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Chapter 1 : Civil War Librarian: CWL Four Fronts: Land Operations in Virginia,

Craig L. Symonds 27 27 Land Operations in Virginia in Craig L. Symonds On April 17, , three days after Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter.

Symonds does a great job setting the context: Through the management of the naval establishment, Symonds develops as a theme the three key leadership skills that Lincoln employed to success, which were patience, pragmatism, and acceptance of new ideas. According to Symonds, Lincoln was a reactive leader, not a proactive one as demonstrated by no set program of reform. When action was required, sometimes forcibly, the administration was required to deal with exponentially growing problems. Lincoln was pragmatic and innovative in looking for solutions. He frequently advocated the development and use of new technologies to fight the Civil War. He often participated in the testing of new weapons and was a frequent presence at the Washington Navy Yard, as much as he is reported to appear at the telegraph office or War Department. Dahlgren, was judged to have gone insane. In all fairness, it was also thought from time to time that General William T. Sherman had gone insane. In the west, he championed a river campaign utilizing combined army and naval forces that could strike simultaneously at multiple targets and force the rebels to divide its military resources. These combined operations succeeded in giving the North a toehold on both ends of the Mississippi as it ran through the South. The other significant part of this Anaconda plan was the blockade of southern ports. Here, Lincoln first had to navigate admiralty law while his fleet was built or acquired. Thanks to "King Cotton," European nations had a vested interest in maintaining trade with the South. They would not submit to a "paper blockade": Yet, the logistics of putting a blockade in place seemed to worry Lincoln less than the legal gymnastics required to legitimize a blockade against the South, which Lincoln had contended was not an entity in and of itself. In the process, we learn about some of the more important naval leaders. We learn of the team: The author notes Page xiii: The book does a nice job of discussing the naval commanders who did not "cut the mustard" and those who did. We learn of those admirals who could work with others and those who did a poor job of collaboration. The book does not necessarily spend a great deal of time on specific battles--such as the taking of New Orleans by David Farragut. But one learns how such events fit into the larger picture. The book does a good job of describing the politics of naval decisions and how decisions came about. Lincoln preferred to let events unfold until his course of action became clear. There was no unified command structure like the present day Joint Chiefs of Staff so Lincoln had to make the two services cooperate. McClellan , it was the same for most of his admirals. With the exception of Porter, many of his admirals, like the generals, were afraid to fight, afraid to lose their ships. Lincoln had to continually prod them to hunt out the confederate navy ships, regardless of where they were, and engage them in battle. Symonds also does a great job explaining the maritime strategy, of the Union and Lincoln, along with its goals Wow, if you think Lincoln had his hands full with some numbskull generals e. Symonds also does a great job explaining the maritime strategy, of the Union and Lincoln, along with its goals and objectives. We read much about the land battles Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Manassas , but not much about what was happening at sea, Symonds closes that loop.

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Chapter 2 : Virginia at War, | Journal of American History | Oxford Academic

Land Operations in Virginia in 1861, Craig L. Symonds, in *Virginia At War*, ed. William C. Davis and James I. Robertson Jr., University of Kentucky Press, 1998, pp. 1-17. With the addition of *Virginia to the Confederacy on April 17, 1861*, many in the South thought independence was won.

The event featured a number of speakers, including a keynote address by former Congresswoman Beverly Byron, followed by a ribbon-cutting ceremony and reception. To combat the disruption of communication during the Civil War, signal corps were used to relay messages through the use of flags. Demonstrations and informal interpretive talks will be conducted throughout the day to bring this unusual form of communication to life. For more information call He likes it but has some quibbles. The Civil War Librarian has not yet perused the book but descriptions of it on Amazon. The Battle That Rescued Washington, was released has helped to do that also. The Washington Post review: Early stood at the doorstep of the District of Columbia. They were "bedded down alongside the Georgetown Pike, strung out along a five-mile stretch from Gaithersburg to Rockville. Whether he could have occupied the city has been endlessly debated, but that he chose not to try probably was a turning point in the war. As Marc Leepson writes: Treasury, virtually undefended, was sitting ready for looting. Tons upon tons of brand-new, desperately needed war supplies, from blankets to rifles, were there for the taking. The president himself was a target of opportunity, not to mention the U. Capitol and dozens of other government buildings. The second is that three days before, Early had been forced into a fight he did not want at Monocacy, in Maryland a few miles from the town of Frederick, against federal forces under the command of Gen. Early prevailed in that engagement, but at considerable cost: If Wallace had not possessed what he called "the determination to stay and fight," Early and his fresh troops would have had a straight shot to Washington. If Early had not been delayed at Monocacy, Grant might not have had time to grasp the seriousness of the threat to Washington and certainly would not have had time to rush crack troops to its defense. If Early had occupied Washington, all the dire consequences elaborated above probably would have arisen, and doubtless many others as well. The Confederacy still would have been in dire straits -- militarily, economically and politically -- but it would have been in position to sue for a peace far more favorable to its interests, probably one that would have maintained slavery in the Confederate states. As is usually the case when we enter the land of might have been, the most salubrious effect of the exercise is to remind us that in war nothing is foreordained and the line between victory and defeat almost always is incredibly thin. Lee sent Early on his mission to Washington, he believed that Grant "would be forced to send a significant number of his troops from outside Richmond and Petersburg to defend the Union capital," and even though the mission failed to achieve its grandest goals, it did achieve that one. Grant might well have taken Richmond in the summer of 1862, ending the war then instead of in the spring of 1865, sparing untold thousands of lives and leaving both sides in better condition to reunite. That series of events prolonged the Civil War for as many as nine long months. He is best known now for his hugely successful novel Ben Hur: A Tale of the Christ and the three Hollywood adaptations of it, but there was much more to him than that. His "long, eventful life" included journalism, law, the army and politics. By the spring of 1862, at age 37, he was "commander of the Eighth Army Corps and of the Middle Department based in Baltimore," his authority including "all of Delaware and Maryland from Baltimore West to the Monocacy River. He "had no formal military training," but at Monocacy he "chose an excellent defensive position," with "the [Monocacy] river in front of him, a river with few easily crossed fords. He left the battlefield "believing, he said to his dying day, that by holding up Early for nearly an entire day, he had reached his goal of giving Grant time to get experienced troops up from Petersburg to defend Washington and letting [Union army chief of staff Henry] Halleck know, with no degree of uncertainty, that Early and his men would be moving on a beeline toward Washington. Writing about military maneuvers and military commanders is a tricky business that can lead to confusion and cameo biographies indistinguishable from each other. These are traps that Leepson does

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not entirely avoid. He seemed more at home in a previous book, *Saving Monticello*, in which military history was of no consequence.

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Attitudes and status of Virginia's Afro-American population is the subject of a thought provoking essay by Ervin L. Jordan Jr. Craig L. Symonds, Joseph T. Glatthaar and Michael Mahone cover land operations, soldiers and the Shenandoah Valley.

Symonds Fordham University Press , Cloth, maps, notes, index. In contributor and general editor Craig L. These are a lack of unified command, flaws in communication, and absence of doctrinal structures for defining areas of responsibility. At their core, the defining feature of successful operations were cordial cooperation between local army and navy heads, simple to ask for but immensely difficult to execute. However, much of this line of argument is flawed. Before assigning all the blame to McClellan, perhaps a re-examination of the timeline is in order. Lincoln relieved McClellan of his duties as general in chief reverting the general to command of the Army of the Potomac only on March 11, a date by which Burnside had not yet captured even New Bern, Beaufort, and Fort Macon which fell on April Snell notes that, in addition to excellent leadership at the subordinate level, sea-land communications were unusually effective during the landing. Of course, Confederate weakness always helped, and Union efforts in seizing the barrier islands and the mouth of the Rio Grande River benefited from this. The army-navy command teams of Hunter-Du Pont and Gillmore-Dahlgren could never see eye to eye or subordinate personal prerogatives enough to exploit the several reasonable opportunities to capture the city that arose between and Along the James River in , navy commanders were allowing themselves to be directed by Grant. In his chapter assessing British reactions, Howard Fuller found that their analysis of U. Navy attacks on fortified Confederate cities, most particularly Charleston, led the Royal Navy to reassess its own strategy of relying on its deep water fleet capability for rapid, decisive strikes against enemy coastal targets. However, while reports about the success of American fortifications, heavy guns, and obstructions raised concern, none of this was enough to spark British development of littoral strike forces. The old system was sustained. Perhaps its profound success made leaders complacent. Wiser also does a good job of recapping the problems raised in the previous essays. The president clearly saw the problem personally on the James River in , yet did nothing to change it. It was a major failure on the part of the commander-in-chief, and lack of precedent cannot be an excuse as Wiser cites temporary codified army-navy command arrangements that were developed during the War of According to the writer, there is simply no reason why a brilliant leader willing to aggressively push radical systemic changes on social and political fronts could not also have done so with the army and navy, yet nearly all historians of Lincoln as commander-in-chief give the president a pass on such a glaring failure. Union Combined Operations in the Civil War is a most welcome set of essays, both a wide ranging general introduction to the subject and a series of deft analyses of specific joint actions. It is also an excellent example of effectively converting academic conference presentations into publishable essay form, a credit to Craig Symonds. This book is highly recommended. See also from this publisher:

