

Castells argues that globalization is a network of production, culture, and power that is constantly shaped by advances in technology, which range from communications technologies to genetic engineering.

Globalization, Technology and Society At the most generic level, globalization is simply the shrinking of geographic space of politically defined borders that accelerates and magnifies flows of money, goods, people and culture around the world. Today, more than ever before, people around the globe are more connected to each other: The negative consequences are mainly on social, economic and environmental levels. On one hand, there is increasing poverty in societies, a growing gap between developed and developing countries and between privileged and excluded people, low standards of living, disease, forced migration and human rights violations, exploitation of weak social groups, racism and xenophobia, conflicts, insecurity and growing individualism. On the other hand, there are many environmental repercussions, such as the greenhouse effect, climate change, pollution and the exhaustion of natural resources. Resistance to globalization, from various ideological perspectives, has grown as people have come to recognize its effects on their lives and on the world. Anti-globalization forces are critical of the inequities of global trade, environmental problems, loss of national sovereignty, and cultural imperialism. Information communication technologies have created what Spanish scholar Manuel Castells refers to as a "space of flows" , where global interactions have been rearranged to create what he calls "a new type of space that allows distant synchronous, real-time interaction". This new kind of interaction has created a global network that increasingly expands the connections and interdependency between individuals, with important implications for education. To Learn More Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. This process has effects on the environment , on culture , on political systems, on economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well-being in societies around the world. To find the right balance between benefits and costs associated with globalization, citizens of all nations need to understand how globalization works and the policy choices facing them and their societies. This process has speeded up dramatically in the last two decades as technological advances make it easier for people to travel , communicate, and do business internationally. Two major recent driving forces are advances in telecommunications infrastructure and the rise of the internet. His approach involves three overlapping tracks. Burbules Globalization reflects a set of changes at the economic, political, and cultural levels of society that tend to promote and reinforce a more global perspective on social policy. These broader economic effects of globalization tend to force national educational policies into a neoliberal framework that emphasizes lower taxes; shrinking the state sector and "doing more with less"; promoting market approaches to school choice particularly vouchers ; rational management of school organizations; performance assessment testing ; and deregulation in order to encourage new providers including online providers of educational services. What is globalization actually up to? Where there are some highly appreciated advantages of globalization , the world has witnessed some enormously bad effects of globalization too. The pros and cons of globalization simultaneously support and contradict its impact on the world economy. While the ones advocating globalization believe that it is because of this trend that poor economies have regained their hopes and faiths of developing financially, thus, raising their standards of living. However, on the other hand, the ones contradicting it believe that globalization is the only reason behind elite and high-profile multinational companies trashing off local cultures and beliefs, domestic small-scale businesses, and commoners, in the rush to attain an international status. Within the system, information technology has been the necessary condition for globalizing the economy. Today it is almost free through the Internet. But what also makes this era of globalization unique is not just the fact that these technologies are making it possible for traditional nation-states and corporations to reach farther, faster, cheaper and deeper around the world than ever before. It is the fact that it is allowing individuals to do so. If the first era of globalization shrank the world from a size "large" to a size "medium," this era of globalization is shrinking the world from a size "medium" to a size "small. In this new setting, the production, processing

and transmission of information become essential instruments for the attainment of economic success, political legitimacy and cultural influence. Increasing global interdependence has profound influence on education at all levels, such as how to deal with a world with more permeable boundaries in which people are on the move more frequently migration than ever before in human history, and in which urbanization is increasing at an unprecedented rate. This paper proposes a transformational analysis of contemporary globalization and identifies the increasing challenge for education due to the globalization, including the struggle to match the pace of technology change in society, to provide graduates with skills relevant to contemporary society, and to lead education students to an accommodation with persistent and rapid social change. This historical change is brought about by the advent of new information technologies – particularly those for communication and biological technologies. Communications technologies allow for the annihilation of space and for globalization; the potential for rapid and asynchronous communication also changes the relationship to time. Think Internet and websites. As the world shrinks, everything is becoming more inter-meshed – economics, politics, culture, traditions and religion. Regional concerns become world issues. Thus, age-old perspectives and worldviews no longer anchor us. For the first time in history, we humans are forging an awareness of our existence as a single entity. Communication technology is just one of the factors that has played a major role in spreading globalization, and some experts believe that globalization would have never been possible in the absence of communication technology. While the impact of communication technology has been overly positive, it has led to certain challenges.

Chapter 2 : Globalization: Culture and Society - Institute of Developing Economies

*Globalization and Networked Societies: Urban-Regional Change in Pacific Asia [Yue-man Yeung] on www.nxgvision.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The world in the last two decades of the twentieth century fundamentally and radically changed at a speed and on a scale never before witnessed.*

Kennedy School of Government. The following interview has been condensed for length and clarity: In a recent paper, you argue that contrary to the prevailing view among economists, trade agreements are the result of rent-seeking by politically well-connected firms. Trade agreements are political documents. Special interests, lobbyists, industry, and labor groups have always played a critical role in shaping them. I think what has changed is not that trade agreements involve special interests and political horse-trading, but the balance of interests. In this story, trade agreements are political, but essentially are a way of limiting the influence of groups that would close off the economy from the rest of the world. I think there is less and less reason to believe that, on balance, trade agreements are pursuing what an economist might consider the gains from trade or appropriate social objectives and are more and more being shaped by the agenda of special interests. When did this change occur? I think the watershed event was probably the s. The creation of the World Trade Organization, for me, is the turning point. By the s, the world economy had already become fairly open, and the WTO marked a fundamental transformation in the nature of trade agreements. They changed from trying to remove barriers at the border—the traditional import tariffs or quotas that economists tend to think about when they talk about trade barriers—and instead began to focus increasingly on behind-the-border rules and regulations, things like investment rules, rules on subsidies and health and safety, intellectual property rights. These are all areas where the economic benefit of global agreements has to be scrutinized very, very carefully because there is no natural benchmark. It becomes very difficult in these new areas to determine whether more trade agreements and international rules is a good thing or a bad thing. The fact that pharmaceutical companies or foreign investors find it so easy to get what they want is in part because of our existing narratives, or existing ideas, about how the world does or should work. A recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development argued that the hyperglobalization of the past 30 years has led to a sharp increase in market concentration, which in turn led to a proliferation of rent-seeking. Do you agree with the assessment that globalization has increased rent-seeking? I think what has happened is a combination of changes in our ideas and changes in the financial power and other powers of different groups, and this combination is reflected in the various parts of our global economy. I think that by fetishizing globalization and exaggerating its benefits and understating its downsides, we have essentially privileged and prioritized a set of powerful interests. Who are the rent-seekers empowered by trade agreements? First, financial institutions, banks; second, multinational institutions; and third, pharmaceutical companies. We see the impacts of these groups in investment rules, financial services agreements, intellectual property rights. To what degree is the populist nationalist backlash in Western democracies essentially a backlash against globalization? I think globalization has contributed to tearing societies apart. You needed to have a well-trained workforce and you needed to ensure that your local government invested in public services. Has the fact that globalization is often used as an excuse for policies that benefit politically connected groups and multinational firms helped fuel this backlash? And then of course we have mainstream political groups that have in many ways contributed to demonizing globalization, because they have a tendency to hide behind globalization. You have the left saying that we need to invest in infrastructure and education so that we can compete better in a global economy—that was the New Democrat line—and the right saying we need low taxes and lower regulations to compete in the global economy. What do you hear when politicians are telling you this? After the s, I think these priorities became reversed and globalization became the end, and countries and societies became the instrument, as opposed to the other way around. Much of the anti-globalization backlash of the last two years has been xenophobic, racist, authoritarian in nature. What is it about the nature of globalization that led to this kind of response? I think a lot of it has to do with the fact that the left has been missing in action. Twenty years ago, when I was fretting that globalization would create a backlash, I would have guessed that the main

