

Chapter 1 : What are the Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens? | National Museum of American History

Relation between Rights and Duties! 1. Rights and Duties always go together: Rights and duties are closely related and cannot be separated from one another. Both go side by side. These are the two sides of the same coin.

The first two, which represent potential claims of individual persons against the state, are firmly accepted norms identified in international treaties and conventions. The final type, which represents potential claims of peoples and groups against the state, is the most debated and lacks both legal and political recognition. Each of these types includes two further subtypes. Twiss delineates a typology: Civil-political human rights include two subtypes: Socio-economic human rights similarly include two subtypes: Finally, collective-developmental human rights also include two subtypes: The three categories align with the three tenets of the French Revolution: They are strongly individualistic and negatively constructed to protect the individual from the state. Civil-political rights have been legitimated and given status in international law by Articles 3 to 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They are not rights directly possessed by individuals but constitute positive duties upon the government to respect and fulfill them. Socio-economic rights began to be recognized by government after World War II and, like first-generation rights, are embodied in Articles 22 to 27 of the Universal Declaration. For example, Twiss argues that no single generation can be emphasized to the exclusion of others without jeopardizing persons and communities over time, including jeopardizing the very interests represented in the type or generation of rights being privileged. He offers examples of self-defeating imbalances that would result from the excessive prioritization of any one generation over another: To emphasize socioeconomic rights to the exclusion of civil-political rights runs the risk of ironically creating a situation where, without the feedback of political participation, the advancement of socioeconomic welfare comes to be hampered or inequitable. To emphasize collective-developmental rights to the exclusion of other types runs the risk of not only fomenting a backlash against civil-political repression but also of under-cutting the equitable distribution of the socioeconomic goods needed for the continuing solidarity of the society. He asserts that, at worst, there may be tension between such rights in specific societies and at periods of socio-historic transition, but this does not mean tensions cannot be solved in a way that respects all three generations of rights. Human rights are so thoroughly interconnected that it is difficult to conceive of them as operating properly except in an interdependent and mutually supportive manner. Does the notion of a progression of rights and the metaphor of age it is based on make sense? Do second generation rights create the background conditions necessary for the exercise of first generation rights, as certain sections of the International Bill of Rights suggest, or are it the other way around? Should second and third generation rights be viewed as simultaneous? Does one generation take precedence over another, or are all equally important? Should second and third generation rights even be considered rights, or are they something fundamentally different? The three generations framework contains within it room for many of the key debates about the nature of rights. It also encourages us to take a critical approach in challenging our own assumptions about rights as we begin to think about some of the real-world problems involved in the application of human rights in the sections ahead.

Chapter 2 : Rights vs. Duties | Globalization

Rights vs. Duties It is worth examining the common conception in the Anglo-American tradition that rights are solely a form of personal entitlement. Many in Asia and the former Soviet Union, for example, argue that rights are equally an entitlement and a duty.

Issues in Environmental Ethics ed. As we look upstream and downstream along the river of time, beyond the scope of adjacent generations and concurrent lives, numerous ethical paradoxes, puzzles and perplexities emerge. And while most would agree that it would be morally reprehensible for our generation to "trash the future" in a spree of resource depletion and environmental destruction, thus devastating the lives of successors we will never know, we are hard-pressed to explicate the ethical concepts or to articulate the ethical theory which might best express and condemn such moral dereliction. Fundamental to this puzzle is the apparent non-reciprocity across generations, typified by the old cynical taunt, "what has posterity ever done for me?" The "downstream" course of the river of time is swift, invariant and unidirectional. One prominent candidate for the portentous task of articulating the moral bonds between the generations, is the notion that our effects upon the remote future are ethically constrained by the rights-claims of our posterity upon us, and consequently by the burdens of moral duty entailed by these rights. The numerous objections to this approach have led many philosophers to seek other justifications for such constraints, such as unreciprocated i. Some have even claimed that future persons have no claims whatever upon our resources. These objections to the "rights approach" have been based upon a few allegedly "essential" differences between actual persons and future or "potential" persons -- most prominently, their temporal remoteness, incapacity, non-actuality, and indeterminacy. Despite all these objections, I will argue that members of future generations have rights-claims upon us, now -- albeit, some of the rights-claims that obtain among contemporaries, do not apply across non-concurrent generations. Though fewer rights might obtain across generation than within them, I will further argue that the rights that remain may nonetheless be stringent. The duties that we have to our successors may be more than merely praiseworthy "duties of beneficence. II "Rights" -- an analysis. Recently, several environmental writers have put the word "rights" to some imaginative uses and contexts, thus placing this essential moral concept under considerable strain and complicating the task of circumspect moral philosophers. Beings "within," may thus said to "have rights" by virtue of their "interests" in perhaps being benefited or more fundamentally in not being harmed. These "interests" entail valid claims upon those in a position to thus affect the rights-bearers a point which will be elaborated shortly. My exclusive focus of concern, however, will be with human persons -- beings of which the word "sentience" denotes the simplest pre-requisite of moral significance. Furthermore, I would endorse H. Rights, in short, entail duties on the part of others. First, the duties and rights referred to herein are, unless otherwise indicated, to be interpreted as prima facie, and thus subject to being over-ridden by competing and compelling rights and duties. Second, duties and rights apply to circumstances that are situated between the extremes of inevitability and impossibility, and thus are subject to the agency of responsible, free, and rational persons. To quote and elaborate upon the old maxim, "ought implies can possibility , and yet might not non-inevitability. However, if duties are presumed to be derived from the rights of others, some interesting controversies emerge. That we have "imperfect duties" to posterity say, "duties of beneficence" is, I believe, granted by most of the critics that I will deal with in this paper. My point of contention with these critics is the stronger and more interesting claim that duties to the future include the "perfect" duties of actual persons to respect the rights of their successors. I claim that there are such rights. My adversaries contend that there are not. But if some critics accept "imperfect" uncorrelated duties to the future and reject the "perfect" duties based upon the alleged "rights" of future persons, why not settle for the imperfect duties and be done with it? Why need we insist that future persons have "rights"? What difference does it make? It might make an enormous moral difference. Thus, for example, we assume that we can write a check to the March of Dimes only if we have cash on balance after paying our bills and installment debts. Our creditors have a right to our money, but the charitable agencies do not. In short, rights have a stringency and urgency which benefactions do not. But there is more.

Beings with rights deserve respect -- especially so, if these "beings" are persons. Rights, as Joel Feinberg insists, command our attention and demand our response. Their characteristic use and that for which they are distinctively well-suited, is to be claimed, demanded, affirmed, insisted upon. They are especially sturdy objects to "stand upon," a most useful sort of moral furniture. Having rights enables us to "stand up like men," to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy of the love and esteem of others. To respect a person then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential maker of claims. On the other hand, if we violate this "perfect" duty, their appropriate response will be not simply regret but also moral indignation. Moral duties born of rights weigh more heavily upon the duty-bearers. Thus, to the degree that our policy-makers and legislators respond to valid moral arguments, the interests of future generations will be far better served if we can succeed in defending the notion that succeeding generations have rights-claims against the living who, in turn, have the moral duty to respect and respond to these rights. In other words, this stronger claim transforms the moral case -- a point of no small significance for those whose job it is to propose and defend environmental policies with long-term significance. And why might future persons not have rights claims against us? I have found five persistent arguments against these claims, to which we now turn. On the contrary, this is a deeply perplexing problem which we must merely mention and step around, lest we enter a thicket from which cannot emerge in the allotted space. Otherwise, the larger part of this paper will not be addressed. In a troubling and provocative paper, Thomas Schwartz argues that any effective attempts to "improve" the living conditions of the remote future will so alter "genetic shuffle" of future meetings, matings, and births, that such policies will, in fact, "repopulate" that future with different individuals. Accordingly, since none of the individuals in "Future A" will exist in "improved" "Future B," no individual will be benefited "made better off" as a result of this policy. It follows that since any attempts to "improve the future" will, strictly speaking, "benefit" no one, there are no obligations to future generations. Since rights imply duties, this conclusion follows by *modus tollens*. Briefly, my reply is that while "radical genetic contingencies" absolve us of obligations to act "in behalf of" future persons as individuals, this moral absolution does not entail a permission to disregard the remote consequences of our policies. Since relevant moral principles bind us to persons in general, and not to particular individuals, we remain obligated to improve the life prospects of variable future persons. The argument itself takes us into the "thicket" and, in effect, another paper. Thus we must instead, walk around this obstacle, with our assumption that this puzzle can be solved serving as our "ticket" to the next section of this paper.

