

## Chapter 1 : Legitimacy | Define Legitimacy at [www.nxgvision.com](http://www.nxgvision.com)

*In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a www.nxgvision.coms "authority" denotes a specific position in an established government, the term "legitimacy" denotes a system of governmentâ€”wherein "government" denotes "sphere of influence".*

The crisis tendencies of advanced capitalism stem from the three subsystems: The establishment of new social movements is essential to this process. Additionally, it is important to note that the logic of legitimation strongly depends on the system of domination deployed. In other words, the basis for any claim to legitimacy is often the basis for resistance against that same claim to legitimacy. But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally. The revolution was characteristic of a time in Europe where the divine right of monarchical rule was being undermined and transformed as the universal rights of the common citizen were emphasized instead. The legitimation crisis, itself, was the result of several economic and political reforms made by the Communist Party of China CPC as part of an effort to salvage their reputation after the socialist policies and populist leadership of Mao Zedong in the 60s and 70s had left the Chinese economy in poor condition. In essence, the reforms were a solid move away from a control-oriented economy towards a more market-oriented, capitalist one. In Congo, for example, the state collapsed as its respective institutions e. In other African countries, state collapse was not a strictly postcolonial issue, as most states had some success transferring between regimes. Problems arose, however, when second-generation and later regimes began overthrowing original nationalist ones. Chad, Uganda, and Ghana are all instances of this happening â€” in each, a successfully established, but dysfunctional independent regime was replaced by a military regime that managed to concentrate power, but failed to effectively wield it. Legitimation crises and state collapse soon followed. Furthermore, communism was implemented in other East European states e. Romania, Hungary, Poland in a much shorter time frame and developed very differently from the way it did in the Soviet Union. Over time, the party began to strategically gain more power and get rid of competition. However, the democratic means the communist parties in these states initially used to gain power lost credibility once they were seen as violent tyrannies in service of an alien power. The Tunisian Revolution began with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, , although it is also possible to consider the miner strike in the west central town of Gafsa in to be the official beginning of the movement. The national dialogue, which is still taking place, is seeking to establish a legitimate government, end the legislative process for the constitution and electoral code, and set up an independent body to organize elections and fix a definitive date. The revolution deposed Muammar Gaddafi , [97] who had been the ruler of Libya for four decades [98] and had united the country under the themes of Pan-Arabism a form of nationalism , common geography, shared history, and Islam. In order to establish democratic legitimacy and sovereignty, the National Transitional Council has had to deal with these brigades, a process which has so far been mostly unsuccessful due to mistrust between the two bodies and the popularly illegitimate but regardless tangible military strength of the brigades. The most significant government official to join the revolutionary movement was Major General Ali Mohsin Al-Ahmar , who ordered his troops to defend antigovernment demonstrators. International crises of legitimacy[ edit ] The implications of an international crisis of legitimacy usually reach further than domestic crises, given that the actors have power over several different countries. International crises can threaten the stability between countries, increasing the probability for conflict. After the Soviet Union fell, however, some scholars believe the United States was no longer needed by the Europeans for that purpose and therefore lost international legitimacy. In this time period, it was accepted by many political theorists that the United States was undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. In this case, the system adapted to the wants of the citizens and the United States re-established legitimacy. Gore reelection[ edit ] In the United States presidential election, United States presidential election, , Bush lost the popular vote but still won the electoral vote. Many United States citizens did not believe this was right. Without the social contract, the natural rights of the public, such as life, liberty, and property, [] are in

jeopardy. There are several ways in which to end a legitimation crisis, but there is currently no unified theory as for the best method. Although the actor could be replaced, as seen in many of the examples above and effectively ending the legitimation crisis, this section will focus on the conflict resolution of the crisis. In this situation, the actor that was seeking legitimacy before the crisis regains legitimacy. An actor can regain legitimacy in two ways: In in Montgomery, Alabama, the more than year-long Montgomery Bus Boycott eventually led to repeal of the local ordinance for bus segregation. In this case, by realigning the laws to fit with public opinion, the government was able to regain legitimacy. One of the political factions, the Hutu, killed thousands of members of the Tutsi party. The RPF had to rely on the capital goods of the international community, in the form of weapons and money, and thus were able to regain control and legitimacy in Rwanda. Chronology of legitimacy theories[ edit ] Time.

**Chapter 2 : Beyond Allocation: The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar**

*Political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and of the decisionsâ€”about laws, policies, and candidates for political officeâ€”made within them.*

