animal nature - the physical (or animal) side of a person as opposed to the spirit or intellect animality nature - the complex of emotional and intellectual attributes that determine a person's characteristic actions and reactions; "it is his nature to help others".

Digging Beneath the Rubble: What we discover is a more complex and nuanced depiction of the battle, a depiction that is neither unambiguously militaristic nor pacifist. The ideologues of this loose movement varied in their prescriptions for the future of their troubled nation, but had several important characteristics in common which defined their movement. Second, the Conservative Revolutionaries were in most cases former soldiers or military officers, who sought to model the post-war society in one way, shape, or form after the militaristic hierarchy they experienced on the front. Firstly, this is important given the nature of his intended audience. Jede Nation hat ihre spezifischen kollektiven Erinnerungen, Wertvorstellungen, Institutionen usw. A critical task faced by the German people during the time of the Weimar Republic was to come to grips with the experience of World War I. Recognizing his literary methods will broaden our understanding of his beliefs. The analysis will be broken up into three larger sections. First, Nietzsche is widely understood to be the ideological forerunner to the Conservative Revolution as a whole. This style of mythical creation, which has profoundly shaped modern civilization is a product of that kind of aesthetic imagination first embraced by Nietzsche. Indeed, he clearly should not believe this to be possible, since according to him, war, or the fight Der Kampf does not proceed entirely as an external observable phenomenon. The tension between the observable and non-observable representations of war is demonstrated through this highly conflicted protagonist. On several occasions, Sturm reveals the paradigm of modern scientific intellectualism grounding his pre-war worldview, and how this contrasts to his new way of life: War er noch derselbe wie vor ein Jahr? Er schrieb an einer Reihe von Novellen, in denen er versuchte, die letzte Form des Menschen in ihren feinsten Ausstrahlungen auf lichtempfindliches Papier zu bringen. Sturm would like to objectively record the acts of war he is observing in careful and accurate detail in feinsten Ausstrahlungen through his characters, but the experience is proving far to overwhelming, disorienting and mystifying. Watching War outlines a critical history of the observation of war, pointing out a shift that occurred during the Napoleonic era and that has survived to this day. In turn, the ideal war spectator was characterized not as an eagle-eyed firsthand witness but as an individual with unique creative faculties, such as a novelist thousands of miles away, writing about what the battle must have been like. Sturm, as In Stahlgewittern, features and ever-present comparison of the condition of battle to devastating natural disasters and dangerous encounters with nature. At the end of the novel, for example when Sturm and his comrades are under siege, he compares the experience to a ship in a dangerous ocean: Firstly, the narrator, Lieutenant Sturm expresses his frustration at the relative weakness and vulnerability of any given man in the path of a violent storm: Krieg war wie ein Sturm, Hagel und Blitz, er stampfte ins Leben, achtlos wohin. For example, the sweet and delicate orchid flowers, the tiny and light hummingbird, and the wispy butterfly are designed to represent some of the most delicate and ornate aspects of nature. Der lebte nur einmal im Licht, und wenn er verging, dann erlosch mit ihm auch das Bild seiner Welt. In seiner Seele ging eine Wandlung vor, und die Landschaft bekam ein neues Gesicht. Denn hinter allem wirkte der Mensch, nur war diese Wirkung so oft gewaltig, dass er sich selbst nicht mehr erkannte darin. Indeed, man and nature seem to be intrinsically connected, as the landscape changes as a mirror to the transformation of the soul of man in the environment of war: King claims that the significance of these metaphors lie with their relation to fluxâ€" the dynamic Sturmwelle, the constant flow of water, the ship quaking in a hurricane, and waves of sand in the desert. At several points in the novel, Sturm recognizes how his world-view has dramatically shifted, and seems to be questioning the assumptions of his pre-war way of life: Shown as being a highly cosmopolitan intellectual, Sturm explains that he did not join the war out of a sense of patriotism, however. However, In Stahlgewittern expresses subtly different ideas through this similar use of metaphor. Einsam standen sie im Gewitter der Schlacht, wenn der Tod als roter Ritter mit Flammenhufen durch wallende Nebel galoppierte. He is also using the image of the thunderstorm Gewitter

and the pre-modern galloping knight Ritter â€"two viscerally emotion-laden symbols, to aestheticize the battle experience. In that sense, he is using metaphor to illustrate the grandeur of war, and the glory of those soldiers brave enough to face it. In this case, the storm metaphor is further amplified into a roaring hurricane: This metaphor reveals two key aspects of the war experience: The most important physical aspect of a natural weather event, like a thunderstorm or a hurricane, in terms of depicting battle, is the indifference with which weather events choose their victims. The choice to continually employ this metaphor seems to suggest that this dimension of battle exists outside of the nationalistic or territorial ambitions of men and their states, and impacts both sides with equal and indifferent force. As a weather event, this spiritual dimension of war impacts both the Allied and Central Powers troops with equal arbitrariness, and does not originate from either side. Both of these characteristics will be dealt with in greater length later in this analysis. Der Kampf, the most expressionistic of the three books, also draws on the violence of nature in describing war, but does so in a way that emphasizes the drama and spectacle of the natural world. This text tends to draw more on images of fire and explosions of light on the battlefield: Jetzt saust das Wetter auch auf uns herunter. The compact collection of descriptive imageryâ€"streaks of sparks, howling, volcanic explosion of lighting clouds of smoke, dust, and gas, seething, glaring lightâ€"are intended to impress upon the reader the overwhelming intensity of the battlefield. According to King, the use of metaphor in Der Kampf als Inneres Erlebnis distinguishes itself from our other two works of study in its sheer excess: Metaphors of storm-tossed seas, frozen wastelands and deserts tend, for all their much-criticized naturalizing direction, not so much to make the War harmless, as to transpose it into a language which vividly suggests exposure and absence of meaning and life. The extremity of the metaphor in this book lends an independent and violent character to war: Der Krieg ist nicht das Ende, sondern der Auftakt der Gewalt. Er ist die Hammerschmiede, in der die Welt in neue Grenzen und neue Gemeinschaften zerschlagen wird. The image here, however, is not of a pensive and reflective sculptor, molding warriors in battle, but of a powerful hammer mill, a fist, pounding and packing the soldier into a battle-hardened warrior. Material, das ist der richtige Ausdruck. While the storm arbitrarily descends on any given landscape, the blacksmith deliberately reshapes its material into something new. In this case, their side of the conflict is assuming the role of the blacksmith, rather than being subject to this greater war-force impacting both sides. Unsere Leistung erregte berechtigtes Aufsehen und wurde im Divisionstagesbefehl lobend besprochen. Was hatte ihn zur Armee gerissen, mitten aus der Doktorarbeit heraus? Das war schon der Krieg gewesen, den er im Blute trug wie jeder ausgesprochene Sohn seiner Zeit, lange bevor er als feurige Bestie sich in die Arena der Erscheinung schnellte. The first is the inevitability of war. Since war explodes out of the animalistic, primitive nature of man, war is bound to follow any sustained period of peace. The bestial drive to fight is so deeply rooted in the nature of man, that the moment of its outbreak into physical violence is bound to repeat itself over and over for an eternity. Brachen ihre verwegenen Trupps in zerschlagene Stellungen ein, wo bleiche Gestalten mit irren Augen ihnen entgegenstarrten, so wurden ungeahnte Energien frei. We are presented with a robot that can tell the time, find the North and stand his ground over the red-hot machine gun, or cut wire without a sound. In the moment of action he is devoid of any fear as of any other emotion. His knowledge of being able to do what he does is his only consciousness of the self. This is believe, is the ideal man of the conservative utopia: Here again Theweleit unpacks this notion: Das war der deutsche Infanterist im Kriege. Nietzsche emphasizes the dynamism of men, and condemns those who see the current capabilities and values of men as static and permanent. For example, in Sturm, the protagonist is reading one of his original stories, which features the character Sergeant Kiel reflecting on a bridge: First, like Sturm earlier in the novel, Kiel is shown to be struggling, intellectually troubled by the unresolved contradictions of their time. This dirty river water can be interpreted as symbolizing the history of people, flowing up to and then beyond the moment in time where Kiel stands. This Abenteuerblut, drives him to adventure, and represents his dynamism, or becoming, towards something greater than his current state. Similarly, earlier in the novel, Sturm also experiences a meaningful moment of reflection while he stands on a bridge, observing a young boy fishing: Unter dem leichten Tuch des Anzuges schlug sein Blut warm und jung gegen die Haut. Wie wurde in solchen Stunden das Kleinste bedeutungsvoll. In the absence of a humanity-loving god, the individual represents a fleeting and insignificant

moment. In this passage, the narrator, reflecting on a bridge, represents this as the wind whips leaves into the water: Ich bin traurig geworden, alles ist einsam und unbekannt. It seems to touch on both the idea of the human as the bridge, as in a state of transition, as well as the perspective of reflection that the bridge provides humans the ability to look below on the passage of time. Mythologizing refers to the process of embodying beliefs about a phenomenon in this case war through narrative, giving the experience a legendary and possibly meaningful character. First, the idea that war is natural and inevitable. Second, that war is productive, transformative, and life-affirming. Third, that the nature of modern machine warfare has displaced the individual and rendered him obsolete. Fourth and lastly, that war is more important than culture in shaping the character of nations. Indeed, the frequent use of metaphor comparing battle to a violent storm implies the naturalness of conflict. Just as hurricane, tornado or thunderstorm strikes with the same cyclical regularity each year, so will the drive of men to war. Zuerst sind wir Menschen, und das verbindet uns. War cannot be avoided through political maneuvering or international diplomacy, because it will explode out of man in regular intervals as a natural and powerful phenomenon. From his perspective, war is an unavoidable phenomenon. Therefore, it would be impossible and useless to apply a moral framework condemning war and attempting to avoid its onset. Condemning and trying to halt war would be as successful as stopping an oncoming hurricane. Though as we shall see, he does praise these potential capabilities of battle, this is only one aspect of his war myth interpreted holistically. In Also Sprach Zarathustra, Nietzsche declares: Here we see the function of the metaphors of war as a blacksmith and the soldier as the Stahlmann. The blacksmith is a productive figure, forming useful and necessary objects out of raw material. Wir sollen erkennen, wie alles, was entsteht, zum leidvollen Untergange bereit sein muss, wir werden gezwungen in die Schrecken der Individualexistenz hineinzublicken â€" und sollen doch nicht erstarren: Wenn das rote Leben gegen die schwarzen Riffe des Todes braust, setzten sich ausgesprochene Farben zu scharfen Bildern zusammen. Furthermore, in Sturm, the narrator describes his wonder at the power of war to create new forms. Vielleicht war es auch das Klare und Bestimmte dieser Kampfbauten, was ihn so ergriff.

