

Chapter 1 : Middle Power Diplomacy

The concept of middle powers raises problems of definition and classification; Holbraad recognizes these difficulties and nevertheless manages to bring order and rationality to his subject by tracing both ideas and practice through history, looking at a number of states systems (as varied as Europe).

Middle powers often refer to states that occupy a middle-level position in the international power spectrum, just below superpowers or great powers. The middle powers project significant influence and reveal some capacity to shape international developments. While the origins of the concept can be traced back to the writings of the 16th-century Italian philosopher Giovanni Botero, middle powers were arguably formalized as a category for the first time during the Paris Conference, when some of the middle powers participated in all the committees, some in one or more, and some in none. There is a lively debate in the current literature regarding the definition, categorization, and assessment of the actions of middle powers. During the Cold War era, the concept of middle powers was employed more extensively as an analytical tool in examining the role of states that lacked superpower capabilities but still enjoyed considerable influence in global politics. These developments compelled a number of scholars in international relations to differentiate between traditional and emerging middle powers that might pursue different trajectories as significant regional players. A regional power is a state that projects influence in a specific region. If this power capability is unrivaled in its region, the state could rise to the level of a regional hegemon. The regional powers display comparatively high military, economic, political, and ideological capabilities enabling them to shape their regional security agenda. There are also cases in which there is a mismatch between the self-image of a regional power and its actual capabilities and influence. The domestic-international nexus plays a critical role in shaping the material and ideational impact of middle and regional powers. The author would like to thank Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi of Koc University and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable suggestions and comments, and Jean Bennett for her able assistance during the editing process. General Overviews Middle powers, regional powers, and regional patterns of security are becoming increasingly prominent in shaping international politics. As a valuable reference work on the role of middle powers in international politics, Holbraad provides historical insights about the role of middle powers and sheds light on the structural determinants of middle-power behavior. Patience examines the concepts that shape middle-power imagining in regional and global affairs and their potential foreign-policy implications. There is also a burgeoning literature on regional powers and regionalism. Although the concept of regional power is frequently used in IR literature, the defining characteristics and sources of regional power status, as well as its connections to the global power structure and security, lead to different perspectives and interpretations. The regional power status stems from the ability to shape a region within which one may be great. There is also the interaction among self- and other-ascribed identity, structural position in the system, goals, behavior, and the ultimate impact on international processes. In assessing the factors that determine the sources of regional power status, Neumann, while offering an impressive compilation of case studies, demonstrates that solely building a military or economic power base does not suffice for the attainment of regional power status. This approach aims to capture the diversity and complexity of security dynamics in different parts of the world. A landmark study on regions, Katzenstein, also highlights the dramatic shift in the global arena since the end of the Cold War, analyzing which regions have become critical to our understanding of world politics. The book offers a compelling analysis by challenging the arguments regarding the overarching resilience of the nation-state or the inevitable march of globalization. A comprehensive volume of edited chapters, Flermes presents us with multiple lenses to assess regional powers and leadership within intraregional, interregional, and global contexts. While highlighting differences and similarities with the relatively more traditional concept of middle powers, Nolte presents an analytical concept of regional powers suitable for early 21st-century IR research. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford University Press, The Structure of International Security. Cambridge Studies in International Relations Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, While the history of each regional security complex is traced back to its origins, the main

focus is on the post-Cold War period. *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*. The authors examine the role of regional powers in intraregional, interregional, and global contexts and how they manage to influence regional and global politics, through a comparative perspective. *Middle Powers in International Politics*. Holbraad argues that middle powers have the greatest opportunity to shape the outcomes when the international system is not governed by strict bipolarity. *Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers*. *South African Journal of Political Studies* It argues that emerging and traditional middle powers distinguish themselves with their mutually influencing constitutive and behavioral differences. *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy*. Cornell University Press, Katzenstein argues that regions are interacting extensively with an American imperium that combines territorial and nonterritorial powers in a more porous world due to globalization and internationalization. *Regional Great Powers in International Politics*. *Analytical Concepts and Research Topics*. Nolte also elaborates on the implications of the ascent of regional powers for global politics. *Theories of New Regionalism*: This comprehensive study covers a wide range of themes, including new regionalism and world order approaches, global governance, region building, and regional security complex theory. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login. *How to Subscribe Oxford Bibliographies Online* is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative click [here](#).

Middle power, in international relations, a state that holds a position in the international power spectrum that is in the "middle" below that of a superpower, which wields vastly superior influence over all other states, or of a great power, but with sufficient ability to shape international events.

The work observes that the use of the lexicon emerging - regarding to markets, countries or powers - as a qualifier for a range of international relations phenomena became a constituent part of the matter. In spite of that, the empirical denotation of the predicate is ahead of the amount of efforts on its theoretical contextualization. Our methodological hypothesis is that the rational denial of the concepts prevailing connotative spectrum by acknowledging the embedded wisdom about cognate phenomena synthesizes a theoretical framework on its accurate use. It starts from the observation that the use of this term as a qualifier of international phenomena makes it a constituent part of the international affairs vernacular. However, the manifold meanings deriving its current usage lack in ordering the principles governing the phenomenon that it denotes. This article targets this gap and aims to contribute for its supplementation. Our methodological hypothesis is that the prevailing connotative spectrum deriving the "travelling and stretching" of the concept of lexicon emerging Sartori, in its appropriation to international relations has to be understood through its denial by the embedded theoretical wisdom about cognate phenomena. This work acknowledges that in post Cold War world, an ongoing discussion on the distribution of power among countries has been raised. In this environment of change in politics and international economics, the predicate emerging develops and is appropriated by the study of international relations. It came from the Wall Street jargon and is therefore built into the classificatory framework of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other multilateral organizations, without a definitional systematization, being initially exchangeable with the term "developing country". Even though the semantic differences between the adjectives "developing" and "emerging" were very tenuous, the developments in their denotation have given them different meanings. The Goldman Sachs 1 reports redefined the discussion of emerging markets, indicating, among them, those who in fact could perform the hierarchical transition to the centre, from the economic and institutional point of view. Since then, the BRIC acronym bequeaths a stronger political sense to the idea of an emerging actor in a wider sense. The meaning of this adjective is "stretched" beyond the operational term "emerging market" and "travels" to denote these countries that were ascending in the political hierarchies and the international economy. The semantic transformations arising from this process are systematized in a conceptual prototype, presented in the third section of this paper. In its new political guise, the qualifier emerging as the adnoun "emerging power" conveys the endowed theoretical accumulation about its subject, the rise in international relations. This debate on hierarchical transition of the countries from the intermediate spectrum of power distribution is, however, prior to the current juncture. The categories of middle powers, regional powers and semi-periphery consecrate a literature concerned with these intermediate actors and their possibilities of rise. This debate comprises the theoretical context of the term emerging power as a concept about upward transitions within the hierarchy of international relations. The conceptual synthesis intended in this article comprises the systematization of the dialect relation between the semantic patterns in the use of lexicon emerging and the theoretical accumulation underlying it. This mutually constitutive opposition is perceived as the theoretical context of semantic transformations undergone by the concept in its appropriation to the literature on international affairs. Epistemologically, this study has a grammatical character, in the sense of Wittgenstein, , as the search for rules and principles entangled in a lexical field within a limited linguistic context. In this case, the objective is to understand the interaction of the lexicon emerging with its linguistic context, the theoretical accumulation on hierarchical dynamic in politics and international economy. This paper is developed in four sections. The next section states the guiding methodological hypothesis of this work and discusses the epistemological character of its potential outcomes. In the third section, it is presented the two dialectical moments of the concept: This confrontation will be made through the contextualization of the patterns of use of the concept by its rules of use, allowing its grammatical synthesis, our aimed contribution to make the concept more precise, which takes

