

Chapter 1 : Israel's Iran Dilemma | World Affairs Journal

One of Israel's leading strategic thinkers joins an important discussion with an eminently sensible book that asks how nuclear weapons will affect Middle East politics and how Israel should deal with its undisclosed option. Evron sees proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a grave.

This combination of eliminationist anti-Semitism and nuclear capacity has placed the most fateful decision since the founding of the state on the shoulders of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak: The dilemma is excruciating. And it faces the world, not just Israel. A nuclear Iran would set off the blue touch paper on a regional nuclear arms race as well as create a shield behind which Iranian proxies militias, terror networks could run amok. So we have to be clear this is a threat potentially much more widely. First, though the sanctions are finally strong, they not have not seriously bitten yet. Iran may well cave eventually but that may not be soon enough. The sanctions timetable is slower than the regime timetable for nuclear breakout. The US could not believe Israel had managed to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in with eight Fs, even though they built and sold Israel the planes. Third, if Israel carried out a limited strike which destroyed the bulk of the existing enrichment capacity and low enriched uranium at Natanz, and the plutonium reactor at Arak, this would set back the clock for Iranian capacity to build a bomb for at least a few years. Reconstructing the facilities would be very difficult under current sanctions. The goal would be to hit certain key targets without which Iran cannot build a bomb, thereby delaying the program, and hope that Iran would be prevented from rebuilding. If it became necessary to do it again in a few yearsâ€”the logic goesâ€”then so be it. The ability of Iran to strike against soft Israeli targets overseas seems to be limited, given the limited success of recent attempts in Georgia, India, and Thailand last month, and the bungled attempt against the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Fifth, while the threat of retaliation against US bases and soft Arab oil targets in the Persian Gulf is real, it is also overstated. Escalating the conflict directly in the Gulf will be self-defeating for Iran, as it will make the situation worse by dragging the Arab states and the US into the conflict against it. Shutting the Strait of Hormuz would be a suicidal move for Iran. More likely will be an escalated shadow or guerrilla war in the Gulf, which is not good but will be a problem for everyone, not just Israel. Sixth, the ability of the US to restrain Israel is limited, particularly in an election year. The Obama administration is doing everything it can to dissuade Israelâ€”including spinning to the Israeli media that the results will be thousands of Israeli casualties or even a World War IIIâ€”but they cannot make Israel stop and will likely back Israel after the event. Seventh, Netanyahu has compared the threat Iran poses as comparable to that of the Nazi extermination camps. And he sees himself as being in the position to bomb Auschwitz. Even though he is an extremely cautious politician, this may be the moment when he is ready to make a decision. Either Iran agrees to stop enrichment, or the talks are considered a failure. The clear failure of diplomacy will be an important element in ensuring legitimacy for an Israeli strike. Iran will likely try to stall and split the international community with a gesture or two that gives the impression of progress, but without giving up any core interests. The real measure of success of a strike will not be only how many years the program is set back, but what the diplomatic reaction is, and whether it makes it easier or harder for Iran to rebuild. If the sanctions regime falls apart as a result of the strike, and further military action becomes diplomatically unfeasible, it may be easier for Iran to rebuild, therefore turning tactical victory into strategic defeat. First, the direct impact on Israel might be appalling. Over the course of two months, Hezbollah can be expected to launch missiles at Israel per day, of which will be aimed at Tel Aviv, according to Mossad estimates revealed by WikiLeaks. This would dwarf the numbers of the conflict. Terrorism, of course, can be expected to increase dramatically. There is also a worry that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, contrary to some assumptions, will not stand idly by. He may use his ballistic ability. Now, more than ever, Assad is obliged to his patrons in Tehran and after an Israeli strike, he may not hold back. More, he may seize the opportunity as the ultimate distraction and look to conflict with Israel as a means of ending the rebellion against him. Though Syrian ground forces are clearly stretched, this is not enough to curb Syrian missile retaliation. Second, there will be an increased threat to US and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. A strike on Iran will become a galvanizing symbol for all the

crackpotsâ€”from Pakistan to kingdom come. US forces are vulnerable and there is little domestic patience regarding their presence, as was apparent in the Koran burning affair. Life for these troops may become hell, at a time when US public opinion is increasingly susceptible to libertarian loonies. The lives of US troops are a paramount consideration if Israel is counting on US assistance after the fact. Third, if the success of any operation is to be determined by its impact on diplomatic support, then that may actually speak against a strike. Take Europe, for example: The collapse of these economies could drag down other EU countries which are now heavily invested in these markets after the recent bailouts. Under these circumstances, a prolonged sanctions regime or military operation may struggle to find support among EU partners. In short, there are no comfortable options; only the excruciating task of discerning where the lesser evil lies.

Chapter 2 : Israel, Iran and the Nuclear Dilemma

Israel is not facing a dilemma about how much, if any, land to give up from the West Bank, because the Palestinians will not agree to take land and cannot be forced to do so.

Be the first of your friends to like this. This article was written before his government service; views expressed herein are his alone. For us, it is not a question of balance of terror but a question of survival. We shall, therefore, have to prevent such a threat at its inception" [1] This preventive counter-proliferation doctrine is rooted in both geostrategic logic and historical memory. A small country the size of New Jersey, with most of its inhabitants concentrated in one central area, Israel is highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. Furthermore, the depth of hostility to Israel in the Muslim Middle East is such that its enemies have been highly disposed to brinkmanship and risk-taking. The raid on Osirak came only after the failure of Israeli efforts to dissuade or prevent France from providing the necessary hardware. Likewise, the Israelis have reportedly been responsible for the assassinations of several Iranian nuclear scientists in recent years. The Iranian Threat Tehran has already reached what Brig. Shlomo Brom has called the "point of irreversibility" at which time the proliferator "stops being dependent on external assistance" to produce the bomb. The Iranian regime has every reason to persevere in its pursuit of the ultimate weapon. The regime has an impressive ballistic missile program for delivering weapons of mass destruction. Tehran has produced hundreds of Shahab-3 missiles, which have a range of nearly 1, miles and can carry a warhead weighing from kilograms to one ton. There is some disagreement as to how long it will take Tehran to produce a nuclear weapon. While the government of Israel has claimed that Iran is within a year or two of this goal, in January , outgoing Mossad director Meir Dagan alleged that Iran will be unable to attain it before The fact that Tehran has poured staggering amounts of money, human capital, and industrial might into nuclear developmentâ€”at the expense of its conventional military strength, which has many gaps, not to mention the wider Iranian economyâ€”is by itself a troubling indicator of its priorities. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many other leading Israeli political and security figures view the Islamic Republic as so unremittingly hostile that "everything else pales" before the threat posed by its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad appears to believe that this day will happen in his lifetime. In , as mayor of Tehran, he ordered the construction of a grand avenue in the city center, supposedly to welcome the Mahdi on the day of his reappearance. General Assembly, Ahmadinejad embarked on a wide-eyed discourse about the wonders of the Twelfth Imam: Those who dissent from this view point out that the Iranian people are not particularly hostile to Israelis; indeed, the two countries enjoyed close relations before the Iranian revolution. In one poll, 27 percent of Israelis said they would consider leaving the country if Tehran developed nuclear capabilities. Loss of investor confidence would damage the economy. The Iranian nuclear umbrella will embolden them. The next time an Israeli soldier is abducted in a cross-border attack by Hezbollah or Hamas, Jerusalem will have to weigh the risks of a nuclear escalation before responding. There is also the possibility that Tehran could provide a nuclear device to one of its terrorist proxies. Turkey has passed a bill in its parliament paving the way for the construction of three nuclear reactors by Those who publicly differ with Netanyahu on this score seem mainly concerned that he is exploiting popular fears for political gain, but they are likely to fall in line with public opinion at the end of the day. The distance to targets in Iran would be considerably greater than to Osirak, and its facilities are better defended. Iran has mastered nuclear technology much more thoroughly than Iraq and can, therefore, repair much of the damage without external help. Of the known Iranian nuclear sites, five main facilities are almost certain to be targeted in any preemptive strike. The first is the Bushehr light-water reactor, along the gulf coast of southwestern Iran. The second is the heavy-water plant under construction near the town of Arak, which would be instrumental to production of plutonium. Next is the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Based on satellite imagery, the facility is above ground although some reports have suggested tunneling near the complex. The facility, which can hold about 3, centrifuges, was built into a mountain, making it difficult to penetrate. Israeli defense minister Barak called it "immune to standard bombs. The complex consists of two large halls, roughly , square feet each, dug somewhere between eight and twenty-three feet below ground and covered by several layers of

concrete and metal. The walls of each hall are estimated to be approximately two feet thick. However, it is believed that the Iranians have dispersed some centrifuges to underground sites not declared to the IAEA. It is by no means clear that Israeli intelligence has a full accounting of where they are. The IAF has carried out long-range missions in the past. In 1981, Israeli F-15s struck the Osirak reactor without midair refueling. The IAF has specialized munitions designed to penetrate fortified targets, including GBU and GBU laser-guided bunker buster bombs and various domestically produced ordnance. Israeli pilots are skilled at using successive missile strikes to penetrate fortifications. Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, who participated in the strike on Osirak. Since greater distance always means that more things can go wrong, Israeli losses and efficacy will likely depend on which of three possible routes they take to Iran. The northern route runs along the Turkish-Syrian border into Iran and is estimated to be about 1,000 miles. This route entails several risks and would need to take into account Syrian air defenses and Turkish opposition to violating its airspace. Israeli planes flew over Turkey when the IAF bombed al-Kibar in 1981 and even dropped fuel tanks in Turkish territory. However, the recent deterioration in relations between Ankara and Jerusalem makes it extremely unlikely that the Turkish government will allow such an intrusion. Jerusalem would have to coordinate either with the Jordanians and the Americans or fly without forewarning. While Israel has a peace treaty with Jordan, Amman will not want to be perceived as cooperating with Israeli military action against Tehran and thus possibly face the brunt of an Iranian reprisal. While Jerusalem could limit the risk of hostile fire by notifying its two allies of the impending attack, there would be considerable diplomatic costs. The southern route would take Israeli planes over Saudi Arabia and then into Iran. While this is longer than the central route, there have been reports that the Saudis have given Jerusalem permission to use their airspace for such an operation. Estimates in Israel vary regarding the losses the IAF might suffer in such an operation. But even just a few pilots shot down and captured by Iran would be a heart-wrenching tragedy for Israelis. To prepare for this, the IAF began increasing mental training for its airmen with an emphasis on survival skills. Addressing an audience at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in May 1981, Meir Dagan said that the idea of attacking Iranian nuclear sites was "the stupidest thing" he had ever heard and that such an attempt would have a near-zero chance of success. Hezbollah will probably initiate hostilities across the Lebanese-Israeli border. During the Israel-Hezbollah war, the Shiite Islamist group fired more than 4,000 rockets into Israel, causing extensive damage and killing forty-four civilians. Dagan estimates that the Iranians can fire missiles at Israel for a period of months, and that Hezbollah can fire tens of thousands of rockets. It is not inconceivable that Syrian president Bashar Assad would join the fight, if still in power, in hope of diverting public anger away from his regime. Iran has also developed an extensive overseas terrorist network, cultivated in conjunction with Hezbollah. This network was responsible for two car bombings against the Jewish community in Argentina that left people dead in the early 1990s. Since Lebanon will probably be the main platform of any major Iranian attack, Israeli retaliation there is sure to be swift and expansive. Should Syria offer up any form of direct participation in the war, it too may come under Israeli attack. This could draw in the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies, particularly if the Alawite-led Assad regime is still facing active opposition from its majority Sunni population. How long such a war will last is impossible to predict. However, the Iranians may hunker down for the long haul, much as they did during the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. According to Lubrani, the highest priority for Israel and the West should be to strengthen the Iranian masses that rose up in protest following the fraudulent June elections. Much will depend on whether the air strikes produce significant collateral damage. The Bushehr, Isfahan, and Natanz facilities contain uranium hexafluoride UF₆ and even some low-enriched uranium, the release of which into the environment would almost certainly raise public health concerns. Conclusion The Israelis will ultimately have to choose between launching an attack likely to spark a large-scale regional conflict and allowing Iran to go nuclear with dire long-term implications. Notwithstanding some disagreement about the immediacy of the threat and possible repercussions, the large majority of Israelis favor military action over living with the ubiquitous threat of nuclear annihilation. Much, therefore, depends on whether policymakers in Washington will stand by Jerusalem when push eventually comes to shove. The American people have increasingly come to recognize the threat to world peace posed by Iran. Whereas 6 percent of Americans named Iran as the country that poses the greatest threat to the United States in 1981, in 2002, Iran led the field with 27 percent.

Israel's nuclear dilemma. [Yair Evron] -- For over thirty years the Israeli nuclear doctrine has amounted to an ambiguous pledge that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

During dinner with an Israeli official, I expressed the opinion that all efforts to deny weapons of mass destruction to so-called rogue Middle Eastern regimes, whether through sanctions, embargoes or otherwise, could at best be considered delaying actions. Given the inexorable spread of technology, those countries wishing to acquire such weapons and their means of delivery eventually would do so. The only purpose of delay, then, was to create time for diplomacy, which alone could provide a long-term solution. To my surprise, the official agreed. Of course, what I had in mind was the near-term negotiation of a genuinely verifiable Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone. Precisely what he had in mind, he did not elaborate. As it happens, the following year, at the Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT passed a resolution, co-sponsored by the US, in favour of establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Instead, the US and Israel have claimed that Israeli accession to the NPT and establishment of a regional nuclear weapons-free zone must await both a comprehensive Middle East peace and full compliance of all regional states read: First, it is consistent with the rational, common-sense notion that both accession to the NPT and establishment of regional nuclear weapons-free zones can only be achieved when the concerned states are persuaded that both are in their interest. Second, it is utterly inconsistent with standing US non-proliferation policy virtually everywhere else. If the US is to enjoy any credibility on non-proliferation in the Middle East, it will either have to change its policy toward Israel, or change its broader non-proliferation policy. The above comes to mind in light of some interesting statements recently made by Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, an Iranian foreign policy expert and confidant of Iranian President Ahmadinejad, in anticipation of the next round of talks between Iran and the so-called five-plus-one group, due to start on December 5. And indeed, perhaps that is all it is. Especially given that regional audience, however, the US and the rest of the five-plus-one, which includes all of the "legitimate" nuclear-weapons states recognised under the NPT, would do well to respond forthrightly to these questions, for they touch upon the essential nuclear bargain which lies at the heart of the NPT, as well as on the essential fairness of Western non-proliferation goals in the region. The notion that nations will forswear nuclear weapons only when they consider it in their national interest to do so is being consistently and compellingly propounded these days by none other than Robert Gates, the US secretary of defence. Security interests Taking the Gates logic to its ultimate conclusion, however, would mean basing our attempts to achieve non-proliferation goals concerning Iran upon an appreciation of Iranian security interests, and not just on the coercive power of sanctions. Now, there are those who believe that Iran is hell-bent on the development of nuclear weapons, and that, once having obtained them, it would have no hesitation in employing them against Israel, oblivious of the retaliatory consequences to itself. There are many, both in Israel and the US, who propound this view, and who appear genuinely to believe it. I know of no one, however, with a genuine understanding of Iran who believes the Iranians to be so devoid of calculation. On the contrary, the Iranians are very sophisticated in determining their national interest, and in pursuing it on several levels simultaneously. It may just be that Iranian leaders have concluded that development of nuclear weapons is the only means of redressing the US ability and apparent willingness to intervene militarily in their region at will, as well as being necessary to counter an Israeli nuclear monopoly in the region, and thus will not be deterred. Down this path probably lie attempts of other regional powers to develop such weapons, and a potentially unstable regional "balance of terror" which Iran cannot view without approbation, but with which it may feel itself well-equipped to deal. And indeed, current Iranian policy appears - one stresses the word appears - designed to maintain the privileges attached to NPT membership while also attempting to subvert those privileges to at least develop a "break-out" nuclear-weapons capability. But let us just suppose that either current or future Iranian leaders could be convinced that there were the genuine possibility of a verifiable regional nuclear weapons-free zone which, perhaps along with certain security guarantees from the US and other major powers, might better serve their long-term interests.

However, entrenched Israeli settlement policy, long aided and abetted by the US, has made a two-state solution in former Mandatory Palestine impossible. An alternative formula may eventually be found, but not without many years of violence and rancour to come. Waiting for peace and harmony to break out in the Middle East is no longer, if indeed it ever was, a viable prerequisite to a regional non-proliferation pact - not at the pace of current developments. Negotiation of such an accord is due to begin in , provided the parties can be brought to the table. Such willingness, if nothing else, would go some way toward addressing the clear ambivalence of many in the Arab world who are otherwise distrustful of Persian nuclear designs, but who are nonetheless susceptible to the appeal of an Iran which, unlike their own governments, is willing to stand up to perceived injustice.

Chapter 4 : Israel nuclear reactor defects pose secrecy dilemma - Newspaper - www.nxgvision.com

"The nuclear matter will resolve itself once there is a regime change," says Uri Lubrani, Israel's former ambassador to Iran and a senior advisor to the Israeli defense minister until last year. According to Lubrani, the highest priority for Israel and the West should be to strengthen the Iranian masses that rose up in protest following the.

Chapter 5 : Viable Opposition: Israel, Iran and the Nuclear Dilemma

Yair Evron examines the problems and dilemmas for Israel that are caused by her possession of nuclear weapons, and the wider implications for Arab/Israeli relations. He gives an account of the development of Israel's nuclear capacity and of disagreements within the military elite over whether an.

Chapter 6 : Solsticewitch13's BOS: Hendel in MEQ: "Iran's Nukes and Israel's Dilemma"

The missiles that had been launched by North Korea and passed over Japan in the last few months and the threat by the North Korean President, Kim Jong-un, to sink Japan using a nuclear bomb have presented the government in Tokyo with a serious dilemma - a nuclear dilemma: whether to develop their own nuclear weapons that would deter North Korea or continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella.

Chapter 7 : Israel nuclear reactor defects spark secrecy dilemma | Jordan Times

Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, by Yair Evron. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, xii + pages. Notes to p. Bibl. to page Index to page \$ Reviewed by George H. Quester This is the substantially expanded English translation of a Hebrew-language book first published in.

Chapter 8 : Israel nuclear reactor defects spark secrecy dilemma

Israel's Nuclear Dilemma provides an academic look at the security structure of the Middle East and the concept of deterrence for Israel. This deterrence is explored both in conventional arms and the qualitative advantage that is enjoyed as well as the possibility of the acquisition publicly of nuclear armaments.

Chapter 9 : Israel's Nuclear Dilemma by Yair Evron

Israel is the status-quo Middle Eastern power par excellence because the status quo cements its nuclear-armed domination. Any change is suspect, including popular Arab uprisings against despotism.