Chapter 2 : Martin Heidegger (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Animals and Nature. 57K likes. Animal and Nature Lovers. Jump to. Sections of this page. Accessibility Help. Press alt + / to open this menu. it 's the animals.

During the s it became the representative branch of German philosophy. It arose with, and has absorbed, Lebensphilosophie, existentialism, and phenomenology, although it is not identical with them. It has affinities with pragmatism and the sociology of knowledge. Although it is historically based on certain German traditions, it is also indebted to, and largely anticipated by, the eighteenth-century "science of human nature. But this wide conception blurs the distinctive features of philosophical anthropology. Its history is best restricted to those authors and ideas whose impact is either admitted or can be traced in the literature of modern philosophical anthropology. Hegel, and Ludwig Feuerbach. What ought I to do? What may I hope? Herder was the first German author to correlate biology and the philosophy of man. From him stems the conception of man as a deficient being who must compensate for his lack of natural tools and weapons by the creative use of weapons and technology. Feuerbach formulated the claim that man can be used as the common denominator of philosophy, the true ens realissimum, embracing reason, will, and emotion. He held that philosophical anthropology was to take the place of theology; and indeed, contemporary philosophical anthropology may be regarded as secularized theology. Feuerbach conceived of God as a projection and objectification of the human spirit, reflecting the categorial structure of the human mind and its conceptual tools. This, as well as the corresponding Hegelian view of the divine spirit as being reflected in human history, is one of the recurring themes of cultural philosophical anthropology. In a specifically German version and modified by the methodology of the practitioners of the Geisteswissenschaften, the "science of human nature," which stemmed from Thomas Hobbes , John Locke , and the Earl of Shaftesbury and reached its culmination in the eighteenth century, is the principal root of philosophical anthropology. In pretending to explain the principles of human nature we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences" Everyman ed. The more widely recognized forerunners of philosophical anthropology—Herder, Christian Garve, and Wilhelm von Humboldt—were directly influenced by the Scottish and French anthropologists and Encyclopedists, who had undermined Cartesian dualism. The Scottish and French precursors, however, had intended to develop more rigorous methods of investigation than those used by contemporary philosophical anthropologists. It uses the phenomenological methods of Verstehen and reduction. Philosophical anthropology shares with existentialism, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie a critique of society. Yet these currents are not identical; Heidegger and Karl Jaspers , for example, refuse to be identified with philosophical anthropology, despite their great impact on it. Philosophical anthropology seeks to interpret philosophically the facts that the sciences have discovered concerning the nature of man and of the human condition. It presupposes a developed body of scientific thought, and accordingly, in its program it aspires to a new, scientifically grounded metaphysics. It seeks to elucidate the basic qualities that make man what he is and distinguish him from other beings. It combines, and mediates between, what Kant designated as physiological and pragmatic anthropology. Thus, philosophical anthropology studies both man as a creature and man as the creator of cultural values—man as seen by a scientific observer and man as interpreted by himself Aussen - and Innenansicht. Accordingly, most philosophical anthropologists wish to combine scientific methods with an imaginative philosophical approach. Philosophical anthropology seeks to correlate the various anthropologies that have developed with the specialization of the sciences. Max Scheler distinguished between scientific, philosophical, and theological anthropologies, or interpretations of the fundamental structure of human activities, which know nothing of one another. In order to stem what its followers describe as anarchy of thought and the "loss of the center," philosophical anthropology offers itself as a coordinating discipline. With the dissolution of traditional beliefs in guidance by gods, by kings and feudal leaders, by God, or by nature, there is today a general lack of direction. Man is now, as he was for Protagoras, the only possible measure. It aims to accomplish this by the development of suitable methods, by a factual elucidation of the perplexities inherent in human institutions, and by borderline research coordinating different branches of the sciences used

as a basis for a new "map of knowledge. Modern French humanism, whether existentialist, religious, or Marxist, is both historically and analytically allied with philosophical anthropology. Many philosophical anthropologists stress that they are theological, historical, political, juristic, biological, phenomenological, or cultural philosophical anthropologists. Much so-called philosophical anthropology is best treated under metaphysics, ontology, theory of value, epistemology, theology, philosophy of science or of history, or under the related contemporary philosophies. This entry will discuss only the distinctive features. Philosophical anthropology embraces most of the social sciences. Some leading practitioners, such as Arnold Gehlen, emphasize the concept of action, rather than man, as the distinguishing feature of philosophical anthropology, and define it as a new empirical discipline, Handlungswissenschaft similar to "behavioral science" and the "theory of action" , as distinct from the natural sciences and the Geisteswissenschaften. At the same time, however, it is pervaded by the same antiscientific currents that mark existentialism, Lebensphilosophie, and phenomenology. But it is its dialogue with science that gives philosophical anthropology its peculiar character. The Crisis of Science Philosophical anthropologists see a "crisis of science," a crisis first brought into view by three "humiliations of man. The crisis in science has been brought to a head by modern developments in depth psychology, post-Euclidean mathematics, and the indeterminacy principle in nuclear physics. From the scientific point of view, these developments represent advances rather than a crisis. However, German philosophers since Kant have conceived of science as being fixed in a rigid mathematicomechanical determinism. According to philosophical anthropologists, this basic concept has broken down. There is a wide consensus among Continental thinkers that nineteenth-century materialism has been overcome and that the methods of the Geisteswissenschaften and phenomenology have been vindicated. These methods seek the meaning immanent in events and in the works of man rather than the causal nexus between events. They aim to interpret other minds both individual and collective , their peculiar intentions and tendencies, and the institutions through which their ideas have found expression. They investigate the conscious and unconscious actions of human beings and the structure of interpersonal social and cultural relationships. These methods are descriptive, interpretative, organic, and concrete, rather than explanatory, mechanical, and abstract, as in the natural sciences. This distinction of two methodologies€"causal explanation on the one hand and Verstehen and phenomenological reduction on the other€"takes up the emphasis of what is known in English as the Germano-Coleridgean school on, in the words of J. Mill, a philosophy of society in the form of a philosophy of history seeking a philosophy of human culture. Theory of Knowledge The crisis of science, according to philosophical anthropologists, evinces a deep crisis in the theory of knowledge€"a crisis that makes imperative the adoption of pragmatic theories of truth. Traditional epistemology, they claim, was occupied with only one of the functions of consciousness. For philosophical anthropologists, as for sociologists of knowledge, knowledge is determined by dispositions and by outside factors. Erich Rothacker claims that all knowledge is based on the particular ways of thought dogmatische Denkformen of national and sectional cultures, which determine both the questions asked and the answers given. Questions and answers have no validity apart from their appropriateness to the cultural environment Umwelt. On the other hand, Scheler sought to establish an objective scale of values that would take into account nonrational elements. He distinguished in an ascending order the strata of vitality, intellectuality, and holiness Herrschaftswissen, Leistungswissen, and Heilswissen. Despite his epistemological relativism, Rothacker has applied a similar scheme of "lower" and "higher" values in his psychological theory. Although most philosophical anthropologists profess value relativism, implicit value scales may be discerned underlying their methodological views and cultural criticism. Methodology Philosophical anthropology rejects the Cartesian dualism of body and soul: Man is not part animal and part spirit but a being sui generis, distinct from animals in physical condition and in aspirations. At the same time, many philosophical anthropologists reject modern intellectualism; their rejection of rationality, like that of many existentialists and Lebensphilosophs, has its roots in the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In its suspicion of Verwissenschaftlichung "scientism" , philosophical anthropology perpetuates the traditional German attacks on Reflexionsphilosophie, in which the nonrational aspects of reality are alleged to be ignored. It is concerned with meanings, an intuitive comprehension of directly experienced essences, and it involves a distinct method