place in the fourth section. Classically, the concepts have the function to define reality, to differentiate the particular from the general, to define necessary and sufficient conditions to identify a feature of reality Goertz, , p. This conception, grounded in an Aristotelian essence and appearance dualism, is at the heart of the idea of conceptual "travelling" and "stretching" in Sartori, For Sartori, , a concept is an abstract construct, belonging to the realm of logics, responsible for the definition of the constitutive elements of a phenomenon, the semantic form of a substantive content. From this arises the notion of "conceptual travelling and stretching", whenever a category is associated to new empirical referents that deform the connotative boundaries. The conceptual "stretching" indicates over-extension 2 of a concept, that is, its use to identify cases that are beyond its original attributes. The expansion itself of the denotative spectrum of the category is what Sartori calls conceptual "traveling". However, part of the literature identifies in these processes a transformation in the concept, but not its deformation. According to Rosch and Mervis, and Lakoff, , the radial centre of this category is its more prototypical set of attributes, although other combinations are also accepted. As stated, this notion has epistemological foundation in Wittgenstein, , whose pragmatic notion of concepts makes its formation synonymous to a theoretical contextualization of patterns comprising its employment in language. The different subtypes components of radial category would be new contexts to apply the same concept, governed by new rules and principles that would redefine its connotative boundaries. The example of the concept of mother 3 , used to illustrate the archetype of family resemblances, is quite linear for this argument: The lexicon emerging went through a similar process, the category "emerging market", used to give credibility to economies that were restructuring their institutions in search of refinancing their debt crises in the s Pilbeam, , has acquired new meanings as the reality of its referents was transformed. New subjects became part of the predicate emerging, their referents were then identified as countries and emerging powers. With these new meanings, the concept progressively becomes part of the vernacular framework of international relations, as a sign of the change within the hierarchy of its political and economic processes. As part of a historical process, this effort of contextualization bears synergy to Hegelian dialectics. As remarked in Fonseca, , the "travelling" of the concept and semantic changes of its "stretching" can be interpreted as the reconstruction of the reality in history, revealed through language. Thus, the historical events that have conducted the concept emerging to qualify international political and economic phenomena produced semantic transformations corresponding to them. The real concrete of which we speak is either the real-revealed-by-discourse and discourse-that-reveals-the-real. This corresponds to the abstraction *Verstand* of a constitutive element *Moment* of the subject *Gegenstand*. The real comprehension of this subject could only be revealed by its constitutive universality. Hence, the forms that the lexicon emerging has acquired in its appropriation to qualify new phenomena is its identity, which is true in itself, but it is not in relation to the reality that exists beyond it: In other words, the perfect match between the concept *Begriff* and its object *Gegenstand* is not what delimits its boundaries, but is what confronts it, creating a positive and rational synthesis in the process called dialectics Hegel, The rational comprehension of the concept is the synthesis of the contradiction that moves it. However, the idea that there is a conflict between the current definition of a concept and rules of use underlying its theorizing is not restricted to the "Hegelian night" that Sartori criticizes, , p. Even Gerring, , pp. On the foundation of Collier and Mahon, , Wittgenstein, , p. In this sense, the terms in opposition have to be understood as connotative conflicts about the notion of rise, between internal and external ontological aspects of the lexicon emerging, and, on the one hand, the pragmatics of usage in the field and, on the other, the grammar governing the theoretical understanding of its object. So, the rules in the current use of the concept generate a thesis about itself, delimiting a conceptual prototype of an emerging power to be rationally denied. The rational comprehension of its attributes comprises the confrontation with its rules of use, the logic offered by the understanding of the same reality in other predicates for the same subject. These attributes will be sought in other competing categories about an intermediate position in power distribution - middle power, regional power and semi-periphery. The relationship between the two discursive fields, which generate this dispute, is expressed by its common phenomenal reality: Those established categories in literature are the antithesis, which allows the concept to be ordered. In turn, the literature which makes use of the term represents the meeting of this theoretical

accumulation with a new historicity, positing him as thesis, to be rationally denied. From this mutually constitutive opposition, is synthesized the concept of an emerging power appropriated to its theoretical context. Procedurally, the work is structured on the reinterpretation of semantic patterns deriving the usage of the predicate emerging by the logic of those competing theoretical categories, to conform a new radial hierarchy Collier and Levitsky, The answer to these questions will synthesize the concept of emerging power and complete the "travelling" and the "stretching" of the lexicon emerging in its appropriation to study international political and economic relations, speculating a connotative a new equilibrium to be reinterpreted for the accurate denotation of further phenomena. It is intended to generate a theoretical framework on an emerging power, the synthesis of a convention on its meaning to allow the ordering of its attributes to understand the reality. Emerging is usually placed as an attribute of power as a reference to an increasing degree of might of a country in politics and international economy. Schenoni, , p. However, semantic patterns of the lexicon emerging reveal a broader range of meanings, where behaviour patterns gain relevance. According to a study 4 performed, an emerging power would be the one whose diplomatic behaviour aims to reform or to review the international order, having material support to its claims. This pattern of behaviour is prototypically associated with a non-identity belonging to the status quo of the international order. The prototypical attributes illustrated in Figure 1 identify the thesis that this section seeks to reinterpret. However, the course of history since the second half of the twentieth century has given way to countries whose degree of integration to systemic processes would not allow this taxonomic gap anymore Lima, , p. A specific object of study has been recognized, a group of countries which "[This theoretical approach towards intermediate states has been developed into three categories: All these three depict distinct dimensions of position and its rupture, conforming an antithesis to the lexicon emerging, which allows us to synthesize it as a concept. Middle Powers and Intermediate States Research on Intermediate States or Middle powers have a common understanding that States are disposed in a certain scale of power among nations. Part of this literature Schneider, Welcher, Woods apud Sennes, , p p; Dupas, seeks to make up such scales from tangible power. Nevertheless, acknowledging the work Keohane, , the most conspicuous development of this literature has focused on the particular attitudes, behaviour and strategies of the intermediate position instead of their material foundation. Keohane, , p. Middle powers are those who have their influence in international affairs necessarily mediated by alliances and multilateral coalitions, the "system-affecting states". Lima, dilutes this segmentation in a continuum between autonomy and vulnerability, where key players are distinguished by having the two at similar doses, in which gains of autonomy would mean a rise. Hurrell, emphasizes the role of historically constructed self-perception, as to their emergence ambitions, in the particularity of a country in its intermediate position. Therefore, foreign policy goals associated with a higher level of systemic influence would be the sign of the upper range of a country from its intermediate position. Still, this perception of influence to Keohane, , pp. The condition of creating more favourable political decisions in multilateral spheres not only represents a gain of influence itself, but also the possibility of these policies in habilitating new capabilities, and these into new political gains that make a collective strategy the most effective for agents who are not decisive in the international system. For Lima, , the formation of a critical mass of interdependent interests would enable the meta-power obtained in coalitions within international regimes to become effective power for systemic projection. Hurrell, , pp. Summing up, for this approach of the intermediate position, the identification of countries that fall in the category can, or should, be based on possession of a middle level of resources - usually income level, military capacity and population - but their behaviour is unlikely to be understood as a direct derivation of this material ground. It is the perception and recognition of similar interests and converging identities that transform the distinct range of capabilities in this midway into patterns of behaviour in international politics, as shown in Figure 2. In any case, the approach converges to recognize the degree of autonomy for systemic political action as the criterion which ranks the actors in the international system. Figure 3 seeks to organize the perceived causalities in the literature. The upper causal axis of the figure refers to the acknowledgment of a necessary material ground of the position; even though, its causality depends on variables exogenous to this literature, which leaves an explanatory gap. The lower causal axis organizes the strategies suggested by the reviewed authors that enable a greater autonomy for agency in the

system. Collective action is perceived as the way to, through the constitution of meta-power from alliances and coalitions, to allow an increase of capabilities and political agency. A regional power is a category that delimitates the geographically classical notion of international politics, the ability to project power Nolte, , pp. This literature conceives regional powers as actors able to dispute the polarity, the leadership or even constitute hegemony in a particular region. This projection of power can be sustained in the possession of material resources, in the capacity ideational direction or in the effective determination of the behaviour of partners in a region Flermes, , p. Buzan and Waever, and Mearsheimer, offer the inceptive theoretical frameworks on the determination of a regional power. On the other hand, Mearsheimer, , pp. Figure 4 seeks to illustrate this theoretical definition of the intermediate position in sub-systemic approaches.

Middle powers, regional powers, and regional patterns of security are becoming increasingly prominent in shaping international politics. Nevertheless, discussions of middle powers in literature on international relations (IR) still lack a consensus about what the term "middle power" actually means.

The origins of the concept of the middle power as an analytical tool can be traced to the 16th century, in the writings of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Botero. Even though that concept may seem a relatively straightforward construct, there is disagreement among theorists about how middle powers should be defined and how they act in world politics. There are two ways to define a middle power: The first conceptualization stems from a realist paradigm and the second from a pluralist paradigm. Research suggests that middle powers are categorically different because of their reliance on diplomacy and the specific conditions under which they pursue foreign policy. Middle powers favour multilateral foreign policy and the formation of coalitions rather than unilateral decision making in foreign policy. However, middle powers do not challenge the status quo in the international system; they are not revisionist or transformatist states. During the Cold War, the concept of middle powers became empirically stronger as an analytical tool in international relations as a result of a balance of power between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. States that did not have superpower capability but still exerted some influence in world politics, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden, were categorized as middle powers. This categorization sought to acknowledge the role they played in international relations while also allowing an analytical differentiation between different types of power. The role that middle powers play as legitimate brokers is emphasized in the pluralist paradigm of international-relations theory. Middle powers are important to the creation and maintenance of world order, and they favour the establishment of international institutions. In that sense, they act as stabilizers in the world system. According to conventional international-relations theory, hegemonic powers are responsible for the creation of international institutions, but the maintenance and survival of those institutions depend on the convergence of interests between other players; that is where the role of middle powers is enhanced. Middle powers often concern themselves with issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, international economic order, debt relief, banning of land mines—issues that do not directly involve the vital interests of the great powers. In such international problems, middle powers are able to set and influence international agendas, build successful coalitions, and challenge great-power hegemony in those issues. That role played by middle powers results partly from perceptions of their legitimate concerns on issues of human security. Middle powers can succeed in effecting change because of their diplomatic capability and their ability to project a credible position, which enables them to act as moral and intellectual leaders. Middle powers also typically possess highly institutionalized foreign services and are able to disseminate their ideas and foreign-policy objectives through the relatively wide network of diplomatic missions they maintain. Some theorists and researchers have also sought to differentiate between types of middle powers, mainly between traditional and emerging middle powers. An important trait for emerging middle powers e.

Middle Powers in International Politics. Authors international relations political science politics.

Political scientists, historians, and practitioners of international relations diplomats have used the following concepts of political power: Power as a goal of states or leaders; Power as a measure of influence or control over outcomes, events, actors and issues; Power as victory in conflict and the attainment of security; Power as control over resources and capabilities; Power as status, which some states or actors possess and others do not. Economic growth, military growth, cultural spread etc. The German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz [3] is considered to be the quintessential projection of European growth across the continent. In more modern times, Claus Moser has elucidated theories centre of distribution of power in Europe after the Holocaust, and the power of universal learning as its counterpoint. This influence can be coercive, attractive, cooperative, or competitive. Mechanisms of influence can include the threat or use of force, economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy, and cultural exchange. Under certain circumstances, states can organize a sphere of influence or a bloc within which they exercise predominant influence. Historical examples include the spheres of influence recognized under the Concert of Europe, or the recognition of spheres during the Cold War following the Yalta Conference. However, "realist" theory attempted to maintain the balance of power from the development of meaningful diplomatic relations that can create a hegemony within the region. British foreign policy, for example, dominated Europe through the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of France. They continued the balancing act with the Congress of Berlin in 1878, to appease Russia and Germany from attacking Turkey. Britain has sided against the aggressors on the European continent. This general usage is most commonly found among the writings of historians or popular writers. Power as capability [edit] American author Charles W. Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft. This definition is quantitative and is most often [dubious – discuss] used by geopoliticians and the military. Capabilities are thought of in tangible terms – they are measurable, weighable, quantifiable assets. A good example for this kind of measurement is the Composite Indicator on Aggregate Power, which involves 54 indicators and covers the capabilities of 44 states in Asia-Pacific from to Chinese strategists have such a concept of national power that can be measured quantitatively using an index known as comprehensive national power. Power as status [edit] Definitions [edit] Much effort in academic and popular writing is devoted to deciding which countries have the status of "power", and how this can be measured. If a country has "power" as influence in military, diplomatic, cultural, and economic spheres, it might be called a "power" as status. There are several categories of power, and inclusion of a state in one category or another is fraught with difficulty and controversy. He does not begin the book with a theoretical definition of a "great power"; however he does list them, separately, for many different eras. Moreover, he uses different working definitions of a great power for different eras. If the mark of a Great Power is country which is willing to take on any other, then France like Austria-Hungary had slipped to a lower position. But that definition seemed too abstract in to a nation geared up for war, militarily stronger than ever, wealthy, and, above all, endowed with powerful allies. In 1947, William T. Fox defined superpower as "great power plus great mobility of power" and identified three states, the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States. In historical mentions, the term great power refers to the states that have strong political, cultural and economical influence over nations around them and across the world. A subjective description of influential second-tier states that could not quite be described as great or small powers. A middle power has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others particularly in the realm of security and takes diplomatic leads in regional and global affairs. The International System is for the most part made up by small powers. They are instruments of the other powers and may at times be dominated;

but they cannot be ignored. This term is used to describe a nation that exercises influence and power within a region. Being a regional power is not mutually exclusive with any of the other categories of power. The majority of them exert a strategic degree of influence as minor or secondary regional powers. A primary regional power like Australia has often an important role in international affairs outside of its region too. Refers to a country whose culture , arts or entertainment have worldwide appeal, significant international popularity or large influence on much of the world. Countries such as Italy , [23] Japan , [24] [25] Spain , [26] [27] [28] the United Kingdom , [29] [30] and the United States [31] have often been described as cultural superpowers, although it is sometimes debated on which one meets such criteria. Describes a country that supplies large amounts of energy resources crude oil , natural gas , coal , uranium , etc. Australia and Canada are potential energy superpowers due to their large natural resources. Hard power , Soft power , and Smart power Some political scientists distinguish between two types of power: The former is coercive example: Hard power refers to coercive tactics: Hard power is generally associated to the stronger of nations, as the ability to change the domestic affairs of other nations through military threats. Realists and neorealists , such as John Mearsheimer , are advocates of the use of such power for the balancing of the international system. Joseph Nye is the leading proponent and theorist of soft power. Instruments of soft power include debates on cultural values, dialogues on ideology, the attempt to influence through good example, and the appeal to commonly accepted human values. Means of exercising soft power include diplomacy, dissemination of information, analysis, propaganda, and cultural programming to achieve political ends. Others have synthesized soft and hard power, including through the field of smart power. This is often a call to use a holistic spectrum of statecraft tools, ranging from soft to hard. Bolstered by shipments of gold and silver from the Americas, the Spanish Habsburg dynasty emerged as a dominant force and regularly launched military interventions to project its power and defend Catholicism, while its rival, France, was torn apart by religious civil war. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith and completed its conquest of the Balkan region. During the 17th century the Netherlands and Sweden were added to the group, whilst the Ottomans, Poland and Spain gradually declined in power and influence. France progressively grew stronger and by the latter part of the century found itself repeatedly facing alliances designed to hold its military power in check. In the 18th century, Great Britain formed from a union of England and Scotland progressively gained strength and Russia and Prussia also saw their importance increase, while Sweden and the Dutch Republic declined. Great Britain and France increasingly struggled for dominance both on the continent and abroad notably in North America , the Caribbean and India. The struggle between the two nations ended only in with the final defeat of the French under Napoleon. During the 19th century, there was an informal convention recognising five Great Powers in Europe: In the late 19th century the newly united Italy was added to this group.

Chapter 5 : The International Relations of the Arab Spring | Middle East Policy Council

In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is not a superpower nor a great power, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition.

About November 12, last updated Richard Gowan Monday, Nov. For the past decade, believers in international cooperation and multilateral institutions have invested a lot of hope in states like Brazil, India and South Korea. Such powers are big enough to play a major part in managing global order, the optimists argue. But unlike China and the U. The not-quite-superpowers gained new diplomatic clout in , when the U. All of a sudden, officials from Argentina and South Korea were participating in first-order global decision-making. There was still an unofficial hierarchy in the Gâ€”with America and China wielding the greatest clout, and Europeans nervously defending their turfâ€”but it looked like a strategic pivot. Yet when G leaders meet in Buenos Aires at the end of this month for their annual pow-wow, there will be a lot of talk about how some middle powers could undermine cooperation. There will be a particular focus on Brazil and its new president-elect, the far-right Jair Bolsonaro, although he will not take office until January. He has back-tracked on the latter threat , but even so, his administration is likely to be a far cry from those of his recent predecessors, who tended to talk piously about sustainable development and green causes. If Brazil is set to be one center of speculation in Buenos Aires, it is hardly the only G member that seems to be turning against international cooperation. Saudi Arabia faces rising criticism for pressing ahead with its brutally destructive military campaign in Yemen despite repeated pleas from the U. For leaders like these, the G and other multilateral talking shops seem to offer little real help in an increasingly competitive multipolar environment. Security Council for failing to stabilize the country. Having campaigned for a permanent seat on the council for decades, Indian diplomats are frustrated at the U. It makes more sense for these powers to advance their interests through bilateral deals and coalition-building with power players like the U. This is quite logical in strategic terms. While the Obama administration coaxed these middle powers to take multilateralism seriously, Trump is actively encouraging them to cut deals away from international institutions. For many middle powers, building up political capital with Trump is a far more concrete diplomatic goal than protecting a weakened global system. Not all G members are running away from multilateralism. Argentina is using its chairmanship of the group as an opportunity to show that it is a responsible global player after a long period of economic and political nationalism. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa is similarly aiming to re-establish South Africa as a respected actor in global forumsâ€”a position it enjoyed in the immediate post-apartheid eraâ€”after diplomatic drift under his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. Still, the number of committed multilateralists around the G table may shrink further. The day after Jair Bolsonaro triumphed in Brazil, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that she will withdraw from German politics in the next few years after bad regional election results. But her eventual departure will be keenly felt by fans of multilateral cooperation. Yet analysts inside and outside Germany ascribe her political retreat to her unusually liberal approach to refugees. While her coalition is doing poorly in the polls and the hard right has gained votes, the instinctively multilateralist Green Party is gaining political momentum. Whoever replaces Merkel as chancellor will probably find it necessary to maintain many of the outward-looking policies that have come to define her tenure. The G could become an echo chamber for these nationalists, rather than the successful economic crisis manager it was in Another global economic shock could jolt the assembled leaders back into a more cooperative mode. But it could equally precipitate a further fragmentation of the global system. Rather than save multilateralism, hawkish middle powers could yet pick it apart. Follow him on Twitter at RichardGowan1.

Chapter 6 : Middle power - Wikipedia

The role of middle powers in international politics has come under increasing scrutiny in the post-Cold War period. Holbraad's text stands as a core analysis of the role that middle powers have played in various historical systems and presents an interesting and inciteful argument about the structural determinants of middle power behaviour.

The BBC external service had a difficult time with its own government when it included negative press comment on the British role in the Suez Crisis. Whereas the study of international relations in the newly founded Soviet Union and later in communist China was stultified by officially imposed Marxist ideology, in the West the field flourished as the result of a number of factors: The traditional view that foreign and military matters should remain the exclusive preserve of rulers and other elites yielded to the belief that such matters constituted an important concern and responsibility of all citizens. This increasing popularization of international relations reinforced the idea that general education should include instruction in foreign affairs and that knowledge should be advanced in the interests of greater public control and oversight of foreign and military policy. This new perspective was articulated by U. The extreme devastation caused by the war strengthened the conviction among political leaders that not enough was known about international relations and that universities should promote research and teaching on issues related to international cooperation and war and peace. International relations scholarship prior to World War I was conducted primarily in two loosely organized branches of learning: Involving meticulous archival and other primary-source research, diplomatic history emphasized the uniqueness of international events and the methods of diplomacy as it was actually conducted. International law – especially the law of war – had a long history in international relations and was viewed as the source of fundamental normative standards of international conduct. The emergence of international relations was to broaden the scope of international law beyond this traditional focal point. Between the two world wars During the s new centres, institutes, schools, and university departments devoted to teaching and research in international relations were created in Europe and North America. In addition, private organizations promoting the study of international relations were formed, and substantial philanthropic grants were made to support scholarly journals, to sponsor training institutes, conferences, and seminars, and to stimulate university research. Three subject areas initially commanded the most attention, each having its roots in World War I. During the revolutionary upheavals at the end of the war, major portions of the government archives of imperial Russia and imperial Germany were opened, making possible some impressive scholarly work in diplomatic history that pieced together the unknown history of prewar alliances, secret diplomacy, and military planning. These materials were integrated to provide detailed explanations of the origins of World War I. There also were extensive memoirs and volumes of published documents that provided much material for diplomatic historians and other international relations scholars. The newly created League of Nations, which ushered in the hope and expectation that a new and peaceful world order was at hand, was a second subject that captured significant attention. Some of the international relations schools that were founded in the interwar period were explicitly created to prepare civil servants for what was expected to be the dawning age of international government. Accordingly, intensive study was devoted to the genesis and organization of the league, the history of earlier plans for international federations, and the analysis of the problems and procedures of international organization and international law. The third focal point of international relations scholarship during the early part of the interwar period was an offshoot of the peace movement and was concerned primarily with understanding the causes and costs of war, as well as its political, sociological, economic, and psychological dimensions. In the s the breakdown of the League of Nations, the rise of aggressive dictatorships in Italy, Germany, and Japan, and the onset of World War II produced a strong reaction against international government and against peace-inspired topics in the study of international relations. The moral idealism inherent in these topics was criticized as unrealistic and impractical, and the academic study of international relations came to be regarded as the handiwork of starry-eyed peace visionaries who ignored the hard facts of international politics. In particular, scholars of international relations were criticized for suggesting standards of international conduct that bore little

resemblance to the real behaviour of nations up to that time. As the desired world of peaceful conflict resolution and adherence to international law grew more distant from the existing world of aggressive dictatorships, a new approach to the study of international relations, known as realism, increasingly dominated the field. Nevertheless, the scholarly work on world affairs of the early interwar period, despite the decline in its reputation and influence, was extensive and sound, encompassing the collection and organization of large amounts of important data and the development of some fundamental concepts. Some topics of study in international relations that are still considered novel or of recent origin were already being vigorously explored in the interwar period. Indeed, a brief review of these topics tends to undermine the image of the interwar period as one dominated by moralistic ideas. Although these earlier studies tended to be somewhat short on theory and long on description, most of the topics examined remain relevant in the 21st century. The scholarly contributions of some individuals in the s were particularly noteworthy because they foreshadowed the development of international relations studies after World War II. Lasswell, for example, explored the relationships between world politics and the psychological realm of symbols, perceptions, and images; Abram Kardiner and his associates laid the groundwork for an approach, based on a branch of anthropology known as culture-and-personality studies, that later became a popular but short-lived theory of international relations; Frederick L. Schuman, setting a style that is still followed by interpreters of foreign policy and by journalists, synthesized analytic commentary with accounts of current international events; Quincy Wright investigated numerous aspects of international behaviour and war as head of one of the first team research projects in international relations; and E. Carr, Brooks Emeny, Carl J. In the Spanish poet, historian, philosopher, and diplomat Salvador de Madariaga, founder of the College of Europe, relied upon his experience in working with the League of Nations Secretariat in Geneva to describe the gap between what was being said or written about international relations and what was actually happening. The broadened definition and scope of the study of international relations were among the fundamental contributions of scholars of the interwar period. Many of these innovators were enlisted by governments during World War II for work in intelligence and propaganda, as well as other aspects of wartime planning. In this respect the war stimulated systematic social-scientific investigations of international phenomena. It also led to important technological advances— notably the computer —that would later have a major impact on the study of international relations. In other ways World War II was a divide for academic international relations. The war itself brought about a drastic change in the agenda of world politics, and the postwar intellectual climate was characterized by a marked shift away from many earlier interests, emphases, and problems. In the early postwar years there was a quest for analyses that would cut through the details of studies of myriad international topics to produce a general understanding of common elements and a clear view of the fundamental nature of international politics. There was also a growing interest in developing theories that could help to explain the major issues of the changing international scene. New security issues emerged, including the issue of nuclear weapons, which led to extensive writings on deterrence as a basis of strategic stability. Schelling, Henry A. Kissinger, and Albert Wohlstetter. Other issues that were addressed in the vast literature of international relations include international, and especially European, integration; alliances and alignment, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO; ideologies; foreign-policy decision making; theories about conflict and war; the study of low-intensity conflict; crisis management; international organizations; and the foreign policies of the increasing number of states that became part of the international system in the mid- to late 20th century. The postwar ascendancy of realism Hans J. Not only did it become one of the most extensively used textbooks in the United States and Britain—it continued to be republished over the next half century—it also was an essential exposition of the realist theory of international relations. Although there are many variations of realism, all of them make use of the core concepts of national interest and the struggle for power. According to realism, states exist within an anarchic international system in which they are ultimately dependent on their own capabilities, or power, to further their national interests. The most important national interest is the survival of the state, including its people, political system, and territorial integrity. Other major interests for realists include preservation of the culture and the economy. Realists contend that, as long as the world is divided into nation-states in an anarchic setting, national interest will remain the essence of international

politics. The struggle for power is part of human nature and takes essentially two forms: Collaboration occurs when parties find that their interests coincide. Rivalry, competition, and conflict result from the clash of national interests that is characteristic of the anarchic system. Accommodation between states is possible through skillful political leadership, which includes the prioritizing of national goals in order to limit conflicts with other states. In an international system composed of sovereign states, the survival of both the states and the system depends on the intelligent pursuit of national interests and the accurate calculation of national power. Realists caution that messianic religious and ideological crusades can obscure core national interests and threaten the survival of individual states and the international system itself. Such crusades included, for Morgenthau, the pursuit of global communism or global democracy, each of which would inevitably clash with the other or with other competing ideologies. The attempt to reform countries toward the ideal of universal trust and cooperation, according to realists, runs counter to human nature, which is inclined toward competition, conflict, and war. Realist theory emerged in the decade after World War II as a response to idealism, which generally held that policy makers should refrain from immoral or illegal actions in world affairs. As no impressive new formulation of political idealism appeared on the international scene to reply to realist theory, the debate between realism and idealism gradually faded, only to be revived in a somewhat different form in the final decades of the 20th century in the disagreement between neoliberal institutionalists and neorealist structuralists. Many international relations scholars neither rejected nor embraced realism but instead were engrossed in other aspects of the broadening agenda of international relations studies. Beginning in the 1950s, as the United States became more fully engaged in world affairs, the U.S. In order to understand the major forces and trends shaping countries such as the Soviet Union and China or the regions extending from Africa to Northeast Asia, the United States needed to recruit greater numbers of specialists in the histories, politics, cultures, economies, languages, and literature of such areas; the Soviet Union did likewise. Theoretical concerns generally played a marginal role in the growth of area specialization in the West. The behavioral approach and the task of integration In the 1950s an important development in the social sciences, including the study of international relations, was the arrival of new concepts and methodologies that were loosely identified in ensemble as behavioral theory. This general approach, which emphasized narrowly focused quantitative studies designed to obtain precise results, created a wide-ranging controversy between theorists who believed that the social sciences should emulate as much as possible the methodologies of the physical sciences and those who held that such an approach is fundamentally unsound. In addition, the great number of new topics investigated at the time—including cognition, conflict resolution, decision making, deterrence, development, the environment, game theory, economic and political integration, and systems analysis—provoked some anxiety that the discipline would collapse into complete conceptual and methodological chaos. This task proved to be a difficult one. Indeed, some scholars began to question the necessity or even the possibility of arriving at a single theory that would explain all the varied, diverse, and complex facets of international relations. Instead, these researchers suggested that a number of separate theories would be needed. At the same time, theories that trace the forces of international relations to a single source were increasingly viewed as unsatisfactory. The struggle for power, for example, was accepted as a fact in past and current international politics, but attempts to make all other factors subordinate to or dependent upon power were thought to exclude too much of what is important and interesting in international relations. Similar assessments were made of the theory that asserts that the character of a nation—and hence the character of its participation in international relations—is determined by its child-rearing practices, as well as of the Marxist theory that international relations are solely the historical expression of class struggle. The general attitude of the behavioral decade was that the facts of international relations are multidimensional and therefore have multiple causes. This conclusion supported, and in turn was supported by, the related view that an adequate account of these facts could not be provided in a single integrated theory and that multiple separate theories were required instead. By the 1960s, for example, studies of international conflict had come to encompass a number of different perspectives, including the realist theory of the struggle for power between states and the Marxist notion of global class conflict, as well as other explanations. At the same time, conflict theory coexisted with economic and political integration theory and game theory, each of which approached

the phenomena of international conflict from a distinct perspective. In keeping with the multiple-theory approach, by the end of the behavioral decade there was a growing consensus that the study of international relations should encompass both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Whereas quantitative methodologies were recognized as useful for measuring and comparing international phenomena and identifying common features and patterns of behaviour, qualitative analyses, by focusing on one case or a comparison of cases involving specific research questions, hypotheses, or categories, were thought to provide a deeper understanding of what is unique about political leaders, nations, and important international events such as World War II and the Cold War. The use of quantitative analysis in international relations studies increased significantly in the decades after the 1950s. This was a direct result of advances in computer technology, both in the collection and retrieval of information and in the analysis of data. When computers were introduced in international relations studies, it was not readily apparent how best to exploit the new technology, partly because most earlier studies of international relations were set forth in narrative or literary form and partly because many of the phenomena examined were not easily quantifiable. Nevertheless, exploratory quantitative studies were undertaken in a number of directions. A growing body of studies, for example, developed correlations between phenomena such as alliances and the outbreak or deterrence of war, between levels of political integration and levels of trade, communication, and mobility of populations, between levels of economic development and internal political stability, and between levels of internal violence and participation in international conflicts. The later 20th century Foreign policy and international systems The influence of behaviourism helped to organize the various theories of international relations and the discipline into essentially two principal parts, or perspectives: Within each of these perspectives there developed various theories. The foreign-policy perspective, for example, encompasses theories about the behaviour of individual states or categories of states such as democracies or totalitarian dictatorships, and the international-system-analysis perspective encompasses theories of the interactions between states and how the number of states and their respective capabilities affect their relations with each other. The foreign-policy perspective also includes studies of the traits, structures, or processes within a national society or polity that determine or influence how that society or polity participates in international relations. One such study, known as the decision-making approach, analyzes the information that decision makers use, their perceptions and motivations, the influence on their behaviour of public opinion, the organizational settings in which they operate, and their intellectual, cultural, and societal backgrounds. Studies that analyze the relations between the wealth, power, or technological level of a state and its international status and role provide other illustrations of the foreign-policy perspective. Comparative foreign-policy analysis first appeared during the 1960s. By comparing the domestic sources of external conduct in different countries, using standard criteria of data selection and analysis, this approach seeks to develop generalized accounts of foreign-policy performance, including theories that explore the relationship between the type of domestic-external linkage a country displays and its political and economic system and level of social development. Some research also has explored the extent to which certain patterns of behaviour, such as violent demonstrations or protests, may spread from one state to another. Whereas foreign-policy analysis concentrates on the units of the international system, international-system analysis is concerned with the structure of the system, the interactions between its units, and the implications for peace and war, or cooperation and conflict, of the existence of different types of states. The term interactions suggests challenge and response, give and take, move and countermove, or inputs and outputs. Diplomatic histories feature narratives of action and response in international situations and attempt to interpret the meanings of the exchanges. Balance-of-power theory, which asserts that states act to protect themselves by forming alliances against powerful states or coalitions of states, is another example of the international-system perspective.

Chapter 7 : Rather Than Saviors, Are Middle Powers Like Brazil a Threat to Multilateralism?

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Economically, middle powers are generally those that are not considered too "big" or too "small," however that is defined. However, economics is not always the defining factor. Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally, but did not dominate in any one area. However, this usage is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as regional powers. According to academics at the University of Leicester and University of Nottingham: The traditional and most common way is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. More recently, it is possible to discern a second method for identifying middle power status by focusing on behavioural attributes. In this way middle powers are countries that use their relative diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability. All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an idealistic imperative they associate with being a middle power. The imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great or principal powers. This imperative was particularly profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War. Middle powers are the driving force in the process of transnational institutional-building. Through MPI, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily with middle power governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Middle power countries are particularly influential in issues related to arms control, being that they are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, for example called Canada "a power of the middle rank" and helped to lay out the classical definition of Canadian middle power diplomacy. Suez Crisis, was not a former colonial power and therefore neutral in anti-colonial struggles, worked actively in the United Nations to represent the interests of smaller nations and to prevent the dominance of the superpowers often being elected to the United Nations Security Council for such reasons, and because it was involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts around the world. Australia would "influence international decision-makers" on issues such as "global economic, security and environmental challenges". Some academics also believe that Germany and Japan are great powers, but due to their large advanced economies and global influence as opposed to military and strategic capabilities. Zbigniew Brzezinski, consider India to be a great power too.

Chapter 8 : Power (international relations) - Wikipedia

Middle Power Politics in the Middle East Research Initiatives This research initiative explores middle powers in the Middle East by studying the varying levels of material power, behavioral aspects, and ideational characteristics of six regional middle powers, namely Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, as well as other aspiring middle powers, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

What I took away from all those encounters was the perception of Don Edgardo as both quintessential statesman and quintessential gentleman: I have long had something of a sentimental attachment to this country for two quite different reasons. First, because of the admirable way in which a flourishing, human rights respecting, democracy has been recreated out of the ashes of , and the “ what was to me and other young idealists of my generation around the world “ the profoundly shocking military overthrow and death of Salvador Allende events which led among other things, as most of you will know, to President Michelle Bachelet spending some time as a young woman living in Australia. Since then it has waxed and waned in political useage, and in the academic literature. It may also reflect the reality that most analytical attention in recent years has been focused on some rather dramatic movements which have been occurring at the tectonic plate level, with the rise of China to potentially challenge the U. But all that said, middle power language has never disappeared entirely. And it is now very much back in favour in Australia with its strong embrace by Prime Miniter, now Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd following the return of Labor to power in And I put both Australia and Chile in that category. In the remainder of this lecture I will try to spell out what is distinctive and important about middle power diplomacy and to identify what factors contribute most to its effective conduct. Objective criteria like GDP, population size, physical size and military capability can be no more than starting points. Chile, which is on some lists “ certainly mine “ but not others, is listed 60th in population terms, and does not pick up much ground on the economic front, ranking 44th in GDP terms. Given the problems of balancing out these competing wholly objective criteria, one approach as adopted for example by the Middle Powers Initiative is to supplement these metrics with more subjective criteria, such as perceived economic and political significance, or perhaps “ much more normatively “ the degree of general respect such countries command. But such criteria, particularly any normative ones, by their very nature, are wholly unlikely to command general consensus. And perceptions will vary anyway according to context: And where is it to be drawn between middle powers and those who have greater stature or inherent influence? But again there is never likely to be ready consensus achievable about any such judgement. These difficulties have led some writers to suggest that the best way of defining middle powers is by reference to their behaviour: Does it then stop being one? There is real utility in doing so, both descriptively and prescriptively: Middle power diplomacy, is, in short, the kind of diplomacy which can, and should, be practised by states which are not big or strong enough, either in their own region or the wider world, to impose their policy preferences on anyone else; but who do recognize that that there are international policy tasks which need to be accomplished if the world around them is to be safer, saner, more just and more prosperous with all the potential this has, in turn, to affect their own interests ; and who have sufficient capacity and credibility to be able to advance those tasks. Middle power diplomacy has been exercised in a variety of ways over the years. I was rather pleased to find Australia being identified by these writers as generally engaged not just at the specifically-focused but the heroic ends of these spectrums, by contrast with the efforts of countries like Canada and Norway, which were being typecast as generally more diffuse and routine. But when one looks back over the historical record it is hard to make any such general characterizations stick. In the early post-World War II years, to focus for the moment just on these two countries, both Australia and Canada concentrated heavily, and very visibly, on building international institutional structures that would, both by their existence and their mode of operation, give weight to middle power and other voices, and dilute some of the authority that would otherwise be exercised by the U. Canada “ unlike Australia for most of this time “ did remain active internationally active, but its focus shifted more, under Lester Pearson and for most of the time under Pierre Trudeau, towards playing a relatively quiet middle-man role as a mediator and

conciliator, helping to defuse some East-West tensions and to put out various smaller conflict brushfires elsewhere. Much effort was also put into giving backroom technical support in the negotiation of complex international regimes like the Law of the Sea treaty. The late s, through to the change of government in , was a period of intense international activism for Australia across not just trade and economic issues but a broad range of environmental and security issues, in which "taking advantage of the new fluidity in the international political environment associated with the end of the Cold War" we played, for example, major roles in initiating bans on mining and oil drilling in the Antarctic, the UN peace plan for Cambodia, the ASEAN Regional Forum as a major new security dialogue forum, and generating international debate on the peace and security role of the UN; in the arms control and disarmament area, those roles extended to establishing the Australia Group and concluding the Chemical Weapons Convention, and sponsoring the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. While I think it is fair to say that Australia was seen as the leading advocate and practitioner of middle power diplomacy during this period, we were by no means the only players in this game, with Norway, for example, being particularly active in initiating the Oslo peace process in the Middle East, and Canada in leading the charge against South African apartheid. And over the next decade, through to the mids, as Australia dropped out of the picture, these two countries continued to play leadership roles on issues like the Ottawa-initiated Landmines Treaty and the Oslo-initiated Cluster Munitions Treaty, again classic exercises of international diplomatic leadership by non-major powers. Chile itself gave a particularly clear example during this period of just how important a diplomatic role can be played by determined small-to-middle-sized powers if circumstances arise which enable them to exercise leverage. Usually that leverage is acquired through the persuasive accumulation of numbers, but in Chile went it alone "using its pivotal vote in the UN Security Council to deny the U. In recent years the wheel has turned again in terms of the most visible examples of middle power diplomacy. But since then, under an inward-looking new government underwhelmed by the liberal internationalist style of most of its predecessors, leadership on this issue has been assumed by others, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia and " in Africa " Rwanda and Ghana. Are there any common threads running through all the disparate activity by various countries that I have been describing? I think there are, both in terms of method and motivation. Countries which are not powerful enough in most circumstances to impose their will may be persuasive enough to have like-minded others see their point of view, and to act accordingly. In the past the countries in whose company Australia certainly felt most comfortable were those sharing the abiding values of Western liberal democracy, the living standards of advanced industrial societies, and preferably speaking English as well: And other countries " I would assume the Latin Americans for a start " had their equivalent comfort groupings. The kind of coalitions that Australia and others have built in recent years, in the pursuit of what I have been describing as middle power diplomacy " whether one is talking about the Cairns Group or APEC, or the Friends of RtoP or the Cross-Regional Group on Nuclear Disarmament or anything else " are by no means confined in their membership to middle-power countries, to the extent that these can ever be defined. They often include great or major powers, and those with very much less influence as well; and the memberships keep changing. The point of middle power diplomacy is not so much who is embraced by it, as how the process of change is initiated and carried through. Australian coalition building, like that of others, has been inherently eclectic: The crucial point to appreciate about good international citizenship is that this is not something separate and distinct from the pursuit of national interests; it is not some kind of foreign policy equivalent of boy scout good deeds. The argument is that, by being seriously committed to cooperative international problem solving, national interest is advanced two ways. First, through simple reciprocity: And secondly, through reputational benefit: What does it take for middle power diplomacy " motivated as I have described, and carried out by the kinds of methods I have been describing " to be really effective? There seem to me to be four factors primarily involved, which I would describe as opportunity, capacity, creativity and credibility. First, there has to be a real opportunity for potentially effective action. There is no prestige, or likely result, in enthusiastically pursuing ideas which are premature, over-ambitious, or for some other reason unlikely to generate any significant body of support. Secondly, there has to be a sufficient physical capacity to follow the issue through. This implies a certain minimum of physical resources, including a sufficiently wide

network of diplomatic posts, which it may be difficult for any country smaller than a middle-sized one to match. It also means that for anyone other than a major power, and maybe even for some of those, there will be a limit to the number of major issues that can be simultaneously pursued: Resources simply have to be concentrated where they are likely to have the most useful impact. The capacity to follow an issue through also involves energy and stamina. Many good ideas, well capable of implementation, fall by the wayside in international affairs simply because institutions, or the individuals who constitute them, tire. Thirdly, there has to be in most cases a degree of intellectual imagination and creativity applied to the issue – an ability to see a way through impasses and to lead, if not by force of authority, then at least by force of ideas. The application of physical resources to a problem without accompanying ideas is unlikely to result in anything much more than the appearance of activity. Of course, creativity and imagination are not the sole prerogative of middle power diplomacy; nor should they be assumed to exist in the case of any particular state seeking to practice this kind of diplomacy. But the point is that what countries which are not major powers may lack in economic, political or military clout, they can often make up with quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork. And resolution of just about any significant problem in international affairs – be it bilateral or multilateral in character – needs just that. And fourthly, effective middle power diplomacy involves credibility on the part of the country applying it. The mix of ingredients here will vary from case to case. Perceived independence from the influence of larger powers will often be one such ingredient. The maintenance of credibility is also crucially dependent on avoiding any charge of hypocrisy: Great and major powers have had a long-ingrained belief – that is only gradually changing as the realities of a complex, interdependent and rather more opinionated world catch up with them – that it is really only they who matter in the international scheme of things. Some of their diplomats manage to conceal these sentiments better than others but – as I have had plenty of occasions to experience over the years, and I suspect there will be a number in this audience in the same position – the belief dies hard that while small and medium sized states, especially those that are failed, failing or otherwise irresponsible, are undoubtedly capable of causing major global problems, their positive contribution is mostly useless, sometimes irritating and at best marginal. But the truth of the matter is that, when the kind of conditions I have described are satisfied, lesser mortals conducting middle power diplomacy can certainly on occasion accomplish what great or major power diplomacy will find difficult. To take just some of the major issues with which I was involved, it is generally acknowledged that APEC would have had much more difficulty getting off the ground if the U. Similarly with the Chemical Weapons Convention: Most exercises in middle power diplomacy will not produce especially spectacular results. Most of the time, trying to achieve progress on problems of the global commons and securing other global public goods like free trade – with all the free-rider, weak-link, sovereign-preference and other constraints on collective action that they involve – involves very slow boring through very hard boards. And in generating acceptable solutions, countries not of major power status are as well equipped as anyone else, and in a number of cases better equipped, to deliver the goods. Edgardo Boeninger understood that as well as anyone ever has, and himself played a seminal role in making Chile a voice that counted, especially in trade diplomacy. It was a pleasure to work with him, and may his legacy long continue. Not only in Chile-Australia relations – which are as good as they possibly could be, not least as a result of his own strong personal engagement over so many years – but in the efforts of all of us to make this planet of ours safer, saner, more prosperous and more just. For example, in Holbraad, *op cit*. Some of the other text in this lecture draws directly on Ch 19 of this book. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, *op cit*, Ch 1. A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, was published in This approach is developed in Evans and Grant, *op cit*, Ch.

Chapter 9 : Middle Powers and Regional Powers - International Relations - Oxford Bibliographies

Another issue in studying middle power politics in the Middle East is the limitations in middle power theory as to how it only focuses on the international hierarchal structure of power, and disregards the multiple hierarchal sub-structures within the international order.

Katz is professor of government and politics at George Mason University and the author of *Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan*. Revolution does not just change things inside one country. It can disrupt international relationships throughout an entire region or even the world. What impact have the "Arab Spring" revolutions had on the international relations of the countries experiencing them, the Middle East, and the world? Have these upheavals been as disruptive of international relations as other revolutions? It will be argued here that, unlike what would occur if revolution succeeded in Syria or Bahrain, the Arab Spring revolutions that have succeeded in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen have had a remarkably nondisruptive impact on international relations. To understand just how remarkable this is, though, something needs to be said about just how much revolution has disrupted international relations in the past. Walt theorizes that revolution in one country is not just disruptive of international relations, but can lead to interstate war. The French Revolution was soon followed by a war that spanned the continent of Europe. The Russian Revolution was soon followed by the involvement of several countries in the Russian civil war as well as a war between Russia and Poland in 1918. The Chinese Revolution was followed by the Korean War in 1950. This fear of "falling dominoes" has served to heighten the importance of countries that may have little value in themselves to the status quo powers but that, allied to [a] revolutionary state, they fear would threaten nearby countries with much greater importance to them. This has repeatedly been borne out in practice. Revolution and International Relations Two of the "great revolutions" of the past – in eighteenth-century France and twentieth-century Russia – were especially disruptive of international relations. They brought to power in significant countries regimes that threatened the status quo elsewhere, both by their own actions and by inspiring rebellion in other countries. In addition, indigenous revolutions led to alliance switches from West to East in numerous countries: Strong Marxist-Leninist insurgencies in several other countries would have led, had they succeeded, to changes in their alliance patterns as well. Yugoslavia, Albania and – most dramatically – China later broke with Moscow. The new regimes all became allied more or less closely with the Soviet Union, though all of them had complex relations with Moscow. Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Iranian Revolution was especially disruptive. It brought to power a revolutionary regime that threatened the existence of several governments in the region, through both its own actions and by inspiring like-minded movements in other countries. The color revolution in Kyrgyzstan, though, did not lead to a similar reorientation, and Ukraine reversed itself in with the election of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich, whose fraudulent election in sparked revolution that year. Before its January revolution, Tunisia was not formally part of a military alliance with a Western state, but was generally aligned with America, Europe and the Arab states friendly toward them. Although it sometimes had uncomfortable relations with Algeria and Libya its larger neighbors, pre Tunisia had generally cooperative relations with other states. This same general pattern has continued. Tunisia has also continued to have decent relations with Russia, China and most other Arab states. Ties with Algeria were tense for a time, when the authoritarian government there feared that what happened in Tunisia and other Arab Spring countries might spark opposition in Algeria, too, but their bilateral ties have been calmer as this prospect has receded. For the last decade of his presidency, though, his government was allied primarily with the United States and Saudi Arabia. Arab Spring demonstrations arose against Saleh in January, and he finally ceded his office to the vice president, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, in February. Both Saleh and Hadi, then, have sought to enlist foreign support for or, at minimum, to forestall foreign opposition to their efforts to suppress regionally based opposition to the Yemeni government by claiming that these movements are linked to others hostile to the West and its Arab allies. But since the Libyan-American rapprochement of the mids, Qadhafi had been cooperating with the United States and with several West European states even longer. While Qadhafi had relatively good if not excellent relations with

Russia,¹⁷ the post-Qadhafi government does not; it canceled several Russian-Libyan contracts that had been agreed to during the Qadhafi era. Moscow, though, could have avoided this if it had been more neutral during the revolution instead of vociferously expressing support for Qadhafi until the bitter end. Even the damage that Russian interests did experience may prove temporary if ongoing talks about the resumption of various forms of Russian-Libyan cooperation are successful. The case of Egypt is more complicated; it has experienced not one, but three changes in government since its Arab Spring revolution. Mubarak also had reasonably good relations with Saudi Arabia and most other Arab states, Europe, Russia, China and others – but not Iran. Tehran initially appeared certain that the downfall of Mubarak would mean Egypt would stop being allied to the United States and would move closer to Iran. Morsi did work to improve Egyptian relations with Iran, but he and the Iranian leadership were sharply divided on Syria; Tehran backed the Assad regime and Morsi the opposition. Morsi attempted to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, but Saudi distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood, of which he had been a leader, undermined this effort. During the latter, the two reportedly agreed that Russia would help Egypt with the construction of a nuclear reactor and the development of its uranium deposits. But, as even Russian observers acknowledge, this does not mean that Egypt is going to embrace Russia as its principal ally instead of America. The United States continues to supply significant economic and military support that the Egyptian military is not willing to forgo and Moscow is not willing to replace. In contrast to the four "successful" Arab Spring revolutions, the two unsuccessful but persistent attempts at revolution in Bahrain and Syria have led to hope in some and fear in others about how their success would sharply disrupt the international relations of these two countries. The United States also fears the loss of an ally that Shia majority rule could bring and so has followed the Saudi lead on Bahrain. While it is not clear how much Iran is actually assisting the Shia opposition there, the downfall of the Sunni monarchy would definitely be seen in Tehran as a gain for Iran and a loss for Saudi Arabia and the United States. America and other Western governments have called for Assad to step down and for a transitional government to be formed that includes representatives from the Sunni majority. America and Europe, though, have not been willing to provide much material support for the Sunni opposition. Tehran fears that the downfall of the Assad regime and the rise of a Sunni majority one in its place would result in the loss of Syria as an ally. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey see the downfall of Assad as depriving Iran of an important ally and thus weakening its influence in the region generally. Each has also hoped that this would lead to an expansion of its own influence. While America and Europe do not get along with Assad and have called for him to step down, they have increasingly come to fear that he might be replaced with a hostile Sunni regime. This is a concern that Israel shares. There are several possible explanations. One is that the downfall of authoritarian rulers who had been in power for decades in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen did not have a disruptive impact on international relations because these were not actual cases of revolution. In Yemen, the Saudi-negotiated transfer of power from the long-ruling Saleh to his vice president – ratified by an election in which the latter was the only candidate – appears more like the forestalling of a revolution. In Libya, it can be argued that the Qadhafi regime would have defeated its internal opponents had they not received large-scale external support from Western and Arab governments. It was the withdrawal of that foreign presence after the death of Qadhafi that helped give rise to the subsequent chaos in Libya. In Egypt, it can be argued that the Egyptian military, the pillar of the Mubarak regime, has remained in control of Egyptian politics ever since his downfall, including the period when Morsi was president. By contrast, if the Sunni minority regime in Bahrain and the Alawite minority regime in Syria were to fall, it would have a truly revolutionary impact on both the internal political hierarchies of these countries and their relations with their primary regional supporters Saudi Arabia in the case of Bahrain; Iran in the case of Syria. Another possibility is that all of the new Arab governments recognized their continuing dependence on the United States in particular. With few Arab governments sympathetic to the cause of democratization, Tunisian leaders who genuinely seek it for their country have, not surprisingly, looked to the West for support. Beleaguered by internal opponents, the new leaders in Libya and Yemen are desperate for American and Western backing, as were the leaders they replaced. While Egyptian-American relations have recently cooled, it is because the Obama administration cut back on the military assistance that the Egyptian government very much wants.

Presumably, the restoration of this American aid would do much to restore ties. Yet another possible explanation for the impact of the Arab Spring revolutions on international relations is that America and the West have less salience in the region than the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The Tunisian revolution happened too quickly for any external power to halt, but the absence of any Iranian role in it helped make its outcome palatable to Riyadh. The kingdom could not prevent the downfall of its ally Mubarak, but the elected leader it disliked – Morsi – was overthrown by the Egyptian military. Riyadh was happy to support this outcome, even in defiance of the United States. While Tehran hoped Morsi would become an ally against both Riyadh and Washington, this did not occur. In Libya, far from seeking to preserve the status quo, Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in rallying Western and some Arab support for overthrowing Qadhafi. Iran played no role here either. In Yemen, Riyadh was instrumental in bringing about the transfer of power from Saleh to Hadi. Whether or not Tehran has supported the Houthi rebellion both before and after the transfer of power in Sanaa, the fact that the Houthis are strongly opposed, not just by the Yemeni government but also by Sunni tribesmen and Saudi Arabia, suggests that they are unlikely to achieve more than control over their base of operations in the far north. By contrast, Saudi-Iranian rivalry is a key factor in both Bahrain and Syria. Thus, Riyadh has intervened to prevent the downfall of its ally in Manama and the rise of a new regime it fears would be allied to Iran, while Tehran has provided large-scale support to the Assad regime to prevent the downfall of an ally and the rise of a new regime it fears would be allied to Saudi Arabia. A fourth possible explanation is that, instead of being cases of revolution disrupting international relations, the Arab Spring revolutions are instances of a prior disruption in international relations allowing revolution to occur. John Foran theorizes that one of the conditions necessary for a successful social revolution is a "world-systemic opening," the result of distraction in the core economies by world war or depression, rivalries between one or more core powers, mixed messages sent to Third World dictators, or a divided foreign policy when faced with an insurrection. This let-up of external control adds to the crisis of the state, and creates an opening for the activity of revolutionaries. This may have given rise to a sense among the revolutionaries that Washington was unlikely to intervene to protect its aging authoritarian allies. As Foran also noted, however, world-systemic openings that give rise to revolution can also close quite quickly. Libya was an outlier; several external powers including America, France, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar acted not to protect an incumbent regime but, first, to prevent it from crushing its opponents and then to help those opponents overthrow the regime. The Arab Spring revolutionaries were then no longer able to take advantage of authoritarian governments or their protectors being caught off guard. Which of these explanations as to why the successful Arab Spring revolutions have had such a limited impact on alliance relationships is correct? This is not yet clear. Indeed, more than one of them may be valid; the explanations discussed here are not necessarily mutually exclusive. And, of course, another unexpected round of revolution in the Arab World could occur that does result in a significant change in alliance patterns. If so, the explanations discussed here may all prove inadequate. The trouble with theories about revolution is that, while they often seem clear in retrospect "the clear presence of a certain factor led to a certain outcome in one case, while the clear absence of that factor led to a different outcome in another case", attempting to apply them in the present, much less prospectively, is extremely difficult. It is often not clear to what extent the causative factor identified by a theory is present, or is in flux, in an ongoing case. So long as the outcome of the Arab Spring revolutions that began in remains unclear, their ultimate impact on international relations will be too. Conge, *From Revolution to War: Just as revolution could lead to war*, Halliday also discussed how war could lead to revolution pp. Katz, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves* St. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*: Oxford University Press, ; and Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1945*, 3rd ed. Praeger, ; Garthoff, *The Great Transition*: