

Chapter 1 : Hegel's Conception of Tragedy - Oxford Scholarship

Stephen Houlgate. On Wednesday, December 10, the AY students had the opportunity to attend a lecture on Hegel's Theory of Tragedy given by Stephen Houlgate of the University of Warwick.

His philosophy of art proper, however, forms part of his philosophy rather than phenomenology of spirit. The system itself comprises three parts: The philosophy of spirit is in turn divided into three sections: Hegel read both Greek and Latin indeed, he wrote his diary partly in Latin from the age of fourteen ; he also read English and French. He never travelled to Greece or Italy, but he did undertake several long journeys from Berlin where he was appointed Professor in to Dresden , , the Low Countries , , Vienna and Paris Hegel was also on close personal terms with Goethe and knew his drama and poetry especially well as he did those of Friedrich Schiller. This may or may not be true of Kant, but it is clearly quite untrue of Hegel: This is available in English as: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. Does he believe that only Greek art is beautiful? Does he hold that art comes to an end in the modern age? The answers one gives to such questions should, however, be offered with a degree of caution, for, sadly, there is no fully worked out philosophy of art by Hegel that was officially endorsed by Hegel himself. In order to understand his philosophy of art, therefore, one must understand the main claims of his philosophy as a whole. In the philosophy of nature, however, he goes on to show that logic tells only half the story: What there is, according to Hegel, is thus not just pure reason but physical, chemical and living matter that obeys rational principles. Life is more explicitly rational than mere physical matter because it is more explicitly self-determining. Life itself becomes more explicitly rational and self-determining when it becomes conscious and self-conscious—that is, life that can imagine, use language, think and exercise freedom. Reason, or the Idea, comes to be fully self-determining and rational, therefore, when it takes the form of self-conscious spirit. Human beings, for Hegel, are thus not just accidents of nature; they are reason itself—the reason inherent in nature—that has come to life and come to consciousness of itself. In his philosophy of objective spirit Hegel analyses the institutional structures that are required if spirit—that is, humanity—is to be properly free and self-determining. These include the institutions of right, the family, civil society and the state. The highest, most developed and most adequate understanding of spirit is attained by philosophy the bare bones of whose understanding of the world have just been sketched. Philosophy provides an explicitly rational, conceptual understanding of the nature of reason or the Idea. It explains precisely why reason must take the form of space, time, matter, life and self-conscious spirit. In religion—above all in Christianity—spirit gives expression to the same understanding of reason and of itself as philosophy. Furthermore, this process is one in which we put our faith and trust: Religion, however, believes in a representation of the truth, whereas philosophy understands that truth with complete conceptual clarity. It may seem strange that we would need religion, if we have philosophy: For Hegel, however, humanity cannot live by concepts alone, but also needs to picture, imagine, and have faith in the truth. Such objects—conjured out of stone, wood, color, sound or words—render the freedom of spirit visible or audible to an audience. The purpose of art, for Hegel, is thus the creation of beautiful objects in which the true character of freedom is given sensuous expression. The principal aim of art is not, therefore, to imitate nature, to decorate our surroundings, to prompt us to engage in moral or political action, or to shock us out of our complacency. It is to allow us to contemplate and enjoy created images of our own spiritual freedom—images that are beautiful precisely because they give expression to our freedom. Kant also maintained that our experience of beauty is an experience of freedom. He argued, however, that beauty is not itself an objective property of things. In contrast to Kant, Schiller understands beauty to be a property of the object itself. It is the property, possessed by both living beings and works of art, of appearing to be free when in fact they are not. We can never see freedom at work in, or embodied in, the world of space and time. Hegel agrees with Schiller against Kant that beauty is an objective property of things. In his view, however, beauty is the direct sensuous manifestation of freedom, not merely the appearance or imitation of freedom. It shows us what freedom actually looks like and sounds like when it gives itself sensuous expression albeit with varying degrees of idealization. Since true beauty is the direct sensuous expression of the freedom of spirit, it must be