The main function of political legitimacy, on this interpretation, is to explain the difference between merely effective or de facto authority and legitimate authority. John Locke put forward such an interpretation of legitimacy. The solution to this problem is a social contract that transfers political authority to a civil state that can realize and secure the natural law. According to Locke, and contrary to his predecessor Thomas Hobbes, the social contract thus does not create authority. Political authority is embodied in individuals and pre-exists in the state of nature. The social contract transfers the authority they each enjoy in the state of nature to a particular political body. While political authority thus pre-exists in the state of nature, legitimacy is a concept that is specific to the civil state. Because the criterion of legitimacy that Locke proposes is historical, however, what counts as legitimate authority remains connected to the state of nature. The legitimacy of political authority in the civil state depends, according to Locke, on whether the transfer of authority has happened in the right way. Locke understands the consent criterion to apply not just to the original institutionalization of a political authorityâ€”what Rawls It also applies to the ongoing evaluation of the performance of a political regimeâ€”Rawls Although Locke emphasises consent, consent is not, however, sufficient for legitimate authority because an authority that suspends the natural law is necessarily illegitimate e. On some interpretations of Locke e. Pitkin , consent is not even necessary for legitimate political authority; it is only a marker of illegitimacy. Whether an actual political regime respects the constraints of the natural law is thus at least one factor that determines its legitimacy. This criterion of legitimacy is negative: When a political authority fails to secure consent or oversteps the boundaries of the natural law, it ceases to be legitimate and, therefore, there is no longer an obligation to obey its commands. For Lockeâ€”unlike for Hobbesâ€”political authority can thus not be absolute. John Simmons uses them to argue that we should distinguish between the moral justification of states in general and the political legitimacy of actual states. I will come back to this point in section 3. Joseph Raz links legitimacy to the justification of political authority. According to Raz, political authority is just a special case of the more general concept of authority , , He defines authority in relation to a claimâ€”of a person or an agencyâ€”to generate what he calls pre-emptive reasons. Such reasons replace other reasons for action that people might have. For example, if a teacher asks her students to do some homework, she expects her say-so to give the students reason to do the homework. Authority is effective, on this view, if it gets people to act on the reasons it generates. Legitimate authority satisfies what Raz calls the pre-emption thesis: There are limits to what even a legitimate authority can rightfully order others to do, which is why it does not necessarily replace all relevant reasons. When is effective or de facto authority legitimate? In other words, what determines whether the pre-emption thesis is satisfied? In full, the normal justification thesis says: The normal justification thesis explains why those governed by a legitimate authority ought to treat its directives as binding. It thus follows as a corollary of the normal justification thesis that such an authority generates a duty to be obeyed. Note that even though legitimate authority is defined as a special case of effective authority, only the former is appropriately described as a serving its subjects. Illegitimateâ€”but effectiveâ€”authority does not serve those it aims to govern, although it may purport to do so. William Edmundson formulates this way of linking authority and legitimacy via a condition he calls the warranty thesis: The idea expressed by the warranty thesis is that legitimacy morally justifies an independently existing authority such that the claims of the authority become moral obligations. As Leslie Green puts it: According to a second important interpretation, by contrast, the main function of legitimacy is precisely to justify coercive power. For an excellent discussion of the two interpretations of legitimacy and a defense of the coercion-based interpretation, see Ripstein ; see also Hampton On coercion-based interpretations, the main problem that a conception of legitimacy aims to solve is how to distinguish the rightful use of political power from mere coercion. One way to capture the thought is that, on these views, legitimacy relates to the way in which the rightful use of political power creates or constitutes political authority. Again, there are different ways in

which this idea might be understood. Both manners of creating a sovereign are equally legitimate. And political authority will be legitimate as long as the sovereign ensures the protection of the citizens, as Hobbes believes that the natural right to self-preservation cannot be relinquished. Leviathan, chapter Beyond that, however, there can be no further questions about the legitimacy of the sovereign. It might even be argued that Hobbes fails to distinguish between legitimate authority and the mere exercise of power Korsgaard Another way in which the relation between legitimacy and the creation of authority may be understood is that the attempt to rule without legitimacy is an attempt to exercise coercive power—“not authority. Rousseau contrasts a legitimate social order with a system of rules that is merely the expression of power. Coercive power is primarily a feature of the civil state. While there are some forms of coercive power even in the state of nature—“for example the power of parents over their children—“Rousseau assumes that harmful coercive power arises primarily in the civil state and that this creates the problem of legitimacy. Such a state would be legitimate. Legitimate political authority is created by convention, reached within the civil state. Specifically, Rousseau suggests that legitimacy arises from the democratic justification of the laws of the civil state Social Contract I: For Kant, as for Hobbes, political authority is created by the establishment of political institutions in the civil state. It does not pre-exist in individuals in the state of nature. What exists in the pre-civil social state, according to Kant, is the moral authority of each individual qua rational being and a moral obligation to form a civil state. It helps people conform to certain rules by eliminating what today would be called the free-riding problem or the problem of partial compliance. The civil state, according to Kant, establishes the rights necessary to secure equal freedom. Unlike for Locke and his contemporary followers, however, coercive power is not a secondary feature of the civil state, necessary to back up laws. According to Kant, coercion is part of the idea of rights. The thought can be explained as follows. Any right of a person—“independently of whether it is respected or has been violated—“implies a restriction for others. Kant, Theory and Practice, Part 2; Ripstein Coercion, in this view, is thus not merely a means for the civil state to enforce rights as defenders of an authority-based concept of legitimacy claim. Instead, according to Kant, it is constitutive of the civil state. Legitimacy, for Kant, depends on a particular interpretation of the social contract. For Kant, the social contract which establishes the civil state is not an actual event. The criterion is the following: The social contract, according to Kant, is thus a hypothetical thought experiment, meant to capture an idea of public reason. As such, it sets the standard for what counts as legitimate political authority. Because of his particular interpretation of the social contract, Kant is not a social contract theorist in the strict sense. The idea of a contract is nevertheless relevant for his understanding of legitimacy. On the difference between voluntaristic and rationalistic strands in liberalism, see Waldron Kant, unlike Hobbes, recognizes the difference between legitimate and effective authority. For the head of the civil state is under an obligation to obey public reason and to enact only laws to which all individuals could consent. If he violates this obligation, however, he still holds authority, even if his authority ceases to be legitimate. Kant famously denied that there is a right to revolution Kant, Perpetual Peace, Appendix II; for a recent discussion, see Flikschuh This obligation is such that it is incompatible with a right to revolution. A right to revolution would be in contradiction with the idea that individuals are bound by public law, but without the idea of citizens being bound by public law, there cannot be a civil state—“only anarchy. As mentioned earlier, however, there is a duty to establish a civil state. In particular, the obligation to obey does not cease when the laws are unjust. But Kant stresses that the head of state is bound by the commands of public reason. This is manifest in his insistence on freedom of the pen: While there is no right to revolution, political authority is only legitimate if the head of state respects the social contract. But political obligations arise even from illegitimate authority. In , Ripstein argued that much of the contemporary literature on political legitimacy has been dominated by a focus on the justification of authority, rather than coercive political power Ripstein In the literature since then, it looks as if the tables are turning, especially if one considers the debates on international and global legitimacy section 5. But prominent earlier coercion-based accounts include those by Nagel and by contemporary Kantians such as Rawls and Habermas to be discussed in sections 3. Let me briefly mention other important coercion-based interpretations. Her theory links the authority of the state to its ability to enforce a solution to coordination and cooperation problems. Coercion is the necessary feature that enables the state to provide an effective solution to these

