

**Chapter 1 : Deleuze, Gilles | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy**

*Difference and Repetition (French: Différence et Répétition)* is a book by philosopher Gilles Deleuze, originally published in [www.nxgvision.com](http://www.nxgvision.com) was translated into English by Paul Patton in

Traditionally, difference is seen as derivative from identity: To the contrary, Deleuze claims that all identities are effects of difference. Identities are neither logically nor metaphysically prior to difference, Deleuze argues, "given that there exist differences of nature between things of the same genus. Difference, in other words, goes all the way down. To confront reality honestly, Deleuze argues, we must grasp beings exactly as they are, and concepts of identity forms, categories, resemblances, unities of apperception, predicates, etc. He therefore concludes that pure difference is non-spatio-temporal; it is an idea, what Deleuze calls "the virtual". Assuming the content of these forms and categories to be qualities of the world as it exists independently of our perceptual access, according to Kant, spawns seductive but senseless metaphysical beliefs for example, extending the concept of causality beyond possible experience results in unverifiable speculation about a first cause. Deleuze inverts the Kantian arrangement: Simultaneously, Deleuze claims that being is univocal, i. Deleuze borrows the doctrine of ontological univocity from the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus. Scotus argued to the contrary that when one says that "God is good", the goodness in question is exactly the same sort of goodness that is meant when one says "Jane is good". That is, God only differs from us in degree, and properties such as goodness, power, reason, and so forth are univocally applied, regardless of whether one is talking about God, a person, or a flea. Deleuze adapts the doctrine of univocity to claim that being is, univocally, difference. Moreover, it is not we who are univocal in a Being which is not; it is we and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal Being. For Deleuze, there is no one substance, only an always-differentiating process, an origami cosmos, always folding, unfolding, refolding. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, for example, reality is a play of forces; in *Anti-Oedipus*, a "body without organs"; in *What is Philosophy?* Truth may be hard to discover—it may require a life of pure theorizing, or rigorous computation, or systematic doubt—but thinking is able, at least in principle, to correctly grasp facts, forms, ideas, etc. Deleuze rejects this view as papering over the metaphysical flux, instead claiming that genuine thinking is a violent confrontation with reality, an involuntary rupture of established categories. Truth changes what we think; it alters what we think is possible. By setting aside the assumption that thinking has a natural ability to recognize the truth, Deleuze says, we attain a "thought without image", a thought always determined by problems rather than solving them. Reason is always a region carved out of the irrational—not sheltered from the irrational at all, but traversed by it and only defined by a particular kind of relationship among irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium, and drift. A philosophical concept "posits itself and its object at the same time as it is created. In his later work from roughly onward, Deleuze sharply distinguishes art, philosophy, and science as three distinct disciplines, each analyzing reality in different ways. While philosophy creates concepts, the arts create novel qualitative combinations of sensation and feeling what Deleuze calls "percepts" and "affects", and the sciences create quantitative theories based on fixed points of reference such as the speed of light or absolute zero which Deleuze calls "functives". According to Deleuze, none of these disciplines enjoy primacy over the others: Hence, instead of asking traditional questions of identity such as "is it true? In a classical liberal model of society, morality begins from individuals, who bear abstract natural rights or duties set by themselves or a God. Following his rejection of any metaphysics based on identity, Deleuze criticizes the notion of an individual as an arresting or halting of differentiation as the etymology of the word "individual" suggests. Guided by the naturalistic ethics of Spinoza and Nietzsche, Deleuze instead seeks to understand individuals and their moralities as products of the organization of pre-individual desires and powers. The first part of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* undertakes a universal history and posits the existence of a separate social body that takes credit for production for each mode of production: Where societies of discipline were characterized by discrete physical enclosures such as schools, factories, prisons, office buildings, etc. Deleuze claims that standards of value are internal or immanent: Modern society still suppresses difference and alienates persons from what they can do. To affirm

reality, which is a flux of change and difference, we must overturn established identities and so become all that we can become—though we cannot know what that is in advance. The pinnacle of Deleuzian practice, then, is creativity. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, but on the contrary because what has value can be made or distinguished only by defying judgment. What expert judgment, in art, could ever bear on the work to come? Deleuze once famously described his method of interpreting philosophers as "buggery enculage", as sneaking behind an author and producing an offspring which is recognizably his, yet also monstrous and different. And the same goes for philosophical concepts, since there are distinct concepts of these spaces. The following list is not exhaustive, and gives only the briefest of summaries. You should not question it. However, May believes that Deleuze can discard the primacy-of-difference thesis, and accept a Wittgensteinian holism without significantly altering his practical philosophy. They give examples of mathematical concepts being "abused" by taking them out of their intended meaning, rendering the idea into normal language reduces it to truism or nonsense. In their opinion, Deleuze used mathematical concepts about which the typical reader might be not knowledgeable, and thus served to display erudition rather than enlightening the reader.