beneficiary of this might have been the left, because it would capitalize on the economic and social grievances that these divisions create. Indeed, when we think about the populisms of the late 19th century—in the US or for that matter Latin America, with its long history of populism—they were by and large not racist and xenophobic, ethno-nationalist populisms, but left-wing populisms that focused on financial elites, on corporate elites, and pushed for social reform and more regulation of the economy. There were other shocks that made it easier. For example, immigration made it easy for right-wing nativists to provide a much more nativist, ethnonationalist frame for economic and social grievances to which I think one might have responded very differently. But I think its specific details are going to take very different forms. I think the challenge today is actually to reform the production stage and the pre-production stage of the market economy, much more so than simply having more progressive income taxation or improved health and employment benefits. How do we increase and democratize our educational system to ensure that the endowments with which workers come into the market seeking jobs diminish this deep cleavage between the technocratic and professional elite and ordinary workers? How do we regulate digital platform monopolies? These are reforms in education and property rights, in regulation and antitrust policy, that I think are going to necessarily look very different from the challenge that we confronted during the New Deal. What is economic populism, and how is it different from political populism? I think economic populism is a populism that takes aim at the sources of economic inequality and at concentrations of economic power. Today in the US, economic populism would take the form of bringing the financial sector down to size, reducing the influence of Wall Street in political institutions, and having much greater regulation of the financial sector. It would mean taking aim at concentrations of power in high-tech and digital industries. It would mean taking aim at our current pattern of trade agreements, which often privilege particular corporate interests and investors. All of that would be economic populism that tries to reshape the distribution of economic power and tries to reduce the concentration of economic power but does not try to turn the political system into an authoritarian one, does not necessarily concentrate political power or undermine liberal norms of pluralism and tolerance. And yet there is a certain overlap between the two, at least in terms of rhetoric. Many far-right populists also attack digital platforms, Wall Street, cronyism. I think the similarity is that both economic and political populism have an aversion to agencies of restraint. The difference, which I think in many ways is more important, is that economic populism is trying to redress economic imbalances and is actually doing things that would fundamentally improve the overall performance of an economy, [rather than] doing things to aggrandize or entrench the power of those who are currently in power. How did so many economists miss what you suggest is a fairly straightforward lesson from history? When I say economists should not have missed this, I am suggesting that the very economic theory that we teach in the classroom has very stark implications for inequality and social divisions, and therefore we should have expected these divisions having political consequences. I think fundamentally, economists were so enamored with the principle of comparative advantage and free trade that they felt that what they needed to do in the public domain was to defend free trade and globalization, even though the specific form that it took diverged very much from what they teach in the classroom. Still, I think they just instinctively sort of felt that they needed to be cheerleaders for this process rather than skeptics. Many of these developments—namely financial deregulation and globalization—have been tied to a set of policies often referred to as neoliberalism. In a recent piece for the *Boston Review*, you described much of neoliberalism as ideology masquerading as economic science, and criticized mainstream economics for embracing it. Should economists have been skeptic? I think in a way, economists were definitely a little bit politically naive. I have no idea what neoliberalism is. I think there is really a big distance between neoliberalism and proper, sound economics. As I argue in that piece, this does not translate into what neoliberalism is usually thought of. The ProMarket blog is dedicated to discussing how competition tends to be subverted by special interests.

Chapter 3 : Globalization - Wikipedia

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Globalization and Networked Societies: Urban-Regional Change in Pacific Asia.

It has also become a key idea for business theory and practice, and entered academic debates. Here we examine some key themes in the theory and experience of globalization. That spread has involved the interlacing of economic and cultural activity. This political project, while being significant and potentially damaging for a lot of poorer nations is really a means to exploit the larger process. Globalization in the sense of connectivity in economic and cultural life across the world, has been growing for centuries. However, many believe the current situation is of a fundamentally different order to what has gone before. There has also been a shift in power away from the nation state and toward, some argue, multinational corporations. Globalization involves the diffusion of ideas, practices and technologies. It is something more than internationalization and universalization. This involves a change in the way we understand geography and experience localness. As well as offering opportunity it brings with considerable risks linked, for example, to technological change. More recently, Michael Mann has commented: Concretely, in the period after this means the diffusion of ideologies like liberalism and socialism, the spread of the capitalist mode of production, the extension of military striking ranges, and the extension of nation-states across the world, at first with two empires and then with just one surviving. Here we want to focus on four themes that appear with some regularity in the literature: He characterizes it as a new brand of capitalism that has three fundamental features: Productivity and competitiveness are, by and large, a function of knowledge generation and information processing; firms and territories are organized in networks of production, management and distribution; the core economic activities are global that is, they have the capacity to work as a unit in real time, or chosen time, on a planetary scale. Many of the activities that previously involved face-to-face interaction, or that were local, are now conducted across great distances. There has been a significant de-localization in social and economic exchanges. Activities and relationships have been uprooted from local origins and cultures Gray But de-localization goes well beyond this. Increasingly people have to deal with distant systems in order that they may live their lives. Banking and retailing, for example, have adopted new technologies that involve people in less face-to-face interaction. Your contact at the bank is in a call centre many miles away; when you buy goods on the internet the only person you might speak to is the delivery driver. In this last example we move beyond simple notions of distance and territory into a new realm and this is what Scholte is especially concerned with when he talks of globalization. When we buy books from an internet supplier like Amazon our communications pass through a large number of computers and routers and may well travel thousands of miles; the computers taking our orders can be on a different continent; and the books can be located anywhere in the world. Not everything is global, of course. What happens in local neighbourhoods is increasingly influenced by the activities of people and systems operating many miles away. People and systems are increasingly interdependent. It may look like it is made up of separate and sovereign individuals, firms, nations or cities, but the deeper reality is one of multiple connections. As Castells noted they are organized around networks of production, management and distribution. Those that are successful have to be able to respond quickly to change both in the market and in production. Sophisticated information systems are essential in such globalization. Globalization and the decline in power of national governments. A major causality of this process has been a decline in the power of national governments to direct and influence their economies especially with regard to macroeconomic management. Shifts in economic activity in say, Japan or the United States, are felt in countries all over the globe. The internationalization of financial markets, of technology and of some manufacturing and services bring with them a new set of limitations upon the freedom of action of nation states. In addition, the emergence of institutions such as the World Bank, the European Union and the European Central Bank, involve new constraints and imperatives. Yet while the influence of nation states may have shrunk as part of the process of globalization it has not disappeared. However, we need to examine the way in which national governments

