

# DOWNLOAD PDF MEASUREMENT AND REFORM OF BUDGETARY POLICY

## Chapter 1 : State Laws and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms

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Capretta Fall The modern federal budget process is turning 40 years old this year. Created by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, this process was established to address a specific set of concerns facing lawmakers at the time. It has helped address some though not all of those concerns, but it is certainly not well suited to helping us deal with the most daunting and significant fiscal problems the federal government now faces. The nation is facing serious fiscal challenges and has been for many years, but our elected leaders have done all they can to ignore the key problems, leaving them to fester. In 1974, the federal government spent 4. By 2000, spending on these mandatory programs had risen to 10. The current budget process does not force policymakers to confront fiscal and economic reality. The demographic trends and health-care cost pressures that are driving up entitlement spending have been with us for many years, and the projections showing that these trends will push federal finances past the breaking point have been widely understood for decades. But instead of forcing policymakers to confront the problem, the current budget process shifts financial pressures off of the welfare state and onto other portions of the federal budget. As spending on entitlement programs has soared since the early 1970s, funding for annually appropriated or "discretionary" accounts, especially defense, fell precipitously "from 1974 to 1990" and probably sooner "the unsustainable nature of the current state of fiscal affairs will force significant change. A reformed federal budget process might be able to establish conditions conducive to this kind of political leadership. Ideally, elected leaders would skip right to consideration of the long-term reforms necessary to provide a sustainable safety net consistent with strong economic growth. But in the absence of evidence indicating that serious reforms of the welfare state are around the corner, it is worth considering what kinds of changes in the budget process could encourage the adoption of the right policies. Before we can think about such changes, however, it is important to understand what events and forces shaped the process we have today and why that process has proven inadequate. Passed in the final days of the Nixon administration, it was focused primarily on re-establishing constitutional balance in budgetary decisions. Nixon pushed against long-established constitutional boundaries by refusing to obligate funds for programs he considered low priorities, even though Congress had explicitly appropriated funds for these purposes. More than any other reason, Congress passed the Budget Act to rein in this practice of "impoundment. In the Budget Act, Congress wanted to make explicit in statute what was previously thought to be implied by the Constitution: The impoundment provisions are now largely irrelevant to current budget policy, though they were crucial in bringing about the new budget process. The rest of the Budget Act, which was frankly given less thought in 1974, has proven to be of far more lasting significance. But unlike the impoundment provisions, the rest of the Budget Act was focused on budget development, not on the execution of already-appropriated funds. The congressional budget resolution provides allocations of spending and taxing authority to the various congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and tax laws. For instance, the resolution sets the maximum amount of discretionary budget authority "called the "a allocation" after the section in the Budget Act designating its inclusion in budget resolutions "that the House and Senate Appropriations Committees are permitted to spend on the various bills that those committees produce each year. If one of the committees writes an appropriations bill that causes total spending within its jurisdiction to exceed its allocation, it commits a violation of the budget rules and puts the bill in jeopardy. Members of the House and Senate can raise objections to the further consideration of such bills. This mechanism is especially important in the Senate, where it typically takes 60 Senators to continue debating a bill that violates an allocation provided under the congressional budget resolution. The committees with jurisdiction over major entitlement programs, like

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Medicare and Medicaid, receive an allocation that can only be understood relative to a "baseline" of expected costs. These programs run based on complex formula provisions defining what will be paid, under what circumstances, to deliver the benefits promised in the statute. In practical terms, CBO looks at what the law requires, historical trends, and other factors such as shifting demographics to provide estimates of what the spending on a given entitlement program will be over the coming decade. A similar approach is used to provide a current-law tax baseline. These baseline estimates for mandatory spending programs and taxes are determined by CBO, along with the Joint Committee on Taxation, and are absolutely critical to the construction of the congressional budget resolution. If the Budget Committees choose not to change mandatory spending or taxes, they allocate the baseline amounts to the respective committees with jurisdiction over these programs the "authorizing committees". If the allocations are equal to the baseline, then the authorizing committees have no budgetary room to increase spending on these programs or decrease revenues, but they are also not forced to make any changes in these programs to cut expenses or raise taxes. In short, they could comply with the budget by doing nothing. They could also approve budget-neutral bills, meaning that spending increases for one program would be offset with spending reductions in another; likewise, tax cuts would be offset with tax increases. Such allocations are often accompanied by "reconciliation instructions," which direct the committees to produce new authorizing legislation that will "reconcile" the programs within their jurisdiction with the allocations provided to them under the congressional budget resolution. With reconciliation, the committees are expected to produce legislation by a certain date that brings spending into line with what is provided in the congressional budget resolution. If multiple committees are part of a reconciliation instruction, their bills are pulled together into an "omnibus bill" for consideration in the House and Senate. Debate on them is limited, meaning they cannot be filibustered and therefore can pass with a simple majority rather than the 60 votes often necessary to get other major legislation through the chamber. The reconciliation procedures provide a current-law roadmap for pursuing entitlement and tax changes in Congress under expedited rules, but it is important to understand how different the budgetary restraints on entitlement programs are from those on discretionary spending. For appropriated accounts like defense, the National Institutes of Health, or the National Park Service, the budget resolution can establish a hard upper limit on the total amount of appropriated spending, and this upper limit is rather easily enforced if the will to do so exists in Congress. An enforceable budget for entitlement spending is far more elusive because it is based entirely on estimates, both for baseline projections and assessments of what new legislation might do to the baseline forecast. In effect, entitlement spending is never held to a firm budget. If spending rises in the programs because of higher enrollment than expected, or higher average benefits than expected per enrollee, nothing in the current budget process can force Congress to enact corrective steps to limit spending. The money simply comes out of the treasury to cover the costs, and the treasury often has to borrow the necessary funds. These programs enjoy wide popular support, so Congress is generally reluctant to open them up for amendment anyway. But the budget process makes it very easy for elected leaders to do nothing and allow entitlement spending to rise "naturally" as more people seek benefits, and as the rules governing benefits grow more lenient based on political and interest-group pressures. Although inflation can also be built into projections for discretionary accounts, it has more often been the case that the default option for appropriated accounts is a freeze or a near-freeze in spending in the budget resolution, or adherence to upper limits previously agreed upon by the Congress and the president. In successive rounds of bipartisan budget deals going back to at least the budget agreement, both major political parties have found it much easier to apply spending restraint even if it is modest to the discretionary accounts of government rather than entitlement programs. In effect, as budgetary pressures have risen with the growth of entitlement spending since the s, successive Congresses and presidents have found the path of least resistance for budgetary restraint to be placing ever tighter caps on annually appropriated spending programs. This partially explains why spending on these accounts is now at 6. The fundamental problem is not that the United States may, in any given year, have to borrow a large amount of money due to a temporarily high deficit. The problem is that rapid growth in

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entitlement spending has created the prospect of a chronic imbalance that can be corrected only with structural reforms of the programs in question or ever higher rates of taxation. The current budget process is ill-equipped to help policymakers see the real problem or do anything about it. The Budget Act requires Congress to write budget plans addressing only the upcoming fiscal year and the four that follow it. In recent years, both the president and Congress have tended to write budgets that cover ten years rather than the required five. But not even a ten-year budget captures the information necessary to see the fundamental fiscal problem or the positive results that could be produced from genuine structural reforms, which may take years to implement. It is telling that one of the most consequential fiscal corrections of recent decades was enacted entirely apart from the regular budget process. In 1981, President Reagan and Congress agreed on a long-term framework to close the financing shortfall in Social Security. Among other things, the reform increased the age at which beneficiaries could start drawing full benefits without an early-retirement reduction. This reform was phased in very slowly, starting in 1998, an amazing 17 years after the law was enacted. The two-year bump in the normal retirement age from age 65 to 67 will not be fully phased in until 2027, more than four decades after the law was enacted. The normal budget process therefore showed no benefits to these reforms, even though its long-term effect is significant. Indeed, our largest entitlement programs will be in the red long before then. Moreover, some reforms require complex implementation adjustments, which also can mean years will pass before the most significant budgetary savings become visible. The resulting budgetary myopia provides a strong bias against reforms like "premium support" in the Medicare program. Private insurance plans and the traditional government-administered Medicare benefit would compete against one another by submitting bids for how much they would charge to provide Medicare-covered services. Beneficiaries would get their entitlement in the form of financial support the amount of which would be based on the bids that they would then apply to the insurance plan of their choosing. Restructuring Medicare in this way has the potential to transform the program and greatly improve its long-term financial outlook. The Congressional Budget Office has found that such a reform could yield major savings in Medicare spending without increasing costs for beneficiaries. But it is a complex reform that would require some time to implement and show its effects. Moreover, to avoid disrupting the insurance arrangements of current beneficiaries, most proposals to move in this direction provide for a lengthy transition period. But, in the absence of the will to transform our entitlement system, an improved budget process offers the best opportunity to build some political momentum for real reform. The first reform would seek to change the way the elected branches interact in the budget process. A key characteristic of a congressional budget resolution is that it is not a law. It is a concurrent resolution, which means it is only relevant for Congress. The parallel budgetary processes of the executive and legislative branches are a reflection of our constitutional structure. As co-equal branches of government, each has a substantial role over the federal budget, and there is no legal requirement that they ever fully come to an agreement with each other. Indeed, with some exceptions, it can be said that the federal government never truly operates within a budget because the legislative and executive branches rarely agree on one. This structure has practical consequences. It is possible in fact it frequently happens that Congress will proceed based on one budgetary framework, defined by a congressional budget resolution, that differs substantially from the framework the president supports. At that point, the president can sign or veto the legislation. Usually, if there is an ongoing disagreement, the anticipation of a veto is enough to bring the entire process to a standstill. This dynamic is an important reason why there are regular, drawn out budget fights between Congress and the president as the fiscal year draws to a close each September. The two branches spend most of the year working from different budgetary plans, and then they have to scramble at the last minute to arrive at an ad hoc resolution to the disagreement so that the government can continue operating. Even if the two branches can cobble together a temporary solution, however, the situation is very different from having in place a budget framework that lasts multiple years and provides financial structure and stability to government finances. The current process does not apply any countervailing pressure to offset the institutional and political tendencies toward budget stalemate that are built directly into our constitutional

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order. The idea of joint budget resolutions offers a possible, partial antidote for such budgetary drift, rising entitlement spending, and the endless inertia in our federal budgeting practices. Unlike a congressional budget resolution, a joint resolution must be agreed to by the president and therefore would be a law. It thus has the potential to facilitate, and perhaps even pressure, the legislative and executive branches into coming to an agreement early in the process on key budgetary aggregates that would govern later decisions by both branches. There are several ways to facilitate the consideration of joint budget resolutions. The most straightforward option would be to build upon the current process by amending the current Budget Act rules to allow an optional joint-resolution "spin-off" from any congressional budget resolution that was agreed to by both the House and Senate. Congress would not have to pursue a joint resolution, but if it did so then legislation would automatically be sent to the president upon adoption of the congressional budget resolution. The joint resolution would reflect the key budgetary aggregates agreed upon: The president could then either approve or veto the legislation. If the president vetoed the joint budget resolution, the process would revert back to the same one in place today under the Budget Act. Congress could proceed under the terms of the budget resolution, and engagement with the executive branch would be postponed until later in the year, when the spending and tax bills flowing from that budget were transmitted to the president. If, however, the president agreed to the joint budget resolution and signed it into law, the budget framework contained within it would have the force of law, and both branches would be bound by it.

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## Chapter 2 : - Measurement and Reform of Budgetary Policy by Terence Sydney, Neild, R.R Ward

*Measurement and Reform of Budgetary Policy by Terence Sydney Ward. Heinemann Educational Publishers, This book has soft covers. Ex-library, With usual stamps and markings, In fair condition, suitable as a study copy.*

Introduction[ edit ] Today, when the management of money is more important than ever for public and private entities, budgeting plays an enormous role in controlling operations efficiently and effectively. Budgeting in itself is a familiar process to even the smallest economic unit – the household - but it needs to be divided into two different classes: This differentiation is important because public bodies need to go through many processes before moving into the budget execution phase and post-execution analyses; furthermore, the entire process involves the collaboration of different bodies throughout the government. This collaboration is not only for budget preparation, negotiation and approval processes, but also for the spending approval after the whole budget allocation is finalized. Compared to private sector, it is cumbersome. Another factor is the increasing awareness of the policies of the World Bank in pursuit of restructuring the budgeting and spending processes of developing nations via the World Bank Treasury Reference Model. This new model has led the public sector to understand, digest and adopt a new style. According to this new budgeting methodology, traditional methods of analyzing and utilizing budget figures are insufficient. In traditional terms, organizations start building up their long-term plans and break those plans into annual budgets that are formed as forecasts. At the end of the year, budget figures are compared with actual results and a simple actual-budget variance comparison is calculated. Since the analysis is simple, this analysis lacks any sophistication in terms of adjusting similar budget items for forthcoming periods by increasing or decreasing the expenditure estimates. Basically, variance results are generally used for revising monetary amounts for the next planning and budgeting cycle, and also for very simple departmental performance tracking. This new approach to budget analysis and utilization is many steps ahead of traditional methods. As an example, a governmental project to enhance the social welfare of children in a remote area can help explain the performance-oriented approach. For such projects, which are generally composed of long-term plans, governments decide on objectives and the activities that are required to be accomplished to achieve them. Practical ways of enhancing social welfare of children in a rural area might include increasing the job skills of parents in the area. In order to achieve such an objective, the government may plan to establish schooling infrastructures in various locations, complete with the necessary equipment, and further plan to assign trainers to those schools for implementing the educational programs. All these activities have a cost aspect and, at this point, long-term plans are broken down into annual budgets that incorporate the monetary figures. Once the long-term plans are accomplished, the traditional way to gauge the effectiveness of this whole project would be to assess the gap between the budget and the actual money spent. However, with the new budgeting approach, the questions to answer are tougher: Did we really succeed in enhancing the social welfare of children? Did this project cost what we expected? Have we done what we should have done in enhancing the social welfare of children? Peter van der Knaap from the Ministry of Finance in the Netherlands [1] suggests: Within this kind of a planning and budgeting setup, the lack of reliable information on the effects of policies emerges as a serious issue. Therefore, it is important to approach the planning and budgeting cycle in a holistic and integrated way, with collaboration across the areas of policy design, performance measures definition and policy evaluation. The technical principles for developing and implementing sound performance-based budgeting systems as a type of outcomes system are described in outcomes theory. Performance-based budgeting PBB [ edit ] This whole framework points us to a newer way of budgeting, the performance-based budgeting. It is a way to allocate resources to achieve specific objectives based on program goals and measured results. In this method, the entire planning and budgeting framework is result oriented. There are objectives and activities to achieve these objectives and these form the foundation of the overall evaluation. According to the more comprehensive definition of Segal and Summers, [4] performance budgeting comprises three elements: With

this information, it is possible to understand which activities are cost-effective in terms of achieving the desired result. As can be seen from some of the definitions used here, Performance-Based Budgeting is a way to allocate resources for achieving certain objectives, [5] Harrison [6] elaborates: From these goals, specific objectives are delineated and funds are then subdivided among them. In performance-based budgeting first the goals and objectives of organization or department are identified, then measurement tools are developed and the last step is reporting. This is a sort of a Balanced Scorecard approach in which KPIs are defined and linkages are built between causes and effects in a tree-model on top of a budgeting system which should be integrated with the transactional system, in which financial, procurement, sales and similar types of transactions are tracked. Moreover, linking resources with results provides information on how much it costs to provide a given level of outcome. Many public bodies fail to figure out how much it costs to deliver an output, primarily due to problems with indirect cost allocation. This puts the Activity-Based Costing framework into the picture. Both the concepts of scorecards, as first introduced by Kaplan and Norton, and activity-based costing are today well-known concepts in the private sector, but much less so for the public-sector bodies until the advent of Performance-Based Budgeting! Another conceptual framework that has gained ground is the relatively recently introduced CPM, again more popular in the private sector. The point is that the CPM framework has not much touched on the topic of Performance-Based Budgeting, although the similarities in policies offered by these frameworks are worth a deeper look. The technical foundation that the CPM framework puts on the table may well be a perfect means to rationalize the somewhat tougher budgeting approach, not only for the public sector but also for commercial companies. The way to CPM and PBB [edit] Leading companies are integrating various business intelligence applications and processes in order to achieve corporate performance management. These metrics and targets feed the next step in the process, Planning and Budgeting, and are eventually communicated to the front-line employees that will carry out the day-to-day activities. Targets and thresholds are loaded from the planning systems into a Business Activity Monitoring engine that will automatically notify responsible persons of potential problems in real time. The status of the business is reviewed regularly and re-forecast and, if necessary, budget changes are made. If the business performance is significantly off plan, executives may need to re-evaluate the strategy as some of the original assumptions may have changed. Optionally, activity-based costing efforts can enhance the strategic planning process – deciding to outsource key activities, for example. ABC can also facilitate improved budgeting and controls through Activity-Based Budgeting which helps coordinate operational and financial planning. The ability to establish CPM to enhance control on budget depends first upon achieving a better understanding of the business through unified, consistent data to provide the basis for a degree view of the organization. The unified data model allows you to establish a single repository of information where users can quickly access consistent information related to both financial and management reporting, easily move between reporting the past and projecting the future, and drill to detailed information. By then, you are ready to plug in - on the unified data - the applications that support consolidations, reporting, analysis, budgeting, planning, forecasting, activity-based costing, and profitability measurement. The applications are then integrated with the single repository of information and are delivered with a set of tools that allow users to follow the assessment path from strategy, to plans and budgets and to the supporting transactional data. CPM and the adoption of more public-sector oriented PBB are not easy to tackle, but in the ever-changing business and political climate they are definitely worth a closer look. Institutions of Higher Education provides incentives for colleges to enroll students and thus provide access to postsecondary education. Carter, The Performance Budget Revisited: Performance-based funding for higher education. College and university budgeting: What do we know? What do we need to know? The Finance of Higher Education: Theory, Research, Policy, and Practice.

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## Chapter 3 : Performance-based budgeting - Wikipedia

*The measurement and reform of budgetary policy. 1. The measurement and reform of budgetary policy. by Terence Sydney Ward; Robert Ralph Neild Print book: English.*

By Tim Shaw , Sandy Davis Thursday, March 8, Flaws in the federal budget process have become self-evident over the past decade, with delayed federal funding and government shutdowns turning into an annual tradition. This joint committee, like other efforts before it, has a chance to advance modest but meaningful improvements to how policymakers develop the federal budget. But what are the fundamental problems with the process that the committee will need to address? And what types of reforms should the committee consider? BPC has advocated improvements in the budget process for years, and through this work we have identified five key needs that should be addressed in budget process reform. Solving all of them would be setting unrealistic expectations for this committee, but any reforms that the members can reach agreement on should seek to advance these principles. Congress has not completed the full budget process on time since , and these delays resulted in government shutdowns four times. Funding delays make it difficult for decision makers at federal agencies to use taxpayer resources efficiently and effectively. Defense Department officials have frequently testified that delays in funding harm military readiness. The Government Accountability Office has testified on multiple occasions that government shutdowns and delays in annual funding make government less efficient. The current budget process does little to focus attention on the long-term fiscal health of the federal government. This has contributed to an outlook of trillion dollar deficits as far as the eye can see despite one of the longest U. Fixing our long-term fiscal myopia needs to be a key focus of the joint committee. One quick look at a flow chart shows why the federal budget process is so difficult to manage. On top of the multiple layers of congressional committees and subcommittees, numerous procedural points-of-order have evolved over the years, providing an additional level of complexity that can further slow the budget process. The complexity of the process also leads to a lack of transparency, furthering public distrust in the institutions that safeguard their tax dollars. As the late Sen. While the process was originally designed to be comprehensive, an increasing portion of the budget has escaped annual review over time. More than two-thirds of federal spending is on auto pilot, not subject to the annual appropriations process. Sorting through these various shortcomings will be a difficult task for the joint committee, but the work is long overdue. A good place to start would be the Domenici-Rivlin proposal from , which contains a comprehensive set of recommendations aimed at each of these issues. In , BPC compiled a report by a series of budget experts on how to account for the long term in federal budgeting. These recommendations, summarized in the table below, should help the committee as it strives for a solution that makes the federal budget process work better for the American people. Social Security, Medicare, etc.

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## Chapter 4 : Federal Budget Process Reform: Key Issues, Proposed Fixes | Bipartisan Policy Center

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Federal legislation requiring payments to vendors on a timely basis was part of a management improvement effort intended to serve as an incentive for more vendors to do business with a federal government. In , there was a proposal to modify the federal law to extend federal prompt-pay requirements to federally assisted state and local government grant and contract programs, but it did not pass because of a final-hour firestorm of criticism. The timely payment of bills is an important financial management practice that can save governments money. By carefully timing payments so there are neither late nor early payments, a government can take advantage of discounts, avoid penalties, and maximize investment return on short-term investments. Furthermore, prompt bill paying reduces vendor costs which, in turn, reduces state and local procurement costs. Governments want to be reliable business partners, so they can retain vendors and reduce the cost of goods and services. Political accountability is also a factor in the prompt payment of bills. State and local prompt-pay laws are relatively new and still evolving. According to the U. Office of Management and Budget, since the passage of the Federal Prompt Pay Act, 27 states have passed new prompt-pay laws and, in addition to this dramatic increase in new laws, states are also amending their existing prompt-pay statutes to strengthen language, increase interest penalties and eliminate loopholes. The Government Finance Officers Association encourages state and local government efforts to improve government bill-paying performance and policy, regardless of the source of financing, and opposes federal regulation of the procurement practices of state and local governments as an unnecessary federal mandate. Such a goal is clearly important, but its stringent liability provisions have placed unintended and potentially crippling liability on state and local governments. The statute makes any individual or group that has created, transported, managed or disposed of hazardous waste strictly liable for the cost of hazardous waste clean up, without regard to fault. When the federal government sues a party, that party acquires the right to sue its fellow polluters to share the clean up expense. Landfills where industrial hazardous waste has contaminated ordinary solid waste now represent approximately 20 percent of the worst hazardous waste sites in the nation as listed by the Environmental Protection Agency EPA. Private party defendants in Superfund cases have sued local governments and others to pick up a disproportionate share of the clean up expense. While EPA has recognized and been responsive to these concerns, only statutory change will provide permanent relief to governments. The Government Finance Officers Association urges Congress to adopt legislation that will bar third-party actions against state and local governments for the generation or transportation of solid waste, facilitate negotiated settlements with the federal government of potential state and local government liability, and enact other changes in the law to reduce litigation. May 4, - Back to Top Flexibility in Managing Federal Financial Assistance Programs Federal assistance programs are an integral part of the intergovernmental partnership used to address national policy goals. However, the regulatory restrictions and administrative requirements attached to many federal grant and entitlement programs often needlessly consume money, restrict local flexibility, and impede the effective delivery of services. State and local governments are dealing with increasingly complex problems that require innovative and efficient delivery of services. This fragmentation requires separate staff, offices and other additional supporting costs. Furthermore, federal laws and regulations attached to federal assistance programs often inhibit state and local governments from implementing federal programs because of costly and inappropriate requirements. Consolidation of programs and waivers of duplicative and unnecessary red tape would benefit the recipients of assistance, taxpayers, and federal, state and local governments. While the federal government should assure the fiscal and programmatic integrity of federal grants and contracts, in all cases, maximum state and local flexibility and authority should be preserved. GFOA Position The Government Finance Officers Association GFOA believes state and local governments should be afforded

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flexibility in spending and regulatory requirements in order to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of federal financial assistance and supports legislative and regulatory initiatives that would: One provision of that law granted state, local, and Indian tribal governments and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico access to federal prices for supplies and services through a cooperative purchasing program administered by the federal General Services Administration GSA. This would allow state or local governments or their agencies to purchase a full range of merchandise and equipment from the Federal Supply Schedules FSS , which in many cases represent substantial cost savings over direct commercial contracts. Participation in the program would be optional for any state and local government and for vendors who sell through the federal schedules program. In , Congress delayed implementation of this provision for 18 months. In the interim, Congress directed the U. General Accounting Office GAO to study the effects of including state and local governments in FSS cooperative purchasing on 1 small businesses and local dealers, 2 state and local governments themselves, and 3 other federal agencies. It also directed the GSA to submit recommendations to Congress prior to beginning the program. GFOA supports federal flexibility in implementing the cooperative purchasing program to allow state and local governments access to the federal schedules program in order to maximize the benefits or minimize the risks to all parties concerned. June 3, - Back to Top

Retaining Budget to Actual Comparisons Within the Audited Financial Statements Generally accepted accounting principles GAAP currently require that state and local governments present as part of their basic audited financial statements a budget to actual comparison statement for governmental funds with annual appropriated budgets. GAAP require that this budgetary comparison statement be presented on the budgetary basis of accounting to demonstrate legal compliance. If the budgetary basis of accounting differs from GAAP, as is often the case, GAAP further require that a reconciliation between the two bases of accounting be presented. This treatment has provided an invaluable link between the legal budget and GAAP financial reporting, which has served to enhance the credibility of both. Recently, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board GASB has explored the possibility of removing the budgetary comparison statement from the basic audited financial statements, mandating instead that it be presented as "required supplementary information" RSI. By definition, RSI does not fall within the scope of the independent audit of the financial statements, although auditors are required to perform certain limited procedures in connection with RSI. Given the importance attached to the budget, it is essential that stakeholders be provided reasonable assurance that a government has maintained budgetary compliance. Until now, this assurance has been provided by the inclusion of the budget to actual comparison statement within the audited financial statements. The database facility transforms the data into management information and serves as a tool to help public entities improve the performance of their risk-management programs, make better policy decisions, and control risk-financing costs. The database is used to perform financial and actuarial analyses, assess and compare performance, identify loss-control opportunities and best practices, and study other aspects of risk management. Data is sent to the PRDP database from many different sources, including cities, counties, special districts, states and insurers and other private organizations. To be useful, data must be collected, coded and stored in a common or "standardized" way that is generally accepted by governments and their data management service providers. Working with public risk managers, PRDP has developed a Liability Claims Data Standard that identifies the core data elements that are needed to manage a risk program. It provides a standardized cause of loss coding system that identifies the conduct and conditions that lead to claims. The Standard serves as a model for structuring risk management information systems and facilitates the transfer of data to the PRDP database. Implementation of the Liability Claims Data Standard benefits state and local governments by improving the quantity and quality of information that is necessary to make decisions about risk-financing options, allocate resources to control risk, and assess risk program performance. Most recently, GFOA has undertaken a comprehensive strategic initiative designed to promote the expanded use of performance measurement by state and local governments. GFOA routinely seeks opportunities to work with other groups to promote common goals; performance measurement has been no exception to this general rule. GFOA was a strong supporter, for example, of the National Advisory Council

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on State and Local Budgeting Budget Council , which identified performance measurement as an essential component of a sound budgeting process. A government uses strategic planning to identify its broad organizational objectives, which it then translates into specific goals and objectives. A government frames its budgetary decisions on the basis of results and outcomes that are directly linked to these specific goals and objectives. A government uses performance measures to monitor actual results and outcomes. A government compares actual and projected results and outcomes and uses this analysis as a basis for identifying any adjustments that are needed. Consequently, to be effective, performance measures must be specific rather than generic. That is, a performance measure is only relevant to the extent it is clearly linked to the goals and objectives that a government has set for itself. Furthermore, inasmuch as goals and objectives reflect public policy, it is only to be expected that they will differ, sometimes substantially, from government to government. Performance measures are inherently budgetary and managerial in character and clearly fall outside the purview of accounting and financial reporting, as those disciplines have traditionally and commonly been understood. In the public sector, goals and objectives are the concrete realization and reflection of public policy. In a democracy, it is the unique prerogative of elected and appointed officials to set public policy. If GASB were to mandate the reporting of specific performance measures it would effectively be usurping this prerogative. There is no such thing as a "neutral" performance measure. The selection of what to measure will inevitably drive performance. Therefore, it is unrealistic to believe that performance measures mandated by GASB would remain purely informational and somehow not have an effect on how governments manage their programs. While we freely admit that data verification is essential if performance measurement is to be credible, we do not believe it should be necessary to involve independent auditors for this purpose. Internal auditing procedures should suffice. Expertise in accounting and financial reporting, while invaluable in many aspects of public finance, does not provide a sufficient basis for making decisions regarding how to measure the quality of services. Real progress must come from governments themselves and the organizations that serve them. GFOA believes that both performance measurement and accounting will best be served by the GASB returning to its proper role as an accounting and financial reporting standard-setting body. Proposals continue to be advanced to promote competition, encourage investment in the national information infrastructure and foster widespread service. State and local governments, which strongly support access to reasonably priced technological advances, must guard against the unintended preemption of their Constitutional authority, including the power to regulate, tax, and collect franchise and other fees from communications providers that operate in their jurisdictions. State and local governments must retain these powers, regardless of the method of distribution of services, in a way that encourages the growth and diversity of the industry, and fosters state and local economic development, while at the same time assures state and local citizen and community control. Preserving the right of state and local governments to manage their own public rights-of-way and to collect fees or fair market compensation for the use of public rights-of-way from communications providers without intervention from or preemption by federal authorities, including the right to collect differing fees from various communications providers. GFOA urges the federal government to respect the legitimate interests of local governments and their residents as it debates and considers communications reform initiatives. GFOA encourages reform that retains essential local authority to determine tax and franchising policies that are consistent with local needs and maintain adequate revenue, and addresses citizen concerns about the community impact of and access to current and emerging communications technologies. They are purchasers and providers of health insurance. They must negotiate with health insurance companies to secure adequate health benefits for active and, in many cases, retired employees and their families. At the same time, they must monitor the costs of purchasing and offering these benefits. In addition, state and local governments may also serve as a community safety net or health provider of last resort, providing health care services to the uninsured, the under-insured, and Medicaid recipients. Health care is now the fastest growing portion of state and local government budgets and governments have cited rising health benefit costs as one of the main contributors to budgetary pressure. These costs limit

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spending on other important public needs such as education, infrastructure and economic development. While national health care policy is set at the federal level, health care costs fall heavily on state and local governments. GFOA encourages a federal approach that includes: Expanded Health Care Coverage. The cost of uncompensated and under-compensated health care is ultimately shifted to employers who provide health insurance coverage as well as to individual purchasers of health insurance in the form of higher medical bills and premium increases. For public employers in particular, the coverage they provide to their state and local government employees makes this cost shifting especially onerous. In addition, locally funded public health systems must provide costly health care services to an increasing number of the uninsured. Expanded health care coverage would temper the effects of cost shifting. In order to effectively expand health care coverage, the federal government should promote a full range of financing and service delivery options. Equal Consideration for All. Federal initiatives that offer health care cost saving mechanisms such as subsidies, reinsurance, purchasing cooperatives, and other options that might arise should be offered to employers, employees and providers in both the public and private sector. State and local governments shoulder a large share of the cost of the health care provided to Medicaid recipients and the uninsured. The federal government should maintain funding for Medicaid as well as Medicare. It should also permit states and local governments necessary flexibility in program design, including the coordination of benefits. In addition, the federal government should ensure that there is adequate federal funding to address costs associated with the health care provided to undocumented residents by state and local governments. Transparency within the Health Care System.

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## Chapter 5 : UPDATE: Assembly Passes Budget Reform Measure | Maclver Institute

*Budgetary reform is little different from human reform - change, when entrenched, fosters a feedback of information to support budget learning (Forrester and Adams ). Such knowledge presumably factors into the decisions about spending by responsible.*

The results on the state level, as of December , vary widely, as detailed below and in separate NCSL reports on Health exchanges and on Medicaid expansion. Update and Archive Notice: For seven years, to , some states and courts played a central role in seeking or demanding achngce in the federal ACA. As of , much health policy focus has shifted to discussions, proposals and congressional action on multiple alternative approaches, commonly termed the "American Health Care Act AHCA and related Senate measures, none of which became law. Supreme Court already admitted that an individual mandate without a tax penalty is unconstitutional," Paxton said in a statement. District Court in the Northern District of Texas. Read the lawsuit as filed. The latest lawsuit against Obamacare poses little immediate danger to the health care law " but it could look a lot more potent if the balance of the Supreme Court changes in the next two years. Supreme Court voted to uphold health insurance subsidies for people who purchased their insurance through a federal health insurance exchange. The ruling in King v. Burwell means that 6 million to 7 million people will continue to receive insurance subsidies. Supreme Court upheld most provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, but rejected the portion of the law that would have penalized states that did not comply with the expanded eligibility requirements for Medicaid, making expansion optional and a state decision. See information at U. Supreme Court and the Federal Health Law. Additional cases continue in , especially on paying insurers for the cost-sharing assistance NCSL will continue to update and analyze the law and its effects on states. A much smaller number of bills were considered - Earlier opposition enacted laws were expanded or amended in Arizona, Arkansas, South Carolina, and Tennessee. For ,15 such bills have been signed into law, in ten states. Select the keyword "Challenges, Opt-outs and Alternatives. These measures may include formal rejections of Medicaid expansion and prohibitions on running a state-based exchange. This number does not include all measures that may oppose HHS regulations or interpretations of implementation of the PPACA, such as mandated coverage of contraception, or optional steps such as administration and enforcement of insurance regulations. Summary of Enacted Provisions: Additional states have enacted measures considered non-conforming with the stated goals of the ACA, such as non-expansion of Medicaid, non-participation in the operation of the health exchange or marketplace, blocking individual health benefits such as contraception, or restrictions on navigators. These are detailed and tallied in other reports: The most recent actions were during in Arizona and Arkansas. Eighteen states currently have statutory or state constitutional language providing that state government will not implement or enforce mandates requiring the purchase of insurance by individuals or payments by employers. Supreme Court upheld the individual coverage mandate, which does not require a state role, the federal law fully applies and any contradictory state laws will have no current effect on PPACA provisions. These state laws do aim at barring state agencies and employees from enforcing fines and penalties, as of These actions are distinct from the 26 states that were parties to the federal court challenge ruled on by the Supreme Court on June 28, Utah repealed most of their compact statute in While 23 states have considered bills seeking to nullify the legal validity of the ACA, none of the bills have become law in their original form. One state, North Dakota, has enacted a law using portions of model state nullification language. Restricting use of Navigators. These are not repeated in the table above. This is binding but not statutory. Opposes elements of federal health reform, providing by constitutional amendment that residents may provide for their own health care, and that "a law or rule shall not compel any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system. Establishes the interstate "Health Care Compact" in the state of Alabama, allowing states that join the compact to propose state health policies that could replace federal provisions, citing, "Each member state, within its state, may suspend by

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legislation the operation of all federal laws, rules, regulations and orders regarding health care that are inconsistent with the laws and regulations adopted by the member state pursuant to this compact. Congress before it becomes a recognized as interstate compact. Prohibits the "funding or implementation of a state-based health care exchange or marketplace. Restricts ACA-related activities by providing that the State Insurance Department shall not allocate, budget, expend, or utilize any appropriation authorized by the General Assembly for the purpose of advertisement, promotion, or other activities designed to promote or encourage enrollment in the Arkansas Health Insurance Marketplace or the Health Care Independence Program, including unsolicited communications mailed to potential recipients; television, radio, or online commercials; billboard or mobile billboard advertising; advertisements printed in newspapers, magazines, or other print media; and Internet websites and electronic media. Also would prohibit responding to an inquiry regarding the coverage for which a potential recipient might be eligible, including without limitation providing educational materials or information regarding any coverage for which the individual might qualify. Also see S Arkansas - SB , signed into law by the governor as Act No. Provides that the Dept. Also see H Prohibits the establishment through existing state law of a state-based health insurance exchange in the state under the ACA. Referencing the King v. Burwell case before the U. Joint resolution proposes a State Constitutional amendment to prohibit laws or rules from compelling any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system, permit any person or employer to purchase lawful health care services directly from health care provider, or permit health care provider to accept direct payment from person or employer for lawful health care services. Prohibits any agency or state action to expand Medicaid or accept any federal grant money to establish a state-run health exchange. Also ends the Univ. Provides by statute that "a resident of Indiana may not be required to purchase coverage under a health plan. Other provisions restricting agencies from implementing ACA provisions were deleted from the final enacted bill. Authorizes the state to join the "Health Care Compact," requiring member states of the compact to take action to secure the consent of Congress for the compact; asserting that member states of the compact have the primary responsibility to regulate health care in their respective States. Kansas - H , passed House and Senate; signed by the governor, May 25, Opposes specific provisions of federal health reform, providing in Sec. Accepts and adopts membership in the Health Care Compact; provides that each member state, within its state, may suspend by legislation the operation of all federal laws, rules, and regulations, and orders regarding health care that are inconsistent with the laws and regulations adopted by the member state pursuant to the compact. The purposes of this compact are, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states to promote and protect the interest of consumers purchasing health benefit plan coverage. Provides that "any federal mandate implemented by the state shall be subject to statutory authorization of the general assembly. Any new proposed rule must "Certify that the rule does not have an adverse impact on, or must exempt small businesses with fewer than fifty full- or part-time employees. Establishes the interstate Health Care Compact, which would pledge member states to act jointly to oppose certain elements within health reform. Would amend state law chapter , a new section relating to the authority for creating and operating health insurance exchanges in Missouri. Would prohibit the establishment and operation of health insurance exchanges in Missouri unless the exchange is created by a legislative act, an initiative petition, or referendum, requiring voter approval. S , as Proposition E, was on the statewide ballot November 6, for a binding vote. Opposes elements of federal health reform, providing that by state law state agencies "may not implement or enforce in any way the provisions" or any federal regulation or policy implementing federal health reform "that relates to the requirement for individuals to purchase health insurance and maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage. Would prohibit, by state statute, the federal and state government from mandating the purchase of health insurance coverage; would prohibit imposing penalties related to health insurance decisions. Provides by insurance statute that a resident of New Hampshire shall not be required to obtain, to maintain, or be assessed a fee or fine for failure to obtain health insurance coverage. Effective date July 1, Prohibits the state from establishing a state based health insurance exchange. Also provides that in the event a

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federally-facilitated exchange is established for New Hampshire, the insurance commissioner retains authority with respect to insurance products sold in New Hampshire "on the federally-facilitated exchange to the maximum extent possible by law. Effective date June 18, It does permit use of federal grants for premium rate review. Continues an exception if health coverage is required by a court or by the state Department of Human Services through a court or administrative proceeding. North Dakota - S was enacted and signed by the governor, April 27, It seeks to preserve their "freedom to choose their health care and health care coverage. Oklahoma - S was enacted and signed by the governor, May 18, South Carolina - H State budget for fiscal year was enacted and signed by the governor, August 2, It includes Section Enacts state participation in the Interstate Healthcare Compact; providing that state compact members must take action to obtain congressional consent to the compact; providing that the legislature is vested with the responsibility to regulate healthcare delivered in their state; provides for healthcare funding; also establishes the S. Prohibits, by statute, the state, the TennCare or Medicaid program or its residents from participating in any state option for Medicaid eligibility expansion authorized under the federal PPACA. Non-binding resolution; requests lawsuit against any fines. Provides by statute that the state join an interstate Health Care Compact, including a pledge to take joint and separate action to secure congressional approval "in order to return the authority to regulate health care to the member states. Renames the Constitutional Defense Council and creates the Commission on Federalism; provides for the repeal of the State Health Compact by July 1, , and subjects these provisions to a point sunset review prior to repeal. Amends state law by adding a section, "Health insurance coverage not required. No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he has or is eligible for health insurance coverage under any policy or program provided by or through his employer, or a plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the federal government, shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage. No provision of this title shall render a resident of this Commonwealth liable for any penalty, assessment, fee, or fine as a result of his failure to procure or obtain health insurance coverage. A constitutional amendment, stating that residents have the right to make their own health care decisions, while "any person may pay, and a health care provider may accept, direct payment for health care without imposition of penalties or fines for doing so. Amends the duties of the Wyoming Health Insurance Exchange Steering Committee to require a study report with 3 options including 1 an exchange based on Wyoming data without influence from the health care reform acts, 2 using selected parts of required federal features and 3 an exchange in complete compliance with the Act. Congress to call a constitutional convention to propose an amendment to repeal the Affordable Care Act. Article 5 requires two-thirds of the legislatures to make such a formal request in order to convene a constitutional convention. Colorado House Seeks U. Convention to Repeal ACA. Adopted by House 42yn; adopted by Senate 28y-5n. Would oppose any state role in compulsory participation in a health care system or purchase of health insurance; would prohibit any government official from enforcing prohibitions on purchase or sale of health insurance in private health care systems otherwise authorized by the laws of the state; would affirm a right to direct payment or purchase of lawful health care services; would prohibit threats of penalties, fines, taxes, salaries, wage withholding, surcharges or fees to punish or discourage the exercise of such right. Would authorize the Governor to enter into the "Interstate Health Care Freedom Compact," intended to guarantee the right and freedom of residents to pay or not to pay directly for health care services and to participate or not to participate in health plans and health systems. Also would create an "Interstate Advisory Health Care Commission" with representatives from each member state. Would have opposed selected provisions of the ACA, by declaring that the public policy of the state "is that every person within the state of Minnesota is and shall be free to choose or decline to choose any mode of securing health care services without penalty or threat of penalty. Would provide for an "Interstate Health Care Freedom Compact;" intended to guarantee the right and freedom of residents to pay or not to pay directly for health care services and to participate or not to participate in health plans and health systems. Compacts would coordinate across state lines. Would create advisory representatives from each state and require congressional approval.

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## Chapter 6 : Formats and Editions of The measurement and reform of budgetary policy [[www.nxgvision.com](http://www.nxgvision.com)]

*This survey suggested that performance budgeting may be a natural conclusion to performance measurement, though the constraints of resource availability, policy priorities and, frankly, political imperative will always appropriately preclude its determinacy in budget outcomes.*

**Budget Framework** The Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse,<sup>1</sup> that is, the power to spend, collect revenue, and borrow. It does not, however, establish procedures by which Congress must consider budget-related legislation. The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of the Budget Act. The Budget Act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. The rotating and representational membership on the Budget Committee affords Members of the House an increased level of participation in the activities of the Budget Committee. Its rules state that no Member, other than the Member designated by leadership, shall serve more than three Congresses in any period of five successive congresses. Both Democrats and Republicans designate the Budget Committee as a nonexclusive committee. In general, this means that besides the House rule restricting any Member from serving on more than two standing committees, 12 few restrictions apply to Budget Committee members regarding their other committee assignments. For example, there have been task forces on such subjects as entitlements, tax policy, economic policy, and budget reform. This jurisdiction is protected under the Budget Act, which states that no bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report dealing with any matter within the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee shall be considered in the House unless it is a bill or resolution that has been reported by the Budget Committee or unless it is an amendment to a bill or resolution reported by the Budget Committee. Over the years, the duties and responsibilities of the Budget Committee have been established in statute, as well as House Rules.

**The Budget Resolution** The Budget Committee is responsible for developing the annual budget resolution. The budget resolution is a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the deficit or surplus, and public debt. Its purpose is to create enforceable parameters within which Congress can consider legislation dealing with spending and revenue. So rather than drafting program- or agency-oriented legislation as most other committees do, the Budget Committee, similar to the House Rules Committee, devotes most of its time to developing the parameters within which the House may consider legislation. In developing the budget resolution, the Budget Committee examines a budget outlook report that includes baseline budget projections presented to Congress by the Congressional Budget Office CBO. The Budget Committee also gathers information from the other committees of the House. The Budget Committee holds hearings at which individual Members testify. In marking up the budget resolution, the Budget Committee first considers budget aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, allowing the offering of amendments. Following adoption of the aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, the text of the budget resolution is considered for amendment. At the completion of this, a final vote on reporting the budget resolution occurs. Because the budget resolution is a concurrent resolution, once the House and Senate each adopt their own version of the budget resolution, they typically agree to go to conference to reconcile the differences between the two versions. Members of the Budget Committee represent the House in these inter-chamber negotiations. Upon agreement on a conference report, a joint explanatory statement is written to accompany the report. Within this joint explanatory statement are allocations required under Section a of the Budget Act that establish spending limits for each committee. The text of the budget resolution establishes congressional priorities by dividing spending among the 20 major functional categories of the federal budget. As a result, the spending levels in the 20 functional categories must subsequently be allocated to the committees having jurisdiction over spending. These totals are referred to as a allocations and hold committees accountable for staying within the spending limits established by the budget resolution. Members

of the conference committee and their staff work to determine appropriate allocations to be included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on the budget resolution. Reconciliation Budget resolutions sometimes include reconciliation instructions that instruct committees to develop legislation that will change current revenue or direct spending 24 laws to conform with policies established in the budget resolution. If the adopted budget resolution does include reconciliation instructions, committees respond by drafting legislative language to meet their specified targets. If only a single committee is instructed to recommend reconciliation changes, then those changes are reported directly to the chamber without packaging by the Budget Committee. The Budget Committee, however, may sometimes collaborate with House leadership to develop alternatives that may be offered as floor amendments to the reconciliation bill. Budget Process Reform Since , House Rules have provided that the Budget Committee shall have jurisdiction over the budget process generally. These rule changes can be proposed as a provision in the budget resolution, or as a separate measure. When considering budget reform, the Budget Committee may create a task force the Budget Committee does not have subcommittees, but sometimes creates ad hoc task forces to address specific issues to research potential reform issues. The task force may hold hearings where they listen to testimony from current and past Members of Congress, as well as representatives from the Administration, to help determine the need for reform. This task force held hearings and eventually released several recommendations, including making the budget resolution a joint resolution. Although budget process reform measures or budget resolutions may include provisions that have an impact on House rules, jurisdiction over the rules of the House is under the Rules Committee. The Budget Act specifically provides that a budget resolution reported from the Budget Committee that includes any matter or procedure that would change any rule of the House would trigger a referral to the House Rules Committee. Specifically, the rules state that the Committee shall review on a continuing basis the conduct by the CBO of its functions and duties. Typically these conditions consist of a committee reporting legislation dealing with a particular policy or an amendment dealing with that policy being offered on the floor. Once this action has taken place, the Budget Committee Chair submits the adjustment to his respective chamber. Reserve funds frequently require that the net budgetary impact of the specified legislation be deficit neutral. Deficit-neutral reserve funds provide that a committee may report legislation with spending in excess of its allocations, but require the excess amounts be offset by equivalent reductions elsewhere. The Budget Committee Chair may then increase the committee spending allocations by the appropriate amounts to prevent a point of order under Section of the Budget Act. Under this rule, the Budget Committee Chair is then authorized to submit for printing in the Congressional Record appropriate changes in budget resolution levels, and committee spending allocations. The Budget Act also allows for further revisions to the budget resolution. Revisions and Adjustments , by Robert Keith. Scorekeeping The Budget Committee is responsible for making summary budget scorekeeping reports available to the Members of the House on at least a monthly basis. If a Member raises a point of order that legislation or an amendment being considered on the floor violates fiscal limits, the Parliamentarian relies on the estimates provided by the Budget Committee in the form of scorekeeping reports to advise the presiding officer regarding whether the legislative matter is out of order. To assist the Budget Committee in scorekeeping, the Director of CBO is required to issue an up-to-date tabulation of congressional budget action to the Budget Committees on at least a monthly basis. Specifically, this report details and tabulates the progress of congressional action on bills and joint resolutions providing new budget authority or providing an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures for each fiscal year covered by the budget resolution. Constitution, Article I, Section 9. Constitution, Article I, Section 8. Constitution, Article 1, Section 5. Congressional Budget Act, as amended, P. House Rule X, clause 5 a 2 ii Under the Rule 16B of the House Democratic Caucus, when the Democratic Party is the majority, Democratic members will be nominated for three of the five seats reserved for Appropriations Committee members, three of the five seats reserved for Ways and Means Committee members, and at least one from the Rules Committee. When the Democratic Party is the minority, Democratic Party members will be nominated for two of the five seats reserved for Appropriations Committee members

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and two of the five seats reserved for Ways and Means Committee members. Rules of the Democratic Caucus, November 18, The House Republican Conference has no comparable rule. House Rule X, clause 5 a 2 ii and iii. Congressional Budget Act, as enacted, Section This rule does not count any service for less than a full session. Exceptions are made for those committers elected to serve as the chair or ranking member of the committee. One author has also stated that such limits were originally designed to address concerns that the Budget Committee could become too powerful if its members were able to serve many successive terms. Allen Schick, *The Federal Budget*: Brookings Institution Press, , p. This rule disregards any service for less than a full session. Exempt from this rule are an incumbent chair or ranking member having served on the Committee for three congresses and having served as chair or ranking member for not more than one Congress. House Rule X, clause 5 b 2. House Rule X, clause 5 b 2 A. Both the House Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference designate exclusive committees and generally limit service to one such panel. Democratic Members of exclusive committees cannot also serve on nonexclusive committees, but they can serve on the Budget Committee. Democrats and Republicans designate nonexclusive committees and limit Members to service on two such panels, unless the House rules contain other requirements. Congressional Budget Act, as enacted, Section b. Allen Schick, *Congress and Money: A standing order provides that resolutions be interpreted as applying to joint resolutions. The authority to include such matters comes from Sec b of the Congressional Budget Act, as amended, P. House Rule X, clause 4 f 1. Unless otherwise determined by the committee. The budget resolution for FY, S. Direct spending is provided for in legislation outside of appropriations acts and is typically established in permanent law that continues in effect until such time as it is revised or terminated by another law. Development and Consideration , by Bill Heniff Jr. Rule X, clause 1 e 2. This provision was added to House Rules in the th Congress Jurisdiction over the budget process generally was shared jointly by the House Government Operations Committee and the House Rules Committee. For more information on the Congressional Budget Office, see [http:](http://) House Rule X, clause 4 b 1. For more information on the hearing, see [https:](https://) Congressional Budget Act as amended, Section Section c , Congressional Budget Act, as amended, P. Section a , Congressional Budget Act, as amended, P. Rule XXI, clause 10 a 2 states that the effect of such measure on the deficit or surplus shall be determined on the basis of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget relative to baseline estimates supplied by the Congressional Budget Office consistent with section of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of*

### Chapter 7 : Reforming the Budget Process | National Affairs

*An Analysis of Selected Budget Process Reforms process occurred in a much broader measure, the Legislative Reform Act of committees in alignment with certain policy and budgetary.*

### Chapter 8 : About - House Budget Committee

*76 Key lessons about the what and how of budget reform can be derived from the experience of over years of reform across the full spectrum of countries.*

### Chapter 9 : ACA Impact on the Federal Budget Deficit | U.S. Health Policy Gateway

*GFOA is committed to working with federal policy makers to develop and support the health care reform initiatives discussed above in order to expand access to quality care and control the growth of health care costs.*