

# DOWNLOAD PDF GLOBALISATION AND THE NEW REGIONALISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

## Chapter 1 : The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series - Routledge

*Globalisation and the new regionalism in the Indian Ocean [P. Venkateshwar Rao] on www.nxgvision.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers.*

Probe as girls sent creepy packages Globalisation is the product of this century which has deep impact on all parts and the nations of the world. Many new phenomena have emerged as a result of this exclusive globalisation. Regionalism is not such a new phenomenon but it has got an immense importance as a by-product of globalisation. Both of these have the same objective of economic cooperation at the regional level as they are considerably successful. Economic cooperation and development through regional organisations have not been a popular stance in our foreign and internal policies. Our efforts to become a part of such organisations are very weak. In the past, we had good chances to gain benefits through regional pacts and accords, but it all remained ineffective. Similarly, when ECO Economic Cooperation Organisation was revived in and 10 countries became its members; this could be a game changer in the region. That was a big economic opportunity for us. We could not envision its future prospects and its infrastructure were not established. Central Asian States which were liberated from the Soviet Union were landlocked and rich in natural resources. They along with Afghanistan needed a land route which could connect them to the world through the ports of Gwadar and Karachi. But due to the external pressure and internal deficiencies, we could not stabilise this organisation. Its result is that we could not get away with our economic dependencies on the West. It could not perform up to the expectations due to the Indian intentions and behaviour. This is a Eurasian organisation which is basically designed for the economic motives. This can be a beneficial bond for the members in the future, but remembering our past and present scenario, there is very little hope of its success for Pakistan. Pakistan is a failure in the matters of regional cooperation. There are many factors involved in it. Afghanistan is a source of continuous unrest and terrorism in the South Asia for almost last four decades. Unfortunately, our ties with her are not so good. Indo-Afghan nexus at present has worsened these relations. Afghanistan is a natural geo-strategic partner of Pakistan but its authorities are ignoring the ground realities. This attitude is harmful for both the countries. Afghanistan is the third largest export market of Pakistan at present so it is needed to take solid steps not only to sustain this trade but also to enhance it. India can be given MFN most favored nation status but only after securing our own national interests. Sanctions have led Iran towards a closed economy. After nuclear agreement with the West, it was thought that the Iranian economy will strengthen slowly. But after American decision to come out of this agreement, has deteriorated the circumstances. Pakistan can have reasonable relations with Iran but our strong relations with Saudi Arabia are a hurdle in its way. Moreover, our region has deep divide of pro-American and pro-Chinese sentiments. Pakistan is naturally tilting towards Chinese side, so we are going to be economic partner of China. The new dimensions of regionalism in Asia have emerged and our future is linked with it.

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## Chapter 2 : India's Evolving Approach to Regionalism: SAARC and Beyond - Rising Powers in Global

*indian, power, politics and maritime governance in the indian ocean [jivanta schoettli] on amazoncom \*free\* shipping on qualifying offers the indian ocean is of tremendous geo political and strategic relevance more than eighty per cent of global.*