frame their thinking about policy. There is a strong argument that the impact of globalization is most felt through the extent to which politics everywhere are now essentially market-driven. Developments in the life sciences, and in digital technology and the like, have opened up vast, new possibilities for production and exchange. Innovations like the internet have made it possible to access information and resources across the world " and to coordinate activities in real time. Globalization and the knowledge economy. Earlier we saw Castells making the point that productivity and competitiveness are, by and large, a function of knowledge generation and information processing. This has involved a major shift " and entails a different way of thinking about economies. For countries in the vanguard of the world economy, the balance between knowledge and resources has shifted so far towards the former that knowledge has become perhaps the most important factor determining the standard of living " more than land, than tools, than labour. Paul Romer and others have argued that technology and the knowledge on which it is based has to be viewed as a third factor in leading economies. Global finance, thus, becomes just one force driving economies. Inevitably this leads onto questions around the generation and exploitation of knowledge. There is also a growing gap within societies see, for example, Stiglitz However, there are powerful counter-forces to this ideal. Indeed, writers like Ulrich Beck Risks in this sense can be viewed as the probability of harm arising from technological and economic change. Hazards linked to industrial production, for example, can quickly spread beyond the immediate context in which they are generated. In other words, risks become globalized. A universalization of hazards accompanies industrial production, independent of the place where they are produced: They dip under borders. Risks can catch up with those who profit or produce from them. The basic insight lying behind all this is as simple as possible: In this way a genuine and systematically intensifying contradiction arises between the profit and property interests that advance the industrialization process and its frequently threatening consequences, which endanger and expropriate possessions and profits not to mention the possession and profit of life Beck As knowledge has grown, so has risk. Indeed, it could be argued that the social relationships, institutions and dynamics within which knowledge is produced have accentuated the risks involved. Risk has been globalized. Globalization and the rise of multinational corporations and branding A further, crucial aspect of globalization is the nature and power of multinational corporations. Such companies now account for over 33 per cent of world output, and 66 per cent of world trade Gray Significantly, something like a quarter of world trade occurs within multinational corporations op. This last point is well illustrated by the operations of car manufacturers who typically source their components from plants situated in different countries. However, it is important not to run away with the idea that the sort of globalization we have been discussing involves multinationals turning, on any large scale, to transnationals: Hirst and Thompson While full globalization in this organizational sense may not have occurred on a large scale, these large multinational corporations still have considerable economic and cultural power. Globalization and the impact of multinationals on local communities. Multinationals can impact upon communities in very diverse places. First, they look to establish or contract operations production, service and sales in countries and regions where they can exploit cheaper labour and resources. It can also mean large scale unemployment in those communities where those industries were previously located. Second, multinationals constantly seek out new or under-exploited markets. They look to increase sales " often by trying to create new needs among different target groups. One example here has been the activities of tobacco companies in southern countries. Another has been the development of the markets predominantly populated by children and young people. In fact the child and youth market has grown into one the most profitable and influential sectors. Kenway and Bullen Of course such commodification of everyday life is hardly new. Writers like Erich Fromm were commenting on the phenomenon in the early s. However, there has been a significant acceleration and intensification and globalization with the rise of the brand see below and a heavier focus on seeking to condition children and young people to construct their identities around brands. Third, and linked to the above, we have seen the erosion of public space by corporate activities. Significant areas of leisure, for example, have moved from more associational forms like clubs to privatized, commercialized activity. Like the concept of citizenship itself, recreational space is now privatized as commercial profit-making venture. Gone are the youth centers, city public parks, outdoor basketball courts or empty lots where kids call play stick ball. Play

areas are now rented out to the highest bidder! This movement has been well documented in the USA particularly by Robert Putnam with respect to a decline in social capital and civic community but did not examine in any depth the role corporations have taken. It has profound implications for the quality of life within communities and the sense of well-being that people experience. Fourth, multinational companies can also have significant influence with regard to policy formation in many national governments and in transnational bodies such as the European Union and the World Bank key actors within the globalization process. They have also profited from privatization and the opening up of services. As George Monbiot has argued with respect to Britain, for example: In addition, national governments still have considerable influence in international organizations and have therefore become the target of multinationals for action in this arena. The growth of multinationals and the globalization of their impact is wrapped up with the rise of the brand. The astronomical growth in the wealth and cultural influence of multi-national corporations over the last fifteen years can arguably be traced back to a single, seemingly innocuous idea developed by management theorists in the mid-1980s: The logic underlying this runs something like the following: Instead, they should concentrate those resources in the virtual brick and mortar used to build their brands Nike, Levi, Coca Cola and other major companies spend huge sums of money in promoting and sustaining their brands. One strategy is to try and establish particular brands as an integral part of the way people understand, or would like to see, themselves. As we have already seen with respect to the operation of multinationals this has had a particular impact on children and young people and education.

Chapter 4 : "Globalization Has Contributed to Tearing Societies Apart" -

Social networking as a special phenomenon has significantly impacted networked societies all over the world. A new generation has recently appeared, variously called N Gen (network).