for "analyzing" or rather, interpreting facts, qualities, relationships, and the basic categories of human nature and cultureâ€"a method of analysis different from that which results in an explanatory theory. However, such thinkers as the biologist Adolf Portmann and the psychologist Karl Jaspers attempt to combine the scientific and interpretative approaches. Ludwig Binswanger , for example, does not exclude the methods of natural science, but raises two objections to reveal their inherent limitations. One is that all abstractions are transpositions and simplifications of reality. The other is that the registration of stimuli in experimental psychology restricts the field of investigation so as to make the perception of meaningful wholes impossible; it precludes the essential selective and synthesizing activities. Helmuth Plessner sees philosophical anthropology as the paradigm of borderline research. Although there is still a methodological gap between the physical and the social sciences, there has been spectacular progress toward methodological and substantive unification of physics, chemistry, and mineralogy, and of physiology and biochemistry. This progress supplies a model for philosophical anthropology. In its physical concerns, philosophical anthropology should correlate the work of medicine, zoology, chemistry, and physics, and in its nonphysical concerns, it should correlate the work of psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and the cultural sciences. The physical and nonphysical concerns correspond to the traditional divisions of body and soul and of empiricism and subjective idealism. The division between body and soul emphasizes the ineluctable natural limitations of man and the determined aspects of his nature, and thus ignores his freedom and historicity, while the division between empiricism and subjective idealism has traditionally lost itself in metaphysical speculation. Philosophical anthropology tries to avoid both extremes; it sees man as essentially homo absconditus, inscrutable, an open question. Man must formulate his destiny so that he is not held rigidly in one role but safeguards his creative freedom. The direction in which this freedom permits man to fulfill himself is not amenable to scientific discovery, and thus science is devalued. An infinite variety of choices is open to man. The Self -Image of Man Formerly, man was threatened not primarily by man, but by nature. Man is threatened neither by nature nor by the God who made nature, but by his own use of nature. Again, even in coming to know nature, man or his scientific representatives meets himself rather than nature. Man no longer seeks nature as such, but nature as we question it for specific scientific purposes and in the specific contexts of axiomatic frameworks that we ourselves have determined. Thus, man is inescapably confronted by man. We have reason to ask, What is this man? Animals are as nature has created them, but man must complete his character; nature has supplied only the rudiments of it. Man must form his own personality, and he does so according to his image of what he can and should be. The next stage was homo sapiens , rational man in harmony with the divine plan. Since the Enlightenment, this image has been largely superseded by the naturalistic, pragmatic image of homo faber â€"man as the most highly developed animal, the maker of tools including language , who uses a particularly high proportion of his animal energy in cerebral activities. Body and soul are regarded as a functional unity. Human being and development are explained by the primary urges of animal natureâ€"the desire for progeny and the desire for food, possessions, and wealth. Machiavellianism, Marxism, racism, Darwinism, and Freudianism, it is claimed, are based on this interpretation of man. These three self-images of man have in common a belief in the unity of human history and in a meaningful evolution toward higher organization. The images of homo dionysiacus and homo creator break with this tradition and herald a new orientation of anthropological thought. In the image of man as homo dionysiacus, man sees decadence as immanent in human nature and history. Man is seen as the "deserter" or the faux pas of life; as a megalomaniac species of rapacious ape; as an infantile ape with a disorganized system of inner secretions; or as essentially deficient in vital powers and dependent for survival on technical means.

Chapter 3 : Daseinsanalysis - Wikipedia

The noun ANIMAL NATURE has 1 sense: 1. the physical (or animal) side of a person as opposed to the spirit or intellect Familiarity information: ANIMAL NATURE used as a noun is very rare.

Preface One of the most beautiful scenes in Nature is the reawakening of the mountain summits after the darksome days of a summer storm. Slowly and hesitatingly at first, great masses of clouds roll along the lower slopes and rise from the deep ravines. Then a long gleam of sunlight falls across great reaches of forest and rock in earnest of what is to follow. Here and there a snowy peak looks out, but immediately withdraws, as if in doubt as to its right to reveal its wintry purity. But, after a time, the lingering clouds disperse with surprising rapidity; and the towering heights stand out in all their glory. What words can picture the beauty of the scene now spread before the eager vision of one who has for days awaited its coming? The time is too sacred to spend in ordinary occupations. One must ascend some neighboring hill, and yield the senses to receptive enjoyment. There is an inspiration in the atmosphere which gives wings even to the feet; and one is drawn irresistibly higher and higher, until an entire horizon of ice- clad peaks is defined against the cloudless blue of heaven. No record of facts could reveal the charm of such a day. Then only can every feature of the landscape be accurately observed, and the mind delights for a time in mere contemplation of details. But, when the soft light of evening falls upon the mountain heights, and the brighter glare of day gives place in blending succession to gold and pink and the marble-like whiteness of twilight, all details are lost in the harmony of the whole,â€"the oneness of mood of Nature and the beholder. The soul has absorbed somewhat which it shall never lose. Neither prose nor poetry could tell what. It was the stern dignity of resistless law, touched by the soft beauty of the ideal whose servant it is. It was life attaining its proper level, pausing for a moment, then plunging into the uncertainties and triumphs of another day. Of such transformations all experience is compounded. The world loves mystery, if not darkness, with all that its obscurity conceals. But there is an instinct which seeks the clear visions of cloudless thought. One cannot tear the clouds away. Yet even a cloudless day will not admit us to the full perception of the meaning of life. In these days of scientific daring we have learned much about the mere configuration of existence. Life is as mathematical as the sternest could demand. Pay its price, and you shall have what you seek. For action and reaction are equal. Action emanates from within, depends on the state of development, and may be improved indefinitely by sharpening the wisdom of choice. Yet exactness is only the prose of beauty. Agnosticism has peered at the sharp summits of life, until it is blind to the transfigured light which alone reveals their true worth. Life is to be contemplated, enjoyed, as well as analyzed and rendered exact. At times it is simply to be observed appreciatively, as one gazes in rapture at the mountains. The following essays and papers, written at different times, seem to throw light upon one another, and to voice the optimistic mood. The volume contains the substance of courses of lectures delivered in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia; and some of the chapters have been in part published in the Journal of Practical Metaphysics, but the revision has been such as to make the book practically new, as well as the expression of a greater hope. The sceptic may object that the mind easily conceives false hopes, and that it were wiser to describe life at its worst. But the author sincerely believes the optimistic mood to be the only one which reveals the fulness of life. Pessimism is ignorance, cloudland, and sleep. We are awake when we are hopeful, when we stand upon the mountain top and enjoy a commanding view. Pessimism is a sign of disease: Optimism beholds all that pessimism saw in the gloomy vales, and more,â€"even the source of the dark rivulets which wear away their wooded slopes. But the author does not insist on just his optimism. Nor does he wish to preach,â€"only to return to the universe some measure of the beauty it has bestowed upon him, to express the joy of living in this well ordered world. In other volumes he has worded this faith before. It is a delight to express it again, almost a necessity to share it. It is neither incurably pessimistic nor pernicious. It still has much to learn from the enjoyment and study of nature; and these lessons shall sometime teach man how to be not only happy, but good. Persons are frequently disappointing, the mountains never. But the world is awakening to the beauties of the perfect mountain day. We can prepare ourselves for its coming by giving ourselves over to the contemplation of beauty, by making

its realization an end in life, by cultivating beautiful thoughts, and by being true to hope. The world was built in beauty. Every day, every hour, is full of revelation of truth and beauty—for him who has eyes to see it. The entire responsibility is therefore placed upon the individual. A man might stand unawed before a glacier-covered mountain, if absorbed in the pessimism of self. Pessimism is but another name for egoism: There is a way out of misery to the heights of happiness and peace. But they are the heights of virtue and the Christ. We need not complain of the universe. We need not charge evil to some god of our own creation. The trouble lies within, and every atom must be purified. There is no half-way solution. There is no easy road to the Alps of thought. But the goal is worth all efforts to attain it. Down the steep slopes, from the beautiful pasture lands, the voices of hope are carried to the toiling traveller. The joyous babbling of the brook, the gentle beauty of the flowers, and the happy jodel of the peasant, all seem to express this hope, this merry optimism of Nature, and to be in keeping with the dignity of the mountains. All the universe rejoices in glad recognition of its Maker. All the music of the spheres is attuned to the key-note of hope. Out of the heart of humanity arises the response of love. When one looks forth upon the fair world of nature, marvelously wrought and bearing numberless evidences of the wisest foresight, or considers the great realm of mind where the beauties of nature are transformed into literature, art, and science, the question inevitably suggests itself: Whence came it all? What does it all mean? Whither is the great stream of life tending? This is an old, old question,—the problem of life. Each of us has proposed it again and again. Each of us has again and again been thrown back in deepened skepticism or apparent defeat. Yet we continually look out on life in the same spirit of wonder, marveling at its strange assemblage of joys, sorrows, surprises, doubts, and victories; the coming and going of its odd specimens of humanity; its throngs of hurrying, laboring, or pleasure-loving people; and its ceaseless movement toward some far-away goal. Each time our wonderment inspires greater eagerness to master and publish its secret. Each time a fresh answer to the baffling question brings greater satisfaction than the solution of some time-honored system. Some way of meeting the problem is implied in the attitude each of us assumes in daily life. The belief haunts us that the meaning of our individual struggle may yet be known. And thus, ever relentlessly, and with unwavering hope, the human spirit sends itself forth, once more and yet again, essaying to interpret both the beauty and hardship of the universe. The great problem has been variously stated, and is probably suggested to each observer in different terms. To some the question comes forcibly, Is life worth living at all? For many the matter resolves itself into this: Must we take life as we find it, passively accepting circumstances as they come? How may we attain the greatest amount of happiness or amass the most wealth? While the philosopher asks, What is life for? The way to know if life be worth living is for each to live and understand it in its fullest sense, sound its hopes, and try its possibilities. To become happy or spiritual, one must not seek these ends alone, but round out all sides of human character. He, too, must live, must have a rich social experience. To comprehend its harmony, he must become in harmony with it, since to know means first to be, then to think. A priori reasoning is likely to lead one astray. We may think we know what life will be before we live it. We construct beautiful theories. But the test alike of faith and of theory is experience. Hence to know what beauty is, what love is, what the Christ is, man must himself become beautiful, he must love, must fashion his conduct after the Christ ideal. The richest experience shall then give birth to the truest theory, and he only shall be competent to speak whose life exemplifies the truth he utters. It is a problem which must be solved by actual life carried to its ultimate stage, where each soul has lived, suffered, overcome, thought, and been perfected, until, true to the universal will and strong on all sides of his nature, word, deed, head, hand, and heart shall tell the same beautifully consistent story. Our situation in life is somewhat like this. We awake to consciousness to find ourselves played upon by a universe of conflicting forces. Irresistibly, as the tide rolls in upon a sandy shore, the incoming stream of sensation is brought before the mind. Marvellous is this flow of the great river of consciousness, bearing into the inner world, where the soul sits in contemplation, its interplay of pains and pleasures, the frivolities and shows of the world, its joys, its strifes and crimes, its sympathies, its eccentricities, and its tales of heroism.