As India rises, there is recognition that for its own interests it needs to consider the wider regional as well as global interests. On the one hand, India today sees global and regional multilateral mechanisms as platforms to engage with the outside world to meet the expectations from a rising power. On the other hand, India needs global and regional multilateral organisations to meet its own rising aspirations. Though some scholars continue to challenge the notion that there is a major power shift underway Cox At the core of this new narrative is the rise of China and India. Recent years have increasingly seen the inability of existing global institutions effectively managing international crises. However, there are some instances where India has been playing an active contributing role in global governance in issue areas such as climate change and multilateral trade negotiations Narlikar ; Saran The South Asia Satellite launched in May is case in point. The paper also argues that unlike the past, New Delhi today views joining and building regional and sub-regional institutions as an important way of advancing its foreign policy interests. Finally, the paper concludes with a few observations as well as challenges. However, whether it is in comparative politics or international relations most scholars agree that regions are socially constructed. As Hettne , p. South Asia has been atypical when seen from this perspective. The idea of a regional grouping in South Asia emerged from within a diverse set of interests among its member states. These political and strategic divergences continue to affect SAARC even today after three decades of its existence. In his idealistic vision of building Asian unity and solidarity, Nehru: If at all, he thought that such a community would be encompassed within the broader goal of Asian solidarity Muni , p. Even as India remained wary of the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia, by the late s the need for a regional forum was felt and the thinking gained momentum. India showed initial hesitation for two reasons. Second, India was also wary of majority decision-making being institutionalised. It was the first regional organisation represented by seven countries of the region. Even as collective regional prosperity began to emerge in speeches of Indian leaders, political differences within SAARC remained an obstruction. The idea of sub-regional approach opened up new ways to build regionalism in South Asia. During this period, India also supported and participated in promoting other sub-regional and regional forums outside the SAARC framework. By the turn of the century, India further pushed its eastward drive when it set up another sub-regional grouping with the mainland Southeast Asian nations. The MGC emphasised cooperation in the field of tourism, culture, education, and transportation linkages. These initiatives suggest that India recognised the benefits of cooperation in maintaining good relations with its neighbours. As Muni , p. The Indian policy makers came to accept with various degrees of candour that India has a greater responsibility to work for the evolution of constructive and cooperative neighbourhood relationships, not only because it is big, but also because it is more resourceful. Furthermore, India would, perhaps, reap greater advantages in its overall foreign policy initiatives, if it enjoy a greater support and understanding of its neighbours and its efforts and attention is not unduly trapped within the South Asian region. Domestically, the process of economic reforms that began in the s led the country witness phenomenal economic growth. To sustain the new economic growth trajectory, one of the key concerns has been to ensure regional instability so that it does not hamper its growth Saran ; Menon ; Mohan Another strategic factor relates to the China factor. Taking the new regional approach forward in building an integrated neighbourhood, in India announced that as the largest country in SAARC it would open its market to the Least Developed Countries without insisting on reciprocity and further reduced the sensitive list in respect of these countries. India also strengthened its engagements with sub-regional groupings. India also began to push for physical connectivity with its neighbours both to integrate the region with its economy as well as to tie these economies to its own. An important policy calibration has been to