IV The Time-Span Argument against the rights-claims of posterity objects that duties and rights cannot meaningfully be said to hold over long periods of time and between persons with non-concurrent lives, who are thus denied reciprocal communication and interaction. But with this argument, time itself is the foremost reason for this moral disconnection. Do long durations of time erode moral responsibilities? For the moment, consider, causal and epistemic connections through time, rather than moral connections. According to informed scientific opinion, some technological innovations and social policies enacted during the last few decades, and others now being contemplated, may result in both short-term advantages for some of our contemporaries, and devastating long-range effects for our successors. Such long-term effects, which are tied to their remote causes by quiet, continuing, and accumulating processes, are called, by ecologists, "time-lag effects. First, the manufacture of thousands of nuclear weapons, and the decision to invest heavily in nuclear fission energy, has resulted in the production of highly toxic, long-lasting, radioactive by-products. Some of these substances i. The "time-lag" between the disposal of these substances and their possible reappearance is unknown and unknowable. Another case concerns the accumulation of chloro- fluorocarbons CFCs in the atmosphere. In the last four decades, several million tons of these "inert" compounds have been released into the atmosphere. There is now significant evidence that CFCs now irrevocably in the atmosphere, are drifting up into the stratosphere where they will deplete the ozone shield that protects the biosphere from harmful ultraviolet radiation. Because of these warnings, the release of CFCs into the atmosphere has been sharply curtailed by law. Nonetheless, it appears that the worst effects of ozone depletion might become evident well into the twenty-first century, which means that due to "time-lag effects," the deadly results might not affect the

generation that introduced these substances into the atmosphere. The point of this recitation should be clear: Events enacted or contemplated within the lifetime of the present generation may, through "time-lag effects," produce benefits for this generation and, perhaps, a generation or two beyond, at the eventual cost of bringing devastation upon those who will be born a century or more hence. Moreover, informed persons now alive recognize these possibilities, and scientific techniques now available might provide even more exact assessments of the long-term impact of our technology. The moral implications are apparent: If, indeed, due to their long-term "time-lag" effects, our activities and policies reach across generations to cause significant changes in the life-conditions of posterity, and if, furthermore, we know this and can choose alternative policies, can we continue to pretend that we have no duties to this posterity? If it is within our knowledge and power to cause or prevent grave harm to future generations, can we still maintain that future generations have no rights to be spared such injury? Can we, in short, acknowledge our foresight, capacity and choices to significantly affect the life conditions of future generations, and, at the same time, disclaim moral responsibility across the same time span? Rather, I would suggest that our power to affect the lives of posterity, and our scientific foresight of the results thereof, require us to extend our moral responsibility to the limits of this anticipation, capacity and choice. Perhaps one reason why the notions of "duty to" and "rights of" posterity might seem strange is that we have not become accustomed to the moral implications of recent scientific and technological developments. Consider again the technological impacts cited above. Today, though environmental scientists know better, the logic of ordinary discourse has yet to reflect this profound change in the human biotic and moral condition. Only a generation or so ago, within the memory of many of us, one could innocently believe that the effect of his generation upon its successors was totally beyond human predictability and agency and thus not within its moral competency. With the contemporary extension of foresight and power has come a corresponding extension of moral responsibility. Time-span, of itself, cannot be construed as an argument against duties and rights. Quite the contrary, these moral relationships are inextricably bound to durations of time. Contractual obligations, and their correlative rights, endure from the time of the agreement to the time of its consummation. And, if a person is duty-bound not to cause deliberate harm during his lifetime, is he any less duty-bound to prevent such injuries that may occur after his death due to neglect during his lifetime? If one is both aware of the harm he might cause and capable of preventing it, does it matter if the calamity takes place five years after his death? Five hundred thousand years? I suggest that foresight, capacity and choice, not time however, long are the morally relevant factors here. To summarize this point: If we have a general duty not to cause avoidable pain, this means the pain, any time, of any being who, at the very least, is a member of the ongoing entity called "mankind. And with recent advances in scientific knowledge and technological power, we are losing our ability to hide behind the excuses of ignorance and impotence. V The "No-Claims" Argument. Another common objection to the claim that future generations have rights, is that posterity, being "merely potential," is incapable of claiming these alleged rights. And without claims, it is argued, there can be no rights. Bertram Bandman expresses the "no claims" position quite directly though he nonetheless affirms some rights of posterity.

Chapter 3 : Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment (E. B. Weiss) - GNHRE

Human rights wither without a language of duties. More important, even the most generous attempts to protect the political and socioeconomic rights of individuals leave some duties of individuals to their own states and all humanity out of account, as well as some duties of states to one another.

When asked how it can be that we have moral duties to those who will be living in the future, the plain answer is that they are people. Persons have human worth and human rights, and actions of ours that undermine their opportunities for fulfilling lives, wrong them, whether they live today or tomorrow. I believe this common sense view is correct. However, it is faced with a number of philosophical, or conceptual, problems, which are called futurity problems. Futurity problems stem from primarily two facts about future people: In particular the second fact generates a hard philosophical problem. So the basic question is whether we have any moral duties at all to people of the future. And this is the topic of my lecture. The further question is what kind of sacrifices are morally required of us? Before I address the basic problem, I must, however, say a little about how we affect the lives of posterity, and what duties this places upon us. I shall now assume the common sense view that we do have such duties. How we affect the future Our duties to future people will of course depend upon how we can affect them by what we do now. This we can do in three interconnected areas of policy: We have today become increasingly aware that our destruction of the environment eventually has serious impacts upon the quality of life in the future. Moral duties to future people therefore contribute to the justification of conservationist environmental policies. Exactly what natural resources we owe it to the future to conserve, is a further issue. But clearly we cannot attribute to all future generations a right to a fair share of non-renewable resources, like oil. First, just as we cannot determine the fair share of a cake unless we know how many there are to share it, we cannot determine the share of the natural resources that we may justly spend, unless we know how many people there will be in the future. Since we do not know that number, we cannot determine the content of such a right. And secondly, even if the notion of a fair share had made sense in this context, the number of future people will be vast, to say the least, unless a catastrophe, like a total nuclear war, wipes mankind off the surface of the planet. The share allotted each will be extremely small: These two considerations show that future people cannot in general have a right to non-renewable resources. Still, we owe it to those in the near future, whose economy and technology we may assume will resemble ours, to save something, and even to channel a part of our surplus into the research for replacements. But even though people in the far away future do not have a right to the non-renewable resources our society depends upon, they must have a right to the self-renewable natural resources that are the very conditions of any human way of life. We are morally required to leave them seas, forests, rivers, the soil, and the atmosphere intact. So, although considerations of distributive justice to future people may not put severe restrictions upon our use of oil, a concern for their right to a clean environment does. To discharge such duties is, we all know, a difficult task, which may require drastic shifts in our present way of living. The quality of life in the future is also affected by the choice, or the lack of choice, of population policies. Though interconnected, environmental policies and population policies are separate factors. We could destroy the environment without having an increase in population, and we could, perhaps not realistically but at least in principle, pursue population policies that render the world uncomfortably crowded within the limits set by ecology. Our lifestyle could even, albeit less likely, result in a drastic decrease in population, for example by massive deaths, which would make life hard for the survivors by undermining their economy. Either way, the moral duty not to impose upon future generations hardship caused by population problems is, as Michael Bayles has argued, the ultimate justification of population policies Bayles , p. Finally, our choices of miscellaneous cultural policies have impacts upon future people. Our ability to develop a fair and functioning world-economy does, of course, greatly affect the standard of living in the future. But quality of life is not just a matter of material goods. The arts and the sciences are important spiritual assets for any culture; political and legal institutions, and moral values, are even more crucial. Life outside legal and moral confines is, in my view, not truly a human life. Duties to posterity may therefore contain the positive moral duty to bequeath to it such cultural goods. Since