problems, and the entitlement to use coercion is what constitutes the authority of the state. The entitlement to use coercion distinguishes such minimally legitimate political authority from a mere use of power. Hampton draws a further distinction between minimal legitimacy and what she calls full moral legitimacy, which obtains when political authority is just. Buchanan also argues that legitimacy is concerned with the justification of coercive power. Buchanan points out that this makes legitimacy a more fundamental normative concept than authority. Like Hampton, he advocates a moralized interpretation of legitimacy. Political authority, in his approach, obtains if an entity is legitimate in this sense and if some further conditions, relating to political obligation, are met. Stilz offers a coercion-centered account of state legitimacy that draws on both Kant and Rousseau.

*Political Legitimacy and Democracy The stability and functioning of any kind of political regime—“including democratic or representative ones”—relies on the combination of the capacity of rulers and government.*

Musings on the End Times: By Rudy Barnes, Jr. Are we approaching the end times--a cataclysmic event that will end our culture as we know it? The passages in the Gospels that describe the end times most likely refer to the Roman destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD. It was precipitated by a Jewish insurrection that invited the Roman reprisals that brought the end times to ancient Judaism. One thing is certain. We are fully responsible for our own violent acts of self-destruction, even when they are motivated by Satan and done in the name of God. Those apocalyptic and cataclysmic end times events shared one salient factor: They were all initiated by religious zealots and pit one tribe against others for political dominance. When will we ever learn? Today as in the past, most Jews, Christians and Muslims interpret cataclysmic events in terms of their faith. Jesus warned us to keep watch for the end times, and when facing his own end times in the Garden of Gethsemane Jesus urged his disciples to watch and pray. But are we keeping watch? Americans remain as polarized as ever by partisan politics. The irony is that Christians elected a man who is the antithesis of Christian morality as their president in , and most continued to support his fear-mongering and divisive politics in . With partisan anger dominating politics, America needs moderates to promote a politics of reconciliation, or intractable political hatreds will lead to the end times of our democracy. The altruistic standards of Christian morality no longer guide American politics. We need to restore those moral standards of legitimacy and promote a politics of reconciliation to avoid the end times for our democracy. A healthy democracy requires balancing individual wants and rights with providing for the common good. The end times are described in the scriptures of both Christians and Muslims. They can be understood as the end of life, the end of an era, or the end of the world. Is American democracy approaching its end times? If we ignore the warning signs, we do so at our peril. Do we have a prayer? Yes, but since we must save our democracy from ourselves it will take more than a prayer. So long as a majority of Americans claim to be Christians, they must promote a moral reformation of their religion and politics to avoid the end times of their democracy--and it must begin in the church. Scriptural references to the end times, or eschatological discourse, are found in Matthew chapter 24 and Mark chapter 13. For the scriptures and commentary, see *End Times: The Heart of Legitimacy*, at pp 1-10, posted in Resources at <http://www.nxgvision.com>. President Trump used apocalyptic language and falsehoods leading up to the elections. A split America reasserted its divisions in the midterm elections. On November 4, Robert Samuelson said, We already know who the lost the midterms. After 30 years of multiculturalism, the bonds of racial solidarity trump the bonds of national solidarity. Democrats have a very strong story to tell about what we owe the victims of racism and oppression. They do not have a strong story to tell about what we owe to other Americans, how we define our national borders and what binds us as Americans. Over the next few decades, America will become a majority-minority country. Republicans have rendered themselves irrelevant to the great generational challenge before us. David Frum has argued the case for liberal Republicanism, asserting that the Republican Party should open its doors to moderate conservatives; but that seems unlikely with Trump and his Republican minions committed to the purity of their radical right politics.

## Chapter 4 : Legitimacy | Definition of Legitimacy by Merriam-Webster

*Legitimacy: Legitimacy, popular acceptance of a government, political regime, or system of governance. The word legitimacy can be interpreted in either a normative way or a "positive" (see positivism) way.*

Share via Email The rules currently allow a minority party – Labour, Tory or anyone else – to form a government if it can win the votes in the House of Commons. PA The French revolutionaries had a phrase for it. To shout that the parliamentary system is in danger lacks the same heroic ring. There are no armed enemies at our gates. But there are plots all the same. And it matters to shout it. Our system is in danger. The danger is here, now, and happening in Britain. It must be stopped. The main danger to the parliamentary system comes from the Conservative party and its supporters. It comes from the increasing hysteria of the claims that a Labour minority government would lack constitutional legitimacy. And it comes from the abuse of power, responsibility and language by the Tory-supporting press – which has its own highly partisan post-Leveson agenda – in being prepared to say whatever it takes to stop Ed Miliband from taking office or allow Scotland its say in the uncertain outcome that this country may vote for tomorrow. This newspaper is no supporter of the British electoral system and the distortions it can and does create. Unlike the major parties and the tax-exile-owned press, we have campaigned for a fairer system. To dismiss them is in some sense an assault on parliamentary democracy itself. Those rules currently allow a minority party – Labour, Tory or anyone else – to form a government if – big if – it can win the votes in the House of Commons. To deny this rule brings the whole system into disrepute. It is like the Tories saying the offside rule applies to the red team but that the blue team can feel free to ignore it. It is fundamental to remember that a general election chooses a parliament not a government, still less a prime minister. The rules for the formation of a government in any new parliament are rooted in the consent of that parliament and are set out in the Cabinet manual. At their heart are simple parliamentary principles. Another is that the incumbent government remains in office until things are sorted. But there is no rule anywhere that says the party which has won most seats or most votes gets to form the government and that no one else can. He will be entitled to try to form a new government first and to put his plan to parliament. But if he cannot, or if he loses the parliamentary vote, then Ed Miliband would be entitled to try instead. And if Mr Miliband can succeed where Mr Cameron cannot, then there will be some sort of Labour government. His government may be weak – in the circumstances it would struggle not to be – and it may lack much loyalty or credibility, but it would be entirely legitimate. It is playing with fire to accuse a government of being illegitimate when it follows the rules. The Tories do this when they say the party they expect to come second – Labour – would be illegitimate. The SNP does it when they say a party with little or no support in Scotland would be illegitimate. Any party does it when it claims the support of nationalist MPs is illegitimate. There is no larger constitutional principle involved. The answer is to change the rules. These accusations reflect a wider crisis of the electoral system and politics, not of any particular party outcome. We hope it happens urgently. Britain needs constitutional arrangements that better reflect the kind of country we are and want to be. In the meantime, the rules are the rules. Our parliamentary democracy, imperfect though it is, is in danger. Stand up for it.

**Chapter 5 : Legitimacy | Encyclopedia Princetoniensis**

*of results for "political legitimacy" Beyond Hegemony: Towards a New Philosophy of Political Legitimacy Aug 31, by Darrow Schecter. Paperback.*

These are external links and will open in a new window Close share panel Image copyright Getty Images Politics is sailing into turbulent constitutional waters. That at least is what the opinion polls tell us. These waters are not entirely uncharted; politicians have had to navigate the shoals of hung parliaments before. But historical precedent and ancient charts can provide only a rough guide through changing winds and tides. Politics, like the sea, is never the same. There is before us a bewildering array of possible outcomes if no one party gets a majority. And many of those outcomes could involve some new politics for us all to get used to. One of the big dynamics of the next parliament, I believe, will be a tension between what is legal, what is constitutional, what is precedented - and what the voters think is right and proper and legitimate. So here is a list of hypothetical scenarios that could place new demands on the electors and the elected. Some are important; others trivial. The list is by no means exhaustive. But there are some searching questions here to which we have yet to have meaningful answers. Image copyright PA Would voters think it legitimate for David Cameron - if defeated - to remain prime minister while other parties struggle to form a new government? If the Conservatives lose the election, it might take some time for Labour to form a new administration if it does not have a majority. It might have to form a coalition or minority government with the support of other parties such as the SNP or the Liberal Democrats or other parties. That could take some weeks. His ministers would remain in office too. Five years ago Gordon Brown was desperate to leave Number Ten to avoid accusations that he was clinging on to power. Might voters put similar pressure on a defeated Tory leader to go? Might David Cameron feel honour-bound to leave as soon as possible to respect the wishes of the people? Would voters think it legitimate for Nick Clegg to remain deputy prime minister if the Lib Dems won significantly fewer votes and seats? Together with Conservative MPs, they had easily enough votes in the House of Commons to achieve a majority. Many polls suggest the Lib Dems could see their number of MPs halved. But if either the Tories or Labour do well enough to need only one more party to form a coalition, they could do it with odd Lib Dem MPs. And once again Mr Clegg could remain deputy prime minister despite having such a small presence in parliament. But would voters think it right for Nick Clegg to remain DPM if his party had been so resoundingly rebuffed in the polls? Constitutionally Mr Clegg would have every right to remain in office. But would it be politically acceptable? Image copyright PA Would voters think it legitimate for the Lib Dems or another other smaller party to decide which of the two larger parties should lead the next government? In , it was pretty clear that the Conservatives had done better than Labour. But what if there were to be some kind of a dead heat between the Conservatives and Labour this time around? In that circumstance, the Lib Dems could be in a position to decide which party they could support. Nick Clegg says repeatedly that he will speak to the party with most votes and seats. But he leaves ambiguous what he would do if one party had more votes and another had more seats. His manifesto certainly swung both ways, leaving the door open to working with either Labour or the Conservatives. Would voters think it right for a smaller, depleted party to decide which party governs the whole nation? Would voters think it legitimate for a party that came second to form a government? The fundamental constitutional principle is that the prime minister is the man or woman who can command a majority in the House of Commons. Normally that is the leader of the largest party. But it would be entirely possible for, say, the Conservatives to end up with most seats and votes but not a majority and yet be unable to form a government if no other parties come to its aid. That might leave Labour as the second largest party forming a government with, say, the support of the Lib Dems or the SNP or another party. This would be entirely proper under the constitution. There are several precedents of this happening before. But it might perplex some voters. The party that came second, that did not have the largest number of votes or seats, would be running the country. Would voters think it legitimate, for example, for a Labour party that came second in England and Scotland to be able to form the government for the whole of the UK? Image copyright PA Would voters think it legitimate for any party to form a

minority government in the first place? The prime minister of this party may command the confidence of the House of Commons, not because he has a majority, but because the opposing parties are unable to form a government among themselves and do not want to table a confidence motion and spark a fresh election. But what will voters think of a government that has such little support in the Commons that it struggles to get anything done? We have no culture of minority government in the UK. People may have learned to get used to the new politics of coalition government. But would they go the next step and adapt to the culture of minority government? Would voters think it legitimate for a government which had lost its central economic policy to struggle on because the opposition parties chose not to fight an election at that time? Would voters think it legitimate for a government to engineer a vote of no confidence in itself simply to try to force an election under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act? This is entirely possible and legal under the FTP Act. But it forces an administration to commit legal self-destruction in plain sight. Would voters think this a little odd? Would they punish a government that forced an election upon them in this way? Image copyright PA Would voters think it legitimate for a minority government to be replaced by another administration of a different political colour without an election taking place? The FTP Act says that if a government loses a vote of confidence, there does not have to be a general election straight away. The Act says the parties first have 14 days to try to form a new government before an election has to be held. In other words, voters could see, say, a Labour-led administration replaced by a Tory-led administration without so much as a single vote being cast. That is the law. But it is a law which I imagine few voters know about. Would they find it legitimate? I imagine many voters would be horrified by the idea of power being traded around at Westminster with barrels of political pork being offered to bribe the smaller parties into one camp or another. The idea of the Westminster parties swapping power among themselves without consulting the voters might add to the already gaping void between politics and the people. Would voters think it legitimate for a party such as the SNP that has a geographical focus on one part of the UK to have a large say in the government of the UK as a whole? One possible outcome of the election is that the SNP do well enough in Scotland to have a big say in any minority government at Westminster. Some of their policy priorities are focused on Scotland, such as giving more powers to the Holyrood parliament. But other policies - such as opposing the renewal of Trident nuclear weapons - would affect the whole of the UK. Would voters in England and Wales and Northern Ireland believe it legitimate for one part of the country to hold such a big say over such a UK-wide issue? This is the issue that was raised by David Cameron on the Andrew Marr show. Now, voters in Scotland might retort that many there have long believed it illegitimate for English-dominated parties like the Conservatives to impose their policies on Scotland. But there is an interesting question here. If the SNP replace the Lib Dems as the third largest party at Westminster, they would have every democratic and constitutional right to play a role in the government of the UK in a hung parliament. But would the voters think it legitimate? Constitutionally, the SNP would have no automatic right to play a role in the next government if other parties chose to work together to form an administration. Would voters think it legitimate for David Cameron to remain prime minister while no longer remaining leader of the Conservative Party? Mr Cameron told me in his kitchen that if he was returned to Downing Street for a second term, he would not serve a third. His aides insist he would serve every day of that second term. But this has led to some confusion. Many commentators say the Tories could not go into the election with one leader and then change their leader immediately after votes have been cast. So the suggestion has been made that Mr Cameron could remain prime minister up to the election but he could stand down as Tory leader, say, a year earlier to allow a successor to be elected. This is not without constitutional precedent. Prime ministers do not have to be party leaders. They just have to command the confidence of the House of Commons. For example, Winston Churchill was prime minister for six months in while Neville Chamberlain remained Tory leader after his resignation from Downing Street. John Major remained Prime Minister in when he briefly resigned as Tory leader to hold a "put up or shut up" contest with John Redwood. Thus, then, some questions about what may or may not be seen as legitimate in the new politics of the next parliament. The optimists say, fear not, look how quickly the people of Britain adapted to coalition government in The warnings of disaster proved unfounded. The pessimists fear a further dislocation between parliament and the people if things are done in their name they do not understand and believe to be

unfair.

### Chapter 6 : Election The politics of legitimacy - BBC News

*Legitimacy is commonly defined in political science and sociology as the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to govern. It is a judgment by an individual about the rightfulness of a hierarchy between rule or ruler and its subject and about the subordinate's obligations toward the rule or ruler.*

The concept of usurpation as the opposite of legitimacy has accompanied the concept of legitimate government since early medieval times and has helped to clarify it. Usurpers, after seizing power, have often tried to strengthen their positions by giving their governments a legitimate form, and these attempts to clothe a usurping power with legitimacy, whether successful or not, have often revealed what the standards of legitimacy are for a given society or civilization. If they succeed they introduce a new principle of legitimacy that supersedes the legitimacy of the former regime. Under such circumstances recognition by the people will often be acquired only as the new government begins governing, and the process of becoming legitimate may include violence and terror. Foreign diplomatic recognition, while not essential, may help internal consolidation and therefore speed acceptance of the new pattern of legitimacy. Governments, whether following traditional principles of legitimacy or establishing revolutionary ones, may lose their legitimacy by violating these principles. The desire for legitimacy is so deeply rooted in human communities that it is hard to discover any sort of historical government that did not either enjoy widespread authentic recognition of its existence or try to win such recognition. Because it is so universal a phenomenon, however, legitimacy is continuously endangered by the plurality of its patterns and sources. Rivals for power often automatically consider themselves legitimate and their opponents illegitimate. It is therefore difficult to talk about legitimacy in general terms; the different types must be discussed separately and specific examples given. The numerous historical types of governmental legitimacy may be classified into two broad groups: Numinous legitimacy

The dominion of a god-king, of which ancient Egypt offers perhaps the most impressive example, is the theological doctrine according to which every pharaoh is himself among other things the god Horus, son of Osiris. The doctrine seems to go back to the very origin of the empire. The underlying myth of the birth of Horus, repeated, as it were, in every accession to the throne, provided the Egyptian kingship with a powerful guarantee of identity and continuity, the appearance of eternity. The pharaoh is, as Henri Frankfort put it, the epiphany of the god, as distinct from the Hellenistic or late Roman institution of the apotheosis granted to an individual emperor for example, Alexander the Great. Obedience is not merely a political necessity but a religious obligation. Obviously, legitimacy of this sort is a matter of might rather than of right and transcends all juridical explanation. The godly origin of the king, more specifically the king being the son of god, is a concept close to that of the godliness of the king. The early pharaoh was, indeed, both god and son of god. The phenomenon of being the son of god does not belong to antiquity alone, however; it constitutes an essential element of the Christian faith. Divine vocation as a principle of legitimate government whether temporal or spiritual must be distinguished from divine origin. Peter, which continues to sanctify and legitimize the rule of every successive pope. For centuries both king and priest were considered the embodiment of the institution of the vicariat. The controversy between them was not about their respective legitimacy as such, but rather about the question whether priestly coronation and consecration were of constituent or merely affirmative significance for the regnum. Inspiration is a numinous basis of legitimate government that has not produced lasting governmental institutions to the degree the three previous bases have. Moses is the foremost example of numinous inspiration, and his name is cited in Christian political philosophy whenever government by inspiration and revelation is discussed. The later prophets of ancient Israel could be considered as performing the function in government that has since come to be called the opposition. Time and again prophecy in the sense of a mission based on direct revelation of a superior will has inspired powerful political movements, often of a revolutionary kind. The Puritan revolution is a prominent example. Such superior will is not necessarily of a divine nature; Marx, for example, refers to history, and the Bolshevik party is guided by the will of history, of which the party claims to have a quasi-theological scientific knowledge. Civil legitimacy

Civil legitimacy exists when a system of government is based on agreement between equally autonomous

constituents who have combined to cooperate toward some common good. Medieval confederacies, viewed not as aggregates of citizens but as aggregates of autonomous estates, form another type of commonwealth, deriving their legitimacy from agreement, or *conjuratio*. The institution of assemblies of estates as for example, the French *Etats Generaux*, the old German Reichstag, or the unreformed English Parliament is another example of an aggregate of autonomous entities, although it is of a very different structure and importance from the confederacy. Finally, every modern constitutional system, or more specifically, every system of representational government is founded either on a basic agreement to follow certain rules or at least on a justifiable assumption that a basic agreement to follow certain rules exists. Modern constitutional government makes one characteristic of civil legitimacy particularly clear: This characteristic is expressed in the institution of periodic elections. In recent times popular elections have become so predominant a criterion of legitimacy that almost every nation feels obliged to pay lip service to the institution of elections, no matter what its system of government[ see Elections ].

**History and interpretations of the concept**  
**Etymology**  
The word *legitimus* is classical Latin, while *legimitas* seems to occur first in medieval texts, and, even then, only rarely. The Roman form means lawful, according to law. While the word was used in all spheres of juridical relations, there are definite political overtones: Cicero uses *legitimum imperium* and *potestas legitima* in the sense of powers or magistrates constituted by law. The medieval meaning is very different: The word begins to be applied to persons: There is, indeed, something to be said for interpreting the medieval *lex* as indicating the particular customary procedure of an appropriate council or assembly composed of members of the family or the judiciary whose resolution or assent gives legitimacy to the respective decisions. In these cases the word *legitimate* points to the element of constituted rule and order, but included in the meaning is the assembly itself to which the rule refers. The Bavarian electoral law of Emperor Louis states that he who is elected by the electors *ex sola electione censeatur*. Here the meaning of *legitimus* appears to come very close to its modern sense by adding the element of consent to the original *veritas* of the elected emperor. This idea of consent is precisely the element of meaning which remains in modern usage. Popular consent, although not the whole essence of legitimate government, is one of its most important criteria. In the course of the medieval revival of interest in Aristotle, his discussion of king and tyrant became particularly important. Later, Thomas Aquinas drew a much sharper line between king and tyrant than Aristotle had done and thus came close to a theory of legitimate and illegitimate government. The king is pursuing the *bonum commune*, the tyrant his *bonum proprium*. Augustine Augustine declared that it was impossible for any community or government outside the City of God to be legitimate. Empires, he stated *De civitate Dei* iv, 4, are big gangs of robbers. The two *civitates*, he insisted, share only a mutual enmity. There is one respect in which the worldly *civitates* are to be justified: It may also explain the similarity of claims made by the Roman church and the Roman Empire: Marsilius of Padua Marsilius rediscovered the concept of the polity as an autonomous entity not in need of spiritual approbation or interpretation. His *Defensor pads* represented a bold revolution in political thought. His astonishing book served the cause of Louis of Bavaria in his struggle with Pope John xxn but did so in a completely novel way: Marsilius thereby cut the bond of theological legitimation that had united church and empire for over five hundred years [see Marsilius of padua ].

John Locke Locke, the great revolutionary political thinker of seventeenth-century England, was, like Marsilius, an Aristotelian and a developer of a novel theory of civil legitimacy. Having destroyed the theory of the divine right of kings, he went on to build a totally different theory of government, according to which kingship was an office created by human agreement that served the common good of those agreeing to create it. Locke served the cause of the Whig party and its Glorious Revolution against the Stuarts as Marsilius had served the Imperial party against the pope [see Locke ].

Joseph de Maistre De Maistre was a leading nineteenth-century advocate of legitimism and a prime opponent of Locke and his revolutionary views. De Maistre conceived of the divine right of kings in a dynastic sense; it is the royal family rather than the royal office that has been chosen by God. Royal families exist, he stated, and this fact is the most telling sign of their legitimacy. In this view hereditary succession is an essential element of legitimate rule. Although legitimism as a political force ended in France with the July revolution of , legitimist ideas dominated nineteenth-century discussions of legitimacy. Modern discussions

Modern scholarly discussions of legitimacy can best be covered by reviewing three writers who dealt with the

general notion of legitimacy: From this selection of a sociologist, a lawyer, and a historian, it is apparent that the problem of legitimacy is of concern to many disciplines other than political science. Max Weber was the first to discover the universal applicability of the notion of legitimacy and therefore the first to use the term for classifying and comparing a great number of sociopolitical phenomena. Legitimate dominion is not distinguished from illegitimate dominion. Instead, within the general framework of a value-free description of social patterns, the plurality of legitimacies becomes apparent. Weber seemed to assume that in legitimate dominion of any type, legitimacy is based on belief and elicits obedience. However, he did not discuss the general sense of legitimacy and instead concentrated on the pure types of legitimacy: His three types together cover the whole range of such phenomena. Although these terms have provided the impetus for much empirical research, whether they provide the best classification of the empirical material they have helped unearth is still questionable. By traditional legitimacy Weber understood mainly patriarchal and feudal forms of order and dominion. Here the objection may be made that the sanction of tradition plays its part in almost every kind of legitimacy, from constitutional systems to charismatic ones. Weber himself had some doubts about the rationality of the third type: However, he never described the precise nature of the belief in legality which he placed at the bottom of legal and bureaucratic dominion. There is almost no place left in his system for civil government in its proper sense. Democratic legitimacy occurs only as a reversion of charismatic leadership and is another concept that cannot be handled in his system. Carl Schmitt The problem of democratic legitimacy was, for obvious reasons, urgently discussed in the late years of the Weimar Republic. The distinction between legality and legitimacy goes back to the French legitimist writers and is most sharply made in M. Although Schmitt did not define the terms of his title, he seemed to say that the state with parliamentary legislation lacks legitimacy altogether. Schmitt considered the plebiscitary elements of the Weimar constitution to be legitimizing factors, and he therefore pleaded that these factors be made the basis of an amended constitution. What is the core of democratic legitimacy? His formula broke the spell of the Rousseauian fiction of a general will *volonte generate* and avoids the dangerous drawbacks of considering majority rule as the essence of democracy. Hopefully this illuminating concept will be tested by comparative studies. Apart from the particular problems already mentioned, there are many important questions about legitimacy that deserve further study. Among them are the partly logical question of the universality of the concept and the partly ethical question of how to resolve conflicts of legitimacies both in theory and in practice. *Ou, du pouvoir, du ministre et du sujet dans la societe.* Brie, Siegfried *Die Legitimation einer usurpierten Staatsgewalt.* Ferrero, Guglielmo *The Principles of Power: The Great Political Crises of History.* A paperback edition was published in by Harper. Frankfort, Henri *Kingship and the Gods:*

## Chapter 7 : Political Legitimacy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*However political legitimacy can be scrutinized and brought into question. This is one lesson President Donald Trump has learned the hard way. According to the American opposition party, the Democrats, Donald Trump's electoral legitimacy is tainted by the possible interference of a foreign state.*

See Article History Legitimacy, popular acceptance of a government , political regime , or system of governance. The first meaning refers to political philosophy and deals with questions such as: What are the right sources of legitimacy? Is a specific political order or regime worthy of recognition? As such, legitimacy is a classic topic of political philosophy. The second meaning relies on empirical approaches that try to measure the degree of popular acceptance of existing regimes or try to test causal explanations for low or high degrees of legitimacy. Classic definitions and discussions Gaining legitimacy is a need that is not restricted to liberal democratic regimes but is considered a basic condition of rule, because governing regimes without at least a minimal amount of legitimacy would face deadlock or collapse. Therefore, every regime seeks to justify its reign, and this justification can be based on various concepts. In history there have been competition and changes between different concepts of legitimacy. Traditionally, the reign of monarchs was justified on the grounds of their divine origin. The Enlightenment helped to challenge this religious source of legitimate rule, and democratic revolutions at and after that time declared the will of the people to be the basic source of legitimacy. In this context of modernization, Max Weber developed a typology of forms of legitimacy legitimate authority that is still one of the most important points of reference. He differentiated a traditional, a charismatic , and a legal-rational type of legitimacy. He basically diagnosed a historical transformation from traditional to legal-rational types of legitimacy, in which legitimacy based on the charisma of a revolutionary leader formed a transitory phenomenon. A constitutionalist conception of legitimacy puts most emphasis on regular procedures employed to formulate the will of the people and also on normative limitations and judiciary controls of governing majorities to secure equal treatment and individual liberty. In contrast, conceptions of democratic legitimacy in the Anglo-Saxon world focus more on the aspects of popular participation and regime accountability secured by free and fair elections combined with a system of political checks and balances in contrast to the legalistic approach of inter-institutional control in the constitutionalist perspective. Another line of thinking about democratic legitimacy, which has mainly French origins, has a different, more collectivist understanding of the will of the people. Not so much the rules and the opportunities to participate but the affective commitment to the community and to its administrative representations lays the basis for democratic legitimacy. In consequence, patriotism and civic nationalism secure loyalty to the system of governance. Collectivist approaches to democratic legitimacy based on a materialist worldview see the legitimacy of the governing regime primarily based on securing economic prosperity and equality. In communist states this line of thinking led to the subordination of all social subsystems under the political system , because only full control especially over the economic system enables the political system to implement the will of the people. In Western countries after World War II , thinking about democratic legitimacy concentrated more on the output or performance of democratic regimes. The relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness of a political system was cast mainly in such a form that legitimacy was seen as a substitute for effectiveness. In such a perspective, legitimacy creates a reservoir of goodwill diffuse support and increases the willingness of the people to tolerate shortcomings of effectiveness which reduces specific support. Whereas in the Anglo-Saxon world the relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness has been at the centre of debates, the discourse on legitimacy in Germany traditionally has had another focal pointâ€”the relationship between form legality and substance morality of legitimate rule. Nevertheless, the German experiences with an inhumane Nazi regime, which based its rule officially on popular consent and on bureaucratic mechanisms for policy implementation, reinvigorated the constitutionalist tradition of complementing and restricting formally legitimate rule by substantive values. Empirical approaches Empirical approaches emphasize the subjective aspect of democratic legitimacy. If people believe that existing political orders or laws are appropriate and worthy of obedience, then those orders and laws are legitimate. By using

polls and other empirical methods, researchers try to reveal these subjectively held beliefs on democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, it is not easy to measure this phenomenon accurately, because legitimacy is an abstract concept. Therefore, it is mostly measured indirectly by asking about political trust or confidence. Empirical studies in Western countries reveal that there has been a loss of confidence in almost all advanced democracies. But there are significant differences with respect to what this gap of confidence refers to. Ruling parties and leaders face a high degree of mistrust, and many institutions that have central functions for classic liberal democracies such as parliament, parties, and public bureaucracies have to deal with low confidence. Nevertheless, only small minorities are dissatisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy functions in their country, and even fewer people declare themselves in favour of radical change. Vast majorities still adhere to their democratic systems.

## Chapter 8 : Legitimation crisis - Wikipedia

*The legitimacy argument arose precisely because the use of the veto had closed off most, if not all, legal avenues, including those avenues which didn't consist of using force.*

Divine right of kings , Mandate of Heaven , and Imperial cult ancient Rome In a theocracy , government legitimacy derives from the spiritual authority of a god or a goddess. In ancient Egypt c. The coat of arms of the Holy See , the seat of Papal government. In the Roman Catholic Church , the priesthood derives its legitimacy from a divine source; the Roman Magisterium dogmatically teaches that Jesus Christ designated St. Peter the supreme and infallible head of the entire Christian Church, and thus each bishop of Rome is sanctified, legitimate, and possesses these charisms as well. Civil legitimacy[ edit ] One measurement of civil legitimacy is who has access to the vote, including women are able to vote. The political legitimacy of a civil government derives from agreement among the autonomous constituent institutionsâ€”legislative, judicial, executiveâ€”combined for the national common good. One way civil society grants legitimacy to governments is through public elections. There are also those who refute the legitimacy offered by public elections, pointing out that the amount of legitimacy public elections can grant depends significantly on the electoral system conducting the elections. In the United States this issue has surfaced around how voting is impacted by gerrymandering [8] and the repeal of part of the Voting Rights Act in In the international system another method for measuring civil legitimacy is through accountability to international human rights norms. Fritz Scharpf introduced two normative criteria, which are output legitimacy, i. A third normative criterion was added by Vivien Schmidt , who analyzes legitimacy also in terms of what she calls throughput, i. From the NPL perspective, political legitimacy emanates from appropriate actions; from a PPL perspective, it emanates from appropriate actors. In the social contract tradition, Hobbes and Locke focused on NPL stressing security and liberty, respectively , while Rousseau focused more on PPL "the people" as the legitimator. Arguably, political stability depends on both forms of legitimacy. Instrumental legitimacy is very much based on the perceived effectiveness of service delivery. Conversely, substantive legitimacy is a more abstract normative judgment, which is underpinned by shared values. If a person believes that an entity has the right to exercise social control, he or she may also accept personal disadvantages. Max Weber proposed that societies behave cyclically in governing themselves with different types of governmental legitimacy. That democracy was unnecessary for establishing legitimacy, a condition that can be established with codified laws, customs, and cultural principles, not by means of popular suffrage. That a society might decide to revert from the legitimate government of a rationalâ€”legal authority to the charismatic government of a leader; e. That traditional authority has disappeared in the Middle East ; that the rule-proving exceptions are Islamic Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hence, the intellectually restrictive politics of dogmatism "My answer is right, and all others are wrong" , scepticism "All answers are equally true or [false]; everyone has a right to his own truth" , and eclecticism "Each meaning gives a partial view, so the more meanings the better" are inappropriate philosophic stances for managing a political term that has more than one meaning. Walter Bryce Gallie Establishing what qualifies as a legitimate form of government continues to be a topic of great philosophical controversy. Forms of legitimate government are posited to include: The legitimacy of a Communist state derives from having won a civil war , a revolution , or from having won an election, such as the Presidency of Salvador Allende â€”73 in Chile; thus, the actions of the Communist government are legitimate, authorised by the people. In the early twentieth century, Communist parties based the arguments supporting the legitimacy of their rule and government upon the scientific nature of Marxism. The modern political concept of constitutionalism establishes the law as supreme over the private will, by integrating nationalism , democracy, and limited government. The political legitimacy of constitutionalism derives from popular belief and acceptance that the actions of the government are legitimate because they abide by the law codified in the political constitution. The political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich â€”84 said that, in dividing political power among the organs of government, constitutional law effectively restrains the actions of the government. In a democracy, government legitimacy derives from the popular perception that the elected government abides by

democratic principles in governing, and thus is legally accountable to its people. In the 1920s and the 1930s, fascism based its political legitimacy upon the arguments of traditional authority; respectively, the German National Socialists and the Italian Fascists claimed that the political legitimacy of their right to rule derived from philosophically denying the popular political legitimacy of elected liberal democratic governments. How can parliamentary government make for law and legality, when a 49 per cent minority accepts as politically legitimate the political will of a 51 per cent majority? In a monarchy, the divine right of kings establishes the political legitimacy of the rule of the monarch king or queen ; legitimacy also derives from the popular perception tradition and custom and acceptance of the monarch as the rightful ruler of nation and country. Contemporarily, such divine-right legitimacy is manifest in the absolute monarchy of the House of Saud est. Moreover, constitutional monarchy is a variant form of monarchic political legitimacy which combines traditional authority and legal-rational authority, by which means the monarch maintains nationalist unity one people and democratic administration a political constitution.

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*Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference.*