**Chapter 2 : NEW - Difference and Repetition by Deleuze, Gilles | eBay**

*Difference and Repetition, a brilliant exposition of the critique of identity, has come to be considered a contemporary classic in philosophy and one of Deleuze's most original works.*

Life and Works Deleuze was born in Paris to conservative, middle-class parents, who sent him to public schools for his elementary education; except for one year of school in Normandy during the Occupation, he lived in the same section of Paris his entire life. His personal life was unremarkable; he remained married to the same woman he wed at age 31, Fanny Denise Paul Grandjouan, a French translator of D. Lawrence, and raised two children with her. He rarely traveled abroad, although he did take a trip to the United States in ; for the most part he minimized his attendance at academic conferences and colloquia, insisting that the activity of thought took place primarily in writing, and not in dialogue and discussion. Deleuze traced his initiation into literature and philosophy to his encounter with a teacher at Deauville named Pierre Halbwachs son of the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs , who introduced him to writers such as Gide and Baudelaire. Early on, he recalled, philosophical concepts struck him with the same force as literary characters, having their own autonomy and style. Like many of his peers he was as influenced by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre as he was by the work of his academic mentors. It was also during this time that he contracted the recurring respiratory ailment that would plague him for the rest of his life. The next year, , proved to be an important one for Deleuze. First, he found a permanent teaching position in Paris, at the experimental campus of the University of Paris VIII in Vincennes which later moved to its current location in St. Denis ; he gave weekly seminars at this institution until his retirement in . Second, he published another major text in his own name, *Logic of Sense*. They followed this with *Kafka: The s* were a decade of independent works for Deleuze: *Logic of Sensation* ; *Cinema I: Leibniz and the Baroque* . He then resumed his collaboration with Guattari for their final joint work, *What is Philosophy?* In writing these works, Deleuze sought to unearth the presuppositions he absorbed in his education; chief among them, he felt, was a deep-seated privilege of identity over difference. Deleuze thus set about trying to accelerate however he could a departure from Hegel, whom he saw as emblematic of that privilege. Deleuze characterized his own work as a philosophy of immanence, arguing that Kant himself had failed to realize fully the ambitions of his critique, for at least two reasons: First, Kant made the field of consciousness immanent to a transcendental subject, thereby reintroducing an element of identity that is transcendent that is, external to the field itself, and reserving all power of synthesis that is, identity-formation in the field to the activity of the always already unified and transcendent subject. Together the passive syntheses at all these levels form a differential field within which subject formation takes place as an integration or resolution of that field; in other words, subjects are roughly speaking the patterns of these multiple and serial syntheses which fold in on themselves producing a site of self-awareness. Of course, Deleuze never simply proclaims this as a bald thesis, but develops a genetic account of subjectivity in many of his books. In other wordsâ€”and this is a pragmatic perspective from which Deleuze never deviatedâ€”philosophy aims not at stating the conditions of knowledge qua representation, but at finding and fostering the conditions of creative production. In other words, Maimon called for a genetic method that would be able to reach the conditions of real and not merely possible experience. Maimon found a solution to this problem in a principle of difference: *Nietzsche and Philosophy* , for instance, suggests that Nietzsche completed and inverted Kantianism by bringing critique to bear, not simply on false claims to knowledge or morality, but on true knowledge and true morality, and indeed on truth itself: In *Bergsonism* , Deleuze develops the ideas of virtuality and multiplicity that will serve as the backbone of his later work. The positive name for that genetic condition is the virtual, which Deleuze adopts from the following Bergsonian argument. We then reverse the procedure and think of the real as something more than possible, that is, as the possible with existence added to it. By contrast, Deleuze will reject the notion of the possible in favor of that of the virtual. Rather than awaiting realization, the virtual is fully real; what happens in genesis is that the virtual is actualized. The fundamental characteristic of the virtual, that which means it must be actualized rather than realized, is its differential makeup. For instance, Deleuze criticizes Kant for copying the transcendental field in

the image of the empirical field. That is, empirical experience is personal, identitarian and centripetal; there is a central focus, the subject, in which all our experiences are tagged as belonging to us. Deleuze still wants to work back from experience, but since the condition cannot resemble the conditioned, and since the empirical is personal and individuated, the transcendental must be impersonal and pre-individual. The virtual is the condition for real experience, but it has no identity; identities of the subject and the object are products of processes that resolve, integrate, or actualize the three terms are synonymous for Deleuze a differential field. The Deleuzian virtual is thus not the condition of possibility of any rational experience, but the condition of genesis of real experience. As we have seen, the virtual, as genetic ground of the actual, cannot resemble that which it grounds; thus, if we are confronted with actual identities in experience, then the virtual ground of those identities must be purely differential. A typological difference between substantive multiplicities, in short, is substituted for the dialectical opposition of the one and the multiple. To these he added a trio of pre-Kantians, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume, but read through a post-Kantian lens. There are many Spinozist inheritances in Deleuze, but one of the most important is certainly the notion of univocity in ontology. The result is a Spinozism minus substance, a purely modal or differential universe. In univocity, as Deleuze reads Spinoza, the single sense of Being frees a charge of difference throughout all that is. In univocal ontology being is said in a single sense of all of which it is said, but it is said of difference itself. What is that difference? In social terms, puissance is immanent power, power to act rather than power to dominate another; we could say that puissance is praxis in which equals clash or act together rather than poiesis in which others are matter to be formed by the command of a superior, a sense of transcendent power that matches what pouvoir indicates for Deleuze. In the most general terms Deleuze develops throughout his career, puissance is the ability to affect and to be affected, to form assemblages or consistencies, that is, to form emergent unities that nonetheless respect the heterogeneity of their components. In , Deleuze published a book on Leibniz entitled *The Fold*: This is the point where one begins to consider the virtual domain on its own account, freed from its actualization in a world and its individuals. First, God is no longer a Being who compares and chooses the richest compossible world; he has now become a pure Process that affirms impossibilities and passes through them. Second, the world is no longer a continuous world defined by its pre-established harmony; instead, divergences, bifurcations, and impossibles must now be seen to belong to one and the same universe, a chaotic universe in which divergent series trace endlessly bifurcating paths, and give rise to violent discords and dissonances that are never resolved into a harmonic tonality: Third, selves or individuals, rather than being closed upon the compossible and convergent world they express from within, are now torn open, and kept open through the divergent series and impossible ensembles that continually pull them outside themselves. In other words, if Deleuze is Leibnizian, it is only by eliminating the idea of a God who chooses the best of all possible worlds, with its pre-established harmony and well-established selves; in Deleuze, impossibilities and dissonances belong to one and the same world, the only world, our world. First, rather than seeking the conditions for possible experience, Deleuze wants to provide an account of the genesis of real experience, that is, the experience of this concretely existing individual here and now. Second, to respect the demands of the philosophy of difference, the genetic principle must itself be a differential principle. However, despite these departures, Deleuze maintains a crucial alignment with Kant; *Difference and Repetition* is still a transcendental approach. Transcendental philosophy in fact critiques the pretensions of other philosophies to transcend experience by providing strict criteria for the use of syntheses immanent to experience. Three further preliminary notes are in order here. First, as we will discuss in section 4 below, the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* project of Deleuze and Guattari will bring to the fore naturalist tendencies that are only implicitly present in the still-Kantian framework of *Difference and Repetition*. It is the experience by human subjects of this individual object in front of it, and it is the experience enjoyed by the concretely existing individual itself, even when that individual is non-human or even non-living. Second, then, in the demand for genetic principles to account for the real experience of concrete individuals, Deleuze is working in the tradition of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. We are now ready to discuss the book itself. Deleuze inverts this priority: Difference is no longer an empirical relation but becomes a transcendental principle that constitutes the sufficient reason of empirical diversity for example, it is the difference of electrical potential

between cloud and ground that constitutes the sufficient reason of the phenomenon of lightning. Let us take up the first four postulates. The first postulate concerns our supposed natural disposition to think; the denial of this is what necessitates our being forced to think. The second and third postulates concern subjective and objective unity. Here difference is submitted to a fourfold structure that renders difference subordinate to identity: Finally, the relation of substance to the other categories is analogical, such that being is said in many ways, but with substance as the primary way in which it is said. Here we see the dynamic genesis from intensity in sensation to the thinking of virtual Ideas. Each step here has a distinct Kantian echo. Intensity is the characteristic of the encounter, and sets off the process of thinking, while virtuality is the characteristic of the Idea. With the notions of intensive and extensive we come upon a crucial distinction for Deleuze that is explored in Chapters 4 and 5 of *Difference and Repetition*. Extensive differences, such as length, area or volume, are intrinsically divisible. A volume of matter divided into two equal halves produces two volumes, each having half the extent of the original one. Intensive differences, by contrast, refer to properties such as temperature or pressure that cannot be so divided. However, the important property of intensity is not that it is indivisible, but that it is a property that cannot be divided without involving a change in kind. X centimeters of length and breadth. Drawing on these kinds of analyses, Deleuze will assign a transcendental status to the intensive: Intensive processes are themselves in turn structured by Ideas or multiplicities. An Idea or multiplicity is really a process of progressive determination of differential elements, differential relations, and singularities. Let us take these step-by-step. Finally, these differential relations of an individual language determine singularities or remarkable points at which the pattern of that language can shift: For another example—“and here, in the applicability of his schema to widely divergent registers, is one of the aspects of Deleuze as metaphysician”—let us try to construct the Idea of hurricanes. These flows qua differential elements enter into relations of reciprocal determination linking changes in any one element to changes in the others; thus temperature and pressure differences will link changes in air and water currents to each other: Finally, at singular points in these relations singularities are determined that mark qualitative shifts in the system, such as the formation of thunderstorm cells, the eye wall, and so on. But this is still the virtual Idea of hurricanes; real existent hurricanes will have measurable values of these variables so that we can move from the philosophical realm of sufficient reason to that of scientific causation. A hurricane is explained by its Idea, but it is caused by real wind currents driven by real temperature supplied by the sun to tropical waters. To see how Ideas are transcendental and immanent, we have to appreciate that an Idea is a concrete universal. The second case, on the contrary, defines a differential Idea in the Deleuzian sense: White light is still a universal, but it is a concrete universal, and not a genus or generality. Indeed, Deleuze adopts a number of neoplatonic notions to indicate the structure of Ideas, all of which are derived from the root word *pli* [fold]: Similarly, the Idea of sound could be conceived of as a white noise, just as there is also a white society or a white language, which contains in its virtuality all the phonemes and relations destined to be actualized in the diverse languages and in the remarkable parts of a same language. We can now move to discuss Chapter 5, on the individuation of concretely existing real entities as the actualization of a virtual Idea. In isolating the conditions of genesis, Deleuze sets up a tripartite ontological scheme, positing three interdependent registers: Simply put, the actualization of the virtual proceeds by way of intensive processes. Tying together the themes of difference, multiplicity, virtuality and intensity, at the heart of *Difference and Repetition* we find a theory of Ideas dialectics based neither on an essential model of identity Plato, nor a regulative model of unity Kant, nor a dialectical model of contradiction Hegel, but rather on a problematic and genetic model of difference. From these examples we can see that Ideas structure the intensive processes that give rise to the behavior patterns of systems, and their singularities mark the thresholds at which systems change behavior patterns.

