

*1. Introduction. Historical consciousness refers to a symbolically mediated ability to consider the meaning of a present set of group-level or individual events with reference to a past set of group-level events "where the group in question may involve a family, a tribe, a clan, a culture, or a nation.*

Citation "Again and again, studies revealed a no doubt pathetic state of historical education. Of course, the question was never raised, nor of course answered, whether the level of historical education had ever been better. Never mind the fact that the relation between historical knowledge and historical awareness has remained unsolved in this context and therefore also what the significance of the empirical findings was in the first place. Anthropological Universal or Cultural Achievement? At first sight, this view arouses approval, but soon, the need for explanation and correction sets in. There is likely to be a consensus, however, that the *historia rerum gestarum*, which is associated with complex communicative and mental performances, with many and diverse forms of media and representations, can be found in man alone. No doubt, other living beings, too, have a memory and are capable of mnemonic performances. This sense presupposes, according to T. On the one hand it is by no means obvious what precisely we mean by historical sense or historical consciousness. On the other hand, the claim of universal applicability of the anthropological definition raises doubts upon closer inspection not because it draws a distinct line between man and other genera, but rather because it attributes identical historical consciousness to all human beings. We would like to remind the reader that not too long ago many experts agreed that the above claim of an anthropological historical sense or historical consciousness represented an inadequate generalisation of a merely selective observation. A closer look would reveal the need to distinguish between peoples, societies and cultures with historical consciousness from those for whom history and historical consciousness is simply alien. Peoples, societies and cultures without a history, so goes the familiar thesis, necessarily have no consciousness of history either. As a rule, this differentiation is linked to the availability of a writing system and occasionally, as in W. According to this view, only with the emergence of the state do peoples leave pre-historic, acephalous, uncivilised communities and enter history. The nexus that links together state and history has long and justifiably been broken. This is supposed to be true for the peoples of dead epochs as well as for so-called primitive cultures that are still scattered across the globe today. This perspective is however not tenable to such a general degree. It evidently took no notice of oral history and historical consciousness informed by it. This ignorant view of historical consciousness that is not reliant upon written records or the "textual objectivation" *textuelle Objektivation* of "life-forms" *Lebensformen* and collectively significant events is, so it seems, no longer current either. He did however get caught up in contradictions and blurred important distinctions. We will come back to that later. Quite often, this link follows or followed the dubious "logic of progress" of a socio-cultural evolution where a writing system is not just seen as a milestone within the development of human "life-forms" *Lebensformen*, but rather as a dividing line between two, by no means equally valued, ways of being human. This understanding determined the perception of the spacio-material environment, which was partly made up of historical signs *Geschichtszeichen*: They were always linked to certain people, and even more to the places where the events took place," perhaps to a special tree, a certain place at the shore of a river, an elevation. The environment was the myth and event-historical space-time-world of a group, landmarks were at the same time markings in a temporal topography from which a community derived its orientation and identity. A similar mnemonic and identity-relevant function was served by numerous objects, which this position views as material narrative abbreviations. Similarly, they can display symbolic, identity-giving and social-integrative power. Be it myths, legends or mundane event-historical data and stories: Narrated time is an anthropological universal. The telling of stories which relate to the horizon of a common history and partially recall it contributes to both these functions to a large degree. The view outlined above, as hinted at by SCHOTT himself but not taken seriously enough, contains an important problem. The anthropologisation of history and historical consciousness does correct the nostroscentric devaluation of state and "scriptless" peoples and other groups which, for a long time, were considered not to have a history and develop a consciousness thereof for the

simple reason that they did not do it by the same means as "us" or "people like us". The anthropologisation of history and historical consciousness is however based on a rather delicate presupposition: Upon closer inspection, it becomes obvious that there are many differences in what is presented as a conceptual unity: The supposed uniformity and unity of the concept cannot be maintained empirically, neither from a historical, a cross-cultural comparative, sociological or psychological perspective. If one considers historical consciousness to be an anthropological universal one should define the concept. It then becomes immediately obvious that talking about human nature in general forces one to deal with rather general definitions. Such definitions do not permit one to categorically grasp and differentially describe varying conceptions of the self and the world that are rooted in variable relations to time. It then becomes obvious that modern historical consciousness of complex societies is not limited to the basic operations of a narrative constitution and examination of time, but rather "inter alia" that it includes specific dealings with contingency and change. This alone unmistakably distinguishes it from other forms of communicative ordering of time and construction of reality. In his widely read article, speaking on behalf of the historical consciousness of peoples without a writing system, he claimed that it "is not in principle different from that of peoples with a writing system" *ibid*, p. Historical events either took place episodically, or they were based on something indefinitely valid. SCHOTT misleadingly plays it down by rejecting the "opposition" of mythical time in the narrow sense "that is, constituted by historicity" and historical time. In an act of performative self-contradiction he does exactly this while drawing the above distinction. There are, no doubt, good if not necessary reasons to make this contrastive distinction. Modern western historical consciousness is initially linked to that consciousness of historicity which is expressed as an awareness of contingency in a world constituted by change. This link is remarkable. It strongly suggests scepticism and caution with regard to a concept of history and historical consciousness that is too broad and general. A concept of history and historical consciousness bound to the awareness of historicity is a specific, integral part of the modern western world. This conception may since have gained influence in many cultures and appears to us today as a matter of course and entirely natural. Despite this impression however, it is not an anthropological universal. A view of the world not only characterised in such a way that all that exists in it is subject to the principles of becoming and passing and therefore, as HERACLITUS and others saw it, is in constant flux, but also characterised as itself contingent, a merely possible order among many, is a historical and cultural innovation of western modernity. Modern temporalisation and dynamisation transforms all those orders that had previously been thought of as necessary into contingent phenomena. Modern history and modern historical consciousness stand for precisely that. It is thus a question of degree or scale according to which people can be distinguished regarding their engagement with the past and "history" "these differences are quite significant, with some societies seemingly "not developing it to a large degree or even working against this drive or sense, if that is what you want to call it. His thoughts lead to a firm rejection of an undifferentiated concept of historical sense or historical consciousness, to a radical skepticism even concerning all anthropological conceptions of the matter in hand: I take it as my starting point "along the lines of NIETZSCHE" that the indications concerning the basic equipment of human nature point towards forgetting rather than remembering and that the facts of remembering, of an interest in the past, of inquiry and analysis are the real problems in need of an explanation. Instead of the appeal to a special sense or drive I consider it more reasonable to ask what it was that impelled man to engage with his past" *ibid*, p. What appears "natural" is not so much remembering but rather forgetting. The naturalness of supposedly ubiquitous mnemonic practices has turned into a problem that is in need of explanation. According to ASSMANN, what needs to be explained is why memory does not always yield to the natural desire to forget and how it operates "in its many different forms" when it remembers reflects, shapes, pragmatically instrumentalises etc. This task of explaining and analysing concrete processes of forgetting and remembering is no doubt of great importance. From a psychological point of view, too, one can ask about "disincentives and incentives of historical remembering, i. In our view, however, such a task does not have to be tied to a characterization of forgetting as a "natural" or "primary" human attitude towards the past. Such a move would shift the problem of the naturalisation or anthropological universalisation of historical consciousness rather than circumvent or solve it. Remembering and forgetting are "equiprimordial"

and are thus equally indispensable for the acting person. In our present context, a much more important question is how one remembers and forgets and, above all, how reality, which in part enters our memory, is imagined and turned into a topic in the first place. This is what an internally differentiated conception of historical sense or historical consciousness could help to explain. Our opening remarks on the specific characteristics of modern historical consciousness relate to this aspect, which is central to us. It is of course precisely these substances and contents that are of interest not only to contemporaries, but also to empirical disciplines like psychology, sociology or the theory of teaching history. To put historical consciousness on the agenda of educational establishments and public discourse or complaining for empirical reasons about the lack of historical sense of individuals, groups etc. One laments the gap that separates the present from the past and history, and that precludes one from moving "in an historically informed way" into the future and consciously shape it. Here there is history and there a consciousness thereof" *ibid.* In contrast, LEITNER points out another peculiarity of modern, in the narrow sense historical consciousness, one which it itself often disregards: And thus the question of historical consciousness shifts. Now comes to the fore the question of the operative logic and cultural significance of the category historical consciousness in general with respect to the substances of historical consciousness as attributable to specific groups regarding historical knowledge and attitudes and as detectable from cultural phenomena. For one can no longer ignore that the discourses about historical consciousness belong to it and historical consciousness is realized in its substances. His sociological analysis thus directs attention to the logic of historical consciousness that precedes any practice and hermeneutics. Modern historical consciousness is no more exhaustively explained by a past that it represents and links to interpretations of the present and expectations of the future. Rather, this representation is a conscious and reflective act and linked to a specific conception of reality, which radically temporalises and dynamises all "being" and views it as a becoming that is saturated with contingency "a becoming that has recently lost any kind of philosophically or scientifically proven telos of historical progress or decay. Finally, we would like to claim for our working concept that although modern historical consciousness can still be and probably always is bound to a "comprehensive and concrete interest in legitimisation, justification, reconciliation, change" in various practical contexts of day-to-day life and in science "that is, "it belongs to the functional frame that we define using the concepts of remembering, handing down and identity" ASSMANN, p. At the same time it is linked to a claim for truth that is ideally substantiated using the methodological means of scientific rationality. Historical consciousness is a certain form of rational construction of reality in this idealised sense, which gives expression to certain values and normative standards of a culture that dominates at least in Germany and other parts of the western world and determines the curricula of schools and other educational establishments. However it may be related to practical contexts and purposes, its inner logic aims at knowledge of the past. Accordingly, it operates methodically and is subject to rational criteria which justify it despite individual procedures and independent of its shortcomings in practice. Everyday practical historical consciousness is in many ways not a mere deficient and dilettante preliminary stage to scientific thinking and research, despite its notorious unprofessional structure. In whatever way it may have its own cause, its own logic and function, it is in many cases, as empirical investigations demonstrate, "at least in our culture and society" often shaped by comparatively general principles of a scientific conception of reality and tied to claims of validity stemming from reasoned argument. It would be wrong to see research in this area as exclusively a matter of practical or empirical epistemology and to leave aside practical logic, from which historical consciousness, which also always functions as historical self-awareness, is never completely detached. Subjective and group-specific ways of dealing with history are never entirely subject to the dictates of scientific imperatives, at times they may care very little about them or even plainly contradict them. This cognitive and practical stance is a modern phenomenon. It takes that which is not only different but also alien as an opportunity for an understanding directed towards the self cf. There are a number of reasons for this slow but nonetheless conspicuous propagation of the recent attention to, and practical interest in, the alien. Among the most important are an increase in mobility, recent migrations and communication technologies that are accessible world-wide. It is still no easy task not to exclude and fend off the alien nostrocetrically but rather be tolerant towards it, a tolerance that often enough

leads to critical self-reflection and relationally structured self-change that is regarded as natural and positive while in previous times it would have only evoked surprise and irritation. The alien is increasingly understood as a welcome challenge that should not immediately be met with aversion and aggression. For the socio-cultural reevaluation of the alien and the accompanying change of mental structures, modern awareness of historicity and therefore the European historicisation of world and self was of great importance. This was of course reinforced by the discovery of "new worlds" in geographically remote regions, which contributed in their own way to the awareness of the "contemporaneousness of the untemporaneous" Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen or, without the deeper logico-developmental meaning, to the awareness of the different, heterogeneous, alien and foreign at the same time. With hindsight, however, GADAMER saw that this paradigmatic perspectival narrowing represented a no longer justifiable one-sidedness of his theory of understanding.

**Chapter 2 : Project MUSE - Collective Memory, History Education, and Historical Consciousness**

*History of Consciousness is the name of a department in the Humanities Division of the University of California, Santa Cruz with a year history of.*

References and Further Reading 1. Various Concepts of Consciousness The concept of consciousness is notoriously ambiguous. It is important first to make several distinctions and to define related terms. We sometimes speak of an individual mental state, such as a pain or perception, as conscious. However, some kind of state consciousness is often implied by creature consciousness, that is, the organism is having conscious mental states. Most contemporary theories of consciousness are aimed at explaining state consciousness; that is, explaining what makes a mental state a conscious mental state. More common is the belief that we can be aware of external objects in some unconscious sense, for example, during cases of subliminal perception. Finally, it is not clear that consciousness ought to be restricted to attention. An organism, such as a bat, is conscious if it is able to experience the outer world through its echo-locatory senses. There is also something it is like to be a conscious creature whereas there is nothing it is like to be, for example, a table or tree. For example, philosophers sometimes refer to conscious states as phenomenal or qualitative states. There is significant disagreement over the nature, and even the existence, of qualia, but they are perhaps most frequently understood as the felt properties or qualities of conscious states. The former is very much in line with the Nagelian notion described above. Access consciousness is therefore more of a functional notion; that is, concerned with what such states do. Block himself argues that neither sense of consciousness implies the other, while others urge that there is a more intimate connection between the two. Some History on the Topic Interest in the nature of conscious experience has no doubt been around for as long as there have been reflective humans. It would be impossible here to survey the entire history, but a few highlights are in order. In the history of Western philosophy, which is the focus of this entry, important writings on human nature and the soul and mind go back to ancient philosophers, such as Plato. As we shall see, Descartes argued that the mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body. He also did not believe in the existence of unconscious mental states, a view certainly not widely held today. Our mental states are, according to Descartes, infallibly transparent to introspection. Perhaps the most important philosopher of the period explicitly to endorse the existence of unconscious mental states was G. He also importantly distinguished between perception and apperception, roughly the difference between outer-directed consciousness and self-consciousness see Gennaro for some discussion. The most important detailed theory of mind in the early modern period was developed by Immanuel Kant. Although he owes a great debt to his immediate predecessors, Kant is arguably the most important philosopher since Plato and Aristotle and is highly relevant today. Kant basically thought that an adequate account of phenomenal consciousness involved far more than any of his predecessors had considered. Over the past one hundred years or so, however, research on consciousness has taken off in many important directions. In psychology, with the notable exception of the virtual banishment of consciousness by behaviorist psychologists e. The writings of such figures as Wilhelm Wundt , William James and Alfred Titchener are good examples of this approach. The work of Sigmund Freud was very important, at minimum, in bringing about the near universal acceptance of the existence of unconscious mental states and processes. It must, however, be kept in mind that none of the above had very much scientific knowledge about the detailed workings of the brain. The relatively recent development of neurophysiology is, in part, also responsible for the unprecedented interdisciplinary research interest in consciousness, particularly since the s. There are now several important journals devoted entirely to the study of consciousness: For a small sample of introductory texts and important anthologies, see Kim , Gennaro b, Block et. The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Dualism Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. There are two broad traditional and competing metaphysical views concerning the nature of the mind and conscious mental states: While there are many versions of each, the former generally holds that the conscious mind or a conscious mental state is non-physical in some sense. On the other hand, materialists hold that the mind is the brain, or, more accurately, that conscious mental

activity is identical with neural activity. For something to be non-physical, it must literally be outside the realm of physics; that is, not in space at all and undetectable in principle by the instruments of physics. However, something might be physical but not material in this sense, such as an electromagnetic or energy field. Thus, to say that the mind is non-physical is to say something much stronger than that it is non-material. Dualists, then, tend to believe that conscious mental states or minds are radically different from anything in the physical world at all.

**General Support and Related Issues** There are a number of reasons why some version of dualism has been held throughout the centuries. For one thing, especially from the introspective or first-person perspective, our conscious mental states just do not seem like physical things or processes. That is, when we reflect on our conscious perceptions, pains, and desires, they do not seem to be physical in any sense. Consciousness seems to be a unique aspect of the world not to be understood in any physical way. Although materialists will urge that this completely ignores the more scientific third-person perspective on the nature of consciousness and mind, this idea continues to have force for many today. The metaphysical conclusion ultimately drawn is that consciousness cannot be identical with anything physical, partly because there is no essential conceptual connection between the mental and the physical. Arguments such as these go back to Descartes and continue to be used today in various ways Kripke , Chalmers , but it is highly controversial as to whether they succeed in showing that materialism is false. Materialists have replied in various ways to such arguments and the relevant literature has grown dramatically in recent years. Historically, there is also the clear link between dualism and a belief in immortality, and hence a more theistic perspective than one tends to find among materialists. Indeed, belief in dualism is often explicitly theologically motivated. If the conscious mind is not physical, it seems more plausible to believe in the possibility of life after bodily death. On the other hand, if conscious mental activity is identical with brain activity, then it would seem that when all brain activity ceases, so do all conscious experiences and thus no immortality. After all, what do many people believe continues after bodily death? There is perhaps a similar historical connection to a belief in free will, which is of course a major topic in its own right. To put it another way: Although materialism may not logically rule out immortality or free will, materialists will likely often reply that such traditional, perhaps even outdated or pre-scientific beliefs simply ought to be rejected to the extent that they conflict with materialism. After all, if the weight of the evidence points toward materialism and away from dualism, then so much the worse for those related views. Somewhat related to the issue of immortality, the existence of near death experiences is also used as some evidence for dualism and immortality. In response, materialists will point out that such experiences can be artificially induced in various experimental situations, and that starving the brain of oxygen is known to cause hallucinations. Various paranormal and psychic phenomena, such as clairvoyance, faith healing, and mind-reading, are sometimes also cited as evidence for dualism. However, materialists and even many dualists will first likely wish to be skeptical of the alleged phenomena themselves for numerous reasons. There are many modern day charlatans who should make us seriously question whether there really are such phenomena or mental abilities in the first place. Second, it is not quite clear just how dualism follows from such phenomena even if they are genuine. A materialist, or physicalist at least, might insist that though such phenomena are puzzling and perhaps currently difficult to explain in physical terms, they are nonetheless ultimately physical in nature; for example, having to do with very unusual transfers of energy in the physical world. The dualist advantage is perhaps not as obvious as one might think, and we need not jump to supernatural conclusions so quickly. For example, my desire to drink something cold causes my body to move to the refrigerator and get something to drink and, conversely, kicking me in the shin will cause me to feel a pain and get angry. But a modern day interactionist would certainly wish to treat various areas of the brain as the location of such interactions. Three serious objections are briefly worth noting here. The first is simply the issue of just how does or could such radically different substances causally interact. How something non-physical causally interacts with something physical, such as the brain? No such explanation is forthcoming or is perhaps even possible, according to materialists. Moreover, if causation involves a transfer of energy from cause to effect, then how is that possible if the mind is really non-physical? So any loss of energy in the cause must be passed along as a corresponding gain of energy in the effect, as in standard billiard ball examples. But if interactionism is true, then when mental events cause physical events, energy would

literally come into the physical world. On the other hand, when bodily events cause mental events, energy would literally go out of the physical world. At the least, there is a very peculiar and unique notion of energy involved, unless one wished, even more radically, to deny the conservation principle itself. Third, some materialists might also use the well-known fact that brain damage even to very specific areas of the brain causes mental defects as a serious objection to interactionism and thus as support for materialism. This has of course been known for many centuries, but the level of detailed knowledge has increased dramatically in recent years. Now a dualist might reply that such phenomena do not absolutely refute her metaphysical position since it could be replied that damage to the brain simply causes corresponding damage to the mind. However, this raises a host of other questions: Why not opt for the simpler explanation, i. Will the severe amnesic at the end of life on Earth retain such a deficit in the afterlife? If proper mental functioning still depends on proper brain functioning, then is dualism really in no better position to offer hope for immortality? It should be noted that there is also another less popular form of substance dualism called parallelism, which denies the causal interaction between the non-physical mental and physical bodily realms. It seems fair to say that it encounters even more serious objections than interactionism. Other Forms of Dualism While a detailed survey of all varieties of dualism is beyond the scope of this entry, it is at least important to note here that the main and most popular form of dualism today is called property dualism. Substance dualism has largely fallen out of favor at least in most philosophical circles, though there are important exceptions e. Property dualism, on the other hand, is a more modest version of dualism and it holds that there are mental properties that is, characteristics or aspects of things that are neither identical with nor reducible to physical properties. There are actually several different kinds of property dualism, but what they have in common is the idea that conscious properties, such as the color qualia involved in a conscious experience of a visual perception, cannot be explained in purely physical terms and, thus, are not themselves to be identified with any brain state or process. Two other views worth mentioning are epiphenomenalism and panpsychism. The latter is the somewhat eccentric view that all things in physical reality, even down to micro-particles, have some mental properties. All substances have a mental aspect, though it is not always clear exactly how to characterize or test such a claim. Finally, although not a form of dualism, idealism holds that there are only immaterial mental substances, a view more common in the Eastern tradition. The most prominent Western proponent of idealism was 18th century empiricist George Berkeley. The idealist agrees with the substance dualist, however, that minds are non-physical, but then denies the existence of mind-independent physical substances altogether. Such a view faces a number of serious objections, and it also requires a belief in the existence of God.

*Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past, by John A. Lukacs Professor Lukacs writes using his historical philosophy, rather than the usual and overworked philosophy of history. This is one of his seminal works.*

Did you define yourself? Or were you defined by another? Is your self definition consistent with historical reality? Does your historical memory work for or against you? The answers to all these questions delineate the importance of historical consciousness. It answers the issues of the reason the Creator created them and placed them in the circumstances that they find themselves. The historical consciousness is a vital element of the original nature fitra and is the ontological indication of Divine Unity tawheed. The innate recognition of the Oneness of the Creator, and the unity of existence, results from a unification of the self, where the unconscious and the conscious are integrated in a symbiotic whole, where the individual sees himself or herself apart of a family, social unit, a nation and an universe which is connected and cohesively apart of an on going historical narrative. This is vitally important when trying to lay the foundations for a historical consciousness which is necessary in fusing the conscious with the unconscious in resolving the problems associated with slavery, colonialism and domestic colonization. These problems although resulting from physical and tangible trauma also lead inevitably to psychological and psychic trauma which, in many cases, is far more debilitating against a people than the former. In this sense the freedom fighter finds in struggle and death a far more attractive end than a continued existence as a slave or subjugated colony. The Last Poets summed it up when they said: It is apart of them and informs the present reality, in spite of their ability to know what exactly is informing it. Because history is in many ways an unconscious phenomenon, this revival of the historical consciousness is in effect a spiritual endeavor and constitutes an aspect of existence which modern scientists are unwilling to recognize, or are incapable of measuring: The disconnect and subjugation would persist until the End of Time, when a miraculous event karaamaat would occur where these Lost Children of Abraham would rediscover themselves and reconnect to their collective historical memory and spiritual heritage. No one said it better than the leading scientist of our people, Dr. Diop who said in an axiomatic fashion: Historical consciousness contains two vital elements which in and of themselves require some form of political sovereignty in order to survive; they are: Collective memory unlike individual memory describes the common store of knowledge about the past that is shared by a collective group of people, be they a linguistic group, religious group, ethnic or cultural group. These institutions require some form of authorization and sway, which in turns require some form of autonomy or sovereignty. This logically leads to the next vital element of historical consciousness, which is communicative memory. Communicative memory is the collective memory of a group which they intentionally transmit to succeeding generations. Its preservation and transmission is so vital that international resolutions have been established by the international community guaranteeing its recognition and status in multinational states where it is feared that a dominant majority can swallow up a national minority. Again the communicative memory requires some form of autonomy, empowerment and sovereignty in order for it to function properly. It constitutes tajdeed revitalization at its highest form because it is a readjustment of the self and the community with the best Sunnan of the past which have been passed down generation after generation going back to the Sunna of the Best of Creation, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. The person who has no past, has no future. The one not in control of his past has no control over his future. The one who knows his past but takes no lessons from it, is doomed to replicate it in the future. The one who is trapped in the past will not be prepared for the future. Only the person who knows his past and is an existential example of it in the Present Moment is the master of his future. They are the offspring of their moments ibn waqt , astonishingly present, and in a constant state of astute awareness muraqqaba of who they were, are and must be. Their mere existence is the Sign that the civilization that repressed them has come to an end. Just as the moon cannot surpass the sun, nor the day outstrip the night; the presence of a cadre within an oppressed group who have historical consciousness is the definitive evidence that the system which subsisted off of them like a succubus is dead. Opposites cannot occupy the same space at the same time. One must succumb and the other must prevail. One is in a state of dynamic continuity and the other in stagnant discontinuity. As the oppressed

are strengthened and enhanced by the genesis of their historical consciousness, the oppressors are weakened and debilitated by the severance from the vitality of their false historical narrative. Protection of Minorities, Sales No. This is because our ancestors were the people of uprightness, guidance, learning, and struggle in the Way of Allah in order to exalt the religion; to make it wide and to deliver it. I am doing this following the command of the Prophet and answering his call when he said, may Allah bless him and grant him peace: We are upon that mission without being kings and rulers who practice oppression and injustice. And those who follow me in that then they are from me, and if not, then not! So that all those who love me from the brothers, the descendents and loved ones, rather all those who follow my commands and are content with my teachings and have answered my call " may know that "it is necessary and obligatory for every reasonable believer to follow the traces of their believing ancestors, to follow the Way of their righteous grandfathers and imitate them. For this reason, I have chosen to imitate my grandfathers in adhering to the Sunna strongly so that I can be a guide to what is good like they were; for the one who guides to what is good is like the one who does that same good and will attain the reward of those who act on it. It unites the past with the present and allows the people collectively to prognosticate what actions they must take for their future. Genuine historical consciousness does not seek to dismiss the present nor is it an idealization or romanticizing of the past; a kind historical opiate designed to make one forget the immediate presence. One of the Sons of Africa, the great intellectual and freedom fighter, Amilcar Cabral said in his memorial lecture at Syracuse University: Thus, it may be seen that if imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture. It is not surprising, then that at-Thawri said: For if he has no weapon with him, then with what can he fight? This is in essence the role and function of the historical consciousness, which is not only conscious of the narrative behind history, has its own view of history, but also projects this view and narrative in order to advance the interest of its group. Thus, the historical consciousness is a political tool, and in some sense, an effective political weapon, especially in the face of a decaying oppressive society, which by the nature of its dysfunction dumbs down its citizens in order to maintain its power. Historical consciousness provides those who were oppressed with an accurate or positive image of whom they were prior to their encounter with the oppressor; allows them to adjust their present spiritual, social and political realities in accordance with such image, and finally it gives them an accurate picture of the role that they played in the formation of the polity under which they were oppressed. They then sink into a state of collective historical amnesia, a kind of social senility, where they can no longer recognize the kith and kin of the core values which gave them their genesis. Clarify for them that evil customs are worthless, And that light illuminates our Sunna. The market place for the amusement of youth has this day perished, While preservation has been established for the bazaar of the righteous. This day the shadowy influence of the people of this world has shrunk, And lofty trees cast their cooling shade over our Sunna. The scale of the one who rejects this religion has become light While the scale of the one who manifest it has become heavy. The one who helps the religion has become exalted among the people While the one who rejects it has become humiliated to the elite and common, alike. Verily the God of the Throne has showered favors Upon us, he who is grateful is the one who prospers. Whoever denies blessings and follows passions For in this world, and in the Judgment, he will perish. This is because He made the religion clear to us, by a person Who is related to us, we are elevated by him and ennobled. If we are receptive to him assisting his teachings We will succeed, garner his blessings and all will prosper. However, if we neglect him he will benefit others, For the misfortunes of one people are the advantages of another. Not in a vibrant animated sense, but as a childish adolescent society which never came to full growth and development, in spite of its manifold powers. On the other hand he portrayed the emerging Islamic polity as the resurgence of a primordial timeless tradition an Ancient Way which like the Sun, the Moon, and the earth, is natural, biological, tender, pulsating and vibrant, in spite of its lack of imperial power. He gave inference to the historical consciousness in his poem when he made reference to: That is to say, we have become the conscious living hires of this Way. For the Absolute Being did not merely speak to our master Muhammad, 14 centuries ago in the historical past. It is only when the Living Sunna is embodied, and people become the vessels for the Muhammadan Reality that they hear that address and inherit his mission as those before them did, generation after generation, in the Present Moment and in the future. This is the

impetus which historical consciousness conveys.

Chapter 4 : History of Consciousness - Wikipedia

*Youth and history: the comparative European project on historical consciousness among teenagers / [5] Report to the students and teachers.*

New York, Huizinga, in his article, came up with a definition: History as literature; the narrated past. History as science; the recorded past. But, in a deeper and wider sense: And this is true not because the West has ruled the East longer than the East ruled the West; it is true because historical thinking has been a Western, though relatively recent, achievement; and because the history of the West has been exceptionally "paradigmatic"--that is, full of potentially instructive examples. History in the West has been less repetitious than elsewhere; exceptions have broken through the surface of routine more often. The historical pattern of other civilizations is more repetitive and more uniform, corresponding to some extent with the frequent element of religious fatalism which, in turn, is involved with the insufficient maturity of their historical thinking. It is thus that, by and large, similar conditions have repeatedly tended toward similar results in the "mythic and mysterious" East rather than in the "systematic and rational" West. Still, uniformity and repetitiveness do not necessarily mean predictability. In the East history may have "repeated" itself more often than in the West: Yet our greatest historical thinkers were not universalists: Tolerance and generosity, like indifference and high-mindedness, are quite different things: Death is irrevocable; the past is not. And, if death and the past are not the same, life and the present are not the same either. The present is an abstract illusion, the elusive and slightly sickening sensation of past and future meeting in our minds; but life, unlike the present, is not an illusion at all: Thus, in a sense, it is life and the past that belong together; and, in another sense, it is death and the present: It is only natural that people should be confused when their accepted institutions and truths, their categories of thought and concepts of life, show cracks in their foundations. Once large and inspiring words--Liberty, Freedom, Democracy, Justice--are losing their meanings; the meanings of other terms change, it appears that about more and more things the Opposite of Everything may be true, that the existing state of affairs might be best expressed through paradoxes, that satire even illuminates less and less, since serious Facts are often more absurd and ridiculous than their exaggerated Fiction could be. These are the marks of an interregnum. This marked a turning-point in the history of American democracy, the turn in the concept of high elective office from delegation to representation. Auden wrote in , "whatever its political form, the great majority prefer opinion to knowledge, and passively allow the former to be imposed on them by a centralized few--I need only mention as an example the influence of the Sunday book supplements of the newspapers upon our public libraries. Apart from all metaphysics, I can but say that the purpose of historical truth like every fact, every truth is to some extent historical is understanding even more than accuracy, involving the reduction of untruth; and I can say that the nature of truth is inseparable from personal knowledge; that it cannot be proven by definitions but that it can be suggested through words. The aim of the realistic novelist "is not to tell a story, to amuse us or to appeal to our feelings, but to compel us to reflect, and to understand the darker and deeper meaning of events. The functions of historians and novelists overlap; their dependence is mutual; their approach is much the same--description, in prose, always the description of some kind of past for even the utopian novel projects the reader in time beyond the "events" narrated by the author in "retrospect". In the broad sense every novel is a historical novel. The novel was a typical product of the Bourgeois Age. Literature in almost all of its known forms was either created or first perfected by the Greeks: If this is one of the reasons of its possible demise, this was one of the principal reasons of its emergence two hundred years ago. Not only was the novel a "transitory response to certain conditions"; more than that, the novel may have been a manifestation of the development of historical consciousness. For the once customary view of equating the novel with narrative, seeing in it a prosaic form of the epic, is mistaken. The theme of the epic is the past as such: It is true that local piety kept gradually linking Homeric men and gods to the citizens of the present by means of slender threads, but this net of genealogical traditions does not succeed in bridging the absolute gap which exists between the mythical yesterday and the real today. No matter how many real yesterdays we interpolate, the sphere inhabited by the Achilleses and the

Agamemnon has no relationship with our existence, and we cannot reach it, step by step, by retracing the path opened up by the march of time. The epic past is not our past. No, it is not a remembered past but an ideal past. The work of Herodotus might be put in verse and it still would be a species of history with meter no less than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophic and higher thing than history; for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. I have mentioned the subtle differences of the "same" words in different languages earlier. Let me repeat here that expression does have a nationality, even while thought may not always have one. I say "always" because expression has a way of forming consciousness; it is therefore legitimate to speak of national mentalities, and of tendencies of national consciousness which are discernible on occasion. Take such different modern thinkers as Machiavelli, La Rochefoucauld, Bentham, Stendhal, Spencer, Tocqueville, Marx, Freud--yes, of course, this is what all of them say. But the better thinkers among them Stendhal rather than Bentham, Tocqueville rather than Marx do not leave it at that; they see deeper motives: For what is self-interest, after all? Its formation comes from the concept of the self: Life is a task.

## Chapter 5 : Historical Encounters

*revival of the historical consciousness is a reconstruction of the actuality of history, or the presence of the past, as a preemptive mechanism, or deterrent; much like a ribaat (military fortress) which lies between the enemies and 'mans the gates' on behalf of.*

The journal editors are particularly interested in presenting a variety of voices from scholars at various career stages, and therefore encourages early career researchers to submit their work for review. Frequency of Publication To ensure timely availability of scholarship, material will be published as soon as it has been through the peer-review and copy editing processes, adding cumulatively to the content of a single regular issue each year. There are no deadlines for submission of manuscripts, however to ensure sufficient time for review, response, and editing, submissions received on or after 1 November each year, will be considered for publication the following year. Special Issue Publication Each calendar year a single special issue will be published that focuses on a theme that is relevant, topical, and of interest to the readership of the journal. Articles for the special issue should conform to the requirements for articles set out below. If you are an author submitting an article for a special issue, ensure that you select "Special Issue" for the Journal Section when completing the submission form. Type of Submissions The journal accepts the following types of submissions all word counts above include references: Original papers of 4,, words. These papers may be on any topic that fits into the scope of the journal. The journal invites 3,, word polemic essays that challenge dominant discourses or provoke debate. Essays that respond to articles published in earlier issues of the journal. Scholars whose work has been subject to critique in the journal are especially encouraged to submit a rejoinder. Submissions to this section should not exceed 3, words. Submitting a Manuscript Authors must register with the journal before they can submit a manuscript. Once registered, an author should login and then select the Author link to begin the submission process. Authors should ensure they have followed the Author Guidelines before commencing the manuscript submission process. Peer Review Process All submissions to the Articles, Features, Provocations, and Rejoinders sections are subject to a preliminary internal review by an Editor member of the Editorial Team. Those submissions deemed appropriate for publication in the journal are then anonymised and subjected to blind appraisal by two reviewers often one reviewer will be a member of the Editorial Board. The Editors rely heavily on the judgements of reviewers, but are not bound by them. You can view the members of both below: The journal publishes a single regular issue in June each year, and a special issue in the December. To ensure timely availability of scholarship, articles and reviews are published as soon as they have been successfully through the peer review and editorial processes, adding cumulatively to the content for the single regular issue each year. No fees are charged for subscription or publication. Follow us on Twitter:

**Chapter 6 : Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past by John Lukacs**

*This is a brief study of the importance of historical consciousness in the context of identity construct and self determination.*

In this sense, school history seems to offer students a temporal framework for situating their own contemporary lives in the course of time. Possibly lurking behind the influence of the History and Citizenship Education program is an unconscious or inadvertent Francophone concern for identity and national survival as handed down through various processes of group socialization. Do they have a better understanding of Canadian history or of how to teach it effectively so as to foster deeper awareness of Canadian civic values and a united citizenry among students? As Hodgetts himself contended, the classroom is really where the action takes place. With this limit in mind, at least three key elements that emerge from our study nonetheless provide illuminating opportunities for discussing the content, character, and sources for a knowledge base for teaching history Shulman, What do prospective history teachers seem to know or have developed as pertinent historical information through their different educational trajectories? What are their overall interests and self-confidence levels in history in general and in Canadian history? These questions are important because one of the key sources for a knowledge base in history teaching is disciplinary content knowledge Shulman, Questions nonetheless arise regarding the number of courses actually needed for being prepared to adequately teach history. Do more courses in the discipline area indicate better preparation for teaching the subject matter in schools? While we can always expect student teachers to take more courses, we can be sure that, on average, most of them will realistically take less; possibly similar to those who have taken three or less courses in Canadian history in our survey. Should prospective history teachers still take more Canadian history courses? Or, as Fenstermacher contends, should they be educated to learn how to self-direct and to constantly learn history as part of their teaching responsibilities and to research new, relevant studies and findings as autonomous professionals working in communities, like historians? Interestingly, some provinces like Ontario have adopted similar ideas with their in-service education. Logic suggests that the number of courses prospective teachers take should directly correlate with their self-confidence levels, but as our survey shows, that is not always the case. Some prospective teachers seem to declare knowledge possession of history without necessarily correlating positively with the number of history courses taken in university. Further research in this regard is, however, needed to precisely understand what aspects of their historical consciousness give them the necessary self-confidence for teaching their subject matter. Is this confidence related to extracurricular activities that these teachers are involved in and that pertain to history? Or is it about the meaningful experience and passion that they developed while taking their history courses? Shulman contends that the teacher has special responsibility with regard to disciplinary content knowledge. This means that beyond the number of specific history courses, prospective teachers ought to develop positive attitudes from their learning experiences that could subsequently be incorporated into their teacher education programs as best practices. The work of Hartzler-Miller with American beginning teachers provides some directions for action here. Not every teacher is enthusiastic and supportive of the same approach to Canadian history. These new activities could be catered to various types of learners and can help develop a better sense of self-confidence among students, as well as a deeper sense of purpose as educators. Variations in content would definitely exist, but if given the tools and the sense of responsibility for getting such information on their own, certain gaps outlined above can be closed. A good lead as an entry point for fostering curiosity in Canadian history would be to gear the content of courses to the various types of interests as expressed by learners. Using examples from these disciplinary areas and bringing them in with relevant teaching methodologies e. Of significance, they are aware of the need for an inquiry-based approach to teaching history, as well as for developing historical and creative thinking skills. But no clear information on their understanding of Canadian history as well as of why and how they should transmit it seem to emerge from our study. Our survey shows that the majority of prospective teachers are nonetheless still confronted with conventional teaching methods, activities, and sources of information. Prospective teachers in our survey

would also like to bring more inquiry-based historical projects to their teaching, well aware that they are not being engaged extensively in their own classrooms. The question remains whether they will maintain their acknowledged drive for doing so once in the field. Under such circumstances, it becomes crucial that history education professors model the kind of work we expect history teachers to offer in their own classrooms. Of particular significance, such emerging information could be employed to create professional communities of practitioners among student teachers whose communal activities can help make historical learning more engaging and thus relevant Sears, ; Seixas, b. Based on these results, for example, professors could bring in professional historians to talk about their work and the types of dilemmas they face in establishing the trustworthiness and reliability of the primary sources they engage with for constructing plausible narratives. They can also discuss how they develop their own perspectives on the past, dealing with their own subjectivities, and on how they account for and handle different historiographical traditions. Similar input could be gained by bringing in other guest speakers from museums and historical sites to talk about the kind of work they do, and what their pedagogical objectives and dilemmas involve. Onsite visits could also be advantageous to teachers. Canadians and their Pasts Conrad et al. So, as reflecting on how groups of people use and do history can help us grasp their historical consciousness and the role history plays in their lives, such a focus can moreover help foster more critical and reflexive uses of the past. Contact with such studies, conducted both in Canada and elsewhere, could better help prospective teachers understand the relevance of history for society; this could also help them decide on the pedagogical activities they would like to bring to their own classroom teachings. All these activities point to the urgency of developing communities of history practitioners in teacher education programs across the country. As an educational tool, if brought to prospective teachers, such surveys can allow them to reflect on emerging issues of significance in the profession. It could thus inspire them to develop a stronger sense of purpose as history educators and members of a community of practice. They can moreover develop surveys of their own as a means of getting more involved in the processes of thinking about their profession and what their responsibilities should involve at the local, national, and international level. Yet surveys like ours have both strengths and weaknesses. Unfortunately, these observations are very research and labour intensive and would require more financial and institutional resources to be accomplished. As such, we believe that surveys like ours should be used in conjunction with other research instruments that are meant to assess the historical thinking and practices of prospective teachers. The participants in our survey seem to already have the workings of a pedagogical vision for when they enter the classroom, and it would seem that they would like to uphold or to even build on what they have in mind. The only question is, will they? What is urgently needed is to engage prospective teachers in professional communities of historical inquiry to help move things along. Organizations like the History Education Network [www](http://www.historyeducationnetwork.org). The only issue now is to get governments and ministries of education on board to fully invest their time and efforts in maintaining such communities for the good of our democracy and its future citizens in the long run. While the focus was primarily on learners, one section of the study also looked into classroom teachers. We can thus assume that participants who chose to complete the questionnaire in French belong to the French-speaking educational community broadly defined. The same can be said for the English-speaking participants. The concept seems to have gradually percolated into the history education discourse and has been appropriated by student teachers themselves to discuss their views on history. The education of social studies teachers. At home with the past: Background and initial findings from the national survey. *Australian Cultural History*, 23, *Social Education*, 67 6 , " Teaching history for the common good. Hazards in Spanish history education. The problem of teacher education. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 55 4 , Canadians and their pasts. University of Toronto Press. Once more unto the breach: Trying to get pre-service teachers to link historiographical knowledge to pedagogy. *Theory and Research in Social Education*, 35 3 , Historiography and teacher education: Reflections on an experimental course. *The History Teacher*, 42 2 , Towards a new approach. *Theory and Research in Social Education*, 33 3 , Philosophy of research on teaching: Who killed Canadian history? Learning from the past: Report of the task force on the teaching of history. *Theory and Research in Social Education*, 29 4 , Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. *Theory and Research in Social Education*, 31 2 , Engaging Canadian students in digital history. *Canadian Social*

Studies, 40 1. Educating students for the 21st century. Historical literacy in 21st century Ontario: Research using the Virtual Historian. What is the use of the past for future teachers? Sustaining practices in historical thinking and knowing pp. What does the eye see? Reading online primary source photographs in history. Contemporary Issues in Teacher Education, 14 2 , History is a verb: We learn it best when we are doing it! French and English Canadian prospective teachers and history. Revista de Estudios Sociales, 52, Standards of practice for the teaching profession. Teaching history in schools:

Chapter 7 : Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*Historical Consciousness and the Use of the Past in the Ancient World offers linked essays on uses of the past in prominent and diverse cultures in ancient civilizations across the world.*

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: The former examines how ordinary people understand and use the past; the latter how students learn about the past. At first glance there should be considerable overlap and interplay between the two. But, in fact, there has been relatively little. The study of collective memory has exploded in the past decade and a half. The study of history education has also experienced dramatic growth in recent years. It, too, is very much concerned with the question of how people—specifically, students and teachers—think about the past. What should people know? How can we improve history education? Answers to these value-laden questions form a considerable portion of the literature on history education. The normative dimension is inescapable. It seems limited, to put it politely, for scholars to offer answers to the normative questions of history education without considering the literature on collective memory. Similarly, it is narrow for those who devote their scholarly lives to the study of collective memory to ignore how the past is currently taught and transmitted to the next generation. The best responses to policy questions should take into account the many ways of understanding the past, as well as the dynamics of inertia and change that collective memory studies explore. To do so, however, requires a conceptual typology of collective memory in order to provide guidance for contemporary history education with its normative demands. Along with a number of other scholars, I believe that the notion of historical consciousness can serve as the conceptual link between these two fields of study. But there are problems, not the least of which is ambiguity in the usage of the term. For example, in an influential essay written before the recent outpouring of collective memory scholarship, Herbert Gutman used historical consciousness to refer to how Americans think about the past. Modern consciousness—precisely as historical consciousness—takes a reflexive position concerning all that is handed down by tradition. Historical consciousness no longer listens sanctimoniously to the voice that reaches out from the past but, in reflection on it, replaces it within the context where it took root in order to see the significance and relative value proper to it. From the standpoint of history education, these tools stand as a legitimate and virtually uncontested goal. But this definition of historical consciousness, when it is used to frame intercultural comparison, suggests that only certain groups

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Chapter 8 : Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*1. History of the issue. Questions about the nature of conscious awareness have likely been asked for as long as there have been humans. Neolithic burial practices appear to express spiritual beliefs and provide early evidence for at least minimally reflective thought about the nature of human consciousness (Pearson , Clark and Riel-Salvatore ).*

History of the issue Questions about the nature of conscious awareness have likely been asked for as long as there have been humans. Neolithic burial practices appear to express spiritual beliefs and provide early evidence for at least minimally reflective thought about the nature of human consciousness Pearson , Clark and Riel-Salvatore Preliterate cultures have similarly been found invariably to embrace some form of spiritual or at least animist view that indicates a degree of reflection about the nature of conscious awareness. Nonetheless, some have argued that consciousness as we know it today is a relatively recent historical development that arose sometime after the Homeric era Jaynes According to this view, earlier humans including those who fought the Trojan War did not experience themselves as unified internal subjects of their thoughts and actions, at least not in the ways we do today. Though the ancients had much to say about mental matters, it is less clear whether they had any specific concepts or concerns for what we now think of as consciousness. The Hamlet who walked the stage in already saw his world and self with profoundly modern eyes. By the beginning of the early modern era in the seventeenth century, consciousness had come full center in thinking about the mind. Indeed from the mid through the late 19th century, consciousness was widely regarded as essential or definitive of the mental. Later, toward the end of the 17th century, John Locke offered a similar if slightly more qualified claim in *An Essay on Human Understanding* , I do not say there is no soul in man because he is not sensible of it in his sleep. But I do say he can not think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but our thoughts, and to them it is and to them it always will be necessary. Locke explicitly forswore making any hypothesis about the substantial basis of consciousness and its relation to matter, but he clearly regarded it as essential to thought as well as to personal identity. Leibniz was the first to distinguish explicitly between perception and apperception, i. In the *Monadology* he also offered his famous analogy of the mill to express his belief that consciousness could not arise from mere matter. He asked his reader to imagine someone walking through an expanded brain as one would walk through a mill and observing all its mechanical operations, which for Leibniz exhausted its physical nature. Nowhere, he asserts, would such an observer see any conscious thoughts. Associationist psychology, whether pursued by Locke or later in the eighteenth century by David Hume or in the nineteenth by James Mill , aimed to discover the principles by which conscious thoughts or ideas interacted or affected each other. The purely associationist approach was critiqued in the late eighteenth century by Immanuel Kant , who argued that an adequate account of experience and phenomenal consciousness required a far richer structure of mental and intentional organization. Phenomenal consciousness according to Kant could not be a mere succession of associated ideas, but at a minimum had to be the experience of a conscious self situated in an objective world structured with respect to space, time and causality. Within the Anglo-American world, associationist approaches continued to be influential in both philosophy and psychology well into the twentieth century, while in the German and European sphere there was a greater interest in the larger structure of experience that led in part to the study of phenomenology through the work of Edmund Husserl , , Martin Heidegger , Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others who expanded the study of consciousness into the realm of the social, the bodily and the interpersonal. At the outset of modern scientific psychology in the mid-nineteenth century, the mind was still largely equated with consciousness, and introspective methods dominated the field as in the work of Wilhelm Wundt , Hermann von Helmholtz , William James and Alfred Titchener However, the relation of consciousness to brain remained very much a mystery as expressed in T. In the s, the grip of behaviorism weakened with the rise of cognitive psychology and its emphasis on information processing and the modeling of internal mental processes Neisser , Gardiner However, despite the renewed emphasis on explaining cognitive capacities such as memory, perception and language comprehension, consciousness remained a largely neglected topic for

several further decades. In the 80s and 90s there was a major resurgence of scientific and philosophical research into the nature and basis of consciousness Baars , Dennett , Penrose , , Crick , Lycan , , Chalmers It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being a sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world Armstrong Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined. Are fish conscious in the relevant respect? And what of shrimp or bees? One might further require that the organism actually be exercising such a capacity rather than merely having the ability or disposition to do so. Thus one might count it as conscious only if it were awake and normally alert. In that sense organisms would not count as conscious when asleep or in any of the deeper levels of coma. Again boundaries may be blurry, and intermediate cases may be involved. For example, is one conscious in the relevant sense when dreaming, hypnotized or in a fugue state? A third and yet more demanding sense might define conscious creatures as those that are not only aware but also aware that they are aware, thus treating creature consciousness as a form of self-consciousness Carruthers The self-awareness requirement might get interpreted in a variety of ways, and which creatures would qualify as conscious in the relevant sense will vary accordingly. If it is taken to involve explicit conceptual self-awareness, many non-human animals and even young children might fail to qualify, but if only more rudimentary implicit forms of self-awareness are required then a wide range of nonlinguistic creatures might count as self-conscious.

What it is like. Subject of conscious states. A fifth alternative would be to define the notion of a conscious organism in terms of conscious states. That is, one might first define what makes a mental state a conscious mental state, and then define being a conscious creature in terms of having such states. In addition to describing creatures as conscious in these various senses, there are also related senses in which creatures are described as being conscious of various things. The distinction is sometimes marked as that between transitive and intransitive notions of consciousness, with the former involving some object at which consciousness is directed Rosenthal There are at least six major options. States one is aware of. On one common reading, a conscious mental state is simply a mental state one is aware of being in Rosenthal , Conscious states in this sense involve a form of meta-mentality or meta-intentionality in so far as they require mental states that are themselves about mental states. To have a conscious desire for a cup of coffee is to have such a desire and also to be simultaneously and directly aware that one has such a desire. Unconscious thoughts and desires in this sense are simply those we have without being aware of having them, whether our lack of self-knowledge results from simple inattention or more deeply psychoanalytic causes. States might also be regarded as conscious in a seemingly quite different and more qualitative sense. See the entry on qualia. There is considerable disagreement about the nature of such qualia Churchland , Shoemaker , Clark , Chalmers and even about their existence. Traditionally qualia have been regarded as intrinsic, private, ineffable monadic features of experience, but current theories of qualia often reject at least some of those commitments Dennett Such qualia are sometimes referred to as phenomenal properties and the associated sort of consciousness as phenomenal consciousness, but the latter term is perhaps more properly applied to the overall structure of experience and involves far more than sensory qualia. The phenomenal structure of consciousness also encompasses much of the spatial, temporal and conceptual organization of our experience of the world and of ourselves as agents in it. States might be conscious in a seemingly quite different access sense, which has more to do with intra-mental relations. In so far as the information in that state is richly and flexibly available to its containing organism, then it counts as a conscious state in the relevant respect, whether or not it has any qualitative or phenomenal feel in the Nagel sense. Although these six notions of what makes a state conscious can be independently specified, they are obviously not without potential links, nor do they exhaust the realm of possible options. Drawing connections, one might argue that states appear in the stream of consciousness only in so far as we are aware of them, and thus forge a bond between the first meta-mental notion of a conscious state and the stream or narrative concept. Or one might connect the access with the qualitative or phenomenal notions of a conscious state by trying to show that states that represent in those ways make their contents widely available in the respect required by the access notion. Aiming to go beyond the six options, one might distinguish conscious from nonconscious states by appeal to aspects of their intra-mental dynamics and interactions other than mere access relations; e. Alternatively, one might try to define conscious states in

terms of conscious creatures. Distinctions can be drawn between creature and state consciousness as well as among the varieties of each. One can refer specifically to phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, reflexive or meta-mental consciousness, and narrative consciousness among other varieties. How much this commits one to the ontological status of consciousness per se will depend on how much of a Platonist one is about universals in general. See the entry on the medieval problem of universals. Though it is not the norm, one could nonetheless take a more robustly realist view of consciousness as a component of reality. That is one could think of consciousness as more on a par with electromagnetic fields than with life. Since the demise of vitalism, we do not think of life per se as something distinct from living things. There are living things including organisms, states, properties and parts of organisms, communities and evolutionary lineages of organisms, but life is not itself a further thing, an additional component of reality, some vital force that gets added into living things. Electromagnetic fields by contrast are regarded as real and independent parts of our physical world. Even though one may sometimes be able to specify the values of such a field by appeal to the behavior of particles in it, the fields themselves are regarded as concrete constituents of reality and not merely as abstractions or sets of relations among particles. Though such strongly realist views are not very common at present, they should be included within the logical space of options. However, this may be less of an embarrassment than an embarrassment of riches. Consciousness is a complex feature of the world, and understanding it will require a diversity of conceptual tools for dealing with its many differing aspects. Conceptual plurality is thus just what one would hope for. However, one should not assume that conceptual plurality implies referential divergence. Our multiple concepts of consciousness may in fact pick out varying aspects of a single unified underlying mental phenomenon. Whether and to what extent they do so remains an open question. Problems of Consciousness The task of understanding consciousness is an equally diverse project. Not only do many different aspects of mind count as conscious in some sense, each is also open to various respects in which it might be explained or modeled. Understanding consciousness involves a multiplicity not only of explananda but also of questions that they pose and the sorts of answers they require. At the risk of oversimplifying, the relevant questions can be gathered under three crude rubrics as the What, How, and Why questions: What are its principal features? And by what means can they be best discovered, described and modeled? How does consciousness of the relevant sort come to exist? Is it a primitive aspect of reality, and if not how does or could consciousness in the relevant respect arise from or be caused by nonconscious entities or processes? Why does consciousness of the relevant sort exist? Does it have a function, and if so what is it? Does it act causally and if so with what sorts of effects? Does it make a difference to the operation of systems in which it is present, and if so why and how? The three questions focus respectively on describing the features of consciousness, explaining its underlying basis or cause, and explicating its role or value. The divisions among the three are of course somewhat artificial, and in practice the answers one gives to each will depend in part on what one says about the others. One can not, for example, adequately answer the what question and describe the main features of consciousness without addressing the why issue of its functional role within systems whose operations it affects. Nor could one explain how the relevant sort of consciousness might arise from nonconscious processes unless one had a clear account of just what features had to be caused or realized to count as producing it. Those caveats notwithstanding, the three-way division of questions provides a useful structure for articulating the overall explanatory project and for assessing the adequacy of particular theories or models of consciousness. What are the features of consciousness? The What question asks us to describe and model the principal features of consciousness, but just which features are relevant will vary with the sort of consciousness we aim to capture.

## Chapter 9 : Historical Consciousness and Theological Foundations - Oxford Scholarship

*The Gilson Lecture to the Mediaeval Studies Institute in Toronto, this chapter undertakes a substantial and wide-ranging critique of the theory of 'historical' (as opposed to 'classical') consciousness elaborated in the later works of Bernard Lonergan and adopted by many theologians since the s.*