produced by free spirit for free spirit, and so cannot be a mere product of nature. Beauty, for Hegel, has certain formal qualities: Hegel gives an example of genuinely beautiful form in his discussion of Greek sculpture: Beauty, however, is not just a matter of form; it is also a matter of content. As we have seen, the content that Hegel claims is central and indispensable to genuine beauty and therefore genuine art is the freedom and richness of spirit. To put it another way, that content is the Idea, or absolute reason, as self-knowing spirit. The content of beautiful art must thus be the divine in human form or the divine within humanity itself as well as purely human freedom. In both cases, the focus of attention is on the human figure in particular. Colors and sounds by themselves can certainly communicate a mood, but only the human form actually embodies spirit and reason. Truly beautiful art thus shows us sculpted, painted or poetic images of Greek gods or of Jesus Christ—that is, the divine in human form—or it shows us images of free human life itself. Art and Idealization Art, for Hegel, is essentially figurative. This is not because it seeks to imitate nature, but because its purpose is to express and embody free spirit and this is achieved most adequately through images of human beings. We will consider the exceptions to this—architecture and music—below. Its role is to show us or remind us of the true character of freedom. Art fulfills this role by showing us the freedom of spirit in its purest form without the contingencies of everyday life. That is to say, art at its best presents us not with the all too familiar dependencies and drudgery of daily existence, but with the ideal of freedom see Aesthetics, 1: This ideal of human and divine freedom constitutes true beauty and is found above all, Hegel claims, in ancient Greek sculptures of gods and heroes. Note that the work of idealization is undertaken not like modern fashion photography to provide an escape from life into a world of fantasy, but to enable us to see our freedom more clearly. Idealization is undertaken, therefore, in the interests of a clearer revelation of the true character of humanity and of the divine. The paradox is that art communicates truth through idealized images of human beings and indeed—in painting—through the illusion of external reality. Hegel thinks that the account he gives describes the principal features of the greatest works of art in the Western tradition, such as the sculptures of Phidias or Praxiteles or the dramas of Aeschylus or Sophocles. At the same time, his account is normative in so far as it tells us what true art is. This, he claims, is to give intuitive, sensuous expression to the freedom of spirit. The realm of the sensuous is the realm of individual things in space and time. Such an individual must not be abstract and formal as, for example, in the early Greek Geometric style, nor should he be static and rigid as in much ancient Egyptian sculpture, but his body and posture should be visibly animated by freedom and life, without, however, sacrificing the stillness and serenity that belongs to ideal self-containment. It does not, however, exhaust the idea of beauty, for it does not give us beauty in its most concrete and developed form. The gods represented in Greek sculpture are beautiful because their physical shape perfectly embodies their spiritual freedom and is not marred by marks of physical frailty or dependence. These heroes are not allegorical representations of abstract virtues, but are living human beings with imagination, character and free will; but what moves them is a passion for an aspect of our ethical life, an aspect that is supported and promoted by a god. This distinction between pure beauty, found in Greek sculpture, and the more concrete beauty found in Greek drama means that ideal beauty actually takes two subtly different forms. Beauty is the sensuous expression of freedom and so must exhibit the concreteness, animation and humanity that are missing, for example, in Egyptian sculpture. Yet since pure beauty, as exemplified by Greek sculpture, is spiritual freedom immersed in spatial, bodily shape, it lacks the more concrete dynamism of action in time, action that is animated by imagination and language. This means that it must move beyond pure beauty to the more concrete and genuinely human beauty of drama. It falls short of ideal beauty when it takes the form of symbolic art, and it goes beyond such beauty when it takes the form of romantic art. The form of art that is characterized by works of ideal beauty itself is classical art. The development of art from one form to another generates what Hegel regards as the distinctive history of art. What produces these three art-forms is the changing relation between the content of art—the Idea as spirit—and its mode of presentation. The changes in this relation are in turn determined by the way in which the content of art is itself conceived. In symbolic art the content is conceived abstractly, such that it is not able to manifest itself adequately in a sensuous, visible form. In classical art, by contrast, the content is conceived in such a way that it is able to find perfect expression in sensuous, visible form. In romantic art, the content is

conceived in such a way that it is able to find adequate expression in sensuous, visible form and yet also ultimately transcends the realm of the sensuous and visible. Symbolic art, by contrast, falls short of genuine beauty altogether. This does not mean that it is simply bad art: Hegel recognizes that symbolic art is often the product of the highest level of artistry. Symbolic art falls short of beauty because it does not yet have a rich enough understanding of the nature of divine and human spirit. Not all of the types of symbolic art Hegel discusses, however, are fully and properly symbolic. So what connects them all? Art proper, for Hegel, is the sensuous expression or manifestation of free spirit in a medium such as metal, stone or color that has been deliberately shaped or worked by human beings into the expression of freedom. This is either because it is the product of a spirit that does not yet understand itself to be truly free, or because it is the product of a spirit that does have a sense of its own freedom but does not yet understand such freedom to involve the manifestation of itself in a sensuous medium that has been specifically shaped to that end. He says nothing, for example, about prehistoric art such as cave painting, nor does he discuss Chinese art or Buddhist art even though he discusses both Chinese religion and Buddhism in his lectures on the philosophy of religion. The first stage is that in which spirit is conceived as being in an immediate unity with nature. This stage is encountered in the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism. The Zoroastrians, Hegel claims, believe in a divine power—the Good—but they identify this divinity with an aspect of nature itself, namely with light. Light does not symbolize or point to a separate God or Good; rather, in Zoroastrianism as Hegel understands it light is the Good, is God. Aesthetics, 1: Light is thus the substance in all things and that which gives life to all plants and animals. This light, Hegel tells us, is personified as Ormuzd or Ahura Mazda. Unlike the God of the Jews, however, Ormuzd is not a free, self-conscious subject. He or it is the Good in the form of light itself, and so is present in all sources of light, such as the sun, stars and fire. This vision, however, does not constitute a work of art, even though it finds expression in well-crafted prayers and utterances.

Chapter 2 : Stephen Houlgate, Hegel's theory of tragedy - PhilPapers

Hegel's theory of tragedy. Stephen Houlgate. In Hegel and the Arts. Northwestern University Press () Stephen Houlgate - unknown. The Presence of Tragedy.

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Chapter 3 : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

This chapter examines Hegel's concept of tragedy from his Early Theological Writings, through the Phenomenology of Spirit to his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the action of the tragic hero the main institutions of ethical life, the family and the state, come into conflict.