wars often greatly destroy all three, the environment, the population, and culture, moral duties to future people enjoin us to promote an international order aimed at a lasting peace. So clearly, if we do have a moral responsibility towards future people, this has vital consequences for present policies in almost all spheres of life. After this brief introduction, I shall address the philosophical aspects of the problem, which concern futurity problems. I first discuss some futurity problems which perhaps are not very hard to solve. I then discuss consequentialism and deontology and their two major forms, utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. After mentioning some notorious problems that confront utilitarianism in our context, I put the two competing kinds of theories to a test. The experimentum crucis is the most intractable futurity problem: The futurity problem due to non-existence. Our first futurity problem arises from the plain fact that future persons do not yet exist. Does it make sense to say that we have duties to people who do not exist, and that we infringe their rights? Assuming the notion of moral rights, they obviously will have moral rights when they exist, and these rights are correlated with moral duties on part of their contemporaries. The problem is whether their moral rights also are correlated with moral duties that we have now, "even before the holders of the rights have come into existence. We can approach this problem through an analogy. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that only persons belong to the moral community, and that human fetuses become persons somewhere in the beginning of the second trimester. From fertilization until that phase, the fetus therefore has no human worth and no rights, so it cannot possibly be wronged by any damage inflicted upon it. Does it follow that some damage inflicted upon it in the first trimester could not wrong the person later to emerge from it? The damage may be carried along until the fetus has developed into a person. So this fetal person is wronged by the damage which was inflicted even before he became a person, and someone might complain on his behalf that his right to bodily integrity has been infringed. Of course, this presupposes that the embryo lives up to be a person. First-trimester fetuses are indeed future persons of a kind. And since it makes sense to say that the rights of fetal persons have been infringed by what we do before they become persons, it is equally obvious that the actions we undertake now can infringe the rights of the future people who have not even been started. Again, this presupposes that they will exist. Against this position, it might be objected that, unlike fetuses, people in the distant future cannot possibly stand in a moral communion with us. The child cannot, for example, sue me for compensation, and she cannot reciprocate in any way. But why must we assume that membership in the moral community extends solely to those in a reciprocal moral communion with us? Children usually are said to have rights against their parents, but hardly because they can be compensated when their rights have not been fulfilled, or because they later acquire a duty to care for their elderly parents. The counter-intuitiveness of denying future people rights can be brought out by an example: Suppose that country A launches a missile killing the innocent denizens of country B. Their right to life has been infringed. Now suppose again that country A launches the missile, only this time it follows an orbit in space before it kills the innocent denizens of country B two centuries later. The fact that the missile hits its target two centuries after it was launched is morally irrelevant. By the same token, the present destruction of the environment and lack of population control will infringe the rights of those affected by it in the future, "unless we remedy the situation. A duty to continue mankind? So it appears that this futurity problem, at least, does not call for a new kind of ethical theory. Our traditional concepts of moral rights and duties seem perfectly adequate. According to Hans Jonas, however, all forms of traditional ethics has delimited moral concerns to the community of contemporary human beings. Nature and future mankind are not included within its horizon. These are two different claims: Against a one might retort that Kant acknowledges both perfect and imperfect duties to other persons, and from what we have discussed thus far, nothing seems to prevent their application to future people. But Jonas acknowledges this Jonas , pp. Jonas believes that the anthropocentric bias of all traditional ethics prevents them from justifying the moral duty to secure that there will be a future, since all duties toward the well-being of future people are conditional upon their existence Jonas , pp. But such conditional moral duties to future people are not sufficient in our age, Jonas believes. He therefore argues that the duty to secure a future for mankind is the primary and unconditional duty of an ethics capable of addressing the threats we face today. Here one could object that the violent annihilation of mankind, say by nuclear war, violates the rights of billions of people, and so is categorically prohibited by an ethics of respect for persons. However, Jonas

believes that anthropocentric ethics could not prohibit non-violent terminations of mankind Jonas , p. A scenario Jonas would not welcome, and which he would claim cannot be proscribed unless there is a duty to continue the human race, is sketched by Gregory Kavka. It stems from the fundamental fact that we influence the number of future people by what we do. This kind of contingency of future populations upon our choices has the uneasy consequence that we may increase the level of our consumption and still provide for all the needs of future people, simply by producing fewer of them! No harm, let us assume, is done to any person, but the environment is depleted. But as I explained in my previous lecture, Humanism does invest nature with intrinsic value. Thereby it proscribes all policies that destroy the environment. Moreover, apart from nuclear war and other catastrophic actions already condemned by Humanism, there is no genuine reason to fear that mankind will bring upon itself its own extinction. Multiple interests, from the personal to the social sphere of life, are connected up with procreation. The interests each generation takes in descendants, and even in their welfare, are in potential conflict with the rights of people in the distant future. So it is important to stress that it is within the resources of Humanism to see the continuation of mankind as of intrinsic value. This argument is clearly within the reach of Kantian ethics. Humanism therefore seems to deliver what Jonas searches for. Adding this final argument to all the above, I think the need for a new ethics has disappeared. The Person-Affecting Principle While Jonas charged all traditional ethics with an inability to ground an unconditional duty to secure the continued existence of mankind, Annette Baier charges that it cannot even ground conditional moral duties to the future people who will exist. She believes that It took so long for the question of our duty to future persons to come to our attention because it took so long for ethics to free itself from theology, and to make morality concerned primarily and directly with the human good Baier , p. Baier claims that as a non-consequentialist theory, it cannot incorporate the so-called Person-Affecting Principle. The principle says that for any action to be wrong, it must affect some person or persons usually other than the agent for the worse Baier , pp.

Chapter 4 : 7 Responsibilities You Have As An American

There are three overarching types of human rights norms: civil-political, socio-economic, and collective-developmental (Vasek,). The first two, which represent potential claims of individual persons against the state, are firmly accepted norms identified in international treaties and conventions.

You have a right to an attorney. You have a right to remain silent. You have a right to free speech, a right to "keep and bear arms," a right to "due process," and a right to have "equal protection under the law. Unreasonable search and seizure? Being tried twice for the same crime? Those would be violations of your rights. We hear about individual rights, civil rights, human rights, and constitutional rights. Responsibilities are the flip side of rights. In fact, the only reason we have rights at all is because there are people who fulfill their responsibilities. With that in mind, here are a few basic responsibilities that you, I, and all of us have as Americans. Nobody owes you a living and that includes other taxpayers. You have a responsibility to pay your own bills and not be a leech. That means, over the course of your lifetime, paying as much in taxes as you take out in services and direct payments from the government. If, by some horrible set of circumstances you feel compelled to go on the dole, you should at least be ashamed to take hand-outs from your fellow citizens. If you have kids, you have a duty to take care of them. That means paying money to feed, clothe, and house them. In recent years there has been a big push to get all Americans to vote. The same goes for voting. Not everyone has to be a political junky, but it would be nice if people took the time to become well-informed about the ins-and-outs of the basic political issues we have to deal with in this country instead of voting on who has the best attack ads. Being an informed voter is a responsibility. Being an uninformed voter is flipping a coin – heads, America wins and tails, it loses. The Constitution is the "set of rules" that we go by as a people and most of the "rights" are guaranteed by the Constitution. Yet, the Constitution is under daily attack in this country by activists and politicians who feel the ends justify the means along with judges who claim to believe in a "living Constitution," which is functionally no different than not having a Constitution at all. Not that Americans in Boston are going to shed tears if an American in LA passes on either, but we at least have a certain small, but meaningful level of kinship with each other by virtue of being Americans. As Samuel Adams noted way back in , A general dissolution of principles and manners will more surely overthrow the liberties of America than the whole force of the common enemy. While the people are virtuous they cannot be subdued; but when once they lose their virtue then will be ready to surrender their liberties to the first external or internal invader. Honesty, honor, godliness, industry, respect for the law, morality, and truthfulness are the wheels on which our entire republic rides.

Chapter 5 : Next Generation Politics | Find Your Voice | Raise Your Voice

So should it be with the rights of future generations. Ideally, their rights will be protected by the laws and by the legitimately appointed and elected representatives of the community. Ideally, their rights will be protected by the laws and by the legitimately appointed and elected representatives of the community.

There must be a duty on all relevant authorities and individuals to enforce those rights. This Declaration proposes comprehensively the implicit system of duties and responsibilities contained in our human rights systems, in particular that enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR and in subsequent international human rights instruments and establishes consequently their bearers. The DHDR explains in details the complexity of the exercise of responsibilities. The bearers are the members of the global community that have collective, as well as individual duties and responsibilities, to promote universal observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The DHDR reflects the gamma of both states and non-states actors that have to be mutual supportive bearers of duties and responsibilities. On the contrary, the UN Millennium Declaration MD , recent international document of the governments, is focused primarily on the States responsibilities that is shared and collective: The DHDR addresses simultaneously the responsibilities of individuals and groups. This statement continues appropriately the way initiated by the UDHR in Article 29 and reiterates the interaction of duties, responsibilities and rights of the International Covenants on Human Rights of The right to life and human security[edit] Most of the titles of the DHDR chapters enunciate a right or fundamental freedom that will be the thematic focus of the related duties and responsibilities. Chapter 2 begins the list of duties and responsibilities with the right to life and human security, rights to be secure for the present and also future generations in the awareness that for the first time in human history the humankind survival is in peril due to human action. The DHDR Article 3 is dedicated to the duty and responsibility to protect the life of every member of the human family and ensure the survival of both present and future generations. A key element of the formulation of the DHDR has been the present duty and responsibility for the potential consequences of our actions for the future generations. Therefore, the right to peace and the right to live in a balanced ecological environment have to be recognized and guaranteed. In a broader sense, the Earth Charter, a declaration of principles for a sustainable world, emphasises the urgency of sharing responsibility for caring for the community of life, including the well-being of human family. The DHDR Article 4 enunciates the duty and responsibility to promote collective security and a culture of peace of all members of the global community. War and conflict prevention, fostering international peace, global security and cooperation are needed for this purpose. The responsibility of States, according to UN Chapter 7, is underlined and also their duty strengthening mediation, conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building mechanisms and peace-keeping capacities. The DHDR Article 5 is dedicated to the duty and responsibility to promote rapid and effective disarmament in the interests of peace. Primarily the States are in charge of reducing military expenditure in favour of human development, and together with no-States actors to carry our nuclear disarmament, to cease any production or use of all chemical and biological weapons, and use of landmines. The Duty to intervene to prevent gross human rights violations is stated in the DHDR Article 6 that means the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other gross or systematic human rights abuses in all circumstances. States are mainly in charge of preventing and also punishing such violations, and there is also a collective duty of the States to intervene in the case where individual State fails to prevent such abuses. UN Chapter 7 remains general framework for this responsibility. For defining gross human rights violations and the need of prevention and punishment this chapter has been inspired by the Rome Statute that was adopted some months before this Declaration was finalised. The DHDR Article 7 enunciates the duty and responsibility unconditionally and in all circumstances to respect international humanitarian law during times of armed conflict. This law, commonly infringed, means for the government forces and insurgents, military or paramilitary forces the obligation to refrain from committing acts of genocide; crimes against humanity, and war crimes , as mass killing , torture or rape. The focus of DHDR Article 8 is the duty and responsibility of humanitarian assistance and intervention to those in need. In a

globalised world with millions of displaced people, it is claimed for the adequate provision of food, shelter, health care and other essential requirements for survival to ensure the right to life for everyone on the world. The DHDR Article 9 finishes this chapter with the duty and responsibility to protect and promote a safe, stable and healthy environment, promoting respect, protection and preservation of the uniqueness and diversity of all forms of life. An adequate use of resources avoiding excessive exploitation and consumption, and a collaborative scientific research and exchange of information are required. This article promotes similarly to the Kyoto Protocol, an international and legally binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gases emissions worldwide, an urgent change of attitude towards the environment. This duty for the present and future generations has already been confirmed by a broad scientific consensus on the existence of climate change and the human responsibility. Human security and an equitable international order[edit] The DHDR Article 10 emphasises the duty and responsibility to promote an equitable international order for the universal enjoyment of sustainable human, economic, social, cultural, political, scientific and technological development and equitably participation in the decision-making processes for an interdependent and technologically well equipped world, providing an extensive vision of the general formulation of the UDHR Article The DHDR statements are categorical: Their fulfilment is measurable indicated by a progress at quantitative level. Following the previous article, the DHDR Article 11 enunciates the duty to alleviate usurious debt that would endanger human lives and impede economic and social development. This Chapter continues with the DHDR Article 12 dedicated to the duty and responsibility to promote safe, responsible and equitable scientific and technological development for the benefit of all humankind. The UNESCO spirit of encouraging universally intellectual and moral solidarity is emphasised, in particular taking into account the condition of the lesser scientifically advanced States. In particular this article has received a good reception by several scientists and related people. Neutrality of science appears today as an illusion, in particular considering formerly scientific advances such as in genetics or cybernetics. This DHDR approach reinforces fully the importance of the recent UNESCO ethical documents for biosciences, and also other efforts for codifying ethical principles for the use of science. The DHDR Article 13 enunciates duties and responsibilities of public and private sector corporations, indicating as common criteria the respect for sovereignty of host countries and simultaneously fully respect and promotion of universal human rights and international labour standards. For having an ethical code of the corporations and for promoting a more sustainable and inclusive global economy, the then UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, has proposed the Global Compact, an international initiative bringing companies together with UN agencies, labour and civil society to support universal environmental and social principles, that was finally launched in The DHDR Article 14 enunciates the duty and responsibility to prevent and punish international and organised crime as a shared task of the members of the global community. This article also has the innovative approach of global cooperation of the Statute of Rome, for combating of international crimes, transnational crimes and organised crime and assisting international criminal tribunals. The focus of the DHDR Article 15 is the duty and responsibility to eradicate corruption and build an ethical society in both the public and private sectors, implementing codes of conduct and training programmes, and promoting accountability, transparency public awareness of the harm caused by corruption. This emphasis in code of ethics was also encouraged by the Global Compact , in particular for the private sector. Meaningful participation in public affairs[edit] The DHDR Article 16 expresses the duty and responsibility to ensure meaningful participation in public affairs, for ensuring that the authority of government is based upon the will of the people and the rule of law. This promoted participation reiterates the universal right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives of the UDHR Article 21 at different levels, in local, national and global governance. Freedom of opinion, expression, assembly, association and religion[edit] Following the content of the UDHR Article 19 on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the DHDR Article 17 reformulates the duty and responsibility to respect and ensure freedom of opinion, expression, and the media, providing concrete measures for the world today, affirming the pursuit of truth as unhindered, and condemning any degrading treatment of individuals and the presentation of violence as entertainment. And Article 17 also insists that "the media and journalists have a duty to report honestly and accurately to avoid incitement of racial, ethnic or religious violence or