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Chapter 4 : Virginia at war., / - Boston University Libraries

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Covers new and classic American Civil War books and media. Davis and James I. With the addition of Virginia to the Confederacy on April 17, , many in the South thought independence was won. The second largest state in the Confederacy brought with it a navy yard near Norfolk, a canon foundry in Richmond, and more people than any other single state in the new nation. By the end of , it became evident though that "the complex and often ontentious relationship between strategy and politics, and the squabbling between generals, many of whom had agenda of their own" were a severe impediment to a successful rebellion. During the same month, George B. McClellan directed a two pronged invasion from Ohio and into the western counties of Virginia. The crossroad towns of Grafton, Clarksburg and Romney in the eastern panhandle was captured. Wheeling and Grafton in the northern panhandle were seized as was the Kanawha River Valley in the western and central counties. By September, the western counties of the state were held by Union troops. The drive was Washington, D. The loss of the western counties prompted Davis to send Lee to the front. He arrived and failed to achieve coordination between the two Confederate commanders, Floyd and Wise. Davis called former governor Wise to Richmond and sent 9, fresh troops to Lee. Rosecrans, front line Union commander in western Virginia, strategically withdrew to the mountiantops and let the foul weather do its work on the lines of the Confederate advance. By the end of in Virginia, the Confederates knew that "one Reb could not whip three Yanks, at least not every time. Both sides came to grips with "lessons not only about the management of troops, but about the care and feeding of political superiors. The First Campaign, Clayton R. Newell Rebels At The Gate: A Little Short of Boats: A Single Grand Victory:

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Chapter 5 : Virginia at war. in SearchWorks catalog

Preface v Contents Preface William C. Davis and James I. Robertson www.nxgvision.com The Virginia State Convention of James I. Robertson Jr.1 Land Operations in Virginia in Craig L. Symonds

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Most Virginians had been willing to adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward the new Republican president , and believed that the precipitous secession by seven southern states that winter had been, at best, premature. The choice now seemed to be subjection or defiance, and the delegates voted accordingly. Many Southerners believed that with Virginia in their camp, independence was as good as won. Aside from Texas, Virginia was the largest state in the Confederacy. It was also the most populous and the home of both its most valuable shipyard , Gosport near Norfolk, and its only cannon foundry,the Tredegar Iron Works. Scholars of the Civil War point out quite rightly that the campaigns in the West were critical, 28 Land Operations in Virginia even decisive, in determining the outcome of the war. But with the opposing capitals only about one hundred miles apart, the popular attention of both sides, as well as that of the international community, focused heavily on the campaigns inVirginia so that even small engagements there had a disproportionate impact on public opinion, and therefore on politics and policy. Though the Civil War was a milestone event that transformed both the nation and indeed the nature of war itself, this fact did not become fully evident during the fighting in Virginia in ; the first eight months of the war witnessed more harbingers of change than change itself. The armies in Virginia, though large by prewar standards, were small in comparison with the hosts that fought in and ; and the number of casualties,though horrifying at the time, were relatively modest by the later standard of Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville. Moreover, the early months of war in Virginia betrayed the inexperience of the volunteer officers and the lack of clarity in command relationships on both sides. What did become evident , however, even in these early battles, was the complex and often contentious relationship between strategy and politics, and the squabbling between generals, many of whom had agenda of their own. From the very outset, the man who was charged with principal responsibility for orchestrating the defense of the state was Robert E. His role changed in the second week of June when on the eighth of that month, the military forces of the state were formally transferred to the Confederacy. Lee was unsure what his new position would be within the Confederate military architecture, but in a few days he received an appointment as militaryadviser to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, and in that capacity Lee continued to oversee the defense of Virginia. As he saw it, danger threatened from four directions: The greatest menace was from the north. Union officials were gathering a large army at Washington just across the Potomac, and to Craig L. Symonds 29 defend against this threat, Lee ordered a concentration of forces around Manassas Junction, forces that were eventually entrusted to the hero of Fort Sumter, Brig You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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