A Critical Guide Published: December 07, David James ed. It is said also that in the early twentieth century two schools of Hegelian philosophy faced each other: There is something to this, but to imply that Hegel is to blame for both would be an indictment too far. Yet the contrast does precipitate thought. There is an unbroken line of continuity between Hegel and the young Hegelians, hence a line of inheritance from Marx, though the line is also one of coarsening the dialectic and its more finessed possibilities. Hegel has been reclaimed by the professors. This book is such a work of reclamation. The chapters in this volume reflect this diversity. They are written with the advantage of historical distance, and they seek to communicate a fresh perspective that makes readers aware of the breadth and depth of this classic work, as well as its continuing relevance. The book does not claim to be comprehensive, but reflects the interests of the contributors. As always in such cases, one worries that the commentator is ventriloquizing through Hegel, but, for the most part, this does not happen. Neuhausser emphasizes how this work seeks to comprehend the modern social world and show it to be rational. He does not see the work as prescriptive of new institutions. Philosophical comprehension for Hegel entails seeing what is, and this as essential to the realization of freedom. What is essential for freedom, as Hegel understands it, is a comprehended reconciliation between the free individual and the social world in which individuals are participants. Hegel takes philosophical comprehension to be a matter of giving a rational form to a context already existing that implicitly has reason at work in it, though not always in a form that is properly understood by that given reality. He gives attention to the movement in the Philosophy of Right as a development of the concept of practical freedom. All of this is not only a matter of conceptual analysis; we must address the question of institutional realization, and how conceptual analysis and institutional realization mesh together. At the outset Hegel takes seriously the freedom of property. Property is made necessary by the very idea of freedom. Houlgate sets out to show why this is so. We are taken through some of the earlier parts of the Philosophy of Right on the relation of free will and abstract right, the connection of right and person. The right of the human will to take possession of everything, to brand it with itself, so to say, might have merited reflection. Houlgate first explains property itself, and then turns to the use of property, followed by discussions of value and contracts. He concludes with some illuminating comparative remarks on the differences between Hegel and Marx in terms of their understanding of value and property. Marx borrows much from Hegel, not least with respect to the workings of dialectic in history, but Houlgate holds that in his account of capitalism he shows himself to be a thinker of the understanding *Verstand*, and not dialectical reason *Vernunft*. Alan Wood offers an account of "Hegel on Morality. Hegel himself offers a more community-based way of thinking. The latter is sometimes taken to copper-fasten Hegel as a conservative thinker who only defers to customary social morality. He is an enemy of individualism. He offers a judicious exposition of the Philosophy of Right, and also makes good use of the treatments of morality and ethical life in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I did note that the role of religion is not addressed in this contribution. Hegel does bring in religion in the later discussion of *Sittlichkeit* in the Philosophy of Right, and in the Phenomenology ethical life is not possible to understand without addressing the religious life of a people or epoch. Religion names a formation of *Geist* beyond morality. He offers the suggestion that the issue hinges on the fact that Hegel is oriented to action rather than judgment. An action-based organicism is superior because it includes a public process of "feedback" that offers support for a dynamic, self-correcting model of political justification. The family is not subsumed into civil society; nor are the tensions and contradiction between family and civil society resolved by the state. Hegel is aware how the modern market and state are sustained by personal relations, but no less is he aware of fault lines that threaten the stability of the state. There is more at stake than a functional account of how the family serves the higher purposes of the state. Hutchins also claim to expose contradictions that raise questions about Hegel that, in turn, suggest an orientation beyond