**Chapter 3 : Difference and Repetition (Continuum Impacts) Gilles Deleuze: Continuum**

*distinctive opposed to the ordinary, an instantaneity opposed to variation 2 Difference and Repetition learned by heart. The head is the organ of exchange, but the heart is the amorous.*

Works[ edit ] The works are in French unless noted. The links following respective editions point to their online versions; where no file format is specified abbreviations stand for digital archives. Links within the wiki are in green. Deleuze, Cresson, David Hume: Japanese *Istinti e istituzioni*, trans. Ubaldo Fadini and Katia Rossi, Milan: Mimesis Eterotopia, , pp. PUF, , pp. Asahishuppansha, , pp; rev. Cappelli, , pp. Italian *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, trans. Greek David Hume, trans. Peter Geble and Martin Weinmann, Frankfurt: Campus, , pp. KR, , pp. Polish *Empirismo e subjetividade: Spinoza* [ . PUF, ; , pp, Log. *Memoria y vida*, trans. Alianza, , pp, Log. *Pax*, , pp. Martins Fontes, , Log. Brazilian Portuguese *Philosophie der Dauer*, trans. Meiner, , pp. German *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, , PDF. NP *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, Paris: *Nietzsche y la filosofia*, trans. Japanese *Nietzsche und die Philosophie*, trans. German *Nietzsche e a filosofia*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian Portuguese *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. English *Nietzsche e a filosofia*, trans. Portuguese *Nietzsche e la filosofia*, trans. Italian *Nietzsche i filozofia*, trans. Pavo, , pp. Holnap, , pp. Plato, , pp. Bai hua wen yi chu ban she, , pp. She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she, , pp. Greek *Nietzsche och filosofin*, trans. Daidalos, , pp. Swedish *Nitsshe i filosofiya* [ ], Moscow: Ad Marginem, , PDF. Russian *Nietzsche a filosofie*, trans. Romanian *Nietzsche ja filosofia*, trans. Summa, , pp. Finnish *Nietzsche ve felsefe*, trans. Norgunk, , pp, PDF. Vietnamese *Nietzsche in filozofija*, trans. Krtina, , pp. Para ler Kant, trans. Alves, , 98 pp. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London: English *Kanto no hihan tetsugaku: Japanese A filosofia critica de Kant*, trans. Portuguese *Kants kritische Philosophie*. Merve, , pp. Payel, , pp. Korean *La filosofia critica di Kant*, trans. Marta Cavazza and Antonella Moscati, Naples: Cronopio, , pp. Marco Aurelio Galmarini, Madrid: Osiris, , pp. Hungarian *Filozofia krytyczna Kanta: She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she*, PS Marcel Proust et les signes, Paris: PUF, , 91 pp; new ed. Marcel Proust e i segni, trans. Einaudi, , 96 pp, PDF. Italian Proust y los signos, trans. Anagrama, ; 2nd ed. Spanish Proust and Signs, trans. Penguin, , pp; New York: Brazillier, , pp; 2nd ed. Greek Proust und die Zeichen, trans. Henriette Beese, Frankfurt a. Ullstein, , pp. German Proust e os signos, trans. Forense-universitaria, , pp. Brazilian Portuguese Proust a znaky, trans. Russian Proust i znaki, trans. Atlantisz, , pp. Hungarian Proust og tegnene, trans. Det lille Forlag, , pp. Shang hai yi wen chu ban she, Chinese Proust in znaki, trans. Slovenian Nietzsche, , PDF. Bertani, , pp. Hans Erich Lampl, Oslo: Lanser, , pp. Asahishuppansha, , pp. Japanese *Nitsshe* [], trans. Axioma, , pp, PDF. Peter De Graeve, Baarn: Pelckmans, , pp. Arena Libros, , pp. KR, , pp, PDF. Polish "Nietzsche", in Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, intro. Anne Boyman, New York:

**Chapter 4 : Difference and Repetition : Gilles Deleuze :**

*This brilliant exposition of the critique of identity is a classic in contemporary philosophy and one of Deleuze's most important works. Of fundamental importance to literary critics and philosophers, Difference and Repetition develops two central concepts – "pure difference and complex repetition" – and shows how the two concepts are related.*

