

DOWNLOAD PDF MATHEMATICAL METHOD IN KANT, SCHELLING, AND HEGEL FREDERICK C. BEISER

Chapter 1 : Absolute idealism - Wikipedia

*Fred Beiser has been a major contributor to work on the history of modern philosophy, especially the history of German philosophy (Kant and German idealism) and the English Enlightenment. His book *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* won the Thomas J. Wilson Prize for the Best First Book.*

German Philosophy, Published: March 16, Frederick C. German Philosophy, , Princeton University Press, , pp. Reviewed by Rudolf A. Although Trendelenburg, Lotze and Dilthey were professors at the University of Berlin, this is by no means merely a history of academic philosophy, for it engages many wider intellectual debates. It is a useful volume that fills in some gaps in standard histories. Frederick Beiser focuses on the crisis of identity that philosophy faced after the death of Hegel in . His narrative starts in , the year in which Trendelenburg published his *Logische Untersuchungen*, which attempted to replace the speculative idealist efforts of Fichte and Hegel to ground the sciences with a more modest, second-order logic of the sciences. Beiser relates this more respectful approach to the sciences back to an earlier set of Kantian idealists such as Jakob Fries, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Beneke. We obtain a very good sense where a figure such as Trendelenburg stands in relation to the sciences, but this is not always rounded out to include his overall position. For that, the reader would have to turn to an earlier work by Beiser on late idealism. It goes on to "stress the abiding importance of metaphysics, i. If philosophers are to take the development of the sciences seriously, what is their distinctive task? How are they to reconcile mechanism and materialism with views such as vitalism and teleology? Are less speculative forms of idealism still viable? Lotze stands out as central in the chapter on the materialism controversy. His *Mikrokosmos* attempts to chart a path between materialism and vitalism by demonstrating the proper use of mechanism. Lotze endorses the procedure of extending mechanical explanations beyond inorganic nature to the organic realm of physiology and the mental realm of psychology. Nevertheless, he claims that there is more to the universe than the world of natural experience, namely, the "realm of value without which we would never grasp the purpose and meaning of things" But unlike Neo-Kantians such as Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, who adopted the validity of value on transcendental grounds, Lotze argued for a new teleological and monistic metaphysics that conceives of matter as the product of immaterial forces. Here Beiser indicates the influence that Leibniz had on Lotze Another central figure is Hartmann , the author of the *Philosophie des Unbewussten*. One of the main tasks of philosophy according to Hartmann is to "see as a whole what the particular sciences see only in scattered and separate parts" The thing-in-itself is explicated as the content that is given visible form in appearances. This allows Schopenhauer to suggest that the task of metaphysics is to interpret and decipher appearances to learn the "meaning-content" of appearances, not the "laws" that govern them. On that basis Beiser criticizes him for not working out a hermeneutics: But these brief passages by Schopenhauer about interpretation and meaning come from Book One of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, which is about how we represent the world in mechanical or causal terms. Schopenhauer needs no hermeneutics because he thinks that the will can directly intuit what is real. These will always admit of only a dynamical explanation, in other words, of one that explains the phenomenon from original forces entirely different from those of impact, pressure, weight, and so on, and thus of a higher order. Everything in both inorganic and organic nature finds its ultimate explanation in the will, which "is the true inner being of world and the kernel of all phenomena. He lived long enough to have to defend his organic worldview against the onslaught of Darwinism. A most interesting follow-up on these discussions of Trendelenburg, Lotze and Hartmann is the chapter on "The Ignorabimus Controversy. While endorsing the mechanical model for all scientific explanation, he also acknowledged its limits by claiming that we would forever remain ignorant of the nature of matter and of the connection between consciousness and the brain. According to Du Bois-Reymond we cannot understand matter by means of atoms because they are merely fictions, and consciousness cannot be explained by the Laplacian paradigm that can account for phenomena only on the basis of position, direction and velocity of particles see The first response,

as represented by Ernst Haeckel, refused to place any limits on the mechanical paradigm. The second, as exemplified by Dilthey, questioned this paradigm as an undue restriction on the scope of science. Haeckel maintained that if matter is not reduced to the inert extension of Descartes and Kant, then we can conceive it as active energy that allows us to think of mind as only a more complex form of matter. For Dilthey the limits of the natural sciences are an invitation to develop another paradigm of scientific method that can account for the meaning of things even when they cannot be fully explained in causal terms. Whereas the explanation of nature proceeds in terms of causal laws, the understanding of history must first place events in their appropriate contexts and discern structural patterns among them. Whatever causal explanations can be found for historical events must be framed by an understanding of the social and cultural systems in terms of which human beings interact. On the one hand, he portrays Dilthey as claiming that human interactions are "formulable in terms of laws of cause and effect" This leads him to make Dilthey into more of a historicist than he really was. But Dilthey aims to articulate "the reason of things that was active in their history" in terms of the "uniformities operative in its formation. Dilthey rejected the attempts by Hegel and Comte to formulate laws that govern history as a whole. The uniformities that are relevant to the understanding of history are not always causal, and if they are, their scope tends to be limited to the social, economic and cultural systems that can be analyzed by the human sciences. This means that the historian has to weave together the differentiated uniformities found by the relevant human sciences and attain as coherent and objective an account of what is singular and individual about his subject matter as possible. His historical approach aims at objectivity and rejects the simple ideographic-nomothetic alternative proposed by the Neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband. Narrative description does not rule out lawful regularities. There he writes that for Dilthey "all philosophies are relative and historical" The fact that Dilthey shows that each worldview "arises from, and gets its meaning within, its own historical context" 50, does not stop him from analyzing and assessing it according to universal standards. In developing a threefold typology of worldviews, Dilthey clearly considers the naturalism of Protagoras, Hobbes, Hume and Nietzsche deficient, but seems to hesitate between the idealism of freedom of Plato and Kant and the objective idealism of Neo-Platonism and Hegel. I think that this hesitation stems from a realization that worldviews attempt to give a totalizing determination of the meaning and value of things that is beyond human limits. Any totalizing understanding will have to acknowledge indeterminacies. Ultimately, Dilthey would have to admit that he has something like the Du Bois-Reymond problem, but that does not make him a relativist. When examining how worldviews are formed, Dilthey writes: Pessimism was a problem that Schopenhauer imposed on the late nineteenth century. The riddles of life that he formulated in Book One, and claimed to solve in Books Two and Four, left those who doubted his pessimistic conclusions with a challenge that none of them could answer definitively. Hartmann was more sympathetic to Schopenhauer and rejected the charge that pessimism undermines morality by claiming that it only demonstrates the futility of egoism and the striving for personal happiness. Hartmann characterized his own form of pessimism as eudemonistic rather than moral, and tried to "foil his many neo-Kantian critics" by claiming that Kant was, like himself, a eudemonistic pessimist and a moral, even evolutionary, optimist. There are many lesser-known participants in this fascinating debate that Beiser recounts in this his longest and last chapter. In sum, Beiser makes a good case that late nineteenth-century German philosophy is much richer in content than is generally recognized. The book provides a valuable resource for scholars, but the fact that everything is organized in terms of controversial debates also means that one gets scattered insights into the philosophers involved, and the assessments given do not always cohere fully as in the two cases discussed above. Schelling, *Schellings Werke*, vol. Princeton University Press, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, , p. Forthcoming in Dilthey, *Selected Works*, vol 6. However, his work is never discussed, which is surprising given his importance as the leader of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism.

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Chapter 2 : The Nine Best Books on or by Hegel - The Daily Idea

43) *"Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling and Hegel", in Discourse on a New Method, eds/ Mark Domski and Michael Dickson. Chicago: Open Court, pp.*

Finding good introductory philosophy books can be difficult for two reasons. One person may be looking for a short, beginner friendly introduction, someone else may want a comprehensive academic overview, a third person may be looking for classic works by Hegel. This list tries to account for this ambiguity by recommending different types of books on Hegel. Here are the best books on Hegel in no particular order:

An Introduction to Hegel: This classic introduction to one of the most influential modern thinkers, G. Hegel has been made even more comprehensive through the addition of four new chapters. New edition of a classic introduction to Hegel. Hegel

Hegel Frederick Beiser Category: Hegel is one of the major philosophers of the nineteenth century. Many of the major philosophical movements of the twentieth century from existentialism to analytic philosophy grew out of reactions against Hegel. He is also one of the hardest philosophers to understand and his complex ideas, though rewarding, are often misunderstood. A masterpiece of clarity and scholarship, Hegel is both the ideal starting point for those coming to Hegel for the first time and essential reading for any student or scholar of nineteenth century philosophy. A Biography

Terry Pinkard Category: One of the founders of modern philosophical thought Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has gained the reputation of being one of the most abstruse and impenetrable of thinkers. Terry Pinkard situates Hegel firmly in the historical context of his times. The story of that life is of an ambitious, powerful thinker living in a period of great tumult dominated by the figure of Napoleon. Few thinkers are more controversial in the history of philosophy than Hegel. He has been dismissed as a charlatan and obscurantist, but also praised as one of the greatest thinkers in modern philosophy. No one interested in philosophy can afford to ignore him. Special attention is devoted to problems in the interpretation of Hegel: *Phenomenology of Spirit*

G. The Science of Logic

G. Recent research has given us a detailed picture of the process that led Hegel to his final conception of the System and of the place of the Logic within it. We now understand how and why Hegel distanced himself from Schelling, how radical this break with his early mentor was, and to what extent it entailed a return but with a difference to Fichte and Kant. The translation is accompanied by a full apparatus of historical and explanatory notes. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*

G. This book is a translation of a classic work of modern social and political thought. The new translation is literal, readable, and consistent, and will be informative and scholarly enough to serve the needs of students and specialists alike. *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*

G.

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Chapter 3 : German Idealism - Frederick C. BEISER - Google Books

Mathematical process in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel Frederick C. Beiser of *Kant's Philosophy of mathematics one hundred thirty five* Charles Parsons.

Traditionally, German idealism is understood as a radical form of subjectivism that expands the powers of the self to encompass the entire world. But Beiser reveals a different--in fact, opposite--impulse: Between Kant and Hegel he finds a movement away from cosmic subjectivity and toward greater realism and naturalism, with one form of idealism succeeding another as each proved an inadequate basis for explaining the reality of the external world and the place of the self in nature. Thus German idealism emerges here not as a radical development of the Cartesian tradition of philosophy, but as the first important break with that tradition.

Realism in German Idealism 2. Exorcising the Spirit 3. The Critique of Foundationalism 4. The Troublesome Hegelian Legacy 5. The Taxonomy of German Idealism I. Kant and the Problem of Subjectivism 1. The Clash of Interpretations 2. Method and Results 1. Idealism in the Precritical Years 1. The Idealist Challenge 2. The First Refutation of Idealism 3. Idealist Dreams and Visions 4. The Critique of Idealism in the Inaugural Dissertation 5. David Hume, Transcendental Realist 2. Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism 1. The Case for Subjectivism 2. Transcendental versus Empirical Idealism 4. Empirical Realism in the Aesthetic 5. Empirical Realism and Empirical Dualism 3. The Priority of Skeptical Idealism 2. The Critique of the Fourth Paralogism 3. The Proof of the External World 4. A Cartesian Reply 6. The Ambiguity of Transcendental Idealism 7. The Coherence of Transcendental Idealism 4. The Missing Refutation 2. The Dispute in the Aesthetic 4. Dogmatic Idealism in the Antinomies 5.

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Chapter 4 : Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling - Wikipedia

OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY DISCOURSE ON A NEW METHOD: Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel â€”Frederick C. Beiser.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: In the Spirit of Hegel: Hegel, was deeply rooted in Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza, and he synthesized the riches of Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. He put dynamic panentheism into play in modern theology, and in some way he inspired nearly every great philosophical idea and movement of the past two centuries. Yet no thinker is as routinely misconstrued as Hegel, partly because his greatest work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, defies categorization and is notoriously hard to understand. In the mids, while Immanuel Kant was elderly and fading and J. For Spinoza, the key to substance was its independent or self-sufficient essence, something that does not depend on anything else. Substance had to be infinite, because anything less than the whole of all things would depend on something outside [End Page] itself. Nature, instead of being an end in itself worthy of spiritual appreciation, was subordinated to the striving of a moral subject, deriving its value from ethical ends imposed upon it. Schelling, a boy genius and Romantic, was the most brilliant of the post-Kantians and the most productive, until he flamed out. Hegel, a slow starter and only briefly a Romantic, made the strongest bid that any thinker has ever made to be the Protestant Thomas Aquinas. Schelling and Hegel, working together in the early s, argued that Kant wrongly dichotomized between form and content, which yielded a strangely abstract philosophy that knew only appearances, not reality. Kant described a real problem, but he fixated on a relatively primitive mode of self-consciousness in which form and content were separate, which led to a dualistic theory of knowledge predicated on the dichotomy between a knowing subject and its objects of consciousness. This principle is not about the self-knowledge of a finite subject, Schelling and Hegel argued. It is about the self-knowledge of the absolute within a finite subject. Instead of trapping subject-object identity inside the circle of its own representations, the answer is to lift subject-object identity outside this circle by equating the self-knowledge of a knowing subject with the self-knowledge of the absolute. My knowledge is not merely something that I know from my own consciousness. It is knowledge of the absolute through the object itself. Schelling put it vividly: You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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Chapter 5 : German idealism - Wikipedia

Discourse on a new method: reinvigorating the marriage of history and philosophy of science. Schelling, and Hegel / Frederick C. Beiser Mathematical method.

But Descartes had a mysterious and mystical part, besides. Leibniz known as on Clerselier and used to be allowed to repeat just a couple of pagesâ€”which, even though written in code, he amazingly deciphered there prompt. Why did Descartes continue a mystery computing device, and what have been its contents? The solutions to those questions lead Amir Aczel and the reader on an exhilarating, swashbuckling trip, and supply a desirable examine one of many nice figures of Western tradition. But Descartes had a mysterious and mystical facet, to boot. Leibniz known as on Clerselier and was once allowed to repeat just a couple of pagesâ€”which, even though written in code, he amazingly deciphered there instant. Why did Descartes hold a mystery computer, and what have been its contents? The solutions to those questions lead Amir Aczel and the reader on a thrilling, swashbuckling trip, and supply a desirable examine one of many nice figures of Western tradition. Addressing quite a lot of issues, from Newton to Post-Kuhnian philosophy of technological know-how, those essays seriously research subject matters which have been significant to the influential paintings of thinker Michael Friedman. Newton as Historically-Minded thinker 65 Mary Domski 5. Kant on beautiful and Repulsive Force: The Balancing Argument Daniel Warren Beiser Logical Positivism and Neo-Kantianism Validity within the Cultural Sciences? Ernst Cassirer and Michael Friedman: Kantian or Hegelian Dynamics of cause? From Mach to Carnap: A story of bewilderment Paul Pojman Kant, Carnap, Kuhn, and past Richard Creath How should still We Describe clinical switch?

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Chapter 6 : German Idealism – Frederick C. Beiser | Harvard University Press

Frederick C. Beiser is professor of philosophy at Syracuse University. He is the author of many books, including "The Fate of Reason," "German Idealism," "Hegel," and "The German Historicist Tradition."

His interest gradually shifted from Lutheran theology to philosophy. Meanwhile, he had begun to study Kant and Fichte, who influenced him greatly. He also visited Dresden, where he saw collections of the Elector of Saxony, to which he referred later in his thinking on art. His time at Jena – put Schelling at the center of the intellectual ferment of Romanticism. He was on close terms with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who appreciated the poetic quality of the Naturphilosophie, reading Von der Weltseele. On the other hand, Schelling was unsympathetic to the ethical idealism that animated the work of Friedrich Schiller, the other pillar of Weimar Classicism. In Jena, Schelling was on good terms with Fichte at first, but their different conceptions, about nature in particular, led to increasing divergence in their thought. Fichte advised him to focus on philosophy in its original meaning, that is, transcendental philosophy: Schelling was especially close to August Wilhelm Schlegel and his wife, Caroline. Auguste died of dysentery in 1799, prompting many to blame Schelling, who had overseen her treatment. In his Jena period, Schelling had a closer relationship with Hegel again. This period was marked by considerable flux in his views and by a final breach with Fichte and Hegel. He moved then to Munich in 1800, where he found a position as a state official, first as associate of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities and secretary of the Royal Academy of Fine Arts, afterwards as secretary of the Philosophische Klasse philosophical section of the Academy of Sciences. In the same year, Schelling gave a speech about the relation between the visual arts and nature at the Academy of Fine Arts; and Hegel wrote a severe criticism of it to one of his friends. After that, they criticized each other in lecture rooms and in books publicly until the end of their lives. Munich period[edit] Without resigning his official position in Munich, he lectured for a short time in Stuttgart Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen [Stuttgart private lectures], 1802–03, and seven years at the University of Erlangen – Three years later, introduced by Goethe,[citation needed] Schelling married one of her closest friends, Pauline Gotter, in whom he found a faithful companion. It is possible that it was the overpowering strength and influence of the Hegelian system that constrained Schelling, for it was only in 1805, after the death of Hegel, that, in a preface to a translation by Hubert Beckers of a work by Victor Cousin, he gave public utterance to the antagonism in which he stood to the Hegelian, and to his own earlier, conception of philosophy. The antagonism certainly was not then a new fact; the Erlangen lectures on the history of philosophy express the same in a pointed fashion, and Schelling had already begun the treatment of mythology and religion which in his view constituted the true positive complements to the negative of logical or speculative philosophy. The appearance of critical writings by David Friedrich Strauss, Feuerbach, and Bruno Bauer, and the evident disunion in the Hegelian school itself, express a growing alienation from the then dominant philosophy. In Berlin, the headquarters of the Hegelians, this found expression in attempts to obtain officially from Schelling a treatment of the new system which he was understood to have in reserve. The realization of the desire did not come about till 1818, when the appointment of Schelling as Prussian privy councillor and member of the Berlin Academy, gave him the right, a right he was requested to exercise, to deliver lectures in the university. The enmity of his old foe, H. His dissertation was *De Marcione Paullinarum epistolarum emendatore* On Marcion as emendator of the Pauline letters. He contributed articles and reviews to the Philosophisches Journal of Fichte and Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, and threw himself into the study of physical and medical science. On its first publication by Franz Rosenzweig, it was attributed to Schelling. In *Ideen* Schelling referred to Leibniz and quoted from his *Monadology*. He held Leibniz in high regard because of his view of nature during his natural philosophy period. In this book Schelling described transcendental philosophy and nature philosophy as complementary to one another. Fichte reacted by stating that Schelling was working on the basis of a false philosophical principle: The breach became unrecoverable in 1818, after Schelling published *Darstellung des Systems meiner*

Philosophie "Presentation of My System of Philosophy". Fichte thought this title absurd, since in his opinion philosophy could not be personalized. According to Schelling, the absolute was the indifference or identity, which he considered to be an essential subject of philosophy. Otherwise, Schelling himself called freedom "a capacity for good and evil". The tract *Ueber die Gottheiten zu Samothrake* "On the Divinities of Samothrace" appeared in , ostensibly a portion of a greater work, *Weltalter* "The ages of the world" , frequently announced as ready for publication, but of which little was ever written. Schelling planned *Weltalter* as a book in three parts, describing the past, present, and future of the world; however, he began only the first part, rewriting it several times and at last keeping it unpublished. The other two parts were left only in planning. Christopher John Murray describes the work as follows: Building on the premise that philosophy cannot ultimately explain existence, he merges the earlier philosophies of Nature and identity with his newfound belief in a fundamental conflict between a dark unconscious principle and a conscious principle in God. God makes the universe intelligible by relating to the ground of the real but, insofar as nature is not complete intelligence, the real exists as a lack within the ideal and not as reflective of the ideal itself. The three universal ages " distinct only to us but not in the eternal God " therefore comprise a beginning where the principle of God before God is divine will striving for being, the present age, which is still part of this growth and hence a mediated fulfillment, and a finality where God is consciously and consummately Himself to Himself. His sons then began the issue of his collected writings with the four volumes of Berlin lectures: Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology ; ii. Philosophy of Mythology ; iii. Philosophy of Revelation Fichte, Spinoza, Jakob Boehme and the mystics, and finally, major Greek thinkers with their Neoplatonic , Gnostic , and Scholastic commentators, give colouring to particular works. The change which experience brings before us leads to the conception of duality, the polar opposition through which nature expresses itself. The dynamical series of stages in nature are matter, as the equilibrium of the fundamental expansive and contractive forces; light, with its subordinate processes magnetism, electricity, and chemical action ; organism, with its component phases of reproduction, irritability and sensibility. Unlike Hegel, Schelling did not believe that the absolute could be known in its true character through rational inquiry alone. His work impressed the English romantic poet and critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge , who introduced his ideas into English-speaking culture, sometimes without full acknowledgment, as in the *Biographia Literaria*. In the s and s, philosophers of neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism, like Wilhelm Windelband or Richard Kroner , tended to describe Schelling as an episode connecting Fichte and Hegel. His late period tended to be ignored, and his philosophies of nature and of art in the s and first decade of the 19th century were the main focus. Heidegger found there central themes of Western ontology: In the s, the situation began to change. In , the centennial of his death, an international conference on Schelling was held. Several philosophers including Karl Jaspers gave presentations about the uniqueness and relevance of his thought, the interest shifting toward his later work on being and existence, or, more precisely, the origin of existence. Walter Schulz , one of organizers of the conference, published a book claiming that Schelling had made German idealism complete with his late philosophy, particularly with his Berlin lectures in the s. Schulz presented Schelling as the person who resolved the philosophical problems which Hegel had left incomplete, in contrast to the contemporary idea that Schelling had been surpassed by Hegel much earlier. Theologian Paul Tillich wrote: In the s nature was again of interest to philosophers in relation to environmental issues. His influence and relation to the German art scene, particularly to Romantic literature and visual art, has been an interest since the late s, from Philipp Otto Runge to Gerhard Richter and Joseph Beuys. This interest has been revived in recent years through the work of the environmental philosopher Arran Gare who has identified a tradition of Schellingian science overcoming the opposition between science and the humanities, and offering the basis for an understanding of ecological science and ecological philosophy. And if so, why was it not reached at once? Why was the consummation not realized from the beginning? To these questions there is but one answer: Because God is Life, and not merely Being. All philosophies say this, but they speak of this ground as a mere concept without making it something real and actual. Since all Being goes up in it as if in flames, it is necessarily unapproachable to anyone still

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embroiled in Being. The beginning in God is eternal beginning, that is, such a one as was beginning from all eternity, and still is, and also never ceases to be beginning. U of Chicago P, , p. Bibliography[edit] Selected works are listed below. Four Early Essays 1766, translation and commentary by F. Bucknell University Press De Marcione Paulinarum epistolarum emendatore Cambridge University Press Von der Weltseele University Press of Virginia Vater, The Philosophical Forum, 32 4 , Winter , pp. State University of New York Press Philosophie der Kunst lecture delivered 1793; published as The Philosophy of Art Minnesota: Ohio University Press System der gesamten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere Nachlass State University of New York Press, Weltalter 1791-1795 as The Ages of the World, translated with introduction and notes by F. The University of Michigan Press Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus Nachlass Philosophie der Mythologie lecture Philosophie der Offenbarung lecture The original edition in new arrangement edited by M.

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Chapter 7 : Works by Frederick Beiser - PhilPapers

Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. Frederick Beiser - - In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinventing the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science.

Mary Domski, Michael Dickson eds. *Discourse on a New Method*: April 08, Mary Domski and Michael Dickson eds. Reviewed by Lydia Patton, Virginia Tech That the history and the philosophy of science have been united in a form of disciplinary marriage is a fact. There are pressing questions about the state of this union. *Reinventing the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science* is a state of the union address, but also an articulation of compelling and well-defended positions on strategies for making progress in the history and philosophy of science. The positions taken in the book take their inspiration, whether sympathetically or more critically, from the philosophy of Michael Friedman. Beyond that, most of the essays in this volume are ambitious, well crafted, and tightly argued -- and some, in particular, are a joy to read. The result is a volume that presents the state of the art in the discipline and that will stimulate and inform work on these subjects in the years to come. Moreover, the volume overall does not restrict itself to providing a *Festschrift* for Friedman, though that word is used. It is a *Manifestoschrift*, as the subtitle suggests: Friedman has defended a number of innovative and influential positions on the history and philosophy of science, always, as he says here, from a revised Kantian standpoint. Introduction Domski and Dickson present a framework for learning from history, via the notion of "synthetic history. There is a difference between the descriptive claim that philosophy has interacted with the sciences and the normative claim that philosophy ought to engage with the sciences and their history. Friedman makes the latter claim 7. The editors note that one need not accept Kantian or neo-Kantian claims in order to accept that, as Norwood Russell Hanson put it, philosophy of science without history of science is empty. The editors present a shared set of compelling questions for historians and philosophers of science about the differing methodologies and approaches of historians and philosophers. Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience? Do the methods employed by historians of science -- "focused, more or less, on the specific events, contexts, and influences surrounding the development and acceptance or rejection of a concept or theory" -- provide material to draw useful philosophical lessons, without further argument? On the other hand, does reading an episode in the history of science as an illumination of a philosophical problem, such as induction or scientific realism, illegitimately impose the concerns of the present on the practices and arguments of the past? Giere suggests that historians and philosophers of science take the burden of proof on themselves, and this volume contains an impressive set of arguments on this score. A final position, implicitly held in common by the contributors to this volume, is a commitment to anti-Whiggishness. As the editors urge, we ought not take history to be a list of failings that lead ineluctably to the glorious present. Rather, history is a teacher, and her teachings allow us to take a more nuanced position on how we should best move forward One note before moving on: Parts I and II: Owing to the clear connections between the projects of the two Parts, I will discuss them together. History of science and methodology of history and philosophy of science The three essays here are by Domski, Domenico Bertoloni Meli, and William R. The essays share a focus on historical techniques and methodologies for philosophy and science. But the essays here go beyond that, to defend controversial and remarkable positions on alchemy, on the place of Newton in the early modern tradition, and on the axiomatic method in history. In "Newton as Historically-Minded Philosopher," Domski focuses on the distinction between Cartesian and Newtonian methods and arguments in the foundations of geometry. In the case of geometry, instead of beginning from Cartesian first principles and clear and distinct ideas, Newton "takes the certainty" of ancient mathematics as his "given" Meli sees in Stevin, Galileo, Torricelli, and Huygens a "common concern for establishing knowledge about nature in an axiomatic fashion" It is this lack of a coherent narrative of the relationship between natural philosophy and empirical practice "that has led both historians and philosophers to overlook one of the major reasons for the move to corpuscular matter theory in the early modern period"

Collected, these essays give an excellent perspective on the interaction between Kant and the early modern tradition. She goes on to argue that it is much more likely that, in many cases, Kant was motivated by reasons internal to the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy. In the context of these narratives, it appears that the dichotomy set up by Jauernig -- In developing the Critical system, was Kant responding to Newton or to internal tensions within Leibnizian metaphysics? What about other figures whom Kant had read and with whom he was in correspondence? While several of the contributions to this volume begin from the thesis of external, Newtonian influence, they by no means suggest that that influence was the only one. The essays in this section argue for several related claims. Since attractive forces are empirical, it would appear they cannot be given a pure treatment. Second, in "Kant on Attractive and Repulsive Force: However, Warren argues that, while Kant thought that we could make substantive claims a priori about the necessary conditions for avoiding the collapse or dispersion of matter, problems arise with his arguments for these "necessary conditions" when they are taken out of the context of the Cartesian mechanism and Newtonian dynamism with which Kant was engaged. The essays by Laywine and Sutherland support the view that Kant intended a thoroughgoing reform of metaphysics. Laywine cites evidence that Kant, unlike Lambert and Wolff, did not take mathematics as a model for metaphysics. Kant thought, nonetheless, that "thinking about the function and significance of postulates" can help philosophers to better understand problems in metaphysics. The key to understanding this, Laywine suggests, is in reading the use of "the constructive postulates of geometry" as suggesting an answer to the question Kant raised in his letter to Marcus Herz of February. The constructive procedures of geometry establish a relationship between geometrical concept and geometrical object. Why not make the case, then, that the understanding can carry out similar constructive procedures that explain how the intellect can represent objects a priori? Laywine concludes by making the interpretive suggestion that the project of the transcendental deduction could be to show that the "logical functions of the understanding" are indeed constructive procedures. These discussions, along with Frederick C. Beiser begins by emphasizing a question Laywine raises as well: Beiser observes that this key question is not much discussed in studies of post-Kantian philosophy. His essay traces the notion of mathematical construction in Schelling and Hegel and its role in allowing for the possibility of "intellectual intuition." Friedman identifies three philosophical paths: As Richardson observes in his essay for this volume, some readers "may have been shocked to discover that the real hero of the tale" is not Carnap but Cassirer. Friedman is responsible for the increasing appreciation of Cassirer as a significant figure in his own right. In his "Validity in the Cultural Sciences? According to Friedman, Cassirer does not explain how the Geisteswissenschaften are to share in the universal validity of the Naturwissenschaften or, at least, how the types of validity proper to each are to be related to each other. As a result, Cassirer abandons his promising middle ground and we are faced with the choice between Carnap and Heidegger. The essays on Carnap in this volume present a mixed perspective. Alan Richardson sums up his view of the state of scholarship on the Aufbau at the beginning of his essay. One reading, perhaps inspired by Quine, sees the Aufbau as the apex of the method of phenomenalist, empiricist reduction using symbolic logic. Another, spearheaded by Richardson and Friedman, sees Kantian and neo-Kantian elements in the Aufbau, especially in the analysis of objectivity. In "From Mach to Carnap: A Tale of Confusion", Paul Pojman interestingly complicates this tale by arguing for two related theses: One story is that Carnap was persuaded by Quine to abandon his original project altogether. Richardson sees critical conventionalism as in tension with the project of the Aufbau; Ricketts does not see a tension there. Thus, while this paper defends a nominally historical thesis, the philosophical stakes for Carnap interpretation turn out to be significant. In arguing for the latter, constitutive sense, Friedman argues for two theses. Friedman fills this gap with an analysis of the transitions from one set of "locally constitutive" principles, or rules of normal science, to another, which allows for a broader picture of the rationality of theory change. Friedman applies his analysis to the shift from Newton to Einstein in particular. This turns out to be quite significant in a way, perhaps, not fully appreciated as yet. A Neo-Popperian Reads Friedman," makes the point that, by focusing on the special case of mechanics and physics, Friedman has prejudiced the case in his favor; other disciplines, such as

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chemistry, may not be amenable to his treatment. Friedman responds as follows: The shift from Newton to Einstein is the most potent challenge to the Kantian ideal of rationality, Friedman says; one can extrapolate, perhaps, that the shift from one theory to another in chemistry or in anthropology does not pose such a challenge. These essays are rich and rewarding, and represent the vanguard of work on post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, as Friedman dubs it. Howard presents evidence that Einstein himself considered versions of the contingent a priori, as defended by Schlick and Reichenbach, and rejected them, in favor of Duhemian holism. The broader approach to historical study that Howard defends, then, is that we ought not "privilege contemporary rational reconstructions over the self-understandings of the historical actors themselves." Historical context can clarify our perspective, or it can muddy it, by introducing the concerns of the present into the reconstruction of the past. If our rational reconstruction of a theory requires that we discount the methodological approach of "the historical actors themselves," that is an excellent reason to question the reconstruction. Friedman and DiSalle see their approaches as "complementary," though Friedman carefully distinguishes the two positions and, it is worth mentioning, brings up the question of the contribution of empirical facts on the ground. The question is of the reconstruction of scientific change. "An Appreciation and a Critique," address the foundations of the dynamics of reason from quite different perspectives. "Dirac on Quantization, Mathematical Beauty, and Theoretical Understanding," stands out among the others as an account of the role of mathematics in scientific understanding. Dickson develops a view, which he takes from Dirac, that mathematical beauty originates from mathematical generality and that mathematical generality contributes to our understanding. First, it does so by contributing to the construction of scientific theories that aid in understanding nature; and second, it does so by allowing us to better understand the theories themselves. The essay is clear, well defended, and itself a beautiful piece of work. How ought we integrate the account of the dynamics of reason into a broad account of scientific theory change, including experiment, evidence, and sciences other than physics and mechanics? What is the contribution of mathematical and conceptual analysis to theory construction and appraisal in science and in philosophy? This volume, as a whole, is an excellent further step on the path toward more productive debate on these issues. *Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis*. Cambridge University Press, Demopoulos, William and Friedman, Michael. *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger*. The Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Kant and the Early Moderns.

Chapter 8 : Hegel: Metaphysics; Thought and Being | 19th century German theory

As he traces the structure and evolution of idealism as a doctrine, Frederick Beiser exposes a strong objective, or realist, strain running from Kant to Hegel and identifies the crucial role of the early romantics--Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis--as the founders of absolute idealism.

Chapter 9 : Works by F. Beiser - PhilPapers

Beiser's essay, "Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel," picks up the train of Sutherland's and Laywine's narratives. Instead of considering the relationship between the pre-Critical and Critical Kant, Beiser focuses on Kant's reception in Schelling and Hegel.