

Chapter 1 : Thomas Hobbes > By Individual Philosopher > Philosophy

Hobbes on the knowledge of God, by R. W. Hepburn. The context of Hobbes's theory of political obligation, by Q. Skinner. The economic foundations of Hobbes' politics, by W. Letwin.

So far 3 volumes are available: Readers new to Hobbes should begin with *Leviathan*, being sure to read Parts Three and Four, as well as the more familiar and often excerpted Parts One and Two. The Philosophical Project Hobbes sought to discover rational principles for the construction of a civil polity that would not be subject to destruction from within. Continued stability will require that they also refrain from the sorts of actions that might undermine such a regime. For example, subjects should not dispute the sovereign power and under no circumstances should they rebel. In general, Hobbes aimed to demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between political obedience and peace. To establish these conclusions, Hobbes invites us to consider what life would be like in a state of nature, that is, a condition without government. Perhaps we would imagine that people might fare best in such a state, where each decides for herself how to act, and is judge, jury and executioner in her own case whenever disputes arise—and that at any rate, this state is the appropriate baseline against which to judge the justifiability of political arrangements. He assumes that people are sufficiently similar in their mental and physical attributes that no one is invulnerable nor can expect to be able to dominate the others. While people have local affections, their benevolence is limited, and they have a tendency to partiality. Concerned that others should agree with their own high opinions of themselves, people are sensitive to slights. They are curious about the causes of events, and anxious about their futures; according to Hobbes, these characteristics incline people to adopt religious beliefs, although the content of those beliefs will differ depending upon the sort of religious education one has happened to receive. Hobbes further assumes as a principle of practical rationality, that people should adopt what they see to be the necessary means to their most important ends. The State of Nature Is a State of War Taken together, these plausible descriptive and normative assumptions yield a state of nature potentially fraught with divisive struggle. The right of each to all things invites serious conflict, especially if there is competition for resources, as there will surely be over at least scarce goods such as the most desirable lands, spouses, etc. People will quite naturally fear that others may citing the right of nature invade them, and may rationally plan to strike first as an anticipatory defense. Conflict will be further fueled by disagreement in religious views, in moral judgments, and over matters as mundane as what goods one actually needs, and what respect one properly merits. Further Questions About the State of Nature In response to the natural question whether humanity ever was generally in any such state of nature, Hobbes gives three examples of putative states of nature. First, he notes that all sovereigns are in this state with respect to one another. Third and most significantly, Hobbes asserts that the state of nature will be easily recognized by those whose formerly peaceful states have collapsed into civil war. The bonds of affection, sexual affinity, and friendship—as well as of clan membership and shared religious belief—may further decrease the accuracy of any purely individualistic model of the state of nature. Another important open question is that of what, exactly, it is about human beings that makes it the case supposing Hobbes is right that our communal life is prone to disaster when we are left to interact according only to our own individual judgments. Perhaps, while people do wish to act for their own best long-term interest, they are shortsighted, and so indulge their current interests without properly considering the effects of their current behavior on their long-term interest. This would be a type of failure of rationality. Such an account would understand irrational human passions to be the source of conflict. Game theorists have been particularly active in these debates, experimenting with different models for the state of nature and the conflict it engenders. The Laws of Nature Hobbes argues that the state of nature is a miserable state of war in which none of our important human ends are reliably realizable. Happily, human nature also provides resources to escape this miserable condition. Humans will recognize as imperatives the injunction to seek peace, and to do those things necessary to secure it, when they can do so safely. They forbid many familiar vices such as iniquity, cruelty, and ingratitude. Although commentators do not agree on whether these laws should be regarded as mere precepts of prudence, or rather as divine commands, or moral imperatives of some other sort, all agree that

Hobbes understands them to direct people to submit to political authority. The social covenant involves both the renunciation or transfer of right and the authorization of the sovereign power. Political legitimacy depends not on how a government came to power, but only on whether it can effectively protect those who have consented to obey it; political obligation ends when protection ceases. Absolutism Although Hobbes offered some mild pragmatic grounds for preferring monarchy to other forms of government, his main concern was to argue that effective governmentâ€”whatever its formâ€”must have absolute authority. Its powers must be neither divided nor limited. The powers of legislation, adjudication, enforcement, taxation, war-making and the less familiar right of control of normative doctrine are connected in such a way that a loss of one may thwart effective exercise of the rest; for example, legislation without interpretation and enforcement will not serve to regulate conduct. Similarly, to impose limitation on the authority of the government is to invite irresolvable disputes over whether it has overstepped those limits. If each person is to decide for herself whether the government should be obeyed, factional disagreementâ€”and war to settle the issue, or at least paralysis of effective governmentâ€”are quite possible. To avoid the horrible prospect of governmental collapse and return to the state of nature, people should treat their sovereign as having absolute authority. He argues that subjects retain a right of self-defense against the sovereign power, giving them the right to disobey or resist when their lives are in danger. He also gives them seemingly broad resistance rights in cases in which their families or even their honor are at stake. These exceptions have understandably intrigued those who study Hobbes. It is not clear whether or not this charge can stand up to scrutiny, but it will surely be the subject of much continued discussion. Hobbes progressively expands his discussion of Christian religion in each revision of his political philosophy, until it comes in *Leviathan* to comprise roughly half the book. There is no settled consensus on how Hobbes understands the significance of religion within his political theory. Hobbes on Women and the Family Scholars are increasingly interested in how Hobbes thought of the status of women, and of the family. Hobbes was one of the earliest western philosophers to count women as persons when devising a social contract among persons. He insists on the equality of all people, very explicitly including women. People are equal because they are all subject to domination, and all potentially capable of dominating others. No person is so strong as to be invulnerable to attack while sleeping by the concerted efforts of others, nor is any so strong as to be assured of dominating all others. In this relevant sense, women are naturally equal to men. They are equally naturally free, meaning that their consent is required before they will be under the authority of anyone else. He also argues for natural maternal right: He witnesses the Amazons. In seeming contrast to this egalitarian foundation, Hobbes spoke of the commonwealth in patriarchal language. Hobbes justifies this way of talking by saying that it is fathers not mothers who have founded societies. Such debates raise the question: To what extent are the patriarchal claims Hobbes makes integral to his overall theory, if indeed they are integral at all? Very helpful for further reference is the critical bibliography of Hobbes scholarship to contained in Zagorin, P.

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Thomas Hobbes, the younger, had a brother Edmund, about two years older, and a sister. The family was left in the care of Thomas Sr. Hobbes was a good pupil, and around he went up to Magdalen Hall , the predecessor college to Hertford College, Oxford. At university, Hobbes appears to have followed his own curriculum; he was "little attracted by the scholastic learning". He did not complete his B. Hobbes was exposed to European scientific and critical methods during the tour, in contrast to the scholastic philosophy that he had learned in Oxford. It has been argued that three of the discourses in the publication known as *Horea Subsecivae: Observations and Discourses* also represent the work of Hobbes from this period. His employer Cavendish, then the Earl of Devonshire, died of the plague in June The widowed countess dismissed Hobbes, but he soon found work, again as a tutor, this time to Gervase Clifton , the son of Sir Gervase Clifton, 1st Baronet. This task, chiefly spent in Paris, ended in when he again found work with the Cavendish family, tutoring William , the eldest son of his previous pupil. Over the next seven years, as well as tutoring, he expanded his own knowledge of philosophy, awakening in him curiosity over key philosophic debates. He visited Florence in and was later a regular debater in philosophic groups in Paris, held together by Marin Mersenne. Despite his interest in this phenomenon, he disdained experimental work as in physics. He went on to conceive the system of thought to the elaboration of which he would devote his life. His scheme was first to work out, in a separate treatise, a systematic doctrine of body, showing how physical phenomena were universally explicable in terms of motion, at least as motion or mechanical action was then understood. He then singled out Man from the realm of Nature and plants. Then, in another treatise, he showed what specific bodily motions were involved in the production of the peculiar phenomena of sensation, knowledge, affections and passions whereby Man came into relation with Man. Finally he considered, in his crowning treatise, how Men were moved to enter into society, and argued how this must be regulated if Men were not to fall back into "brutishness and misery". Thus he proposed to unite the separate phenomena of Body, Man, and the State. It was not published and only circulated as a manuscript among his acquaintances. A pirated version, however, was published about ten years later. Although it seems that much of *The Elements of Law* was composed before the sitting of the Short Parliament, there are polemical pieces of the work that clearly mark the influences of the rising political crisis. However, the arguments in *Leviathan* were modified from *The Elements of Law* when it came to the necessity of consent in creating political obligation. Namely, Hobbes wrote in *The Elements of Law* that Patrimonial kingdoms were not necessarily formed by the consent of the governed , while in *Leviathan* he argued that they were. He did not return for 11 years. In Paris, he rejoined the coterie around Mersenne and wrote a critique of the *Meditations on First Philosophy* of Descartes , which was printed as third among the sets of "Objections" appended, with "Replies" from Descartes, in A different set of remarks on other works by Descartes succeeded only in ending all correspondence between the two. Hobbes also extended his own works in a way, working on the third section, *De Cive* , which was finished in November Although it was initially only circulated privately, it was well received, and included lines of argumentation that were repeated a decade later in *Leviathan*. He then returned to hard work on the first two sections of his work and published little except a short treatise on optics *Tractatus opticus* included in the collection of scientific tracts published by Mersenne as *Cogitata physico-mathematica* in He built a good reputation in philosophic circles and in was chosen with Descartes, Gilles de Roberval and others to referee the controversy between John Pell and Longomontanus over the problem of squaring the circle. The printing began in by Samuel de Sorbiere through the Elsevier press at Amsterdam with a new preface and some new notes in reply to objections. In , Hobbes took up a position as mathematical instructor to the young Charles, Prince of Wales , [20] who had come over from Jersey around July. This engagement lasted until when Charles went to Holland. Frontispiece from *De Cive* The company of the exiled royalists led Hobbes to produce *Leviathan*, which set forth his theory of civil government in relation to the political crisis resulting from the war. Hobbes compared the State to a monster

Leviathan composed of men, created under pressure of human needs and dissolved by civil strife due to human passions. The work closed with a general "Review and Conclusion", in response to the war, which answered the question: During the years of composing Leviathan, Hobbes remained in or near Paris. In , a serious illness that nearly killed him disabled him for six months. On recovering, he resumed his literary task and completed it by . Meanwhile, a translation of *De Cive* was being produced; scholars disagree about whether it was Hobbes who translated it. Meanwhile, the printing of the greater work proceeded, and finally appeared in mid-1651, titled *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*. It had a famous title-page engraving depicting a crowned giant above the waist towering above hills overlooking a landscape, holding a sword and a crozier and made up of tiny human figures. The work had immediate impact. Soon, Hobbes was more lauded and decried than any other thinker of his time. The first effect of its publication was to sever his link with the exiled royalists, who might well have killed him. The secularist spirit of his book greatly angered both Anglicans and French Catholics. Hobbes appealed to the revolutionary English government for protection and fled back to London in winter . After his submission to the Council of State , he was allowed to subside into private life in Fetter Lane. *Leviathan* Hobbes book Frontispiece of *Leviathan* In *Leviathan*, Hobbes set out his doctrine of the foundation of states and legitimate governments and creating an objective science of morality. This gave rise to social contract theory. *Leviathan* was written during the English Civil War ; much of the book is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and civil war. Beginning from a mechanistic understanding of human beings and their passions, Hobbes postulates what life would be like without government, a condition which he calls the state of nature. In that state, each person would have a right, or license, to everything in the world. This, Hobbes argues, would lead to a "war of all against all" *bellum omnium contra omnes*. The description contains what has been called one of the best known passages in English philosophy, which describes the natural state humankind would be in, were it not for political community: So, in order to avoid it, people accede to a social contract and establish a civil society. According to Hobbes, society is a population and a sovereign authority , to whom all individuals in that society cede some rights for the sake of protection. The individuals are thereby the authors of all decisions made by the sovereign. Hobbes duly replied, but not for publication. However, a French acquaintance took a copy of the reply and published it with "an extravagantly laudatory epistle". In , Hobbes was ready with *The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance*, in which he replied "with astonishing force"[citation needed] to the bishop. Hobbes's Wallis controversy Hobbes opposed the existing academic arrangements, and assailed the system of the original universities in *Leviathan*. He went on to publish *De Corpore* , which contained not only tendentious views on mathematics but also an erroneous proof of the squaring of the circle. This all led mathematicians to target him for polemics and sparked John Wallis to become one of his most persistent opponents. After years of debate, the spat over proving the squaring of the circle gained such notoriety that it has become one of the most infamous feuds in mathematical history. Atheist[edit] Hobbes has been accused of atheism , or in the case of Bramhall of teachings that could lead to atheism. He says that this "sort of discrepancy has led to many errors in determining who was an atheist in the early modern period ". For example, he argued repeatedly that there are no incorporeal substances, and that all things, including human thoughts, and even God, heaven, and hell are corporeal, matter in motion. He argued that "though Scripture acknowledge spirits, yet doth it nowhere say, that they are incorporeal, meaning thereby without dimensions and quantity". Like John Locke , he also stated that true revelation can never disagree with human reason and experience, [33] although he also argued that people should accept revelation and its interpretations for the reason that they should accept the commands of their sovereign, in order to avoid war. Later life[edit] In , Hobbes published the final section of his philosophical system, completing the scheme he had planned more than 20 years before. *De Homine* consisted for the most part of an elaborate theory of vision. The remainder of the treatise dealt cursorily with some of the topics more fully treated in the *Human Nature* and the *Leviathan*. In addition to publishing some controversial writings on mathematics and physics, Hobbes also continued to produce philosophical works. From the time of the Restoration , he acquired a new prominence; "Hobbism" became a byword for all that respectable society ought to denounce. The king was important in protecting Hobbes when, in , the House of Commons

introduced a bill against atheism and profaneness. That same year, on 17 October, it was ordered that the committee to which the bill was referred "should be empowered to receive information touching such books as tend to atheism, blasphemy and profaneness Hobbes called the Leviathan". At the same time, he examined the actual state of the law of heresy. The results of his investigation were first announced in three short Dialogues added as an Appendix to his Latin translation of Leviathan, published in Amsterdam in 1651. In this appendix, Hobbes aimed to show that, since the High Court of Commission had been put down, there remained no court of heresy at all to which he was amenable, and that nothing could be heresy except opposing the Nicene Creed, which, he maintained, Leviathan did not do. The only consequence that came of the bill was that Hobbes could never thereafter publish anything in England on subjects relating to human conduct. Other writings were not made public until after his death, including Behemoth: For some time, Hobbes was not even allowed to respond, whatever his enemies tried. Despite this, his reputation abroad was formidable, and noble or learned foreigners who came to England never forgot to pay their respects to the old philosopher. His final works were an autobiography in Latin verse in 1650, and a translation of four books of the Odyssey into "rugged" English rhymes that in led to a complete translation of both Iliad and Odyssey in 1653. Three of the discourses in the Horae Subsecivae: A new edition has been edited by John T. Southern Illinois University Press, De Motu, Loco et Tempore first edition with the title: Part of the Praefatio to Mersenni Ballistica in F. Marini Mersenni minimi Cogitata physico-mathematica. Opticae, liber septimus, written in in Universae geometriae mixtaeque mathematicae synopsis, edited by Marin Mersenne reprinted by Molesworth in OL V pp. Of Liberty and Necessity published without the permission of Hobbes in 1651. Elementa Philosophica de Cive second expanded edition with a new Preface to the Reader

Chapter 3 : Calvin and Hobbes Use Superpowers to Fight Back-to-School

formulated by a distinguished Hobbes scholar, S. I. Benn, according to which "power is an ability to determine the actions of persons in intended ways". Seemingly Benn's.

References and Further Reading 1. Introduction Hobbes is the founding father of modern political philosophy. Directly or indirectly, he has set the terms of debate about the fundamentals of political life right into our own times. Few have liked his thesis, that the problems of political life mean that a society should accept an unaccountable sovereign as its sole political authority. Nonetheless, we still live in the world that Hobbes addressed head on: But what or who determines what those rights are? And who will enforce them? In other words, who will exercise the most important political powers, when the basic assumption is that we all share the same entitlements? A century before, Nicolo Machiavelli had emphasized the harsh realities of power, as well as recalling ancient Roman experiences of political freedom. Machiavelli appears as the first modern political thinker, because like Hobbes he was no longer prepared to talk about politics in terms set by religious faith indeed, he was still more offensive than Hobbes to many orthodox believers, instead, he looked upon politics as a secular discipline divorced from theology. But unlike Hobbes, Machiavelli offers us no comprehensive philosophy: How is political authority justified and how far does it extend? In particular, are our political rulers properly as unlimited in their powers as Hobbes had suggested? And if they are not, what system of politics will ensure that they do not overstep the mark, do not trespass on the rights of their subjects? What did Hobbes write that was so important? How was he able to set out a way of thinking about politics and power that remains decisive nearly four centuries afterwards? Born in 1588, the year the Spanish Armada made its ill-fated attempt to invade England, he lived to the exceptional age of 91, dying in 1679. He was not born to power or wealth or influence: And these in turn - together with a good deal of common sense and personal maturity - won him a place tutoring the son of an important noble family, the Cavendishes. This meant that Hobbes entered circles where the activities of the King, of Members of Parliament, and of other wealthy landowners were known and discussed, and indeed influenced. Thus intellectual and practical ability brought Hobbes to a place close to power - later he would even be math tutor to the future King Charles II. Although this never made Hobbes powerful, it meant he was acquainted with and indeed vulnerable to those who were. As the scene was being set for the Civil Wars of 1642-51 - wars that would lead to the King being executed and a republic being declared - Hobbes felt forced to leave the country for his personal safety, and lived in France from 1640 to 1650. Thus Hobbes lived in a time of upheaval, sharper than any England has since known. This turmoil had many aspects and causes, political and religious, military and economic. England stood divided against itself in several ways. Society was divided religiously, economically, and by region. Inequalities in wealth were huge, and the upheavals of the Civil Wars saw the emergence of astonishingly radical religious and political sects. For instance, "the Levellers" called for much greater equality in terms of wealth and political rights; "the Diggers," more radical still, fought for the abolition of wage labor. Civil war meant that the country became militarily divided. And all these divisions cut across one another: Intensely disputatious, Hobbes repeatedly embroiled himself in prolonged arguments with clerics, mathematicians, scientists and philosophers - sometimes to the cost of his intellectual reputation. For instance, he argued repeatedly that it is possible to "square the circle" - no accident that the phrase is now proverbial for a problem that cannot be solved! His writing was as undaunted by age and ill health as it was by the events of his times. Hobbes gained a reputation in many fields. He was known as a scientist especially in optics, as a mathematician especially in geometry, as a translator of the classics, as a writer on law, as a disputant in metaphysics and epistemology; not least, he became notorious for his writings and disputes on religious questions. But it is for his writings on morality and politics that he has, rightly, been most remembered. Without these, scholars might remember Hobbes as an interesting intellectual of the seventeenth century; but few philosophers would even recognize his name. What are the writings that earned Hobbes his philosophical fame? Other important works include: *The second* is a deep admiration for and involvement in the emerging scientific method, alongside an admiration for a much older discipline, geometry. Both influences affected

how Hobbes expressed his moral and political ideas. Leviathan and other works are littered with references to the "frequency of insignificant speech" in the speculations of the scholastics, with their combinations of Christian theology and Aristotelian metaphysics. In the first place, he makes very strong claims about the proper relation between religion and politics. He was not as many have charged an atheist, but he was deadly serious in insisting that theological disputes should be kept out of politics. For Hobbes, the sovereign should determine the proper forms of religious worship, and citizens never have duties to God that override their duty to obey political authority. He insists that terms be clearly defined and relate to actual concrete experiences - part of his empiricism. Many early sections of Leviathan read rather like a dictionary. It looks rather like a dead-end on the way to the modern idea of science based on patient observation, theory-building and experiment. Once more, it can be disputed whether this method is significant in shaping those ideas, or merely provides Hobbes with a distinctive way of presenting them. On his view, what we ought to do depends greatly on the situation in which we find ourselves. Where political authority exists, our duty seems to be quite straightforward: For him ethics is concerned with human nature, while political philosophy deals with what happens when human beings interact. He ends by saying that the truth of his ideas can be gauged only by self-examination, by looking into our selves to adjudge our characteristic thoughts and passions, which form the basis of all human action. But what is the relationship between these two very different claims? For obviously when we look into our selves we do not see mechanical pushes and pulls. As to what he will say about successful political organization, the resemblance between the commonwealth and a functioning human being is slim indeed. Science provides him with a distinctive method and some memorable metaphors and similes. Those ideas may have come, as Hobbes also claims, from self-examination. In all likelihood, they actually derived from his reflection on contemporary events and his reading of classics of political history such as Thucydides. But it does mean we should not be misled by scientific imagery that stems from an in fact non-existent science and also, to some extent, from an unproven and uncertain metaphysics. But while it is true that Hobbes sometimes says things like this, we should be clear that the ideas fit together only in a metaphorical way. What self-interest is depends on the time-scale we adopt, and how effectively we might achieve this goal also depends on our insight into what harms and benefits us. The mechanistic metaphor is something of a red herring and, in the end, probably less useful than his other starting point in Leviathan, the Delphic epithet: The other aspect concerns human powers of judgment and reasoning, about which Hobbes tends to be extremely skeptical. Like many philosophers before him, Hobbes wants to present a more solid and certain account of human morality than is contained in everyday beliefs. Plato had contrasted knowledge with opinion. Hobbes has several reasons for thinking that human judgment is unreliable, and needs to be guided by science. Our judgments tend to be distorted by self-interest or by the pleasures and pains of the moment. We may share the same basic passions, but the various things of the world affect us all very differently; and we are inclined to use our feelings as measures for others. It becomes dogmatic through vanity and morality, as with "men vehemently in love with their own new opinions" and obstinately bent to maintain them, [who give] their opinions also that revered name of conscience" Leviathan, vii. When we use words which lack any real objects of reference, or are unclear about the meaning of the words we use, the danger is not only that our thoughts will be meaningless, but also that we will fall into violent dispute. Hobbes has scholastic philosophy in mind, but he also makes related points about the dangerous effects of faulty political ideas and ideologies. We form beliefs about supernatural entities, fairies and spirits and so on, and fear follows where belief has gone, further distorting our judgment. Judgment can be swayed this way and that by rhetoric, that is, by the persuasive and "colored" speech of others, who can deliberately deceive us and may well have purposes that go against the common good or indeed our own good. For Hobbes, it is only science, "the knowledge of consequences" Leviathan, v. Unfortunately, his picture of science, based on crudely mechanistic premises and developed through deductive demonstrations, is not even plausible in the physical sciences. He is certainly an acute and wise commentator of political affairs; we can praise him for his hard-headedness about the realities of human conduct, and for his determination to create solid chains of logical reasoning. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Hobbes was able to reach a level of "scientific" certainty in his judgments that had been lacking in all previous reflection on morals and politics. Many interpreters have presented the Hobbesian agent as a

self-interested, rationally calculating actor those ideas have been important in modern political philosophy and economic thought, especially in terms of rational choice theories. It is true that some of the problems that face people like this - rational egoists, as philosophers call them - are similar to the problems Hobbes wants to solve in his political philosophy. There are good reasons why earlier interpreters and new readers tend to think the Hobbesian agent is ultimately self-interested. Hobbes likes to make bold and even shocking claims to get his point across. What could be clearer? First, quite simply, it represents a false view of human nature. People do all sorts of altruistic things that go against their interests. They also do all sorts of needlessly cruel things that go against self-interest think of the self-defeating lengths that revenge can run to. So it would be uncharitable to interpret Hobbes this way, if we can find a more plausible account in his work. Second, in any case Hobbes often relies on a more sophisticated view of human nature. He describes or even relies on motives that go beyond or against self-interest, such as pity, a sense of honor or courage, and so on. And he frequently emphasizes that we find it difficult to judge or appreciate just what our interests are anyhow. The upshot is that Hobbes does not think that we are basically or reliably selfish; and he does not think we are fundamentally or reliably rational in our ideas about what is in our interests. He is rarely surprised to find human beings doing things that go against self-interest: But we shall see that this would over-simplify the conclusions that Hobbes draws from his account of human nature. We are needy and vulnerable. We are easily led astray in our attempts to know the world around us. Our capacity to reason is as fragile as our capacity to know; it relies upon language and is prone to error and undue influence. Unsurprisingly, Hobbes thinks little happiness can be expected of our lives together. The best we can hope for is peaceful life under an authoritarian-sounding sovereign.

Chapter 4 : Hobbes: Intellectual Context - Bibliography - PhilPapers

Accounts of Hobbes's 'system' of sciences oscillate between two extremes. On one extreme, the system is portrayed as wholly axiomatic-deductive, with statecraft being deduced in an unbroken chain from the principles of logic and first philosophy.

Hardwick, Derbyshire, England, 4 December political philosophy, moral philosophy, geometry, optics. His father, for whom he was named, was vicar of St. His mother came of a yeoman family named Middleton. According to John Aubrey, the elder Thomas Hobbes was a semiliterate man: Standing in front of his church, the father quarreled with a fellow parson, struck him, and was obliged in consequence to flee from Malmesbury, never to return. Thus, before he reached the age of seven, Thomas Hobbes was deprived of the society of his father; and salt was rubbed in the wound when the man his father had struck became the new vicar. The care of the Hobbes family passed to an uncle, Francis Hobbes, a glover and an intelligent man who recognized signs of precocity in his nephew and underwrote the cost of his education. Astronomy and geography were his favorite subjects at this time. In Hobbes, now bachelor of arts, was recommended by the principal of his college to be tutor to the son of William Cavendish, Baron Hardwicke, who later became the second earl of Devonshire. The young graduate was introduced to a cultured, aristocratic world. Moreover, in Chatsworth and Hardwick Hall, the great houses of the Cavendish family, Hobbes had at his disposal an excellent library in which, he said, he found the university he had missed at Oxford. To a second branch of the Cavendish family residing at Welbeck Abbey, Hobbes owed the awakening of his interest in natural science. In Hobbes set out on a grand tour of the Continent with his pupil. On this first tour, through France, Germany, and Italy, Hobbes perfected his knowledge of foreign tongues and resolved, on his return, to become a scholar. Although they held some points in common, the two philosophers had worked out their ideas independently and essentially along different lines. It was in a library in Geneva that he first read Euclid; he was ever afterward enamored of geometry. By November of Hobbes was recalled to the Cavendish family to serve as tutor in Latin and rhetoric to the next earl of Devonshire. With this young man, Hobbes, now in his forties, made his third grand tour of the Continent, the one which had the most important consequences for the development of his interest in natural science. That interest had not previously been dormant, since as Hobbes himself tells us, he had formulated a theory of light and sound as early as 1636; a short manuscript tract giving a theory of sense and appetite is assigned by Dr. Frith of Brandt to 1636. But on the third journey to France and Italy Hobbes made personal contact with scientific minds. He also met Gassendi and Roberval; he read Descartes; and everywhere he went, he meditated on the problems of motion, which he conceived to be the principle by which a wholly material universe is to be understood. Probably this interest was awakened in him by his contact with the Cavendish circle, especially with Charles Cavendish, Walter Warner, and John Pell. But a letter of 1642 to William Cavendish shows that Hobbes had by this time abandoned the emission theory in favor of a mediumistic theory—light is propagated by a motion or pressure of the medium intervening between the source and the eye—and a letter of May 1642 shows that he developed the idea of the expansion and contraction of the medium as a way of accounting for the motion of the light and of the medium. He later rejected the idea of expansion and contraction because it demanded the presence of a vacuum, and a vacuum was precluded by the doctrine of plenitude in which Hobbes had come to believe. He accepted that light has physical dimensions but he argued that the significant feature of light, from a mathematical point of view, is its impulse or endeavor to motion; and this impulse is to be understood as the motion of infinitesimal elements. When he returned to Chatsworth in 1644, after his third journey abroad, Hobbes continued to correspond with Mersenne on questions of physics and optics. He was now forty-nine: He therefore formulated the outline of a large philosophical system, to be composed of three parts—body, man, and citizenship—and to be described in that order, since for Hobbes body or matter is the ultimate constituent of all things, including human society. In 1648, while Parliament and king were locked in political combat but before the outbreak of military hostilities in the Civil War, Hobbes considered it prudent for his safety to return to France. He did so and remained there for eleven years, part of that time with the duke of Newcastle in Paris. Relations between

these two proud thinkers were strained because neither was willing to concede any originality in the thought of the other. In the spring of 1650, while still in England, he wrote a short treatise on politics which circulated widely in manuscript and was published in two parts under the titles *Humane Nature* and *De corpore politico*, or the *Elements of Law*. In Paris he wrote *De cive*, published in 1651, a book which enjoyed international success. Hobbes therefore set to work on an English treatise, *Leviathan*, published in 1651. This work is justly celebrated for the brilliance, breadth, and coherence of its philosophical vision and for its concise, vigorous, and eloquent prose style. The outlook of *Leviathan* is nominalist, materialist, and anticlerical. Hobbes believed that the universe is a great continuum of matter. It was created and set in motion by God, who is himself a material being, since the universe is utterly devoid of spirit. Our knowledge of the external world is derived, either directly or ultimately, from our sense impressions; and since sensory knowledge is the only knowledge we can ever have, we have no grounds for believing in the independent existence of universals or absolute ideas, or classes of things as separate entities. Human language consists of manes of things and names of names, all joined by predicates. Hobbes was uncompromising in the application of his nominalist principles to ethics. He argued that ethical judgments are products of human thought and culture. Some commentators, such as A. In this view natural law is prudential. Whichever view is correct, there can be no doubt that Hobbes cast his natural law doctrine in a secular mold. In the same secular spirit Hobbes developed his ideas of human nature. Man is a part of material nature, so his behavior, including the behavior of his mind, can ultimately be understood by reference to physical laws. Viewed from a shorter perspective, human behavior is seen by Hobbes to be grounded in self-interest, especially in the fundamental desire to survive. Hobbes did not argue that human nature was an entity separate from human culture, but he asked his readers to imagine what life would be like in the absence of culture—“in the absence, that is, of social conventions and civil restraint. What Hobbes feared more than the tyranny of a sovereign was anarchy, and so he constructed a model of the state in which he thought anarchy would be impossible. Moved by their fears and passions, and instructed by their reason, men would come to realize that they can be delivered from the state of nature only by the generation of a stable commonwealth. To achieve this condition of enforceable peace, men will make a sort of contract among themselves but not between themselves and the sovereign to transfer their individual powers to a central sovereign authority. Hobbes did not insist that the sovereign be a single individual; although he favored monarchy, he thought that a body of men, a parliament, or even a king and parliament working in concert could achieve the same results. The main point was that the power of the sovereign be absolute, for the slightest diminution of his power would erode the security of the citizens; and it was for their security from each other that the sovereign was brought into being. Hobbes reserves to the citizens the right of rebellion if the sovereign fails to protect their security, but he treats this question warily. Hobbes recognized that a seventeenth-century audience would demand to know whether his principles conformed to the teaching of Scripture. He himself knew the Bible well, and he was able to find passages in it supporting his doctrine of absolute sovereignty; but other passages were inconvenient and there remained the question, Particularly vexing in an age of religious warfare, of which of several interpretations of Scripture was the correct one. Ultimately, said Hobbes, all Scripture is subject to interpretation, there being nothing about it except its existence that is agreeable to all minds. His solution to the problem of conflicting interpretation was both political and philosophical. On the political side he adopted the ultra-Erastian position that the only interpretation of Scripture that may be publicly espoused by citizens in a commonwealth is the interpretation of the sovereign authority. The natural right which citizens, by agreement among themselves, had transferred to the sovereign included the natural right of scriptural interpretation; should they retain that right, the commonwealth would inevitably lapse into a state of nature. Moreover, Hobbes remained philosophically skeptical about the truth of Scripture. He conceded that a core of mystery in Scripture must be accepted on faith; but the greater part of the Bible is immune to human reason. His skepticism took the form of a surprisingly modern biblical criticism in which he anticipated Richard Simon and Spinoza by calling in question the number, scope, authorship, and general authenticity of the books of the Bible. Watkins, the science implies the civil philosophy in the same way, for example, that the law of evidence has important implications for statements made by witnesses in law courts, although the law of evidence does not entail any

of those statements. He has shown how Hobbes came to abandon his earliest political views, set down in the introduction to his *Thucydides*. Under the shaping influence of the new scientific outlook, however, Hobbes adopted the method called *resolutive-compositive*, which he derived partly from Galileo, partly from Harvey, but primarily from the philosophers and scientists of the school of Padua. Hobbes was personally acquainted with a disciple of this school, Berigardus, author of *Circulus Pisanus*. The method is described by Hobbes in *De corpore*. It has a large Aristotelian component. Put in its simplest form, it consists of resolving whole conceptions into their constituent parts or first principles and then recomposing them. Hobbes assimilated it into his political theory as in the striking example of the break-up of society into its constituent parts called the state of nature and its recomposition into a common-wealth. He was embroiled in controversy for the rest of his life—more, in fact, than any English thinker before or since. The first signs of opposition appeared in France before *Leviathan* was published. On the recommendation of Newcastle, Hobbes was appointed tutor in mathematics to the prince of Wales, the future Charles II. Because of fears expressed by clergymen that the prince would be contaminated with atheism, Hobbes was obliged to promise that he would teach mathematics only, and not politics or religion. And when *Leviathan* was published, no one of the English court in France liked it. Although it was absolutist, it expressed no particular bias in favor of monarchy; and it appeared to favor the Puritan regime in England when it insisted that a citizen submit to any government that can secure internal peace. Moreover, its anticlericalism and attacks on the papacy offended French Jesuits and English Catholics. For these reasons Charles ordered Hobbes to leave the English colony in France, and in the philosopher returned to England. He stayed in London for a year and then retired to Chatsworth, where the Cavendish family treated him with affection and even a certain deference, as befitted a philosopher of international renown. But the shock inflicted by *Leviathan* on clerical and lay opinion produced a rising tide of hostile criticism, some of it intelligent and philosophical but much of it in the form of abuse. Indeed, his doctrines were cited by the House of Commons as a probable cause of the Great Fire of 1666. The two had met in at Paris, where they debated the subject of free will. Bramhall committed his ideas to paper; Hobbes wrote a rejoinder. Thus was launched a controversy which continued until Hobbes had the last word with the posthumous publication of *An Answer to a Book by Dr Bramhall Called The Catching of the Leviathan*. To Bramhall this doctrine was the essence of impiety; it would deny any meaning to rewards for good actions or punishments for evil ones, thus over turning the whole apparatus of religious worship. He wrote, but did not publish, a short treatise in the form of a legal brief showing that the law of heresy had been repealed in the time of Elizabeth and had never been revived, so that there could be no legal grounds for executing him. Not included in this ban was the Latin translation of *Leviathan*, made by Henry Stubbe and first published at Amsterdam in 1668 and at London in 1670. Wallis was a vastly superior mathematician who made important contributions to the development of the calculus. But he was an acrimonious, coarsetempered man; in a controversy that lasted almost twenty-five years, Wallis pressed his mathematical advantage with ferocious zeal, also attacking Hobbes for what he thought were errors in Greek, for having a West Country manner of speech, for being a rustic, for disloyalty to the crown, and so on. The issue between the two men was whether Hobbes had succeeded, as he claimed, both in squaring the circle and in duplicating the cube. Hobbes boldly announced success in both enterprises, although he modified his claim slightly in some of the later books written against Wallis. It should be observed that neither Hobbes nor Wallis doubted the possibility of a quadrature, a proof of its impossibility not having been discovered until the nineteenth century; moreover, the problem of the quadrature was not only venerable but had a particular vitality in the seventeenth century. Hobbes made no original contributions to geometry but, as A. His writings, erroneous as they are in many things, contain acute remarks on points of principle. He appreciated the unity and logical structure of geometry, its freedom from verbal confusion, and its reasoning from definitions placed in their proper order. Algebra, on the other hand, failed to attract Hobbes.

Chapter 5 : Hobbes and Power

Thomas Hobbes () was a 17th century thinker who sought to apply the new methods of science and the Greek rigor of logic to sociology. In his masterwork, 'Leviathan', he describes power and promotes the notion of a commonwealth as an effective society.

For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself. And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science, which very few have and but in few things, as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share. From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And the invader again is in the like danger of another. And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: Also, because there be some that, taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. Again, men have no pleasure but on the contrary a great deal of grief in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he dares which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other, to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example. So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: All other time is peace. Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another: Let him therefore consider with himself: Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it. It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate

into a civil war. But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men. To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason. The passions that incline men to peace are: And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following chapters. A law of nature, *lex naturalis*, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound *jus* and *lex*, right and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them: And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason: The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law: For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his: This is that law of the gospel: Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that law of all men, *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without hindrance from another. Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it, or by transferring it to another. By simply renouncing, when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By transferring, when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted away his right, then is he said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: So that injury or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning; so in the world it is called injustice, and injury voluntarily to undo that which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceth or transferreth his right is a declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he doth so renounce or transfer, or hath so renounced or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words and actions. And the same are the bonds, by which men are bound and obliged: Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: And therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment, both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience, as there is to the patience of

suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned, as also because a man cannot tell when he seeth men proceed against him by violence whether they intend his death or not. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end for which those signs were intended, he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will, but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted. The mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract. If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature which is a condition of war of every man against every man upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: And therefore he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of living. But in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so to do. The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made, as some new fact or other sign of the will not to perform, else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing. He that transferreth any right transferreth the means of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land is understood to transfer the herbage and whatsoever grows upon it; nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers, and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice. To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible, because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right, nor can translate any right to another: To make covenant with God is impossible but by mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural or by His lieutenants that govern under Him and in His name: And therefore they that vow anything contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain, as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them. The matter or subject of a covenant is always something that falleth under deliberation, for to covenant is an act of the will; that is to say, an act, and the last act, of deliberation; and is therefore always understood to be something to come, and which judged possible for him that covenanteth to perform. And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible is no covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid and bindeth, though not to the thing itself, yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible, for to more no man can be obliged. Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing, or by being forgiven. For performance is the natural end of obligation, and forgiveness the restitution of liberty, as being a retransferring of that right in which the obligation consisted. Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy, I am bound by it. For it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it, and consequently, where no other law as in the condition of mere nature forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it: And even in Commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear: A former covenant makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away his right to one man today hath it not to pass tomorrow to another: A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For as I have shown before no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right; and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right, nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you when you come to kill me.

Chapter 6 : Thomas Hobbes's and View on Government by Ben Taret on Prezi

The purpose of this article is to consider Thomas Hobbes's uses of modal notions. I shall concentrate on his theory of causality and on his theory of knowledge. Modal notions play an interesting role in both areas, but the characterizations which Hobbes gives to them are different from each other.

John Locke 29 August 28 October Two Philosophers Two prominent English political philosophers have had a profound impact on modern political science. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke both have made contributions to modern political science and they both had similar views on where power lies in a society. They both are in favor of a popular contract or constitution, which is where the people give the power to govern to their government. This does not necessarily mean a democracy, but can be something as simple as a tribe or as complex as the fictional government described by Plato in *The Republic*, which is more like an aristocracy or communism rather than a Republic. The key is that the people have granted this authority to the government and that authority rests in the people. This, however, is where most of the similarities in opinion end. Of the two, Locke has been the most influential in shaping modern politics, our view of human nature, the nature of individual rights and the shape of popular constitutions that exist today; on the other hand, Hobbes has influenced to some degree what can be done to change a government by the people. Thomas Hobbes 5 April 4 December Motivation Hobbes and Locke both break human motivation down to a basic state of nature. What is interesting is that these two states of nature Hobbes and Locke come up with are polar opposites. Hobbes establishes a science that explains humanity at a physics like level of motion. In fact, this motion in humanity leads to "a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceases only in death" Deutsch, p. Hobbes argues that so strong is this desire for power that "man is a wolf to his fellow man," and that the true state of nature for man is at war Deutsch, p. This does not seem to be fair to wolves or men. Based off of this argument, in nature when two men come face to face on a narrow path, one will bash the other in the head to make way for his path, or perhaps enslave him to carry his burden and do work for him. Locke takes a very different approach. His ideas of human nature are formed with a deist philosophy, meaning that he recognizes that there is a God but does not espouse any particular religion or dogma behind this being or beings. Rather than having human nature rooted in individualism, our nature is governed by natural laws which are set by this creator. Unlike Hobbes, Locke sees that man is not only interested in self survival, but also the survival of his society because of these governing laws. This idea of altruism, of risking ones life to save another is somewhat unique to humanity with the exception of a mother animal defending its children. This divergence in ideas between these two men does come back together in one way at least. In both cases, there has to be a choice of forming alliances and creating or joining societies. Both perceive a need for free will and intelligence else under an extreme Hobbesian philosophy we would be battling brutes and under an extreme Lockeian philosophy we would be ants. There is only one natural right, and that is the right of self preservation Deutsch, p. This is literally might makes right. That while there are some who are stronger than others, the weak are capable of forming confederacies to kill the stronger and so be strong themselves Hobbes, p. This equality makes it so that each man has the ability to consent to be governed and does for the sake of survival. This theory makes Hobbes the originator of the modern social contract theory Deutsch, p. Locke, however, views man in a nicer light by countering that since we are governed by natural laws that come from a creator, then there also follows that there are rights that come from this being as well. These rights are called inalienable right and now days are also referred to as human rights. Sadly there is some ambiguity about the definition of these rights, but there are at least three that are well know. These are life, liberty and property ownership or in the words of Thomas Jefferson, the pursuit of happiness. In respects to equality, since we all are owing our lives and rights to this creator and we are not God and so are subject to death, this makes all of us equal. This equality is not based of alliances, physical or mental prowess but rather on the fact that we are, in a sense, children of a god. This makes any alliance, government or ruler subject to the law rather than being above it because they or he is the author of the law. He who violates the inalienable rights is the enemy of mankind. The reason man forms government is for self preservation and this government is perpetuated by fear. This

returns us back to nature and basically destroys society. This absolute sovereignty is achieved when people give all their power to one individual or to an assembly of individuals through a contract or covenant Deutsch, p. Once made, the sovereign has absolute power in waging war, declaring peace, levying taxes and so forth. If the government were to become oppressive, Hobbes gives no justification or solution to get out of this because going back to the state of nature is worse than being subject to such a government to him. It is hoped that the sovereign will do what is right for his people if nothing more than for fear of violent death, and yet, the people are supposed to do as they are told for the same reasons. What is more, Hobbes then says that the sovereign can be above natural law and so can use it to get his subjects to do as he wills. A man who would normally fear going into battle can be "motivated" to do so by a greater fear of his government Deutsch, p. This is not absolute sovereignty because the government is limited in two ways. First, that the sovereign power is governed by the natural laws and inalienable right and are not allowed to violate them. Second, because Locke advises that the legislative branch or law making and the executive branch or law enforcing be separated so as to prevent abuses and a sense of being above these laws Deutsch, p. If at any point the government does exceed its bounds and will not self correct, Locke declares that the people have one final inalienable right which is clearly defined. This is the right to revolt and establish a government which honors natural laws and human rights Deutsch, p. Thomas Jefferson saw and understood this. In the Declaration of Independence was a clear statement that since the colonies had attempted to resolve the wrong done to them through all means possible and that these attempts had not affect, that they then had the right to "abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed" and to, "throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security" Jefferson. This is the final check and ultimate limit to government in preserving the liberties that come from natural rights. Both Hobbes and Locke see government as a necessity, but the amount of government and the means and justifications for ruling are very much different. Conclusion Finally, of the two, John Locke could be considered as an honorary founding father of the United States. As seen in his ideas being used by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence and by the principles of separating powers included in the Constitution, his contributions justify placing him in that group of great men. There are two things he would be opposed to in the Constitution however. One being the lack of recognition of or allowing for rebellion in the event of a tyrannical government and second in the limitations of power upon the executive, especially since that individual would not be a monarch. Locke was in favor of monarchy when balance with a law making legislature like the Parliament. It seems that Hobbes opposition to revolution has lived on in the exclusion of this right from the founding document of the United States. Whatever the views that one has on Hobbes or Locke, it is important to see that both have had a profound influence on modern politics, human rights and specifically in the formation of the United States of America. Works Cited Deutsch, Kenneth L. An Invitation to Political Thought. The Delcaration of Independence.

Chapter 7 : Thomas Hobbes Quotes - BrainyQuote

Because Hobbes held that "the true doctrine of the Lawes of Nature is the true Morall philosophie", differences in interpretation of Hobbes's moral philosophy can be traced to differing understandings of the status and operation of Hobbes's "laws of nature", which laws will be discussed below.

Detail from painting by John Michael Wright, c. His famous book "Leviathan" and his social contract theory, developed during the tumultuous times around the English Civil War, established the foundation for most of Western Political Philosophy. His vision of the world was strikingly original at the time, and is still relevant to contemporary politics. He did not shrink from addressing sensitive issues head on, and while few have liked his thesis, many have seen the political realism it represents. Like Machiavelli before him, Hobbes looked on politics as a secular discipline, divorced from theology, and he has always attracted his share of powerful and often vitriolic detractors. Others have taken issue with his apparent assumption of mankind as not inherently benevolent, but rather self-centered and competitive. His father, also Thomas, was the vicar of Charlton and Westport, but he abandoned his three children to the care of his older brother, Francis Hobbes, and fled to London after an altercation outside his own church. Nothing is known of his mother. Hobbes was a good pupil and, around 1628, he moved to Magdalen College, Oxford to continue his education. He was little attracted by the Scholastic learning of the day, and largely pursued his own curriculum, graduating in 1631. Sir James Hussey, his master at Magdalen, recommended him as tutor to William, the son of William Cavendish, Baron of Hardwick and later Earl of Devonshire, and began a life-long connection with that family. In 1634, as companion to the younger William, he undertook a grand tour of Europe, where he was exposed to European scientific and critical methods in contrast to the Scholastic philosophy which he had learned in Oxford. His only output before that time was the first English translation of the "History of the Peloponnesian War" by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, which was published in 1629. After his employer, the Earl of Devonshire, died of the plague in June 1633, the widowed countess dismissed Hobbes, but he soon found work as tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clifton. This time, chiefly spent in Paris, ended in 1637, when he again found work with the Cavendish family, tutoring the son of his previous pupil. Over the next seven years, as well as tutoring, he expanded his own knowledge of philosophy, including a visit to Florence in 1638 and attendance at regular philosophical debates in Paris. During these years, he first developed a theory of physical motion and momentum although disdaining any experimental work in physics, and then extended this to the more human phenomena of sensation, knowledge, affections and passions, and from there he began to consider the sociological and political aspects of human interaction. The first two parts of his three-part treatise, "Human Nature" and "De Corpore Publico", were written in 1642, but, before publishing them, and in the light of the uncertain political climate in the run up to the English Civil War of 1642-52, he cautiously decided to move to Paris, where he remained for the next 11 years. In 1648, after some months as mathematical instructor to the young Charles, Prince of Wales later to become Charles II of England, he was persuaded by his Royalist friends to set forth his theory of civil government in detail, especially in relation to the political crisis resulting from the Civil War. Despite a serious illness which disabled him for six months, he continued in this task until 1651, when his famous masterwork "Leviathan" was published. The work had immediate impact, and soon Hobbes was both more lauded and decried than any other thinker of his time. The secularist spirit of his book greatly angered both Anglicans and French Catholics, and he was ultimately forced to flee the exiled royalists back to England and to appeal to the new revolutionary English government for protection. In addition to publishing some ill-founded and controversial writings on mathematics and physics, Hobbes also continued to produce and publish philosophical works. The king was also important in protecting Hobbes when, in 1650, the House of Commons introduced a bill against Atheism and profaneness, which specifically targeted "Leviathan". In the end, the only consequence was that Hobbes was disallowed from publishing anything in England on subjects relating to human conduct including even responses to the attacks of his enemies, and later editions of his works were printed in Amsterdam. Despite this, his reputation abroad remained formidable. His final works were a curious mixture: In October 1659, Hobbes suffered a bladder disorder, which was followed by a paralytic

stroke from which he died on 4 December in Derbyshire, England, aged 70. Work Back to Top Hobbes was not as many have charged an atheist, but he had a boundless contempt for Scholastic philosophy and the speculations of the Scholastics, with their combinations of Christian theology and Aristotelian Metaphysics, and he was insistent that theological disputes should be kept out of politics. He claimed there is no natural source of authority to order our lives, and that human judgment is inherently unreliable, and therefore needs to be guided. He was deeply influenced by the new deterministic science of the age Galileo, Newton, Boyle, Hooke, etc and by the certainty of mathematics. He was interested in constructing a completely mechanical model of the universe and, after visiting Galileo Galilei, he came to believe that the entire physical world could be explained by the new science of motion. He further believed that the human body was also explicable as a dynamic system, as were even the workings of the mind and the whole of civil society. In his "Leviathan" subtitled "The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil" of 1651, Hobbes set out his doctrine of the foundation of states and legitimate governments, based on social contract theories Contractarianism. It was written during the English Civil War of 1642-51, and much of the book is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of a strong central authority and the avoidance of the evils of discord and civil war. It built on the earlier "Elements of Law" of 1650, which was initially an attempt to provide arguments supporting the King against his challengers, and particularly on his "De Cive" of 1642. He argued that the human body is like a machine, and that political organization "commonwealth" is like an artificial human being. Beginning from this mechanistic understanding of human beings and the passions, Hobbes postulated what life would be like without government, a condition which he called the "state of nature" and which he argued inevitably leads to conflict and lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". In order to escape this state of war and insecurity, men in the state of nature accede to a "social contract" and establish a civil society. Thus, all individuals in that society cede their natural rights for the sake of protection, and any abuses of power by this authority must be accepted as the price of peace although in severe cases of abuse, rebellion is to be expected. In particular, he rejected the doctrine of separation of powers, arguing that the sovereign must control civil, military, judicial and ecclesiastical powers, which some have seen as a justification for authoritarianism and even Totalitarianism. In other fields, he was also known as a scientist especially in optics, as a mathematician especially in geometry, although some of his mathematical work has been unceremoniously slammed as inadequate and unrigorous, as a translator of the classics, and as a writer on law.

Chapter 8 : Hobbes and Locke Summary

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Chapter 9 : Hobbes's Moral and Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Thomas Hobbes's and John Locke's Views on the Syrian Civil War Hobbes's Opinions Hobbes believed that in a state of nature (no government) all of mankind are greedy and power seeking animals that unless are controlled will fight for glory, diffidence, and competition.