

Chapter 1 : Project MUSE - Dynamics of State Formation: Europe and India Compared (review)

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But the story of the European state has an equally significant counterpart, a history that happens outside. Outside Europe the modern state succeeded in two senses – first as an instrument, and second, as an idea. In fact, when other people began to reflect on the reasons for this astonishing success of Europe, they often settled on this as its intangible but indispensable instrument. By extending Tocqueville insights, it can be argued that traditional, pre-modern forms of political authority were utterly inadequate in dealing with the power of the modern European state. It could be restrained and eventually effectively opposed only through a movement that organised the power of entire populations against the colonial state in the form of national mobilisations. But it succeeded a second time as an idea. Eventually, in the gigantic transformations of third world societies which have followed on de-colonisation, for good or for worse, were driven through by using the power of this modern instrumentality of the state. In the absence of other forces – like the bourgeoisie or the proletariat- that played such an important role in European social transformations – it was the state which almost entirely arrogated to itself the power of proposing, directing and effecting large scale change. There might be great debates about judging what the state has done; but there is no doubt that it has been the most powerful collective agency. That is why the state is central to the story of non-Western modernity, and colonialism is central to the story of the state. This paper is not about the post-colonial state in general; only the historically specific form it assumed in India. It is thus necessary to spell out what can be generalised from the Indian case, and what cannot. First, although India is a single country, its numerical significance is obvious: Second, as there is little dispute today about the desirability of democratic forms of government, the Indian case is particularly important. It is one of the most successful cases of democracy outside of Europe. The narrow, and minimalist reading of the success of democracy is simply the continuance of a competitive electoral system of government: In India, democracy has been a great success in both these senses. First, in a highly diverse society, divided by religion, castes, classes, languages the democratic system has functioned without interruption and without popular apathy for nearly six decades now. Second, and more significantly, this institutional continuation of democracy has produced in this period a fundamental social transformation which is in some respects startlingly different from the European social processes. The story of Indian democracy is of more general interest for a third reason as well. If democratic institutions spread and achieve success in the non-European world, the institutions would produce social results depending on the forms of sociability available in each historical context. This paper offers a brief sketch of the post-colonial state in India. It interprets post-colonial to mean not the trivial fact that this state has emerged after the colonial regime departed. It takes it in the stronger sense to mean that some of its characteristic features could not have arisen without the particular colonial history that went before. I also believe, unlike some other political scientists, that political change in modern India cannot be studied fruitfully – except in the long term historical perspective. To understand the unfolding story of politics and the state today, it is thus essential to start with the coming of colonial authority. Modernity in India, and perhaps also in other European colonies, was largely a political affair. All commentators on European modernity point out the significant, if not ordinary role that transformations of the production and economic processes played in the making of European modernity. I wish to suggest that in India by contrast the causal powers of economic changes were far more limited. The type of capitalist development that eventually took place in colonial India was determined to a large extent by political imperatives of state control. In the second phase, its scope was extended through the popular nationalist movement from the s when Indian more generally took part in this as a large, encompassing transformative activity. Although most Indian were affected by this form of politics, their participation and capacity to behave as actors depended on class and education. Nationalist politics was more the politics of the