hatred. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights The DHDR Article 18 establishes duties and responsibilities concerning information and communications technologies with the aim of ensuring universal access to basic communication and information infrastructure and services. Complementing the UDHR Article 20 on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association the DHDR Article 19 enunciates the duty and responsibility to take all necessary steps to ensure the substantive realisation of the rights to free assembly and freedom of association. Finally, the DHDR Article 20, following the UDHR Article 18 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, formulates the related duty and responsibility to respect and ensure freedom of religion, belief and conscience, and of having or not having a religion or belief. The right to personal and physical integrity[edit] The DHDR Article 21 focused on formulating the duty and responsibility to respect and ensure the physical, psychological and personal integrity of all members of the human family in all circumstances, including in situations of armed conflict, reformulate the UDHR articles dedicated to the rights to personal integrity and respect for privacy. The DHDR Article 22 enunciates the duty and responsibility to take all necessary measures to respect and ensure the right to personal liberty and physical security, in first place by the States, preventing arbitrary arrest and detention and ensuring that all arrests and detentions are carried out in accordance with universally recognised standards of fairness and due process. The DHDR Article 23 emphasises today the duty and responsibility to prohibit and prevent slavery and institutions and practices similar to slavery and slave-like practices including child prostitution, child exploitation, enforced prostitution, debt bondage, serfdom, and other forms of enforced labour inconsistent with international law, punishing such practices; instituting effective controls to prevent the illegal trafficking of persons; creating greater public awareness through education of the human rights abuses associated with such practices. Today slavery is still not eradicated from the world, although universally condemned. The DHDR Article 24 enunciates the duty and responsibility to condemn torture and to take all necessary measures to prevent torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, declaring criminal and punishing all acts of torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, enforcing strict controls over places and conditions of custody of persons deprived of their liberty. The duty and responsibility to condemn and to prevent and eradicate enforced disappearances declaring criminal and punishing all acts of forced disappearances, ensuring that persons deprived of their liberty are only held in officially recognised places of detention, and that they have adequate access to judicial officers, legal representation, medical personnel and family members during the course of their detention. Equality[edit] After trying to meet the major global challenges of our interdependent world, that are affecting today humankind as a whole. The DHDR Article 26 enunciates in general the duty to respect, ensure and promote the right to equal treatment and to eradicate discrimination in all its forms. The DHDR Article 27 states the duty and responsibility for the States, in primary place, to respect and ensure the substantive equality of every member of human family, not only ensuring equality before the law, but also taking positive action to prevent direct or indirect discrimination. In the DHDR Article 28 is enunciated the duty and responsibility to ensure substantive racial and religious equality, that means to ensure the effective enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, and to condemn all forms of racial and religious discrimination and respect racial, ethnic and religious diversity; promoting equal opportunities for all. In particular the States have to ensure the effective enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination on the basis of sex or gender, promoting the equality in the representation and participation of women in the public and political life, the eradication of cultural, religious and social practices which discriminate against women; the economic empowerment of women and the recognition of the full legal capacity of women. The DHDR Article 30 is dedicated to the duty and responsibility to ensure the substantive equality of persons with a disability, and to ensure the enjoyment and exercise of all human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination on the basis of disability. Some progress towards the accomplishment of this duty can be observed at international level. Protection of minorities and indigenous peoples[edit] Reinforcing the fulfilment of equality, the aim of the Chapter 8 is to emphasise the need for protection of minorities and indigenous peoples. Both the global community and the States are considered by this Declaration as the major responsible, collectively and individually for ensuring

the rights of these vulnerable groups. The DHDR Article 31 formulates the duty and responsibility to respect and protect the existence, identity and rights of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, having the States a primary duty and responsibility to take adequate measures. The above referred efforts of the UNESCO for protecting the value of cultural diversity and cultural expressions are a reflection of this obligation. The DHDR Article 32 enunciates the duty and responsibility to respect, protect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples, in particular their right to preserve, maintain and develop their identities and to protect their means of livelihood, in a general context of respect of universal human rights. Indigenous rights are diversely protected at national level, but it is much needed that the international community assumes collectively their responsibility. It is also expected that the proposed declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples will be again considered for approval in September by the UN General Assembly in order to protect these rights universally. Rights of the child and the elderly[edit] The chapter 9 deals also with the implementation of the principle of equality taking into account the primary responsibilities of the States for the children and elderly rights. The DHDR Article 33 emphasises the duty and responsibility to respect, protect and promote the rights of the child , following the content of the almost universally ratified UN Convention on the Right of the Child and aware, that although this excellent document is shared broadly by the international community, today million of children are still innocent victims of armed conflict, extreme poverty and hunger. The DHDR Article 34 is dedicated to the formulation of the duty and responsibility to promote and enforce the rights and wellbeing of the elderly, trying to ensure the full and effective enjoyment by elderly people of all human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination on the basis of age, and to respect the well-being, dignity and physical and personal integrity of the elderly. Although major efforts are being made by the United Nations, such as the International Year of Older Persons and the formulation UN Principles addressing the independence, participation, care, self-fulfillment and dignity of older persons, and regional and national efforts, it does not exist by now a recognised framework for securing their rights. Therefore, the DHDR constitutes a very interesting contribution for enforcing the rights of the elderly. Work, quality of life and standard of living[edit] The DHDR Chapter 10 complements the system of duties and responsibilities related to the right to work , quality of life and standard of living. For doing that, the DHDR take into account at the same time, the responsibility of the States and the shared responsibility of the world community in the context of the global interdependence. Measures such adopting policies designed to promote productive work; ensuring employment security, in particular protection against arbitrary or unfair dismissal; and ensuring equality of opportunity and conditions of work, are proposed by the DHDR. The DHDR Article 36 emphasises the postponed duty and responsibility to promote quality of life and an adequate standard of living for all. The DHDR reiterates the shared responsibility for eradicating extreme poverty from the world, in particular if we consider the sufficiency of material resources for meeting this challenge. Similarly, but with a more pragmatic approach, the Millennium Development Goals establishes an intergovernmental agreement for realising globally human rights. These transitional goals indicate indubitably the correct course for implementing human rights in a continuous process with measurable criteria. However, it would be positive to promote a dialogue on the achievement and evolution of the achievement of those goals with the help of this systematised view on universal duties and responsibilities. The DHDR Article 37 enunciates the duty and responsibility to promote and enforce the right to education , taking into account that illiteracy still affects millions of people in the developing countries and that is coincident with the already referred Millennium Development Goals. Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities Chapter Right to a remedy[edit] The DHDR finishes with the Chapter 12 dedicated to the right to a remedy where a human right or fundamental freedom is threatened or has been violated. The DHDR Article 39 enunciates the duty and responsibility, primarily of the States, to provide for and enforce effective national judicial, administrative, legislative and other remedies for these cases, in similarity with the UDHR Article 8. This Chapter proposes, finally, in article 40 the duty to monitor and implement the Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities, by establishing tripartite councils composed of State, civil society and private sector representatives in cooperation with States, relevant civil society organisations, national, regional and international inter-governmental organisations,.

Chapter 6 : Future generations of people [lecture]

Rights and Duties are like to two sides of a coin, absolutely inseparable. Whenever and wherever we have any rights, we must have corresponding duties. Whether it be the home, the society or the country, in every sphere of life we have rights and duties that go hand in hand. We have rights in the same measure as we have duties.

The need for change in human development for them to lead happy lives has been debated for decades. The sustainability discourse started in the 1980s, and the UN Conference on the Environment and Development recognized intergenerational equity as central for policymaking that safeguards the future—this principle is now found in the constitutions of many countries. Its implementation through binding policy-making, however, is rare. One of the reasons for this may be the structural short-term nature of representative democracies. We act as we do because we can get away with it: Each created its own guardian or commissioner for future generations, independent voices for the long term that act as temporal checks and balances. Hungarians even have the right to take complaints about particular development projects and policies to court. Such guardians for future generations can protect any constitutional right or binding policy goal for the long term. Despite decades-long calls for integrated policies that would tackle social, environmental, and economic issues together, government decision making is still done in single-issue silos, many of which compete over budget allocations. Arguing for the quality of life of children in introduces a framework that deconstructs the alienating technocratic jargon around sustainability, connecting individual desires for well-being today with the experiences of people in the future. All over the world, climate change, environmental destruction, financial crises, and the widening gap between rich and poor are spreading insecurity and fear. Common sense suggests that these challenges are too big for one country to handle alone and too structural in nature to ignore where our expertise needs an update. We are the first generations whose decisions will determine for good or ill the future of human life on this planet, and we seem stuck in a way of thinking that is obsolete in a globalized world of growing populations. We remain mired in institutional stalemates that inhibit farsighted action, and are trapped by the fear of losing individual material wealth, a fear that jeopardizes any spirit of common action. All this even though we have been aware for decades that the trajectory of human development needs to change: In 1987, the UN General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and Development WCED to investigate what seemed a collision course between concerns for the global environment and the needs of development. The final report, *Our Common Future*, is so clear in its analysis and vision that looking at our governments and economies today can prompt screams of frustration about our ignorance and inertia. This report called for a world political transformation based on the concept of sustainable development, so that the parallel problems of environmental degradation and development could be addressed in an integrated way. The states agreed on an action plan, called Agenda 21, concerning how to make sustainable development a reality. Even before 1992, and following thereafter, the plight of future generations had become the subject of ethical study and debates among scholars. Both produced conferences and essay volumes in the 1990s. Targets for climate change mitigation, biodiversity, ocean protection, poverty eradication, health, and social equity are continuously missed. This, even despite ever-better scientific measures telling us that the pressure to act is increasing tremendously. So, why are we not changing our trajectory? One paragraph from *Our Common Future* is highly relevant: These institutions tend to be independent, fragmented, and working to relatively narrow mandates with closed decision processes. Those responsible for managing natural resources and protecting the environment are institutionally separated from those responsible for managing the economy. The real world of interlocked economic and ecological systems will not change; the policies and institutions concerned must. The short-term orientation of representative democracies that have election cycles of three to five years means that the interests of current lobbyists and voters easily trump future concerns. Each single-issue department seeks to deliver on its own targets rather than identifying where long-term trends create convergence. In worst cases, agencies compete with each other over limited budgets and are lobbied strategically by single-issue groups. The well-being of societies depends on many factors, as indicated by at least two efforts: The excessive focus on individualist notions of freedom

and well-being leaves many people fearful in times when big problems overwhelm personal responsibility. Bringing future generations to the negotiating table could be a solution. It is time to pierce the alienating technocratic jargon around sustainability and think about our decisions from the point of view of children. It is their quality of life that should be the benchmark when debating environmental protection, youth unemployment, sustainable pension systems, the level of public debt, and so on. Some of us will still be alive to play with these children, and we have never had more knowledge and ability to ensure that that play takes place in a better world. Scholars like Janna Thompson and those of the International Human Rights Clinic at the Harvard Law School have discussed several ways of incorporating intergenerational justice into our political systems. Giving a real person the right to speak up for future interests grants a voice in decision making to everyone whose well-being and rights will be affected. Such guardians would function as temporal checks and balances in the structural short-term orientation of our democratic institutions. They could be directly approachable by civil society like ombudspersons, so that concerns about long-term impacts of political decisions would be filtered straight into the system. If such a watchdog had a mandate to access all information in all governmental departments, he or she could minimize the risk of policy incoherence, of economic goals trumping resource regulation, instead initiating early cross-issue exchanges and thereby improving policymaking effectiveness. Building on sustainability assessment mechanisms if in place, the guardians would actively engage with different departments to help decision makers understand the effects of their particular decisions on the living conditions of future people, avoiding significant future adverse effects that would cost much more to clean up than to prevent. Keeping our common future in view and analyzing how single decisions might support or harm that future can help nurture a new common purpose: Shifting our focus from individual bargaining power and winning zero-sum games to the well-being of my children and your children could trigger collective responsibility: Several countries around the world have created guardians for the long term, even to the point of giving them the mandate to engage in the legislative process, as the following examples demonstrate. The parliamentary commissioner for the environment PCE has an auditing function with a view of preserving ecosystems and improving environmental governance. Additionally, the PCE and staff experts have incorporated issues such as social and economic rights in their research and reports, creating latitude to move beyond environmental issues in relation to the protection of future generations. Depending on who is appointed to the role, the commissioner may or may not actively advocate for the rights of future generations. There have been and still are proposals to change the PCE into the Office for Sustainable Development, as the idea of an agency that can mainstream sustainability is gaining support. In practice, however, the commissioner could claim the right to issue an informed opinion, even when the Knesset was bound by law to make a decision within a given time frame or to otherwise postpone the decision. This amounted to the commission having informal veto power, similar to what a filibuster in the U. It challenged business as usual in a troubled region and was a voice for future generations in policymaking across environmental, economic, and social concerns. Especially through the visionary approach of Commissioner Shlomo Shoham, it provided opinions and analyses with a commendably systemic and integrative perspective. Whether or not to abolish the overarching law is currently being debated. A Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations Hungary An additional model, which is different from commissioners who report to environment ministers or auditor generals, involves establishing an ombudsperson to actively defend the rights of future generations. In , as part of an overarching statute that created an ombudsperson for civil rights, the Hungarian government also created the parliamentary commissioner for future generations. This includes providing opinions to members of Parliament as well as to other entities that seek to take actions affecting the environment. The commissioner may conduct investigations, and his or her role is not limited to the national government but includes the ability to review the actions of and to assist municipal and other local governments. In terms of sanctions, after an investigation the commissioner can order that an action be stopped or modified and can bring a case to court if deemed necessary. Thus the position has a significant degree of independence. The important difference is that the Hungarian commissioner directly defends the rights of our descendants. Given the fate of the Israeli commission, a strong asset in the Hungarian case is that the authorizing statute makes removal of the

parliamentary commissioner difficult without cause. The weak spot remains financial: Characteristics of a Powerful Guardian If a guardian for future generations is to become a strong mechanism of temporal checks and balances, such an office should have the following characteristics: It should be independent, according to the logic of the division of powers. A guardian should not also hold another governmental post, such as in a parliamentary committee. The Hungarian commissioner is the only such guardian discussed who has legally binding tools. The Israeli commission enjoyed de facto veto power through the delivery of statements in a tactical way, but this power was risky to use because it could destroy the trust-based cooperation between deputies and the commission. Another issue regarding effectiveness involves the size of the office: While the commissioners in all of the above examples provide regular reports, the Hungarian commissioner has the most direct mandate for their independent distribution. The New Zealand and Israeli offices were established top-down. The mandate of the Hungarian commissioner is most generous in this sense. Both offices are reported to follow a strong grassroots engagement strategy in their work. Reviewing the three examples, we become aware that every legal and cultural setting will lead to a different mandate for a guardian for future generations, depending on the fundamental rights and duties of citizens or overarching political goals. A civil-society coalition is just starting to promote a guardian to protect the aims of the European Union as defined in the Lisbon Treaty similar to a constitution in its legal status. Article 3 lists three aims: Thus, an EU-level guardian with the mandate to speak up in the name of future generations would directly support EU commitments regarding sustainable development, would improve the coherence and efficacy of European policies drafted in single-issue departments, and would give teeth to the principle of intergenerational solidarity. Yet, expectations about the impact of such guardians should remain realistic: They all report successfully pushing the envelope in terms of what their ascribed mandates should cover and which methodologies would best fulfill them. Yet, work that is too visionary may turn the tables to the detriment of the entire institution, as seems the case with the Israeli commissioner for future generations. Established in , the position was only filled for one five-year term, and thereafter the Knesset has debated its abolition. Passig combines systems research with behavioral science,³⁰ and Goleman emphasizes the ability to perceive the best for both sides in a relationship. Shoham himself gave this assessment: In its originality of concept in calling the Commission to life, the Knesset showed courage. And in our success in influencing legislation and bringing a new concept into the legislative realm, we see an unprecedented event. An interesting debate between scholars on this topic can be found in the Intergenerational Justice Review. Hans Jonas is probably the most prominent advocate of a systemic justice view, which informs his advocacy for the rights of future generations. He defines a generational categorical imperative that can be summarized as follows: Along with enjoying access is the notion of trusteeship, meaning the protection of the common heritage as the property of humankind as a whole. We represent past generations, even while trying to obliterate the past, because we embody what they passed on to us. We represent future generations because the decisions we make today affect the well-being of all persons who come after us and the integrity and robustness of the planet they will inherit. The diversity of the natural and cultural resource base must be conserved so that the options available to future generations for solving their problems and satisfying their own values are not unduly restricted. The quality of the earth should become no worse. And each generation should provide its members with equitable rights of access to the legacy of past generations and should conserve this access for future generations. An updated institution will also need a new vision and common purpose that informs judgments about the just allocation of opportunities and the responsibilities to maintain them. Using empathy for the children of to build this new view of justice may ease a transition from an individual to a more relational perspective. Future Justice Starts Today The pioneering solutions described above are evidence that we may actually have learned something in the last two decades. Building understanding of what is at stake and encouraging individuals to trust in joint action have proven crucial, as has the strategic issuing of information to orchestrate consensus.

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Tip 2: Mind the Generation Gap. Clashes occur in all communities. Research shows gender, cultural and generational perceptions create sticking points that may affect organizations. Yet, of all three variables, 'generational differences' (McCrinkle,) take the lead in bringing people together or setting them apart. Keep an eye on them.

This Declaration was certainly a conquest for humanity: The Declaration has surely not eliminated the many attacks and violations of human rights that have been perpetrated during its 50 years in force. However, there is no doubt that recognition of its principles is always a notable stimulus for the spirit and practice of justice, both within nations and in relations between States, when its true "universality" is preserved and when it is not subject to fragmentation that can take away its original spirit. Among the fundamental rights, the Declaration recognizes the Family as "the natural and fundamental group unit of society" Art. We now offer a reflection on the Rights of the Family in the context of the Universal Declaration, the fruit of a seminar in which a large group of experts in different disciplines took part. For practical reasons and to aid their dissemination and knowledge, we are also offering the texts of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself and the Charter of the Rights of the Family of the Holy See in this publication. The Charter is in itself a deep reflection and development in the light of reason of what is already indicated in the Declaration. These documents are not always readily available. The reflection we are presenting on the occasion of this fiftieth anniversary is an instrument for dialogue and a scientific exchange of ideas on themes that affect the fundamental values of the person and of society. A Meeting Point 1. We, a group of experts and other persons committed to the cause of the family and life,¹ have met at the invitation of the Pontifical Council for the Family, to reflect for three days December , on the theme: We join with great hope in the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promulgated by the United Nations on December 10, Sharing the truth is a necessary condition for human coexistence. We certainly do not ignore the reservations to which the Declaration may have given rise: In this sense, various critiques have been made of it. However, it is good to stress the great convergence between this Declaration and Christian anthropology and ethics,³ despite the fact that the document makes no reference to God. There is also a conceptual proximity regarding the points admitted as being natural in that they are based on the common conscience of humanity. For this reason, it is certainly not a question of rights created by the Declaration but rather of rights which it recognizes and codifies. Out of the sufferings of war, with the deep wounds and lacerations it inflicted, and the grave attacks on the dignity of persons and peoples, humanity united to affirm "the value of the human person",⁶ together with the due respect and protection. From all places and cultures, the nations of the world proclaimed universal truths, universal rights and universal values. Although the nations of the world are different, their delegates listened to the prompting of the spirit, the call of reason, the lessons of history, and the inclinations of the heart. Representing the peoples of the world,⁷ the nations agreed to forego ideologies and go beyond utilitarianism in order to recognize the ends grounded in the nature of each and every person. This brings in universal dynamics so that around the truth about man, many more nations than the original signers could adhere to the Declaration and, hopefully in the near future, all the nations of the world will do so. We are aware that the "cold war" impeded application of the Declaration, but we are also aware of the great possibilities that the present era can derive from the so-called "globalization". This means a globalization that is not limited to purely economic aspects but involves other realities and dimensions that have to converge in recognition of the dignity of the human person and pass through a whole body of ethical values that have a binding force. This will all become a reality if we discover the way to encourage the recognition and application of human rights. In his message of November 30, , John Paul II paid explicit homage to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when he described it as "one of the most valuable and significant documents in the history of law". John Paul II has also stated "and this is a warning of great importance" that the selective use of the principles of the Declaration threatens "the organic structure of the Declaration which associates each right with other rights, duties and limits necessary for a just social order". For this reason, the present document is not just an "anniversary celebration" of the document published in ,

but a call to all those who recognize the centrality of the human person and the family as the fundamental and irreplaceable nucleus capable of generating the society which will respond to the world we are hoping for. The building up of that society is a noble and difficult task of humanity. We focused on two inseparable areas: The Role of the Family 8. Taking into consideration that the Declaration was inspired by firmly anchored ethical and anthropological values consolidated by convictions regarding an objective moral order which were well-grounded at that time, and that it responded to cultural, socio-economic and political circumstances in a given historical setting, we nonetheless believe that it still maintains its complete force. It is in this perspective that the promotion of "Human Rights" should be facilitated in the face of the many aspects of the present crisis. One aspect of fundamental importance for the promotion of human rights is recognition of the "rights of the family". This implies the protection of marriage in the framework of "human rights" and of family life as an objective of every juridical system. The Charter of the Rights of the Family, presented by the Holy See, implies the conception of the family as a subject that includes all its members. The family is thus a whole which should not be divided up when it is being dealt with by isolating its members— not even for reasons of social substitution which, although necessary in many cases, should never put the family as a subject in a marginal position. The family and marriage need to be defended and promoted not only by the State but also by the whole of society. Both require the decisive commitment of every person because it is starting from the family and marriage that a complete answer can be given to the challenges of the present and the risks of the future. Challenges such as threats to survival, the "culture of death", violence, the lack of safety, under-development, unemployment, migrations, distortions by the communications media, etc. We are aware that it is possible and even necessary to introduce and carry forward a dialogue based on human reason regarding society and the principles and ethical requirements that must guide human coexistence. However, we would like to develop our reflection in a vision in which faith and reason converge. Reason is enriched when enlightened by faith, and faith makes a depth and a density possible that serve the dignity of the person and of peoples. The Foundation of Brotherhood In our century, man has been studied sufficiently on the basis of the many human sciences; nonetheless, the question, Who is man? This paradox has not been solved: Euripides thus stated that "the intellect is God in each one of us". Thomas Aquinas continued in this direction and recognized that man is a person and that this is what is most perfect in the whole of nature: Man is a living, bodily and spiritual being; he is a structured whole. He is distinctum subsistens in intellectuali natura. The concepts of person and dignity are related to one another but not identical. The person refers to being in its highest degree of perfection with its three characteristics of subsistence, spirituality and totality. Dignity refers first to a quality of being, a value that can be opposed to a countervalue. Every person as such has an innate dignity that must be recognized and respected. In this sense, a person also has an acquired dignity that is attained as one perfects in the human order. As the image of God, man has been created through an act of love. God wanted to give man a nature that was different from the whole created order. Man stands out among the other created beings; he transcends them. We all share in existence in a personal way through God the Creator himself. As a personal creature endowed with reason and free will and called to eternal happiness, each human being reflects something of divine magnificence. This is the ultimate, indispensable foundation of our brotherhood. The family is the pre-eminent, most favorable and irreplaceable place for the recognition and development of a personal being on its way to complete dignity. In the family the first steps in human development are taken. In it one is forged not only in the maternal uterus but, as St. Thomas points out, in a "spiritual uterus". A person who does not receive this initial promotion in the family will be greatly hampered in achieving the human fullness to which he is called as a person. Respect for human rights is necessary for the human development of persons in the community. These values include life itself, health, knowledge, work, the community and religion. Above all, "the family is in fact a community of persons whose proper way of existing and living together is communion: Parents give that new life a home in which the child can grow and develop. All the rights that are necessary by nature for the development of the person in his wholeness become real in the family in the most effective way. The family, by its very nature, is a subject of rights, the foundational element of human society, and the most necessary force in the full development of the human person. This is something that maintains all its value, despite the changes that have affected the family over

