

DOWNLOAD PDF NIETZSCHES PROCLAMATION OF THE DEATH OF GOD REVISITED

Chapter 1 : R. B. Thieme, Jr., Bible Ministries " Victorious Proclamation

God's death as a passing away of the divine being in a manner similar to human passing.³ Neither should Nietzsche's proclamation be seen as a more grandiose way of expressing unbelief.

His sister, Elisabeth , was born in , followed by his brother Ludwig Joseph in . In , he began to attend a Catholic preparatory school, but after demonstrating particular talents in music and language, he was admitted to the internationally recognized Schulpforta, where he continued his studies from to . Here he became friends with Paul Deussen and Carl von Gersdorff. He also found time to work on poems and musical compositions. At Schulpforta, Nietzsche received an important introduction to literature, particularly in regard to the Ancient Greeks and Romans, and also first experienced a distance from his family life in a small-town Christian environment. After graduation, in , Nietzsche commenced his studies in theology and classical philology at the University of Bonn. For a short time, with Deussen, he was a member of the brotherhood Frankonia, which he found uncomfortable. After one semester and to the anger of his mother, he stopped his studies in theology, and concentrated on philology, with Professor Friedrich Ritschl, whom he followed to the University of Leipzig the next year. There, he became close friends with fellow student Erwin Rohde. Both of these encounters were stimulating, encouraging him to no longer limit himself to philology and continue his schooling. In , Nietzsche committed to one year of voluntary service with the Prussian artillery division in Naumburg. After a bad riding accident in March , however, he revisited his philological studies while unfit for service. Later that year, Nietzsche completed the last year of studies, and had his first meeting with Richard Wagner. Among his philological work there, he discovered that the ancient poetic meter related only to the length of syllables, different from the modern, accentuating meter. In accordance with his own wish, after moving to Basel, Nietzsche renounced his Prussian citizenship, and was for the rest of his life, officially stateless. Nevertheless, he served on the Prussian side during the Franco-Prussian War as a medical orderly. His time in the military was short, but he experienced much, and witnessed the traumatic effects of battle. He also contracted diphtheria and dysentery. On returning to Basel in , Nietzsche observed the establishment of the German Empire and the following era of Otto von Bismarck as an outsider and with a degree of skepticism regarding its genuineness. Also, Nietzsche met Franz Overbeck , a professor of theology, who remained his friend throughout his life. The other most influential colleague was historian Jacob Burckhardt, whose lectures Nietzsche frequently attended. The Wagners brought Nietzsche into their closest circle, and enjoyed the attention he gave to the beginning of the Festival House in Bayreuth. However, the work, in which he forewent a precise philological method to employ a style of philosophical speculation, was not well received among his classical philological colleagues, including Ritschl. Nietzsche remarked freely about the isolation he felt within the philological community and attempted unsuccessfully to attain a position in philosophy at Basel. Between and , Nietzsche published separately four long essays: These four were later collected and published under the title, *Untimely Meditations*. The four shared the orientation of a cultural critique, challenging the developing German culture along lines suggested by Schopenhauer and Wagner. Starting in , he also accumulated notes that were posthumously published as *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. However, his disappointment with the Bayreuth Festival of , where he was repelled by the banality of the shows and the baseness of the public, caused him to finally distance himself from Wagner. Most commentators agree that Nietzsche read Max Stirner , however they differ in respect to whether he was influenced by him. Nietzsche undertook more experiments, attempted to find a wife, and pursued Malwida von Meysenbug to no avail. In , after a significant decline in health, he was forced to resign his position. Since his childhood, Nietzsche had been plagued by various disruptive illnesses -- moments of shortsightedness practically to the degree of blindness, migraine headaches, and violent stomach attacks. These persistent conditions were perhaps aggravated by his riding accident in and diseases in , and continued to affect him through his years at Basel, forcing him to take longer and longer holidays until regular work was no longer

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practicable. Driven by his illness to find more compatible climates, Nietzsche travelled frequently and lived until as a free author in different cities. He spent many summers in Sils Maria , near St. He occasionally returned to Naumburg to visit his family, and especially during this time, he and his sister had repeated periods of conflict and reconciliation. He lived on his pension from Basel, but also received aid from friends. To the end of his life, Gast and Overbeck were consistently faithful friends. Malwida von Meysenbug remained like a motherly patron even outside the Wagner circle. Soon Nietzsche made contact with the music critic Carl Fuchs. Nietzsche was at the beginning of his most productive period. Beginning with *Human, All-Too-Human* in , Nietzsche would publish one book or major section of a book each year until , his last year of writing, during which he completed five. The following year, he published *The Wanderer and His Shadow*. Both were published as the second part of *Human, All-Too-Human* with the second edition of the latter. In , Nietzsche published *Daybreak: After severing philosophical ties to Schopenhauer and social ties to Wagner*, Nietzsche had few remaining friends. Now with the new style of *Zarathustra*, his work became even more alienating and was received only to the degree prescribed by politeness. Nietzsche recognized this and maintained his solitude, even though he often complained about it. He gave up his short-lived plan to become a poet in public, and was troubled by concerns about his publications. His books were as good as unsold. In , he printed only 40 copies of the fourth part of *Zarathustra*, and only a fraction of these were distributed among close friends. In , he printed *Beyond Good and Evil* at his own expense. With this book and the appearance in of second editions of his earlier works *The Birth of Tragedy* , *Human, All-Too-Human* , *Daybreak* , and *The Gay Science* , he saw his work completed for the time and hoped that soon a readership would develop. In fact, the interest in Nietzsche did arise at this time, if also rather slowly and hardly perceived by him. Nietzsche continued to have frequent and painful attacks of illness, which made prolonged work impossible. In , Nietzsche quickly wrote the polemic *On the Genealogy of Morals*. In the same year, Nietzsche wrote five books, based on his voluminous notes for the long-planned work, *The Will to Power*. His health seemed to be improving, and in the summer he was in high spirits. He overestimated the increasing response to his writings, above all, for the recent polemic, *The Case of Wagner*. For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else. Walter Kaufmann In December, Nietzsche began correspondence with August Strindberg , and thought that, short of an international breakthrough, he would attempt to buy back his older writings from the publisher and have them translated into other European languages. Moreover, he planned the publication of the compilation *Nietzsche Contra Wagner* and the poems *Dionysian Dithyrambs*. On 3 January , Nietzsche had a mental collapse. That day he had been approached by two Turinese policemen after making some sort of public disturbance in the streets of Turin. What actually happened is not known. In the following few days, he sent short writings to a number of friends, including Cosima Wagner and Jacob Burckhardt, which showed signs of a breakdown. To his former colleague Burckhardt he wrote: Also, last year I was crucified by the German doctors in a very drawn-out manner. Wilhelm, Bismarck, and all anti-Semites abolished. The following day Overbeck received a similarly revealing letter, and decided Nietzsche must be brought back to Basel. Overbeck traveled to Turin and brought Nietzsche to a psychiatric clinic in Basel. By that time, Nietzsche was fully in the grip of insanity, and his mother Franziska decided to bring him to a clinic in Jena under the direction of Otto Binswanger. Langbehn assumed greater and greater control of Nietzsche until his secrecy discredited him. In January they proceeded with the planned release of *The Twilight of the Idols* , by that time already printed and bound. Naumann secretly printed Overbeck and Gast decided to withhold publishing *Antichrist* and *Ecce Homo* due to their more radical content. Overbeck was eventually dismissed, and Gast finally cooperated. After the death of Franziska in , Nietzsche lived in Weimar , where he was cared for by Elisabeth, who allowed people to visit the uncommunicative Nietzsche. On August 25, , Nietzsche died after contracting pneumonia. Another diagnosis was a form of brain cancer. Others suggest that Nietzsche experienced a mystical awakening, similar to ones studied by Meher Baba. Key concepts Much controversy surrounds whether Nietzsche advocated a single or comprehensive philosophical viewpoint. Many charge Nietzsche with propounding contradictory thoughts and ideas. Nihilism and the death of God Edit After the

skepticism in his early works towards the old foundations of philosophy, religion, and morality, Nietzsche experienced the absence of any meaning or purpose to the world and human existence. Nietzsche did not attribute this nihilism to an autonomous and reactive movement against culture; rather, he diagnosed nihilism as a latent presence within the very foundations of European culture, and thus, as a necessary and approaching destiny. For Nietzsche, nihilism is the outcome of repeated frustrations in the search for meaning. The religious worldview had already suffered a number of challenges from contrary perspectives grounded in philosophical skepticism, modern science heliocentrism superseding geocentrism, evolution superseding creationism, and internal disputes Reformation. However, these attempts to replace God with human reason were also inadequate and unjustified. Given these two insights, But as soon as man finds out how that world is fabricated solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes into being: The Will to Power, Book I, sec. Walter Kaufmann [2] Nietzsche sees this intellectual condition as a new challenge to European culture, which has extended itself beyond a sort of point-of-no-return. Nietzsche treats this phrase as more than a provocative declaration, but almost reverently, as it represents the potential of a nihilism that arrests growth and progress in the midst of an overwhelming absurdity and meaninglessness: But in the main one may say: Much less may one suppose that many people know as yet what this event really means -- and how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it; for example, the whole of our European morality. This long plenitude and sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin, and cataclysm that is now impending -- who could guess enough of it today to be compelled to play the teacher and advance proclaimer of this monstrous logic of terror, the prophet of a gloom and an eclipse of the sun whose like has probably never yet occurred on earth? Gay Science, Book V, sec.

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Chapter 2 : The Death of God : Frederiek Depoortere :

However, despite common interpretation, Nietzsche's proclamation for the death of God is not a celebration, but rather mourning, an utterance of grief. Zarathustra does not find joy in making the separation of God and meaning, but is rather expressing his enlightenment, and for Nietzsche, being enlightened goes beyond ones initial emotions.

According to Nietzsche, the death of God leads to the positive effects of allowing solitude, re-valuation of good things due to the decline of morality GS Sec. The death of God is an indication of the receding of the shadow of religion from its reign over human consciousness – that is, the reduction in the use of religious explanations for how the universe operates and our roles in it. In the wake of the death of God, aided by advances in scientific thought, man developed the mechanistic perspective, seeing the universe as being like a machine, complete with laws of nature. The mechanistic assesses the sensory world through the human constructs the experiences result in via its empirical manifestations, according to its fundamental aims of understanding the world as an ordered entity, through the lens of their human valuations. A mechanistic universe GS Sec. It imposes mechanistic order onto view of the world, supposing that the world has inherent laws but is in reality prone to errors, as humans are. In addition, a scientific mindset is linked to the constructs of humans: Humans now anthropomorphize nature, and, conversely, on a reactionary level, define nature as being non-human. This differentiates them from the world of which they so clearly are a component. Even with the dissolving of the distinction between the metaphysical and the empirical world, there is still such a distinction between man and all else. Reigning shadows of God GS Sec. Let us beware of thinking that the world is a living being! Let us us even beware of believing that the universe is a machine! When will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds? When will we complete our de-deification of nature? So humans must now both de-deify nature and naturalize humanity to achieve proper understanding of the world they inhabit. Through such a two-fold path the individual will be able to interpret the natural world as well as gain further conscious definition of himself. A de-deified, de-anthropomorphized universe ontology leads toward the naturalized: Naturalization is a process by which views about the world constructed under the premise of order and logic are aligned with the world, as it truly exists. Lingering metaphysical need GS Sec. The metaphysical need is not the origin of religions, as Schopenhauer supposed, but merely a late offshoot. In order for humans to become naturalized and move past the problems of natural projection and distinction, they must recognize their own fallible nature and thus the potential for science to error, effectively realizing that science cannot fill every role infallible divine authority and metaphysics formerly inhabited.

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Chapter 3 : Nietzsche's Death of God | Tom Grimwood - www.nxgvision.com

These videos show Peterson presenting his interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God as creating a problem for morality--particularly, the Western morality of natural rights or human rights as founded on the sacred dignity of all individuals.

Tom Grimwood Final Draft of Chapter: Wiley-Blackwell, , pp. The Gay Science, translated by Josefine Nauckhoff. Cambridge University Press, While Nietzsche resists easy logical formulation, the significance of his critique of the ideas of truth and morality in western philosophy makes him one of the most important thinkers in modern times. Perhaps no other philosopher has been defined through his legacy as has been Nietzsche: For Nietzsche, the contemporary age Northern Europe at the end of the nineteenth century was witnessing a radical undermining of its philosophical foundations. On the one hand, the traditional beliefs in God were rendered unbelievable by developments in science. On the other hand, Nietzsche saw that this great shift had produced not radical change but only apathy. The real problem, Nietzsche argued, was not that God had ceased to be believable, but "given the way in which science seamlessly slotted into the same foundational space" nobody had really noticed the significance of the event. Nietzsche is not a nihilist: He is more interested in how we, as humans, react to the event: Given that such an ordering of the world infects both our language and practice, Nietzsche consequently views the importance of truth as metaphorical rather than rational: Even less may one suppose many to know at all what this even really means "and, now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown on it" for example, our entire European morality. That is probably the case; only we need still ask: But why not allow oneself to be deceived? Note that the reasons for the former lie in a completely different area from those for the latter: Is it really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? But what if this were to become more and more difficult to believe, if nothing more were to turn out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie "if God himself were to turn out to be our longest lie? If we accept or commit to something as an organizing principle of our lives, then it should be rational, true, or believable. We should not accept and commit to God as an organizing principle of our lives *modus tollens*, P1, P2. It is these substitutions which Nietzsche sees as remnants of belief that are really challenged by the idea of the Death of God. Thus, Nietzsche is not interested in discussing the existence or nature of God P2 or C1. His issue is rather with the claim made in P1: If science, morality, or religion contains assumptions, then these will affect the outcome of its inquiry. Science, morality, and religion contain the same assumption: If the Will to Truth is essential to our understanding i. But we do not have a moral or utilitarian reason for following it. The Will to Truth is not essential to our understanding *modus tollens*, P5, P6. It comes from the Odyssey, where it is used to describe the hero who uses these traits to survive the wrath of the gods. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to Truth, our reasons must be other than these. Our reasons for following the Will to Truth are other than moral or utilitarian *modus ponens*, P7, P6. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to Truth, then it cannot be rational, true, or believable C5. The Will to Truth cannot be rational, true, or believable *modus ponens*, P8, P6. It rests on a metaphysical faith which is no different, at heart, to the Christian 4 belief in God. The Will to Truth is, thus, a means for limiting our expression of such power: With this connection established between science, morality, and faith, Nietzsche returns to the first part of the argument.

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Chapter 4 : How Resurrection Changes Everything: Revisited - Pacific Crossroads Church

Sunday, July 21, "God is Dead" Nietzsche's proclamation to the "advent of nihilism".

His father died in 1844, and the family relocated to Naumburg, where he grew up in a household comprising his mother, grandmother, two aunts, and his younger sister, Elisabeth. Nietzsche had a brilliant school and university career, culminating in May 1869 when he was called to a chair in classical philology at Basel. At age 24, he was the youngest ever appointed to that post. Before the opportunity at Basel arose, Nietzsche had planned to pursue a second Ph.D. When he was a student in Leipzig, Nietzsche met Richard Wagner, and after his move to Basel, he became a frequent guest in the Wagner household at Villa Tribschen in Lucerne. His first book, *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*, was not the careful work of classical scholarship the field might have expected, but a controversial polemic combining speculations about the collapse of the tragic culture of fifth century Athens with a proposal that Wagnerian music-drama might become the source of a renewed tragic culture for contemporary Germany. These essays are known collectively as the *Untimely Meditations*. When he sent the book to the Wagners early in 1872, it effectively ended their friendship: As a result, he was freed to write and to develop the style that suited him. He published a book almost every year thereafter. These works began with *Daybreak*, which collected critical observations on morality and its underlying psychology, and there followed the mature works for which Nietzsche is best known: *In later years*, Nietzsche moved frequently in the effort to find a climate that would improve his health, settling into a pattern of spending winters near the Mediterranean usually in Italy and summers in Sils Maria, Switzerland. His symptoms included intense headaches, nausea, and trouble with his eyesight. Recent work Huenemann has convincingly argued that he probably suffered from a retro-orbital meningioma, a slow-growing tumor on the brain surface behind his right eye. In January 1889, Nietzsche collapsed in the street in Turin, and when he regained consciousness he wrote a series of increasingly deranged letters. His close Basel friend Franz Overbeck was gravely concerned and travelled to Turin, where he found Nietzsche suffering from dementia. After unsuccessful treatment in Basel and Jena, he was released into the care of his mother, and later his sister, eventually lapsing entirely into silence. He lived on until 1890, when he died of a stroke complicated by pneumonia. *Critique of Religion and Morality* Nietzsche is arguably most famous for his criticisms of traditional European moral commitments, together with their foundations in Christianity. This critique is very wide-ranging; it aims to undermine not just religious faith or philosophical moral theory, but also many central aspects of ordinary moral consciousness, some of which are difficult to imagine doing without. By the time Nietzsche wrote, it was common for European intellectuals to assume that such ideas, however much inspiration they owed to the Christian intellectual and faith tradition, needed a rational grounding independent from particular sectarian or even ecumenical religious commitments. Then as now, most philosophers assumed that a secular vindication of morality would surely be forthcoming and would save the large majority of our standard commitments. Christianity no longer commands society-wide cultural allegiance as a framework grounding ethical commitments, and thus, a common basis for collective life that was supposed to have been immutable and invulnerable has turned out to be not only less stable than we assumed, but incomprehensibly mortal—and in fact, already lost. The response called for by such a turn of events is mourning and deep disorientation. Indeed, the case is even worse than that, according to Nietzsche. Not only do standard moral commitments lack a foundation we thought they had, but stripped of their veneer of unquestionable authority, they prove to have been not just baseless but positively harmful. Unfortunately, the moralization of our lives has insidiously attached itself to genuine psychological needs—some basic to our condition, others cultivated by the conditions of life under morality—so its corrosive effects cannot simply be removed without further psychological damage. Still worse, the damaging side of morality has implanted itself within us in the form of a genuine self-understanding, making it hard for us to imagine ourselves living any other way. Thus, Nietzsche argues, we are faced with a difficult, long term restoration project in which the

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most cherished aspects of our way of life must be ruthlessly investigated, dismantled, and then reconstructed in healthier form—all while we continue somehow to sail the ship of our common ethical life on the high seas. The most extensive development of this Nietzschean critique of morality appears in his late work *On the Genealogy of Morality*, which consists of three treatises, each devoted to the psychological examination of a central moral idea. In the First Treatise, Nietzsche takes up the idea that moral consciousness consists fundamentally in altruistic concern for others. He begins by observing a striking fact, namely, that this widespread conception of what morality is all about—while entirely commonsensical to us—is not the essence of any possible morality, but a historical innovation. In such a system, goodness is associated with exclusive virtues. There is no thought that everyone should be excellent—the very idea makes no sense, since to be excellent is to be distinguished from the ordinary run of people. Nietzsche shows rather convincingly that this pattern of assessment was dominant in ancient Mediterranean culture the Homeric world, later Greek and Roman society, and even much of ancient philosophical ethics. It focuses its negative evaluation evil on violations of the interests or well-being of others—and consequently its positive evaluation good on altruistic concern for their welfare. Such a morality needs to have universalistic pretensions: It is thereby especially amenable to ideas of basic human equality, starting from the thought that each person has an equal claim to moral consideration and respect. The exact nature of this alleged revolt is a matter of ongoing scholarly controversy in recent literature, see Bittner ; Reginster ; Migotti ; Ridley ; May Afterward, via negation of the concept of evil, the new concept of goodness emerges, rooted in altruistic concern of a sort that would inhibit evil actions. For Nietzsche, then, our morality amounts to a vindictive effort to poison the happiness of the fortunate GM III, 14 , instead of a high-minded, dispassionate, and strictly rational concern for others. That said, Nietzsche offers two strands of evidence sufficient to give pause to an open minded reader. Second, Nietzsche observes with confidence-shaking perspicacity how frequently indignant moralistic condemnation itself, whether arising in serious criminal or public matters or from more private personal interactions, can detach itself from any measured assessment of the wrong and devolve into a free-floating expression of vengeful resentment against some real or imagined perpetrator. The First Treatise does little, however, to suggest why inhabitants of a noble morality might be at all moved by such condemnations, generating a question about how the moral revaluation could have succeeded. The Second Treatise, about guilt and bad conscience, offers some materials toward an answer to this puzzle. Nietzsche begins from the insight that guilt bears a close conceptual connection to the notion of debt. The pure idea of moralized guilt answers this need by tying any wrong action inextricably and uniquely to a blamable agent. As we saw, the impulse to assign blame was central to the resentment that motivated the moral revaluation of values, according to the First Treatise. Thus, insofar as people even nobles become susceptible to such moralized guilt, they might also become vulnerable to the revaluation, and Nietzsche offers some speculations about how and why this might happen GM II, 16— These criticisms have attracted an increasingly subtle secondary literature; see Reginster , as well as Williams a, b , Ridley , May In such cases, free-floating guilt can lose its social and moral point and develop into something hard to distinguish from a pathological desire for self-punishment. Ascetic self-denial is a curious phenomenon indeed, on certain psychological assumptions, like descriptive psychological egoism or ordinary hedonism, it seems incomprehensible , but it is nevertheless strikingly widespread in the history of religious practice. One obvious route to such a value system, though far from the only one, is for the moralist to identify a set of drives and desires that people are bound to have—perhaps rooted in their human or animal nature—and to condemn those as evil; anti-sensualist forms of asceticism follow this path. As Nietzsche emphasizes, purified guilt is naturally recruited as a tool for developing asceticism. Suffering is an inevitable part of the human condition, and the ascetic strategy is to interpret such suffering as punishment, thereby connecting it to the notion of guilt. Despite turning her own suffering against her, the move paradoxically offers certain advantages to the agent—not only does her suffering gain an explanation and moral justification, but her own activity can be validated by being enlisted on the side of punishment self-castigation: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; still more

precisely, a perpetrator, still more specifically, a guilty perpetrator who is susceptible to suffering, and the ascetic priests says to him: GM III, 15 Thus, Nietzsche suggests, The principal bow stroke the ascetic priest allowed himself to cause the human soul to resound with wrenching and ecstatic music of every kind was executedâ€”everyone knows thisâ€”by exploiting the feeling of guilt. Consider, for example, the stance of Schopenhauerian pessimism, according to which human life and the world have negative absolute value. From that standpoint, the moralist can perfectly well allow that ascetic valuation is self-punishing and even destructive for the moral agent, but such conclusions are entirely consistent withâ€”indeed, they seem like warranted responses toâ€”the pessimistic evaluation. That is, if life is an inherent evil and nothingness is a concrete improvement over existence, then diminishing or impairing life through asceticism yields a net enhancement of value. While asceticism imposes self-discipline on the sick practitioner, it simultaneously makes the person sicker, plunging her into intensified inner conflict GM III, 15, 20â€” While this section has focused on the Genealogy, it is worth noting that its three studies are offered only as examples of Nietzschean skepticism about conventional moral ideas. Nietzsche tried out many different arguments against pity and compassion beginning already in *Human, All-too-human* and continuing to the end of his productive lifeâ€”for discussion, see Reginster , Janaway forthcoming , and Nussbaum Nietzsche resists the hedonistic doctrine that pleasure and pain lie at the basis of all value claims, which would be the most natural way to defend such a presupposition. From that point of view, the morality of compassion looks both presumptuous and misguided. It is misguided both because it runs the risk of robbing individuals of their opportunity to make something positive individually meaningful out of their suffering, and because the global devaluation of suffering as such dismisses in advance the potentially valuable aspects of our general condition as vulnerable and finite creatures GS ; compare Williams For him, however, human beings remain valuing creatures in the last analysis. It follows that no critique of traditional values could be practically effective without suggesting replacement values capable of meeting our needs as valuers see GS ; Anderson , esp. Nietzsche thought it was the job of philosophers to create such values BGE , so readers have long and rightly expected to find an account of value creation in his works. There is something to this reaction: It is common, if not altogether standard, to explain values by contrasting them against mere desires. If I become convinced that something I valued is not in fact valuable, that discovery is normally sufficient to provoke me to revise my value, suggesting that valuing must be responsive to the world; by contrast, subjective desires often persist even in the face of my judgment that their objects are not properly desirable, or are unattainable; see the entries on value theory and desire. We [contemplatives] â€” are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: Only we have created the world that concerns man! Some scholars take the value creation passages as evidence that Nietzsche was an anti-realist about value, so that his confident evaluative judgments should be read as efforts at rhetorical persuasion rather than objective claims Leiter , or relatedly they suggest that Nietzsche could fruitfully be read as a skeptic, so that such passages should be evaluated primarily for their practical effect on readers Berry ; see also Leiter Others Hussain take Nietzsche to be advocating a fictionalist posture, according to which values are self-consciously invented contributions to a pretense through which we can satisfy our needs as valuing creatures, even though all evaluative claims are strictly speaking false. First, while a few passages appear to offer a conception of value creation as some kind of legislative fiat e. Second, a great many of the passages esp. GS 78, , , , connect value creation to artistic creation, suggesting that Nietzsche took artistic creation and aesthetic value as an important paradigm or metaphor for his account of values and value creation more generally. While some Soll attack this entire idea as confused, other scholars have called on these passages as support for either fictionalist or subjective realist interpretations. In addition to showing that not all value creation leads to results that Nietzsche would endorse, this observation leads to interesting questionsâ€”e. If so, what differentiates the two modes? Can we say anything about which is to be preferred? Nietzsche praises many different values, and in the main, he does not follow the stereotypically philosophical strategy of deriving his evaluative judgments from one or a few foundational principles. A well-known passage appears near the opening of the late work, *The Antichrist*:

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Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. Everything that is born of weakness. The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. That doctrine seems to include the proposal that creatures like us or more broadly: The same conception has been developed by Paul Katsafanas, who argues that, qua agents, we are ineluctably committed to valuing power because a Reghinster-style will to power is a constitutive condition on acting at all. His account thereby contributes to the constitutivist strategy in ethics pioneered by Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman. On this view, what Nietzsche values is power understood as a tendency toward growth, strength, domination, or expansion. Schacht and Leiter are surely right to raise worries about the Millian reconstruction. Nietzsche apparently takes us to be committed to a wide diversity of first order aims, which raises prima facie doubts about the idea that for him all willing really takes power as its first-order aim as the Millian argument would require. It is not clear that this view can avoid the objection rooted in the possibility of pessimism. Given his engagement with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche should have been sensitive to the worry. According to Reghinster: I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful.

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Friedrich Nietzsche is notable for having declared that God is dead and for having written several of his works in the presumption that man must find a new mode of being given the death of God.

Darwinian Conservatism by Larry Arnhart The Left has traditionally assumed that human nature is so malleable, so perfectible, that it can be shaped in almost any direction. By contrast, a Darwinian science of human nature supports traditionalist conservatives and classical liberals in their realist view of human imperfectibility, and in their commitment to ordered liberty as rooted in natural desires, cultural traditions, and prudential judgments. The fourth is a compilation of videos that is longer--about 55 minutes. Oh, I know, many of you think I have already written too much about Jordan Peterson. So you can skip this post. And I promise this will be my last one on Peterson. Peterson claims that this shows that morality is impossible without a grounding in a transcendent religious metaphysics. Even those who think they are scientific atheists--like Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, for example--are actually acting out their implicit practical belief in Christian metaphysics, because they embrace a Christian morality of natural individual rights. People like Dawkins and Harris think that their morality can be based on pure rationality--the rational science of the Enlightenment. Dostoevsky is showing us that this is what we would do if we truly were atheists. If God is dead, then everything is permitted. In the first passage, Nietzsche ridicules George Eliot and the English generally for thinking they can deny the existence of the Christian God while keeping Christian morality, without realizing that Christian morality must be a command of God--its origin is transcendental--and therefore the death of God must bring the death of Christian morality. Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continuously? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night and more night coming on all the while? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? I have written about this in a series of posts in January to April, That Peterson agrees with the middle Nietzsche in seeing morality as grounded on a Darwinian moral anthropology is clear in 12 Rules for Life. Agreeing with my principle that the good is the desirable, Peterson writes: Start from the observation that we indeed desire things--even that we need them. We share the experience of hunger, loneliness, thirst, sexual desire, aggression, fear, and pain. Such things are elements of Being--primordial axiomatic elements of Being. Thus, we must become conscious of our desires, and articulate them, and prioritize them, and arrange them into hierarchies. That makes them sophisticated. That makes them work with each other, and with the desires of other people, and with the world. It is in that manner that our desires elevate themselves. It is in that manner that they organize themselves into values and become moral. Our values, our morality--they are indicators of our sophistication" Here Peterson seems to agree with me and with Philippa Foot that morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives that depend on human interests and desires. Morality is informed desire. The good is the desirable, and reason judges how best to satisfy the desires over a whole life, which often requires settling conflicts between desires by judging how one desire fits with others in some deliberate conception of a whole life well lived. But then immediately after the passage just quoted, Peterson says that we need to move to a deeper level of morality to see how the "ultimate values" depend on religion, which is what Plato meant by the transcendent "Idea of the Good. You can only find out what you actually believe rather than what you think you believe by watching how you act. You are too complex to understand yourself" So if we believed that God was dead, we would commit murder. If this were true, we would expect to see empirical historical evidence that religious belief is correlated with a low homicide rate, and declining religious belief is correlated with a high homicide rate. Oddly, Peterson does not notice how this contradicts his prediction that the modern death of God must necessarily turn us all into murderous Raskolnikovs. There is another aspect of this fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, Peterson insists that the domain of science as the study of

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objective facts is completely separated from the domain of religion as mythic storytelling about subjective values , On the other hand, he accepts the "social brain" hypothesis of evolutionary psychology as explaining the evolution of religious belief as expressing the "hyperactive agency detection device" in our brains Nor does he recognize the contradiction in asserting that science both can and cannot study religious belief.

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Chapter 6 : Revelation 5 Revisited | Alpha and Omega Ministries

"God is Dead" (German: "Gott ist tot" (help · info); also known as the Death of God) is a widely quoted statement by German philosopher Friedrich Schlegel who used the phrase in a figurative sense, to express the idea that the Enlightenment had "killed" the possibility of belief in God or any gods having ever existed.

How Resurrection Changes Everything: It is the one historical event which, if it is true, topples every other claim, and if it is not makes Christianity not just another religion, but absolutely worthless. But in fact Christ has been raised from the dead and we will be raised with Him. I wish I had time and space enough to explore this in full, but here is a cliff notes version. Resurrection changes how we see death. If resurrection is true, it means that death was never an intended part of creation. It means that death really is wrong, an invader, an unwelcome and intrusive guest. Death is not part of life; it is the exact opposite. It means that when we weep at death, it is the right and proper response. Resurrection changes how we see life. It tells us life is a good thing. Which seems almost too simple to mention, until you find yourself overwhelmed by despair and life seems hopeless and meaningless. Resurrection is the promise that life really is good no matter how tinged with death it has become. And it is the promise that our end is life; life forever. Death is no longer the last thing it is the second to last thing. Resurrection changes how we see ourselves. Resurrection is different than our souls living on after we die. Christianity does not teach the immortality of the soul apart from the body. It teaches about a resurrected Savior with a new and whole body. And if that is true, it tells us something shocking: It means we are built to enjoy our senses. It means the invigoration we feel after a run, the bliss we feel tasting a great meal all of these are good and right. Resurrection changes how we see other people. Resurrection is the theological imperative behind our work in our city and across the world. Resurrection changes how we see the world. God created the world and He said it was good. Sunsets are supposed to make us catch our breath. The night sky is meant to make us feel small and yet significant. This world, even though now it is tinged with death, is still stunningly beautiful. And one day it will be fully restored, just as we will. Resurrection is a defense of beauty as much as it is a proclamation of life. Resurrection changes how we see our responsibilities. The great chapter on resurrection, 1 Corinthians 15, ends with this appeal: Since resurrection is true, our work here on this world, at this time is never fruitless. At the same time, resurrection denies any attempt to place the ultimate responsibility of restoration in human hands. Resurrection changes how we see our past. If God can bring life out of death, then there is nothing and no one that cannot be redeemed. And that is our hope. No matter where we have been, no matter where we are right now. We are not so far down that Jesus is not willing to come to us; not so lost that Jesus will not find us; not so broken that Jesus will not restore us; not so sick that Jesus cannot heal us; not so dirty that Jesus cannot clean us. Resurrection changes how we see our future. Often the picture of life after death is one of disembodied souls floating on clouds, playing harps. No wonder no one is in a hurry to get there. This leads many people to repeat this oft-heard phrase: Finally, resurrection changes the way we see God. What is He about? From Genesis 3 onward, God has been working to restore life to the world, to fix what is broken, to reform and renew the shattered pieces of His world and His people whom He loves. Paul says, Jesus is the firstborn of many brothers and sisters. What does that mean? There will be more. It is the first stone in an avalanche of life. It is the turning of the tide in the sea of death. It is the torch that sets the world on fire. It is our one hope, our one assurance, our one destination, and the driving force that sends us out. Jesus who died lives again, and we will be raised with Him. It has now become past history. But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied. Taking care of those

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that the world does not care for or even abuses is what God wants us to do. When Jeremy preached on Isaiah 1 recently, he said of this passage: The poor were uncared for and trampled on. God thinks this is a charade.

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Chapter 7 : Friedrich Nietzsche (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Hence, despite its subject matter, Nietzsche does not argue for the Death of God itself in his work in a way that would engage traditionally with the philosophy of religion - it is, rather, a proclamation of an event which is witnessed or reported (for example, in *The Gay Science*, *Ä§*, *Ä§*, and in the prologue to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*).*

First, amazing that so many people read this blog many thanks! But more amazing is the kinds of replies that have been offered to a single paragraph of devotional commentary. I wonder why my published works do not garner such replies? And it seems that I do not have the luxury, at any time, of speaking to fellow believers outside of the context of the strictest standards of scholarship. For example, this was sent to me a couple of days ago. One of the glorious truths [argumentum ad superbium] of Scripture is that Jesus is not a hypothetical Savior [straw man], a mere wanna-be who fails with regularity [argumentum ad odium]. No, we proclaim a powerful Savior who perfectly does the will of the Father [black-or-white fallacy in addition to other previously-mentioned fallacies]. His death did not make the purchase of men from every tribe, tongue, people and nation possible, it actually accomplished that which the Triune Majesty intended. The physical size of his works would double with the insertion of such commentary. Only if you ignore the fact that I was writing a single paragraph in a devotional context can such assertions be made. So, since the context did not provide the necessary foundations for these statements, allow me to do so now. It is a glorious truth of Scripture that Jesus is a perfect Savior, is it not? I do not apologize for asserting that the glory of God is, in fact, central to my understanding of the entire drama of Creation and Redemption. But is this an argument? Or a statement of my theological belief? In context, it is a statement of my theological belief and not a formal argument, hence, it cannot be a formal error if it was never intended to carry some kind of argumentational weight! What is the difference between the proclamation of Christ as a perfect Savior who saves John 6: Within the context of my statement, this is not a straw man. But once again, where is the misrepresentation of the opposing viewpoint? The adherents of that system may well dispute the conclusion of their own teachings, but that is a far cry from providing a coherent rejoinder. If they are not universalists, and a person for whom Christ dies ends up under the wrath of God for eternity, is this an example of 1 success or 2 failure? If it is failure, how is the statement incorrect? There is no straw-man in stating that an atonement that does not atone is not an atonement. If sin is atoned for, that is, if propitiation has taken place, then the wrath of God will not find place in eternity in the one whose sins have been propitiated. And yet, the system I was addressing says just that: Now, I have said in my published works that this is a wonderful example of the self-contradiction of these systems: It convicts them of inconsistent, tradition-driven theologizing. Once again, all of those nit-pickers out there who have chosen to demonstrate their mastery of Latin phrases in logic class might do well to try out their skills on targets larger than a single paragraph. The understanding presented by the Arminian is as follows: Christ is the propitiation for the sins of all Christians, and not for Christians only, but also for every single person in all places and at all times. The Reformed understanding is that Jesus Christ is the propitiation for the sins of all the Christians to which John was writing, and not only them, but for all Christians throughout the world, Jew and Gentile, at all times and in all places. If there was not so much emotional energy involved in the debate the means of determining which interpretation is the proper one would be agreed to by all: For example, such a study would find the following passage, also from the pen of John, relevant: You have made them to be a kingdom and priests to our God; and they will reign upon the earth. And we likewise see the direct relevance to 1 John 2: So we must look at the way John uses the term in the many contexts found not only in his gospel but in his epistles and in Revelation. And when we do this we note a common theme in reference to the intention, purpose, and scope of His death. I posted our memory verse for those who follow this blog regularly. I assume the only folks who would want to memorize Scripture passages such as these already agree with me on these fundamental issues and that they are, by and large, familiar with the body of my writings. I confess, I have to wonder about folks who have so much extra time in their lives so as to be nit-picking at

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single paragraphs written in such an obvious context. I do wish they would invest their efforts in more worthwhile and meaningful endeavors. He is the author of more than twenty four books, a professor, an accomplished debater, and an elder of the Phoenix Reformed Baptist Church.

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Chapter 8 : God is dead - Wikipedia

He explains that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable, i.e., the idea of God is dead. Of course, most people in 19th century Germany/Europe were still Christian, but Nietzsche is noticing that society is outgrowing the idea of God, much like a child comes to the point when s/he can no longer believe in Santa Claus.

The text looked at radical notions of enlightenment for the individual in a world somewhat dominated by Platonic thought. Platonism as a paradigm inadvertently influenced Christianity to the extent that the underlying principles of transcendence for Christianity rely on the ideal form that encompasses reality for Plato. Zarathustra does not find joy in making the separation of God and meaning, but is rather expressing his enlightenment, and for Nietzsche, being enlightened goes beyond ones initial emotions. The idea of the overman is an extension of the consequences for the death of God. As this essay will demonstrate, the overman is the fulfilling of enlightened life without God. The idea of the overman is one that has gone through history scathed by misrepresented ideas imposed on what Nietzsche intended to express. The reasoning for such misapplication can be found in certain forms of redemptive politics, such as Nazi Germany. This has been largely manifested through Christianity. For people, God gives meaning to their worlds because of the idea that everything that occurs is a part of his plan and is within his control. If all of existence is secured by the idea of an overseer that has a plan for each individual, people feel as though their lives are intrinsically meaningful because the God that they believe in supposedly believes in the individual. Furthermore, because there is an image of a plan laid out for every life, people feel as though there is meaning in their lives because they have some sort of cosmic purpose. It is in understanding the process that has liberated the world from God that facilitates an understanding of why we no longer need God, why we should in fact look away from the conception of God and to find meaning in other things. In regards to the history of popular philosophy, it is in the period of the enlightenment and the renaissance from the 17th century onwards in which the idea of understanding the world without the Christian God began to take place. With the ideas of Spinoza, Hume and Voltaire gathering momentum, the idea of making a rational explanation for why God does not exist was allowed to thrive and become popular in a post-medieval Europe. Furthermore, with the revolution of science making waves through doctrines of heliocentrism and evolution further paved the way for a world that is not designed for humans by God, but rather a world in which humans incidentally exist with God having little or no power. In the distress for no longer turning to God for meaning, people were left in a position of potential nihilism and furthermore, dread due to the meaningless nature of ones life. But the initial radical shift in the overman from Christianity is in situated-ness. Zarathustra claims that in the enactment of the overman, meaning in the world can be found. In finding meaning in this world alone, for Nietzsche, the eternal soul is seen as a Christian or rather, a religious construct that separated man from true meaning. In consequence, for Zarathustra, ones soul is a part of the body as all that exists is within this world. Once Zarathustra has proclaimed that all that exists is in this world, we are radically stripped down. But in in stripping down the convoluted ideas that found meaning in false pretences arises an affirmation of life in the form of the single human for himself. In negating the God of outside built purpose, Zarathustra embraces the meaninglessness of life, light and darkness that is the expression of nature that builds no purpose towards any man. Deep is its woe. But ecstasy is deeper yet than agony. But joy aims at eternity- At deep, deep eternity. Consequently implying that the character of meaning in a Godless world is in embracing chaos, the mode-of-being for the overman is to affirm our surroundings. Another critical characteristic of the overman that is a direct response to the death of God regards the singularity of way of the overman. The overman is someone who overcomes such obstacles that is almost inherent in humanity, which is to follow the leader. But in doing so, one be enlightened through themselves, as opposed to merely following the herd. Furthermore, why they breed certain forms of morality and way of thought. The regard for the process of becoming the overman has been criticised as a form of radical individualism that neglects the collective. Because in finding enlightenment and

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meaning through only ones self appears to deny that the human is inherently social. The embracing of truth for Nietzsche looks to imply that introspection is all that is critical, which denies a critical component that drives humanity. Because if we were to reach complete understanding of meaning in the world, we cannot separate ourselves from it, taking a Heideggerian understanding of situated-ness in the world. And from that, claiming that in being-in-the-world, we cannot separate ourselves from our social nature. But perhaps mediation between our own solitude and a gathering facilitates humans to gain meaning in the world. However, because the world within the gathering is full people expressing certain things, making sense of the world can be stifled due to the clutter of information. Thus meaning through the self can be found in ones own self-reflection. A constant interchanging of ideas and self-reflection is in some way the most pragmatic and all-encompassing method of understanding and gaining meaning in the world. In a Godless world, meaning is either attributed or recognised as absurd. The concept of the overman birthing out of the death of God works on all levels basing on the condition of the death of God. The criticism lies in how exactly one becomes enlightened, but if there is no dispute regarding the death of God and the negation of Platonic realms, the path for the overman has been made much easier. Camus, A , The Myth of Sisyphus:

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Chapter 9 : An Indic Reading of Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra – Part I

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was a German philosopher and cultural critic who published intensively in the 1870s and 1880s. He is famous for uncompromising criticisms of traditional European morality and religion, as well as of conventional philosophical ideas and social and political pieties associated with modernity.

From a Christian perspective, this situation is complicated by the fact that this loss of transcendence occurred in the Christian West. This raises the question of the relation between Christianity and secularization. How did the idea of the "Death of God" come about, where were its origins? Frederiek Depoortere presents a fascinating investigation into the history of the concept of God through Greek philosophy, Mediaeval theology, the Reformation to Early Modern philosophy. He proves that the roots of modern secularism can be traced back to the epistemology of the first metaphysicians of Greek philosophy and the Christian theologians, who developed their concepts further. Table of contents Introduction: God, the Ultimate Foundation 3. The Death of God: The End of All Foundations 4. God in Stoic Philosophy d. God in the Philosophy of the Platonists after Plato e. The Legacy of Greek Natural Theology 3. From Augustine to Aquinas 5. The Breakdown of the Medieval Synthesis 6. Divine Omnipotence in the Bible 2. Divine Omnipotence in the Patristic Era 3. The Theological Origins of Modernity Evaluated a. Divine Omnipotence in Descartes: The Doctrine of the Creation of the Eternal Truths 5. Summary and Conclusion 4. From Analogy to Univocity: The Beginning of the End for God in the West? Personal Immortality and the Autonomy of Natural Philosophy 4. The Chalcedonian Definition of the Faith b. The Doctrine of the Communicatio Idiomatum c. Such a project must of necessity grapple with an array of complex movements and developments within Western thought over a period of some two thousand years and this has been done proficiently. He chooses his interlocutors well and offers scholarly and informative analyses of their central ideas as they relate to his theme. The breadth of sources and the depth of issues requires remarkable skill and insight I am sure there are many who will be engaged, enlightened and encouraged to think further by this serious study as it grapples with the relation of Greek philosophy to Christian belief in the history of Western thought. Depoortere has written a refreshing, interesting, and courageous volume. Well-written and well-edited, it is an informative source for students of theology and philosophy. Depoortere also shows signs of humor--look for references to Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman! For information on how we process your data, read our Privacy Policy.