wider educated elites, much less of the ordinary Indian peasant. Curiously, even after independence, this structure of politics continued unchanged. Since the seventies, in another serious transformation, the business of politics became much more expansive, and lower caste and lower class politicians brought in the concerted pressures of their ordinary constituents into the life of the state. What were the central processes in this transformation? Why has politics of a discursive, representative, democratic character succeeded in India? The basic argument of this paper is controversial, but fairly simple. There can be no doubt that in the last two hundred years Indian society has undergone a most fundamental transformation. In pre-modern times, control over the state was relatively marginal to the narratives of significant social change. The most significant upheavals in early Indian history were not dynastic or regime changes, but the challenges to the religious organisation of society through reform movements of Buddhism and Jainism against ritualistic Brahminism in ancient India, rise of the bhakti cults against Hindu orthodoxy in the middle ages. The European state thus still dominates modern Indian life in those two senses. The institutional apparatuses introduced into Indian society by British colonial power have not been dismantled, but massively extended. Secondly, the idea of that to be modern is to live through the state, to organise society through this central institution of power, has had a great vindication – ironically through the demise of colonial power itself. Following this main idea, I shall present my argument in three parts: At the time when colonial power began to exert serious influence, power in Indian society was structured in a peculiar form. Much of Northern and central India had been under an Islamic empire for nearly six centuries. In most other societies, a conquering Islamic power had converted and transformed indigenous social practices and religious doctrine. In India the irresistible military power of Islamic dynasties learnt to coexist with the immovable social structure of the Hindu caste system. Indian society, thus, had a dual structure of power, composed on strange crossing of Hindu and Islamic principles. Caste is a peculiar structure of social power which tends to circumscribe the jurisdiction of political authority. To understand the changes that the modern state brought into Indian society, it is necessary to picture the functioning of caste society. Caste, as is generally known, has two forms – the formal, ritualistic structure of the four varnas, and the effective sociological structure of much more numerous jatis. Sociological analysts usually give less importance to the formal varna structure, but it is significant for one central reason. The social order of castes separated the search for social prestige and cognitive powers, political and military supremacy and commercial wealth. This also meant that, unlike aristocratic societies of pre-modern Europe, political pre-eminence, economic wealth and cultural prestige did not coincide in a single social elite. Occupational separation by birth meant that social groups lived in three types of relations to each other: Occupationally divided social groups could not seek the same goods; and therefore, it reduced, if not entirely excluded, competition for wealth and power. Significantly, this authoritative allocation did not originate from political authority. The idea of modern sovereignty therefore did not apply to the power of the political authority in this society. Since large parts of Indian society were securely governed by Islamic rulers since the eleventh century, does this model apply to those areas as well? Although Islamic religious doctrine was fundamentally different from Hinduism. It required a state of a very different sort, animated by very different intellectual principles of self-organisation and endowed with new types of cognitive-statistical appliances, to alter this stable social constitution and replace it with a new one. The modern state is, by definition, the state which, because of its self-interpretation in terms of the principle of sovereignty, considered this invasive transformation of society possible. First, the European states themselves came from vastly different cultural and institutional contexts, and the differences between European states reflected themselves in the system of political power they brought into the colonial territories. Secondly, much depended on exactly when a territory was brought under European control. Third, European powers followed entirely different projects in different colonies, and though experience of colonial rule in one part of the world informed decisions about another, British rule in Africa, for instance, was very different from what it was in India. Finally, the exact nature of colonial rule depended not merely on what the colonial power was ideologically intent on doing, or instrumentally capable of achieving, but also the manner in which the colonized society deployed its own

cultural and political resources. Focusing on India therefore gives us a single story out of many diverse ones of European colonial rule, and because of the strange intimacy that developed between India and Britain, it might portray European colonial domination in general in a misleadingly benevolent light. Not all groups in colonized countries responded to the arrival of European power and culture with the initial enthusiasm of the modern Indian elites. The sharing of at least abstract common political principles between the colonial rulers and the nationalist elite to produce an effective framework of political conflict was also rather unusual, as much as the negotiated nature of the ultimate withdrawal of British power. The state established by British colonialism was precisely an historical force of this kind. Dominion established by British power, even though its immediate instrument was a commercial company, occurred in an intellectual context which presupposed sovereignty as a definitional quality of state-power. Thus, when the British eventually turned India into a crown colony, the colonial state assumed the rights of state sovereignty as these were understood in European discourses of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, however, British colonial power did not enter India in the shape of state authority: It is the peculiar constitution of society, and the relative externality of the state to the orders of caste practice which allowed this to happen. By the first half of the nineteenth century, British organisations already controlled much of commercial activity, military power, quasi-political administrative apparatuses and had a substantial influence on cultural life in several parts of India. When they finally decided to end the fiction of Mughal rule after the rebellion of 1857, Mughal authority was already purely nominal. But this first, and rather peculiar stage in the establishment of British power, stretching over a century, is critical for an understanding of the special dynamics of British colonialism in India. British Power, established initially through control over channels and instruments of commerce and revenue-collection, and at the second step, through the introduction of modern cultural apparatuses, slowly turned into a state of the modern kind – though, its actual institutions were quite different from European models of the nineteenth century. Older aristocracies which lost their power to the British and their supporters were understandably hostile to the gradual entrenchment of British power. Similarly, traditional holders of social authority and prestige, like Brahmin conservatives, often looked at the new influences with hostility. Recent historical research has strongly underlined the fact that the British could establish their control over a large and diverse territory like India, partly because they went along with historical trends that had already started in India in the eighteenth century, and for this reason, they also drew substantial support from indigenous groups. Important sections of Indian society, like powerful commercial interests, aspirant political groups, and relatively modern elites produced by new educational institutions strongly supported the establishment of British power. Eventually, this allowed British rule in India to become an interesting arrangement of power which was administered by large groups of Indian elites who collaborated with British authority and ran the colony under British supervision. Establishment of a new kind of state, with formal legal claims to sovereignty, was itself a major transformative project, which against the logic of the limitation of political authority in the segmentary caste civilisation. It established and familiarized the idea that the apparatuses of the state, especially its legislative organs, in British or Indian hands, could, in principle, judge social institutions critically, and formally alter them. Some of the most fateful and long lasting effects were not introduced through political policies narrowly defined, but through more indirect cultural changes it induced through its administrative habits. Surprisingly, the colonial administration changed identities by implanting cognitive practices which objectified communities, changing them from an earlier fuzzy or underspecified form to a modern enumerated one. Processes of enumeration of the social world, like mapping and census, irreversibly altered social ontology by giving groups a new kind of agentive political identity. However, the colonial state was subject to contradictory impulses. It certainly set in motion large information-gathering processes under the rationalist belief that in order to rule that large, complex society the state and its officials had to know it well. But this impulse of cognitive appropriation was not part of a state-directed agenda of wholesale social reform. The colonial state was surprisingly cautious about unnecessary interference in everyday social life. One strand of colonial administrative thinking advocated a state of deliberate inactivity, which did not meddle in social

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affairs which colonial rulers did not understand fully, and which might unwittingly create disaffection. Even in case of a barbaric practice like sati – the burning of widows on the funeral pyre of their deceased husbands – the initial response of the colonial regime was fairly cautious. Only the righteous indignation of the native reformers eventually pushed it into legislation banning the practice. British policy oscillated between a reforming impulse, which wanted to restructure Indian society, on rational lines, and an impulse of restraint, which wanted to leave social affairs of Indians alone. This ability to form associations, exercise group solidarity, pursue their economic interests, transact business with the colonial state, gave the modern Indian elite the confidence to develop larger projects of self-government, and led to the growth of Indian nationalism.

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Indian States in the Era of Globalization and Liberalization! The Indian State was to become the engine of growth and socio-economic transformation and reconstruction of the Indian society. The DPSP were to be taken as fundamental and as providing guidance in the governance of the country. By and large, this mixed economy model of development with the dominance of public sector continued till late s when it started giving way to transnational model of economic development based on neo-liberal ideas and prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank. And in the s the public sector has been eclipsed by the unfettered play of market forces. We submit that the post-independent Indian model of socio-economic development and the role of the Indian State therein must be understood in the light of the nature of the post-colonial Indian State. That is to say, apart from the factors of domestic and international conditions and constraints and the prevalent dominant ideologies at the international level, the background and the constitution of the ruling elite, the nature of political leadership that was at the helm of affairs of the state and the interests of dominant social groups were the most decisive factors in determining the post-independent Indian developmental path and the role of the state therein. It is important to note that the internal balance of social forces is not fixed or static, rather it is in perpetual flux; old social classes get liquidated and new social classes are born, old alliances are terminated and new alliances are made. This change in the internal balance of social forces brings concomitant change in the nature and role of the state in the process of development. The problem is compounded by the complexity of the Indian social structure. In this context, it is relevant to look at what Amit Bhaduri and Deepak Nayyar have to say about the nature and role of the Indian State in the process of socio-economic development: The pronounced social and economic inequalities have, inevitably, meant an unequal distribution of political power. Hence, by and large, the state has represented the interests of the dominant economic and social classes that constitute the ruling elite. This reality has been moderated by the compulsions of a democracy where governments are elected by the people and where the vast majority of the people are poor. Taking a political economy perspective on the post-independent Indian developmental strategy, Jayati Ghosh opines in the same vein. Thus, any attempt to evaluate approximately 40 years of planning in our country and the role of the state therein must be done in the light of the nature of the Indian State during the phase of development planning. The importance of following such an approach has been emphasized by people like Terence J. If we cannot grasp adequately the nature of that Indian state, then, one might say, neither can we confront suitably the nature of development planning. That, I think, would be too harsh a judgement. The Marxist literature on the Indian state is abundant in insight, and yields a rich variety of possible hypotheses. A number of nationalist uprisings in Europe during the 19th century resulted in the formation of a number of new states throughout the continent. This is crucial to the understanding of nation-state formation in the 20th century. The Soviet approach to the question of nation and nationality has to be understood in the light of the objectives of the Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution stood for proletarian internationalism. During the post-war period, this approach to nationality was followed in Yugoslavia. Thus, in both the USSR and Yugoslavia, the historical, cultural and political specificities of various national components of the state were sidelined in favour of an overarching national identity. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the process of nation-state formation in the erstwhile colonies was influenced by European nationalism of the 19th century. The nationalist movements in the colonies were led by indigenous elites who derived inspiration from European nationalism. The example of the Russian Revolution also helped the leaders of the nationalist movements to mobilize the masses. In course of freedom struggle, portentous grey areas in the emergent nations were ignored to facilitate freedom from the colonial bondage. European nationalism of the 19th century served as a template for the emergence of nationalism and nation-states in the former colonies. After

independence, they preferred to inherit the colonial state rather than to transform it radically to meet the basic needs of the common man. The above analysis holds good in the Indian context too. In his recent book *India: A History*, Alam castigates Nehru for sliding into an emotional construction of the Indian nation based on an imagined past. The nation-state came under the attack of neo-liberal globalization in the 1990s. Neo-liberal globalization is eroding the sovereignty and relative autonomy of the nation-state, particularly in the developing world. The nation-state is less autonomous today in the sense that economic and monetary policies and decisions are invariably affected by happenings outside the national boundaries. The combined effect of the unprecedented growth of information technology, the global fluidity of finance capital, the growth of FDI, and the emergence of big MNCs is to undermine the economic sovereignty and relative autonomy of the nation-state. While these processes affect the autonomy of the nation-state all over the world, the smaller economies of the developing world are worst hit since they are more vulnerable to external pressures and shocks and have weak bargaining power vis-a-vis the developed first world and the big MNCs. This is perceptively brought out by Eric Hobsbawm: A major reason for the crisis of the social-democratic and Keynesian policies which dominated Western capitalism in the third quarter of the century is precisely that the power of states to set levels of employment, wages and welfare expenditures on their territory has been undermined by exposure to inter-national competition from economies producing more cheaply or more efficiently. It is the ruling elite of the developing world which is instrumental in pushing through the economic reforms dictated by the IMF and the World Bank. In this context, it is pertinent to raise this question: Is nation-state still a relevant concept in a globalized world? Or, does it mean the demise of the nation-state? It is interesting to note that this question is being debated in one form or another and the beginning of the demise of the nation-state is being predicted for more than two decades now. Here it is relevant to look at some excerpts from the book. Spencer, the president of the First National City Corporation, which does business with 90 countries, declared: Maisonrouge a top US technocrat maintained: In a recent article published in *Span*, a journalist wrote: But despite all these noises about the nation-state outliving its utility, the nation-state is very much alive and there are no signs of its demise in the near future. The concept of nation-state is very much relevant in an unequal world. Given deepening inequality and wide gaps in development concomitant with globalization, indeed nation-state remains the only agency for intervention on behalf of the citizens of the developing world. In this context, it is important to note that simultaneous with the process of erosion of the relative autonomy of the nation-state, the opposite tendencies of nationalism and the assertion of ethnic and local identities are also visible, particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of the eastern European communist regimes and the Soviet Union. This phenomenon is perceptively brought out by T. He has drawn our attention to assertions by ethno-national entities, which had not been an integral part of the nationalist movements of the 19th century, for independent sovereign statehood or autonomy. Thus, issues of nationality and nation-state are being redefined in central and eastern Europe in general and former Yugoslavia in particular, as well as in the former Soviet Union. The biggest challenge facing the nation-state in the developing world today is to reap the benefits of the processes of globalization and liberalization and mitigate their ill effects on the vast majority of humanity. Certainly, this task cannot be left at the mercy of the ruling elite of the developing countries; as we have already noted, the ruling classes of the Third World are hand in glove with the transnational capital. Therefore, internally, strategies need to be explored and new alliances need to be forged to mount pressure on the nation-state to perform such a role. According to Amartya Sen, two problem areas that stand out sharply at this time in India are: He has argued that the two issues are closely linked with each other, and an appropriate approach to globalization would require that adequate attention be paid to the problems of domestic disparity. In contrast to this, Indian approach towards globalization has been unplanned and crisis-driven. If India has to emulate China in market success, Sen argues, it is not adequate just to liberalize the economy, but also to create social opportunities through expansion of primary education and health care, and comprehensive land reforms. While agreeing with liberalization enthusiasts that India has too much government in some fields, Sen points out that they ignore the fact that India has too little government activities in other fields like basic education and basic

health care; thus, Sen has emphasized the necessity of taking away policy debates in India well beyond liberalization to get somewhere. Prabhat Patnaik, Baldev Raj Nayar and Jayati Ghosh have also tried to examine in detail the context in which economic reforms have been introduced in our country. They have also reflected upon the support base of economic reforms and the nature and social base of our ruling elite. Thus, Prabhat Patnaik says: The reform process has also to be understood against a backdrop of the emergence of a new political class during post-Nehru era. With the assumption of economic and political power by this new grasping political class during the 1980s and 1990s, a new republic came into being – what J. It is this tiny ruling elite which became the main beneficiary and the backbone of the reform process. The various sections of our ruling elite and the upwardly mobile middle class form the support base of economic reforms. The various sections of our ruling elite, which is increasingly acquiring an international character, and the urban professional classes are the main beneficiaries of the process of liberalization and it is these people who are getting better off. It is these people, who are not equipped in terms of availability of opportunities to compete in the market with their urban counterparts on an equal footing, who are getting worse off. The unmistakable urban bias of liberalization is clearly brought out by Amit Bhaduri and Deepak Nayyar. According to Bhaduri and Nayyar, the advocates of economic liberalization are not bothered about the poverty of rural India, for their main objective is to integrate with the affluence of the outside world. They have expressed their serious apprehensions that economic reforms in our country are likely to further widen rather than narrow the rural-urban divide, which, in turn, will worsen problems in polity and society. Prabhat Patnaik has tried to bring out the support base of liberalization process. According to Patnaik, new business houses aspiring to break the existing monopoly positions in the domestic market with the help of metropolitan capital, a new upstart group of Indian capitalists, non-resident as well as resident with large assets abroad, bureaucrats and professionals with links with the World Bank and the urban middle class are the main supporters of World Bank-style liberalization. In a similar vein, Jayati Ghosh has argued that the growing globalization of Indian society has been influential in mounting pressures for a shift in macroeconomic strategy in our country. After having looked at the socio-economic context and the support base of economic reforms, it is appropriate to look at attempts to reflect upon the nature of the Indian State in the context of the emergence of transnational model of development. The nature, content and direction of economic reforms are being dictated by competing demands of dominant groups in our society. This is perceptively brought out by Baldev Raj Nayar in these words: As the process of economic reforms unfolds itself, the gap between the haves and have-nots is widening. With this, pressure for a more equitable distribution of resources is increasing upon the Indian State which, in turn, is reducing its functions in the area of public welfare and, more importantly, which has very little control over economic policy options in a globalizing India. But the Indian State needs political legitimation from the masses for its economic decisions. It is interesting to note what Sudipta Kaviraj has to say about the process of legitimation in recent times: Basu brings out his apprehensions in these words: This creates a paradox for the Indian State: Theoretically, a minimalist state is not an ineffective state – its activities will be confined to two functions, i. In other words, its repressive teeth remain intact. Noteworthy are the attempts by Prabhat Patnaik and C. Bhambhri to theorize the nature of the Indian State in the context of economic reforms. The IMF-World Bank prescriptions are being put into effect not only because of the power of the IMF and the World Bank to dictate, but also because of the emergence of an internal support base. This argument of Patnaik is taken a step ahead by C. While agreeing with Patnaik about the possibility of the Indian State resorting to authoritarian measures, Bhambhri looks into some other possibilities also. Therefore, the Indian State lacks proper instruments to implement and enforce the goals of authoritarianism. Thus, he has expressed serious apprehensions that a weak and deformed state in its inability to manage serious crisis can lead to social anarchy or even disintegration of the country.

Chapter 3 : Marx and postcolonial thinking

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He ends by pointing out that there are disagreements within the communalist groups. Historians do usually bring in a longer term perspective, but fail often to disentangle this from anachronistic and present assumptions. The most common procedure is to speak of religious communities unworriedly in a language of majorities and minorities. This is misleading because, I shall argue, before the coming of modern cognitive processes, to speak of this language is inappropriate, and it does not respect the identity of the past to be different. This logic consists of two distinct parts or processes. Modernity, as is well known, brings in a new logic of self-determination, which means in this context literally, determination of the self, choosing what one would be. But again there are two sides to this act of self-determination. First, there are wholly new types of belonging which modernity renders possible. Identities like modern national ones were not available in a world that existed before. Indian culture had traditionally been marked by great internal inequality and distance: Despite the various inflections and articulations by divergent groups, it was identifiably a single common sense, held together within the confines of a common discourse or conceptual alphabet which groups used opportunistically for their particular aims. It created two separate discourses about the social and political worlds. This was reinforced by the symbolic association of these two conceptual languages with the natural languages of English and Indian vernaculars, respectively. Bengali babus, for instance, warmly welcomed its unfamiliar principles, and imposed them on a society going through rapid and unclear transformation to disallow access to women and lower classes. This created a strange dichotomy of inside and outside, of the home and the world, of the rationalist world of politics and the sentimental one of domesticity created essentially by generalising upon the experience of the middle class. English was regarded as the language of the outside, the public space, of control, of easy and effortless domination of the upper orders against the vernacular muteness of the women and the lowly. The first Bengali babus spoke Bengali at home, increasingly apologetically. In the public contexts of their office, or in public discussions they discoursed in English, which in any case was also necessary for career advancement in the colonial bureaucracy subsequently, in Bengali and other languages of India, there were distinguished and determined attempts to break down this barrier and to make the vernacular perform those exalted functions which modernists had reserved for English. Yet in institutional terms, this fatal connection between modernity and Westernism and English language remained. I have called it one of enumeration: Thus modern communal politics in India presupposes the existence of parliamentary electoral arrangements, or at least of the numerical biases of the modern state. Indeed, the most significant feature of this transition to modernity is the relationship of the state to the other institutions of society, the struggling appearance of something resembling sovereignty through the expanding claims of the colonial state. In India, this idea of sovereignty of the state meant of course that other states could not interfere with its internal process of political decision-making. India experienced nothing comparable to that decisive historical process. The state could not, by explicit legislation, reorder the structure of castes, the arrangement simultaneously of production and ritual status; thus its authority, though despotic in one sense, was not absolute. But after initial resistance during the colonial period, society resigned itself, in large measure, to the new relationship between the state and other social organisations, to its sovereignty, its right to legislate changes in the fundamental productive and distributive order. As a consequence, all types of social exchanges which happened earlier in the non-state realms, have now to be mediated through the apparatuses of the state. The national state simply assumed that citizens would act as liberal individuals, but failed to set in motion a cultural process which could provide the great masses of people the means of acquiring such self-understanding. Since the sixties, Indian politics has seen a massive alteration in style, language, modes of

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behaviour, reflecting far more the actual cultural understandings of rural Indian society rather than the Westernist cultivation of the elite which inherited power in the Nehru yearsâ€¦[which] not merely failed to create conditions for a common sense in Indian politics,â€¦its neglect of cultural institutions like primary education contributed to a further division between a Westernist English-using social aristocracy and a disadvantaged vernacular culture condemned to backwardness and self-deprecation. First, of course, it set off a great movement of emulation, through the enormous extension of English medium schools. Since the benefits of development were so unequally and unjustly distributed, it prepared ground for two types of political discontentâ€”an economic critique of class and an indigenist critique of modernist cultural privilege. The second kind of resentment, naturally, has predominantly found cultural expression through regionalist and communal politics, through the politics of Hindi and Hinduism. Is capturing of government a means of building the Rama temple, or is the slogan of the temple the means to securing victories in elections?

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Chapter 6 : The Post-colonial State â€” Sudipta Kaviraj | Critical Encounters

Sudipta Kaviraj in "The Imaginary Institution of India" explicates the idea of territorial demarcation of boundaries of the modern- nation state, asan imperativ e condition for enumerating its subjects in the process of nation.

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Sudipta Kaviraj has long been recognized as among India s most thoughtful and wide-ranging political thinkers and analysts, one of the subtlest and most learned writers on Indian politics. Ironically, this has remained something of a state secret because Kaviraj s writings are scattered and not easy.

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