

*The military staff, its history and development [J. D Hittle] on www.nxgvision.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Book is used and has been withdrawn from service from a Library.*

The large majority of military aircraft are fighters, followed by bombers, transporter-tankers, early-warning and patrol aircraft, and a variety of propeller- and jet-driven trainers. As is the case with commercial aircraft, the complexity of the technology and the immense capital requirements have narrowed the market. Early history When the first practical aircraft were produced, in the form of hot-air and hydrogen balloons in 1783, they were adopted quickly for military duties. Two months later the first military reconnaissance from such a balloon was made before the city of Maubeuge. Similar reconnaissance balloons were used later by other armies, notably by both armies during the American Civil War and by the British in Africa from 1840 to 1850. Hydrogen gas generator being used to inflate an observation balloon during the American Civil War, Department of Defense; Brady Collection True military aviation began with the perfection of the navigable airship in the late 19th century and the airplane in the first decade of the 20th century. The brothers Wilbur and Orville Wright, who made the first powered, sustained, and controlled flights in an airplane on December 17, 1903, believed such an aircraft would be useful mainly for military reconnaissance. When they received the first contract for a military airplane from the U. S. Army, Wright and Lieutenant Frank Purdy Lahm are catapulted down a rail and launched into the air. The most formidable aircraft of the years before World War I were airships rather than airplanes. Airships were large self-propelled craft consisting of a rigid fabric-covered metal frame within which were gas bags containing a lighter-than-air gas such as hydrogen. The most ambitious examples of this type of craft were the huge airships designed and built in Germany by Ferdinand, Count von Zeppelin. A typical zeppelin could carry five kg pound high-explosive bombs and 20 crew. The airship Schwaben landing at Potsdam, Ger. Experiments with arming airplanes were made spasmodically after 1910, when August Euler took out a German patent on a machine-gun installation. Bombing techniques evolved simultaneously. Dummy bombs were dropped on a target in the form of a ship by the American designer Glenn Curtiss on June 30, 1911. This test was followed by the dropping of a real bomb and the devising of the first bombsight. The pin was pulled out over the target by tugging on a string. It was primitive but it worked. The Naval Wing of the RFC subsequently attempted to drop torpedoes from Short and Sopwith seaplanes, with some success, and efforts were soon under way to develop means to launch and recover such craft on shipboard. In 1911 a Curtiss biplane had been flown from and onto wooden platforms erected over the decks of anchored U. S. ships. The following year the old cruiser Hermes was fitted with a short deck from which seaplanes took off on wheeled trolleys that were fitted under their floats and dropped away as the machines became airborne. Thus, by 1914, reconnaissance, bomber, and carrier-based aircraft all were evolving, and some had been used in combat. The first bombing raid came nine days later, when a pilot dropped four grenades on Turkish positions. The first reconnaissance photographs of enemy positions were taken on February 24, 1915, in the same conflict. World War I Airships At the start of World War I the German armed forces had 10 zeppelins and three smaller airships, but this impressive offensive capability was largely offset by the highly explosive nature of the hydrogen gas that gave the zeppelins their lifting power. After losing three zeppelins in daylight raids over heavily defended areas in the first month of the war, the army abandoned airship operations, but the navy, with its battle fleet blockaded in port by the Royal Navy, mounted a night bombing offensive—the first aerial strategic bombardment campaign in history. A zeppelin flying over the harbour at Kiel, Ger. The finest of the zeppelins was the LZ 129; this craft was 135 metres long, was able to fly above 4,000 metres, and had a range of 12,000 km, 7,000 miles. The LZ 129 was shot down late in the war, however, and large rigid metal-framed airships were never again employed as combat aircraft. Smaller, nonrigid airships were used throughout World War I by the British for antisubmarine patrol, convoy escort, and coastal reconnaissance, achieving a remarkable record of protecting coastal convoys from German submarines. They were revived by the U. S. Navy during World War II for the same use. Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. World War I is remembered for its terrible combination of technological ingenuity and strategic indecisiveness. The growth of army sizes, and the introduction of new

weapons like long-range heavy artillery and chemical gas, turned combat into mechanized carnage on an unprecedented scale. It also made it more essential than ever for armies to gather information about enemy troops and weapons. Stationary balloons were used for observation and artillery spotting as early as the American Civil War but found widespread use in World War I. This video shows the view from a balloon over the Western Front. Reconnaissance aircraft At the outbreak of World War I, heavier-than-air craft were used only for visual reconnaissance, since their feeble engines could carry little more than a pilot and, in some cases, an observer aloft. They soon proved their worth in this mission, however, and RFC aviators provided reconnaissance that enabled the British and French armies to counterattack in the decisive Battle of the Marne on September 6â€”12, , turning back the invading Germans just short of Paris. More powerful engines and better aircraft designs soon made possible specialized reconnaissance aircraft that could fly at high altitudes to avoid interception. The Germans, for example, had Rumpler two-seaters in service by that could operate as high as 24, feet 7, metres. Radios were carried aloft to permit aerial observers to spot and adjust artillery fire, at first with transmitters only and then, as radios became lighter, with receivers for two-way communication. Fighters The importance of aerial reconnaissance and artillery spotting particularly the latter made it clear that the belligerent able to deny the enemy use of airspaces above the battlefield would enjoy enormous advantages. This realization led to the emergence of fighters as a distinct category of aircraft. In the early days of the war, pilots and observers blazed away at enemy aircraft with pistols, rifles, and even shotguns, but to little effect. Machine guns were the obvious solution. In the Vickers company in Britain had exhibited a two-seat biplane of pusher configuration i. A development of this machine, the Vickers F. The French armed similarly configured Voisin pushers with machine guns one had shot down a German aircraft as early as October 5, , but, burdened with the extra weight of observer and gun , such aircraft were slow and unmaneuverable, and their successes were mostly the result of accidental encounters. Light single-seat aircraft of tractor configuration i. The solution to the problem emerged in the spring of in the form of an interrupter gear, or gun-synchronizing device, designed by the French engineer Raymond Saulnier. The interrupter itself was not new: The real breakthrough was made by Roland Garros , a famous sporting pilot before the war and a friend of Saulnier, who perceived that a machine gun fitted with such a device and mounted rigidly atop the fuselage could be aimed accurately simply by pointing the airplane in the desired direction. With this machine, Garros shot down three German aircraft on April 1, 13, and Then, on April 19, Garros himself force-landed with a ruptured fuel line and was taken prisoner. The Germans reacted quickly, putting the designer Anthony Fokker to work on a similar device. Though a superb flying machine, the Nieuport was limited by its light armament, while the two British machines had taken the aerodynamically inefficient pusher configuration to its limit and were soon outclassed. Thereafter, the pace of fighter development began to be set by improvements in engine designâ€”a phenomenon that was to persist well into the jet age. Most Allied fighters at that time were powered by rotary radial engines i. These engines were relatively powerful in relation to their weight, but their large frontal areas produced a great deal of drag, and the gyroscopic forces induced by their whirling mass posed serious aircraft-control problems. In mid Germany took the lead in fighter design on the basis of its superb Daimler and Benz water-cooled in-line engines, such as those that powered the streamlined Albatros D. III series of fighters. These were faster than their Allied opponents and, most important, could carry two machine guns without sacrificing performance. I pioneered a fighter configuration that was to prevail into the s: Prominent among these were the French Spad fighters and the British S. A Albatros D. Va, a German fighter plane of World War I. Typically powered by a horsepower Mercedes engine, the D. VII was a fabric-covered biplane that differed from others in having a sturdy fuselage structure of welded steel tubing. Armed with two machine guns, it had a top speed of km miles per hour. Even more powerful engines made two-seat fighters possible. The best of these was the British Bristol F. Ground attack The Allies fielded specialized aircraft for ground attack only at the very end of the war. Notable among these was the Sopwith Salamander, a development of the Sopwith Camel with an armoured cockpit and two machine guns firing downward through the floor at a fixed angle to rake enemy trenches while flying low over them. The Germans produced a number of specialized two-seat aircraft for this purposeâ€”notably the Halberstadt CL. III of , which was armed with a forward-firing synchronized machine gun as well as a flexible gun and racks of

grenades for the observer. At the Battle of Cambrai in November and December, the Germans sent large formations of such aircraft over the British trenches and into the rear areas with devastating effect. By the end of the war, they were using numbers of armoured all-metal Junkers J-1 ground-attack aircraft, one of the most advanced machines to see combat during the war. German Junkers J-1 monoplane fighter prototype, The first bombing raids to achieve significant success and the first to cross national boundaries were mounted against the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen from Belgian bases by airmen of the Royal Naval Air Service RNAS on October 8 and November 21. However, their spectacular success owed more to the highly flammable nature of the zeppelins themselves than to the destructive power of the pound 9-kg bombs used. These raids prompted the Admiralty to commission the development of the first specialized heavy night bomber, the Handley Page H. Meanwhile, other air forces began building and putting into service strategic day bombers. Among the first were French Voisins. The type L was used in early to carry about 60 kg pounds of small bombs that simply lay in the bottom of the cockpit until the time came for the observer to drop them overboard. Later models had more powerful engines and were equipped alternatively as attack aircraft, carrying up to kg pounds of bombs or having a mm 1. None flew faster than km 85 miles per hour, so the Voisins operated mainly under cover of darkness in the last year of the war. Italy too was quick to appreciate the value of bombing attacks on enemy targets. Its big three-engined, twin-tailboom Capronis were among the finest bombers of World War I. About 80 were built, and they made raids on German targets with the loss of only one plane. The German air force also operated a family of giant four-engined metal bombers known as Riesenflugzeug, or R-planes. Typical of these was the Staaken R. This had a takeoff weight of 11, kg 25, pounds, which included a crew of seven and a bomb load of up to 1, kg 4, pounds. Italian Caproni bomber of World War I. Three distinct categories of combat aircraft emerged: Long-range flying boats so called because their fuselages were shaped like the hull of a boat were used extensively by the British.

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Overview[edit] A German Army, equipped, organized and trained following a single doctrine, and permanently unified under one command dates from , and the unification of Germany under the leadership of Prussia. From to the title Deutsches Heer German Army was the official name of the German land forces. From to the name of the German land forces was Reichsheer Army of the Realm and from to the name Heer was used. The Heer was formally disbanded in August While the modern German army prefers to distance itself from the World War II era, it still retains certain uniform accessories from that era and before. For example, the iconic Stahlhelm remains in service, as do the arabesque general collar tab designs. Cufftitle designs used by elite units during World War II now appear on both cuffs. Founding of the Army[edit] See also: However already one year after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in May and because of its increasing links with the West under German chancellor Konrad Adenauer , the Consultative Assembly of Europe began to consider the formation of a European Defence Community with German participation on 11 August Former high-ranking German Wehrmacht officers outlined in the Himmeroder memorandum a plan for a "German contingent in an international force for the defense of Western Europe. The officers saw the need for the formation of twelve Panzer divisions and six corps staffs with accompanying Corps troops, as only armored divisions could muster a fighting force to throw back the numerically far superior forces of the Warsaw Pact. This Defence Ministry forerunner was known somewhat euphemistically as the Blank Office Amt Blank , but explicitly used to prepare for the rearmament of West Germany Wiederbewaffnung. Plans foresaw the formation of six infantry, four armoured, and two mechanised infantry divisions, as the German contribution to the defense of Western Europe in the framework of a European Defence Community. The nucleus of army was the so-called V Branch of the Department of Defence. The army saw itself explicitly not as a successor to the defeated Wehrmacht , but as in the traditions of the Prussian military reformers of to and the members of the military resistance during National Socialism; such as the officers which undertook the failed 20 July plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler in Nevertheless, for lack of alternatives the officer corps was made up largely of former Wehrmacht officers. The first Chief of the Army was the former Wehrmacht General der Panzertruppe Hans Rottiger , who had been involved in the drafting of the Himmeroder memorandum. The official date of the founding of the army is 12 November when the first soldiers began their service in Andernach. On 1 April , the first conscripts arrived for service in the army. To achieve this goal existing units were split approximately every six months. However the creation of all twelve divisions did not take place until At the end of the strength of the army was about , men. The army was equipped at first with American material, such as the M Patton main battle tank. Three corps commands were formed beginning in Also in the "Office for Territorial Defence" was established as the highest Territorial Army authority. The main function of the Territorialheer was to maintain the operational freedom of NATO forces through providing rear area defence against saboteurs, enemy special forces, and the like. M47 Patton tank in service with the Bundeswehr, The development of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons required the development of a new Army structure even before Army Structure I was fully achieved. To minimize the effects of attacks with tactical nuclear weapons on massed forces, the 28, strong divisions of the Heer were broken up into smaller and more mobile brigades. These smaller units were also to be capable of self-sustainment on an atomic battlefield for several days, and to be capable of to move quickly from defense and to attack. The new armoured and mechanized brigades were capable of combined arms combat. Each division was composed of three brigades. The armoured brigades consisted of an armoured infantry battalion, two armoured battalions, an armoured artillery battalion and a supply battalion. The mechanized brigades consisted of a motorized infantry battalion, two mechanized infantry battalions, an armored battalion, a field artillery battalion and a supply battalion. The motorized brigades consisted of three motorized infantry battalions, an anti-tank battalion, a field artillery battalion and a supply battalion. The alpine brigades consisted of three alpine

battalions, a mountain artillery battalion and a supply battalion. At the end of the Cold War the German Army fielded 12 divisions with 38 brigades: Nine divisions were grouped into three corps: It was continuously downsized from this point. The onwards restructuring of the German Army saw it move to a seven division structure – 5 mechanized each with two mechanized brigades , 1 special forces, and one air assault. In , three Corps still existed, each including various combat formations and a maintenance brigade, as well as the I. The 1st Panzer would have reported to the corps in wartime while the 7th would be posted to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Corps in time of war the 5th Panzer. The 5th Panzer was formally Division disbanded as of 30 June In peacetime it also commanded the 10th Panzer Division , which was allocated to Eurocorps and which parents the German half of the Franco-German Brigade. The 1st Mountain Division at Munich was also subordinate to this headquarters. The 14th Panzergrenadier Division also took control of units in Western Germany re-subordinated from the 6th Panzergrenadier Division when it lost its command function. It would have made up the German contribution to the Multinational Corps Northeast in time of war. German Army today[edit] All corps have now been disbanded or transferred to a multinational level such as Multinational Corps North East. An army reorganisation in recent years has seen the disbandment of the 13th Mechanized Infantry Division headquarters, a merge of the Airmobile Operations Division and Special Operations Division headquarters, the disbandment of the 1st Airmobile Brigade, and reshuffling of units between divisions. In accordance with EU working hour regulations, the regular work-week is 41 hours, although numerous exceptions exist for e.

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Visit Website Did you know? At Chancellorsville, Jackson was shot by one of his own men, who mistook him for Union cavalry. His arm was amputated, and he died from pneumonia eight days later. In 1861, the U. Congress passed the Kansas- Nebraska Act, which essentially opened all new territories to slavery by asserting the rule of popular sovereignty over congressional edict. On April 12, after Lincoln ordered a fleet to resupply Sumter, Confederate artillery fired the first shots of the Civil War. Border slave states like Missouri, Kentucky and Maryland did not secede, but there was much Confederate sympathy among their citizens. Though on the surface the Civil War may have seemed a lopsided conflict, with the 23 states of the Union enjoying an enormous advantage in population, manufacturing including arms production and railroad construction, the Confederates had a strong military tradition, along with some of the best soldiers and commanders in the nation. They also had a cause they believed in: McClellan—who replaced the aging General Winfield Scott as supreme commander of the Union Army after the first months of the war—was beloved by his troops, but his reluctance to advance frustrated Lincoln. The combined forces of Robert E. Lincoln refused, and instead withdrew the Army of the Potomac to Washington. Halleck, though he remained in command of the Army of the Potomac. On the heels of his victory at Manassas, Lee began the first Confederate invasion of the North. Despite contradictory orders from Lincoln and Halleck, McClellan was able to reorganize his army and strike at Lee on September 14 in Maryland, driving the Confederates back to a defensive position along Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg. Total casualties at Antietam numbered 12, of some 69, troops on the Union side, and 13, of around 52, for the Confederates. The Union victory at Antietam would prove decisive, as it halted the Confederate advance in Maryland and forced Lee to retreat into Virginia. After the Emancipation Proclamation Lincoln had used the occasion of the Union victory at Antietam to issue a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which freed all slaves in the rebellious states after January 1, He justified his decision as a wartime measure, and did not go so far as to free the slaves in the border states loyal to the Union. Still, the Emancipation Proclamation deprived the Confederacy of the bulk of its labor forces and put international public opinion strongly on the Union side. Some 180,000 black soldiers would join the Union Army by the time the war ended in 1865, and 38,000 lost their lives. The Confederates gained a costly victory in the battle that followed, suffering 13, casualties around 22 percent of their troops; the Union lost 17, men 15 percent. Over three days of fierce fighting, the Confederates were unable to push through the Union center, and suffered casualties of close to 60 percent. Also in July 1863, Union forces under Ulysses S. Grant took Vicksburg Mississippi, a victory that would prove to be the turning point of the war in the western theater. Despite heavy Union casualties in the Battle of the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania both May 1862, at Cold Harbor early June and the key rail center of Petersburg June 1862, Grant pursued a strategy of attrition, putting Petersburg under siege for the next nine months. For most of the next week, Grant and Meade pursued the Confederates along the Appomattox River, finally exhausting their possibilities for escape. On the eve of victory, the Union lost its great leader:

Chapter 4 : The military staff, its history and development | Open Library

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Is It Still Practicable? Many who have scaled the peaks of the military profession have testified to the utility of studying military history. Most of these, however, seem to be commanding voices out of the past. These Army commanders were all remarkably well versed in history. So were many of their civilian superiors. Roosevelt was an avid reader of naval history, and Harry Truman frequently acknowledged the pertinent lessons that he had gleaned from a lifetime of exposure to history: Reading history, to me, was far more than a romantic adventure. It was solid instruction and wise teaching which I somehow felt that I. It seemed to me that if I could understand the true facts about the. History is "useful" in illustrating points of doctrine, in instilling in the young officer the proper military values or an appreciation for our military heritage. Such assumptions inevitably determine the way military history is taught. Because an important duty of the officer in peacetime is to teach, and because in the Army teaching usually involves explaining, it is often assumed that history, to be taught, must be explained. The emphasis therefore is on organizing and presenting information in a lucid, often lavishly illustrated lecture, in which tidy answers outrank nagging questions in the minds of everyone involved. The inference on the part of most students, if not the instructor, is that a person who remembers the lecture will somehow have learned history. It is also true that no other field of history is under as much pressure as military history to provide "practical" answers to some current problem. If military history cannot provide such answers, why study it? The specialist in Renaissance diplomacy is rarely solicited for his views on foreign policy but, rather, is left alone to concentrate his thoughts on the cold war with the Turks in the 15th century. Nor is the scholar who has spent a lifetime studying the ramifications of the French Revolution apt to be consulted when news breaks of still another palace coup in some Latin American banana republic. But let a historian or journalist prowl around in some remote corner in the field of military history and often he will be expected, even tempted, to function as a current-affairs military analyst. Perhaps we think this way because, as a society, we are largely ignorant about both the facts and the nature of history. In high school, European history no longer is required, having been replaced by something called "Western Civilization. Students voting with their feet in colleges and universities across the nation have caused enrollments in history courses to plummet as they turn to "more practical" subjects such as economics, psychology, biology, engineering, and business administration. Even at the Military Academy, the required course in the military art was severely curtailed several years ago and only recently has been restored to its logical place in the curriculum. For that matter, how many officers who have invested off-duty hours to work toward an advanced degree have taken it in history? In the officer corps of today, the subject is rarely considered "practicable. For without even a rudimentary understanding of history and its processes, there is no way that the past can be made to offer object lessons for the future. Professor Pieter Geyl, a distinguished Dutch historian, reminds us that it is useless to talk about "the lessons of history" when the historian "is after all only a man sitting at his desk. For, as a German general asserted a hundred years ago, "it is well known that military history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of any theory or opinion. Once removed from its historical context, which is always unique, a battle or a campaign ceases to offer meaningful lessons from history. According to Napoleon, "old Frederick laughed in his sleeve at the parades of Potsdam when he perceived young officers, French, English, and Austrian, so infatuated with the manoeuvre of the oblique order, which in itself was fit for nothing but to gain a few adjutant-majors a reputation. Soldiers, Frederick repeatedly had warned, "can be held in check only through fear" and should therefore be made to "fear their officers more than all the dangers to which they are exposed. Good will can never induce the common soldier to stand up to such dangers; he will only do so through fear. If there is a lesson here for us, it is simply that solutions to problems are not to be viewed as interchangeable parts. Even the Germans in World War II apparently failed to heed this lesson in drawing conclusions from their own war experiences. In addition to displaying a tendency to generalize from personal or limited experience, they often indiscriminately applied

the experiences of one situation to entirely different circumstances. Thus the German Supreme Command "applied the experiences acquired on the Western Front in , unchanged, to the war against Russia" despite the "greater tenacity" of the Russian soldier, his "insensibility against threatening the flanks," the scarcity of roads, and the vast space involved "giving. The much publicized Schlieffen Plan was an adaptation of this idea. Having thus discovered the "key," Schlieffen turned in his writings to the idea of envelopment to unlock the secrets of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, both of whom, he claimed, had always attempted to envelop the enemy. When he turned to history at large for confirmation, of course he "discovered" that nearly all successful generals, whether they had been aware of it or not, had employed something akin to the strategy of indirect approach. Moreover, nothing is necessarily proven by citing examples from history. There are many works on military theory that provide examples of bad argument from analogy or authority; such faulty use of historical examples, according to Karl von Clausewitz, "not only leaves the reader dissatisfied but even irritates his intelligence. If anyone lists a dozen defeats in which the losing side attacked with divided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that very tactic was employed. Obviously this is no way to reach a conclusion. And if the author or lecturer has never mastered the events he describes, "such superficial, irresponsible handling of history leads to hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing. Drawing upon an exhaustive examination of 30 campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon, Jomini deduced certain fixed maxims and principles which he claimed were both eternal and universal in their application. If such maxims would not produce great generals they would "at least make generals sufficiently skillful to hold the second rank among the great captains" and would thus serve as "the true school for generals. They are based upon my unrivaled knowledge of the campaigns of Napoleon, much of it acquired at first hand, and of the basic works of Thiers, Napier, Lloyd, Tempelhof, Foy, and the Archduke Charles. Thanks to my labors you need not invest years of your own time in scrutinizing these voluminous histories. Did not Napoleon himself confess: The emergence of doctrine as late as the American Civil War there were only drill manuals and the introduction of historical sections on most European general staffs after the Prussian victories in and meant that increasingly, in the eyes of professional soldiers at least, military history was linked to doctrine and more specifically, to the principles of war as these principles were rediscovered and refined. Since World War I it has become fashionable to use history to illustrate the official principles of war as they are variously defined. There are three dangers inherent in this approach. In the first place, pressed into service in this way history can only illustrate something already perceived as being true; it cannot prove its validity or lead to new discoveries. This is probably the terrain on which most soldiers first encounter the subject, and they would do well to heed the warning of Clausewitz that if "some historical event is being presented in order to demonstrate a general truth, care must be taken that every aspect bearing on the truth at issue is fully and circumstantially developed--carefully assembled. Clausewitz goes so far as to suggest that, even though historical examples have the advantage of "being more realistic and of bringing the idea they are illustrating to life," if the purpose of history is really to explain doctrine, "an imaginary case would do as well. If one starts with what is perceived as truth and searches history for confirmation or illustrations, there can be no "lessons learned. A second weakness in linking history to doctrine is the natural tendency to let doctrine sit in judgment of historical events. Most serious of all is the ease and frequency with which faith in doctrine has actually distorted history. This was happening frequently by the end of the 19th century as each army in Europe developed and became committed to its own doctrine. It is the primary reason why the tactical and strategical lessons of the Civil War, which in many respects was the first modern war, went unheeded. The Boers had applied that doctrine and therefore usually won, at least in the earlier battles before the weight of numbers alone could determine the outcome. British doctrine was faulty, if indeed the British yet had a doctrine, and therefore the British suffered repeated defeats. The Germans had trained the Japanese Army and the Japanese had won in , "proving" again the superiority of German doctrine. Had a trained historian instead of an officer serving a tour with the Military History section analyzed the same campaigns, surely he would have asked some searching questions about the differences in the discipline, morale, and leadership of the two armies. Did the Japanese cavalry win, for example, because of superior doctrine based on shock tactics or because it was better disciplined and led? Thus military history distilled by Jomini and his disciples ultimately found itself

shaped by a commitment to doctrine, and the instinct of most professional soldiers before World War I was to explain away exceptions to the official rules rather than to use history as a means of testing and refining them. Facts in History Although it is not always evident in a lecture or a textbook, we can never be completely certain--and therefore in agreement--about what actually happened in history. Frederick and Napoleon knew this well. An agreed upon fiction. There are facts that remain in eternal litigation. A full account of the battle as it was will never, can never, be made. Who could sketch the charges, the constant fighting of the bloody panorama! It is not possible. The official reports may give results as to losses, with statements of attacks and repulses; they may also note the means by which results were attained. And factions, and parties, and politics. Of this battle greater than Waterloo, a history, just, comprehensive, complete, will never be written. By-and-by, out of the chaos of trash and falsehood that newspapers hold, out of the disjointed mass of reports, out of the traditions and tales that come down from the field, some eye that never saw the battle will select, and some pen will write what will be named the history. With that the world will be, and if we are alive we must be, content. If his narrative is to mean anything at all to the reader he must simplify and organize the "disjointed mass of reports. He must resolve controversies, not merely report them, and he must recognize that not every general is candid, every report complete, every description accurate. Orders are not always executed; not every order is even relevant to the situation. At Gettysburg, the watches in the two armies were set 20 minutes apart, and after the battle Lee had some of his subordinates rewrite their after-action reports to avoid unnecessary dissension. Well may it be said that "on the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms. Men who yesterday seemed destined to oblivion have, today, acquired immortality. Has some new virtue been instilled in them, has some magician touched them with his wand?. Civilian historians have studied historical events from a point of view which is exclusively military. Far from trusting to their judgment, they have not considered it respectful to exercise their critical faculties on the facts as guaranteed by a body of specialists. An idolatrous admiration for everything which concerns the army has conferred upon them the favour of having eyes which do not see and memories which are oblivious of their own experiences. An incredible conspiracy exists in France at this very moment. No one dares to write the truth. This truth was given eloquent expression by a French pilot on a reconnaissance flight to Arras in May as he reflected on the chaos engulfing a dying society 30, feet below. Ah, the blueprint that historians will draft of all this! The angles they will plot to lend shape to this mess! They will take the word of a cabinet minister, the decision of a general, the discussion of a committee, and out of that parade of ghosts they will build historic conversations in which they will discern farsighted views and weighty responsibilities. They will invent agreements, resistances, attitudinous pleas, cowardices. Historians will forget reality. They will invent thinking men, joined by mysterious fibers to an intelligible universe, possessed of sound far-sighted views and pondering grave decisions according to the purest laws of Cartesian logic. Truth, though for God it may be One, assumes many shapes to men. So if anyone wants to differ from me, I am prepared to agree with him.

Chapter 5 : Civil War - HISTORY

Staff military A military staff often referred to as general staff, army staff, navy staff, or air staff within the individual services is a group of officers, enlisted and civilian personnel that are responsible for the administrative, operational and logistical needs of its unit.

Members of the MI Hall of Fame Nathan Hale, the unfortunate amateur spy with but one life to give for his country, may have been the most publicized intelligence agent of the American Revolution, but he was not the best. Nor was operational security neglected. Despite its noteworthy successes during the American Revolution, military intelligence was largely neglected in the years that followed. Military institutions and intelligence practices did not fit in easily with American values. The American Revolution had been won by a professional regular force, the Continental Army, amply supported by an intelligence system as sophisticated as the 18th century would allow. However, this fact seemed too uncomfortable for Americans to accept. A national myth developed that the Revolution had been fought by patriotic amateurs. As a corollary, it was widely accepted that the country had scant need of permanent military institutions or a permanent military intelligence organization. In case any conflict developed, it was felt citizen armies would rise up and overwhelm the foe. The circumstances of American life tended to enforce this myth. Although the young nation faced serious menaces on the North American Continent in its early years, the Pax Britannica that followed the War of allowed the United States to develop in an environment of unparalleled security, protected by wide oceans and facing only feeble resistance to its continental expansion. For most of the early 19th century, until the Civil War broke out, the United States was able to survive with a Regular Army of only 10, men. Under these conditions, the chances for the development of a professional military intelligence service were slight. The picture during the first hundred years of American history was not completely bleak. The transcontinental expedition of Lewis and Clark was a noteworthy example of topographic intelligence, as were the subsequent explorations undertaken by Captain Zebulon Pike in the Southwest. One of the most famous members of the Corps was John C. Fremont, the "Pathfinder" who figured so prominently in the early history of California. Nevertheless, the hard fact was that for most of the early period of U. Despite the existence of intelligence collection mechanisms such as cavalry, scouts, and topographic engineers, intelligence within the Army lacked permanent organization and a directing brain. When war came, intelligence organizations were mobilized on an ad hoc basis, in much the same fashion as the mass citizen armies that did the fighting. When peace was restored, everyone went home, and the vestigial Regular Army returned to its normal bureaucratic procedures. The inevitable result was that the Army was handicapped at the beginning of every conflict and sometimes suffered from intelligence shortfalls until well into the war. The great national drama of the Civil War illustrates the point perfectly. The early efforts of both the Union and Confederate armies in the intelligence field were stumbling. The raw new Union Army was particularly handicapped. It lacked good cavalry for reconnaissance, and Alan Pinkerton, the private detective who served for a time as intelligence chief of the Army of the Potomac, provided mostly misinformation. Eighteen months after the fighting had begun, the chief of staff of the Army of the Potomac noted grimly that "we were as ignorant of the enemy in our immediate front as if they had been in China. On the other hand, intelligence collectors were now able to exploit new technologies. Both Union and Confederate armies made use of observation balloons at the beginning of the war, although the lone Confederate balloon was lost in action, while the Union Army eventually lost interest in the project. Observers intercepted enemy semaphore messages, and attempts were made to obtain enemy message traffic by tapping telegraph lines. In selfdefense, both sides resorted to the use of simple codes and ciphers. After the Civil War, however, things went back to normal. The huge Union Army was demobilized, and the intelligence resources that had supported it were discarded. The late 19th century Army was a force designed for Indian- fighting, not for major conflict. Under these conditions, every commander served as his own intelligence officer, and the only specialized assets that seemed to be needed were the familiar collection mechanisms of cavalry and Indian scouts. Surprisingly, under these unpromising conditions, military intelligence at last came into its own. Tides were sweeping over

the country that would end American isolation and necessitate the formation of a permanent military intelligence organization for the first time in American history. This was a period of profound change which witnessed the beginnings of bureaucratization and professionalization of American life, and an increasing tendency for the nation to edge into the international arena. An alert and professional Army needed to keep itself informed about military developments in the rest of the world. The war proved to be a watershed for both the United States and its Army. America emerged from the conflict as a world power of the first rank with a foreign empire in the Philippines and the Caribbean. There were also some intelligence milestones. The Signal Corps deployed an observation balloon at the Battle of Santiago, and the necessity of confronting an insurrection in the Philippines involved the Army in counterintelligence work. The increasing importance of intelligence to the Army was recognized by the fact that the Military Information Division was made one of the three functional elements of the General Staff. The Signal Corps went on to take pioneering steps in adapting technology to the purposes of intelligence. The Corps continued to experiment with observation balloons, and was quick to seize upon the new possibilities of heavier than air flight. The Army acquired its first airplane in 1908. By the time Brigadier General John J. Additionally, the invention of radio allowed the Army to explore the field of signals intelligence. However, the evolution of military intelligence in the early 20th century proved not to be a smooth one. The Second Division of the General Staff, which performed intelligence functions, was merged into the Third, which conducted operational planning. Soon, intelligence work at the General Staff level ceased to be done at all. By 1917, the Army was less prepared in this area than it had been in 1861. When the storm finally broke upon America in 1917, the Army would once again have to improvise an intelligence organization. Scouts and guides of the Union Army. Throughout the 19th century, commanders relied on cavalry, scouts, and reconnaissance parties for most of their tactical intelligence. During the course of the Civil War, spies occasionally provided valuable information. Because of her access to officials in Washington, the Southern spy Rose Greenhow was able to warn Confederate forces that Union troops were on the march to Bull Run. Human Collection The Impact of Technology By the middle of the 19th century, advances in technology allowed breakthroughs in intelligence collection techniques. Communications intelligence became a factor during the Civil War. Armies intercepted signal flag and telegraph messages sent by their opponents, forcing both sides to make use of simple codes and ciphers. In the space of 17 months, the U. S Army was transformed from a constabulary into a draft-raised force of 400,000 men, half of it deployed overseas. By the end of the war, the Military Intelligence Division had become one of four equal divisions on the War Department General Staff, and Army units down to the level of battalion had been provided with intelligence staffs. Since there were not enough Regular Army officers to go around, most intelligence slots were filled by reservists recruited through the familiar "oldboys" network. Once the United States entered the war, it was quick to develop a cryptologic element of its own. By the end of the war, MI-8 had set up its own intercept service along the Mexican border. Army intelligence also took to the skies. In France, observation balloons were used to overwatch enemy lines and direct artillery fire, while scout aircraft provided both visual and photographic coverage of enemy dispositions. Interpreters used stereoscopic lenses to discern the details contained in aerial photographs. Moreover, the Army became heavily involved in counterintelligence CI work both in the Continental United States and overseas. At home, the Army was seriously concerned with a possible but largely unrealized threat that might be presented by German spies, saboteurs, and disaffected aliens. Overseas, the Army attempted to protect the integrity of its forces in an unfamiliar environment. As a result, the Army instituted a professional enlisted counterintelligence force, the Corps of Intelligence Police. Intelligence was collected by observers, scouts, reconnaissance patrols, and interrogation of prisoners of war. Additionally, Brigadier General Dennis E. The National Defense Act of 1916 provided for a force of 10,000 Regulars, backed by National Guardsmen and reservists. But lack of adequate appropriations ensured that this remained a paper force. Military Intelligence suffered along with the rest of the Army. The Military Intelligence Division was cut back to a staff of 20 officers. The intelligence staff organization put in place during World War I continued. The Corps of Intelligence Police maintained a tenuous existence. In 1918, the Army established a Military Intelligence Officers Reserve Corps, thus establishing a professional nucleus of intelligence officers that could be drawn upon in any future mobilization. Even in

peacetime, dedicated officers of the Army Air Corps continued to expand the frontiers of aerial photography. The intelligence discipline which showed most signs of prospering during the peace, however, was that of signals intelligence. Changes affected every intelligence discipline. As a result of a major reorganization of the Army staff in , a separate Military Intelligence Service MIS was created to act as the operating arm of the Military Intelligence Division. This school, which later was relocated to Fort Snelling, Minnesota, trained thousands of Niseisâ€™ second- generation Japanese- Americansâ€™ to act as language specialists. However, by the end of the war, the CIC had expanded to 5, officers and men, and CIC units were deployed with Army tactical elements down to the level of division. The most dramatic advances in Army intelligence in World War II took place in the field of communications intelligence. After a long struggle, SSA was able to decipher the major code systems used by the Japanese military. It is estimated that the efforts of SSA may have shortened the war in the Pacific by two years. Arlington Hall Station furnished the Army with the raw data in the form of decrypted Japanese communications. The job of transforming this into intelligence was provided by the Special Branch of the Military Intelligence Service. The British shared with their American counterparts their degree of success against German communications. It was mutually agreed that each party would fully share intelligence derived from COMINT and that in the future the Americans would concentrate on the Japanese problem, the British on the German. The Special Branch of MIS lost its monopoly over this intelligence source and was broken up on the eve of the Normandy invasion, on the grounds that it was no longer possible to produce valid intelligence without access to COMINT. At the tactical level, as opposed to the strategic one, Army intelligence was decentralized.

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