the course of history. Since all men are persons, the Holy Father has defined the fundamental institution of society as a "communio personarum". This is why it remains a social institution which neither can nor should be replaced: To achieve this end, it is becoming increasingly necessary to give value to the family and to the different members who comprise it. **Dignity and Equality** The concept of the dignity of a human being must always be the key to interpreting the Declaration. This is mentioned in the first paragraph of the Preamble, taken up in the first article, and subsequently repeated throughout the whole Declaration. All the affirmations, principles and rights mentioned in the Declaration were written and must be interpreted in the light of the dignity of a human being. Moreover, the Christian understanding of man makes it possible to arrive at a deeper foundation of this reality by making it known that man is the only being who has worth in himself and not only by reason of the species. Furthermore, man has been created in the image and likeness of God Gn 1: The human creature is wanted and loved by God as an end in itself. The Universal Declaration begins by affirming that it recognizes the innate dignity of all the members of the human family as well as the equality and inalienability of their rights. Therefore, this is a reflection of the substantial and spiritual reality of the human person and not a creation of the human will, a concession by public authorities, or a product of cultures or historical circumstances. In the Declaration, the dignity of the human being is put in relation to the reason and conscience with which the human being is endowed²⁴ and thus to his free will. The Encyclical *Pacem in Terris* also expressly emphasizes this. **Every Human Being** Every human being possesses this dignity, as affirmed by the Declaration in which almost every article begins with expressions such as "every human being", "every member of the human species", "every human individual without any distinction", etc. The enumeration of the rights and duties which the Declaration includes thus offers both juridical and ethical guidelines that make it possible to focus on many human situations, both those which existed at the time the Declaration was written, and those brought about by the subsequent social changes and innovations introduced through the development of technology, the economy, and political institutions within States. Everything that is stated about the dignity, rights and duties of the human being holds equally for men and for women. The common dignity of men and women and their reciprocity is the authentic basis for affirming their complete dignity. Reciprocity implies in fact that there is neither a static and undifferentiated equality between men and women, nor an inexorable and irreconcilable conflictual distinction. **Work and the Family** As both a right and a duty,²⁹ work expresses and fulfills the dignity of human beings. It demonstrates their ability to dominate the world around them; it contributes to the development of their personality,³⁰ and makes the growth of civilization possible. The whole of society and the organizations and policies of the States must generate conditions that will lead to making it possible for everyone to work. We cannot forget that "work constitutes a foundation for the formation of family life, which is a natural right and something that man is called to.

Chapter 8 : II. Alternative approaches to intergenerational equity

The Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities (DHDR) was written for reinforcing the implementation of human rights under the auspices of the UNESCO and the interest of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights and was proclaimed in "to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"(UDHR) in the city of Valencia.

Relation between Rights and Duties Article shared by: Relation between Rights and Duties! Rights and Duties always go together: Rights and duties are closely related and cannot be separated from one another. Both go side by side. These are the two sides of the same coin. If the state gives the right to life to a citizen, it also imposes an obligation on him to not to expose his life to dangers, as well as to respect the life of others. If I have a right to work and earn, it is also my duty to recognize the same right of others. Right of One is the Duty of Others: Rights can be enjoyed only in the world of duties. For every right there is corresponding duty. When the people fail to discharge their duties properly, the rights all become meaningless. Rights of a Citizen also implies Duties for him: Rights are not the monopoly of a single individual. Everybody gets these equally. It is my duty to respect the rights of others as well as the duty to use my rights in the interest of society. Rights are to be used for Social Good: Rights originate in society. Therefore, while enjoying rights, we must always try to promote social interest. It is the duty of every one of us to use our rights for promoting the welfare of the society as a whole. Duty towards the State: Since state protects and enforces rights, it also becomes the duty of all citizens to be loyal to the state. It is their duty to obey the laws of the state and to pay taxes honestly. Citizens should always be ready to defend the state. Thus a citizen has both Rights and Duties. He enjoys rights and performs his duties. Rights and Duties are the two sides of the same coin.

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Today there are evident signs that the good of children is being overlooked: However, the mass media has become, in our day, an extraordinary influence over the lives of children and young people, and therefore over the rights and duties of parents. Many ideas about life are presented without due regard for the social order. False values and pornography have helped to break the primary role of parents in the education of their children. When we consider the philosophical nature of rights and duties it is immediately clear that parents, precisely because they are persons with a special task to carry out, have a claim upon rights and duties which comes before that of the media, which is only an organ of society. Moreover, the family is a special subject of rights and duties. The Family, unlike the mass media, pertains to the essential nature of man. Indeed, the social dimension of humanity finds its innate expression in the family. How do we account for this? The basis of the family is located in the nature of the human person. This nature is witnessed to in "the common conscience of humanity" [1], in philosophy, in culture, in the sciences, in law, especially Common Law, the *ius gentium* and international law. Furthermore, such an understanding about the family is witnessed to in the "Declaration of Human Rights", article The same understanding is given profound treatment in Revelation and in the Magisterium of the Church. Human rights and their accompanying duties are thus not identified in an arbitrary way, but are based upon the true goods and values of the human person. The true goods and values of the person together comprise the well-being of the person. These true goods and values are founded in the natural inclinations of man and in his ends as a person. Thus, both the natural law and natural rights are founded in the very nature of the human person. The Magisterium of the Church intensifies this understanding describing the education of children as the "proper mission" [2] of parents. The education of children, in fact, pertains to the essential nature of marriage: Pope John Paul II defines the right to educate children as an original and primary right. It is a right which flows directly from the person, it is universal and is manifested in mandatory form. Moreover, it is not substitutable and it is inalienable - it cannot be negated or delegated of *Familiaris Consortio*, The duty that parents have to educate their children means that they must also have the right to do so, and that all other agents of education within the community are subsidiary. These rights engender civic consequences: It follows then that the community has rights and duties with regard to families: The Council confirms that the role of schools is subsidiary to that of the parents. Essentially the media is ordered to the good of the person and society. The Vatican Instruction *Communio et Progressio* succinctly bears the purpose of the media in its title: The Council document which treats of the media, *Inter Mirifica*, emphasises the role of society in regulating the media and establishing the criteria of public service. Indeed, society has the task of ensuring that the media maintains its subsidiary role viz a viz the task of parents. Article 5,f of the document in amplifying the Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26, establishes the right of families to a truly beneficial media, and the right to be protected against the misuse of the media. This right is founded in the natural law and thus, in the nature of the human person. Therefore, the right to communicate information is secondary to the right of the family to a beneficial media. The media has a special duty towards parents and families. The Church endorses the active role of media users within the media [5] and, singularly, promotes the active role of parents. Indeed, parents have a particular right, within the common good, to express their opinions about the media. The Holy Father describes how contemporary culture, especially a media which is a source of both good and evil, has interfered with parents responsibilities. He teaches that parents must respond to this new culture in three specific ways: The responsibility of parents to educate children because of the state of the media, and the accompanying duty of the media to truly serve families. The responsibility of parents to control the use of the media within families, and the accompanying duty of the community to aid parents. The responsibility of parents to influence media production, and their right to be heard within society and the media empire. The media itself has the capability of promoting and developing these rights. However, the tendency today is to actually take the task of parents out of their hands. As I have noted, this is done by

communicating false values, false conflict situations and bogus opinions which reflect badly upon the family. When we reflect upon the actual agents of the media we find it hard to pinpoint who those agents might be. Within society as a whole and within the State we know that Government exercises only a pragmatic influence over the media and, apart from a few regulatory Commissions, probably the most dominant agent of the media is public opinion. In underlining the relationship of the family to society and in delineating particular rights and duties, the Church is declaring that parents are the primary agents of the media within society. We should not let the force of this statement pass us by. Parents have a responsibility over the media which is based in the nature of the human person and which overrides any other claim within the common good. This should not surprise us since the family is the true agent of human values, and it is the bearer of primary rights. The rights and duties of parents reinforce the family as the true environment for the education of children; these same rights and duties should be used more directly, within the public forum, to call for a reform of the media. *Gaudium et Spes, Communio et Progressio,*