Monday, April 8, Globalization and Identity: Castells examines the nature of finance in a globalized world presenting the idea that finance is fickle, profit driven, and knows no national loyalties. Finance is the Achilles heel of globalism and the global economy, specifically the fluid nature of capital in a networked world. Castells discusses the huge capital flows across borders, as occurred during the Asian Flu crisis in , which many consider as the first global financial crisis of the new era of globalization. He suggests that the flow of capital across state borders is at the heart of the "new world order", and that such flows represent both opportunity and weakness. Castells observes that multinational corporations, in a world with open markets, are driven by the desire to search out low-cost producers and low-cost labor, with little if any loyalty to a "home country. The ripple effects of financial tsunamis diffuse throughout the world, very rapidly. Volatility and unpredictable side effects are an inherent risk in integrated, networked global financial systems, concentrated in time and space, which Castells describes as "timeless time" and a "space of flows". Castells suggests that the technological and networking revolution is a reinforcing feedback loop that produces ever-accelerating change. He was prescient in warning against the dangers of hedge funds and trading firms dealing in unregulated securities and points out that the interdependence of global unregulated financial markets puts not just financial markets at risk, but the monetary policies of entire countries and national economies See Castells, p as well as global economies. Castells discusses various factors in his book, such as the information and technology revolution, the dominant initial influence of the United States, the free flows of capital across state boundaries, and the pervasive influence of the Internet on business and individual behavior and identity. According to Castells, globalization is the result of complex interactions of many forces, including both traditional historical trends as well as economic forces and new technology, that has created a new global world order, one which will continue to exist and evolve. He recognizes the driving, greedy imperative of free-market capitalism, as well as the backlash against it. Information and access to the global network have become as important, if not more so, than traditional sources of power "Power of flows takes precedence over the flows of power" [See Castells, p] and the advent of the internet as a transformative event in human society. Globalism is not merely an economic phenomenon, but is also transforming human society. For example, Castells believes that the conflict between "Net and Self" is a major tension inherent within globalism See Castells, p23 , and that job insecurity and other insecurity related to economic factors, like food and self-sufficiency are major drawbacks of globalism. Castells believes that a sense of identity or identities is a fundamental aspect of human existence. In a networked world undergoing an information revolution See Castells, p22 , people may have multiple, and simultaneous, individual and group identities. These societal changes amount to a qualitative change in the human experience. Castells is verbose and well written, but he is not completely convincing; either in the sense of explaining the nature and consequences of "globalism", or in the sense of convincing me that our brave new world is inevitably going to be either happier or morally better than our flawed old world. The present-day economic woes of the global system is an obvious factor in such skepticism toward what appears to me to be a flimsy, unequal, unstable and in many ways unfair social and economic order. Castells includes many caveats to his evaluations and specifically claims not to make predictions, but he does mention the possibility of a system-wide crash, but offers a similarly optimistic overall view, including many of the same bromides used by proponents of globalism like Thomas Friedman e. However, it would be interesting if Castells were to collaborate with an expert in edge theory and networking mathematics. The question of a crisis of identity stemming from the information revolution raised by Castells offers a fascinating non-economic consideration in considering the everyday effects of globalization.

We live in a "network society", we work in a "network economy", we interact in "social networks." Inasmuch as our lives are mediated by electronics, they are mediated by networks. These networks are made possible by the technology revolution -- the cheapening of the cost of making connections as a result of electronics, and created by both the.

The rise of networks Castells, in the excerpt quoted at the beginning of this paper, notes that the changes over the last 30 years or more happened "because the information technology revolution provided the indispensable, material basis for its creation. Of particular note is the dramatic cheapening and speeding up of computer processing power, and along with it, the dramatic cheapening and speeding up of communication. And the revolution has only begun. From boxy computers transferring bits back and forth over copper wire, to celphones and laptops communicating via radio waves, to chip-sized transmitters that can be attached to goods, or inserted into animals, the ability of devices nodes to transfer bits i. New technology has provided the means for a dramatic intensifying of interconnections in the economy and the broader society. As Howard Rheingold has noted, "the result is an infrastructure that makes certain kinds of human actions possible that were never possible before. Certainly each of these technical advances enriched the connections within the economy, and provided the platform for future advances. From the vantage point of centuries, we can view the medieval network of towns and roads as a complex adaptive system, but such a structure would have been largely invisible to most inhabitants. Even with a denser communication and transportation system of the telegraph and railroad, interaction with the network was relatively expensive and thus restricted. The economy has always been as global as technology has allowed, but the electronic technology platform allows something new to emerge. What is unique and revolutionary about the "information technology" revolution is that it could re-unite the communication and transportation into one system through the rendering of information into digital bits, 1s and 0s, which could then be loaded, secured, transported, and off-loaded by general purpose digital processors, without the use of human labor. Davis and Stack, , So while there is a rich history of constantly developing interconnections in the world economy, each one cheapening what had been done before, allowing the extension of the world market and the capitalist system, still something special and new appeared at the end of the 20th century. The technology revolution is so total that today computer technology is intrinsic, fundamental to a modern economy. In production one interacts with "computer networks" -- electronic devices communicating through cables or radio waves -- directly e. In the realm of consumption, transactions are mediated by electronic devices linked via wires or electromagnetic waves -- i. Networks extend into the reproduction of our lives. Medical care and education especially distance education are increasingly computerized and those computers are linked to other computers. To the extent that social interactions transpire via electronic devices, including the telephone, mobile devices or email, those interactions are transpiring over a computer network. Entertainment -- television, radio, Internet, etc. Some million Americans have access to the Big Network, the Internet, and use it to meet, communicate, play, learn, fantasize, as well as to work and shop and lie and cheat and steal. We live in a "network society", we work in a "network economy", we interact in "social networks. These networks are made possible by the technology revolution -- the cheapening of the cost of making connections as a result of electronics, and created by both the drive for profit and the human drive to associate, socialize, connect. These technological networks are material, objective. These material networks give rise to, or at least contribute to, the rise of the common usage of "networks" as a concept to apply to processes in general. Technology is the means by which we interact with world. Consciousness is shaped by and shapes interactions with the world. Those interactions are mediated by visible network nodes linked with other nodes. The visibility of the interactions with computer networks feeds the consciousness of networks. At the same time, the new communication networks enable new forms of interaction. Like water seeking its own level, people explore and push the uses of new communication technology. The consciousness of these new forms of interaction and organization in turn flows back into the development of the instruments of production. As the technology revolution advances, the organization of production is changed to take advantage of what new technology makes possible e. New forms