Hegel. He does so in light of the fact that civil society is also gripped by a host of pathologies: What he claims for his approach is that Hegel fashions his account, not despite these pathologies and disparities but because of them. The unfolding of the social substance becomes a subject to itself, but the logic governing this becoming is immanent in the manner in which a community constitutes itself by addressing its own inherent maladies. Buchwalter gives special attention to the *Bildung* and the *Bildungsprozess* that are immanent in the full unfolding of the *Philosophy of Right*. There is a rejection of an understanding of ethical life as appealing to any pre-existing set of values or a given order of being. If there is a transcendence of the aporias of modern society it is an entirely immanent one. Of course, immanence alone may be the hand that wounds and only equivocally the hand that heals. He does not think their critique is entirely justified and sets out to show a more nuanced Hegel, one who is aware of the ethical ambivalence of civil society, and of the limits of the state to counter some of the negative outcomes of civil society. This is why he wants to show Hegel as a theoretician of the fragility of modern ethical life. Indeed, he wants to argue that ethical life in the modern world, even if Hegel does not always say so explicitly, is marked by a fragility that is irrevocable. Hegel, Rabble and Consequences. All ought to earn their living by the work of their own hands, and thus avoid poverty. And yet modern civil society produces a poverty where all the advantages of civil society are lost while the desires it produced persist. Under the term "rabble" refers to the most extreme form of this difficulty. Ruda distinguishes interestingly between rabble in a more generic sense, and a second kind of rabble which he calls "luxury rabble. Though I worry about ventriloquizing, this is interesting ventriloquizing. It does so by putting the primary stress on practical necessity rather than logical necessity, offering us an account of the transition from civil society to the state as best explained in terms of this practical necessity. One thinks of this proposal as tilting towards a certain Kantian distinguishing of theoretical and practical reason rather than the Hegelian affirmation that both theory and practice are manifestations of reason, and hence subject to the same logic. Ludwig Siep asks the question: Even when not granted the fullness of the claim, Hegel is seen, by Habermas for instance, as the first philosopher for whom modernity became a problem. Against the image of him as a reactionary conservative, many Anglophone philosophers have increasingly wanted to see him as a prominent thinker of modernity. The recognized affinity with pragmatism and Wittgenstein-influenced styles of thought, for instance, have dealt a blow to the image of Hegel as the a priori metaphysician who conceptualizes reality as a whole, according to a procrustean logic into which everything finally is to be fit in. Siep asks about the distinctive sense in which Hegel is a philosopher of modernity, drawing on how Hegel himself saw modernity. Like many of the contributors, he focuses on the features of civil society and the state that mark modernity. By contrast with Kant, for instance, Hegel is more modern relative to the welfare state, whereas his views of war and international law are less modern. We should see the relevance of Hegel to current conditions, but not underestimate the gap separating our time from his. All the contributions are worthy of commendation for their engagement with Hegel and his concerns. As the summaries above communicate, there is much to be learned from them. I would have liked if the prevailing stress on self-determination addressed more fully issues concerned with an ethics of the other wherein a logic of autonomy or self-determination is not enough. The "free will that wills the free will" is not a subtle enough formulation of right for an ethics differently attuned to the other as other, and our "being free" or "being freed" in relation to the other. I would also have appreciated some more attention to the place of religion, and the relations between morality, ethical life and religion. Finally, with the exception of the last chapter, there is no consideration of the concluding part of the *Philosophy of Right*, which deals with World-history. This is surely one of the most fascinating and challenging parts of the entire work. Here there would have been an opportunity for asking about the relation of the political and the trans-political, as well as the problematic status of the agency of objective Geist, wavering as it does between the human and the divine. Hegel would deny the wavering, and say that there is a dialectical interplay between the two, but this is just the issue at stake, even in the immanent unfolding of morality, ethical life, civil society, the state and world-history. And perhaps, to add a further twist, philosophy is not just our own time comprehended in thought.

Chapter 4 : Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature

1. *Hegel's Knowledge of Art. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit () contains chapters on the ancient Greek "religion of art" (Kunstreligion) and on the world-view presented in Sophocles' Antigone and Oedipus the King.*

What all these thinkers share, which distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus and Thomas Hobbes and from empiricists like David Hume, is that they regard freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important ontological implications for soul or mind or divinity. All three find common ground on the unique position of humans in the scheme of things, known by the discussed categorical differences from animals and inanimate objects. Begriff, "Spirit" and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given". In this way, Hegel intends to defend the germ of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism. Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought", [54]: Hegel renders these dualities intelligible by ultimately his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic". The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. This is because as Hegel suggests by his introduction of the concept of "reality", [54]: Finite things do not determine themselves because as "finite" things their essential character is determined by their boundaries over against other finite things, so in order to become "real" they must go beyond their finitude "finitude is only as a transcending of itself". Modern philosophy, culture and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and Other, freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, or the Enlightenment and Romanticism. According to Hegel, the main characteristic of this unity was that it evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation. Contradiction and negation have a dynamic quality that at every point in each domain of reality "consciousness, history, philosophy, art, nature and society" leads to further development until a rational unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up *Aufhebung* to a higher unity. This whole is mental because it is mind that can comprehend all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, logical, developmental order underlies every domain of reality and is ultimately the order of self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness. The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds. Rather, it comes to completion only in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who through their own understanding bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself. Geist combines the meaning of spirit "as in god, ghost, or mind" with an intentional force. Civil society Hegel made the distinction between civil society and state in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was followed by Alexis de Tocqueville. For example, while it seems to be the case that he felt that a civil society such as the German society in which he lived was an inevitable movement of the dialectic, he made way for the crushing of other types of "lesser" and not fully realized types of civil society as these societies were not fully conscious or aware "as it were" as to the lack of progress in their societies. Thus, it was perfectly legitimate in the eyes of Hegel for a conqueror such as Napoleon to come along and destroy that which was not fully realized. The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them. All three together are called "ethical life" *Sittlichkeit*. The State involves three "moments". In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place. They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill their obligations. The individual has "substantial freedom in the state". The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" section. Furthermore, every member both loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended mere "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship. Members of a Hegelian State are happy even to sacrifice their lives for the State. Heraclitus[edit] According to Hegel, "Heraclitus is the one who first declared the

nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process. The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle". Hegel asserted that in Heraclitus he had an antecedent for his logic: Sein und Nichts sei dasselbe Being and non-being are the same. Heraclitus does not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and in that fragment seems to be opposing any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A. However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but indeterminate or "pure" being without particularity or specificity. This interpretation of Heraclitus cannot be ruled out, but even if present is not the main gist of his thought. Just as humans continually correct their concepts of reality through a dialectical process, so God himself becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming. Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual substance and is identical to limited being, but more remains to be thought in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought. The universe as becoming is therefore a combination of being and non-being. The particular is never complete in itself, but to find completion is continually transformed into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars. The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself;" that is, it does not depend on anything else such as matter for its being. The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly be casting off as it becomes freer and more self-determining. This means that Jesus as the Son of God is posited by God over against himself as other. Hegel sees both a relational unity and a metaphysical unity between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God as Jesus not only died, but "[God, that is to say, maintains himself in the process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed". Kaufmann admits that Hegel treated many distinctively Christian themes and "sometimes could not resist equating" his conception of spirit Geist "with God, instead of saying clearly: So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian. Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, He formulates an early philosophical example of a disenchantment narrative, arguing that Judaism was responsible both for realizing the existence of Geist and, by extension, for separating nature from ideas of spiritual and magical forces and challenging polytheism. During the last ten years of his life, Hegel did not publish another book, but thoroughly revised the Encyclopedia second edition, ; third, He also published some articles early in his career and during his Berlin period. A number of other works on the philosophy of history, religion, aesthetics and the history of philosophy were compiled from the lecture notes of his students and published posthumously. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.

Chapter 5 : Hegel's Theory of Tragedy by Casey Taylor on Prezi

Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit': A Reader's Guide (Hardcover) By Stephen Houlgate, Download Full PDF Version of This Book - Free Download Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit': A Reader's Guide (Hardcover) pdf ebooks free.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: According to the misleading conception, the tragic consists in the defeat of human lives and projects that arises from irresolvable conflict. Goethe is the most notable exponent of this view. As soon as resolution enters or becomes possible the tragic vanishes. It is easy to see how the two views support one another. For Hegel presents the tragic as a dialectic of conflict and reconciliation in human action, a dialectic in which the moment of reconciliation is ineliminable. Hegel does not have a theory of tragedy, he has a theory of the tragic. A theory of tragedy would be genre-specific, a theory about tragedies, the works of theater and not the pitiable and terrifying events they represent. It is a theory about the composition of tragic poems, about their parts and their function. By contrast, a theory of the tragic is not a theory about tragedies. It is not genre specific, for not only tragedies are tragic. Rather, it is a theory about what makes a work of theater into a tragedy, about what it is to be a tragedy. True, the essence of tragedy has to do with experience, but it has to do primarily with the experience of the tragic hero, not the experience of the actor or the spectator. Furthermore, whereas a theory of tragedy tells us something about tragedies, a theory of the tragic tells us something about human experience, human actions and the ethical-life of a community in which the actions are played out. Hence the question of the tragic enjoys a certain priority over the question of tragedy. The works of theater we call tragedies exist because of the tragic, not vice versa. There is another reason why we should grant that the question of the tragic as such is interesting and relevant. Tragedy is not a vague term; historically at least the matter of classification has been settled. It is not as if, in significant instances, it is impossible to decide whether a work of ancient drama is or is not a tragedy. Lebeck may argue, rather unconvincingly that the trial scene in the Eumenides is a parody of Athenian litigation; but she does not dispute that it is a tragedy. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Chapter 6 : Bibliografía - Seminario especial "Ciencia de la Lógica" G.W.F. Hegel

content: hegels theory of tragedy stephen houlgate tragedy and aesthetic individuality tragic drama, for aristotle, reveals the vulnerability of human virtue it shows how human beings can go wrong, even if they are "like ourselves" and.

Until around 1800, Hegel devoted himself to developing his ideas on religious and social themes, and seemed to have envisaged a future for himself as a type of modernising and reforming educator, in the image of figures of the German Enlightenment such as Lessing and Schiller. In the 1790s the University of Jena had become a center for the development of critical philosophy due to the presence of K. Reinhold and then Fichte, who taught there from until his dismissal on the grounds of atheism at the end of the decade. By that time, Schelling, who had first been attracted to Jena by the presence of Fichte, had become an established figure at the university. By late 1800 Hegel had completed his first major work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* published in 1807, which showed a divergence from his earlier, seemingly more Schellingian, approach. Now without a university appointment he worked for a short time, apparently very successfully, as an editor of a newspaper in Bamberg, and then from 1808 as the headmaster and philosophy teacher at a gymnasium high school in Nuremberg. During his time at Nuremberg he married and started a family, and wrote and published his *Science of Logic*. In 1817 he managed to return to his university career by being appointed to a chair in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, but shortly after, in 1818, he was offered and took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, the most prestigious position in the German philosophical world. In 1817, while in Heidelberg he published the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, a systematic work in which an abbreviated version of the earlier *Science of Logic* the *Encyclopaedia Logic* or *Lesser Logic* was followed by the application of its principles to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. In 1820 in Berlin Hegel published his major work in political philosophy, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, based on lectures given at Heidelberg but ultimately grounded in the section of the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit* dealing with objective spirit. During the following ten years up to his death in 1831 Hegel enjoyed celebrity at Berlin, and published subsequent versions of the *Encyclopaedia*. After his death versions of his lectures on philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy were published. Hegel himself had been a supporter of progressive but non-revolutionary politics, but his followers divided into factions broadly groupable as those of the left, right and centre Toews ; from the left, Karl Marx was to develop his own purported scientific approach to society and history which appropriated many Hegelian ideas into a materialistic outlook. Later, especially in reaction to orthodox Soviet versions of Marxism, many so-called Western Marxists re-incorporated further Hegelian elements back into their forms of Marxist philosophy. In academic philosophy, Hegelian idealism had seemed to collapse dramatically after the failure of the revolutionary movements of that year, but underwent a revival in both Great Britain and the United States in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In Britain, where philosophers such as T. However, a later generation of French philosophers coming to prominence in the 1830s tended to react against Hegel in ways analogous to those in which early analytic philosophers had reacted against the Hegel who had influenced their predecessors. In the 1840s the German philosopher Klaus Hartmann developed what was termed a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel which, together with the work of Dieter Henrich and others, played an important role in the revival of interest in Hegel in academic philosophy in the second half of the century. By the close of the twentieth century, even within core logico-metaphysical areas of analytic philosophy, a number of individuals such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell had started to take Hegel seriously as a significant modern philosopher, although generally within analytic circles a favorable reassessment of Hegel has still a long way to go. The contents of philosophical knowledge, we might suspect, will come from the historically changing contents of its cultural context. On the other, there is the hint of such contents being raised to some higher level, presumably higher than other levels of cognitive functioning such as those based in everyday perceptual experience, for example, or those characteristic of other areas of culture such as art and religion. This higher level takes the form of conceptually articulated thought, a type of cognition commonly taken as capable of having purportedly eternal contents think of Plato and Frege, for example. In line with

such a conception, Hegel sometimes referred to the task of philosophy as that of recognising the concept *Der Begriff* in the mere representations *Vorstellungen* of everyday life. In contrast, the British Hegelian movement at the end of the nineteenth century tended to ignore the Phenomenology and the more historicist dimensions of his thought, and found in Hegel a systematic metaphysician whose *Logic* provided the basis for a definitive philosophical ontology. This latter traditional metaphysical view of Hegel dominated Hegel reception for most of the twentieth century, but from the 1950s came to be challenged by scholars who offered an alternative non-metaphysical, post-Kantian view. But in turn, this post-Kantian reading has been challenged by a revised metaphysical view, critical of the purported over-assimilation of Hegel to Kant by the post-Kantians. Thus, for example, Leibniz had contrasted Plato as an idealist with Epicurus as a materialist. The opposition to materialism here, together with the fact that in the English-speaking world the Irish philosopher and clergyman George Berkeley is often taken as a prototypical idealist, has given rise to the assumption that idealism is necessarily an immaterialist doctrine. This assumption, however, is mistaken. The type of picture found in Berkeley was only to be found in certain late antique Platonists and, especially, early Christian Platonists like Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. It thus had features closer to the more pantheistic picture of divine thought found in Spinoza, for example, for whom matter and mind were attributes of the one substance. The materialists to which he was opposed mechanistic corpuscularists of his time conceived of unformed matter as a type of self-subsistent substance, and it seems to have been that conception to which he was opposed, at least in some periods of his work, not the reality of matter *per se*. In this picture, Hegel is seen as offering a metaphysico-religious view of God qua Absolute Spirit, as the ultimate reality that we can come to know through pure thought processes alone. Indeed, Hegel often seems to invoke imagery consistent with the types of neo-Platonic conceptions of the universe that had been common within Christian mysticism, especially in the German states, in the early modern period. Thus, in our consciousness of God, we somehow serve to realize his own self-consciousness, and, thereby, his own perfection. In English-language interpretations, such a picture is effectively found in the work of Charles Taylor and Michael Rosen, for example. With its dark mystical roots, and its overtly religious content, it is hardly surprising that the philosophy of Hegel so understood has rarely been regarded as a live option within the largely secular and scientific conceptions of philosophy that have been dominant in the twentieth century. To critics, such as Karl Popper in his popular post-war *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Hegel had not only advocated a disastrous political conception of the state and the relation of its citizens to it, a conception prefiguring twentieth-century totalitarianism, but he had also tried to underpin such advocacy with dubious theo-logico-metaphysical speculations. With his idea of the development of spirit in history, Hegel is seen as literalising a way of talking about different cultures in terms of their spirits, of constructing a developmental sequence of epochs typical of nineteenth-century ideas of linear historical progress, and then enveloping this story of human progress in terms of one about the developing self-consciousness of the cosmos-God itself. The pantheistic legacy inherited by Hegel meant that he had no problem in considering an objective outer world beyond any particular subjective mind. But this objective world itself had to be understood as conceptually informed: Thus in contrast to Berkeleian subjective idealism it became common to talk of Hegel as incorporating the objective idealism of views, especially common among German historians, in which social life and thought were understood in terms of the conceptual or spiritual structures that informed them. But in contrast to both forms of idealism, Hegel, according to this reading, postulated a form of absolute idealism by including both subjective life and the objective cultural practices on which subjective life depended within the dynamics of the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualisation of God, the Absolute Spirit. Despite this seemingly dominant theological theme, Hegel was still seen by many as an important precursor of other more characteristically secular strands of modern thought such as existentialism and Marxist materialism. Existentialists were thought of as taking the idea of the finitude and historical and cultural dependence of individual subjects from Hegel, and as leaving out all pretensions to the Absolute, while Marxists were thought of as taking the historical dynamics of the Hegelian picture but reinterpreting this in materialist rather than idealist categories. As for understanding Hegel himself, the traditional metaphysical view remained the dominant interpretative approach of Hegel scholars throughout much of the twentieth century. Thus it is commonly asserted that implicit within

the metaphysical Hegel is an anti-metaphysical philosopher struggling to get out—“one potentially capable of beating the critical Kant at his own game. More controversially, one now finds it argued that the traditional picture is simply wrong at a more general level, and that Hegel, even in his systematic thought, was not committed to the bizarre, teleological spirit monism that has been traditionally attributed to him because he was free of the type of traditional metaphysical commitments that had been criticized by Kant. Prominent among such interpretations has been the so-called post-Kantian interpretation advanced by North American Hegel scholars Robert Pippin , , and Terry Pinkard , , From an explicitly analytic perspective, broadly similar views have been put forward by Robert Brandom , , and John McDowell With this notion, it is claimed, Hegel was essentially attempting to answer the Kantian question of the conditions of rational human mindedness, rather than being concerned with giving an account of the developing self-consciousness of God. But while Kant had limited such conditions to formal abstractly conceived structures of the mind, Hegel extended them to include aspects of historically and socially determined forms of embodied human existence. Proponents of the post-Kantian view, it is commonly said, are guilty of projecting onto Hegel views they would like to find there rather than what is actually to be found. Here one tends to find interpreters attributing to Hegel some type of conceptual realism, sometimes appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics for the legitimacy of metaphysics conceived as inquiry into the fundamental features or structures of the world itself. Among the interpreters advancing something like this revised metaphysical view might be counted Stephen Houlgate b , Robert Stern , , Kenneth Westphal , James Kreines , and Christopher Yeomans On a number of points, the proponents of the revised conceptual realist metaphysical interpretation will agree with advocates of the post-Kantian non-metaphysical approach. First, they tend to agree in dismissing much of the extravagant metaphysics traditionally ascribed to Hegel. While it is for the most part clear what sets both post-Kantians and conceptual realists against the traditional view, it is still not clear which issues dividing them are substantive and which are ultimately verbal. After all, Kant himself was not critical of metaphysics per se. His claim was that existing so-called dogmatic metaphysics was in a state analogous to that in which, say, physics had been in before the scientific revolution of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Rather than wanting to eliminate metaphysics, after the style, say, of Hume or the modern logical positivists, Kant had wanted to put metaphysics itself on a secure scientific basis analogous to what Galileo and Newton had achieved for physics. The relevant differences between revised metaphysical and the non-metaphysical views would need to be established with respect to such particular issues as, for example, the nature of acceptably Kantian metaphysical claims. In the next category are works that were published at the time as handbooks for use in student teaching such as the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* first published in while he was teaching at Heidelberg and subsequently revised and republished in and again in , and *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, effectively an expansion of a section of the *Encyclopaedia* and published in after his move to Berlin. Transcripts of his earlier lectures on this topic delivered in Heidelberg have also since been published. Along with the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Philosophy of Right* might be added similar teaching-related writings from the Jena period, prepared as lectures but only published as such much later. Here we will restrict the discussion to the first three categories. The term clearly suited Kant as he had distinguished the phenomena known through the faculty of sensibility from the noumena known purely conceptually. It is meant to function as an induction or education of the reader to the standpoint of purely conceptual thought from which philosophy can be done. As such, its structure has been compared to that of a *Bildungsroman* educational novel , having an abstractly conceived protagonist—“the bearer of an evolving series of so-called shapes of consciousness or the inhabitant of a series of successive phenomenal worlds—“whose progress and set-backs the reader follows and learns from. Or at least this is how the work sets out: Hegel constructs a series of such shapes that maps onto the history of western European civilization from the Greeks to his own time. When Kant had broached the idea of a phenomenological propaedeutic to Lambert, he himself had still believed in the project of a purely conceptual metaphysics achievable by the use of the regressive or analytic method, but this project conceived as an exercise in theoretical reason was just what Kant in his later critical philosophy had come to disavow. Supporters of the post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel obviously interpret this work and its telos differently. For example, it has been argued e. As Pinkard had pointed out in that work, this was a conception of the

normatively structured practices of human reason found in the American pragmatist Wilfrid Sellars, the inspiration behind the Hegelian dimensions of analytic philosophers such as Willem deVries , Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Chapters 1 to 3 effectively follow a developmental series of distinct shapes of consciousness—jointly epistemological and ontological attitudes articulated by criteria which are, regarded from one direction, criteria for certain knowledge, and from the other, criteria for the nature of the objects of such knowledge. In chapter 1, the attitude of Sense-certainty takes immediately given perceptual simples—the sort of role played by the so-called sense-data of early twentieth-century analytic epistemology, for example, with which a subject is purportedly acquainted as bare thises—as the fundamental objects known. Hegel is clear that these contents are not merely qualitative simples that are immediately apprehended, but comprehended instances of the conceptual determination of singularity [Einzelheit] Phen: The idea seems to be that for Hegel, the same content can play the roles played by both concepts and intuitions in Kant. By the end of this chapter our protagonist consciousness and by implication, we the audience to this drama has learnt that the nature of consciousness cannot be as originally thought: The general truth that was learned about the apparent qualitative simples in Sense-certainty that they were instances of generals is now explicitly taken as the truth of the object of Perception *Wahrnehmung*—in German this term having the connotations of taking *nehmen* to be true *wahr*. In contrast to the purported single object of Sense-certainty the object of Perception is taken as instantiating general properties: But this can be conceived in a variety of ways: Predictably, problems will be revealed in these various different ways of thinking of the nature of those everyday objects of our experience. In fact, such collapse into a type of self-generated skepticism is typical of all the shapes we follow in the work, and there seems something inherently skeptical about such reflexive cognitive processes. But this is not the type of skepticism that is typical of early modern philosophy, such as that used by Descartes in his attempt to find some foundation of indubitability on which genuine knowledge can be built Forster As is clear from his treatment of ancient philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel was attracted to the type of dialectic employed by Socrates in his efforts to get his interlocutors thinking about something beyond that given immediately in sensation LHP II: For Hegel, the ancient skeptics captured the skeptical moment of thought that is the means by which thought progresses beyond the particular categories that have given rise to contradictions. Just as in the way a new shape of thought, Perception, had been generated from the internal contradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, the collapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence of some new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergent attitude. In the case of Perception, the emergent new shape of consciousness, the Understanding, explored in Chapter 3, is a shape identified with the type of scientific cognition that, rather than remaining on the level of the perceived object, posits underlying forces involved in the production of the perceptual episode. The transition from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, The Truth of Self-Certainty, also marks a more general transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness. It is in the course of Chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most well-known part of the Phenomenology, the account of the struggle of recognition in which Hegel examines the inter-subjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of consciousness. Such complex patterns of mutual recognition constituting objective spirit thereby provide the social matrix within which individual self-consciousnesses can exist as such. But this is only worked out in the text gradually. So we have to see how the protagonist self-consciousness could achieve this insight. It is to this end that we further trace the learning path of self-consciousness through the processes of reason in Chapter 5 before objective spirit can become the explicit subject matter of Chapter 6 Spirit. Thus Hegel might be seen as adopting the viewpoint that since social life is ordered by customs we can approach the lives of those living in it in terms of the patterns of those customs or conventions themselves—the conventional practices, as it were, constituting specific, shareable forms of life made actual in the lives of particular individuals who had in turn internalized such general patterns in the process of acculturation. It is not surprising then that his account of spirit here starts with a discussion of religious and civic law. But for non-traditionalists it is not obvious that Hegel, in employing such phrases, is in any way committed to any metaphysical supra-individual conscious being or beings.

Chapter 7 : ECLA Guest Lecture: Stephen Houlgate on Hegel's Theory of Tragedy – Die BÄrliner

Stephen Houlgate's page. The focus of my current work is Hegel's Science of Logic. I am in the process of completing a comprehensive study of the "doctrine of being" in the Logic, which will examine Hegel's account of quality, quantity and measure.

The lecture not only addressed issues discussed during the AY core course, but it also incorporated topics that were of interest to students taking the electives on Philosophy of Greek Tragedy and Greek Polis in Hegelian Perspective. The first topic beginning the lecture was the Hegelian definition of tragedy. A widely accepted notion of tragedy historically has been that it is caused by an external force, sometimes referred to as fate, which has an immense governing power over human lives and actions. However, for Hegel, tragic fate is self-imposed, a result of the convictions and beliefs of the tragic hero. When discussing and comparing Greek to modern tragedy, it is relevant to make a clear distinction between the motives and the traits that make the tragic hero truly tragic. For the Greeks, tragedy arises from the fact that the characters pursue their convictions, which are a direct result of their own ethical pathos, and which fail to meet the beliefs of the opposing side. Characters are both right and wrong at the same time, fuelling this conflicting position with a rigid pursuit of the individual right, thus making their fall the only way to restore the balance. Antigone does what is right for the family; Creon protects the law of the state. Hence, Hegel does not see as tragic the fact that Oedipus kills his father and marries his mother. Therefore, Oedipus consciously seeks the truth which brings upon the uncovering of his own crimes. Hegel analyzed modern tragedy mostly through the works of Shakespeare. Although these characters may be irresolute in the beginning, once they take action there is no force that could stop them. What makes such characters heroic is their brutal magnificence. Modern tragic justice revolves more around the axis of receiving the deserved punishment. A more complex reconciliation is possible only in the mind of the tragic figure, either by repenting or remaining unchanged to the very end. Some critics argue that here there is not any tragic element to begin with; to Hegel, though, the tragic element is the fact that Iphigenia entrusts her faith in the hands of a man who is unpredictable, building up a tension because of the fatal consequences that this act could have had. Nevertheless, everything is peacefully resolved owing to the fact that Iphigenia chooses to trust human nature. The lecture concluded with a discussion, during which students and professors together tried to reach an agreement about how tragedy should be seen, and what is to be regarded as truly tragic. Northwestern University Press, and G. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right Oxford: Oxford University Press, By Elena Volkanovska , Macedonia.

Chapter 8 : Project MUSE - Hegel and Shakespeare on Moral Imagination

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Chapter 9 : Project MUSE - Conflict and Reconciliation in Hegel's Theory of the Tragic

In "The Method of the Philosophy of Right," Frederick Neuhouser seeks to illuminate aspects of the distinctive method of Hegel's book. Neuhouser emphasizes how this work seeks to comprehend the modern social world and show it to be rational.