

Chapter 1 : Israel Peace Process

Some countries have signed peace treaties, such as the Egypt-Israel () and Jordan-Israel () treaties, whereas some have not yet found a mutual basis to do so. William B. Quandt, in the introduction of his book Peace Process, says.

Especially gratifying is that each has challenged, extended, or put into historical and political perspective the main arguments I made about Palestinian public opinion and its impact on the prospects for reaching a durable two-state solution. I should begin by noting that none of the three, nor any critic I am aware of writing elsewhere, has contested the factual claims I advanced. To recapitulate, these are: Indeed, I explicitly invited such challenges. Their absence in the month since my essay was published and widely circulated strengthens my sense that these claims are correct. Ghaith al-Omari, a thoughtful scholar-practitioner, a man of integrity and courage, and a long-time advocate of a two-state solution, challenges not my factual claims but one of my underlying premises—namely, that Palestinian public opinion must necessarily have a substantial impact on Palestinian political behavior. He argues, first, that public opinion need not constrain bold political decisions, and in fact can be made more moderate in the aftermath of such decisions. On the basis of subsequent polling, al-Omari is definitely correct that there was widespread support, after the fact, for the agreement reached by PLO and Israeli negotiators and signed on the White House lawn in September . Hence, the case of Oslo demonstrates that in some circumstances, a widely respected Palestinian leader willing to reach a compromise with Israel has the chance to bring the public behind him. As shown in my essay, nearly half of Palestinians surveyed by JMCC in the three years beginning in June averred that the goal of their struggle with Israel should be to liberate all of historical Palestine from the Jordan to the Mediterranean. In December , Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared that in the absence of progress in negotiations, Israel would act unilaterally to dismantle settlements that were not expected to be included in the state of Israel in the event of a final-status agreement with the Palestinians. It was widely understood that he was speaking principally about the Gaza Strip. As al-Omari suggests, Palestinians embraced the prospect of Israeli disengagement—at least initially. In a PSR poll that month, disengagement was described as follows: Israel will evacuate unilaterally, and in stages, all settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank. In addition, Israel will remain in control of a border strip on the Rafah-Egypt border and on the border crossing, and will continue to block sea and air access to the Gaza Strip. Once these limitations were noted, the pendulum swung the other way. Sixty-five percent of all Palestinians were opposed. A poll by the Bir Zeit Center for Development Studies that month found an even larger majority of Palestinians, 61 percent, favoring the use of Gaza as a launching point for armed attacks. Belief that the Israeli pullout was a victory for the Palestinian resistance actually became stronger over time. Three-quarters of respondents expressed that view in PSR polls in and , and this figure reached a peak of 84 percent immediately after the disengagement was completed. Yet perhaps the major takeaway for most Palestinians was that the use of violence had brought about Israeli withdrawal when negotiations had proven ineffective. Not surprisingly, a majority of Palestinians expressed their willingness to use Gaza as a base for attacking Israel, presumably with the aim of securing further concessions. Hence, it is hard to use this case to demonstrate Palestinian willingness, after the fact, to accept a compromise that goes against what the majority of Palestinians had been seeking. Al-Omari makes a second, thought-provoking point to show that political behavior need not be based on public opinion. Decades after the conclusion of these two peace treaties, despite turbulent times and episodes of sometimes severe testing, diplomatic relations have survived. Meanwhile, even today one would still be hard-pressed to find more than a handful of individuals in either of the two Arab nations who view Israel favorably. Rather, anti-Israel sentiment and even, in some cases, outright anti-Semitism remain widespread among both the public and the elites. There is no doubt al-Omari is accurate as to how Israel is viewed by rank-and-file Jordanians and Egyptians. This came across starkly when, in , the Pew Research Center carried out surveys in these two countries and among the Palestinian public. Respondents were asked their view of various groups along a spectrum from very favorable to very unfavorable. In the same survey, a majority in all three of these publics agreed that certain religions are more prone to violence than others; when asked which religion is the most violent, 88 percent of Palestinians

pointed to Judaism, a figure surpassed only by Egyptians at 93 percent and Jordanians at an astounding 96 percent. Egypt and Jordan also share with the Palestinians a deep unwillingness to accept Israel as a Jewish state. Tellingly, though, when asked whether their country should maintain its peace agreement with Israel, 67 percent of Egyptians said yes. In Jordan, by contrast, 54 percent wanted to annul their treaty with Israel. Al-Omari is right, then. The cases of Egypt and Jordan demonstrate that it is possible to bring about and, no less important, to maintain a peace agreement with Israel even if an overwhelming majority of the rank-and-file are hostile to Jews, Judaism, and Israel. Specifically, the Egyptian example shows that a leader can reach an unpopular peace agreement with Israel and that ultimately the citizens will come to favor its maintenance, while Jordan demonstrates that an agreement can be maintained even if a clear majority of citizens are explicitly opposed to doing so. Thus, while public opinion can be a factor in constraining leaders seeking to reach or preserve a peace agreement, it by no means has a veto. Nonetheless, there are many differences between the circumstances, political institutions, and culture of Egyptians and Jordanians and those of the Palestinians. It would therefore be quite difficult for a Palestinian leader to emulate Anwar Sadat and his successors, or King Hussein and his son and successor Abdallah. On this point, I am inclined to concur with Elliott Abrams, who devotes his response to the importance of political culture and suggests that: It is not crazy to say that a peace deal should come first, and that this in turn would lead to a change in political culture. Conceivably it might even be true “if there were a strong Palestinian leadership of the sort provided by great leaders like Mandela in South Africa and Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa in Eastern Europe, and if Palestinians and Israelis lived on a shared island in the middle of the ocean. But such leaders are nowhere in sight in the Fatah party, much less in Hamas, and far from living on an island, Israelis and Palestinians live in the Middle East. There, Palestinians are surrounded by Islamist and jihadist groups, and Iran, all of which urge ever more extremism and ever greater violence. Indeed, precisely because of the absence so far of a strong leadership committed to peace, of the kind that both al-Omari and Abrams quite rightly wish for, Palestinian public opinion is all the more significant. Daniel Pipes, for his part, is quite clear on the significance of Palestinian public opinion, and discusses it in the context of arguing for what he terms an Israeli strategy for victory: Pipes adds that his own research, confirmed by mine, shows that about 20 percent of Palestinians are ready to live peaceably with the Jewish state. The challenge is to increase this number to 60 percent and more, so that this group at last can wrest control of the Palestinian national movement from rejectionists. I believe, however, that he is somewhat more pessimistic than is warranted by the available data regarding the extent of moderation in Palestinian society today. When asked in a PSR poll in December about their desired outcome for the long term, 31 percent of Palestinians opted for a two-state solution, explicitly choosing it over a Palestinian Arab state in all of historical Palestine, though the latter was the majority choice. Six years later, in a Stanley Greenberg survey on behalf of The Israel Project, respondents were given a pair of statements: If the Palestinian leadership is able to negotiate a two-state solution with Israel, do you think that this should be the end of the conflict with Israel, or should resistance continue until all of historic Palestine is liberated? Again the majority 64 percent were for liberating all of historical Palestine, but a solid 32 percent saw a two-state solution as the end of the conflict. Through all of these surveys, then, there appears to be a fairly consistent group, roughly 30 percent of Palestinians, who are prepared to accept, as a permanent resolution of the conflict with Israel, a two-state solution. But if public opinion really matters “and I continue to believe it does” the prospects of a sustainable, two-state solution strike me as substantially stronger if the group currently eschewing a rejectionist approach represents nearly a third of the Palestinian population rather than only a fifth. This base could, one hopes, expand further, especially if a credible leadership arises that broadcasts a clear message on the need for a durable, two-state solution and acts consistently to bring about that outcome. There is far more to be said about Palestinian public opinion concerning a two-state solution and the effect of rank-and-file views on the prospects for an enduring resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In seeking to lay out the unvarnished reality of Palestinian rejectionism, I hope my essay has helped advance a discussion on a subject of great significance to Palestinians, Israelis, and those seeking to bring about greater peace and stability in the Middle East.

Chapter 2 : Four Arab states 'support US plan' for peace in the Middle East | USA News | Al Jazeera

AMMAN, Jordan, May 2 (UPI) -- Egypt and Jordan are keener than ever before to revive the deadlocked Middle East peace process after Hamas' rise to power and Kadima's win in Israel. The only two.

The two signed an agreement defining a framework for a Middle Eastern peace conference. Mubarak encouraged him, but Assad told him only to "talk" and not sign any accord. The efforts succeeded and Jordan signed a nonbelligerency agreement with Israel. Thousands of colorful balloons released into the sky ended the event. The Lebanese militia group Hezbollah resisted the treaty and 20 minutes prior to the ceremony launched mortar and rocket attacks against northern Galilee towns. It settles issues about territory, security, water, and co-operation on a range of subjects. Section Annex I a establishes an "administrative boundary" between Jordan and the West Bank, occupied by Israel in , without prejudice to the status of that territory. The Parties agreed to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident embassies , grant tourists visas , open air travel and seaports, establish a free trade zone and an industrial park in the Arava. The agreement prohibits hostile propaganda. This included thwarting border attacks, smuggling, preventing any hostile attack against the other and not cooperating with any terrorist organization against the other. Article 9 links the Peace Treaty to the Israeliâ€”Palestinian peace process. Israel recognized the special role of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem and committed itself to give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines in negotiations on the permanent status. Israel agreed to give Jordan 50,, cubic metres 1. Both countries could develop other water resources and reservoirs and agreed to help each other survive droughts. Israel also agreed to help Jordan use desalination technology in order to find additional water. Israel and Jordan agreed to cooperate to help the refugees, including a four-way committee Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians to try to work towards solutions. Follow-up Following the agreements, Israel and Jordan opened their borders. Several border-crossings were erected, allowing tourists, businessmen and workers to travel between the two countries. In the two nations signed a trade treaty. As part of the agreement, Israel assisted in establishing a modern medical center in Amman. The annex granted Jordan the right not to renew the lease of Naharayim Baqoura and Tzofar Ghumar after 25 years, given that a notice is given a year prior.

Chapter 3 : Israelâ€™Jordan peace treaty - Wikipedia

The Palestinian Authority is relying on help from Egypt and Jordan to involve the United States in the peace process with Israel, though some Palestinians question whether the United States can participate without bias. REUTERS/Muhammad Hamed Jordan's King Abdullah II welcomes Egypt's President.

They want victory, a victory that will lead to the elimination of Israel and the expulsion of the Jews. The charter of the PLO has never been changed, despite decades of promises that it would be modified. Although secular in character, it advances much the same attitudes as those found in the Hamas charters. In Article 2, for example, it defines "Palestine" in boundaries encompassing the entirety of Israel: This means that calls for a Palestinian state based on that definition are also calls for the destruction of Israel. All attempts at normalization between Palestinians and Israelis or between other Arab states and Israel are routinely dismissed as treachery, a position that endangers the lives of any Palestinian who seeks peace. Meanwhile, Western leaders, including religious figures such as the Pope, are enchanted with the fantasy that a peace process exists, and forever chant the mantra that nothing must be done to interrupt it. Embassy from Tel Aviv to the ancient city. That move, according to the Act itself, was to "be established in Jerusalem no later than May 31, ". So why has it taken so long to act on this agreement? For more than two decades, this clear expression of the will of Congress had, in effect, been held in abeyance following an amendment section 7 that introduced a waiver that allowed presidents to "suspend the limitation set forth in section 3 b for a period of six months if he determines and reports to Congress in advance that such suspension if necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States". Since then, every president who followed including Trump, six months earlier exercised this waiver. Over the years, implementation of the Act was caught up in increasingly complicated legal and diplomatic issues that made deferment appear judicious and necessary in the belief that stalling it might help the so-called "peace process" between Israel and the Palestinians: So much for that peace process. We did not succeed because our Palestinian neighbors have not yet internalized the fact that in order to achieve peace, each side has to give up some of their dreams; to give, not only to demand. Since then, there have been numerous attempts to arrive at a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Not even the most promising of these has succeeded, and that lack of success must be put down flatly to the refusal of the Palestinian leadership to accept a single proposal, or even proposing a counter-offer. Everyone who has ever been involved in setting up a deal in business, in law, in a religious or political dispute is aware that nothing can be achieved if there is no one on the other side willing to play the game and make compromises, even if a few compromises might lead to their benefit. Regrettably, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, currently in the twelfth year of his four-year term, is doubtless correctly convinced that any deal he might sign would propel him to be "drinking tea" with assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the first Arab leader to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Like his predecessor Yasser Arafat left , Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas right is doubtless correctly convinced that any deal he might sign would propel him to be "drinking tea" with assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the first Arab leader to sign a peace agreement with Israel. The simple reason for this recalcitrance in the Israel-Palestinian dispute is that the Palestinians do not want peace. A victory would also end Jewish immigration. To say the Palestinians and their allies do not want peace is not based on a contrarian imagination. When eight Arab states met in Khartoum shortly after the Six-Day War, they passed a resolution that included "three Nos": Although Egypt and Jordan subsequently did make peace treaties with the Jewish state, the spirit of Khartoum among the Palestinians is, after decades of further anti-Israel indoctrination , stronger than ever. When the Palestinians and their supporters in the West chant "Palestine will be free from the river to the sea", they could not be clearer: Declarations of the Palestinian aspiration to replace Israel with a triumphant Arab state see any map of "Palestine" are not confined to protesters in the West Bank or on US and British university campuses. They are deeply embedded within the four Palestinian charters: The current Hamas charter , for example, rejects "the Zionist state" Article 18 , is explicit in encouraging armed resistance through jihad Article 21 , and in Article 19 insists on total reclamation of what they consider Palestinian land: Hamas refuses any alternative

which is not the whole liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea. Like Hamas, the PLO still calls for the use of brute force to achieve its aims: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. Article 9 How exactly is one to believe that a peace process is even on the table given the expressed intentions of Hamas and the PLO in a context of repeated Palestinian violence against Israel: They are probably unique in this. In , the Irish Free State now the Republic of Ireland , despite a bloody Civil War, entered into a peace treaty with the United Kingdom, and agreed to give up its northern counties. If Ireland is ever to be reunited, that shift will take place by a democratic process, not violence. But the Palestinians seem wedded to violence. In both Gaza and the West Bank, the entire culture is devoted to hatred of Jews, admiration for suicidal terrorism, financial benefits to murderers and their families, anti-Semitic school textbooks, maps that portray a Palestinian state that eliminates Israel, mosque sermons that call for armed resistance, and political speeches that do the same. Nowhere is there the least effort to pursue peace. Last year , four Palestinians who visited Israelis along with other Palestinians to wish them well for the Sukkot holiday as part of a peace event, were arrested by the Palestinian Authority. All attempts at normalization between Palestinians and Israelis or with other Arab states and Israel are routinely dismissed as treachery, a position that endangers the lives of any Palestinian who seeks for peace. There is no sign of a genuine peace process on the horizon any time soon. As of this writing, orchestrated " spontaneous " protests have broken out across the West Bank: Perhaps in response to that, rockets have been fired from Gaza into Israel, forcing the Israeli Defence Force to declare a red alert in Hof Ashkelon. In Egypt, television host Hisham Abdallah has already called on Palestinians to set Jerusalem on fire. According to Patrick Wintour in the Guardian, there have been protests in Istanbul, a Tunisian labour leader has, like Haniyeh, condemned the US decision as a declaration of war, and, more widely, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation OIC met in Istanbul on December 13 in a special session to co-ordinate a response. It is an only too familiar story. Once again, the Palestinian response is not to sit down and talk about the changes this act of recognition would bring about. Meanwhile, Western leaders, including religious figures such as the Pope, are enchanted with the fantasy that a peace process exists and forever chant the mantra that nothing must be done to interrupt it. Jerusalem has never served as an Arab or Islamic capital. Jerusalem is not, and never will be, an obstacle to peace for those who want peace. As it is written, "Pray for the peace of Jerusalem, may all that love her prosper, may there be peace in her quarters and palaces". The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute. Get Free Exclusive Gatestone Content:

Chapter 4 : Donald Trump's Egypt hopes for Middle East peace deal fade - Washington Times

Jordan was the second Arab country, after Egypt, to sign a peace accord with Israel. [1] The treaty settled relations between the two countries, adjusted land and water disputes, and provided for broad cooperation in tourism and trade.

Part of this section is transcluded from Two-state solution. Oslo â€” Main article: Oslo Accords The slowpaced Madrid talks were upstaged by a series of secret meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway. These meetings produced the Oslo Peace Accords between Palestinians and Israel , a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions and ". On behalf of the Israeli people, Rabin said: After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in , the peace process eventually ground to a halt. Later suicide bombing attacks from Palestinian militant groups and the subsequent retaliatory actions from the Israeli military made conditions for peace negotiations untenable. Netanyahu declared a tit-for-tat policy which he termed "reciprocity," whereby Israel would not engage in the peace process if Arafat continued with what Netanyahu defined as the Palestinian revolving door policy , i. The Hebron and Wye Agreements were signed during this period, after Israel considered that its conditions were partially met. Hebron agreement Main article: This agreement dealt with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with the Oslo Accords. The agreement dealt with redeployments in Hebron, security issues and other concerns. Wye River Memorandum Main article: The agreement dealt with further redeployments in the West Bank, security issues and other concerns. Camp David Summit Main article: East Jerusalem would have fallen for the most part [39] under Israeli sovereignty, with the exception of most suburbs with heavy non-Jewish populations surrounded by areas annexed to Israel. Borders, airspace, and water resources of the Palestinian state would have been left in Israeli hands. No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense U. Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Summit. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee that later published the Mitchell Report. The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas from the West Bank, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. However, Prime Minister Ehud Barak did not conduct further negotiations at that time; the talks ended without an agreement and the following month the right-wing Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon was elected as Israeli prime minister in February Beirut summit Main articles: The summit concluded by presenting a plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed it and said, " Israel was not prepared to enter negotiations as called for by the Arab League plan on the grounds that it did not wish for "full withdrawal to borders and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees ". Road map for peace President George W. In July , the "quartet" of the United States, the European Union , the United Nations , and Russia outlined the principles of a "road map" for peace, including an independent Palestinian state. The plan called for independent actions by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with disputed issues put off until a rapport can be established. In the first step, the Palestinian Authority must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. In his bid to negotiate a peace accord and establish a Palestinian state, Olmert proposed a plan to the Palestinians. Olmert proposed annexing at least 6. Israel insisted on retaining an armed presence in the future Palestinian state. Olmert, for his part, was presenting a plan in which the most sparsely populated settlements would be evacuated. Olmert and Abbas both acknowledged that reciprocal relations would be necessary, not hermetic separation. They also acknowledged the need to share a single business ecosystem, while cooperating intensively on water, security, bandwidth, banking, tourism and much more. Regarding Jerusalem the leaders agreed that Jewish neighborhoods should remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Arab neighborhoods would revert to Palestinian sovereignty. Hostilities between Gaza and Israel increased. He also claimed that Israeli settlements retain a right to growth and expansion in the West Bank. Palestinians rejected the proposals

immediately. President Barack Obama was the orchestrator of the movement, U. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went through months of cajoling just to get the parties to the table, and helped convince the reluctant Palestinians by getting support for direct talks from Egypt and Jordan. The talks aimed to put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an official end by forming a two-state solution for the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, promoting the idea of everlasting peace and putting an official halt to any further land claims, as well as accepting the rejection of any forceful retribution if violence should reoccur. Hamas and Hezbollah, however threatened violence, especially if either side seemed likely to compromise in order to reach an agreement. The US was therefore compelled to re-focus on eliminating the threat posed by the stance of Hamas and Hezbollah as part of the direct talk progress. Israel for its part, was skeptical that a final agreement was reached that the situation would change, as Hamas and Hezbollah would still get support to fuel new violence. In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the s. The mainstream within the PLO have taken the concept of territorial and diplomatic compromise seriously and have showed serious interest in this. The issue of the ratio of land Israel would give to the Palestinians in exchange for keeping settlement blocs is an issue of dispute, with the Palestinians demanding that the ratio be 1: Indyk served as U. The Israeli negotiating team was led by veteran negotiator Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, while the Palestinian delegation was led by Saeb Erekat, also a former negotiator. On the expiry of the deadline, negotiations collapsed, with the US Special Envoy Indyk reportedly assigning blame mainly to Israel, while the US State Department insisting no one side was to blame but that "both sides did things that were incredibly unhelpful. The following six months would focus on issues including refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, security and water. In early, some media sources reported the new administration was preparing a new peace initiative for an Israeli-Palestinian deal. Details of the new plan were not disclosed officially yet. He described the initiative as a contribution to stability in the region, while helping weaken Iranian influence. Please help improve it by rewriting it in a balanced fashion that contextualizes different points of view. December This section appears to be slanted towards recent events. Please try to keep recent events in historical perspective and add more content related to non-recent events. On 1 December, the two parties signed an unofficial suggested plan for peace in Geneva dubbed the Geneva Accord. In sharp contrast to the road map, it is not a plan for a temporary ceasefire but a comprehensive and detailed solution aiming at all the issues at stake, in particular, Jerusalem, the settlements and the refugee problem. It was met with bitter denunciation by the Israeli government and many Palestinians, with the Palestinian Authority staying non-committal, but it was warmly welcomed by many European governments and some significant elements of the Bush Administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell. Yet another approach was proposed by a number of parties inside and outside Israel: It was not actually a new idea, dating back as far as the s, but it was given extra prominence by the growing demographic issues raised by a rapidly expanding Arab population in Israel and the territories. Considering the huge political and demographic issues that it would raise, however, it seems an improbable solution to the problem. The plan advocates the formal annexation of West Bank and Gaza by Israel and that Palestinians will be become either Jordanian citizens or permanent residents in Israel so long as they remained peaceful and law-abiding residents. All these actions should be done in agreement with Jordan and the Palestinian population. The result is that both Israelis and Palestinians have grown weary of the process. Israelis point out the fact that the Gaza Strip is fully controlled by the Hamas who do not want peace with a Jewish state. Furthermore, in the Israeli view, a violent overtake of the West Bank by the Hamas as a result of the creation of an unstable new state is likely. In theory this would allow negotiations until a "shelf agreement" defining peace would be obtained. Such an agreement would not entail implementation. It would just describe what peace is. It would stay on the shelf but eventually will guide the implementation. The difficulty with this notion is that it creates a dis-incentive for Israel to reach such an agreement. The lack of clarity about what happens after agreement is reached will result in insurmountable pressures on Abbas to demand immediate implementation. However, from the Israeli point of view, the Palestinians are not ready to create a stable state, such an implementation process will almost guarantee instability in the Palestinian areas with a possible Hamas takeover as happened

in Gaza. To avoid it some definition of what happens after a shelf agreement is needed. One possible idea by this essay is to agree ahead of time that following attainment of a final status agreement there will be a negotiated detailed and staged implementation agreement which would define a process which would allow the creation of a stable functional Palestinian state in stages and over time. Joint economic effort and development Main article: Projects working for peace among Israelis and Palestinians Despite the long history of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, there are many people working on peaceful solutions that respect the rights of peoples on both sides. In March , Japan proposed a plan for peace based on common economic development and effort, rather than on continuous wrangling over land. Both sides stated their support. It is mainly designed to foster efforts in the private sector, once governments provide the initial investment and facilities.

Chapter 5 : Egypt, Jordan keen to revive peace process - www.nxgvision.com

Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (), various initiatives were put forth by Israel and others to further the peace process in the Middle East. These efforts eventually led to the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference in October

Chapter 6 : Israel Negotiations with the Palestinians Table of Contents

This will be coupled with an effort to bring key Arab States—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other US allies—into a regional process that would create, as Trump called it, a "bigger canvas" for reaching peace.

Chapter 7 : In Jerusalem, new envoys from Cairo and Amman recommit to peace with Israel | The Times o

The foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan and Palestine are scheduled to meet in Cairo on Saturday to discuss means of pushing forward with efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Egypt's.

Chapter 8 : Jordanian - Egyptian proposals for Palestinian/Israeli Cease Fire

Encyclopedia of Jewish and Israeli history, politics and culture, with biographies, statistics, articles and documents on topics from anti-Semitism to Zionism.

Chapter 9 : The US Embassy Move to Jerusalem vs. The "Peace Process"

The peace process cannot reach a stage where Jordan is isolated and progress on the other tracks has stalled. Therefore, Jordan must assume a positive role in moving the process forward toward the only logical solution of a durable regional peace.