Perhaps his provocations only make sense against the background of a quasi-scholastic reverence for the classics. I took a few notes as I read. On the contrary, it is said of a world without identity, without resemblance or equality. It is said of a world the very ground of which is difference, in which everything rests upon disparities, upon differences of differences which reverberate to infinity the world of intensity. Is this the world in which any of us live? Deleuze is said to have acquired his life-long love of philosophy from reading Being and Nothingness as a teenager. While his mature thought would obviously develop in a very different direction, away from phenomenology, toward structuralism and beyond, I wonder if his fundamental orientation remained Sartrean throughout. Sartre notoriously represents the apotheosis of subjectivity, in which freedom becomes absolute. As a post-structuralist, Deleuze is supposed to have no truck with such cartesian naivetes. The unconscious becomes an absurd doctrine if we think of it as a series of representations that just happens to fall below the threshold of consciousness. Absurd, yet often difficult to avoid; it seems that Freud himself often fell into this error. If it is beneath or beyond representations, then how is it possible to speak of it at all? Paul Ricoeur addresses this problem in his great book Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. He admits to a certain modesty, indirection, restraint in what he as a philosopher is able to say. The imperative to think without representations seems to give total license to nonsense at times. The passage quoted above continues In this sense it is not even clear that thought, in so far as it constitutes the dynamism peculiar to philosophical systems, may be related to a substantial, completed and well-constituted subject, such as the Cartesian Cogito: Is he saying that in order to do philosophy we should first fry our brains on hallucinogens? Just read the central chapter, "The Image of Thought. What else could it be? Duchamp never meant for his urinal to be discussed seriously by art historians in the same breath as Poussin, and it at least seems possible that article like the following are simply not getting the joke, [http:](http://) Given that I likened it to a prose poem, I should add that as such it often succeeds fantastically. A well-known test in psychology involves a monkey who is supposed to find food in boxes of one particular color amidst others of various colors: On the one hand, damn! Phenomenology of Perception is a book that at times leans heavily on common sense. These pathological cases, in turn, must ultimately be understood against a ground or horizon of meaning. Perception is already a whole; we perceive a whole, not discrete bits of sensory data; and perception is also the model for all further truth and meaning. Deleuze seems to have an entirely different model in mind. He begins chapter 3 by ridiculing common sense, the idea that there are things that everybody knows. He apparently wants to do Descartes one better. Not only can the world be doubted, it must be dissolved in a miasma of lunatic ideas. He stresses that it is only a violent encounter that sets us thinking. One could fall mute, but that clearly is not the choice of the verbose Monsieur Deleuze.

**Chapter 5 : Difference and Repetition - Wikipedia**

*Outline of Gilles Deleuze, Différence et Répétition (Paris: PUF, ). English translation by Paul Patton, English translation by Paul Patton, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, ).*

Additional Uncollected Articles 1. Biography Gilles Deleuze was born in the 17th arrondissement of Paris, a district that, excepting periods in his youth, he lived in for the whole of his life. He was the son of an conservative, anti-Semitic engineer, a veteran of World War I. When the Germans invaded France, Deleuze was on vacation in Normandy and spent a year being schooled there. In Normandy, he was inspired by a teacher, under whose influence he read Gide, Baudelaire and others, becoming for the first time interested in his studies. In a late interview, he states that after this experience, he never had any trouble academically. His first book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, on David Hume, was published in 1948, when he was 27. Over the next ten years, Deleuze held a number of assistant teaching positions in French universities, publishing his important text on Nietzsche *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in 1962. It was also around this time that he met Michel Foucault, with whom he had a long and important friendship. When Foucault died, Deleuze dedicated a book-length study to his work *Foucault*. This was also the period of the first major incidence of pulmonary illness that would plague Deleuze for the rest of his life. These texts were considered by many including Deleuze to be an expression in part of the political ferment in France during May 1968. He took his own life on November 4th, 1995. While in later years, he became quite critical of both the style of thought implied in narrow reproductions of past thinkers and the institutional pressures to think on this basis, Deleuze never lost any enthusiasm for writing books about other philosophers, if in a new way. Most of his publications contain the name of another philosopher as part of the title: Deleuze expresses two main problems with the traditional style and institutional location of the history of philosophy. The first concerns a politics of the tradition: The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in philosophy, and even in thought. It has played the repressors role: A formidable school of intimidation which manufactures specialists in thought - but which also makes those who stay outside conform all the more to this specialism which they despise. An image of thought called philosophy has been formed historically and it effectively stops people from thinking. This criticism also sits well with a general theme throughout his writings, which is the immediate politicisation of all thought. Philosophy and its history is not separated from the fortunes of the wider world, for Deleuze, but intimately linked to it, and to the forces at work there. Producing mental, conceptual portraits. As in painting, you have to create a likeness, but in a different material: Perhaps such a method does not seem extremely creative, or perhaps only in a relatively passive sense. For Deleuze, however, the history of philosophy also embraces a much more active, constructive sense. Each reading of a philosopher, an artist, a writer should be undertaken, Deleuze tells us, in order to provide an impetus for creating new concepts that do not pre-exist DR vii. Thus the works that Deleuze studies are seen by him as inspirational, but also as a resource, from which the philosopher can gather the concepts that seem the most useful and give them a new life, along with the force to develop new, non-preexistent concepts. In this text on Kant, these reveal themselves by way of emphasis, rather than out-and-out creation. While Deleuze himself locates in Kant the development of the concept of the transcendental at the root of modern philosophy DR , he is quick to insist that, even as transcendental faculties in Kant, understanding, reason and imagination act only in an immanent fashion to achieve their own ends: The Critique of Pure Reason thus condemns the transcendent employment of a speculative reason which claims to legislate by itself; the Critique of Practical Reason condemns the transcendent employment of practical reason which, instead of legislating by itself, lets itself be empirically conditioned. He argues not only that there are conflicts between the activity of the faculties, and thus between the first two Critiques, a moot point in reading Kant, but that the Critique of Judgement solves this problem already a controversial perspective by positing a genesis of free accord between the faculties deeper than their conflicts. Not only are the struggles between the faculties not insoluble: When we turn to consider a much later text, *The Fold: Leibniz*, Deleuze argues, is the philosopher whose point of view can be best used to understand the Baroque period, and Baroque architecture, music and art give us a unique and illuminating

vantage point for reading Leibniz. In fact, one of the more astonishing claims that Deleuze makes is that the one cannot be understood properly without the other: It is impossible to understand the Leibnizian monad, and its light-mirror-point of view-interior decoration system, if we do not come to terms with these elements in Baroque architecture. FLB 39; translation altered How is such a statement to be demonstrated? Instead of claiming that in fact there is an a priori link between Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze creates a new concept, and reads both of them through it: While there are elements of the fold already in Leibniz and the architecture and art of the period, as Deleuze points out N , it gains a new consistency and significance when used as a creative term in this manner. Throughout the book, and later, in Foucault, Deleuze uses the concept of the fold to describe the nature of the human subject as the outside folded in: We also see a return to the question of the body that he examines with Guattari in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Deleuze thus provides a reading of Leibniz that strikes the reader as eccentric and certainly at odds with the traditional approach, and yet which holds to both the text in all his historical studies, Deleuze cites quite exhaustively , and to the new direction that he is working in. I have always felt that I am an empiricist. N 88; WP 7 One can see that such a definition of empiricism differs sharply, at least apparently, from the traditional understanding canonised by Anglo-American histories of philosophy. Such a history would have us believe that empiricism is above all the doctrine that whatever knowledge that we possess is derived from the senses and the senses alone - the well-known rejection of innate ideas. Modern views of science embrace such a doctrine, and apply it as a tool to derive facts about the physical world. Rather, it takes a standpoint regarding the transcendental in general. Writing of Hume, he states that, We can now see the special ground of empiricism: The first is the rejection of all transcendentals, but the second is an active element: In terms of philosophy, the creation par excellence is the creation of concepts: On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever. Deleuze primarily developed this point of view through the texts he wrote prior to , and particularly through three other philosophers, who he reads as empiricists in the sense mentioned: Hume, Spinoza and Nietzsche. Deleuze, however, takes Hume to be far more radical than he is normally considered to be. His central concern is to establish the basis upon which the subject is formed. All the well-known arguments about habit, causation and miracles reveal a more profound question: Deleuze develops this argument by asserting precisely the opposite of the traditional reading of Hume: According to Hume, and also Kant, the principles of knowledge are not derived from experience. But in the case of Hume, nothing is transcendental, because these principles are simply principles of our nature. ES Kant proposed transcendental operations of categories in order to make experience possible, criticising Hume for thinking that we could have unified knowledge of an empirical flux that we only passively receive. The difference is that for Hume, these principles are natural; they do not rely upon the postulation of a priori structures of experience. The question of the subject is resolved by Hume, according to Deleuze, by the creation of a number of key concepts: Association is the principle of nature which operates by establishing a relation between two things. The imagination is affected by this principle to create a new unity, which can in turn be used later on to come to conclusions about other ideas that this unity resembles, is closely related to, or seems to cause. If we consider the traditional example of the balls on a pool table, the process of association allows a subject to form a relation of causality between one ball and the next, so that the next time one ball comes into contact with another, an expectation that the second ball will move is created. Thus Hume, for Deleuze, considers the mind to be a system of associations alone, a network of tendencies ES Perhaps there is no more striking answer to the problem of the Self. The mind, affected by the natural principle of association, becomes human nature, from the ground up: Empirical subjectivity is constituted in the mind under the influence of the principles affecting it; the mind therefore does not have the characteristics of a preexisting subject. ES 29 These associations account not only for experience in the basic sense, but up to the highest level of social and cultural life: Morals, feelings, bodily comportment, all of these elements of subjectivity are explained, not by transcendental structures, such as Kant will propose, but the immanent activity of association. Once this habitual structure of the self is in place, Deleuze suggests, the Humean concept of belief comes into play, which is resolutely a central part of human nature. It describes the particularly human way of going beyond the given. When we expect the sun to come up tomorrow, we do not do so because we know that it will, but because of a belief based on a habit. This in turn reverses the hierarchy