open up its frontiers to its neighbours for border trade. As part of the new thinking on regionalism of the s, the realisation of deep interdependence in the security realm among South Asian nations where India cannot insulate itself also pushed New Delhi to reframe its regional security approach. This thinking allowed India to see itself as a regional leader as well as collaborate with neighbours in ensuring regional order and stability. A bilateral exercise launched in between India and the US, the Malabar, began as a familiarisation exercise between the navies of the two countries acquired greater geopolitical content by the mid-2000s involving interoperability exercises and with participation from more countries, though it revert back to the bilateral exercise following protest from China. A tripartite maritime security cooperation was signed in July with the aim to buttress maritime cooperation to secure sea routes in the Indian Ocean. Recognising the need for wider participation on the emerging issues of the Indian Ocean, New Delhi took the lead in creating new platforms for exchange of views among the IOR littorals. A couple of recent developments suggest that India is willing to push for regional integration in South Asia. Here again, Pakistan is the only country that have opted itself out of the project. In the Indian Ocean region, the Modi government has taken major policy initiatives to promote collective action and integrated maritime security coordination. India has been in talks with several countries in the Indian Ocean region to enter in data-sharing agreement on white shipping. India has also been strengthening closer security ties with the key players in the Indo-Pacific region. This could be seen in the expansion of the Malabar exercise as it acquired a trilateral status with the inclusion of Japan and the setting up of the Japan-India-Australia trilateral in Lang. First, in the early years of its independence, India envisioned a much broader regionalism overlooking South Asia. In the current thinking, equal emphasis is given to both the two constructs South Asia and Indo-Pacific. Contrary to this, the new Indian regional approach is driven by strategic interests. A crisis-ridden neighbourhood would keep India preoccupied. Failing to integrate the sub-continent with its economy would increase the potential of South Asian nations to look towards China to fulfil their developmental needs with long-term strategic implications for India. Gulati In the current approach, new concept has been employed that allows India to enter into regional security arrangements. India recognises that an unstable South Asia could guarantee neither its economic development nor its security. In this sense, as in the economic realm, the need to engage the region in security is based on its own self-interest. However, such hope were dash in the context of continued hostilities and tensions between India and Pakistan. By the turn of the century, New Delhi was determined to explore new ways to make the concept relevant where opportunities exist, even if that means minus Pakistan. As discussed above, India has precisely taken forward the idea of building maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean. This could be seen both in the economic field as well as in the security domain. Second, while Delhi has the option of inviting leaders of the sub-regional BBIN initiative, this would have left out other neighbours including Sri Lanka and Myanmar. However, then questions could be raised as to why New Delhi overlooked its immediate neighbours. Implications and Challenges If China is the factor pushing India to play a more active role in the region, the question is, would India undertake regional initiatives in the absence of the China factor. One may argue that the urgency to recalibrated its regional approach would have been missing without China in its regional calculus. But at the same time, there is no denying the fact that India has been increasingly taking regional initiatives for its own self-interest and the wider regional interests, particularly in areas such as the maritime domain. Traditional issues in South Asia such as territorial disputes particularly the Kashmir dispute, regional rivalry with Pakistan which is likely to increase as a result of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, and lack of trust with its smaller neighbours. India is increasingly taking the lead to improve regional governance in key areas including socio-economic development, maritime, energy, water, cyber, space and security. In any community building project the people of the region are the most significant component. The necessity to adopt such an approach in regional cooperation will only grow with issues such as climate change, rise in sea-level, energy scarcity, food security, natural disasters, etc. The initiatives to strengthen a new maritime order in the Indian Ocean region by creating mechanisms both with its immediate neighbours such as the Sri Lanka and Maldives but also with other regional and extra-regional players will have long-term implications

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for the evolving dynamics of the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. India is beginning to demonstrate that it has the intent and the capability to maintain a stable regional order at sea. In fact, several analysts argue that India is beginning to take up leadership role particularly in regional maritime governance. Conclusion Drawing from the above discussion, this paper concludes with a few observations. First, India has begun to take leadership role in shaping and building regionalism in South Asia and beyond. Third, New Delhi is finding innovative ways of creating alternative mechanisms to address the much-needed regional governance. Naval diplomacy has been the most active both in South Asia and in the Indo-Pacific region. Pant and the two anonymous reviewers. Negotiating cooperation, institutional structure, Routledge, London. But will South Asia Satellite become white elephant in space? Muni, S D

## Chapter 3 : talkingeconomics - Sri Lanka's New Regionalism: Looking beyond South Asia

*Regionalism in the Indian Ocean: Order, Cooperation and Community* is a result of the authors research while at Jawarhalal Nehru [www.nxgvision.com](http://www.nxgvision.com) book looks at factors favouring regionalism in the Indian Ocean; where a shared history, geographical contiguity and global economically based regional blocks act as pull factors while the end of Cold War, political and economic reforms within the.

Regions have found it difficult to address the equitable distribution of gains and losses from integration. Mechanisms to provide compensation to the less developed members of groupings have been either absent or ineffective. The dependence of many African countries on their former colonial powers tended to work against viable regional groupings. Regionalism has been driven from above by public sector organizations and has lacked the support and involvement of the private sector and the general public. Cooperation has been seen as involving bloated and expensive bureaucracies, rather than opportunities for growth and development. Institutional weaknesses, including the existence of too many regional organizations, a tendency towards top-heavy structures with too many political appointments, failures by governments to meet their financial obligations to regional organizations, poor preparation before meetings, and lack of follow up by sectoral ministries on decisions taken at regional meetings by Heads of State. Integration is hampered by the existence of weak states and political opposition to sharing sovereignty. Integration arrangements are not characterized by strong supranational bodies and virtually all integration institutions are intergovernmental. Given the ongoing economic reform programs in these countries, the underlying premise is that regional integration can accelerate the pace of economic growth by fostering efficient cross-border investment and trade flows. Assessments by the co-sponsors suggested that good if variable progress has been achieved by the Initiative and that the model represents an effective example of regional partnership Fajgenbaum et al, Trade relations, which are now based on non-reciprocal trade preferences granted by the EU, will in future be based on economic integration agreements. Formal negotiations of EPAs started in September in a two-phase process. The first phase of the negotiations takes place between the EU and the ACP group as a whole with the aim of defining the format, structure and principles for the negotiations, to be followed by the negotiation of individual EPAs. It is envisaged that EPAs will enter into force by 1 January at the latest. Decisions about the geographical configuration of future EPAs are still outstanding. Under the Cotonou Agreement, this decision lies with the ACP countries, but the EU has added the rider that it is up to the Community to ensure that this decision is in line with the objectives and principles of the Agreement. Criteria for ACP regions The criteria for eligible regions are clear enough; the difficulty lies in implementing them in the specific context of the existing structure of African regional groupings. It highlights the importance of structural funds financed by customs and taxation revenues to assist weaker partners in the integration scheme to ensure an equitable distribution of the gains of regional integration. Finally, it recommends that integration should take account of existing infrastructures, trading and production links. This requirement runs up against the overlapping membership and fragmented nature of African regional organizations. There are a number of permutations. The simplest is where one grouping is a sub-group of another, possibly embarked on pursuing deeper integration as an example of variable geometry. An example typical in West and Southern Africa is where there is a wide free trade area arrangement, within which a sub-group has established a customs union or an even more deeply integrated group. Here the options are for the negotiations to proceed with either one group or the other as it would be impossible to have two negotiations in parallel, one with respect to the free trade area and one with the customs union. The difficulty is that if negotiations proceed with the customs union sub-group, it is hard to see how this could avoid fragmenting the larger grouping unless it decides to accelerate its own integration ambitions. More tricky situations arise with groupings that have members in common. In this situation, overlapping membership would lead to the negotiation of two or more EPAs with the same countries, which is not conceivable. As overlapping memberships mainly affect the broad, free trade

groupings, this could effectively end up forcing even larger integration arrangements than currently exist. Another difficult situation is where groupings have non-ACP States as members. The Commission points out that while, legally, arrangements could be put in place to allow free circulation of goods within the free trade area while confining the benefits of the EPA to the ACP members of the group, in practice this situation would not be tenable in the longer term because of the possibility of trade deflection. Given that the EU will have entered into separate FTAs with many of these non-ACP African states, it suggests that a logical step would be to extend the geographical coverage of EPAs by merging the existing agreements. While this might imply that only the former are required to provide some measure of reciprocity under the new regime, in practice it is hard to see how LDCs which are members of regional groupings with non-LDC ACP States can retain external protection against EU imports. It goes on to suggest that the appropriate response for LDCs in a regional grouping is to adopt a variable speed approach under which they would be offered a delayed start or a slower pace of tariff dismantlement. In practice, such an arrangement would give rise to the potential for goods with reduced or zero tariffs to be imported from the EU by the more advanced ACP members and re-exported under the FTA to LDC members which have the right to protect themselves by higher tariffs. While the problem can be avoided in principle by proper documentation of rules of origin, the difficulties of policing these may in practice undermine the tariff policies of the least developed countries. As the LDCs also lose out because of the potential for trade diversion under EPAs as EU exporters now gain better access to the markets of ACP countries at their expense, there is a strong case for compensation measures in their favor. These include whether trade diversion will dominate trade creation, the loss of fiscal revenues from the abolition of customs duties, the limited capacity in most ACP countries to conduct parallel sets of trade negotiations, and how to provide for sufficient scope for flexibility, special and differential treatment and asymmetry while ensuring that the agreements reached remain WTO-compatible. The future of regional integration in Africa

Despite competing visions of regional integration We have seen how a new momentum is building up behind regionalism in Africa, but that there are competing visions for the objectives and design of regional integration arrangements. On the other hand, there are the erstwhile sceptics among the donors who have been converted to supporting regionalism of a certain type, one which is outward-looking, which is focused on trade facilitation, which has strong private sector involvement and which has light institutional structures. Finally, there is the traditional model of top-down African regionalism, espoused by the OAU and endorsed by African Heads of State, which has a strong rhetorical basis and a largely political significance. This has implications for those interested in promoting a food security dimension to these agreements as outlined more fully in Chapter 5. For example, food security is explicitly addressed in the Cotonou Agreement in the provision which reads: The new regionalism must address the following issues which have been partly responsible for the poor record of the past: Overlapping memberships of competing groups should be resolved to allow a clear political commitment to particular country groupings. For a common market to function its members at least need to be at peace. The wars and conflicts in a number of African regions which have devastated transport networks, communications and other basic infrastructure need to be peacefully resolved. Ways must be found to involve the private sector in the integration process. It should not be expected that all private sector groups will favor regional integration. In some countries, farmers may fear low-cost competition from elsewhere in the region and may take quite a protectionist stance. The participation of consumer groups and other NGOs should be encouraged as these groups can also gain from exploiting the opportunities for greater intra-regional trade. Given the disparities in economic weight that exist between members of some groupings, new policy instruments to deal with the fears of economic polarization must be found, for example, multispeed arrangements allowing weaker members more time to liberalize , compensation schemes, regional investment banks, or structural solidarity funds such as the Food Security Financial Instrument proposed in Chapter 5. Dispute settlement mechanisms need to be strengthened and ways to ensure policy credibility must be put in place. Investors need to have confidence that integration measures will not be reversed and that barriers to regional markets will not be re-instituted overnight. Binding liberalization commitments in the

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WTO should be encouraged where possible, while the opportunity of the REPA negotiations with the EU should also be used to bind and enforce policy commitments. As the value of the EBA initiative was in the extension of duty-free access to agricultural products with transition periods for rice, sugar and bananas , these countries may now be in a position to export duty-free to the EU by transshipment through the LDC members of their EPA. Again, the quality of enforcement of rules of origin will be the decisive issue.

## Chapter 4 : Regionalism and Pakistan

*South Asia is a latecomer with regard to regionalism compared with other regions of the world and the Indian Ocean Region in particular, which have established at least one group in their respective regions. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)'s initial role as the.*

Whereas during the conflict its outlook was predominantly security-oriented, the island nation has now become prominent in economic and political matters in the region. In doing so, the country is recognizing its pivotal position as a strategic asset to both India and China. This was prompted mostly by political necessity. Sri Lanka was facing growing political pressures from the international community regarding alleged war crimes, and China offered much-needed cover at the United Nations and other international forums. Moreover, China was willing to provide unconditional economic support to finance large-scale infrastructure development, albeit through loans at market-rate interest. In return, Sri Lanka shifted away from its carefully curated non-aligned foreign policy in the Indian Ocean and started engaging in activities that demonstrated its new allegiance with China. Over the past five or so years, China has provided the island nation with financial support to develop an international seaport and airport, while also investing heavily in the Colombo Port City project. Each of these investments and actions has consequently raised concerns with India and its allies. As a small island economy with a population of 21 million, Sri Lanka depends heavily on foreign direct investment FDI and its export sector to catalyze economic growth. Domestic protectionist policies hinder the competitiveness of Sri Lankan firms, and the country is in dire need of diversifying its export basket and expanding exports beyond its traditional markets in the United States and United Kingdom. The inadequacy of regional value chains within South Asia has further heightened the need for Sri Lanka to look elsewhere for profitable economic linkages. Intra-regional trade in South Asia stands at a meager 5 percent, and that too is heavily influenced by bilateral trade with India. Cognizant of its weak position on the global economic platform and the failures of regional trade agreements such as the South Asian Free Trade Agreement SAFTA, Sri Lanka is currently negotiating a trifecta of bilateral trade and investment agreements with India, China, and Singapore. Immediately following the January presidential election, the new Sri Lankan government halted the Colombo Port City project in an attempt to appease India by signaling independence from Chinese influence. Yet Sri Lanka has taken considerable measures over the past two years to demonstrate its willingness to balance both Indian and Chinese interests. The Sri Lankan government is also currently negotiating a debt-to-equity swap with China by granting it access to an industrial park and management of the Hambantota Deep Sea Port and Mattala International Airport, while at the same time agreeing to work with India to develop a war-era oil tank farm in Trincomalee, a strategic port on the East Coast of the island. This is especially important as India itself moves towards broader regional engagement. Sri Lanka is beginning to establish itself as a logistical hub for Indian manufacturing and trade, while also positioning itself as an increasingly reliable political ally. For example, China has been willing to compromise on issues of land ownership and investment conditions while providing the Sri Lankan government adequate policy space to engage with India. China will support this balance so long as it is allowed to pursue its strategic investments in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. For instance, Chinese investors could invest in industrial zones in Sri Lanka to export to both China and India under an improved free trade agreement between Sri Lanka and India. Additionally, an increasingly inward-looking American foreign and economic policy and the consequent shift in global economic power towards the East increases opportunities for Sri Lanka to position itself as a regional economic hub. The change in focus, however, could pose potential challenges in terms of balancing Indian and Chinese interests. Both nations consider Sri Lanka a strategic asset, while also recognizing the concerns of their counterpart.

