

Chapter 1 : Transcendent | Definition of Transcendent by Merriam-Webster

This study provides, in the notion of transcendence, a framework for interpreting Heidegger's thinking in regard to language, one of his major preoccupations.

This is contrasted with immanence, where a god is said to be fully present in the physical world and thus accessible to creatures in various ways. In religious experience transcendence is a state of being that has overcome the limitations of physical existence and by some definitions has also become independent of it. Transcendence can be attributed to the divine not only in its being, but also in its knowledge. Thus, a god may transcend both the universe and knowledge is beyond the grasp of the human mind. Although transcendence is defined as the opposite of immanence, the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some theologians and metaphysicians of various religious traditions affirm that a god is both within and beyond the universe panentheism; in it, but not of it; simultaneously pervading it and surpassing it. Transcendental idealism and Transcendental arguments In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant introduced a new term "transcendental", thus instituting a new, third meaning. In his theory of knowledge, this concept is concerned with the condition of possibility of knowledge itself. He also opposed the term transcendental to the term transcendent, the latter meaning "that which goes beyond" transcends any possible knowledge of a human being. Transcendental philosophy, consequently, is not considered a traditional ontological form of metaphysics. Kant also equated transcendental with that which is "Ordinary knowledge is knowledge of objects; transcendental knowledge is knowledge of how it is possible for us to experience those objects as objects. Kant argues that the mind must contribute those features and make it possible for us to experience objects as objects. In the central part of his Critique of Pure Reason, the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories", Kant argues for a deep interconnection between the ability to have self-consciousness and the ability to experience a world of objects. Through a process of synthesis, the mind generates both the structure of objects and its own unity. A metaphilosophical question discussed by many Kantian scholars is how transcendental reflection is itself possible. Contemporary philosophy[edit] In phenomenology, the "transcendent" is that which transcends our own consciousness: Noema is employed in phenomenology to refer to the terminus of an intention as given for consciousness. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre uses transcendence to describe the relation of the self to the object oriented world, as well as our concrete relations with others. For Sartre, the for-itself is sometimes called a transcendence. Additionally if the other is viewed strictly as an object, much like any other object, then the other is, for the for-itself, a transcendence-transcended. When the for-itself grasps the other in the others world, and grasps the subjectivity that the other has, it is referred to as transcending-transcendence. Thus, Sartre defines relations with others in terms of transcendence. Holz liberated transcendental philosophy from the convergence of neo-Kantianism, he critically discussed transcendental pragmatism and the relation between transcendental philosophy, neo-empiricism and the so-called postmodernism. Colloquial usage[edit] In everyday language, "transcendence" means "going beyond", and "self-transcendence" means going beyond a prior form or state of oneself. Mystical experience is thought of as a particularly advanced state of self-transcendence, in which the sense of a separate self is abandoned.

Chapter 2 : Language and Transcendence in Dante's Paradiso » Brill Online

In the contemporary world, where dogmatic and inhumane voices are growing ever louder, the anti-dogmatic voice of Karl Jaspers needs to be heard.

You can help by adding to it. Hinduism[edit] Transcendence is described and viewed from a number of diverse perspectives in Hinduism. Some traditions, such as Advaita Vedanta , view transcendence in the form of God as the Nirguna Brahman God without attributes , transcendence being absolute. Other traditions, such as Bhakti yoga , view transcendence as God with attributes Saguna Brahman , the Absolute being a personal deity Ishvara , such as Vishnu or Shiva. In the Bhagavad Gita transcendence is described as a level of spiritual attainment, or state of being which is open to all spiritual aspirants the goal of yoga practice , the state at which one is no longer under the control of animalistic, base desires and is aware of a higher spiritual reality. Tawhid and Tanzih Tawhid is the act of believing and affirming that God Arabic: Aside from the supreme name "Allah" and the neologism al-Rahman referring to the divine beneficence that constantly re creates, maintains and destroys the universe , other names may be shared by both God and human beings. Tawhid or Oneness of God constitutes the foremost article of the Muslim profession. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. August Learn how and when to remove this template message Jewish theologians, especially since the Middle Ages , have described the transcendence of God in terms of divine simplicity , explaining the traditional characteristics of God as omniscient and omnipotent. Interventions of divine transcendence occur in the form of events outside the realm of natural occurrence such as miracles and the revelation of the Ten Commandments to Moses at Mt. The emanation of creation from the Ein Sof is explained through a process of filtering. In the Kabbalistic creation myth referred to as the "breaking of the vessels," filtering was necessary because otherwise this intense, simple essence would have overwhelmed and made impossible the emergence of any distinct creations. This process ultimately continued until the "light" of Godliness was sufficiently reduced to allow the world we inhabit to be sustained without breaking. The creation of this world, however, comes with the consequence that Godly transcendence is hidden, or "exiled" from the immanent world. Only through the revelation of sparks hidden within the shards embedded in our material world can this transcendence be recognized again. In Hasidic thought, divine sparks are revealed through the performance of commandments or " mitzvot ," literally, the obligations and prohibitions described in the Torah. A Kabbalistic explanation for the existence of malevolence in the world is that such terrible things are possible with the divine sparks being hidden. Thus there is some urgency to performing mitzvot in order to liberate the hidden sparks and perform a " tikkun olam " literally, healing of the world. Until then, the world is presided over by the immanent aspect of God, often referred to as the Shekhinah or divine spirit, and in feminine terms. Sikhism[edit] Waheguru Punjabi: It means "Wonderful Teacher" in the Punjabi language, but in this case is used to refer to the Sikh God. Wahi means "wonderful" a Middle Persian borrowing and " Guru " Sanskrit: Waheguru is also described by some[according to whom? Cumulatively, the name implies wonder at the Divine Light eliminating spiritual darkness. It might also imply, "Hail the Lord whose name eliminates spiritual darkness. Sikhs do not identify a gender for Ek Onkar, nor do they believe it takes a human form. In the Sikh tradition, all human beings are considered equal regardless of their religion, sex, or race. All are sons and daughters of Waheguru, the Almighty. Vahanian argued that modern secular culture had lost all sense of the sacred, lacking any sacramental meaning, no transcendental purpose or sense of providence. He concluded that for the modern secular mind "God is dead", but he did not mean that God did not exist. Paul Van Buren and William Hamilton both agreed that the concept of transcendence had lost any meaningful place in modern secular thought. According to the norms of contemporary modern secular thought, God is dead. In responding to this denial of transcendence Van Buren and Hamilton offered secular people the option of Jesus as the model human who acted in love. The encounter with the Christ of faith would be open in a church-community. Altizer offered a radical theology of the death of God that drew upon William Blake , Hegelian thought and Nietzschean ideas. He conceived of theology as a form of poetry in which the immanence presence of God

could be encountered in faith communities. However, he no longer accepted the possibility of affirming his belief in a transcendent God. Altizer concluded that God had incarnated in Christ and imparted his immanent spirit which remained in the world even though Jesus was dead. It is important that such ideas are understood as socio-cultural developments and not as ontological realities. As Vahanian expressed it in his book, the issue of the denial of God lies in the mind of secular man, not in reality. The school of the theology of the "Requiem of God," not even implementing a "Requiem for Satan," will constitute only a footnote to the history of theology.

Chapter 3 : Karl Jaspers and the language of transcendence | Guy Bennett-Hunter

In everyday language, "transcendence" means "going beyond", and "self-transcendence" means going beyond a prior form or state of oneself. Mystical experience is thought of as a particularly advanced state of self-transcendence, in which the sense of a separate self is abandoned.

Language and Transcendence in Emerson and de Man Language and Transcendence in Emerson and De Man No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at my back. The luster of his phrases and the audacity of his proclamationsâ€”in short, his never-quite-foregone tendency to sermonizeâ€”detract, and reasonably so, from his credentials as a serious philosopher. In any case, a purported seeker of truth who writes with such rhetorical flourish and disdain for method, and who employs such an imprecise terminology, ought, it seems, to be regarded with some degree of suspicion. His style prompted his contemporary C. It seems that such cautionary advice is meant to act as a balance against the tendencies of the undergraduate to get carried away by the swells of passion in his prose, and forget his responsibilities to sound logic. Of course, as the reader of his diaries can attest, nowhere is this element of doubt more prominent and active than in the text of Emerson itself. The author is always engaged with the phenomenon of his own uncertainty, so much to the point that the uncertainty becomes itself a necessary component of the functioning system. He is, as much as the reader, wary of being swept away by the power of his languageâ€”and if the rhetorical aspects of his writings were expendable to his efforts to his project, then surely he would have left them by the wayside. In his essay on Montaigne and skepticism in Representative Men, he writes earnestly that he, will shun the weakness of philosophizing beyond my depth. What is the use of pretending to powers we have not? What is the use of pretending to assurances we have not, respecting the other life? Why exaggerate the powers of virtue? Why be an angel before your time? These strings, wound up too high, will snap. If there is a wish for immortality, and no evidence, why not just say that? If there are conflicting evidences, why not state them? If there is not ground for a candid thinker to make up his mind, yea or nay,â€”why not suspend the judgment? Any speculation concerning matters metaphysical must be substantiated by evidence on the level of certitude that is provided by immediate phenomenological apprehension. In the moment of transcendental understanding, this oppositional paradigm provides the means by which the subject can go beyond mere relativity, and identify and access the source of all meaning. It was first employed by the Scholastics in order to describe the four elements of nature namely, Being, Truth, Unity and Goodness that eluded the empirical categories of Aristotle. Though its actual mechanics are a matter of contention, transcendence is the means by which meaning arises in a linguistic system that is seemingly circular and self-referential. It produces anomalous results when applied as a term in even elementary logical statements, and perhaps this explains in part the difficulty that defenders of Emerson meet when attempting to establish his reputation as a transcendental philosopher. It could be analogously considered in the sense that one is prioritized in the sense of being above the other, spatiallyâ€”de Man prefers the temporal idiom. In other words, we would be determining which system could be subsumed within the other, necessarily broader, system. Thus the two elements would fit together as an item, closed unto itself and in need of little or no further elaboration. But this would seem to come into conflict with that which, according to my understanding, both systems are trying to impart to the reader. What, then, can we assert that the two systems have in common? To begin with, both are frequently occupied with like subject matter: While at first blush Emerson may seem to be the typical purveyor of a romantic ideology of aesthetics and thus grist for the mill of de Manian skepticism, the discerning reader will recognize that there is perhaps more that unites these two schools than divides them. Both men determine the purportive capacity for metaphor to be the locus of the linguistic crisis that either can elevate human understanding to an atemporal awareness of the true metaphysic, or falsely lead us to think so. The primary difference between the two philosophers, is that Emerson maintains a belief though not at times unshaken that, through an arduous examination of the mechanism that allows for the possibility of symbolic representation in the human mind, one can arrive at a unity a fullness or absolute presence, while for de Man this is patently impossible. However, we find in either argument an abstract and at

times obscure reliance on its respective counter-argument. Both writers seem engaged in a struggle to impart some essential truth concerning the speculative mind which cannot be spelled out in the rudimentary alphabet of objects, space and time. Both task themselves with determining the validity of the enduring romantic belief that truth dwells in some nebulous relation or to take a Keatsian perspective is identical to beauty. And while there is no doubt that a casual reading of Emerson will yield an ideology that is highly vulnerable to this critique, a more careful analysis will reveal that his philosophy utilizes these incommensurable terms or similar ones as the terms that render transcendental thought possible. In other words, his account of human understanding is generated out of the conflicts that emerge between the skeptical drive on the one hand and specular affirmation on the other. When darkness closes in upon my eyes, and the earth around me and the heaven dwell in my soul like the form of a beloved mistress; then do I often think longingly: Oh couldst thou only express, couldst thou breathe forth upon this paper, all that lives so full and warm in thyself, that it might become the mirror of thy soul, as thy soul is the mirror of the infinite God! Goethe [Trials of Young Werther] What little of all we know is said! What drops of all the sea of our science are baled up! Hence the necessity of speech and song; hence these throbs and heart-beatings in the orator, at the door of the assembly, to the end namely that thought may be ejaculated as Logos, Word. It was not he, however, who delivered the commencement address that day, but a classmate named Sampson Reed. The sun of the spiritual world shone bright on their hearts, and their senses were open with delight to natural objects. In the eve were the beauties of paradise; in the ear was the music of birds; in the nose was the fragrance of the freshness of nature; in the taste was the fruit of the garden; in the touch, the seal of their eternal union. What had they to say? Reed was not the first to associate the Fall of Man with the emergence of language. Similarly Milton, in *Paradise Lost*, traces the effrontery and corruption of Adam and Eve to their act of naming the animals and natural formations in the Garden. The dialectic between word and object seems to suggest a deferral of meaning, that was at one time in the past and will be perhaps once again at some point in the future absent or eliminated, whereupon man would freely imbibe the beauty of his surroundings, without need for knowledge of particulars and only of universals—or, perhaps better, of no knowledge of universals but only of radical particulars. For Reed, the idealized act of naming will implicate the subject in such a way that there is no mediation between himself and the absolute form or forms that constitute the source of all particulars, that allow for the possibility of particulars. Reed, though he would continue to write articles intermittently for the *New Jerusalem Magazine*, ultimately pursued a pharmaceutical vocation, and thus engaged in a more practical variety of alchemy, than that of Emerson the metaphysician and poet. The same controversies that led Emerson to leave the church had been fomenting debate across the country for years prior to his departure. As the various Protestant denominations contended for American souls during the second Great Awakening, ecclesiastic debates often centered around the proper interpretation of scripture. The Unitarian Church—which maintained strong associations at the time with the faculty at Harvard and was situated on the liberal end of the spectrum of American Christianity—followed a method of biblical hermeneutics based on the empiricism of Locke. Figures such as Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart sought to eliminate those features of language that did not adhere to a precisely limited formalism; their method was direct, democratic and, perhaps most importantly, non-revelatory. Salvation and the Kingdom of God were attainable for any human being, and as such the truth, or actual meaning, of scripture was determinable through purely rational channels. If language, as Locke held, was a tool whose purpose was to represent the condition of the world, then its truth and value consisted simply in the accurate correspondence of its statements to the world as such. This method was developed into an hermeneutics that left no room for paradox, contradiction or opacity—and it was this very feature of the system that appealed to the Unitarians. The path to spiritual liberation consisted of a series of discernable ratiocinations, organized into a unified and discrete system that was sufficient unto itself. Andrews Norton, a leading intellectual figure of the Unitarian movement, writes the following concerning the doctrine of the trinity: Three persons, each equally possessing divine attributes, are three Gods. A person is a being. No one who has any correct notion of the meaning of words will deny this. And the being who possesses divine attributes must be God or a God. The doctrine of the Trinity, then, affirms that there are three Gods. It is affirmed at the same time, that there is but one God. But no one can believe that

there are three Gods, and that there is but one God. Their dogged refusal to consider propositions that did not adhere to firm logic and consistent nomenclature bears resemblance to the positivist agenda a century later. The concept of being, for these church leaders, was immediately apparent and of elemental simplicity. By the late 18th century, however, continental figures such as J. Griesbach, under the influence of Kantian idealism, had come to suggest that the true value of scripture lay in its metaphoric or figurative value. The apprehension, of course, among some, was that advocating such a view would undermine the absolutism that provided the bedrock of faith. For where, among the multitudinous meanings that can be wrought by metaphor, was one to find the absolute? Revelatory truth does not conduce to settling political disputes, or everyday ethical quandaries. As stated, it was amidst disputes of this nature that Emerson came to intellectual maturity, eventually coming to take a position as a minister at a Unitarian Church in Christ served as the archetype of the poet in his work, because his parables most effectively pursued the ever-moving point of truth, whether moral or metaphysical. In the gospels, Christ rarely makes outright moral pronouncement, but rather speaks in metaphorical language that would transcend cultural and historical circumstances. To arrest the endless sequence of meaning is an erroneous judgment, tantamount to mistaking the sign for the signified. In a familiar fashion, we are referred to natural phenomena as the standard for idealized comprehension. The watershed event of leaving the church is one of countless instances in which Emerson would seek to unburden metaphor from its finite allegorical allusions, and facilitate the elevation of the self unto a somewhat ambiguous mystical union with that which lays beyond mere form. Perception never equates to understanding as such: When the eye of Reason opens, to outline and surface are added grace and expression. Furthermore, it is this aspect of apprehension that must constitute, Emerson tells us, what we understand to be the true foundation of being—“not idealism or materialism as such but rather the conditions that make possible such a distinction. This slim volume, which remains among his most difficult works, that we first come to understand the nature of the qualitative experience that he will perpetually seek to adorn with expression. And although it doubtless lacks the relative focus and illocutionary force of the later essays, its dark veins of association and innumerable meanings would come to provide an archetype of the particular admixture of philosophy and poetry that Emerson would advocate. The centerpiece of the book which he originally intended to complemented by a second book, to be entitled Spirit was his chapter on language, which was flanked on either side by three supplementary chapters, in addition to being composed itself of three sections, providing a provocative symmetry. These sections are paraphrased by the following tripartite axiom: Words are signs of natural facts. Particular natural facts are signs of particular spiritual facts. Nature is the symbol of spirit. The relationship between words meaning and mind being provides an instance of the self-generating process that forms the foundation of epistemology. Rather, the relation between meaning and phenomenological apprehension is in many cases issued by performative means, and is seldom directly treated. It is unclear, even, if there is a consistent referent to his transcendental conjectures—“if there is, then it clearly does not function in the same manner as a typical referent. It is more accurately described as a process than as a thing, whose apprehension by the knower is coeval with its identification with the knower, the most ordinary condition of being as it is evident in the range of human being. The path of things is silent. Will they suffer a speaker to go with them? A spy they will not suffer; a lover, a poet, is the transcendency of their own nature,—“him they will suffer. It is the aspect of form that renders the thing intelligible to the understanding, but not the form itself. As important as the object that transcendental dialogue purports to represent is the account itself, and how it can employ language in order to transmit its content. Although he is often characterized as being somewhat too prone to ethereal musing—“as engaged with the abstract at the cost of real valuable material analysis—“in actual fact Emerson occupies himself with the most direct and indisputable facts of our psychology, that provide the self-sufficient components out of which arise the synthesis of our daily being.

Chapter 4 : Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion

Language, Reality, and Transcendence deals with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein by delving into language, grammar, rule, self, world, culture, and value. Wittgenstein has given a comprehensive philosophy of man and the world and has dealt with the destiny of man by outlining the moral and the spiritual goals of human life.

According to Peter Mathiessen channeling the great Africanist, G. The San, being hunter-gatherers, can live almost anywhere and so have wound up in arid corners of the Kalahari and such places no one else wants. Herein lies an intimation of prelapsarian innocence, of a time when the self as world-limit evinced a porousness now lost, when the sound of the Lord God could be heard in the garden in the cool of the day. I once heard Allen Savory say that, whoever you are, when you come to Africa you are coming home, because mankind was born there. I have known others to express feeling this strongly when they first visited the Holy Land, where man was reborn from above in the City of David, the very crossroads where the human family had come up from the south and turned from itself to go east and north, to fill the earth and subdue it. The spiritual problem was eloquently and famously expressed by Augustine in the opening passages of his Confessions, where he asks God: And where would you come from? And insofar as spiritual experience operates most fundamentally on a plane transcending language, the very possibility of such fundamental spiritual experience entails a resolution of the problem. Over the course of his career, Wittgenstein himself seems also to have intuited this connection. I cannot call him Lord; because that says nothing to me. Because I do not believe that he will come to judge me; because that says nothing to me. And it could say something to me, only if I lived completely differently. By way of reformulating the problem, one might ask: In order to know ourselves as we are, it is necessary that we should get behind or outside of ourselves. Just so, to know the transcendent God we must learn to look upward, toward what is beyond the limit "the limit constituted by our very selves" beyond the limit of this world, beyond the limit within which thought and language and sense-perception all operate. In the opening verses of *The Waste Land*, T. Eliot circled around the problem: If the lost word is lost, if the spent word is spent If the unheard, unspoken Still is the unspoken word, the Word unheard, The Word without a word, the Word within the world and for the world; And the light shone in darkness and Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled About the centre of the silent Word. William James likewise intuited something of the problem, or swam in it, or addressed it obliquely, as in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. One is, as such, cutting below the level of languages, so distinctive in their variety. It is perhaps no coincidence that this transpired in the context of the rise of the universities, made possible by the rapid urbanization of Europe, a process which we see reaching a crescendo, now on a global scale, just in our own day. Indeed it seems harder to love in cities, where we spend our time ever more radically self-limited, staring into smartphones, even our transient relationships with checkout clerks increasingly mediated by screens and keypads. It gets harder and harder for us to break through our self-limits, our limits as selves, and to commune with what is above and beyond in *illa quae ultra sunt*, and thus to engage in a more integrated way with what is within and below. It has perhaps been impossible for a long time. Kierkegaard said, Leaping means to belong essentially to the earth and to respect the law of gravity so that the leap is merely the momentary, but flying means to be set free from telluric conditions, something that is reserved exclusively for winged creatures. On my most recent visit to Africa, the shepherd trees were flowering, filling the air with their trademark, slightly acrid sweetness. In a specimen was found in the central Kalahari with a root depth of 68 meters. In East Asia, rhino horn is thought to be an aphrodisiac. The rhinos looked ridiculous, but they were alive. I thought how that landscape is an icon of our predicament. The insularity of humanity, the impermeable boundaries of our selfhoods, of our discourses and desires; it is all a great conspiracy of alienation "from the land, from the plant and animal kingdoms over which we have been set as stewards, from one another, and from our own selves. We have lost the ability to speak and understand the language of creation. It is lost in our flight from one another, in the radical heterogeneity of our crazy little identities and discourses. In *Laudato Si* Pope Francis wrote precisely in such terms: I thought of W. Nothing can save us that is possible: We who must die demand a miracle. I thought of its root structure cracking the hard mantle of

human pride, creating an oasis of living water in the midst of all this aridity. Benedicite omnia opera Domini, Domino. The featured image of a baobab tree *Adansania digitata* was supplied by the author.

Chapter 5 : Transcendence (philosophy) - Wikipedia

Language, according to Heidegger, is the house of Being (Heidegger ,). It is the place where Being presents itself to Dasein (There-Being); Dasein is the place whereby Being makes itself accessible to man.

Pierpaolo Ciccarelli Pierpaolo Ciccarelli Ordinary language and transcendence of ideas. I The aim of this contribution is to look at a rather lengthy excursus on Plato in a book Leo Strauss wrote about Hobbes in Accordingly, they allowed the discussion of political-moral things to come under the influence of deforming passions, prejudices and common views. Strauss makes a remark about these statements that will later prove to be crucial for his interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. He argues⁴ that there is a significant difference between the exactness of mathematics and the exactness of political science. In both cases, exactness has a different relationship with what is not exact, namely with what is approximate, not scientific, with what belongs to ordinary or vulgar opinion. Its basis and its Genesis. The German original which differs from the English edition in several respects was first published in and is today accessible in L. Strauss, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. We will quote from the English edition. Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, cit. It is a historiographical topos taken from a well-known story of John Aubrey, friend and biographer of Hobbes. Science, or more precisely, the scientific attitude of the intentional consciousness enacts the objectivation of the world. The moral sciences, or rather, those practicing these sciences, because their viewpoints must necessarily clash with ordinary opinion, cannot be politically neutral. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, Frankfurt a. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, transl. Carr, by Northwestern University Press, pp. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Gesamtausgabe vol. Stroeker, Hamburg, pp. An introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague, p. Therefore, all moral sciences, i. Science, although it is a way of life itself, cannot help but become independent from life, and, in this way, generate a contrast with it. A contrast that, in the case of the sciences of man, takes the form of a political disagreement. He states that Hobbes was responsible for a serious misunderstanding of the ancient tradition. The Platonic dialogues and afterwards, of course, many other classical sources appear to him to be paradigmatic ways of rising to the challenge of this basic impasse that affects the moral sciences. Hobbes, *Opera latina*, vol. Hobbes, *English Works*, vol. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, cit. This would amount to a serious misunderstanding of both thinkers. I simply aim to point out that both have "â€" so to speak - a questioning attitude toward texts. For each of them, however, the questioning to be performed is different. The *Seinsfrage* is considered by him, at least at the time of *Sein und Zeit*,¹⁶ as an essentially Platonic issue. And it too is understood by him as a Platonic question. Hofstadter, *Bloomington*, p. Meier, *Stuttgart- Weimar*, p. Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His Predecessors, transl. Adler, Albany, p. McNeill, in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge, p. Da-sein not at all comprehended, and not experienced. And as for the difference between Plato and Aristotle, which develops in the course of an approach which was common to them both, it consists rather in this, that Plato, much more than Aristotle, orientates himself by speech. Churchill, *Bloomington*, p. The development of these possibilities has the effect of transforming the problem and thus preserving in its import as a problem. However, Strauss adds some important features to it that are not so self-evident. This implies, on closer consideration, that the truth cannot prove, or reveal itself if not politically. In other words, assuming that politics essentially aims to establish agreement between citizens, Strauss is pointing out here that politics, i. It thus appears to Strauss to be twofold: If one may say that the turning to Euclid is to be characterized as a return to Plato, one must immediately add that, on 22 *Ibidem*. To understand this somewhat amazing statement, we must remember what Strauss said about the genetic relationship between speech, or ordinary language and transcendence of ideas. Stated in other words: Why must it not be rejected as Hobbes does? For to give up orientation by 25 *Ivi*, p. It might seem especially to contemporary readers accus- tomed to the philosophy of ordinary language that things are exactly the reverse. Now, I would like to try to make it plausible, by highlighting the Husserlian phenomenological question which in my opinion has to be seen as the under- lying motivation for such an unusual interpretation. For this purpose, I will draw atten- tion to two of the many passages from the Platonic dialogues which Strauss refers to, the

former taken from the *Phaedo*, the latter from the *Republic*. Let us start with the *Phaedo*. It occurs after the critical assessment of the pre-Socratic physiologists, in particular of Anaxagorean physics which had 32 Ivi, p. To explain what he means by this danger, he compares the natural scientist to someone who observes an eclipse of the sun. Like this person, he risks being blinded by the sight of the sensible things and, therefore, needs a kind of blackened mirror. To grasp, in the present context, the link I am suggesting between Strauss and Husserl, we need to pay attention to what Strauss considers important in the abovementioned passage from *Phaedo*. Thus, it seems that ancient physics has to be rejected, because it threatens the believed standards, i. Thus, ancient physics has to be rejected - not because it is ethically or politically dangerous, but for the very opposite reason, namely, because it leads to acquiescing in what is believed by a given community e. In *Phaedo*, Socrates rejects pre-Socratic physics by taking refuge in ordinary language, i. Now, it is in this very interpretative argumentation that the Husserlian background becomes discernible. In fact, the reasoning ascribed here by Strauss to Plato can be partly traced to a celebrated article by Husserl that appeared in in the journal *Logos*. The article is *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, a manifesto of phenomenological thought, on which Strauss would later write an essay entitled *Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political Philosophy*. Husserl uses these expressions interchangeably. They share an important feature: See my essay *Filosofia e politica in Heidegger: XI*, n. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, cit. Generations upon generations work enthusiastically on the immense edifice of science and add their modest objects of inquiry to it, ever conscious of the fact that the edifice is infinite and will never ever be completed. However, this is precisely where the problem arises for philosophy as a rigorous science. Faced with the exigencies of life, with the practical necessity of taking a position, man could not wait until "perhaps millennia later" science had arrived, even assuming that he was at all already familiar with the idea of rigorous science. Let us now come back to Strauss. Let us attempt to interpret this passage from the viewpoint outlined by Strauss. Strauss, *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy*, cit. This book appeared posthumously but was drafted by Strauss himself. *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Kersten, The Hague, pp. It is the most natural question that would occur to any reader of the *Republic*: It would deserve a careful reading, which here, of course, is not possible to do. In other chapters of the book,⁵² he points to a peculiar development of political thought in the early modern age. As soon as the question of the application, or of the effectiveness of the ideal standard becomes the prevalent one, the philosophical search for it, i. Until we live in the natural attitude, the intentional phenomena remain concealed and therefore phenomenology cannot start. Now, what I am suggesting is that Strauss reads *Resp.* Therefore, in the above mentioned later essay entitled *Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political Philosophy*, Strauss points out the necessity of grasping the political sense of the contrast between philosophy and *Weltanschauung*: In order to see the relation between philosophy as rigorous science and the alternative to it, one must look at the political conflict between the two antagonists, i. *Its Basis and Its Genesis*, This interpretation is based, among others, on two passages in the Platonic dialogues, *Phaedo* 99 c-e and *Republic* c-e. According to Strauss, the Platonic dialogues and in particular the figure of Socrates shows that philosophy, understood as the pursuit of truth, can never neutralize the conflict with the *doxa*, understood as the order established by authority.

Chapter 6 : Philosophy Papers: Language and Transcendence in Emerson and de Man

Emerson, throughout his work, maintains the belief that such a transcendence is possible, although this belief must coincide simultaneously with the fact of which he is aware, that inherent to metaphorical language is an inexorable deferral and distancing, which always mediates between the poet and his object.

A collection of essays on philosophy, politics, and moral thought. It is the place where Being presents itself to Dasein There-Being ; Dasein is the place whereby Being makes itself accessible to man. Man, as Dasein, has the fundamental character of thrownness. By being thrown into the world, it is through man whereby the Being of beings becomes manifest. It is through man whereby Being is known. Metaphysics, says Heidegger, is the basic occurrence of Dasein Heidegger , For Heidegger, Dasein dwells on the disclosure of Being through the nothing the unsaid in human speech , which stands as its groundless ground and source of meaning. The nothing, Heidegger, says, makes possible the openness of beings Ibid. Thomas, on the other hand, views human language differently. Thomas, is the means whereby the reality of Being as the ultimate cause of all beings is made known to the human intellect. According to John Caputo, St. Thomas understands language as an activity of man, to be mastered and perfected like any other craft and not as a response to the address of Being Caputo , Thomas, the reality of Being does not unfold in language; instead, through language, the reality of Being is affirmed by way of causal participation. Language is an event that has Being as its ultimate origin, a house that is arranged according to a pattern inscribed and prescribed by it Richardson , This means that Being makes manifest the presence of beings to man through language. Being therefore reveals the truth of beings to human consciousness through language. Aristotle understands Being as ousia, which refers to the active concrete and changing substance, actualized by form. Aristotle rejects the abstract world of forms of Plato and considered the particular entities in the world as the really real. To be real therefore means to be a substance or to be an attribute of a substance Guignon , For Aristotle, substances form the structure of the world. They are objective and independent existing entities. In the sense, Aristotle bypassed Being. But Heidegger says that we sense more in things than mere substance and accidents for things are closer to us than the sensations that announce them Richardson , Aristotle has examined beings in his metaphysics but was oblivious to the fact that they are the manifestations of Being. Aristotle, therefore, is oblivious to Being. Furthermore, Aristotle defined language as a sound that signifies something Sallis , , and this means that he is not aware of the role language in the disclosure of Being. Aristotle is ignorant of the radical role that language plays in the disclosure of beings. Thus, he says, it is the home where man dwells Heidegger , This belongingness means that of all existing beings only man can ask the question regarding Being. And the reason for this, according to Heidegger, is that human existence means standing in the lighting of Being Ibid. For Heidegger, human existence thoughtfully dwells in the house of Being Ibid. Dasein, or man, by being thrown into the world, lives in this house. Dwelling in the house of Being enables man to speak of a world. Henceforth, it is language that makes the world a world for man, a world where his possibilities are realized. To speak of the world, then, means to speak of Being. Man, by being-in-the-world, stands in front of Being. Thus, man as Dasein bears witness to Being, gives voice to Being Clarke , For Heidegger, it is through the nothing that the openness of the meaning of beings is revealed. Nothingness opens up the possibilities of being human. Nothingness reveals what it means for man to exist. As source of meaning, the nothing brings forth the different possibilities of being-in-the-world. These possibilities are shed light in language for language reveals the truth of being-in-the-world. This is because language, as the house where Being dwells, is the same place where meaning is. Language, in this regard, reveals the reality of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Now, we ask, what is in human language that allows the possibility of saying? If language is the place where Being comes into light, then there must be something in language that allows this coming-into-presence and self-concealing as its source or ground. For Heidegger, in the very instance of whatever is said, a hidden plenitude is left unsaid Deely , This plenitude enables the possibility of saying. This nothing is the veil of Being King , Ancient metaphysics, according to Heidegger, conceives the nothing in the sense of non-being, that is, unformed matter, matter that cannot take form as an informed being Heidegger , Thus, for a long time,

metaphysics exposes the nothing to only one meaning: What does this mean? For Heidegger, the Nothing is an abyss, the groundless source of meaning where the reality of being human is made manifest. The nameless is the silence in human speech. Silence presupposes the fact that one has something to say. But science and mathematics, according to Heidegger, have dismissed the nothing as meaningless. Science gives up the nothing as a nullity. Thus, he states that, for these two fields what should be examined are beings and, besides that, nothing; beings alone, and further nothing; solely beings and beyond that, nothing Ibid. Science rejects the nothing precisely because scientific language requires methodical objectivity. The scientist sees the nothing as empty, as something that is devoid of any objective sense. Thus, for the scientific discipline, the silence of the nothing does not say anything. Science conceals the nothing from man. Science renders mute the possibilities of man in the realm of silence. But silence is not all silence. Silence opens up the possibilities of saying something. To every man, what silence reveals is the possibility of saying something about what still remains hidden. The truth of being human dwells in the nothing for Being is encountered in this silence. If truth dwells in silence, we must actually experience it. So where do we find this silence? If the nothing itself is to be questioned as we have been questioning it, then it must be given beforehand. We must be able to encounter it Ibid. The nothing, according to Heidegger, reveals itself in anxiety Ibid. Anxiety makes man silent, so that because of anxiety what humans have to say falls silent, making the reality of beings slip away. But what is anxiety? Anxiety, Heidegger says, is not a kind of grasping of the nothing Ibid. Anxiety refers to the state of mind that brings humans to the indeterminate possibilities of their existence. In speech, this state of mind points to the indeterminate possibilities of saying. What anxiety reveals to man is that through the nothing the reality of beings comes into light, that they are beings and not nothing. Anxiety, then, opens up the meaningfulness of beings for humans. Henceforth, the dismissal by science of the nothing implies its annihilation of the Being of beings. The rejection of the unsaid in language means the dismissal of the meanings still concealed in such silence. The dismissal of silence, of nothing as nothing, is a dismissal of what it means to be human. An instance of being held out into the nothing in speech occurs when one travels to a far place and bids goodbye to a beloved. During this anxious moment, one says goodbye and the girl says nothing, remains silent. But this silence makes the openness of Being of the girl. Her silence reveals that there is something in her that she wants to say. Her silence discloses something about her as a human being. Her silence means something. Her silence captures her Being as a girl who is in love with someone who will be leaving her. Her silence opens up what the departure means to her and to their relationship. Thus, *ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit* from the nothing all beings as being come to be Ibid. Being as Source Being for St. Thomas is not the lighting up process but the *ipsum esse subsistens* that renders beings their being by way of causal participation. Thomas addresses Being in a different way. Thomas, every being *ens* is a being insofar as it participates in *esse*. Thomas is the cause of the act of existence in beings. The reason for this, according to John Caputo, is that *ens* derives its meaning from *esse*. A being is a being insofar as it is referred to the act of existing which in its unparticipated state is pure act. Thomas, then, Caputo says, cannot be accused of oblivion of the ontological difference between Being and beings.

Chapter 7 : Right and Wrong: Language, Being and Transcendence

LANGUAGE, REALITY, AND TRANSCENDENCE An Essay on the Main Strands of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy R. C. Pradhan BrownWalker Press Boca Raton.

Chapter 8 : Transcendence - Christy Lemire : Christy Lemire

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Chapter 9 : Benedicite: a meditation on language and transcendence â€œ Covenant

The oddness of Christian language derives from the transcendence of God, and the ordinariness of it derives from God's immanence. Christian language is odd because it is the language of basic commitment; and the transcendence of God's Lordship demands that our commitment be basic.