

Chapter 1 : Logical Existence Functoid

@JeremyHadfield "I believe that philosophy is defined by its method, which is based on logical analysis." This idea is the legacy of a particularly vulgar form of logical positivism - the attempt (or often, the demand) to turn the philosophical concept into a proposition.

Would you like to merge this question into it? MERGE already exists as an alternate of this question. Would you like to make it the primary and merge this question into it? MERGE exists and is an alternate of. A philosophy that emphasizes the uniqueness and isolation of the individual experience in a hostile or indifferent universe. Its intention is to show people their own obligation to secure their existence identity by realizing how they define themselves as separate from anything that blurs individual identities. An easy way to begin understanding that concept is to think about how we are generalized into groups or types of people, and how that negates our individual significance. To do something because you are part of a group or want to be accepted into one following trends, for example nullifies your personal identity. You exist only as part of a group. But to make a choice the same choice, even separate from influence of anything except yourself e. Existentialists argue that not thinking and acting towards determining your place in the universe essentially makes your existence meaningless. Existentialism is a 20th century cultural movement, primarily literary , theological and philosophical in character, that recognizes the free individual as the sole creator of meaning and morality. It is a reaction against traditional philosophy including Rationalism, without seeks ultimate meaning in metaphysical principles, and Empiricism which seeks it in the observed world, and it is a total repudiation of all traditional systems of belief. The core of Existentialism is to be found in the dictum " Existence precedes Essence", that is, the existence of the individual, both factually and logically, comes before the meaning that he or she gives to the world. This fact inevitably generates "Anxiety" against which the individual seeks to defend himself by various stratagems, including, accepting the meaning that others have ascribed to him, which Sartre called "Being for Others", or living under their " Gaze", or by lying to himself about the nature of reality, which he termed " Bad Faith". For the existentialist, a belief in reason, or at the very least, the belief that rationality can solve the riddle of meaning, is an act of " bad faith" particularly attractive to intellectuals. The existentialist rejects all these stratagems, embraces existence , accepts that he lives in an " absurd" world, that is, one that is objective and therefore indifferent, and recognizes himself as the only genuine source of meaning. Indeed, theologians more than others, are prepared to style themselves Existentialists. In the 20th-century Sartre and de Beauvoir were self-confessed Existentialists, but most other intellectuals eschewed the term. Even Heidegger, who, on any view, is a key existentialist thinker, denied he was an existentialist in the Sartrean sense. Moreover, " Existentialism" has come under fierce attack from philosophers of differing traditions. From a Marxist perspective, Marcuse accused existentialism of projecting anxiety and meaningless onto existence rather than recognizing them as products of the capitalist system, and identified it as reactionary. The Logical Positivists, particularly, Carnap and Ayer, thought that existentialists misunderstood the verb " to be", which led them to peculiar conclusions about " Being" and its opposite " Nothingness". More recently, in " From Descartes to Wittgenstein", Roger Scruton describes existentialism as inconsistent in recommending the " authentic life", which, on its own assumptions, can have no objective force. Indeed, if existentialism had merely been a philosophical movement it is unlikely to have had such a profound affect on the intellectual climate of the middle of the 20th century. Sartre himself was a novelist and playwright of some note as well as a propagandist or brilliance. Unsurprisingly, literature has been far more effective in portraying the existentialist perspective than philosophy. Is existentialism now of purely historical interest? Certainly, there has been no great existentialist figure since the death of Sartre in and de Beauvoir shortly after, but existential literature and film continue to flourish, for example," Taxi Driver", "Blade Runner" and " Fight Club", though on the whole existentialism has given way to fashionable postmodernism, which exhibits similarities particularly in relation to the relativity of morality. Philosophy on life is often attributed to ontology, the study of being. There are many ways to consider why we are alive. One major example is Existentialism, which was a movement in the s that was prevalent into the mid s until structuralism

took over. There are still many Existentialists today. The most basic sentence that summarizes the foundation upon which existential thought is placed is, "Human action dictates essence. A student is only a student as long as he or she does student-like things such as studying. Notice the emphasis on human action. This is because other objects, such as a table, or sentient beings, such as a cat, do not have the capacity to act in such a way that they give consent to act. A cat has no choice in the matter of action; its impulses drive it to act a certain way and it will never stop being a cat. Humans, however, have the freedom of choosing their actions, which gives rise to the phrase "humans are condemned to freedom". Thus is one example of the nature of life or "existence", in this case. It is up to you to choose one to which to adhere.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND EXISTENTIALISM WALTER CERF 1. Introduction. The two most antagonistic schoExistentialism and Logical Positivism.*

Both the ontology and manner of human existence are of concern to existentialism. Ontic structure of human existence The fundamental characteristic of existentialist ontology is the primacy that study of the nature of existence gives to the concept of possibility. That priority dominated the philosophy of Kierkegaard and also was amply utilized by Husserl, who had explicitly affirmed the ontological priority of possibility over reality. Possibility, however, is not understood by the existentialists in the purely logical sense as absence of contradiction nor in the traditional metaphysical sense as potentiality destined to become actuality but, rather, in the sense of ontic or objective possibility, which is the very structure of human existence. It is thus the specific modality of the being of humans. The future is its fundamental temporal dimension, to which the present and the past are subordinate and secondary; existence is always stretched out toward the future. As possibility, existence is also transcendence, being beyond, because all of its constitutive possibilities organize it beyond itself toward the other beings of the world and toward the world in its totality. To existence, Heidegger contrasted the presence of the things in the worldâ€”a presence that assumes, as the individual takes notice of such things for his needs, the aspect of utilizability. But utilizability is not a simple quality of things; it is their very being. According to Jaspers, over against the existence of the possible humanity, Dasein stands the world as the infinite horizon that encompasses within itself each possible existence and, therefore, cannot itself be encompassed by any one of them. It is a world that is a reality of fact, at the origin of which there is a Being that is pure transcendence and that, therefore, never reveals itself. Similarly, the religious forms of existentialism insist on transcendence, considering it to be the property of the Being that is beyond the existential possibilities and that can enter among them solely under the form of mystery Marcel and of the extratemporal revelation of faith Barth, Jaspers. Marcel, in that regard, contrasted Being, which is a mystery, with having, which is the condition of humans in the world. That is to say, the individual has objects before him that are foreign to his subjectivity. He tries to organize them and discover the bond that ties them together so as to control and use them. In all such doctrines, there is the dominating theme of the contrast between the modality proper to existence, which is possibility, and the modality proper to Being, which is reality or facticity. As a result of that contrast, existence as possibility appears as the nothingness of Being, as the negation of every reality of fact. In a brief but famous work, *Was ist Metaphysik?* In truth, Nothingness is, for the existentialists, possible existence, as the negation of the reality of fact. The same is true of value, which is such insofar as it does not exist. For even when value occurs or is perceived in certain acts, it lies beyond them and constitutes the limit or the goal toward which they aim. Analogously, knowledge, in which the object the in-itself presents itself to consciousness the for-itself, is a relationship of nullification, because the object cannot be offered to consciousness except as that which is not consciousness. Manner and style of human existence Existentialism is never a solipsism in the proper sense of the term, because every existential possibility relates the individual to things and to other humans. Sometimes it is presented as humanism in the sense that it places human destiny in the hands of humans themselves. But that version is rejected by all of the currents of the movement that, starting with Heidegger, insist on the priority and the initiative of Being with regard to human existence. The opposition between those two points of view depends on how the different existentialists solve the problem of freedom. The individual always finds himself in a situation in which his constitutive possibilities are rooted. For Heidegger and Jaspers, that situation determines the choice that he makes among the possibilities; for Sartre, conversely, the situation is determined by the choice. From the first point of view, every project of life falls back on or is reduced to the situation from which it starts; thus, the possibility of being, of acting, of willing, of choosing is really, as Jaspers pointed out in his *Philosophie*, the impossibility of being, acting, willing, and choosing in a manner different from the way things areâ€”i. From the second point of view, the fundamental project, which is the primordial choice, has no conditions; as Sartre said: In the latter instance, freedom is a kind of damnation. Jaspers affirms, in his turn, that the only choice

offered is that between accepting or rejecting the situation with which one is identified. The rejection of it, however, is a betrayal that plunges one back into the situation itself. Existentialist ontology thus fluctuates between Being and Nothingness and concludes by regarding Nothingness as the only possible revelation of Being. In the cosmological or theological version, it is Being that intervenes, in a way that is more or less mysterious or hidden, to redeem one from Nothingness. Problems of existentialist philosophy The key problems for existentialism are those of the individual himself, of his situation in the world, and of his more ultimate significance. Humanity and human relationships Existentialist anthropology is strictly connected with its ontology. The traditional distinction between mind and body or soul and body is completely eliminated; thus, the body is a lived-through experience that is an integral part of human existence in its relationship with the world. Consciousness, according to Sartre, is constant openness toward the world, a transcendent relationship with other beings and thereby with the in-itself. For the same reasons, the traditional opposition between subject and object, or between the self and the nonself, loses all sense. Dasein is always particular and individual. It is always a self; but it is also always a project of the world that includes the self, determining or conditioning its modes of being. All such modes of being thus arise, as Heidegger showed in his masterpiece *Sein und Zeit ; Being and Time* , from the relationship between the self and the world. Being thrown means, for humans, being abandoned to the whirling flow of things in the world and to their determinism. All of the existentialists are in agreement on the difficulty of communication –i. Jaspers is perhaps the one to insist most on the relationship between truth and communication. Truths are and can be different from existence. But if fanaticism and dogmatism which absolutize a historical truth are avoided on the one hand while relativism and skepticism which affirm the equivalence of all truths are avoided on the other, then the only other way is a constant confrontation between the different truths through an always more extended and deepened intersubjective communication. Sartre, however, denied that there is authentic communication. According to him, consciousness is not only the nullification of things but also the nullification of the other person as other. To look at another person is to make of him a thing. Such is the profound meaning of the myth of Medusa. Sexuality itself, which Sartre held to be an essential aspect of existence, fluctuates between sadism and masochism , in which either the other person or oneself is merely a thing. On that basis, the intersubjective relationship is obviously impossible. The human situation in the world Heidegger pointed to the foundation of the intersubjective relationship in dread. When a person decides to escape from the banality of anonymous existence –which hides the nothingness of existence, or the nonreality of its possibilities, behind the mask of daily concerns –his understanding of that nothingness leads him to choose the only unconditioned and insurmountable possibility that belongs to him: The possibility of death, unlike the possibilities that relate him to other things and to other humans, isolates him. It is a certain possibility, not through its apodictic evidence but because it continuously weighs upon existence. They enable one only to perceive the common destiny to which all humans are subject; and they offer, therefore, the possibility of remaining faithful to that destiny and of freely accepting the necessity that all humans have in common. In that fidelity consists the historicity of existence, which is the repetition of tradition, the return to the possibilities from which existence had earlier been constituted , the wanting for the future what has been in the past. And in that historicity participate not only humans but all of the things of the world, in their utilizability and instrumentality, and even the totality of Nature as the locus of history. Dread , therefore, is not fear in the face of a specific danger. It is rather the emotive understanding of the nullity of the possible, or, as Jaspers said, of the possibility of Nothingness. It has, therefore, a therapeutic function in that it leads human existence to its authenticity. From the fall into factuality into which every project plunges him, the individual can save himself only by projecting not to project –i. The contradiction to which that antithesis leads becomes clear when the same reality is interpreted in terms of possibility: It has been said that a coherent existentialism should avoid the constant mortal leap between Being and Nothingness; should not confuse the problematic character of existence with the fall into factuality; should not confuse the finitude of possibilities with resignation to the situation, choice with determinism, freedom conditioned by the limits of the situation with the acknowledgment of the omnipresent necessity of the Whole. In that inquiry, it is held, existentialism could well benefit from a more attentive consideration of science, which it has viewed only as a preparatory,

imperfect, and objectifying knowledge in comparison with the authentic understanding of Being, which it considers to be a more fundamental mode of the being of humans in the world. Science, it is submitted, offers today the example of an extensive and coherent use of the concept of the possible in the key notions that it employs, especially in those branches that are interdisciplinary—among them such notions as indeterminacy, chance, probability, field, model, project, structure, and conditionality. Some steps in that direction were taken by Abbagnano and by Merleau-Ponty. According to the latter, considerations of probability are rooted in the being of humans, inasmuch as they are situated in the world and invested with the ambiguity of events. Our freedom does not destroy our situation, but is engaged with it. The situation in which we live is open. This implies both that it appeals to modes of privileged resolution and that it is of itself powerless to obtain one of them. From that point of view, there is always a certain freedom in situations, although its degree varies from situation to situation.

Significance of Being and transcendence Among the thinkers most frequently mentioned here, the concept of the necessity of Being prevails as the basis of their metaphysical or theological orientations. Heidegger came more and more to insist on the massive presence of Being in the face of human existence, by attributing to Being all initiative and to humans only the possibility of abandoning themselves to Being and to the things that are the modes of the language of Being. For Heidegger, Being is interpreted better through the etymology of those words that designate the most common things of daily life than through the analysis of existential possibilities. Jaspers saw the revelation of transcendence in ciphers—i. Problems of existentialist theology

Existentialism has a theological dimension. Although Heidegger rejected the label of atheist, he also denied to the Being of which he spoke the essential qualifications of divinity, inasmuch as it is not the ultimate cause and the Good. But Jaspers, in his last writings, emphasized more and more the religious character of faith in transcendence. Faith is the way to withdraw from the world and to resume contact with the Being that is beyond the world. Faith is life itself, in that it returns to the encompassing Whole and allows itself to be guided and fulfilled by it. Jaspers even developed a theology of history. He spoke of an axial age, which he placed between the 8th and 2nd centuries bce, the age in which the great religions and the great philosophers of the Orient arose—Confucius and Laozi, the Upanishads, Buddha, Zoroaster, the great prophets of Israel—and in Greece the age of Homer and of Classical philosophy as well as Thucydides and Archimedes. In that age, for the first time, humans became aware of Being in general, of themselves, and of their limits. The age in which humans now live, that of science and technology, is perhaps the beginning of a new axial age that is the authentic destiny of humans but a destiny that is far off and unimaginable. For Bultmann, the theologian of the demythologization of Christianity, inauthentic existence is tied to the past, to fact, to the world, while authentic existence is open to the future, to the nonfact, to the nonworld—i. Thus, authentic existence is not the self-projection of humans in the world but, rather, the self-projection of humans in the love of and obedience to God. But that self-projection is no longer the work of human freedom; it is the saving event that enters miraculously through faith into the future possibilities of humans. Courtesy of Edward C. Hobbs

In such theological speculations and in others that are comparable, the common presupposition of the existentialists is recognized—i. There is either an acknowledgment of that gap, with existence assuming the role of the demonic the alternative that Sartre and others have all illustrated above all in their literary works, or an acknowledgment of the hidden participation of human existence in Being through a gratuitous initiative on the part of Being. Kierkegaard had earlier distinguished three stages of existence between which there is neither development nor continuity but gaps and jumps: The ethical and religious stages correspond roughly to what Heidegger and Jaspers called, respectively, the inauthenticity and the authenticity of existence. Art was not as a rule recognized by modern existentialists as an autonomous stage; it was almost always for them an essential manifestation of existence itself. For Jaspers, it is a mode of reading in nature, in history, and in humans the cipher of transcendence—i. According to Camus, it is an aspect of human revolt against the world.

Chapter 3 : Logical Positivism and Existentialism - Frederick Charles Copleston - Google Books

In predicate logic, an existential quantification is a type of quantifier, a logical constant which is interpreted as "there exists", "there is at least one", or "for some". Some sources use the term existentialization to refer to existential quantification.

This was his passport to a teaching career. His phenomenological investigation into the imagination was published in and his Theory of Emotions two years later. During the Second World War, Sartre wrote his existentialist magnum opus Being and Nothingness and taught the work of Heidegger in a war camp. Being and Nothingness was published in and Existentialism and Humanism in His study of Baudelaire was published in and that of the actor Jean Genet in In , after three years working on it, Sartre published the Critique of Dialectical Reason. He was a high profile figure in the Peace Movement. In , he turned down the Nobel prize for literature. He was actively involved in the May uprising. In , he claimed no longer to be a Marxist, but his political activity continued until his death in This means that the acts by which consciousness assigns meaning to objects are what is analysed, and that what is sought in the particular examples under examination is their essential structure. Sartre puts his own mark on this view by presenting consciousness as being transparent, i. For Sartre, the task of an eidetic analysis does not deliver something fixed immanent to the phenomenon. It still claims to uncover that which is essential, but thereby recognizes that phenomenal experience is essentially fluid. Emotion originates in a degradation of consciousness faced with a certain situation. Faced with an object which poses an insurmountable problem, the subject attempts to view it differently, as though it were magically transformed. Thus an imminent extreme danger may cause me to faint so that the object of my fear is no longer in my conscious grasp. Or, in the case of wrath against an unmovable obstacle, I may hit it as though the world were such that this action could lead to its removal. In The Psychology of the Imagination, Sartre demonstrates his phenomenological method by using it to take on the traditional view that to imagine something is to have a picture of it in mind. So there is no internal structure to the imagination. It is rather a form of directedness upon the imagined object. Imagining a heffalump is thus of the same nature as perceiving an elephant. Both are spontaneous intentional or directed acts, each with its own type of intentionality. Such a move is not warranted for Sartre, as he explains in The Transcendence of the Ego. Moreover, it leads to the following problems for our phenomenological analysis of consciousness. The ego would have to feature as an object in all states of consciousness. This would result in its obstructing our conscious access to the world. But this would conflict with the direct nature of this conscious access. Correlatively, consciousness would be divided into consciousness of ego and consciousness of the world. This would however be at odds with the simple, and thus undivided, nature of our access to the world through conscious experience. In other words, when I am conscious of a tree, I am directly conscious of it, and am not myself an object of consciousness. Sartre proposes therefore to view the ego as a unity produced by consciousness. In other words, he adds to the Humean picture of the self as a bundle of perceptions, an account of its unity. This unity of the ego is a product of conscious activity. As a result, the traditional Cartesian view that self-consciousness is the consciousness the ego has of itself no longer holds, since the ego is not given but created by consciousness. What model does Sartre propose for our understanding of self-consciousness and the production of the ego through conscious activity? An example of pre-reflective consciousness is the seeing of a house. This type of consciousness is directed to a transcendent object, but this does not involve my focussing upon it, i. For Sartre, this pre-reflective consciousness is thus impersonal: Importantly, Sartre insists that self-consciousness is involved in any such state of consciousness: Reflective consciousness is the type of state of consciousness involved in my looking at a house. In so doing, reflective consciousness takes the pre-reflectively conscious as being mine. By substituting his model of a two-tiered consciousness for this traditional picture, Sartre provides an account of self-consciousness that does not rely upon a pre-existing ego, and shows how an ego is constructed in reflection. Through them, he opposes the view, which is for instance that of the Freudian theory of the unconscious, that there are psychological factors that are beyond the grasp of our consciousness and thus are potential excuses for certain forms of behaviour.

As a result, accounts of agency cannot appeal to a pre-existing ego to explain certain forms of behaviour. Rather, conscious acts are spontaneous, and since all pre-reflective consciousness is transparent to itself, the agent is fully responsible for them and a fortiori for his ego. In the case of the imaginary, the traditional view of the power of fancy to overcome rational thought is replaced by one of imaginary consciousness as a form of pre-reflective consciousness. As such, it is therefore again the result of the spontaneity of consciousness and involves self-conscious states of mind. To dispel the apparent counter-intuitiveness of the claims that emotional states and flights of imagination are active, and thus to provide an account that does justice to the phenomenology of these states, spontaneity must be clearly distinguished from a voluntary act. A voluntary act involves reflective consciousness that is connected with the will; spontaneity is a feature of pre-reflective consciousness. Thus, in his "Letter on Humanism", Heidegger reminds us that the analysis of Dasein is only one chapter in the enquiry into the question of Being. Sartre sets up his own picture of the individual human being by first getting rid of its grounding in a stable ego. As Sartre later puts it in *Existentialism is a Humanism*, to be human is characterised by an existence that precedes its essence. Let us now examine the central themes of this theory as they are presented in *Being and Nothingness*. The *Ontology of Being and Nothingness* Being and Nothingness can be characterized as a phenomenological investigation into the nature of what it is to be human, and thus be seen as a continuation of, and expansion upon, themes characterising the early works. In contrast with these however, an ontology is presented at the outset and guides the whole development of the investigation. One of the main features of this system, which Sartre presents in the introduction and the first chapter of Part One, is a distinction between two kinds of transcendence of the phenomenon of being. The first is the transcendence of being and the second that of consciousness. This means that, starting with the phenomenon that which is our conscious experience, there are two types of reality which lie beyond it, and are thus trans-phenomenal. On the one hand, there is the being of the object of consciousness, and on the other, that of consciousness itself. These define two types of being, the in-itself and the for-itself. To bring out that which keeps them apart, involves understanding the phenomenology of nothingness. This reveals consciousness as essentially characterisable through its power of negation, a power which plays a key role in our existential condition. Let us examine these points in more detail. The *Being of the Phenomenon and Consciousness* In *Being and Time*, Heidegger presents the phenomenon as involving both a covering and a disclosing of being. For Sartre, the phenomenon reveals, rather than conceals, reality. What is the status of this reality? Sartre considers the phenomenalist option of viewing the world as a construct based upon the series of appearances. He points out that the being of the phenomenon is not like its essence, i. Just as the being of the phenomenon transcends the phenomenon of being, consciousness also transcends it. Sartre thus establishes that if there is perceiving, there must be a consciousness doing the perceiving. How are these two transphenomenal forms of being related? As opposed to a conceptualising consciousness in a relation of knowledge to an object, as in Husserl and the epistemological tradition he inherits, Sartre introduces a relation of being: It differs from the latter in two essential respects. First, it is not a practical relation, and thus distinct from a relation to the ready-to-hand. Rather, it is simply given by consciousness. Second, it does not lead to any further question of Being. For Sartre, all there is to being is given in the transphenomenality of existing objects, and there is no further issue of the Being of all beings as for Heidegger. *Two Types of Being* As we have seen, both consciousness and the being of the phenomenon transcend the phenomenon of being. It exists in a fully determinate and non-relational way. This fully characterizes its transcendence of the conscious experience. In contrast with the in-itself, the for-itself is mainly characterised by a lack of identity with itself. This is a consequence of the following. It has no nature beyond this and is thus completely translucent. Insofar as the for-itself always transcends the particular conscious experience because of the spontaneity of consciousness, any attempt to grasp it within a conscious experience is doomed to failure. Indeed, as we have already seen in the distinction between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, a conscious grasp of the first transforms it. This means that it is not possible to identify the for-itself, since the most basic form of identification, i. This picture is clearly one in which the problematic region of being is that of the for-itself, and that is what *Being and Nothingness* will focus upon. But at the same time, another important question arises. Indeed, insofar Sartre has rejected the notion of a

grounding of all beings in Being, one may ask how something like a relation of being between consciousness and the world is possible. This issue translates in terms of understanding the meaning of the totality formed by the for-itself and the in-itself and its division into these two regions of being. By addressing this latter issue, Sartre finds the key concept that enables him to investigate the nature of the for-itself. The nothingness in question is also not simply the result of applying a logical operator, negation, to a proposition. The first is a purely logical construction that reveals nothing about the world, while the second does. Sartre says it points to an objective fact. However, this objective fact is not simply given independently of human beings. Rather, it is produced by consciousness. Thus Sartre considers the phenomenon of destruction. When an earthquake brings about a landslide, it modifies the terrain.

Chapter 4 : logical positivism - Is existentialism philosophy? - Philosophy Stack Exchange

Existentialism (/ ɛkzɪˈstɛnʃiəlɪzəm /) is a tradition of philosophical inquiry associated mainly with certain 19th and 20th-century European philosophers who, despite profound doctrinal differences, shared the belief that philosophical thinking begins with the human subject—“not merely the thinking subject, but the acting, feeling, living human individual.

Back to Top Logical Positivism later also known as Logical Empiricism is a theory in Epistemology and Logic that developed out of Positivism and the early Analytic Philosophy movement, and which campaigned for a systematic reduction of all human knowledge to logical and scientific foundations. Thus, a statement is meaningful only if it is either purely formal essentially, mathematics and logic or capable of empirical verification. This effectively resulted in an almost complete rejection by Logical Positivists of Metaphysics and to a large extent Ethics on the grounds that it is unverifiable. Its influence in 20th Century Epistemology and Philosophy of Science , however, has been profound. Most early Logical Positivists asserted that all knowledge is based on logical inference from simple "protocol sentences" grounded in observable facts. They supported forms of Materialism , Naturalism and Empiricism , and, in particular, they strongly supported the verifiability criterion of meaning Verificationism , the doctrine that a proposition is only cognitively meaningful if it can be definitively and conclusively determined to be either true or false. Logical Positivism was also committed to the idea of "Unified Science", or the development of a common language in which all scientific propositions can be expressed, usually by means of various "reductions" or "explications" of the terms of one science to the terms of another putatively more fundamental one. The main tenets of the doctrine include: The opposition to all Metaphysics , especially ontology the study of reality and the nature of being , not as necessarily wrong but as having no meaning. The rejection of synthetic a priori propositions e. The idea that all knowledge should be codifiable in a single standard language of science, and the associated ongoing project of "rational reconstruction", in which ordinary-language concepts were gradually to be replaced by more precise equivalents in that standard language. Logical Positivism in Germany rose in response to the Metaphysics of Georg Hegel , which was the dominant philosophical view in Germany at the time, particularly the rejection of his concept of metaphysical entities that did not have any empirical basis. It grew from the discussions of the so-called "Vienna Circle" of Moritz Schlick - in the early 20th Century. A pamphlet jointly written by Otto Neurath - , Hans Hahn - and Rudolf Carnap - brought together some of the major proponents of the movement and summarized the doctrines of the Vienna Circle at that time. The contemporaneous Berlin Circle of Hans Reichenbach - also propagated the new doctrines more widely in the s and early s. Ayer is considered responsible for the spread of Logical Positivism to Britain, and his book "Language, Truth and Logic" was very influential. Developments in logic and the foundations of mathematics, especially in the "Principia Mathematica" by the British philosophers Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead , particularly impressed the more mathematically-minded Logical Positivists. Logical Positivism was essential to the development of early Analytic Philosophy , with which it effectively merged. Criticisms of Logical Positivism Back to Top There were many internal arguments within the Logical Positivism movement, which in reality was only ever a loose collective of philosophers holding a wide range of beliefs on many matters, although with certain principles in common. Karl Popper - disagreed with the logical positivist position that metaphysical statements must be meaningless, and further argued that a metaphysical statement can change its unfalsifiable status over time - what may be "unfalsifiable" in one century may become "falsifiable" and thus "scientific" in another. Ayer responded to the charge of unverifiability by claiming that, although almost any statement except a tautology or logical truth is unverifiable in the strong sense, there is a weak sense of verifiability in which a proposition is verifiable if it is possible for experience to render it probable. This defense, however, was controversial among Logical Positivists, some of whom stuck to strong verification, and insisted that general propositions were indeed nonsense. Hilary Putnam - has argued that making a distinction between "observational" and "theoretical" is meaningless. Quine has criticized the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and the reduction of meaningful statements to

immediate experience. Thomas Kuhn - has argued that it is just not possible to provide truth conditions for science, independent of its historical paradigm.

Chapter 5 : Syllogistic Fallacies: Existential Fallacy

Existential Fallacy (also known as: existential instantiation) Description: A formal logical fallacy, which is committed when a categorical syllogism employs two universal premises ("all") to arrive at a particular ("some") conclusion.

As an atheism, Sartre demands that we completely abandon the traditional notion of human beings as the carefully designed artifacts of a divine creator. There is no abstract nature that one is destined to fill. Instead, each of us simply is in the world; what we will be is then entirely up to us. But my exercise of this capacity inevitably makes me totally responsible for the life I choose. Since I could always have chosen some other path in life, the one I follow is my own. Since nothing has been imposed on me from outside, there are no excuses for what I am. Since the choices I make are ones I deem best, they constitute my proposal for what any human being ought to be. Responsibility But accepting such total responsibility entails a profound alteration of my attitude towards life. Sharing in the awesome business of determining the future development of humanity generally through the particular decisions I make for myself produces an overwhelming sense of anguish. Moreover, since there is no external authority to which I can turn in an effort to escape my duty in this regard, I am bound to feel abandonment as well. Finally, since I repeatedly experience evidence that my own powers are inadequate to the task, I am driven to despair. There can be no relief, no help, no hope. Human life demands total commitment to a path whose significance will always remain open to doubt. Although this account of human life is thoroughly subjective, that does not reduce the importance of moral judgment. Indeed, Sartre maintained that only this account does justice to the fundamental dignity and value of human life. Since all of us share in the same situation, we must embrace our awesome freedom, deliberately rejecting any false promise of authoritative moral determination. Even when we choose to seek or accept advice about what to do, we remain ourselves responsible for choosing which advice to accept. Making a moral decision is an act of creation, like the creation of a work of art; nothing about it is predetermined, so its value lies wholly within itself. Nor does this mean that it is impossible to make mistakes. Although there can be no objective failure to meet external standards, an individual human being can choose badly. When that happens, it is not that I have betrayed my abstract essence, but rather that I have failed to keep faith with myself. Self-deception invariably involves an attempt to evade responsibility for myself. If, for example, I attribute undesirable thoughts and actions to the influence upon me of the subconscious or unconscious, I have made part of myself into an "other" that I then suppose to control the real me. Thus, using psychological theory to distinguish between a "good I" and a "bad me" only serves to perpetuate my evasion of responsibility and its concomitants. Sartre offered practical examples of *mauvaise foi* bad faith in action. Focussing exclusively on what-we-might-become is a handy though self-deceptive way of overlooking the truth about what-we-are. Similarly, servers who extravagantly "play at" performing their roles illustrate the tendency to embrace an externally-determined essence, an artificial expectation about what we ought-to-be. But once again, of course, the cost is losing what we uniquely are in fact. In our relationships with other human beings, what we truly are is all that counts, yet it is precisely here that we most often betray ourselves by trying to be whatever the other person expects us to be. Only in the true-to-life moment of someone facing up to the immanence of his own death will the nature of human life be revealed. Pablo fully experiences his own weakness in the face of death. But then his captors offer him the choice of saving himself by betraying his comrade. Now he must decide whether to defend the great cause or to live. After sweating it out, he chooses to give the authorities a phony story, knowing that it will guarantee his death. But the tables are turned when the lie turns out to be true. Here are all of the consequences of human responsibility: This, Sartre believed, is the character of human life.

Chapter 6 : Existentialism - Wikipedia

Logical Positivism and Existentialism WALTER CERF Brooklyn College, Brooklyn I - *SCIENCISM AND HuMANISM IN PHILOSOPHY. II - Is A DECISIÃO POSSIBLE BETWEEN SciENCISM AND HÅ¼MANISM?*

Varieties of ontological dependence A crucial notion in metaphysics is that of one entity depending for its existence upon another entity – not in a merely causal sense, but in a deeper, ontological sense. The kind of dependence in question must also be distinguished from any kind of logical dependence, because logical relations, strictly speaking, can obtain only between propositions, not between concrete objects, nor between abstract objects that are not propositional in nature. We should also distinguish ontological dependence, broadly conceived, from what is usually considered a stricter type of metaphysical dependence, namely metaphysical grounding. It is not uncommon to see the notion of ontological dependence used in a rather coarse-grained manner, given that it encompasses a family of relations. For instance, we often see claims such as: The type of dependence in question is rigid existential dependence, to be clarified in a moment. In fact, there is another sense of dependence at work in 1 as well, namely identity-dependence, but we will return to this example later on. In 2 , we seem to have in mind a more general kind of dependence: So existence of electricity depends on the existence of a very specific kind of particle, the electron. This second type of dependence is also existential, but to separate it from the rigid dependence in 1 , we may call it generic existential dependence. In 3 we are instead referring to the ontological independence of God. Presumably, God does not depend for her existence on anything, by her very nature. In other words, it is part of the essence of God that she is ontologically self-sufficient. We might call this essential independence, in contrast to essential dependence. A family of notions is beginning to emerge. However, we should formulate each notion somewhat more precisely. The first thing to note in defining ontological dependence is the modal-existential element in dependence claims. So there is a sense in which the existence of a set necessitates the existence of its members. Indeed, it is common to talk about, e. Typically, statements of ontological dependence are thought to refer to metaphysical modality rather than, say, conceptual or logical modality , primarily because they concern matters that are broader than just conceptual or logical; the ontological independence of God being a case in point. Besides God, substances are often considered to be entities that do not depend for their existence upon anything else. For example, Descartes asserts that by substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: The modal-existential analysis of dependence In this section we will focus on the modal-existential analysis of ontological dependence, which has until recently dominated the discussion. We will return to essential dependence later on. Let us start from 1 ; how should this relationship of existential dependence be defined? An obvious proposal would be to say, quite simply: Because there is no flexibility here: It could not be something a little bit like y, something falling roughly in the same category, for instance; it must be y. We have mentioned one example of rigid existential dependence, namely, sets ontologically depending on their members more precisely, a set depends rigidly on the very members it has, i. Another, although more controversial, example is a particular person depending for her existence on her parents, or, more precisely, on the particular sperm and egg that she originates from. This example is of course related to the essentiality of origin as discussed in Kripke We can express EDR in a more compact manner by resorting to further formalization the following notation is used e. Following this notation, we can formalize rigid existential dependence as follows: Note that EDR , somewhat controversially, implies that everything dependsR for its existence upon itself. We can quite naturally contrast rigid existential dependence as defined by EDR with what might appropriately be called non-rigid existential dependence, defined as follows: So, for example, it might be said that a material object x dependsN for its existence upon the matter composing x, even though it might have been composed of different matter, because in every possible world in which x exists the matter composing x in that world exists in that world. On the face of it, EDR seems to capture precisely one strongly intuitive notion of existential dependence. For example, when it is said that a particular event, such as the assassination of Caesar, depends for its existence upon Caesar, EDR seems to explicate this

appropriately in terms of the fact that the assassination could not have existed if Caesar had not existed to be assassinated. Some other assassination, we may suppose, could have existed at that very time and place, but for that very assassination to have existed, Caesar himself had to exist. However, there are clearly cases in which EDR fails to capture the intuitive sense of dependence at hand. Consider a living organism. A living organism would appear to depend for its existence upon its parts, such as cells. But we also know that a living organism may survive a change of any of its cells, provided that the change is effected in a non-disruptive manner. It is true, of course, that such an organism must have parts such as cells if it is to exist, but which objects those parts are is inessential—and consequently it is not the case that it depends for its existence, in the sense defined by EDR, upon any one of those parts. But it is possible to define another sense of existential dependence in which it is true to say that a composite object depends for its existence upon its proper parts; a generic notion of existential dependence, defined as follows: The important difference between the rigid and the generic cases is that EDR refers to a specific object whereas EDG only requires that at least some Fs exist. More precisely, we could say that electricity depends for its existence upon electrons. We would now have the tools to formalize most of the mentioned examples, but note that there are cases where further tools are required. This looks like a case of rigid existential dependence, but it is clear that once *z* has been born, her parents can go out of existence without any effect on her own existence. At that point, there is only past rigid existential dependence. For cases such as this, we would require temporally relativized versions of EDN and EDG, but we will omit these complications here see Thomasson Note, incidentally, that generic existential dependence as defined by EDG above is very close to a pluralised form of non-rigid existential dependence, as defined by EDN. We could call this plural non-rigid existential dependence, definable as follows: What could be a plausible example of an essential property of an individual object, say, Socrates? Let us assume that properties are to be conceived of as property instances, such as the particular redness of a certain apple. Of course, an apple can change its colour, so that this is not an example of an essential property of the apple. But what about—in the case of Socrates—his humanity as it were, his particular being human? Certainly, if there is such a thing as the particular humanity of Socrates, he cannot lose it without ceasing to exist. Properties are commonly said to depend for their existence upon the entities that possess them. One might propose to state this in the form of a principle, with the help of EDR, as follows: Note that PROP-NEC is not intended to apply to properties understood as universals, but only to particularized properties otherwise variously known as property instances, individual accidents, tropes, or modes. These are items exactly like the particular redness of a particular apple mentioned above, conceived of as an object distinct from the redness of any other apple, no matter how well matched in colour to the first. Actually, PROP-NEC itself does not quite imply this, although it does imply that a particularized property cannot migrate from one object to another when the first object ceases to exist. But it would require a further argument to say, quite generally, that wherever items *x* and *y* are mutually existentially dependent as defined by EDR, they are identical. For instance, consider the relationship between Socrates and the temporally extended event or process that was his life. And yet there are things true of the life of Socrates that are not true of him and vice versa for example, that it was so many years long, and that he weighed so many pounds—so there is no question of their being identical. But it could be disputed whether Socrates is existentially dependent upon his life—whether he necessarily would not have existed if it had not—for it may be urged that he might have had or led a different life. Now, it is true enough that his life might have been qualitatively different in many ways, but what is currently at issue is whether he might have had a numerically different life—and it is hard, perhaps, to see how he could. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Socrates could have had a numerically different life: Other possible worlds clearly do contain lives that do not exist in the actual world, insofar as they contain people who do not exist in the actual world: It seems thus that there are certain difficult questions which the modal-existential analysis may not fully address, at least not in the form that we have presented it until now. We will continue to discuss these issues in sections 3 and 4. Asymmetrical existential dependence Where does the above analysis of existential dependence lead us? But this implication does not seem to be acceptable in every context. Take, again, the relationship between Socrates and his life. According to EDR, Socrates is quite as much existentially dependent upon his life as his life is upon him. Plausibly, two distinct states of affairs cannot explain each

other. There may, quite conceivably, be self-explanatory states of affairs, so we should only want to urge that non-identical states of affairs cannot be mutually explanatory. The asymmetry of explanation is, of course, intimately related to the unacceptability of circular arguments. It is also closely linked to recent discussions regarding metaphysical grounding, to which we will return later, in section 5. One upshot of all this is that, for the purpose of defining ontologically independent existents if there are any, EDR should be replaced, at least to a first approximation, by something like: Thus EDX is quite unlike EDG in its implications for part-whole dependence relations, as far as composite objects are concerned. Indeed, we may take it that the definiens of EDX entails the definiens of EDR “although not vice versa, of course” so that the following is a principle that one could accept: There are perhaps two sources of worry here: Some of these worries can perhaps be allayed by resorting to the recent work on metaphysical grounding, which presents a much more rigorous analysis of non-causal, metaphysical explanation of this type see especially the articles in Correia and Schnieder eds. So we should perhaps accept that EDX as it stands does not really constitute a satisfactory definition of a species of existential dependence, conceived as an objective metaphysical relation between entities, because it is insufficiently perspicuous. This is to allow that in principle an object may, in the anticipated sense, depend ontologically upon itself. As we shall see in a moment, a relation that may be of some assistance in spelling out the relevant sense of dependence is the relation of identity-dependence, to be explained below. But first we should digress for a moment to note that the one-sided holding of the relation defined by EDR is unlikely to do the job. According to this suggestion, we have: Notice that the relation thus defined is asymmetric rather than antisymmetric: One might think that this is at it should be, as on the face of it the idea of something existentially depending on itself appears very strange. There is of course an obvious theological candidate that may violate this condition, namely God, so perhaps we should not rule out the possibility outright. But there may be slightly less controversial candidates as well, for it could be suggested that there are fundamental entities that existentially depend on themselves rather than on nothing. At any rate, if anything of the sort is possible, we better not rule it out by definition, as EDA does. For neither Socrates nor his life is existentially dependent^A on the other, since in neither case is clause ii of EDA satisfied. Until quite recently, it was common to think that ontological dependence can be fully characterized in modal-existential terms, as we have seen above. However, this is not to suggest that Aristotle did not rely on the modal-existential notion of ontological dependence.

Chapter 7 : Logical Positivism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

logic is free from existential commitment is so ingrained in the contemporary understanding of logic, that it is hard to see how it couldâ€”relevantly and soberlyâ€”be challenged.”¹ The main job of this paper is to make clear how the idea that logic is free from existential commitment can be relevantly and soberly challenged.

He rarely left his hometown of Copenhagen, and travelled abroad only five timesâ€”four times to Berlin and once to Sweden. His prime recreational activities were attending the theatre, walking the streets of Copenhagen to chat with ordinary people, and taking brief carriage jaunts into the surrounding countryside. His teachers at the university included F. Martensen also had a profound effect on Kierkegaard, but largely in a negative manner. Kierkegaard regarded Martensen as one of his chief intellectual rivals. Martensen was only five years his senior, but was already lecturing at Copenhagen University when Kierkegaard was a student there. Heiberg, more than any other person, was responsible for introducing Hegelianism into Denmark. Kierkegaard spent a good deal of energy trying to break into the Heiberg literary circle, but desisted once he had found his own voice in *The Concept of Irony*. Much of the thrust of his critique of Hegelianism is that its system of thought is abstracted from the everyday lives of its proponents. This existential critique consists in demonstrating how the life and work of a philosopher contradict one another. Kierkegaard derived this form of critique from the Greek notion of judging philosophers by their lives rather than simply by their intellectual artefacts. Because of his existentialist orientation, most of his interventions in contemporary theory do double duty as means of working through events from his own life. His mother does not rate a direct mention in his published works, or in his diariesâ€”not even on the day she died. However, for a writer who places so much emphasis on indirect communication, and on the semiotics of invisibility, we should regard this absence as significant. Kierkegaard was deeply enamoured of the Danish language and worked throughout his writings to assert the strengths of his mother-tongue over the invasive, imperialistic influences of Latin and German. With respect to the former, Kierkegaard had to petition the king to be allowed to write his philosophy dissertation *On the Concept of Irony* with constant reference to Socrates in Danish. Even though permission was granted he was still required to defend his dissertation publicly in Latin. Latin had been the pan-European language of science and scholarship. In *Repetition*, the character and pseudonymous author Constantin Constantius congratulates the Danish language on providing the word for an important new philosophical concept, viz. This may explain the sense of urgency that drove Kierkegaard to write so prolifically in the years leading up to his 34th birthday. The breaking of the engagement allowed Kierkegaard to devote himself monastically to his religious purpose, as well as to establish his outsider status outside the norm of married bourgeois life. It also freed him from close personal entanglements with women, thereby leading him to objectify them as ideal creatures, and to reproduce the patriarchal values of his church and father. The latter included viewing women in terms of their traditional social roles, particularly as mothers and wives, but also in their traditional spiritual roles as epitomes of devotion and self-sacrifice. This problem was compounded by the fact that Denmark had recently and very rapidly been transformed from a feudal society into a capitalist society. Given this problematic in this social context Kierkegaard perceived a need to invent a form of communication which would not produce stereotyped identities. On the contrary, he needed a form of rhetoric which would force people back onto their own resources, to take responsibility for their own existential choices, and to become who they are beyond their socially imposed identities. In this undertaking Kierkegaard was inspired by the figure of Socrates, whose incessant irony undermined all knowledge claims that were taken for granted or unreflectively inherited from traditional culture. In his dissertation *On the Concept of Irony* with constant reference to Socrates Kierkegaard argued that the historical Socrates used his irony in order to facilitate the birth of subjectivity in his interlocutors. Kierkegaard sought to provide a similar service for his own contemporaries. He used irony, parody, satire, humor, and deconstructive techniques in order to make conventionally accepted forms of knowledge and value untenable. He was a gadflyâ€”constantly irritating his contemporaries with discomfiting thoughts. He was also a midwifeâ€”assisting at the birth of individual subjectivity by forcing his contemporaries to develop an inner life through critical self-reflection. Hegelianism

promised to make absolute knowledge available by virtue of a science of logic. Kierkegaard thought this to be the hubristic attempt to build a new tower of Babel, or a scala paradisi—a dialectical ladder by which humans can climb with ease up to heaven. Instead of seeing scientific knowledge as the means of human redemption, he regarded it as the greatest obstacle to redemption. Instead of seeking to give people more knowledge he sought to take away what passed for knowledge. Instead of seeking to make God and Christian faith perfectly intelligible he sought to emphasize the absolute transcendence by God of all human categories. Instead of setting himself up as a religious authority, Kierkegaard used a vast array of textual devices to undermine his authority as an author and to place responsibility for the existential significance to be derived from his texts squarely on the reader. Kierkegaard distanced himself from his texts by a variety of devices which served to problematize the authorial voice for the reader. He used pseudonyms in many of his works both overtly aesthetic ones and overtly religious ones. He partitioned the texts into prefaces, forewords, interludes, postscripts, appendices. Sometimes Kierkegaard appended his name as author, sometimes as the person responsible for publication, sometimes not at all. Sometimes Kierkegaard would publish more than one book on the same day. These simultaneous books embodied strikingly contrasting perspectives. He also published whole series of works simultaneously, viz. All of this play with narrative point of view, with contrasting works, and with contrasting internal partitions within individual works leaves the reader very disoriented. Christian faith, for Kierkegaard, is not a matter of learning dogma by rote. This belief is offensive to reason, since it only exists in the face of the absurd the paradox of the eternal, immortal, infinite God being incarnated in time as a finite mortal. These works fall into three genres: The point of indirect communication is to position the reader to relate to the truth with appropriate passion, rather than to communicate the truth as such. It draws on irony, the comic and is high-spirited, in order to get thoughts into motion prior to action. A deliberation is a weighing-up, as a propaedeutic to action. It seeks to build up the faith that it presupposes. Kierkegaard published many of his Edifying Discourses in short collections to accompany particular pseudonymous texts, then later published them again in larger collections. These are particularly intimate addresses to the sincere Christian, who strives to deepen the subjective passion of faith through confession and through acceptance of divine forgiveness. This was aimed at subverting our focus on worldly goals in order to refocus on other-worldly goals. Our struggle to accept divine forgiveness can become mired in despair, including the second-order despair over the impossibility of forgiveness of our sins and the demonic despair of defiance in which we refuse to accept forgiveness. The first is the aesthetic, which gives way to the ethical, which gives way to the religious. The aesthetic stage of existence is characterized by the following: The figure of the aesthete in *Either-Or Part One* is an ironic portrayal of German romanticism, but it also draws on medieval characters as diverse as Don Juan, Ahasuerus, and Faust. Johannes the seducer is a reflective aesthete, who gains sensuous delight not so much from the act of seduction but from engineering the possibility of seduction. His real aim is the manipulation of people and situations in ways which generate interesting reflections in his own voyeuristic mind. The aesthetic perspective transforms quotidian dullness into a richly poetic world by whatever means it can. That is, the aesthete uses artifice, arbitrariness, irony, and wilful imagination to recreate the world in his own image. The prime motivation for the aesthete is the transformation of the boring into the interesting. This type of aestheticism is criticized from the point of view of ethics. It is seen to be empty self-serving and escapist. It is a despairing means of avoiding commitment and responsibility. And it is self-deceiving insofar as it substitutes fantasies for actual states of affairs. But Kierkegaard did not want to abandon aesthetics altogether in favor of the ethical and the religious. As far as the aesthetic stage of existence is concerned what is preserved in the higher religious stage is the sense of infinite possibility made available through the imagination. But this no longer excludes what is actual. Nor is it employed for egotistic ends. Aesthetic irony is transformed into religious humor, and the aesthetic transfiguration of the actual world into the ideal is transformed into the religious transubstantiation of the finite world into an actual reconciliation with the infinite. Language and all other media of representation belong to the realm of the ideal. No matter how eloquent or evocative language is it can never be the actual. Therefore, any representation of faith is always suspended in the realm of ideality and can never be actual faith. In fact Johannes Climacus acknowledges this implicitly when at the end of *Concluding Unscientific*

Postscript he revokes everything he has said, with the important rider that to say something then to revoke it is not the same as never having said it in the first place. His presentation of religious faith in an aesthetic medium at least provides an opportunity for his readers to make their own leap of faith, by appropriating with inward passion the paradoxical religion of Christianity into their own lives. These works include those by Anti-Climacus, who represents the Christian point of view par excellence, beyond where Kierkegaard placed himself. Kierkegaard also used many biblical figures and stories with poignant and striking effect in the religious writings he published under his own name. As a poet of the religious Kierkegaard was always preoccupied with aesthetics. In fact, contrary to popular misconceptions of Kierkegaard which represent him as becoming increasingly hostile to poetry, he increasingly referred to himself as a poet in his later years all but one of over ninety references to himself as a poet in his journals date from after Kierkegaard never claimed to write with religious authority, as an apostle. His works represent both less religiously enlightened and more religiously enlightened positions than he thought he had attained in his own existence. Such representations were only possible in an aesthetic medium of imagined possibilities like poetry. It is used to denote both: These social norms are used as reasons to make sense of, or justify, an action within a community. Even human sacrifice is justified in terms of how it serves the community, so that when Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia he is regarded as a tragic hero since his community understands that the sacrifice is required by the gods for the success of the Greek expedition to Troy Fear and Trembling. Kierkegaard, however, recognizes duties that cannot be justified in terms of social norms. That is, Abraham recognizes a duty to something higher than both his social duty not to kill an innocent person and his personal commitment to his beloved son, viz. However, he cannot give an intelligible ethical justification of his act to the community in terms of social norms, but must simply obey the divine command. In order to raise oneself beyond the merely aesthetic life, which is a life of drifting in imagination, possibility and sensation, one needs to make a commitment. That is, the aesthete needs to choose the ethical, which entails a commitment to communication and decision procedures. The metaethics or normative ethics are cognitivist, laying down various necessary conditions for ethically correct action. The choice of metaethics, however, is noncognitive. There is no adequate proof of the truth of metaethics. The choice of normative ethics is motivated, but in a noncognitive way. The Judge seeks to motivate the choice of his normative ethics through the avoidance of despair.

Existentialism. The general concern of existentialism is to give an account of what it is like to exist as a human being in the world. Epistemologically, it is denied that there can be an absolutely objective description of the world as it is without the intervention of human interests and actions.

Existence precedes essence Sartre claimed that a central proposition of Existentialism is that existence precedes essence, which means that the most important consideration for individuals is that they are individuals— independently acting and responsible, conscious beings "existence" —rather than what labels, roles, stereotypes, definitions, or other preconceived categories the individuals fit "essence". The actual life of the individuals is what constitutes what could be called their "true essence" instead of there being an arbitrarily attributed essence others use to define them. Thus, human beings, through their own consciousness, create their own values and determine a meaning to their life. His form must be just as manifold as are the opposites that he holds together. The systematic eins, zwei, drei is an abstract form that also must inevitably run into trouble whenever it is to be applied to the concrete. To the same degree as the subjective thinker is concrete, to the same degree his form must also be concretely dialectical. But just as he himself is not a poet, not an ethicist, not a dialectician, so also his form is none of these directly. His form must first and last be related to existence, and in this regard he must have at his disposal the poetic, the ethical, the dialectical, the religious. Subordinate character, setting, etc. The setting is not the fairyland of the imagination, where poetry produces consummation, nor is the setting laid in England, and historical accuracy is not a concern. The setting is inwardness in existing as a human being; the concretion is the relation of the existence-categories to one another. Historical accuracy and historical actuality are breadth. Instead, the phrase should be taken to say that people are 1 defined only insofar as they act and 2 that they are responsible for their actions. For example, someone who acts cruelly towards other people is, by that act, defined as a cruel person. Furthermore, by this action of cruelty, such persons are themselves responsible for their new identity cruel persons. This is as opposed to their genes, or human nature, bearing the blame. As Sartre says in his lecture Existentialism is a Humanism: The more positive, therapeutic aspect of this is also implied: A person can choose to act in a different way, and to be a good person instead of a cruel person. In a set of letters, Heidegger implies that Sartre misunderstood him for his own purposes of subjectivism, and that he did not mean that actions take precedence over being so long as those actions were not reflected upon. This way of living, Heidegger called "average everydayness". Absurdism The notion of the Absurd contains the idea that there is no meaning in the world beyond what meaning we give it. This meaninglessness also encompasses the amorality or "unfairness" of the world. According to Albert Camus, the world or the human being is not in itself absurd. The concept only emerges through the juxtaposition of the two, where life becomes absurd due to the incompatibility between human beings and the world they inhabit. These are considered absurd since they issue from human freedom, undermining their foundation outside of themselves. The notion of the Absurd has been prominent in literature throughout history. It is in relation to the concept of the devastating awareness of meaninglessness that Albert Camus claimed that "there is only one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide" in his *The Myth of Sisyphus*. The possibility of having everything meaningful break down poses a threat of quietism, which is inherently against the existentialist philosophy. The ultimate hero of absurdism lives without meaning and faces suicide without succumbing to it. Facticity Facticity is a concept defined by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* as the in-itself, which delineates for humans the modalities of being and not being. This can be more easily understood when considering facticity in relation to the temporal dimension of our past: As an example, consider two men, one of whom has no memory of his past and the other who remembers everything. They both have committed many crimes, but the first man, knowing nothing about this, leads a rather normal life while the second man, feeling trapped by his own past, continues a life of crime, blaming his own past for "trapping" him in this life. There is nothing essential about his committing crimes, but he ascribes this meaning to his past. Another aspect of facticity is that it entails angst, both in the sense that freedom "produces" angst when limited by facticity, and in the sense that the lack of the possibility of having facticity

to "step in" for one to take responsibility for something one has done, also produces angst. Authenticity Many noted existentialist writers consider the theme of authentic existence important. Authentic existence involves the idea that one has to "create oneself" and then live in accordance with this self. This can take many forms, from pretending choices are meaningless or random, through convincing oneself that some form of determinism is true, to a sort of "mimicry" where one acts as "one should". How "one should" act is often determined by an image one has, of how one such as oneself say, a bank manager, lion tamer, prostitute, etc. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre relates an example of a "waiter" in bad faith: The Other and the Look[edit] Main article: Other philosophy The Other when written with a capital "O" is a concept more properly belonging to phenomenology and its account of intersubjectivity. However, the concept has seen widespread use in existentialist writings, and the conclusions drawn from it differ slightly from the phenomenological accounts. The experience of the Other is the experience of another free subject who inhabits the same world as a person does. In its most basic form, it is this experience of the Other that constitutes intersubjectivity and objectivity. To clarify, when one experiences someone else, and this Other person experiences the world the same world that a person experiences – only from "over there" – the world itself is constituted as objective in that it is something that is "there" as identical for both of the subjects; a person experiences the other person as experiencing the same things. This is because the Look tends to objectify what it sees. Suddenly, he hears a creaking floorboard behind him, and he becomes aware of himself as seen by the Other. He is thus filled with shame for he perceives himself as he would perceive someone else doing what he was doing, as a Peeping Tom. Another characteristic feature of the Look is that no Other really needs to have been there: Angst and dread[edit] See also: Living educational theory "Existential angst", sometimes called existential dread, anxiety, or anguish, is a term that is common to many existentialist thinkers. It is generally held to be a negative feeling arising from the experience of human freedom and responsibility. The archetypical example is the experience one has when standing on a cliff where one not only fears falling off it, but also dreads the possibility of throwing oneself off. Angst, according to the modern existentialist, Adam Fong, is the sudden realization of a lack of meaning, often while one completes a task that initially seems to have intrinsic meaning. While in the case of fear, one can take definitive measures to remove the object of fear, in the case of angst, no such "constructive" measures are possible. There is nothing in people genetically, for instance that acts in their stead – that they can blame if something goes wrong. Therefore, not every choice is perceived as having dreadful possible consequences and, it can be claimed, human lives would be unbearable if every choice facilitated dread.

Chapter 9 : Existential quantification - Wikipedia

Thus, existentialist atheism like that found in Sartre's writings is not so much a position arrived at after philosophical investigation and theological reflection, but rather one adopted as a consequence of taking certain ideas and attitudes to their logical conclusions.

As such, I want to divide my answer into three parts: First, you helpfully give us your definition of philosophy: I believe that philosophy is defined by its method, which is based on logical analysis. This is an interesting claim, but this does not explain what "logical analysis" entails. An immediate question presents itself, why should we privilege this mode of analysis? And then why, even if we privilege it, should we call that philosophy? Philosophy is not about finding the meaning of things. Philosophy should do logical analysis. Logical analysis looks at the meaning of things i. Ergo, philosophy is not about logical analysis. To be a philosophical idea, that idea has to be based on reason Sure, but what does reason mean here? Is it a pure synonym for "logical analysis"? If so, then what justifies that choice? Can logical analysis itself justify itself? First, regarding the thinkers you categorize as existentialists, the term "existentialist" is mostly a term coined by Sartre and applied retroactively to Kierkegaard. This seems pretty dubious to me. They were not interested in building a logically constructed philosophical system, but in expressing ideas about life as it is lived. This again is a bold assertion and interpretation. But the second half of the claim "but in expressing ideas about life as it is lived" seems to be much more dubious to me as a description of their philosophies. Kierkegaard, for instance, does not deny that there are objective truths. In terms of your comment about Nietzsche, Nietzsche speaks in many poetic ways, but his critique there is actually quite close to the logical positivists. The point being, that it is slavish i. As I stated above, I do want to address your conclusion in the question and the thought that existentialism should not be called philosophy. First off, if we grant your definition of philosophy, i. On that definition, the first philosophers appeared in the late 19th century, because the methodologies prior to that were not largely based on symbolic logic. Given this dichotomy, it seems best to reject this as the definition of philosophy. Why, then, would someone assert this definition? Clearly, the goal is to exclude certain methods and views from the realm of philosophy. A better definition might be either the tradition of thinking that grows out of Plato. Maybe in the 21st Century, we can give it a less Euro-centric version and refer to the equivalent considerations in other traditions as well. If you want to heap opprobrium onto "existentialists," writing them out of philosophy by definition does not seem very viable to me.