of organization emerge to make optimal use of the new technologies. These new forms in turn contribute to the development of new technologies and ways of using them. It is a dialectical process. Globalization The dating of the technology revolution from the early s is significant because it so neatly fits in with a generally accepted beginning of globalization. The coup in Chile provided a laboratory for neoliberal programs. The electoral victories of Thatcher and Reagan late s, s provided a world power platform from which to aggressively promote the same programs, forcing structural adjustments on other countries. The political agenda of globalization was "free trade" programs, "open markets", and the withdrawal of the state from the economy deregulation, elimination of social programs, privatization and marketization of the public sphere. The result was capital hyper-mobility, the accelerated destruction of the environment, the contingentization of labor, the shifting of social risk to the individual, and the general polarization of wealth not just between North and South, but within every capitalist country as well. But the history of globalization, stretches back much farther. It grows out of the two world wars of the first half of the 20th century, themselves an attempt to resolve the crisis of the system of imperialism. The capitalist resolution of the crisis of imperialism was globalization achieved through world war. The post-World War II restructuring included the dismantling of the colonial system as a pre-cursor to free trade and open markets; the establishment of international bodies of governance like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the agency that would become the World Trade Organization; and the establishment standards to stabilize the world economy. This first phase comprises what Robinson refers to as the "golden age". However, technology advanced the electronics revolution really began in the s with the accompanying crises that that always entails. The rebuilt economies of Europe and Japan re-entered the world market, increasing competition. The cost of the Cold War and containing insurgent popular forces around the world strained the U. These developments rendered the post-WWII system, with its social contract and system of stable exchange rates, untenable. While the connection of processing power and the weakening of the gold standard are connected in the deep sense that technology advances are profoundly related to the economy, the connection between the collapse of the gold standard and speculative capital is more direct. The money markets, made possible by advances in computerized communication technology networks , were necessitated by multi-national corporate economic activity in the absence of fixed-exchange rates. Money markets were required to protect operations against changes in the currency values. The crisis that in part caused these events, and in part resulted from them eventually provided the opportunity for the restructuring programs that we think of as neoliberalism to be pushed forward. All of the features of "globalization" are only possible, because of what technology makes possible, and what capitalism requires when based on a technical foundation of electronics. In the network of imperialism, colonies were exclusively linked -- politically, economically and culturally -- to their respective European, U. In other cases, nominally free states were economically dominated single colonial powers. In some contested areas, like China, some arrangement was made to divide up the spoils. The imperialist economy that Lenin wrote about was dominated by monopolies and "finance capital", the merger of industrial and bank capital under the control of the banks. The financial system was oriented to production, creating assets that could service the debt. Henwood, The system was distinctly bank-centric: The change from the old type of capitalism, in which free competition predominated, to the new capitalism, in which monopoly reigns, is expressed, among other things, by a decline in the importance of the Stock Exchange. In the colonies, the transportation systems, such as they were, led in one direction: Economies at a certain level turn on networks of connection and transactions. You have resources that need to get to producers, and products that need to get to consumers. Overwhelmingly, especially in the post-colonial world, the infrastructure such that it was, was oriented towards extraction only. So they would lay down some infrastructure e. Winters, Imperialism was a chain that would break at its weakest link. The working class of the colonial powers was "bribed" with super-profits from the colonies, and had no political initiative. The liberation of oppressed nations, the weak links, was focus of the "anti-imperialist" struggle. The Maoist "four contradictions of imperialism" summarized the main categories of connections in the post-October revolution world: In many ways the features of imperialism and globalization appear to be the same. The poor are still with us, and concentrated in what once were the direct colonies. The digital divide is most glaring between North and South. Exploitation

has not ended. There is no fair trade. But how fundamentally different things are. Not a new or neo-colonialism, and not something better; but something different. A confluence of circumstances and initiatives after -- the war-wrecked world of the old colonial rulers, militant independence movements, the Soviet Union, and the program of international-oriented capital -- ended the old colonial system, a process not concluded until the s. This breakup allowed the process of "open markets" where any exploiter has access to resources, labor, markets. Direct political control of the former colonies does not exist. Even in cases of U. Socialism as a state-based political alternative has for all practical purposes disappeared. With robotics, global labor markets, just-in-time labor, the relationship between capitalist and worker has dramatically shifted. The "bribe" of the working class in the metropolis that Lenin described had two components. The job bribe was cancelled via takebacks, cutbacks, mass layoffs, and job flight to low wage labor markets all related to adjustments made possible by the technology revolution. The neoliberal offensive is still in the process of destroying the social welfare bribe; witness the assault on Social Security in the U. Monopolies still dominate the economy, and is the result of the natural drift in capitalism. But new technologies regularly create entirely new industries for new capitalists, and new technologies have created havoc for traditional monopolies as the pendulum has shifted back towards global competition. The rhetoric of entrepreneurship, contingency, self-employment, etc. Finance capital has radically evolved, such that a small section of it, speculative capital, has grown to dominate other forms of capital. The finance system has moved away from banks to markets trading in elaborate financial instruments , increasingly existing inside computers. The shape and structure and dynamic of globalization -- the world economy today and the politics to keep it running -- is different. Not a chain but a real-world network enabled through the cheapness and ease of making and using connections. Just because a technology, e. The law system of capitalism -- profits come from unpaid labor, commodities exchange on the basis of the socially necessary labor it took to make them, capitalists strive to maximize profit or risk the penalty of being driven into the ranks of the property-less -- provides a particular kind of Petri dish for the cultivation of new technologies. To the extent that automation where production is controlled by computer devices increases output, eliminates troublesome workers, and wins the battle of production, computer networks were a logical step beyond stand-alone devices. Networks enable machines to cooperate, maximize resources in the nodes, allow for dispersed production, provide better feedback, awareness, command and control of processes. In theory, hooking intelligent nodes together, including workers, increases productivity. Robert Metcalf, one of the developers of the Ethernet computer networking standard used in most office networks, stated that the utility of networks grows exponentially as nodes are added.

Chapter 6 : Networks and globalization

Get this from a library! Globalization and networked societies: urban-regional change in Pacific Asia. [Yue-man Yeung].

It is frequently said that society is now living in an information age, which has provided various information technologies. However the "information age" has not been clearly defined. Although many define the current economy as an information economy, there is still no universally accepted definition to refer to the current society. Some of these labels include: Some of the terms describe the same phenomena, while others do not. Among the numerous scholars trying to define this new society, Manuel Castells is the most foremost and unique, in terms of at least two aspects: Firstly, he is an incredibly prolific and energetic theorist on the subject of the information age. He has written over twenty books, published over one hundred academic journal articles, and co-authored over fifteen books. He has also served on many national and international organizations such as: Secondly, his critical viewpoint toward networks and the information economy has made him more unique than other information economists and sociologists. Thus, Castells maintains a deterministic view of technology, whereas the Utopians regard information technologies as instruments for human evolution. Castells has become one of the most influential theorists over the past thirty years since his wide array of works has provided a unique and critical framework for examining contemporary society. Castells has been called the first great philosopher of cyberspace for his work on the information economy. His trilogy published between 1996 and 2000 is recognized as a compendium of his theory about the information age. The Network Society deals with the "new techno-economic system" Castells, p. The Power of Identity discusses social movements and politics resisting or adapting to the network society. End of Millennium, the last work of the trilogy, describes the results of the previous two factors in the world. This chapter thus explores what a Castellian network society is, through exploration of his trilogy and other articles. New Economy[edit] New forms of time and space[edit] The concept of an information economy or network economy is undoubtedly related to new information technologies. According to economists, the definition of an information economy can mean not only an abundant use of information technologies, but also a new something that affects the way individuals work, produce, and consume. Human processes are changed by these technologies. Thus, to understand the information economy, one should first understand the characteristics of new information technologies, and then study the paradigm shift into the network society. Castells, a, defined the network society as a social structure which is characterized by networked communications technologies and information processing. This includes such social phenomena as economic interdependence among nations as well as globalization and social movements related to individual identity. Based on this definition, Castells hypothesized that the network society is organized around two new forms of time and space: In terms of timeless time, new technologies, such as biotechnologies and communication networks, are breaking down the biological sense of time as well as logical sequences of time. Space of flow infers that physical distances are closer among organizations in the society, and information can be easily transmitted from one point to another point by new communication technologies. This means the annihilation of logical concept of space. For example, the hyperlink on webpage collapses succession of things in time and space span, because it brings one from one location to another location in an instant. Information processing and communication, like newspapers, radios, and televisions, existed in history too. However, information technologies were not fundamental materials for development in the past industrial economy. The informational economy depends on the capacity of networks. Thus, without the capacity provided by these new technologies, the new economy would not be able to operate, as the industrial society could not fully expand without electricity. Castells, Whereas the industrial economy was based on a value chain from manufacturers to retailers, the information economy created various positions related to information technologies and the networks in the value chain such as designers, operators, and integrators. The information economy requires a greater number of highly intelligent laborers that can manage and control the technologies than in an industrial economy. Moreover, there are comparatively more opportunities to create a profit in the network industry or information industry than in other industries. Due to the importance of the networks and

communication technologies in the new economy, networks, as a new material for new economy, began to formulate social power, and the members exploiting the ability of networks began to acquire social power Gerstner, Global Economy[edit] Since the modern digital networks that the new paradigm emphasizes have no geographical limitation, the information economy is largely characteristic of global economy. Thus, these linkages are not really firms, but instead can be seen as networking nodes. The nature of technologies and networks generally affects the structure of the economy. The flexibility of modern business organizations reflects the flexible nature of new networks, so that the linkages are occasionally transformed and reconstructed for its profitability. Thus, the structure of information economy is not constrained by geographical restrictions. At the definition of the global economy, the planetary scale does not require highly internationalized organizations or wide geographical ranges. Rather, in terms of the space of flows made of bits and pieces of places, global economy exists in the reconstructed time and space. The global economy is a concept that values the speed with which knowledge, goods, and people are transacted. Spatial distance is no longer significant. On the contrary, rails and telegraph have also influenced the structure of the past industrial economy. In the case of the 19th century, the railroad and telegraph, as new networks, contributed to compress geographical distance, which accelerated industrial development. However, since the networks were less flexible under their physical limitations, the industrial structure, based on the networks, was less flexible than today. In the 19th century, the structure of business was generally vertically integrated, relying on mass-production systems, and mass-distribution networks. In sum, new technology alters the structure of society and industry by its inherent nature, so that the structure in the new economy is flexible and horizontal with production and consumption relying on the new global and digital networks. Generic labour refers to a person who is unskilled or possesses lower skills or has a low level of education. These individuals usually work for low-wage labor, and according to Castells can be, "disposable, except if they assert their right to exist as humans and citizens through their collective action" p. On the contrary, self-reprogrammable labour refers to highly educated people who manage and control information with high creativity. This demands the appropriate training, not in terms of skills, but in terms of creative capacity, and ability to evolve with organizations and with the addition of knowledge in society" p. Since the matter of labour in the global economy is related to capacity and creativity, Castells suggests that education is a more important solution today. Another problem in the cleavage between both types of labours is that labor organizations cannot function properly, and rather divide the self-reprogrammable labour from the generic labour. Another example of the cleavage is that within the industrial system, the employment of "flexible woman" increased, but that of "organized man" decreased, over the last couple of decades. The more valuable segments in the value chain of global economy can survive. Since the global economy allows flexible and arbitrary linkage between nodes, a business organization can easily redeploy their labour sources from one market to the other market in a planetary scope. Thus, globalization of the economic activities enables the situation that one labour market is supplied for abundant works, but, at the same time, one market experiences a serious unemployment. The other problem of labour in global economy is that new technologies increase the productivity of blue-collar worker, so that the network enterprises downsize its own system. This is reminiscent of the mass layoffs in the 19th century. Castells b views these trends as "the reversal trend of socialization of labour that characterized the industrial age" p. Which is all right when they are strong, but becomes a dramatic condition when they do not have proper skills, or they fall into some of the traps of the system illness, additions, psychological problems, lack of housing, or of health insurance " Castells, This is not because of political purposes, but because of the inherent nature of technology. Why does the inequality increase if tremendous technological advancements are supplied to society? New networks and communication technologies enable people or nodes to build relations with others. However, the decision of making relations is up to the comparative value of each node. Thus, Africa, which has no legacy from an industrial era, is composed of less valuable segments, which remain isolated or utilized for cheap wage labor in the new economy. Poor children in Africa and Latin America are still exploited at work by global business organizations. The inequality occurs in information consumption. Alvin Toffler and Nicolas Negroponte believed that the new information technologies would lead a radical, positive change in the economy. Castells foresees that technical changes are not equally

beneficial to everyone in the global economy. His attention is focused on the digital divide, which refers inequitable distribution or access to information. Wireless communication, Broadband cable, and other new technologies made it possible to hyperlink instantly among multiple spots. However, the majority of the populations remain unwired. According to Castells, information, like the capitals in industrial economy, is always insufficient to all the people. Since Castells considers the new techno-economic paradigm in network society a "socially embedded process, not as an exogenous factor affecting society," he can be categorized as a technology determinist. However, he has never blamed the technology itself, even if he thinks that the nature of modern technology increases the inequity of global societies. However, this is not the fault of technology, it is the way we use it Unequal, undemocratic, exclusionary societies, on the contrary, will see the power of technology dramatically increases social exclusion" Gerstner, Since both global networks and communication technologies have increased the strength and frequency of transforming information, capitals, and labour among other nodes in the networks, all nations and states have become more interdependent. Castells argues that the degree of freedom of nation states has shrunk to an extraordinary degree in the last ten years, because of the European Union. Member nations in the European Union have decentralized markets in order to strengthen their bargaining power and socio-economic control. Consequently, each member state in the Union has experienced diminishing social power over their national issues and more complex relations with each other. Nodes in information economies or network economies do not necessarily exist in the form of an organization, but occasionally exist as individuals, such as Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of Federal Reserve Board Castells, However, the demise of sovereignty for Castells does not mean that the current nations or states will disappear through global networks, but that their social power should be shared or restricted by other institutions, nations, or states. The theory of the network society uses many concepts and viewpoints traditionally held by Marxists. Castells replaces the position of capital in industrialism by the concept of information. In his analysis, Castells recognizes that the rise of informationalism and the nature of networks has led global societies toward inequality and social exclusion, widening the cleavage between "generic labour" and "self-reprogrammable labour," global city and local city, information-rich and information-poor. During the s, Castells exhibited a Marxist intellectual trajectory, and he confessed that he felt the need of Marxism for probing political change in information age. Even though his work is still progressing, his wide ranging analysis has provided an in-depth, yet macro understanding about the information society. The majority of his approach has been empirical in an attempt to diagnose the contemporary problems in the information society. Castells states his high dissatisfaction with the apparent superficiality of the prophecies that futurists such as Toffler and Gilder had announced for the "new" society. Although there are some criticisms that Castells overemphasized the negative effects of the information economy, his analysis for each case, such as the collapse of Soviet Union, was empirical and very accurate. In addition, Castells analysis is globalized, even if he warns of the dark side of globalization. As most information infrastructures are centralized on U. References[edit] Alvarez, I.

Chapter 7 : Communication Theory/Network Society - Wikibooks, open books for an open world

Get this from a library! Globalization and networked societies: urban-regional change in Pacific Asia. [Yue-man Yeung] -- Annotation Globalization, along with globalism, continues its unrelenting and accelerating march as it draws more countries, cities, and people closer into interdependent relationships.

Archaic globalization Archaic globalization conventionally refers to a phase in the history of globalization including globalizing events and developments from the time of the earliest civilizations until roughly the s. This term is used to describe the relationships between communities and states and how they were created by the geographical spread of ideas and social norms at both local and regional levels. The first is the idea of Eastern Origins, which shows how Western states have adapted and implemented learned principles from the East. The second is distance. The interactions of states were not on a global scale and most often were confined to Asia, North Africa , the Middle East , and certain parts of Europe. The third has to do with inter-dependency, stability, and regularity. If a state is not dependent on another, then there is no way for either state to be mutually affected by the other. This is one of the driving forces behind global connections and trade; without either, globalization would not have emerged the way it did and states would still be dependent on their own production and resources to work. This is one of the arguments surrounding the idea of early globalization. It is argued that archaic globalization did not function in a similar manner to modern globalization because states were not as interdependent on others as they are today. Because it predated the Great Divergence of the nineteenth century, where Western Europe pulled ahead of the rest of the world in terms of industrial production and economic output , archaic globalization was a phenomenon that was driven not only by Europe but also by other economically developed Old World centers such as Gujarat , Bengal , coastal China , and Japan. This archaic globalization existed during the Hellenistic Age , when commercialized urban centers enveloped the axis of Greek culture that reached from India to Spain , including Alexandria and the other Alexandrine cities. Early on, the geographic position of Greece and the necessity of importing wheat forced the Greeks to engage in maritime trade. Trade in ancient Greece was largely unrestricted: Maize, tomato, potato, vanilla , rubber, cacao , tobacco Trade on the Silk Road was a significant factor in the development of civilizations from China, Indian subcontinent , Persia , Europe, and Arabia , opening long-distance political and economic interactions between them. In addition to economic trade, the Silk Road served as a means of carrying out cultural trade among the civilizations along its network. Proto-globalization " Early modern -" or "proto-globalization" covers a period of the history of globalization roughly spanning the years between and The concept of "proto-globalization" was first introduced by historians A. Hopkins and Christopher Bayly. The term describes the phase of increasing trade links and cultural exchange that characterized the period immediately preceding the advent of high "modern globalization" in the late 19th century. In the 17th century, world trade developed further when chartered companies like the British East India Company founded in and the Dutch East India Company founded in , often described as the first multinational corporation in which stock was offered were established. The Triangular Trade made it possible for Europe to take advantage of resources within the Western Hemisphere. The transfer of animal stocks, plant crops, and epidemic diseases associated with Alfred W. European, Muslim , Indian, Southeast Asian , and Chinese merchants were all involved in early modern trade and communications, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. During the early 19th century the United Kingdom was a global superpower. Modern[edit] According to economic historians Kevin H. Innovations in transportation technology reduced trade costs substantially. New industrial military technologies increased the power of European states and the United States, and allowed these powers to forcibly open up markets across the world and extend their empires. A gradual move towards greater liberalization in European countries. During the 19th century, globalization approached its form as a direct result of the Industrial Revolution. Industrialization allowed standardized production of household items using economies of scale while rapid population growth created sustained demand for commodities. In the 19th century, steamships reduced the cost of international transport significantly and railroads made inland transportation cheaper. The transport

revolution occurred some time between and . The invention of shipping containers in helped advance the globalization of commerce. Exports nearly doubled from 8. Many countries then shifted to bilateral or smaller multilateral agreements, such as the South Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement. Since the s, aviation has become increasingly affordable to middle classes in developed countries. Open skies policies and low-cost carriers have helped to bring competition to the market. In the s, the growth of low-cost communication networks cut the cost of communicating between different countries. More work can be performed using a computer without regard to location. This included accounting, software development, and engineering design. Between and the number of students studying in a foreign country increased 9 times. This slowed down from the s onward due to the World Wars and the Cold War , [47] but picked up again in the s and s. The migration and movement of people can also be highlighted as a prominent feature of the globalization process. In the period between and , the proportion of the labor force migrating approximately doubled. Most migration occurred between the developing countries and least developed countries LDCs. It also resulted in the growing prominence of attention focused on the movement of diseases, the proliferation of popular culture and consumer values, the growing prominence of international institutions like the UN, and concerted international action on such issues as the environment and human rights. One influential event was the late s recession , which was associated with lower growth in areas such as cross-border phone calls and Skype usage or even temporarily negative growth in areas such as trade of global interconnectedness. It shows that the depth of global integration fell by about one-tenth after , but by had recovered well above its pre-crash peak.

Chapter 8 : Globalization & Technology - Education For Global Interdependence (E4GI)

You just hear that globalization is this monster out there that's making us do all these things, instead of what I think is a sort of an older tradition of thinking, where the world economy was something to help domestic societies achieve their objectives of prosperity, full employment, inclusion, and equity.

Comment Historically, globalization has been considered both a great opportunity and a threat. Globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon which entails several economic, cultural, and political pros and cons. Discover here the implications and arguments for and against globalization. International trade, capital flows, migration, technological transfer and cultural exchanges are some of the typical manifestations of this process. The encounters and relationships between ancient civilizations and the colonization processes initiated during the Age of Discoveries were archaic and early-modern forms of globalization. During the 19th century technological progress and the Industrial Revolution catalyzed globalization. The political and economic international agreements after the Second World War accelerated this process even further. However, this term really became paramount in the academic literature and media after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union which enabled a much more fluid communications, exchanges of goods and services and migration. For years globalization was equated with progress and economic growth and generally supported. However, in the last few years an increasing number of voices have started to criticize this phenomenon and point at several flaws and dangers associated with it. The anti-globalization movement has grown. To what extent is globalization to blame for problems such as national unemployment, inequality, terrorism and cultural homogenization? These consumers are characterized by their material and economic self-interest rather than cultural, civic or other forms of identity. The expansion and dominance of global companies and brands is another key feature. These corporations contribute to deepen global interconnectedness not only by uniformly shaping consumption patterns across societies, but by binding economies together through complex supply chains, trade networks, flows of capital and manpower.

Pros of economic globalization: Cheaper prices for products and services more optimized supply chains Better availability of products and services Easier access to capital and commodities Increased competition Producers and retailers can diversify their markets and contribute to economic growth

Cons of economic globalization: In the era of the Internet and fast communications people can interact more easily with each other. Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are to some extent manifestations of cultural globalization. Communities are less insulated than ever in history, even those who cannot travel can have today a good understanding of other cultures and meet virtually people from other parts of the world. People change their views and lifestyle influenced by global cultural and consumption trends. Access to new cultural products art, entertainment, education Better understanding of foreign values and attitudes. These international and supranational actors increasingly shape domestic politics.

Pros of political globalization: Access to international aid and financial support It contributes to world peace.

If you want to promote your own scholarly debate, lecture, research project or academic article, contact us: Vote and tell us which aspects or dimensions do you consider the most beneficial or dangerous for us. Invite anyone concerned with globalization and its impact to join our public discussion Vote to see result and collect 1 XP. Your vote is anonymous. If you change your mind, you can change your vote simply by clicking on another option. Voting results Pros and cons of economic, social and political globalization: Join with confidence, netivist is completely advertisement free. You will not receive any promotional materials from third parties. Log in Get your netivist points! Join us Or sign in with your favourite Social Network: Join the debate In order to join the debate you must be logged in. Already have an account on netivist? Create your account for free. Order by Be the first to comment. There are no comments for the selected user level. Your account might be penalized should we not find any wrongdoing by this user. Yes, I want to report this user. No, sorry this is a mistake. Our moderators will now review this comment and act accordingly. If it contains abusive or inappropriate language its author will be penalized.

Chapter 9 : Network society - Wikipedia

The network society is more convincingly a development of industrial society than an entirely new construct. Capitalism is still the economic basis for society; the manifestation of capitalism's power in faceless networks is a phenomenon going back to Marx's original critique of the system in the 19th century.

Networks of Capital A Brief History: In popular discourse, globalization is a notoriously ambiguous term, generally used as a shorthand way to refer to the social fact that people, cultures, communities, and economies around the world are becoming increasingly interconnected. And what do social theorists mean when they talk about globalization? While globalization can still remain a vague term even in social scientific discussions, a great deal of social theory has focused on globalization as a distinct shift in the spatial and temporal dimensions of social life. Digital technologies like the Internet, for example, have allowed us to communicate virtually with anyone in the world at any time. This shift to flexible production has also been accompanied by a shift towards credit and faster, more frequent consumption. How Globalization Theory Matters Today Globalization challenges some of our most fundamental distinctions about politics and social life—distinctions between local and global, proximity and distance, domestic and foreign, national and international. Social theory, however, begins to give us the tools for grasping the enigma of globalization, showing how changes in the capitalist economy and information technologies have reshaped the contours of social time and space. Immanuel Wallerstein While theorists of globalization tend to focus on economic and technological changes since the mid-to-late twentieth century, Immanuel Wallerstein — looks at globalization over a much longer duration. He argues that the modern world system emerged as early as the s through a series of economic transitions and now connects all countries through a single division of labor. Much like Marx argued that exploitation happens through the relationship between laborer and bourgeoisie, Wallerstein argues that core countries in the developed world extract labor and raw materials from peripheral ones. Capital, he says, now accumulates through an ever-expanding network of trade routes, property rights, and labor agreements that simultaneously connect the world while reinforcing its inequalities. David Harvey Along with Wallerstein, geographer and social theorist David Harvey — is the pre-eminent Marxist theorist of globalization. Harvey argues that capital moves at a pace faster than ever before, as the production, circulation, and exchange of capital happens at ever-increasing speeds, particularly with the aid of advanced communication and transportation technologies. The most extreme example of this is how a computer on Wall Street can transfer millions of dollars in one national currency into another in response to a slight fluctuation in the exchange rate and, in the process, gain millions of dollars in profit in a matter of seconds. In these scenarios which happen every day on Wall Street and other global financial institutions the time it takes to get from production to exchange to profit is almost non-existent. According to Harvey, it is this compression of social time—space through economic activity that is the driving force behind globalization. Anthony Giddens A theorist with wide-ranging interests, Anthony Giddens has also become a respected scholar in globalization theory, particularly for his insights on how globalization has affected contemporary social life and politics. In the era of globalization, however, human activities have become connected across the globe, so that events in one part of the world the housing market bubble bursting in the U. As such, the management of risk has become an undeniably worldwide affair. For more on Giddens, check out his Profile page. Manuel Castells While most scholars look to transformations in the capitalist economy to account for globalization, sociologist Manuel Castells — is unique in that he gives just as much attention to changes in the social organization of communication and information. Castells argues that globalization is a network of production, culture, and power that is constantly shaped by advances in technology, which range from communications technologies to genetic engineering. Castells suggests that the rules of global capitalism have changed to embrace these new information technologies. Power now flows not from corporations or states, but through the informational flows and codes that connect those corporations and states to each other and the world. For Castells, the advancement of the Information Age does not necessarily mean that the world has become flat; rather, with technological advance, he argues, come new global forms of exclusion and inclusion, fragmentation and

integration. She has written about the increased mobility of labor, the rise of global cities, and the changing role and powers of the nation state in an era of globalization. In her book, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, Sassen became one of the first scholars to argue that the international spread of the notion of human rights could override distinctions of nationality and citizenship. Under a global human rights regime, she argues, law must treat people as persons-qua-persons first, and citizens only second. Associated Writing out Loud: