Chapter 1 : John Searle - WikiVisually

John R. Searle's publication The Construction ofSocial Reality is the foundation of this collection ofscholarly papers examining Searle's philosophical theories. Thebook works to reconstruct the ontology of the social sciencesthrough an analysis of linguistic practices in the context of JohnSearle's celebrated work on intentionality.

Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language , philosophy of mind and social philosophy , he began teaching at Berkeley in Among his notable concepts is the " Chinese room " argument against "strong" artificial intelligence. Searle began his college education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and subsequently became in his junior year a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University , where he obtained all his university degrees, B. He has five honorary doctorate degrees from four different countries and is an honorary visiting professor at Tsing Hua University and East China Normal University. In , Searle began to teach at Berkeley and was the first tenured professor to join the â€"5 Free Speech Movement. In The Campus War: A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony , [7] Searle investigates the causes behind the campus protests of the era. In it he declares that: Stylistically, the attacks are interestingly similar. He called for the realization that the US is in a more-or-less permanent state of war with these forces. Moreover, a probable course of action would be to deny terrorists the use of foreign territory from which to stage their attacks. He also drew on the work of H. Paul Grice the analysis of meaning as an attempt at being understood , Hare and Stenius the distinction, concerning meaning, between illocutionary force and propositional content , P. Strawson , John Rawls and William P. Alston , who maintained that sentence meaning consists in sets of regulative rules requiring the speaker to perform the illocutionary act indicated by the sentence and that such acts involve the utterance of a sentence which a indicates that one performs the act; b means what one says; and c addresses an audience in the vicinity. In his book Speech Acts, Searle sets out to combine all these elements to give his account of illocutionary acts. There he provides an analysis of what he considers the prototypical illocutionary act of promising and offers sets of semantical rules intended to represent the linguistic meaning of devices indicating further illocutionary act types. Among the concepts presented in the book is the distinction between the "illocutionary force" and the "propositional content" of an utterance. Searle does not precisely define the former as such, but rather introduces several possible illocutionary forces by example. According to Searle, the sentences Would that Sam smoked habitually! For example, the statement "John bought two candy bars" is satisfied if and only if it is true, i. John did buy two candy bars. By contrast, the command "John, buy two candy bars! Searle refers to the first as having the "word-to-world" direction of fit, since the words are supposed to change to accurately represent the world, and the second as having the "world-to-word" direction of fit, since the world is supposed to change to match the words. Limited Inc In the early s, Searle had a brief exchange with Jacques Derrida regarding speech-act theory. The exchange was characterized by a degree of mutual hostility between the philosophers, each of whom accused the other of having misunderstood his basic points. Consequently, some critics [15] have considered the exchange to be a series of elaborate misunderstandings rather than a debate, while others [16] have seen either Derrida or Searle gaining the upper hand. He argued that Austin had missed the fact that any speech event is framed by a "structure of absence" the words that are left unsaid due to contextual constraints and by "iterability" the constraints on what can be said, given by what has been said in the past. Derrida argued that the focus on intentionality in speech-act theory was misguided because intentionality is restricted to that which is already established as a possible intention. He also took issue with the way Austin had excluded the study of fiction, non-serious or "parasitic" speech, wondering whether this exclusion was because Austin had considered these speech genres governed by different structures of meaning, or simply due to a lack of interest. In his brief reply to Derrida, "Reiterating the Differences: Derrida, in his response to Searle "a b c Searle did not respond. Later in , Derrida tried to review his position and his critiques of Austin and Searle, reiterating that he found the constant appeal to "normality" in the analytical tradition to be problematic. One "infelicity," for instance, occurs when it cannot be known whether a given speech act is "sincere" or "merely citational" and therefore possibly ironic, etc. Derrida argues that every iteration is necessarily "citational," due to the graphematic nature of speech and

writing, and that language could not work at all without the ever-present and ineradicable possibility of such alternate readings. Derrida argues that intention cannot possibly govern how an iteration signifies, once it becomes hearable or readable. All speech acts borrow a language whose significance is determined by historical-linguistic context, and by the alternate possibilities that this context makes possible. This significance, Derrida argues, cannot be altered or governed by the whims of intention. He simply declares that there is nothing outside of texts An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind , Searle applies certain elements of his account s of "illocutionary acts" to the investigation of intentionality. Searle also introduces a technical term the Background, [32] which, according to him, has been the source of much philosophical discussion "though I have been arguing for this thesis for almost twenty years," Searle writes, [33] "many people whose opinions I respect still disagree with me about it. Thus, when someone asks us to "cut the cake" we know to use a knife and when someone asks us to "cut the grass" we know to use a lawnmower and not vice versa , even though the actual request did not include this detail. To give an example, two chess players might be engaged in a bitter struggle at the board, but they share all sorts of Background presuppositions: Searle maintained that even if one was to see a written statement with no knowledge of authorship it would still be impossible to escape the question of intentionality, because "a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the intentional speech act". For Searle ascribing intentionality to a statement was a basic requirement for attributing it any meaning at all. He argues that, starting with behaviorism an early but influential scientific view, succeeded by many later accounts that Searle also dismisses , much of modern philosophy has tried to deny the existence of consciousness, with little success. In Intentionality, he parodies several alternative theories of consciousness by replacing their accounts of intentionality with comparable accounts of the hand: No one would think of saying, for example, "Having a hand is just being disposed to certain sorts of behavior such as grasping" manual behaviorism , or "Hands can be defined entirely in terms of their causes and effects" manual functionalism , or "For a system to have a hand is just for it to be in a certain computer state with the right sorts of inputs and outputs" manual Turing machine functionalism , or "Saying that a system has hands is just adopting a certain stance toward it" the manual stance. Searle says simply that both are true: A view which he suggests might be called biological naturalism. Ontological subjectivity Searle has argued [38] that critics like Daniel Dennett , who he claims insist that discussing subjectivity is unscientific because science presupposes objectivity, are making a category error. Perhaps the goal of science is to establish and validate statements which are epistemically objective, i. Searle calls any value judgment epistemically subjective. Thus, " McKinley is prettier than Everest " is "epistemically subjective", whereas "McKinley is higher than Everest" is "epistemically objective. No such criteria exist for prettiness. Beyond this distinction, Searle thinks there are certain phenomena including all conscious experiences that are ontologically subjective, i. Searle goes on to affirm that "where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality". Artificial intelligence See also: Chinese room and philosophy of artificial intelligence A consequence of biological naturalism is that if we want to create a conscious being, we will have to duplicate whatever physical processes the brain goes through to cause consciousness. Searle thereby means to contradict what he calls " Strong AI ", defined by the assumption that as soon as a certain kind of software is running on a computer, a conscious being is thereby created. Assume you do not speak Chinese and imagine yourself in a room with two slits, a book, and some scratch paper. Someone slides you some Chinese characters through the first slit, you follow the instructions in the book, transcribing characters as instructed onto the scratch paper, and slide the resulting sheet out the second slit. To people on the outside world, it appears the room speaks Chineseâ€"they slide Chinese statements in one slit and get valid responses in returnâ€"yet you do not understand a word of Chinese. It follows that anything that carries out the same informational processes as a human is also conscious. Thus, if we wrote a computer program that was conscious, we could run that computer program on, say, a system of ping-pong balls and beer cups and the system would be equally conscious, because it was running the same information processes. Searle argues that this is impossible, since consciousness is a physical property, like digestion or fire. No matter how good a simulation of digestion you build on the computer, it will not digest anything; no matter how well you simulate fire, nothing will get burnt. By contrast, informational processes are observer-relative: Since they do not exist at a physical level, Searle

argues, they cannot have causal efficacy and thus cannot cause consciousness. There is no physical law, Searle insists, that can see the equivalence between a personal computer, a series of ping-pong balls and beer cans, and a pipe-and-water system all implementing the same program. Searle begins by arguing collective intentionality e. Adapting an idea by Elizabeth Anscombe in "On Brute Facts," Searle distinguishes between brute facts , like the height of a mountain, and institutional facts, like the score of a baseball game. Thus, for instance, filling out a ballot counts as a vote in a polling place, getting so many votes counts as a victory in an election, getting a victory counts as being elected president in the presidential race, etc. According to what he calls the Classical Model, rationality is seen as something like a train track: Searle doubts this picture of rationality holds generally. Searle briefly critiques one particular set of these rules: He points out that its axioms require that anyone who valued a quarter and their life would, at some odds, bet their life for a quarter. Searle insists he would never take such a bet and believes that this stance is perfectly rational. Most of his attack is directed against the common conception of rationality, which he believes is badly flawed. So in any decision situation we experience a gap between our reasons and our actions. We also have to make an effort to cast our vote. Similarly, every time a guilty smoker lights a cigarette they are aware of succumbing to their craving, not merely of acting automatically as they do when they exhale. It is this gap that makes us think we have freedom of the will. Searle thinks whether we really have free will or not is an open question, but considers its absence highly unappealing because it makes the feeling of freedom of will an epiphenomenon, which is highly unlikely from the evolutionary point of view given its biological cost. It is widely believed that one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", i. By contrast, in so far as a fact is understood as relating to an institution marriage, promises, commitments, etc. For example, Searle believes the fact that you promised to do something means you should do it, because by making the promise you are participating in the constitutive rules that arrange the system of promise making itself, and therefore understand a "shouldness" as implicit in the mere factual action of promising. Furthermore, he believes that this provides a desire-independent reason for an actionâ€"if you order a drink at a bar, you should pay for it even if you have no desire to. While in the Classical Model, one would start from a desire to go to Paris greater than that of saving money and calculate the cheapest way to get there, in reality people balance the niceness of Paris against the costs of travel to decide which desire visiting Paris or saving money they value more. Hence, he believes rationality is not a system of rules, but more of an adverb. We see certain behavior as rational, no matter what its source, and our system of rules derives from finding patterns in what we see as rational. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts essay collection; Intentionality: Philosophy in the Real World summary of earlier work; Rationality in Action Consciousness and Language essay collection; Freedom and Neurobiology lecture collection; Mind: Selected Essays Making the Social World: A Theory of Perception See also.

Chapter 2 : lectures/ideas: Minds, Brains, & Science - John Searle's Reith Lectures (Transcripts Available)

John R. Searle's publication The Construction of Social Reality is the foundation of this collection of scholarly papers examining Searlea s philosophical theories.

In his William James Lectures at Harvard University , published posthumously as How to Do Things with Words , Austin criticized the tendency of analytic philosophers, especially adherents of the school of logical positivism , for supposing that there is only one basic kind of language use: Focusing as they did on scientific discourse, the logical positivists went so far as to claim that an utterance is meaningful only if it is a tautology or such that it can be confirmed or disconfirmed in principle through experience; all other utterances are literally nonsense see verifiability principle. Other examples are orders, requests, promises, greetings, resignations, warnings, and dozens more. For most speech acts, the utterance through which the act is performedâ€"e. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language , Searle treated speech acts much more systematically than Austin had. Among the rules for promising, for example, are that the speaker S predicate a future act A of himself, that S intend to carry out A, that the hearer H prefer that S carry out A, that it not be obvious to both S and H that S would carry out A in the normal course of events, and that S intend to place himself under an obligation to carry out A. At a more general level, Searle identified three basic dimensions with respect to which different kinds of speech vary from one another: For example, the illocutionary point of a statement, insofar as it is a statement, is to present the world as being a certain way, and the illocutionary point of an order, insofar as it is an order, is to get the hearer to do something. In contrast, a promise has a world-to-word fit because it constitutes an undertaking on the part of the speaker to make the world match his words. Finally, the expressed psychological state of a speech act is the belief, desire, intention, or other mental state that a speaker necessarily expresses by performing an act of that type. The expressed psychological state of a speech act is distinct from its propositional content; in the examples above, the propositional contents of the acts are, respectively, that it is raining, that the hearer gets the speaker some raisins, and that the speaker will be there. Using these dimensions, Searle developed an elaborate speech act taxonomy , consisting at its highest level of five categories: Searle also introduced the notion of an indirect speech act, in which the speaker performs one kind of speech act by means of performing another. According to Searle, speech acts do not function in isolation. Speech act theory is important in the philosophy of language not only for having demonstrated the wide range of meaningful uses of language but also for yielding insight into fundamental issues such as the distinction between speaker meaning and conventional meaning, the nature of reference and predication, the division between semantic and pragmatic use-generated aspects of communicated meaning, and the scope of linguistic knowledge. Philosophy of mind In large part, Searle was driven to the study of mind by his study of language. As indicated above, his analysis of speech acts always involved reference to mental concepts. Since mental states are essentially involved in issuing speech acts, Searle realized that his analysis of language could not be complete unless it included a clear understanding of those states. Intentionality in this sense is distinct from the ordinary quality of being intended, as when one intends to do something. Thus, believing is necessarily believing that something is the case; desiring is necessarily desiring something; intending is necessarily intending to do something. Not all mental states are intentional, however: Speech acts are intentional in a derivative sense, insofar as they are expressive of intrinsically intentional mental states, including expressed psychological states and propositional contents. According to Searle, the derived intentionality of language accounts for the apparently mysterious capacity of words, phrases, and sentences to refer not only to things in the world but also to things that are purely imaginary or fictional. Indeed, Searle maintains that the notion of an unconscious mental state is incoherent. He argues that, because consciousness is an intrinsically biological phenomenon, it is impossible in principle to build a computer or any other nonbiological machine that is conscious. Imagine that a person who knows nothing of the Chinese language is sitting alone in a room. In that room are several boxes containing cards on which Chinese characters of varying complexity are printed, as well as a manual that matches strings of Chinese characters with strings that constitute appropriate responses. On one side of the room is a slot through which speakers of

Chinese may insert questions or other messages in Chinese, and on the other is a slot through which the person in the room may issue replies. Thus, contrary to strong AI, real understanding cannot be a matter of mere symbol manipulation. Like the person in the room, computers simulate intelligence but do not exhibit it. He does not understand Chinese because he is only one part of the computer that responds appropriately to Chinese messages. What does understand Chinese is the system as a whole, including the manual, any instructions for using it, and any intermediate means of symbol manipulation. Suppose the person in the room simply memorizes the characters, the manual, and the instructions so that he can respond to Chinese messages entirely on his own. He still would not know what the Chinese characters mean. Another objection claims that robots consisting of computers and sensors and having the ability to move about and manipulate things in their environment would be capable of learning Chinese in much the same way that human children acquire their first languages. Rather, they are intrinsic features of certain very complex kinds of biological system. Because mental states are biological, they can cause and be caused by physical changes in human bodies. Moreover, reference to them is essential to any adequate explanation of human behaviour. Speech acts, after all, are linguistic entities embedded in social settings. Searle was thus naturally drawn to questions concerning the constitution and creation of social institutions. Although we-intentions are held only by individuals, they are not reducible to I-intentions; in other words, a we-intention is not merely the sum of a certain number of I-intentions. This fact is evident, according to Searle, in any example of cooperative behaviour, such as a football soccer game or an orchestral performance. The we-intention to run a set piece in football is not equivalent to the sum of I-intentions to run, kick, or head; and the we-intention to perform a symphony is not equivalent to the sum of I-intentions to play a certain sequence of notes on a certain instrument. According to Searle, objective social reality is literally created by means of we-intentions. A familiar example is the institution of money , which is created by the we-intention to treat certain pieces of paper or metal, issued by the appropriate governmental authority, as money. An important feature of we-intentions in their role as creators of social institutions is that they can be iterated: For example, a certain utterance X counts as an English sentence Y in the context of an intention by an English speaker to utter an English sentence C ; an English sentence X counts as a promise Y in the context of an intention by the speaker that he do what he says he will do C ; the making of a promise X counts as getting married Y in the context of a marriage ceremony C ; and so on. According to Searle, the possibility of this kind of iteration helps to explain how complex social institutions are created out of simpler ones. Other examples of social institutions created by we-intentions are employment, ownership of private property , games, universities, political parties, governments, and, most importantly for Searle, language. Searle has written scores of journal articles and several books. In addition to Speech Acts, the latter include: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts , Intentionality: The Structure of Human Civilization

Chapter 3 : Social reality - Wikipedia

John Rogers Searle (/ s ÉœË•r l /; born 31 July) is an American www.nxgvision.com is currently Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Language and Professor of the Graduate School at the University of California, Berkeley.

So, for example, good, full social functioning depends on requires the symbolic communication of the lingual aspect, the ability to form, the ability to make distinctions, the ability to feel, as well as on life functions and on physical activity. He adds into this his beliefs about consciousness and the ability to represent things in the mind, to complete the summary ontology, and then asks "how can we account for the existence of social facts within that ontology? It seems as though, independently of Dooyeweerd, he finds that the social aspect somehow depends upon and requires at least all the aspects from the physical to the lingual. He gives special place to the lingual, as we discuss below. Furthermore, other aspects depend on the social or, perhaps, the lingual. From a Dooyeweerdian perspective, lingual phenomena utterances, facts will usually be for a purpose from one of the later aspects. Searle explicitly lists p. I believe that Searle cannot quite escape reductionism, though he wishes to. Occasionally breaking away from it, he seems always to be pulled back. In the above, he states that he wishes to find social reality "within that ontology [of physics, biology, psychology]". In the end, the main reduction that he seems to practice is to the lingual aspect. He gives it special place on p. We find his tendency to reduce social reality to lingual comes through in the wording of his text more than in its content. Similarly, "new property rights are created by speech acts" [my emphasis]. Now, Dooyeweerd would see things slightly differently: First, a marriage is an institution, not an "institutional fact". To Dooyeweerd, a marriage or a property right, etc. Second, Dooyeweerd would agree that speech acts are involved when such things as contracts, marriages etc. Third, while phenomena like marriages, contracts, etc. The social is involved, by virtue of the dependency discussed above, but it is not sufficient of itself to characterise the meaning. In fact, this characterises several things he has written, and he himself seems to "oscillate between" trying to reduce things and recognising their irreducibility. Characterising Social-Institutional Facts One place he seems to support irreducibility is in chapter 5, part 2 of his general theory of institutional facts. He provides a seven-level taxonomy, starting with all facts and narrowing them down by various distinctions, until he arrives at institutional facts. Many of his levels seem to speak of a single Dooyeweerdian aspect, while others relate to other things in the Dooyeweerdian framework:

Chapter 4 : The Construction of Social Reality Analysis - www.nxgvision.com

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Social Theory Back cover copy John R. His book provideda stimulating account of institutional facts such as money andmarriage and how they are created and replicated in everyday sociallife. David Koepsell and Laurence S. Searle, Rationality, and Social Reality: Alex Viskovatoff, University of Pittsburgh. Searle and Collective Intentionality: Dan Fitzpatrick, University of Hertfordshire. Hans Bernhard Schmid, University of St. Mariam Thalos, University of Utah. Raimo Tuomela, University of Helsinki. Can Collective Intentionality Be Individiualized? The New Role of the Constitutive Rule: Hindriks, University of St. Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality: Zaibert, University of Wisconsin--Parkside. Ingvar Johansson, Umea University. Nenad Miscevic, University of Maribor. The Social Ontology of Virtual Environments: Philip Brey, University of Twente. The Construction of Social Reality: Its focus on philosophicalconsiderations adds depth to the debate, and it takes a novelperspective. A book that proposes that the model should beabolished should promote useful debate in the field. Koepsell David Koepsell is an attorney with a special research interest in the problems of modern philosophy. His research focuses on the intersection between the philosophy of mind and action, and moral and political theory. He teaches courses at the University of Buffalo in New York. He is also a well--known historian of economic thought.

Chapter 5 : Social reality - How Emotions Are Made

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He also drew on the work of Paul Grice the analysis of meaning as an attempt at being understood , Hare and Stenius the distinction, concerning meaning, between illocutionary force and propositional content , P. Strawson , John Rawls and William Alston , who maintained that sentence meaning consists in sets of regulative rules requiring the speaker to perform the illocutionary act indicated by the sentence and that such acts involve the utterance of a sentence which a indicates that one performs the act; b means what one says; and c addresses an audience in the vicinity. In his book Speech Acts, Searle sets out to combine all these elements to give his account of illocutionary acts. There he provides an analysis of what he considers the prototypical illocutionary act of promising and offers sets of semantical rules intended to represent the linguistic meaning of devices indicating further illocutionary act types. Among the concepts presented in the book is the distinction between the "illocutionary force" and the "propositional content" of an utterance. Searle does not precisely define the former as such, but rather introduces several possible illocutionary forces by example. According to Searle, the sentences Would that Sam smoked habitually! For example, the statement "John bought two candy bars" is satisfied if and only if it is true, i. John did buy two candy bars. By contrast, the command "John, buy two candy bars! Searle refers to the first as having the "word-to-world" direction of fit, since the words are supposed to change to accurately represent the world, and the second as having the "world-to-word" direction of fit, since the world is supposed to change to match the words. Limited Inc This section may contain an excessive amount of intricate detail that may interest only a particular audience. April Learn how and when to remove this template message In the early s, Searle had a brief exchange with Jacques Derrida regarding speech-act theory. The exchange was characterized by a degree of mutual hostility between the philosophers, each of whom accused the other of having misunderstood his basic points. Consequently, some critics [25] have considered the exchange to be a series of elaborate misunderstandings rather than a debate, while others [26] have seen either Derrida or Searle gaining the upper hand. He argued that Austin had missed the fact that any speech event is framed by a "structure of absence" the words that are left unsaid due to contextual constraints and by "iterability" the repeatability of linguistic elements outside of their context. Derrida argued that the focus on intentionality in speech-act theory was misguided because intentionality is restricted to that which is already established as a possible intention. He also took issue with the way Austin had excluded the study of fiction, non-serious or "parasitic" speech, wondering whether this exclusion was because Austin had considered these speech genres governed by different structures of meaning, or simply due to a lack of interest. In his brief reply to Derrida, "Reiterating the Differences: Derrida, in his response to Searle "a b c Searle did not respond. Later in , Derrida tried to review his position and his critiques of Austin and Searle, reiterating that he found the constant appeal to "normality" in the analytical tradition to be problematic. One "infelicity," for instance, occurs when it cannot be known whether a given speech act is "sincere" or "merely citational" and therefore possibly ironic, etc. Derrida argues that every iteration is necessarily "citational", due to the graphematic nature of speech and writing, and that language could not work at all without the ever-present and ineradicable possibility of such alternate readings. Derrida argues that intention cannot possibly govern how an iteration signifies, once it becomes hearable or readable. All speech acts borrow a language whose significance is determined by historical-linguistic context, and by the alternate possibilities that this context makes possible. This significance, Derrida argues, cannot be altered or governed by the whims of intention. Intentionality and the background[edit] Searle defines intentionality as the power of minds to be about, to represent see Correspondence theory of truth , or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs in the world. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind , Searle applies certain elements of his account s of "illocutionary acts" to the investigation of intentionality. Searle also introduces a technical term the Background, [43] which, according to him, has been the source of much philosophical discussion "though I have been arguing for this thesis for almost twenty years," Searle writes, [44] "many people whose opinions I

respect still disagree with me about it". He calls Background the set of abilities, capacities, tendencies, and dispositions that humans have and that are not themselves intentional states. Thus, when someone asks us to "cut the cake" we know to use a knife and when someone asks us to "cut the grass" we know to use a lawnmower and not vice versa , even though the actual request did not include this detail. To give an example, two chess players might be engaged in a bitter struggle at the board, but they share all sorts of Background presuppositions: Searle maintained that even if one was to see a written statement with no knowledge of authorship it would still be impossible to escape the question of intentionality, because "a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the intentional speech act". For Searle ascribing intentionality to a statement was a basic requirement for attributing it any meaning at all. 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Chinese room and philosophy of artificial intelligence A consequence of biological naturalism is that if we want to create a conscious being, we will have to duplicate whatever physical processes the brain goes through to cause consciousness. Searle thereby means to contradict what he calls " Strong AI ", defined by the assumption that as soon as a certain kind of software is running on a computer, a conscious being is thereby created. Someone slides you some Chinese characters through the first slit, you follow the instructions in the book, transcribing characters as instructed onto the scratch paper, and slide the resulting sheet out the second slit. To people on the outside world, it appears the room speaks Chineseâ€"they slide Chinese statements in one slit and get valid responses in returnâ€"yet you do not understand a word of Chinese. It follows that anything that carries out the same informational processes as a human is also conscious. Thus, if we wrote a computer program that was conscious, we could run that computer program on, say, a system of ping-pong balls and beer cups and the system would be equally conscious, because it was running the same information processes. Searle argues that this is impossible, since consciousness is a physical property, like digestion or fire. No matter how good a simulation of digestion you build on the computer, it will not digest anything; no matter how well you simulate fire, nothing will get burnt. By contrast, informational processes are observer-relative: Since they do not exist at a physical level, Searle argues, they cannot have causal efficacy and thus cannot cause consciousness. There is no physical law, Searle insists, that can see the equivalence between a personal computer, a series of ping-pong balls and beer cans, and a pipe-and-water system all implementing the same program. Searle begins by arguing collective intentionality e. In The Construction of Social Reality , Searle addresses the mystery of how social constructs like "baseball" or "money" can exist in a world consisting only of physical particles in fields of force. Adapting an idea by Elizabeth Anscombe in "On Brute Facts," Searle distinguishes between brute facts , like the height of a mountain, and institutional facts, like the score of a baseball game. Thus, for instance, filling out a ballot counts as a vote in a polling place, getting so many votes counts as a victory in an election, getting a victory counts as being elected president in the presidential race, etc. Although their accounts of social

reality are similar, there are important differences. Lawson places emphasis on the notion of social totality whereas Searle prefers to refer to institutional facts. Furthermore, Searle believes that emergence implies causal reduction whereas Lawson argues that social totalities cannot be completed explained by the causal powers of their components. Searle also places language at the foundation of the construction of social reality while Lawson believes that community formation necessarily precedes the development of language and therefore there must be the possibility for non-linguistic social structure formation. According to what he calls the Classical Model, rationality is seen as something like a train track: Searle doubts this picture of rationality holds generally. Searle briefly critiques one particular set of these rules: He points out that its axioms require that anyone who valued a quarter and their life would, at some odds, bet their life for a quarter. Searle insists he would never take such a bet and believes that this stance is perfectly rational. Most of his attack is directed against the common conception of rationality, which he believes is badly flawed. So in any decision situation we experience a gap between our reasons and our actions. We also have to make an effort to cast our vote. Similarly, every time a guilty smoker lights a cigarette they are aware of succumbing to their craving, not merely of acting automatically as they do when they exhale. It is this gap that makes us think we have freedom of the will. Searle thinks whether we really have free will or not is an open question, but considers its absence highly unappealing because it makes the feeling of freedom of will an epiphenomenon, which is highly unlikely from the evolutionary point of view given its biological cost. It is widely believed that one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", i. By contrast, in so far as a fact is understood as relating to an institution marriage, promises, commitments, etc. For example, Searle believes the fact that you promised to do something means you should do it, because by making the promise you are participating in the constitutive rules that arrange the system of promise making itself, and therefore understand a "shouldness" as implicit in the mere factual action of promising. Furthermore, he believes that this provides a desire-independent reason for an action—if you order a drink at a bar, you should pay for it even if you have no desire to. While in the Classical Model, one would start from a desire to go to Paris greater than that of saving money and calculate the cheapest way to get there, in reality people balance the niceness of Paris against the costs of travel to decide which desire visiting Paris or saving money they value more. Hence, he believes rationality is not a system of rules, but more of an adverb. We see certain behavior as rational, no matter what its source, and our system of rules derives from finding patterns in what we see as rational.

Chapter 6 : John Searle - Wikipedia

John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions / Edition 1 John R. Searle's publication The Construction of Social Reality is the foundation of this collection of scholarly papers examining Searle's philosophical theories.

Chapter 7 : John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality : David R. Koepsell :

1 John Searle: From speech acts to social reality Barry Smith It was in the Oxford of Austin, Ryle and Strawson that John Searle was shaped as a philosopher.

Chapter 8 : ON JOHN SEARLE'S 'THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY'

John Searle joins the discussion and proposes that social realities exist precisely because we represent them as existing, both in our minds and through the use of speech acts. In Searle's view, whenever there is a structured procedure with a set of standard expectations—from sessions of Congress to fraternity parties—there is the.

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Social reality is distinct from biological reality or individual cognitive reality, representing as it does a phenomenological

level created through social interaction and thereby transcending individual motives and actions.