Chapter 4 : Dasein - Wikipedia

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Messkirch was then a quiet, conservative, religious rural town, and as such was a formative influence on Heidegger and his philosophical thought. In he spent two weeks in the Jesuit order before leaving probably on health grounds to study theology at the University of Freiburg. In he switched subjects, to philosophy. He began teaching at Freiburg in From this platform he proceeded to engage deeply with Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and, perhaps most importantly of all for his subsequent thinking in the s, two further figures: Dilthey whose stress on the role of interpretation and history in the study of human activity profoundly influenced Heidegger and Husserl whose understanding of phenomenology as a science of essences he was destined to reject. In Husserl took up a post at Freiburg and in Heidegger became his assistant. Heidegger spent a period of reputedly brilliant teaching at the University of Marburg â€" , but then returned to Freiburg to take up the chair vacated by Husserl on his retirement. Published in , Being and Time is standardly hailed as one of the most significant texts in the canon of what has come to be called contemporary European or Continental Philosophy. A cross-section of broadly analytic reactions to Heidegger positive and negative may be found alongside other responses in Murray Being and Time is discussed in section 2 of this article. During the short period of his rectorshipâ€"he resigned in â€"Heidegger gave a number of public speeches including his inaugural rectoral address; see below in which Nazi images plus occasional declarations of support for Hitler are integrated with the philosophical language of Being and Time. After Heidegger became increasingly distanced from Nazi politics. After the war, however, a university denazification committee at Freiburg investigated Heidegger and banned him from teaching, a right which he did not get back until One year later he was made professor Emeritus. Exactly when this occurs is a matter of debate, although it is probably safe to say that it is in progress by and largely established by the early s. If dating the turn has its problems, saying exactly what it involves is altogether more challenging. Indeed, Heidegger himself characterized it not as a turn in his own thinking or at least in his thinking alone but as a turn in Being. This uncompromising text was written in â€"7, but was not published in German until and not in English translation until Heidegger died in Freiburg on May 26, He was buried in Messkirch. According to this latter gloss, the linguistic constructions concernedâ€"which involve hyphenations, unusual prefixes and uncommon suffixesâ€"reveal the hidden meanings and resonances of ordinary talk. In any case, for many readers, the initially strange and difficult language of Being and Time is fully vindicated by the realization that Heidegger is struggling to say things for which our conventional terms and linguistic constructions are ultimately inadequate. It was meant to have two parts, each of which was supposed to be divided into three divisions. What we have published under the title of Being and Time are the first two divisions of the intended part one. The reasons for this incompleteness will be explored later in this article. For the young Heidegger, then, it is already the case that phenomenological analysis starts not with Husserlian intentionality the consciousness of objects , but rather with an interpretation of the pre-theoretical conditions for there to be such intentionality. Thus the unity of the different modes of Being is grounded in a capacity for taking-as making-present-to that Aristotle argues is the essence of human existence. For more on the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, see e. Consider some philosophical problems that will be familiar from introductory metaphysics classes: Does the table that I think I see before me exist? Does mind, conceived as an entity distinct from body, exist? These questions have the following form: But Heidegger does, which is why he raises the more fundamental question: This is one way of asking what Heidegger calls the question of the meaning of Being, and Being and Time is an investigation into that question. The question of the meaning of Being is concerned with what it is that makes beings intelligible as beings, and whatever that factor Being is, it is seemingly not itself simply another being among beings. But to think of Being in this way would be to commit the very mistake that the capitalization is supposed to help us avoid. For while Being is always the Being of some entity, Being is not itself some kind of higher-order being waiting to be discovered. As long as we remain alert to this worry, we can follow the

otherwise helpful path of capitalization. Heidegger means by this that the history of Western thought has failed to heed the ontological difference, and so has articulated Being precisely as a kind of ultimate being, as evidenced by a series of namings of Being, for example as idea, energeia, substance, monad or will to power. In this way Being as such has been forgotten. So Heidegger sets himself the task of recovering the question of the meaning of Being. In this context he draws two distinctions between different kinds of inquiry. The first, which is just another way of expressing the ontological difference, is between the ontical and the ontological, where the former is concerned with facts about entities and the latter is concerned with the meaning of Being, with how entities are intelligible as entities. The second distinction between different kinds of inquiry, drawn within the category of the ontological, is between regional ontology and fundamental ontology, where the former is concerned with the ontologies of particular domains, say biology or banking, and the latter is concerned with the a priori, transcendental conditions that make possible particular modes of Being i. For Heidegger, the ontical presupposes the regional-ontological, which in turn presupposes the fundamental-ontological. As he puts it: The question of Being aimsâ€¦ at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine beings as beings of such and such a type, and, in doing so, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. Being and Time 3: So how do we carry out fundamental ontology, and thus answer the question of the meaning of Being? It is here that Heidegger introduces the notion of Dasein Da-sein: That said, one needs to be careful about precisely what sort of entity we are talking about here. As Haugeland notes, there is an analogy here, one that Heidegger himself draws, with the way in which we might think of a language existing as an entity, that is, as a communally shared way of speaking. This appeal to the community will assume a distinctive philosophical shape as the argument of Being and Time progresses. The foregoing considerations bring an important question to the fore: Here there are broadly speaking two routes that one might take through the text of Being and Time. The first unfolds as follows. If we look around at beings in generalâ€”from particles to planets, ants to apesâ€”it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be e. More specifically, it is human beings alone who a operate in their everyday activities with an understanding of Being although, as we shall see, one which is pre-ontological, in that it is implicit and vague and b are able to reflect upon what it means to be. Mulhall, who tends to pursue this way of characterizing Dasein, develops the idea by explaining that while inanimate objects merely persist through time and while plants and non-human animals have their lives determined entirely by the demands of survival and reproduction, human beings lead their lives Mulhall , This gives us a sense of human freedom, one that will be unpacked more carefully below. The second route to an understanding of Dasein, and thus of what is special about human beings as such, emphasizes the link with the taking-as structure highlighted earlier. Sheehan develops just such a line of exegesis by combining two insights. These dual insights lead to a characterization of Dasein as the having-to-be-open. In other words, Dasein and so human beings as such cannot but be open: The two interpretative paths that we have just walked are not necessarily in conflict: Dasein stands out in two senses, each of which corresponds to one of the two dimensions of our proposed interpretation. Second, Dasein stands out in an openness to and an opening of Being see e. As we have seen, it is an essential characteristic of Dasein that, in its ordinary ways of engaging with other entities, it operates with a preontological understanding of Being, that is, with a distorted or buried grasp of the a priori conditions that, by underpinning the taking-as structure, make possible particular modes of Being. Heidegger puts it like this: This resistance towards any unpalatable anti-realism is an issue to which we shall return. But what sort of philosophical method is appropriate for the ensuing examination? In the Heideggerian framework, however, phenomenology is not to be understood as it sometimes is as the study of how things merely appear in experience. Presupposed by ordinary experience, these structures must in some sense be present with that experience, but they are not simply available to be read off from its surface, hence the need for disciplined and careful phenomenological analysis to reveal them as they are. So far so good. But,

in a departure from the established Husserlian position, one that demonstrates the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger claims that phenomenology is not just transcendental, it is hermeneutic for discussion, see e. For Heidegger, this hermeneutic structure is not a limitation on understanding, but a precondition of it, and philosophical understanding conceived as fundamental ontology is no exception. Thus Being and Time itself has a spiral structure in which a sequence of reinterpretations produces an ever more illuminating comprehension of Being. As Heidegger puts it later in the text: What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the right wayâ€¦ In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. Being and Time And this is a tension that, it seems fair to say, is never fully resolved within the pages of Being and Time. The best we can do is note that, by the end of the text, the transcendental has itself become historically embedded. More on that below. Heidegger argues that we ordinarily encounter entities as what he calls equipment, that is, as being for certain sorts of tasks cooking, writing, hair-care, and so on. Indeed we achieve our most primordial closest relationship with equipment not by looking at the entity in question, or by some detached intellectual or theoretical study of it, but rather by skillfully manipulating it in a hitch-free manner. Entities so encountered have their own distinctive kind of Being that Heidegger famously calls readiness-to-hand. The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it isâ€"as equipment. While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects i. Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent. The carpenter becomes absorbed in his activity in such a way that he has no awareness of himself as a subject over and against a world of objects. Phenomenologically speaking, then, there are no subjects and no objects; there is only the experience of the ongoing task e. Heidegger, then, denies that the categories of subject and object characterize our most basic way of encountering entities. He maintains, however, that they apply to a derivative kind of encounter. When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe e. With this phenomenological transformation in the mode of Being of entities comes a corresponding transformation in the mode of Being of Dasein.

brightness) if it is to deal concerrifully with what is ready-to-hand within the present-at-hand. With the factical disclosedness of Dasein's world, Nature has been uncovered for Dasein.

Included here under Fair Use Doctrine for teaching purposes. This backup copy is to be used only if the original site on the Web is not accessible. It is meant to preserve the document for teaching purposes, when sometimes the URLS are changed when sites are updated, or sites are eliminated. Please be certain to give credit if you refer to this to the original URL: For many years, psychoanalysts have been the target of contempt by the media. More recently, films such as Good Will Hunting and Analyze This have portrayed psychotherapy as a powerful vehicle for radical psychological transformation and healing. Negative portrayals of psychoanalysts in the media typically provide the image of the cliched classical psychoanalyst -- aloof, cold, and distant, silently stroking his beard, emitting a "hmmm Ironically, as Freud had intended it to be, the psychoanalyst has become the image on which to project our feelings about authority figures, only now on a cultural level. People often do not realize, however, that psychoanalysis, since Freud, is in the service of liberating us from the chains of our past authority figures rather than creating new "shoulds" with which we must feel obligated. The new media images of psychoanalysts, however, portray the psychotherapist as a healer in this more originary sense of the word. I also find it interesting that the new images of psychotherapy are no longer of the classical Freudian patient lying upon the couch, but rather portrays client and therapist as face-to-face. I feel -- and I will surely ruffle some feathers with this opinion -- that this face-to-face orientation is indebted to the humanistic orientation of psychotherapy, once the "third force" counter-movement against psychoanalysis and behaviorism, though now its influences have very much become integrated into contemporary psychoanalytic thought. I think many people have a very difficult time understanding psychoanalytic theory because it is a way of thinking which is radically different than our everyday way of talking about ourselves. Of course there is an unconscious! As we tarry about our everyday lives, there is good reason to fall into the belief that we are transparent to ourselves. For more on existential-phenomenology, you can visit my existential-phenomenology page. Let me just leave off this topic by saying that psychoanalytic theory, Freud being the pioneer, has given us a great gift by delivering to us a kind of language with which to talk about the depths of the soul. Generally, there are two extreme views of psychoanalytic theory which are equally misleading. In the first place, there exists a view, largely perpetuated by introduction to psychology courses in universities, that psychoanalysis is mostly the project of one man, Sigmund Freud. The fact is, however, that Freud, though the pioneer of psychoanalysis, is far from being the sole contributor to psychoanalytic theory and practice today. And, as I eluded to above, the new psychotherapy does not fit the old image of the endlessly free associating analysand, lying on a couch while surrendering to the authority of the analyst. The exception to this rule is Lacanian psychoanalytic analysis, which in many ways is a return to Freud from a post-structuralist position. Rather, psychotherapy as it is practiced today, while there are exceptions to the rule, is viewed more as a collaborative process between therapist and client. If one is to provide an accurate account of psychoanalytic theory, one must take account of all the developments which follow from Freud, including the work of theorist-practitioners such as Harry Stack Sullivan, Carl Jung, Erik Erikson, Melanie Klein, Margaret Mahler, Jacques Lacan, and Heinz Kohut, among many others. The second, related misconception, I feel, is the exact opposite of the above misconception. Personally, I am somewhat sick and tired of those who take pleasure in bashing Freud. Most of the people I hear criticizing Freud, if probed further, will be discovered to have never read a lick of Freud, their opinions gathered instead by close-minded, dumbed-down secondary resources. For chrissake, if you are going to criticize Freud, at least read him! If you read Freud himself, you do not simply find the Freud you heard about in your introductory psychology texts. Instead, you discover a brilliant rhetor who managed to take great pains, although often failing like the rest of us , to treat his patients with the dignity they are due, while, at the same time, persuasively legitimizing his theory amongst his neurology-trained colleagues with his meta-psychology. It is unfair to say that Freud always held rigidly to his theory since he did continually develop his theoretical

model. For the record, however, I think it is only fair to say that Freud would have never discovered what he discovered if he had not listened to his patients rather than his own presumptions. But I also realize that had Freud not embarked upon his pioneering work, there would be no place from which to make such distinctions. Lacan, in particular, has been instrumental in demonstrating the vital connection between the unconscious and language -- a move which situates psychoanalysis within the tradition of the science of linguistics as opposed to the natural sciences. Freud conceptualized the mind, metaphorically, as an ancient, buried ruin which had to been unearthed much like an archeologist would unearth the treasures of an ancient civilization. In fact, this tension between understanding and explanation can be said to be a tension which exists, whether acknowledged or not, in all of the human sciences see, for example, Dilthey. This technique involved placing the patient in a hypnotic trance and removing the symptoms through the use of posthypnotic suggestion. When the patient, through talking, followed associations in her memory, she was able to recover the forgotten event, which led to the cure. Freud eventually gave up the process of using hypnotism for the use of a technique he came to call "free association," in which the patient was encouraged to put aside all inhibitions and follow her associations, which would eventually, even without hypnosis, lead to the recovery of unconscious memory. Initially theoretical formulations led to the topographic model of the psyche, which Freud categorized into three different subsections: Freud also came to acknowledge that unconscious events are traceable in other phenomena, as well, including dreams, slips of the tongue, and in jokes. From his work with patients, Freud was eventually led to develop a more and more sophisticated theory of the human psyche which became increasingly understood according to a developmental model. Freud, by observing his patients, found that many of the memories uncovered by his patients were sexual in nature and reverted back to early childhood memories. From these observations, Freud developed his controversial theory of childhood sexuality. Freud eventually justified these observations with a generalized theory of an instinctual drive, which became the foundation for his theory. At first, Freud felt that such instincts were largely sexual in nature. Later, he conceded that instincts also involved aggressive drives, as well as sexual drives. The particular organization of these conflicts depends on how the child has negotiated the earlier psychosexual stages. Freud felt that the Oedipus complex is ultimately resolved, at least for males, by "castration anxiety. From this resolution of the conflict, the child develops an "ideal" self based on the internalization of parental values. Thus, the "ego" is governed by the "reality principle," which must use various defenses to negotiate between the unrealistic motives of the "superego" "ego ideal" and the "id," governed by the "pleasure principle. But it is a good start for the neophyte. I simply warn the reader that one must not stop here before making judgements. For further exploration, see the Freud page. As mentioned previously, Freud was very protective of his theory, and he entered into conflicts with various colleagues who offered alternative theoretical perspectives, including Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, Otto Rank, and Sandor Ferenczi. The psychoanalytic clinician, Ernst Kris , was also instrumental for this endeavor through his brilliant clinical observations, which lead to his emphasis on the clinical analysis of ego defenses at work in his patients. Influenced by Charles Darwin, as Freud himself had been, Hartmann felt that ego defenses need not always be a source of conflict, but, with psychological maturity, can and do, in fact, develop into "conflict-free ego capacities" which are well-adapted to the environment. Since ego defenses, as Hartmann asserted, could become adaptive through psychological maturation, this opened the way for a more fully elaborated developmental ego psychology. Rene Spitz pioneered the use of empirical observation of children to further develop the insights of ego psychology. She was especially innovative in her insights into the world of the psychotic child, as was Klein in Object Relations Theory, and she developed a fully elaborated model of developmental growth with her theory of "separation-individuation. This is particularly evident in the work of Edith Jacobson who developed a revised theory of instinctual drives. The clinical implications of ego psychology were far-reaching. Ego psychology also involved an increased focus on pre-Oedipal experiences which contributed to the formation of the psychic structure of the patient. Sullivan, on the contrary, felt that the symptoms of schizophrenia are meaningful, but only appear meaningless when taken out of the context of their development in the interpersonal field between self and other. Like Freud, Sullivan used the therapeutic relationship for the benefit of the client, but, while Freud did so in the service of liberating libidinal energy, Sullivan did so in the service of making the client

aware of interpersonal processes which occur between him- or herself and others. From these basic premises, Sullivan developed sophisticated theories of anxiety, motivation and the self-system which were way ahead of their time. Laing and Timothy Leary. Klein was also profoundly influenced by Sandor Ferenczi, her own psychoanalyst. Klein used play therapy and used interpretive techniques which were very similar to the techniques used with adults. The heated debates in WWII Britain -- within the British psychoanalytic society -- led to a profound schism in the psychoanalytic community which is still evident to this day. In fact, until recently, most American psychoanalysts, who were more closely aligned with Freudian ego psychology, held Klein and subsequent Object Relations Theory in contempt for this reason, and, vice versa, the Kleinian tradition generally demonized the ego psychology movement. Thankfully, today this schism is beginning to heal. Working with children, Klein felt she had observed processes in pre-Oedipal children that were very similar to Oedipal conflicts in older children. Throughout her career, she attempted to theoretically justify these observations. In turn, Klein and her followers applied her practice and theory to work with psychotic adult patients. In general, however, Klein imagined that all adults retain, at some level, such psychotic processes, involving a constant struggle to cope with paranoid anxiety and depressive anxiety. Klein was led, therefore, to apply her approach to adult neurotics, as well as psychotics and children. In the case of Bion, the mother has a significant impact on the child by the way she assists the child in coping with his or her anxiety. Drawing on this fundamental insight, Bion felt that one of the central tasks of the psychoanalyst is to contain the anxiety of the client. British object relations theory, as already mentioned, is indebted to the work of Klein. Interestingly, however, the major figures of object relations theory, including Fairbairn, Winnicott, Balint, Bowlby and Guntrip, developed their positions without taking sides in the debates at the British Psychoanalytic Society. If the libido is primarily pleasure-seeking as Freud has argued, thought Fairbairn, why do people continually involve themselves in traumatic experiences? How can one explain, for example, nightmares, sexual masochism, and traumatic neurosis involving the repetition compulsion? In other words, intimacy and a connection to others is the primary motivation in human beings and pleasure is rather a secondary motivation derived from this more primary motivation. Also, unlike Klein, internal objects are not inevitable consequences of development, but rather the result of compensations for a real connection with others and stem from disruptions in early object relations with primary caregivers. In particular, Fairbairn conceptualized a "splitting of the ego" into a libidinal and anti-libidinal ego to account for his observations. Winnicott began his career as a pediatrician and used his experience with children to develop his innovative ideas. Like Fairbairn, Winnicott conceptualized the psyche of the child as developing in relation to a real, influential parent. For a child to develop a healthy, genuine self, as opposed to a false self, Winnicott felt, the mother must be a "good-enough mother" who relates to the child with "primary maternal preoccupation. This concept of the "holding environment" led Winnicott to develop his famous theory of the "transitional object. Other important figures in the Object Relations tradition include Michael Balint, John Bowlby, and Harry Guntrip, as well as the following contributors: Scharff, and Elliott Jaques. The humanistic psychologists of the day, including pioneers such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, drafted a manifesto which characterized the humanistic "third force" as having four essential principles: The experiencing person is of primary interest. This principle was largely established in relation to the behaviorist movement in psychology. Radical behaviorists, such as B. Skinner, went so far as to argue that consciousness does not even exist. These kinds of absurdities in the name of logical positivist psychology led the "third force" humanists to develop this principle. The principle is particularly influenced by existential-phenomenological criticisms of logical positivist approaches to understanding the human being.

Chapter 6 : Journal archive. Articles: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY Modern philosophical anthropology originated in the s. During the s it became the representative branch of German philosophy. It arose with, and has absorbed, Lebensphilosophie, existentialism, and phenomenology, although it is not identical with them.

During the s it became the representative branch of German philosophy. It arose with, and has absorbed, Lebensphilosophie, existentialism, and phenomenology, although it is not identical with them. It has affinities with pragmatism and the sociology of knowledge. But this wide conception blurs the distinctive features of philosophical anthropology. Its history is best restricted to those authors and ideas whose impact is either admitted or can be traced in the literature of modern philosophical anthropology. Hegel, and Ludwig Feuerbach. What ought I to do? What may I hope? Herder was the first German author to correlate biology and the philosophy of man. From him stems the conception of man as a deficient being who must compensate for his lack of natural tools and weapons by the creative use of weapons and technology. Feuerbach formulated the claim that man can be used as the common denominator of philosophy, the true ens realissimum, embracing reason, will, and emotion. He held that philosophical anthropology was to take the place of theology; and indeed, contemporary philosophical anthropology may be regarded as secularized theology. Feuerbach conceived of God as a projection and objectification of the human spirit, reflecting the categorial structure of the human mind and its conceptual tools. This, as well as the corresponding Hegelian view of the divine spirit as being reflected in human history, is one of the recurring themes of cultural philosophical anthropology. The more widely recognized forerunners of philosophical anthropologyâ€"Herder, Christian Garve, and Wilhelm von Humboldtâ€"were directly influenced by the Scottish and French anthropologists and Encyclopedists, who had undermined Cartesian dualism. The Scottish and French precursors, however, had intended to develop more rigorous methods of investigation than those used by contemporary philosophical anthropologists. It uses the phenomenological methods of Verstehen and reduction. Philosophical anthropology shares with existentialism, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie a critique of society. Yet these currents are not identical; Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, for example, refuse to be identified with philosophical anthropology, despite their great impact on it. Philosophical anthropology seeks to interpret philosophically the facts that the sciences have discovered concerning the nature of man and of the human condition. It presupposes a developed body of scientific thought, and accordingly, in its program it aspires to a new, scientifically grounded metaphysics. It seeks to elucidate the basic qualities that make man what he is and distinguish him from other beings. It combines, and mediates between, what Kant designated as physiological and pragmatic anthropology. Thus, philosophical anthropology studies both man as a creature and man as the creator of cultural valuesâ€"man as seen by a scientific observer and man as interpreted by himself Aussen- and Innenansicht. Accordingly, most philosophical anthropologists wish to combine scientific methods with an imaginative philosophical approach. Philosophical anthropology seeks to correlate the various anthropologies that have developed with the specialization of the sciences. Max Scheler distinguished between scientific, philosophical, and theological anthropologies, or interpretations of the fundamental structure of human activities, which know nothing of one another. With the dissolution of traditional beliefs in guidance by gods, by kings and feudal leaders, by God, or by nature, there is today a general lack of direction. Man is now, as he was for Protagoras, the only possible measure. Modern French humanism, whether existentialist, religious, or Marxist, is both historically and analytically allied with philosophical anthropology. Many philosophical anthropologists stress that they are theological, historical, political, juristic, biological, phenomenological, or cultural philosophical anthropologists. Much so-called philosophical anthropology is best treated under metaphysics, ontology, theory of value, epistemology, theology, philosophy of science or of history, or under the related contemporary philosophies. This article will discuss only the distinctive features. Philosophical anthropology embraces most of the social sciences. At the same time, however, it is pervaded by the same antiscientific currents that mark existentialism, Lebensphilosophie, and phenomenology. But it is its dialogue with science that gives philosophical anthropology its peculiar character. The crisis in science has

been brought to a head by modern developments in depth psychology, post-Euclidean mathematics, and the indeterminacy principle in nuclear physics. From the scientific point of view, these developments represent advances rather than a crisis. However, German philosophers since Kant have conceived of science as being fixed in a rigid mathematicomechanical determinism. According to philosophical anthropologists, this basic concept has broken down. There is a wide consensus among Continental thinkers that nineteenth-century materialism has been overcome and that the methods of the Geisteswissenschaften and phenomenology have been vindicated. These methods seek the meaning immanent in events and in the works of man rather than the causal nexus between events. They aim to interpret other minds both individual and collective , their peculiar intentions and tendencies, and the institutions through which their ideas have found expression. They investigate the conscious and unconscious actions of human beings and the structure of interpersonal social and cultural relationships. These methods are descriptive, interpretative, organic, and concrete, rather than explanatory, mechanical, and abstract, as in the natural sciences. This distinction of two methodologiesâ€"causal explanation on the one hand and Verstehen and phenomenological reduction on the otherâ€"takes up the emphasis of what is known in English as the Germano-Coleridgean school on, in the words of J. Mill, a philosophy of society in the form of a philosophy of history seeking a philosophy of human culture. Theory of Knowledge The crisis of science, according to philosophical anthropologists, evinces a deep crisis in the theory of knowledgeâ€" a crisis that makes imperative the adoption of pragmatic theories of truth. Traditional epistemology, they claim, was occupied with only one of the functions of consciousness. For philosophical anthropologists, as for sociologists of knowledge, knowledge is determined by dispositions and by outside factors. Erich Rothacker claims that all knowledge is based on the particular ways of thought dogmatische Denkformen of national and sectional cultures, which determine both the questions asked and the answers given. Questions and answers have no validity apart from their appropriateness to the cultural environment Umwelt. On the other hand, Scheler sought to establish an objective scale of values that would take into account nonrational elements. He distinguished in an ascending order the strata of vitality, intellectuality, and holiness Herrschaftswissen, Leistungswissen, and Heilswissen. Although most philosophical anthropologists profess value relativism, implicit value scales may be discerned underlying their methodological views and cultural criticism. Methodology Philosophical anthropology rejects the Cartesian dualism of body and soul: Man is not part animal and part spirit but a being sui generis, distinct from animals in physical condition and in aspirations. At the same time, many philosophical anthropologists reject modern intellectualism; their rejection of rationality, like that of many existentialists and Lebensphilosophs, has its roots in the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. However, such thinkers as the biologist Adolf Portmann and the psychologist Karl Jaspers attempt to combine the scientific and interpretative approaches. Ludwig Binswanger, for example, does not exclude the methods of natural science, but raises two objections to reveal their inherent limitations. One is that all abstractions are transpositions and simplifications of reality. The other is that the registration of stimuli in experimental psychology restricts the field of investigation so as to make the perception of meaningful wholes impossible; it precludes the essential selective and synthesizing activities. Helmuth Plessner sees philosophical anthropology as the paradigm of borderline research. Although there is still a methodological gap between the physical and the social sciences, there has been spectacular progress toward methodological and substantive unification of physics, chemistry, and mineralogy, and of physiology and biochemistry. This progress supplies a model for philosophical anthropology. In its physical concerns, philosophical anthropology should correlate the work of medicine, zoology, chemistry, and physics, and in its nonphysical concerns, it should correlate the work of psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and the cultural sciences. The physical and nonphysical concerns correspond to the traditional divisions of body and soul and of empiricism and subjective idealism. The division between body and soul emphasizes the ineluctable natural limitations of man and the determined aspects of his nature, and thus ignores his freedom and historicity, while the division between empiricism and subjective idealism has traditionally lost itself in metaphysical speculation. Philosophical anthropology tries to avoid both extremes; it sees man as essentially homo absconditus, inscrutable, an open question. Man must formulate his destiny so that he is not held rigidly in one role but safeguards his creative freedom. The direction in which

this freedom permits man to fulfill himself is not amenable to scientific discovery, and thus science is devalued. An infinite variety of choices is open to man. The Self-Image of Man Formerly, man was threatened not primarily by man, but by nature. Man is threatened neither by nature nor by the God who made nature, but by his own use of nature. Again, even in coming to know nature, man or his scientific representatives meets himself rather than nature. Man no longer seeks nature as such, but nature as we question it for specific scientific purposes and in the specific contexts of axiomatic frameworks that we ourselves have determined. Thus, man is inescapably confronted by man. We have reason to ask, What is this man? Animals are as nature has created them, but man must complete his character; nature has supplied only the rudiments of it. Man must form his own personality, and he does so according to his image of what he can and should be. The next stage was homo sapiens, rational man in harmony with the divine plan. Since the Enlightenment, this image has been largely superseded by the naturalistic, pragmatic image of homo faberâ€"man as the most highly developed animal, the maker of tools including language ,who uses a particularly high proportion of his animal energy in cerebral activities. Body and soul are regarded as a functional unity. Human being and development are explained by the primary urges of animal natureâ€"the desire for progeny and the desire for food, possessions, and wealth. Machiavellianism, Marxism, racism, Darwinism, and Freudianism, it is claimed, are based on this interpretation of man. These three self-images of man have in common a belief in the unity of human history and in a meaningful evolution toward higher organization. The images of homo dionysiacus and homo creator break with this tradition and herald a new orientation of anthropological thought. In the image of man as homo dionysiacus, man sees decadence as immanent in human nature and history. Human social institutions are pitiful crutches for assuring the survival of a biologically doomed race. Reason is regarded as separate from the soul, which belongs to the vital sphere of the body. The image of man as homo creator is likewise derived from Nietzsche, and also from Feuerbach. But the Nietzschean superman has been transformed into a stricter philosophical conception by Nicolai Hartmann, Max Scheler, and the Sartrean existentialists. Only in a mechanical, nonteleological world is there the possibility of a free moral being. Where there is a planning, all-powerful God, there is no freedom for man responsibly to work out his destiny. The Major Branches of Philosophical Anthropology Philosophical anthropology shares with French humanism a particular critical analysis of society, but before this analysis can be presented, it is necessary to make a survey of the important branches of philosophical anthropology and of their results. Biological Philosophical Anthropology The reaction to determinism in the physical sciences has given rise to biological philosophical anthropology, or bioanthropology. Among many important practitioners of bioanthropology are the biologists F. Buytendijk and Adolf Portmann and the philosopher Arnold Gehlen. Devoid of instincts and of natural weapons and tools, man has been compelled to compensate for his shortcomings by active responses to the challenges of his environment and of his physiological urges.

Chapter 7 : Philosophical Anthropology: Definition, History, Methods - iResearchNet

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Deleuze, Seminar of the 4th April 1 Kant appeals several times to metaphors related with animal instinct and animal life in order to highlight the goals that the human being has to per- form to develop completely its rationality. Animal metaphors thus uncover certain political and anthropological hazards of which the human species must be conscious to be able to prevent them. The general goal of this paper is to address the ambiguous relation that human reason establishes with the animal nature, so that the last one could be portrayed as the verso of the idea of human being, namely the final end of Creation. Finally, I shall try to draw some conclusions about the Kantian appraisal of the animal being, as it fulfills an essential hermeneutical function for understanding the final destination of human being and for showing the steps that will definitively set it apart from the animal life. All in all, the human being has to use his faculties and powers in a substantially different way from animal behavior, deciding his purposes through his autonomy. He cannot 1 This seminar, delivered at the University of Vincennes, is available at www. As a preliminary remark, I would like to highlight the following passage from Conjectural Beginning of Human History , where Kant, moving from a biblical text, sketches a speculative dialogue between the human being and the animal, The first time [the human being] said to the sheep: Nature gave the skin you wear not for you but for me, and then took it off the sheep and put it on himself Genesis 3: This claim thus puts up a rift between the two species and disjoins forever the destiny that both of them have to perform. In other words, every attempt that human being makes to come back to the past animal fellowship will be judged as a kind of betrayal regarding his own essence. The animal shall be continuously guided by that voice of God that is the instinct, whilst the human being ought to become good of bad through his own free choice, as the Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone states: The human being must make or have made himself into whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil. These two characters must be an effect of his free power of choice, for otherwise they could not be imputed to him [â€¦]. He has been created for the good and the original predisposition in him is good; the human being is not thereby good as such, but he brings it about that he becomes either good or evil, according as he either incorporates or does not incorporate into his maxims the incentives contained in that predisposition and this must be left entirely to his free choice. As a matter of fact, sometimes the human being is caught doing or saying something inap- propriate for such a specimen, what makes of right and pedagogy two tasks so difficult to accomplish. Particularly, education has to instruct the way to Instinct and Reason keep under control some habits and tendencies akin to animal drives. The reason why the habits of another stimulate the arousal of disgust in us is that here the animal in the human being jumps out far too much, and that here one is led instinctively by the rule of habituation, exactly like another non-human nature, and so runs the risk of falling into one and the same class with the beast. Yet, Kant declares that it is possible to perceive an analogy between animal behavior and human con- duct, insofar as the activity of both follows goals, even if the ground of animal technical or artistic action â€" instinct â€", at first glance an obscure prin- ciple, cannot be reduced to the faculty of reason and remains an unknown force for us, as a kind of consciousness that does not match with the one we have. Vis repraesentativa and animal mind The observation of phenomena yields no evidence of any identity between animal and human actions, which seem to stem from very different gears and grounds. Nevertheless, it does not preclude that an external observer could suggest that both actions hold the same cause-effect relation. An analogy in a qualitative sense is the identity of the relation between grounds and consequences causes and effects , insofar as that identity obtains in spite of the specific difference between the things or those of their properties that contain in themselves the ground for similar con- sequences i. Thus, in comparing the artistic actions of animals with those of human beings, we conceive of the ground of the former, which we do not know, through the ground of similar effects in human reason , which we do know, and thus as an analogue of reason, and by that we also mean to indicate that the ground of the artistic

capacity in animals, designated as instinct, is in fact specifically different from reason, but yet has a similar relation to the effect comparing, say, construction by beavers with that by humans. Nonetheless, an observer could consider the animal worker as the author of the products crafted through its instinct as the human being brings about its own works. Due to the fact that the relation that instinct maintains with its effects is similar to the relation between the human technique and its handwork, any observer will be authorized to claim that the unknown ground of the animal actions maintains an analogical relation with human technical skill, whose ground is well known for everybody. Therefore, the use of the metaphor requires not to incur into an unacceptable argument about the similarities between the human and the animal realm, but to be conscious of the limits of the analogy, which does compare different causal processes without identifying them. Yet from the fact that the human being uses reason in order to build, I cannot infer that the beaver must have the same sort of thing and call this an inference by means of the analogy. Yet from the comparison of the similar mode of operation in the animals the ground for which we cannot immediately perceive to that of humans of which we are immediately aware we can quite properly infer in accordance with the analogy that the animals also act in accordance with representations and are not, as Descartes would have it, machines , and that in spite of their specific difference, they are still of the same genus as human beings as living beings. The principle that authorizes such an inference lies in the fact that we have the same ground for counting animals, with respect to the determination in question, as members of the same genus with human beings, as humans, insofar as we compare them with one another externally, on the basis of their actions. There is par ratio. Consequently, the ability to act in accordance with the own representations will prevent from the disproportion of equating animals to machines that would be moved by general laws of matter, Instinct and Reason something that thinkers such as Descartes claimed without any reluctance. Indeed, to be fitted with a vis repraesentativa hints clearly to the fact that the subject provided with such a force or faculty could not be reduced to the simple matter. Put differently, the faculty of thought â€" animal or human â€" could never be depicted as a thing occupying a place in the space. Moreover, it could never be an object of outer sense that could be explained according to the performance of the pieces that constitute a machine, since its function seems not to occupy any place in the space. But to think of animals as machines is not possible, for one would then deviate from all analogies of experience, and the proposition that man himself is a machine is utter lunacy, for we are even conscious of our own representations, and all of natural science rests on the proposition that matter cannot have representations. Everything machine-like is external and consists in relations in space: That thought is a mechanism is therefore absurd, which would be to make thought an object of outer sense for its own consciousness. Matter might be a necessary requirement for the support of our thoughts, but thought itself is not mechanical. Hence, most phil- osophers failed claiming that animals should be analyzed as machines are, since the lack of consciousness does not entail a completely lack of re- presentation. Therefor, representation belongs to a wider field than the human mind, so that to perform actions guided by representations does not require being conscious of its efficiency. It will be enough to accomplish the logical instructions contained in them. More precisely, nature â€" that is, instinct â€" would have placed certain laws of imagination into the an- imal mind, what should be regarded as a certain surrogate of consciousness N. Thus, the animal does not need to realize which actions it carries out, despite acting according to its own representations, which have to be referred as a whole to the unconscious force of instinct. The point here is whether the vis repraesentativa is able to insert a living being into the realm of consciousness, something that the commented texts decidedly urge to refuse. The animal is not world-forming, but that does not imply that it has to be described as a being poor of world, according to the heideggerian jargon. So it is worth assessing the complexity of the entangled anthropocentric approach that Kant endorses as he enquires the animal position into the world. Despite animals lack synthetic unity of apperception, they orientate themselves in the environment, where they survive fulfilling their natural goals. All of this is performed without the support of consciousness, but causal efficiency does not require this faculty, the emergency of which brings about the experience of knowledge and the event of intelligence. The Metaphysics of Morals enforces this statement, insofar as this work dis- claims that a human being could hold a feeling of respect or could have duties regarding animals. In fact, it will never arise any reciprocity between these two living species. As human beings do not recognize animals as their

fellows, it remains no alternative but that they could be constrained only by their equals: But from all our experience we know [kennen] of no being other than Instinct and Reason a human being that would be capable of obligation active or passive. A human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than human beings. Although animals are not persons, the observer who assigns moral attributes to different animals seems to suffer what Kant calls in the Anthropology bewitchment [fascinatio], which is a contradiction of the senses. Although the human observer shows to be aware of the ontological gap existing between animal and human beings, he cannot help to harbor this kind of metaphors regarding the alleged intelligence or morality of some animal species. This association does not involve that animals could dispose of a reflective cognition of objects and of its own desire, since they lack inner sense and self-consciousness. Therefore, animals have no sensibility or reception to the moral law as an unconditional principle. Kant supports in some Lectures on Morals that animals like the beaver, the monkey, the dog and the elephant could be called an analogon respectively of human reason and of human morality. Thus, the skillful monkey seems to be an animal quite similar to human being, but its tendency to steal and to dupe other animals does not allow considering it an example of development of the forces and faculties: Although the monkeys have an analogon rationis, no analogon moralitatis will be found in them, as they are always wicked, spiteful and obstinate, and everywhere they go, they wreak havoc. It is an example of a living being which knows how to adapt itself to different social needs and situations: In fact, Kant gets admired that this animal endures that someone breaks coconuts on its head, without bringing for taking revenge with its trunk, a tool lauded as the most noble in the animal realm. This dovelike character makes it special fit for performing the tasks that normally human beings let in the hands of a servant. Therefore, the elephant is a gentle animal, and seems to be an Analogon of Morality. It understands jokes, but cannot be duped. Kain Thus, the elephant seems to be the unique animal able to be disciplined and to learn a conduct that interacts with the human prudence. It is, indeed, of the greatest importance, when considering the nature of animals, to take account of this. In observing them, we only notice external actions; the differences between those actions are indicative of the differing determinations of their appetites. Instinct and Reason It is clear that animals have a capacity to act according to representations, but they do not become aware of the relation or connection that those representations hold, according to what Kant calls the concepts of reflection. Moreover, animals have not a born predisposition to discover freedom, what abridges considerably the scope of their conduct. All in all, the attribution of moral attributes to animals should be understood only in a metaphorical sense and should not lead to forget that they are not rational souls, namely, that they could never be considered or treated as persons. They have sen- sations and execute choices, but neither of these operations are rational, so that it would be absurd to suggest that human beings could have duties to animals. As we already saw earlier, Kant often points out the absurdness of such a conclusion: The dogs moves itself, seizes things, cries â€" thus are animals thinking beings that have desire, grounds for acting. Just as Descartes has the paradoxical opinion of animal-machines, so must I likewise say of humans and of myself as well, only to a greater degree: In fact, every violent and cruel treatment of animals ought to be refrained at any case, as Kant asserts in Metaphysics of Morals, in an epi- sodic section between the perfect duties to oneself and the imperfect duties to oneself and to others. In fact, only within certain special conditions human beings will be considered authorized to quickly kill animals, but always sparing them all pain. The limitation he mentions sounds vaguely as if it were drawn from the golden rule: Thus, indirect duties seem to be viewed by Kant not only as a useful tool, but also as a manifestation of human development of morality. On the contrary, to take care of animal well-being belongs to the task of improving on human practical conduct, which forces the human being to get acquainted also with non-rational animals. As far as reason alone can judge [â€¦] a human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than human beings; and if he thinks he has such duties, it is because of an amphiboly in his concepts of reflection, and his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this misunderstanding by mistaking his duty with regard to other beings for a duty to those beings. In fact, those feelings are related with a rational moral conduct, but could never substitute it. Christine Korsgaard has pointed out that the duty that enjoins us to treat animals humanely contains actually a duty to ourselves, which does not aim at any other being in the world. Yet, although animals are not able to obligate us through their wills, their nature and

capacity to experience something as good or bad could result in that their nature obligates us. Instinct and Reason establish an enlarged reciprocity that would tie up the human and the animal being into a natural continuity. It may be enough to remember the following classical Kantian distinction between things and persons: Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is, something that may not be used merely as a means. Kant and the animal that therefore I am Kant accepts that representations could follow a certain order in animal mind without being drawn to the awareness of the own existence. So animals could maintain a phenomenal consciousness, since this would not necessary- ly entail the reference of every representation to a unified subject, an operation that only human apperception would be able to perform: This might be so without my cognizing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition [Zustand] is. Moreover, the lack of this capacity entails the fact that animal behavior is not preceded by an act of knowledge of what is being produced or made: All living beings are either substantia bruta repraesentativa or intelligentia. The main, and nearly the only, difference between animals and humans is consciousness, but that is also so great that it can never be replaced with something else. Many animals behave and build so craftly that they come quite close to humans, but all are without consciousness. McLear regarding the set of texts that I have also commented McLear, , p. What lacks in animal mind is â€" as Kant sometimes states, especially in his pre-critical writings â€" the inner sense, but animal would be perfectly able to identify phenomena. Yet, this faculty to draw the own representations to consciousness does not deny that animals can experience some temporal, although fragmented, order. Animals are accordingly different from human souls not in degree but rather in species; for however much animal souls increase in their sensible faculties, consciousness of their self, inner sense, still cannot be attained thereby. Even though they have better phenomena in sensibility than we do, they still lack inner sense [â€¦].

Chapter 8 : Animals and Nature | DK Find Out!

Fun Facts about the name Dasein. How unique is the name Dasein? Out of 5,, records in the U.S. Social Security Administration public data, the first name Dasein was not present.

History[edit] s and Ludwig Binswanger[edit] Ludwig Binswanger was a Swiss Psychiatrist and one of the leading minds in the field of existential psychology. In the s, Binswanger worked as the medical director of the sanatorium in Kreuzlingen , Switzerland. Here, Biswanger worked with patients suffering from Schizophrenia , melancholy and mania. For Binswanger, mental illness involved the remaking of the world in the patients mind, including alterations in the lived experience of time, space, body sense, and social relationships. While also influenced by Sigmund Freud, Binswanger disagreed with Freud and psychoanalysis that mental illness was caused by a strong attachment to the mother, but rather, that attachment can only exist due to an alteration in the patients life experience that differs from others. To do this, he had to take the ontologically determined existentials of Heidegger and bring them into the frame of concrete human existence that is, applying the ontological a prioris to the concrete individual ". Binswanger discussed all of his ideas and concepts in his book, Basic Forms and Perception of Human Dasein German: Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins. However, Medard Boss , a friend and colleague of both Ludwig Binswanger and Martin Heidegger wanted to take Daseinsanalysis beyond research and turn it into a practical therapy. Initially, Boss was a strong believer in Freudian psychoanalysis , but after World War II , Boss felt that the meta-psychology of psychoanalysis was fundamentally flawed and that Daseinsanalysis was correct. However, in , Boss published a paper that directly criticized not only Freud and his student Jung , but Binswanger as well. This critique lead to a break in the friendship between Boss and Binswanger. Boss felt that psychology had moved away from religion and God. If a patient were to understand and accept religion and God as the answer to their conflict, they would resolve the conflict and the illness would vanish. Daseinsanalytical therapy[edit] Theory and division from psychoanalysis[edit] One of the pivotal claim that daseinsanalytical therapy holds to be true is that there is no objective way to explain the openness of the human dasein. This is one of the first divergences with psychoanalysis because psychoanalysis attempts to define the human condition with constructs like instincts and libido. This avoidance of constructs to define patients is what sets daseinsanalysis apart from psychoanalysis. This theory allows a daseinanalysist to be an objective therapist; therapeutically avoiding bringing previous prejudice into sessions and allowing the analysis to be individualized and not generalized. The human dasein cannot see these limitations from within itself and needs to be exposed to the freedoms beyond the limitations. A therapist should never contradict the phenomenon that their patient is experiencing. Boss explains that this puts unnecessary stress and anxiety onto the patient and covers the true limitations that the patient is feeling within themselves. This construct is then used to be the foundation to analyze the phenomenological world and fix the problems around the already existing existence. Boss warns against forcing clients to be explanatory before they can properly illustrate why they do or say what they do. This rejects that causal relationship by proposing to the client the thought that they can change. A premature explanation of an event or behavior will remove all significance and place an identity-splice onto the client. The example Boss uses is a story of a woman compelled to kneel during a psychoanalytic session. The therapist stopped her and asked why she was doing that when in fact the therapist should have tried to understand the cause of that behavior. This mode of existence in daseinanalytical thinking is primarily guilty. The human Dasein is open to all experience, where the body can only experience one thing at a time. This guilt can only be handled acknowledging and accepting this debt as the fact that not all experiences may be had. This accepting is also the point where a person reaches their full potential of truly living in the world. They become unbound in the sense that they do not have to serve their own egos and consciences. Dream analysis[edit] Daseinsanalytical analysis of dreams is focused solely on the phenomenological content of the dream being analyzed. This means that experiences in a dreaming state do not signify things beyond their face value, using the phenomenological content to interpret the meaning of that dream. The reason that meaning is not imposed on the manifest experienced content is because it is yet another construct that limits the patient in

their understanding of themselves. This means that the therapist tries to challenge the self-imposed limitations and barriers that the dreamer is putting upon themselves in order to allow a free relationship with their own dream world, which is the overall goal of Daseinsanalysis. In this way, dreams can be thought to be of great value into understanding a patient beyond the waking state experiences of that patient.

Chapter 9 : A Brief History of Psychoanalytic Thought -- and Related Theories of Human Existence

Human being and development are explained by the primary urges of animal natureâ€"the desire for progeny and the desire for food, possessions, and wealth. Machiavellianism, Marxism, racism, Darwinism, and Freudianism, it is claimed, are based on this interpretation of man.