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## Chapter 5 : Regional Cooperation in Indian Ocean: Trends and Perspectives by P. Venkateshwar Rao free

*Pan-regional constructions in the Indian Ocean are of relatively recent origin, are contested and remain relatively weak at present. Sub-regional constructions, on the other hand, have tended to be more focussed, especially in terms of security, and have generally been more successful.*

March 7, 1: For the pessimists, the IORA is a talking shop that is unlikely to turn the diverse littoral into a coherent region. Realists will concede that IORA is not yet a credible regional institution. Yet, they would also acknowledge that its existence is a reminder of the untapped potential of Indian Ocean regionalism. Nearly five decades ago, in the aftermath of decolonisation, the attempt to bring together the Indian Ocean states faltered amidst deep divisions within the littoral and due to the negative impact of the Cold War. Together the three countries have already breathed new life into an organisation that few had heard of. Those who did had taken IORA for dead. It was India that took the diplomatic initiative at the beginning of this decade to revive the moribund idea of Indian Ocean regionalism. As it began to reinvest in Indian Ocean regionalism, the Indian Ocean forum identified some priority areas, including maritime safety and security, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, disaster risk management, and promotion of tourism. If the new found interest in Delhi put the IORA back on the regional agenda, Australia that took the baton from India in as the chair of the forum gave it a new name and fresh energy. Jakarta, which took over from Canberra in , deserves credit for hosting the first ever summit of the forum. The leaders are also likely to identify an action plan of specific steps that could be implemented in the near term. The summit is also likely to approve an agreement to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation in the littoral. The ideas of regional and global integration that held sway since the turn of the s has taken some beating amidst the resurgence of the dark forces of de-globalisation in the West. America, that had guaranteed the regional security order after the withdrawal of the British from the littoral in the late s looks terribly distracted. Internal turbulence in the littoral, especially in the Middle East, has unleashed forces of violent extremism that bring anarchy and instability. While Indonesia, Australia and other middle powers are important players in the Indian Ocean, their regionalist priorities are elsewhere. As the largest economy and biggest military power, it is largely up to India to shape the future of Indian Ocean regionalism. At the time of Independence, India was at the heart of trade and capital flows across the Indian Ocean, deeply connected to the rest of the littoral through multiple corridors, and the very centre of regional security management. By the time it came back to into the play in the new millennium, it finds huge obstacles for reclaiming the regional leadership of the littoral. The rise of China has meant that Beijing has become a powerful economic force in the Indian Ocean. It has the resources and the will to develop regional infrastructure and connectivity. Purposeful military diplomacy has helped Beijing carve out an expanding security profile in the littoral. Delhi cannot match the resources, financial or institutional, that Beijing brings to bear on Indian Ocean connectivity.

## Chapter 6 : CHAPTER REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

*Giving a renewed push to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), at its 13th meeting of the Council of Ministers in Perth, Australia in November , Indian External Affairs Minister announced New Delhi's plans to host the Track Indian Ocean Dialogue (IOD) to bring together scholars, experts and policy-makers from the Indian Ocean regional grouping to exchanges views.*

## Chapter 7 : Choppy waters, unsure navigator | The Indian Express

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