 8 : Philosophy | Definition of Philosophy by Merriam-Webster

Concepts. Concepts are of central importance to an overall theory of cognition and the mind. Our thoughts, especially those that express or involve propositions, are analyzed and distinguished from one another by appeal to various facts involving concepts and our grasp of them.

On this view we can more accurately, and less perniciously, understand and describe morally despicable actions, characters, and events using more pedestrian moral concepts such as badness and wrongdoing. By contrast, evil-revivalists believe that the concept of evil has a place in our moral and political thinking and discourse. On this view, the concept of evil should be revived, not abandoned see Russell and Someone who believes that we should do away with moral discourse altogether could be called a moral-skeptic or a moral nihilist. Evil-skepticism is not as broad. Evil-skeptics believe the concept of evil is particularly problematic and should be abandoned while other moral concepts, such as right, wrong, good, and bad, are worth keeping. Evil-skeptics give three main reasons to abandon the concept of evil: The monsters of fictions, such as vampires, witches, and werewolves, are thought to be paradigms of evil. These creatures possess powers and abilities that defy scientific explanation, and perhaps human understanding. Many popular horror films also depict evil as the result of dark forces or Satanic possession. Some evil-skeptics believe that the concept of evil necessarily makes reference to supernatural spirits, dark forces, or creatures. Evil-revivalists respond that the concept of evil need not make reference to supernatural spirits, dark forces, or monsters. The concept of evil would have explanatory power, or be explanatorily useful, if it were able to explain why certain actions were performed or why these actions were performed by certain agents rather than by others. Evil-skeptics such as Inga Clendinnen and Philip Cole argue that the concept of evil cannot provide explanations of this sort and thus should be abandoned. According to Clendinnen the concept of evil cannot explain the performance of actions because it is an essentially dismissive classification. To say that a person, or an action, is evil is just to say that that person, or action, defies explanation or is incomprehensible see Clendinnen , 81; see also, Pocock Joel Feinberg also believes that evil actions are essentially incomprehensible. But he does not think that we should abandon the concept of evil for this reason. Similarly, Cole believes that the concept of evil is often employed when we lack a complete explanation for why an action was performed. For instance, we might wonder why two ten-year-old boys, Robert Thompson and Jon Venerables, tortured and murdered two-year-old James Bulger while other ten-year-old boys with similar genetic characteristics and upbringings cause little harm? Cole believes that the concept of evil is employed in these cases to provide the missing explanation. However, Cole argues that the concept of evil does not provide a genuine explanation in these cases because to say that an action is evil is just to say either that the action resulted from supernatural forces or that the action is a mystery. To say that an event resulted from supernatural forces is not to give a genuine explanation of the event because these forces do not exist. To say that an event is a mystery is not to give a genuine explanation of an event, but rather, it is to suggest that the event cannot be explained at least with the information currently available , 6â€”9. Evil-revivalists have offered several responses to the objection that the concept of evil should be abandoned because it is explanatorily useless. Another common response is to argue that evil is no less explanatorily useful than other moral concepts such as good, bad, right, and wrong Garrard , â€”; Russell , â€” Thus, if we should abandon the concept of evil we should abandon these other moral concepts as well. Eve Garrard and Luke Russell also point out that even if the concept of evil cannot provide a complete explanation for the performance of an action, it can provide a partial explanation. For instance, Garrard argues that evil actions result from a particular kind of motivation. Call this an E motivation. Thus, to say that an action is evil is to say that it has resulted from an E motivation. This provides a partial explanation for why the action was performed. Bush made it more likely that suspected terrorists would be mistreated and less likely that there would be peaceful relations between the peoples and governments of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea and the peoples and government of the United States. But should we abandon the concept of evil because it leads to harm when it is misapplied or abused? So why do they believe that we should abandon the concept of evil? An evil-skeptic might reply that we should abandon only the concept of evil, and not other

normative concepts, because the concept of evil is particularly dangerous or susceptible to abuse. We can discern several reasons why ascriptions of evil might be thought to be more harmful or dangerous than ascriptions of other normative concepts such as badness or wrongdoing. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that evildoers not only deserve the greatest form of moral condemnation but also the greatest form of punishment. Thus, not only are wrongfully accused evildoers subjected to harsh judgments undeservedly, they may be subjected to harsh punishments undeservedly as well. For instance, some people believe that to say that someone performed an evil action implies that that person acted out of malevolence see e. Given this ambiguity, it might be unclear whether an attribution of evil attributes despicable psychological attributes to an evildoer, and this ambiguity might result in an overly harsh judgment. For instance, on some conceptions of evil, evildoers are possessed, inhuman, incorrigible, or have fixed character traits See Cole , 1â€™21; Russell , , and ; Haybron a and b. These metaphysical and psychological theses about evildoers are controversial. If evildoers have these traits, and thus will continue to perform evil actions no matter what we do, the only appropriate response might be to isolate them from society or to have them executed. But if evildoers do not have these fixed dispositions and they are treated as if they do, they will likely be mistreated. Thus, while most theorists agree that the concept of evil can be harmful or dangerous there is considerable disagreement about what conclusion should be drawn from this fact. Evil-skeptics believe that because the concept of evil is harmful or dangerous we should abandon it in favour of less dangerous concepts such as badness and wrongdoing. Evil-revivalists believe that because the concept of evil is harmful or dangerous more philosophical work needs to be done on it to clear up ambiguities and reduce the likelihood of abuse or misuse. Card and Kekes argue that it is more dangerous to ignore evil than to try to understand it Card and ; Kekes For if we do not understand evil we will be ill-equipped to root out its sources, and thus, we will be unable to prevent evils from occurring in the future. But his reasons for thinking that the concept of evil is dangerous are different from those discussed above. Nietzsche believes that the concept of evil is dangerous because it has a negative effect on human potential and vitality by promoting the weak in spirit and suppressing the strong. In *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*, Nietzsche argues that the concept of evil arose from the negative emotions of envy, hatred, and resentment he uses the French term *ressentiment* to capture an attitude that combines these elements. He contends that the powerless and weak created the concept of evil to take revenge against their oppressors. Nietzsche believes that the concepts of good and evil contribute to an unhealthy view of life which judges relief from suffering as more valuable than creative self-expression and accomplishment. For this reason Nietzsche believes that we should seek to move beyond judgements of good and evil Nietzsche and Instead, she argues that judgments of evil often indicate a healthy recognition that one has been treated unjustly. Card also argues that we have just as much reason to question the motives of people who believe we should abandon the concept of evil as we do to question the motives of people who use the concept. She suggests that people who want to abandon the concept of evil may be overwhelmed by the task of understanding and preventing evil and would rather focus on the less daunting task of questioning the motives of people who use the term Card , According to this line of argument, it is hard to deny that evil exists; and if evil exists, we need a concept to capture this immoral extreme. A second argument in favour of the concept of evil is that it is only by facing evil, i. A third reason to keep the concept of evil is that categorizing actions and practices as evil helps to focus our limited energy and resources. If evils are the worst sorts of moral wrongs, we should prioritize the reduction of evil over the reduction of other wrongs such as unjust inequalities. For instance, Card believes that it is more important to prevent the evils of domestic violence than it is to ensure that women and men are paid equal wages for equal work Card , 96â€™” A fourth reason not to abandon the concept of evil is that by categorizing actions and practices as evil we are better able to set limits to legitimate responses to evil. By having a greater understanding of the nature of evil we are better able to guard against responding to evil with further evils Card , 7â€™”8. However, philosophers have considered the nature and origins of evil in the broad sense since ancient times. Although this entry is primarily concerned with evil in the narrow sense, it is useful to survey the history of theories of evil in the broad sense since these theories provide the backdrop against which theories of evil in the narrow sense have been developed. Philosophers and theologians have recognized that to solve the problem of evil it is important

to understand the nature of evil. One theory of evil that provides a solution to the problem of evil is Manichaeism. According to Manichaeism, the universe is the product of an ongoing battle between two coequal and coeternal first principles: God and the Prince of Darkness. From these first principles follow good and evil substances which are in a constant battle for supremacy. The material world constitutes a stage of this cosmic battle where the forces of evil have trapped the forces of goodness in matter. For example, the human body is evil while the human soul is good and must be freed from the body through strict adherence to Manichaeism. The Manichaean solution to the problem of evil is that God is neither all-powerful nor the sole creator of the world. God is supremely good and creates only good things, but he or she is powerless to prevent the Prince of Darkness from creating evil. For more about Manichaeism see Coyne and Lieu. Since its inception, Manichaeism has been criticized for providing little empirical support for its extravagant cosmology. A second problem is that, for a theist, it is hard to accept that God is not an all-powerful sole creator. For these reasons influential medieval philosophers such as Saint Augustine, who initially accepted the Manichaean theory of evil, eventually rejected it in favor of the Neoplatonist approach. For instance, the evil of disease consists in a privation of health, and the evil of sin consists in a privation of virtue. The Neoplatonist theory of evil provides a solution to the problem of evil because if evil is a privation of substance, form, and goodness, then God creates no evil. For instance, it seems that we cannot equate the evil of pain with the privation of pleasure or some other feeling. Pain is a distinct phenomenological experience which is positively bad and not merely not good. Similarly, a sadistic torturer is not just not as good as she could be. She is not simply lacking in kindness or compassion. These are qualities she has, not qualities she lacks, and they are positively bad and not merely lacking in goodness. See Caldera; Kane. See Anglin and Goetz and Grant for replies to these objections. Instead, Kant equates evil with having a will that is not fully good. According to Kant, we have a morally good will only if we choose to perform morally right actions because they are morally right. Kant, 4: There are three grades of evil which can be seen as increasingly more evil stages of corruption in the will. First there is frailty. A person with a frail will attempts to perform morally right actions because these actions are morally right, but she is too weak to follow through with her plans. Instead, she ends up doing wrong due to a weakness of will. Kant, Bk I, 24. The next stage of corruption is impurity. A person with an impure will does not attempt to perform morally right actions just because these actions are morally right. Instead, she performs morally right actions partly because these actions are morally right and partly because of some other incentive, e.

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Concept, in the Analytic school of philosophy, the subject matter of philosophy, which philosophers of the Analytic school hold to be concerned with the salient features of the language in which people speak of concepts at issue.

Contact Author There were philosophers before Plato but they mostly served as tutors for children of the rich. Plato was the first to ask many of the questions that philosophers would be obsessed with for the next couple thousand years. Plato and Socrates It is difficult to talk about Plato without talking about Socrates and it is difficult to talk about Socrates without talking about Plato. Socrates never wrote anything down and so a lot of our perception of who he was and what he thought comes from Plato. What we know of Socrates is mostly as a literary character. The legend about Socrates goes that the Oracle of Delphi proclaimed him the wisest man in all of Athens. Confused by this, Socrates went around and talked to all the men who he thought were wiser than he was. After talking to them and questioning them he found that their beliefs were full of contradictions and when he pointed this out to them they became upset. Afterwards, he came away with the belief that the oracle had been right. Socrates established the role of the philosopher to question everything. Because he constantly questioned the values of society, criticized politicians and proposed ideas that made the establishment nervous he was finally put on trial for corrupting the youth and for not worshipping the correct Gods. With *The Republic*, Plato struck out on his own philosophical territory, and while it still has a literary structure with Socrates as our hero, we are seeing a systematic philosophy start to take hold for the first time. Early in the book Socrates encounters the character of Thrasymachus who insists that justice is the interest of the stronger. This was a common viewpoint in ancient Greece. This was a society that valued strength above everything else and it was Thrasymachus who held the view that it was acceptable to dominate others, lie, cheat and steal if one of strong enough to get away with it. A story we are given to illustrate this is the ring of Gyges. Gyges is given a ring that makes him invisible and the story is used to argue that no man would be just if he could commit unjust acts without being caught or punished. What Virtue Ethics states is that the reasoning of what is moral is determined by the person moral agent rather than by rules or consequences. These parts are reason, spirit and appetite. He argues that the human soul must have at least two parts in order to explain why we have so many psychological conflicts. It could be seen that reason is our thinking ability to judge, spirit our emotional ability to feel empathy and appetite our desires but you will always have people who read the book and see it differently. The point for Plato however, is that we need to balance these three parts of our souls in order to make good ethical choices. The whole point of being moral is to balance these three parts of us to keep us healthy and sane. Letting one take too much control of our minds is not good for us and leads to bad decisions. His defenders point out that while it may seem that way to us today we must look at it in historical context. Plato was thinking of his ideal government as a city state and this is a relatively small area where those who did not approve of the government could move to another city state that they found less objectionable. Private families no longer exist and the social mobility of women is greatly increased because they are no longer expected to simply play the role of wife and mother. Plato gives his central government even enough power to censor all artists. Plato contends that artists portray a copy of reality that deceives those who experience it. He goes into great detail about what art would and would not be acceptable in his new society and such passages do not do well to defend him against those claims of fascism. This is a lie that is presented to citizens in order to keep social order and assure that everybody stays within their position of society. It is worth noting that though he placed them at the top of the hierarchy he gave them little monetary reward for their status. Luckily I do not have to explain this one. The allegory has been studied tirelessly so giving my interpretation would just be one of many. It is essentially about the process of becoming a philosopher and looking beyond the surface of things. It is also worth noting that Plato was distrustful of the senses when it came to the ability to perceive knowledge. Plato knew that our senses could be fooled and he placed an emphasis on our abilities to think and reason than knowledge gained from the study of the physical world. This leads us to another famous metaphysical idea, *The Theory of the Forms*. Plato was fascinated by the problems of universals. An example would be as if I told you I had a dog. What makes a dog

have its essential "dogness"? An ideal form of the thing could never exist in the physical world but it could exist in in a higher reality. This concept was extremely influential on medieval religious thinkers who found its literal idealism irresistible. While it still remains an interesting idea to discuss, modern philosophers have long disregarded it as a path to any useful knowledge.