of knowledge and belief, and results, for Deleuze, in a, "great conversion of theory to practice. A flash of red, a movement, a gust of wind, these elements must be externally related to each other to create the sensation of a tree in autumn. In the social world, this externality attests to the always-already interested nature of life: The ways in which habits are formed attests to the desires at the heart of our social milieu. Subjectivity, as Deleuze describes it through his reading of Hume, is a practical, passional, empiricist concept, immediately located at the heart of the conventional, which is to say the social. Spinoza While Hume may not be a contentious name to link with a deepened empiricism, Benedict de Spinoza certainly is. Generally considered the arch-rationalist par excellence, Spinoza is most well known for the first main thesis proposed in his Ethics: Such a point of view hardly seems consistent with a radical construction of concepts, and an essential pragmatism: Spinoza is without a doubt the philosopher most praised and referred to by Deleuze, often with words that are rarely a part of philosophical writing. EPS 11 Spinoza is the Christ of philosophers, and the greatest philosophers are hardly more than apostles who distance themselves from or draw near to this mystery. Indeed, for Deleuze, Spinoza combines the two things into one movement: In more Spinozist language, we can refer to the thesis of a single substance instead of a plane of immanence; all bodies beings are modal expressions of the one substance SPP But not only is The Ethics for Deleuze the creation of a plane of immanence, it is the creation of a whole regime of new concepts that revolve around the rejection of the transcendental in all spheres of life. The unity of the ontological and the ethical is crucial, for Deleuze, in understanding Spinoza, that is: Which is a way of saying that, whatever the importance of my speculative propositions may be, you can only judge them at the level of the ethics that they envelope or imply [impliquer]. Practical Philosophy, indicates, the Ethics is only understood when it is seen, at one and the same time, to be theoretical and practical. Deleuze considers there to be three primary theoretico-practical points in the Ethics: The great theories of the Ethics. Spinoza argues that we are not the cause of our thoughts and actions, but only assume that we are based on their affects upon us. Deleuze insists on this point because he sees Spinoza bypassing an important illusion of subjectivity: The illusion of consciousness, for Spinoza a result of inadequate knowledge and sad affects, allows us to posit a transcendental consciousness supposedly free from the interventions of the world as in Descartes. The second is the critique of morality. Good and Evil, for Spinoza as for Lucretius and Nietzsche, are the illusions of a moralistic world-view that does nothing but reduce our power to act and encourages the experience of the sad passions SPP 25; LS

**Chapter 6 : Gilles Deleuze - Monoskop**

*About Difference and Repetition. Since its publication in , "Difference and Repetition", an exposition of the critique of identity, has come to be considered a contemporary classic in philosophy and one of Deleuze's most important works.*

Structure of the work[ edit ] Difference and Repetition contains five chapters, along with a preface, introduction, and conclusion. Preface[ edit ] Deleuze uses the preface to relate the work to other texts. He describes his philosophical motivation as "a generalized anti-Hegelianism" ix and notes that the forces of difference and repetition can serve as conceptual substitutes for identity and negation in Hegel. The importance of this terminological change is that difference and repetition are both positive forces with unpredictable effects. Deleuze suggests that, unlike Hegel, he creates concepts out of a joyful and creative logic that resists the dualism of dialectic: He also suggests not only that "conclusions should be read at the outset," but also that "This is true of the present book, the conclusion of which could make reading the rest unnecessary" ix. Repetition and Difference[ edit ] Deleuze uses the introduction to clarify the term "repetition. Both words describe events that have some underlying connections. Generality refers to events that are connected through cycles, equalities, and laws. Most phenomena that can be directly described by science are generalities. Seemingly isolated events will occur in the same way over and over again because they are governed by the same laws. Water will flow downhill and sunlight will create warmth because of principles that apply broadly. In the human realm, behavior that accords with norms and laws counts as generality for similar reasons. Science deals mostly with generalities because it seeks to predict reality using reduction and equivalence. Repetition, for Deleuze, can only describe a unique series of things or events. The Borges story in which Pierre Menard reproduces the exact text of Don Quixote is a quintessential repetition: Art is often a source of repetition because no artistic use of an element is ever truly equivalent to other uses. Pop Art pushes this quality to a certain limit by bringing production near the level of capitalism , while Net Art does away with replication altogether in favor of identification. For humans, repetition is inherently transgressive. Coldness and Cruelty , Deleuze identifies humor and irony as lines of escape from the generalities of society. Humor and irony are in league with repetition because they create distance from laws and norms even while re-enacting them. Deleuze describes repetition as a shared value of an otherwise rather disparate trio: He goes on to define repetition as "difference without a concept" Repetition is thus reliant on difference more deeply than it is opposed. Further, profound repetition will be characterized by profound difference. Difference in Itself[ edit ] Deleuze paints a picture of philosophical history in which difference has long been subordinated to four pillars of reason: He argues that difference has been treated as a secondary characteristic which emerges when one compares pre-existing things; these things can then be said to have differences. This network of direct relations between identities roughly overlays a much more subtle and involuted network of real differences: The chapter contains a discussion of how various philosophers have treated the emergence of difference within Being. This section uses Duns Scotus , Spinoza , and others to make the case that "there has only ever been one ontological proposition: A single voice raises the clamor of being" One then tries to understand the nature of differences that arise within Being. He accuses this conception of having a theological and metaphysical slant. Deleuze proposes citing Leibniz that difference is better understood through the use of  $dx$ , the differential. Deleuze argues that difference should fundamentally be the object of affirmation and not negation. As per Nietzsche, negation becomes secondary and epiphenomenal in relation to this primary force. Repetition for Itself[ edit ] The chapter describes three different levels of time within which repetition occurs. Deleuze takes as axiomatic the notion that there is no time but the present, which contains past and future. These layers describe different ways in which past and future can be inscribed in a present. As this inscription grows more complicated, the status of the present itself becomes more abstract. Passive synthesis[ edit ] Basic processes of the universe have a momentum that they carry into each present moment. Prior thought and behavior, all substance performs contraction. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations" Passive synthesis is exemplified by habit. Habit incarnates the past and gestures to the future in the present by transforming the

weight of experience into an urgency. Habit creates a multitude of "larval selves," each of which functions like a small ego with desires and satisfactions. In Freudian discourse, this is the domain of bound excitations associated with the pleasure principle. Deleuze cites Hume and Bergson as relevant to his understanding of the passive synthesis. Active synthesis[ edit ] The second level of time is organized by the active force of memory , which introduces discontinuity into the passage of time by sustaining relationships between more distant events. A discussion of destiny makes clear how memory transforms time and enacts a more profound form of repetition: Destiny never consists in step-by-step deterministic relations between presents which succeed one another according to the order of a represented time. Rather, it implies between successive presents non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals, and roles which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions. It deals with events in their depth and structure rather than in their contiguity in time. Proust and Lacan are key authors for this layer. Empty time[ edit ] The third layer of time still exists in the present, but it does so in a way that breaks free from the simple repetition of time. This level refers to an ultimate event so powerful that it becomes omnipresent. It is a great symbolic event, like the murder to be committed by Oedipus or Hamlet. Upon rising to this level, an actor effaces herself as such and joins the abstract realm of eternal return. The me and the I give way to "the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I Empty time is associated with Thanatos, a desexualized energy that runs through all matter and supersedes the particularity of an individual psychic system. The Image of Thought[ edit ] This chapter takes aim at an "image of thought" that permeates both popular and philosophical discourse. According to this image, thinking naturally gravitates towards truth. Thought is divided easily into categories of truth and error. The model for thought comes from the educational institution, in which a master sets a problem and the pupil produces a solution which is either true or false. This image of the subject supposes that there are different faculties, each of which ideally grasps the particular domain of reality to which it is most suited. In philosophy, this conception results in discourses predicated on the argument that "Everybody knows Descartes , for example, appeals to the idea that everyone can at least think and therefore exists. Deleuze points out that philosophy of this type attempts to eliminate all objective presuppositions while maintaining subjective ones. Deleuze maintains, with Artaud , that real thinking is one of the most difficult challenges there is. Thinking requires a confrontation with stupidity , the state of being formlessly human without engaging any real problems. One discovers that the real path to truth is through the production of sense: Sense is the membrane that relates thought to its other. Accordingly, learning is not the memorization of facts but the coordination of thought with a reality. This thought is fundamentally energetic and asignifying: At the end of the chapter, Deleuze sums up the image of thought he critiques with eight attributes: Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference[ edit ] This chapter expands on the argument that difference underlies thought by proposing a conception of Ideas based on difference. Deleuze returns to his substitution of the differential  $dx$  for negation  $-x$  , arguing that Ideas can be conceived as "a system of differential relations between reciprocally determined genetic elements" Ideas are multiplicities"that is, they are neither many nor one, but a form of organization between abstract elements that can be actualized in different domains. One example is of organisms. An organism actualizes itself according to a schema that can be varied but nevertheless defines relations between its components. Its complexity is achieved by progressive breaks in symmetry that begin with small distinctions in an embryonic mass. The notion of virtuality emphasizes the way in which the set of relations themselves are prior to instances of these relations, called actualizations. Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible[ edit ] This chapter continues the discussion of the play of difference and explains how sense can arise from it. To do so, it engages with a handful of scientific and mathematical concepts that relate to difference. Intensive and Extensive[ edit ] One major theme is the intensive , which opposes and for Deleuze, precedes the extensive. Extensity refers to the actualized dimensions of a phenomenon: Correspondingly, while extensive properties can be subject to division the object can be cut in half , intensive qualities cannot be simply reduced or divided without transforming their bearer entirely. There is an intensive space, called spatium, which is virtual and whose implications govern the eventual production of extensive space. This spatium is the cosmic analogue of the Idea; the mechanism of abstract relations becoming actualized is the same. Intensity governs the basic

processes through which differences interact and shape the world. Modes of Thought[ edit ] Deleuze attacks good sense and common sense. Good sense treats the universe statistically and attempts to optimize it to produce the best outcome. Good sense may be rationalist, but it does not affirm fate or difference; it has an interest in reducing rather than amplifying the power of difference. It takes the economic view in which value is an average of expected values and present and future can be interchanged on the basis of a specific discount rate. Common sense is the ability to recognize and react to categories of objects. To both common sense and good sense, Deleuze opposes paradox. Paradox serves as the stimulus to real thought and to philosophy because it forces thought to confront its limits. That is, even after individuation takes place, the world does not become passive background or stage on which newly autonomous actors relate to each other. Individuals remain bound to the underlying forces that constitute them all, and these forces can interact and develop without individual approval.

## Chapter 7 : Deleuze's Eternal Problem: Difference and Repetition – ENTROPY

*Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition was first published in French in It is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy and stands out as one of the great philosophical works of the twentieth century.*

## Chapter 8 : Gilles Deleuze (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Difference and Repetition (French: Différence et Répétition) is a book by philosopher Gilles Deleuze, originally published in France.*

## Chapter 9 : Difference and Repetition by Gilles Deleuze

*Gilles Deleuze (/ d ɛˈl ɛˈl ɪ ʊˈz /; French: [Éˈil dɛˈlɛˈz]; 18 January - 4 November ) was a French philosopher who, from the early s until his death in , wrote on philosophy, literature, film, and fine art.*