Chapter 1 : Moral Responsibility (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Psychotherapeutic and philosophical-theological concepts of responsibility: A critical evaluation (Publication - Institutionen for praktisk teologi vid Abo akademi ; nr.

APA accreditation recognizes that the program meets the standards for high-quality programs in psychology as stated in the APA Guidelines and Principles for Accreditation of Programs in Professional Psychology. Learn more about program-specific application requirements. International students have a separate application procedure. Doctor of Psychology Psy. Established schools of thought, the recovery model, evidence-based and promising practices and their immediate descendants are presented in a blended learning format both face-to-face and online instruction through lectures, videotapes, reflection, application via clinical case presentations, and experiential learning. The course also highlights cultural and spiritual diversity as it applies to the therapeutic process and awareness of the self, interpersonal issues, and spiritual values as they impact the use of theoretical frameworks. This course is taken during the first year of the doctoral program and is foundational to the curriculum. As such, subsequent coursework builds upon the knowledge, concepts and skills introduced in this course. Students learn how to analyze the ethical bias of the psychotherapeutic psychologies and to identify their underlying philosophical assumptions. As such, subsequent coursework builds upon the knowledge, concepts, and skills introduced in this course. Basic Skills, 3 Units This course provides students with an introduction to the skill and the art of psychotherapy. The course incorporates didactic instruction, experiential learning, readings, and reflection in order to meet this course objective. Infancy through Adolescence, 2 Units This course is part of a two-course sequence that helps students learn to utilize a life-span perspective in their work as clinical psychologists. This course reviews important developmental issues and milestones from infancy through adolescence, paying particular attention to context, culture, and environmental issues. Students are encouraged to consider how development occurs within a specific social context and learn how social stress, poverty, low education attainment, abuse and neglect, and inadequate housing impact development. Biological, social, and psychological aspects of development are included; models of psychological development are presented; and the processes of change and adaptation are examined, including clinical issues such as grief and loss. Clinical application of the material is highlighted through case examples, group discussion, and hands-on application during class activities. This course is taken during the first year of the Psy. The course will combine didactic and experiential elements of instruction in order to promote student growth and professional development regarding cultural diversity and the practice of psychotherapy. Examples of psychotherapy models that integrate Christian theology, spirituality with existing psychology theoretical and clinical models will be presented and discussed. Opportunities for synthesis, application, and creative development of ideas are all part of the course content and process. Special emphasis is placed on understanding the science of psychological assessment, including an introduction to descriptive statistics, reliability, validity, and item analysis. Structuring a basic assessment battery, conducting clinical interviews and the use of psychological tests in diverse contexts is also addressed. Family Therapy, 3 Units This course consists of an overview of current theories and methods of family intervention. The systems approach is emphasized, though psychodynamic and communication concepts in the interpersonal field are also included. The major theorists in each system are identified and their techniques demonstrated. Advanced Skills, 3 Units This course provides an introduction to the clinical world of the psychologist. A review of basic clinical skills is provided, with an emphasis on developing and refining the skills related to the relationship between clinician and client-respect, warmth, genuineness, empathy, concreteness, potency, self-disclosure, confrontation, and immediacy. Work in small groups gives students an opportunity to role play and receive feedback concerning their skills. This course is taken during the first year of the doctoral program and is foundational to the curriculum; as such, subsequent coursework builds upon the knowledge, concepts, and skills introduced in this course. Students practice basic skills in assessment, interviewing, and sensitivity to

diversity, with a special focus on case conceptualization. Activities include role playing and videotaping of clinical practice. Additional exploration of ethical issues in the practice of clinical psychology is also included. Students must pass a competency examination on legal and ethical issues, practice basic clinical skills, and have their clinical work reviewed. Prominent theorists and movements within psychoanalytic history will be featured, with an emphasis on central concepts such as: Empirical support for the efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy will be presented. Key movements in the consideration of religion and spirituality within psychoanalysis will also be discussed. Cognitive and Behavioral, 2 Units Students will learn the cognitive and behavioral research and theory that underpin evidence-based cognitive-behavioral interventions. Cognitive and behavioral research and theory will be examined in the context of specific populations and disorders. Students will develop a basic understanding of the efficacy of cognitive-behavioral therapy as a psychotherapeutic treatment modality. Group, 2 Units This course provides an introduction to the theory and practice of group psychotherapy. Students explore several prominent group therapy models and develop some clinical competency in group therapy. Postmodern, 2 Units This course provides an overview of postmodern theories that are prominent in the field of clinical psychology. Course material covers the theoretical and research underpinnings of specific models, along with their relationship to language, human interaction, and social constructivism; the various schools of thought associated with the discipline since its inception; and the influence and impact of each of these schools on the practice of psychology. Models covered include narrative therapy, solution-focused therapy, feminist therapy, and multicultural therapy, and students explore the subject matter through lectures, readings, discussions, and videos. Psychodynamic, 2 Units Students in this course learn an empirically supported model of time-limited psychodynamic psychotherapy. Consultation on cases is provided to students in this course. Group, 2 Units This course provides an introduction to the practice of group psychotherapy. Students explore several prominent group therapy models and begin to develop clinical competency in group therapy. Postmodern, 2 Units In this course, students learn conceptual, perceptual, and executive skills of postmodern interventions, including solution-focused brief therapy. Students develop a better understanding of how postmodern interventions enhance the treatment of clients. An in-depth analysis of the tenets of systems theory and their application to psychotherapy is provided. Philosophical, theological, and psychological ramifications of systems theory are considered. Students are challenged to adopt an ecological systems epistemology and think critically regarding the integration of psychological theories within a systemic framework. Contemporary theories are reviewed and critiqued in light of current research on the effectiveness of treatments based upon those theories. Students are expected to develop a coherent theoretical and empirical rationale for therapeutic interventions. Personality, 4 Units This course provides a review of the fundamentals of psychological assessment; the administration, scoring, and interpretation of objective instruments for the clinical assessment of personality; and professional report writing. Cultural issues in the interpretation of psychological tests are addressed. This course includes a mandatory lab for practice in the administration, scoring, and interpretation of assessment devices. Cognitive Assessment, 4 Units This course covers the assessment of intelligence in children, adolescents, and adults and the assessment of children for developmental, learning, and emotional disorders. The course emphasizes the Wechsler intelligence scales. Critical analysis of cultural considerations in test interpretation is considered. The development and composition of comprehensive assessment batteries are addressed. Systemic and social interaction is emphasized in developmental process, etiology and manifestation of psychopathology, and therapeutic interventions. Culturally diverse populations are considered. Students learn to administer and interpret family assessment measures. The role of culture, ethnicity, and religious influences in families is discussed. Students develop systemic treatment plans that recognize the value of the appropriate inclusion of individual, dyadic, and family therapy sessions. Emotional, behavioral, and learning problems are thoroughly examined and understood within a systemic developmental context. Particular attention is paid to assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of children within the familial and cultural context. Topics covered include the theoretical and research underpinnings of the discipline; the various schools of thought associated with the discipline since its

inception; and the influence and impact of each of these schools upon the practice of psychology. Students explore the subject matter through lecture, readings, discussion, and videos. The focus is on theory and empirical research which supports theory. In addition, classic action-oriented social psychology is examined in the application of social psychological theory to real-life situations. The primary purpose of this course is to provide an opportunity for students to discuss their clinical caseload, and to provide department oversight of clinical placement experience. This series of courses are 1 unit consultation courses that allow DGP faculty to be a resource to PsyD students while they are receiving clinical training at practicum sites. This course is required every semester students are on practicum. A range of addictive behaviors is studied, including substance use and eating disorders, gambling, sexual addictions, and relationship addictions. Cultural and religious factors in addictions are studied. Special attention is given to social and environmental factors in the progression and treatment of addictive behaviors. Emphasis is given to developing knowledge and skills in research design, and in assessing the technical adequacy of research conducted by others. Various types of clinical dissertations are presented and discussed to assist students in developing their clinical dissertation proposal. Lectures emphasize statistical concepts and their application to clinical research. Computer applications of statistical software packages are emphasized in an experiential laboratory component. This course provides the foundational skills necessary for students to finalize their clinical dissertation proposal and to conduct the research to complete their clinical dissertation. Couples Theory and Therapy, 3 Units This course reviews the current literature on dyadic relationships and psychotherapeutic approaches to couples. A minimum of three contemporary theoretical orientations and their clinical applications are studied in depth. Demonstration, simulation, case presentations, and clinical experience are used to reinforce the models presented. Students receive training in the administration and interpretation of assessment devices for the clinical evaluation of couples. Variations across cultures and interaction with wider systems are considered. Students gain an understanding of the moral development of individual and family life using the conceptual frameworks and moral categories of phenomenological, gestalt, existential, cognitive, and object relations theories. Special attention is given to cultural and ethical relativism, biblical ethics and community life, and the clinical use of biblical ethics in ethical confrontation. Diversity Competency, 2 Units This course provides an on-campus forum for the review of clinical experience at a practicum site chosen subsequent to the development of an individual training plan. This course focuses on competency in the delivery of psychological services to diverse populations. Students must pass a competency examination on diversity to complete this course. Students are evaluated on the development of increased skill in the practice of psychology. Domestic Violence and Case Conceptualization, 2 Units This course provides an on-campus forum for review of clinical experience at a practicum site. Focus is on detection, assessment, and intervention strategies for spousal or partner abuse and meets the California requirements for training in this area. Students must pass a competency examination in domestic violence to complete this course.

Chapter 2 : Existential Psychotherapy (book) - Wikipedia

Psychotherapeutic and philosophical-theological concepts of responsibility: a critical evaluation / A critical study of Leibniz' influence on Russell's conception of the infinite. on.

Some Historical Background What follows in this section is a brief outline of the origins and trajectory of reflection on moral responsibility in the Western philosophical tradition. Against this background, a distinction will be drawn between two conceptions of moral responsibility that have exerted considerable influence on subsequent thinkers. An understanding of the concept of moral responsibility and its application is present implicitly in some of the earliest surviving Greek texts, i. If some particular outcome is fated, then it seems that the agent concerned could not be morally responsible for that outcome. Likewise, if fatalism were true with respect to all human futures, then it would seem that no human agent could be morally responsible for anything. Though this brand of fatalism has sometimes exerted significant historical influence, most philosophers have rejected it on the grounds that there is no good reason to think that our futures are fated in the sense that they will unfold no matter what particular deliberations we engage in, choices we make, or actions we perform. Aristotle â€" BCE seems to have been the first to construct a theory of moral responsibility. A bit later, he clarifies that only a certain kind of agent qualifies as a moral agent and is thus properly subject to ascriptions of responsibility, namely, one who possess a capacity for decision. According to Aristotle, a voluntary action or trait has two distinctive features. First, there is a control condition: That is, it must be up to the agent whether to perform that action or possess the traitâ€"it cannot be compelled externally. Second, Aristotle proposes an epistemic condition: Aristotle aims to identify the conditions under which it is appropriate to praise or blame an agent, but it is not entirely clear how to understand the pivotal notion of appropriateness in his conception of responsibility. There are at least two possibilities: These two possibilities may be characterized in terms of two competing interpretations of the concept of moral responsibility: While Aristotle argued against a version of fatalism On Interpretation, ch. Causal determinism is the view that everything that happens or exists is caused by sufficient antecedent conditions, making it impossible for anything to happen or be other than it does or is. One variety of causal determinism, scientific determinism, identifies the relevant antecedent conditions as a combination of prior states of the universe and the laws of nature. Another, theological determinism, identifies those conditions as being the nature and will of God. It seems likely that theological determinism evolved out of the shift, both in Greek religion and in Ancient Mesopotamian religions, from polytheism to belief in one sovereign God, or at least one god who reigned over all others. The doctrine of scientific determinism can be traced back as far as the Presocratic Atomists 5th cent. BCE , but the difference between it and the earlier fatalistic view seems not to be clearly recognized until the development of Stoic philosophy 3rd. If fatalism is true, then human deliberation, choice, and action are completely otiose, for what is fated will transpire no matter what one chooses to do. In other words, even though our deliberations, choices, and actions are themselves determined like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the occurrence or existence of yet other things depends upon our deliberating, choosing and acting in a certain way Irwin Since the Stoics, the thesis of causal determinism, if true, and its ramifications, have taken center stage in theorizing about moral responsibility. During the Medieval period, especially in the work of Augustine â€" and Aquinas â€" , reflection on freedom and responsibility was often generated by questions concerning versions of theological determinism, including most prominently: During the Modern period, there was renewed interest in scientific determinismâ€"a change attributable to the development of increasingly sophisticated mechanistic models of the universe culminating in the success of Newtonian physics. The possibility of giving a comprehensive explanation of every aspect of the universeâ€"including human actionâ€"in terms of physical causes became much more plausible. Many thought that persons could not be free and morally responsible if such an explanation of human action turned out to be true. Others argued that freedom and responsibility would not be undermined by the truth of

scientific determinism. In keeping with this focus on the ramifications of causal determinism for moral responsibility, thinkers may be classified as being one of two types: For example, those who accept the merit-based conception of moral responsibility have tended to be incompatibilists. That is, most have thought that if an agent were to genuinely merit praise or blame for something, then he would need to exercise a special form of control over that thing e. In addition to Epicurus, we can cite early Augustine, Thomas Reid â€", and Immanuel Kant â€" as historical examples here. Thomas Hobbes â€", David Hume â€", and John Stuart Mill â€" are, along with the Stoics, representatives of this view. This general trend of linking the consequentialist conception of moral responsibility with compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility and the merit-based conception with incompatibilism continued to persist through the first half of the twentieth century. As discussed above, philosophical reflection on moral responsibility has historically relied upon one of two broad interpretations of the concept: Though versions of the consequentialist view have continued to garner support Smart; Frankena Increased attention to the stance of regarding and holding persons morally responsible has generated much of the recent work on the concept of moral responsibility. All theorists have recognized features of this practiceâ€"inner attitudes and emotions, their outward expression in censure or praise, and the imposition of corresponding sanctions or rewards. In other words, it was typically assumed that blame and praise depended upon a judgment, or belief pre-reflective in most cases , that the agent in question had satisfied the objective conditions on being responsible. For the holder of the consequentialist view, this is a judgment that the agent exercised a form of control that could be influenced through outward expressions of praise and blame in order to curb or promote certain behaviors. For those holding the merit view, it is a judgment that the agent has exercised the requisite form of metaphysical control, e. If holding responsible is best understood as resting on an independent judgment about being responsible, then it is legitimate to inquire whether such underlying judgments and their associated outward expressions can be justified, as a whole, in the face of our best current understanding of the world, e. According to incompatibilists, a judgment that someone is morally responsible could never be true if the world were deterministic; thus praising and blaming in the merit-based sense would be beside the point. Compatibilists, on the other hand, contend that the truth of determinism would not undermine the relevant underlying judgments concerning the efficacy of praising and blaming practices, thereby leaving the rationale of such practices intact. Strawson sets out to adjudicate the dispute between those compatibilists who hold a consequentialist view of responsibility and those incompatibilists who hold the merit-based view. According to Strawson, the attitudes expressed in holding persons morally responsible are varieties of a wide range of attitudes deriving from our participation in personal relationships, e. In the first, one might conclude that, contrary to first appearances, the candidate did not violate the demand for a reasonable degree of good will. In the second kind of circumstance, one may abandon the participant perspective in relation to the candidate. In these cases, one adopts the objective standpoint, one from which one ceases to regard the individual as capable of participating in genuine personal relations either for some limited time or permanently. Such individuals lie, in some sense or to some varying extent, outside the boundaries of the moral community. For example, we may regard a very young child as initially exempt from the reactive attitudes but increasingly less so in cases of normal development or adopt the objective standpoint in relation to an individual we determine to be suffering from severe mental illness P. The central criticism Strawson directs at both consequentialist and traditional merit views is that both have over-intellectualized the issue of moral responsibilityâ€"a criticism with which many subsequent thinkers have wrestled. Strawson, by contrast, maintains that the reactive attitudes are a natural expression of an essential feature of our form of life, in particular, the interpersonal nature of our way of life. Though judgments about the appropriateness of particular responses may arise i. That is, their justification refers back to an account of the reactive attitudes and their role in personal relationships, not to some independent theoretical account of the conditions on being responsible. Given the above, Strawson contends that it is pointless to ask whether the practice of holding responsible can be rationally justified if determinism is true. This is either because it is not psychologically possible to divest ourselves of these reactions and so

continually inhabit the objective standpoint, or even if that were possible, because it is not clear that rationality could ever demand that we give up the reactive attitudes, given the loss in quality of life should we do so. In sum, Strawson attempts to turn the traditional debate on its head, for now judgments about being responsible are understood in relation to the role reactive attitudes play in the practice of holding responsible, rather than the other way around. Whereas judgments are true or false and thereby can generate the need for justification, the desire for good will and those attitudes generated by it possess no truth value themselves, thereby eliminating any need for an external justification Magill That is, unlike most former consequentialist forms of compatibilism, it helps to explain why we feel that some agents deserve our censure or merit our praise. They do so because they have violated, met, or exceeded our demand for a reasonable degree of good will. Responding to the first of these, some have argued that it does seem possible to critique existing practices of holding responsible from standpoints outside them. If such evaluations are legitimate, then, contrary to what Strawson suggested, it seems that an existing practice can be questioned from a standpoint external to it. In other words, being responsible cannot be explicated strictly in terms of an existing practice of holding responsible. This then, would suggest a possible role to be played by independent theoretical conditions on being responsible, conditions which could prove to be compatibilist or incompatibilist in nature. There is a strong pull to think that our reactive attitudes are altered in such cases because we perceive such a background to be deterministic. If this is the proper interpretation of the phenomenon, then it is evidence that theoretical considerations, like the truth of determinism, could in fact dislodge the reactive attitudes Nagel Incompatibilists, in particular, seem largely unpersuaded and so have continued to assume a more or less traditional merit-based conception of moral responsibility as the basis for their theorizing. A number of compatibilists also remain unconvinced that Strawson has successfully shown independent theoretical considerations to be irrelevant to ascriptions of responsibility. It is noteworthy that some of these have accorded the reactive attitudes a central role in their discussions of the concept of responsibility, resulting in new merit-based versions of compatibilism see e. Until recently philosophers have assumed that they were concerned about a shared concept of moral responsibility. Even when controversy increasingly arose over how best to characterize it, the assumption seems to have been that it was a controversy over the one correct way of characterizing the concept of responsibility. Strawson was certainly amongst those who made this assumption in trying to adjudicate the dispute between those compatibilists who held the consequentialist view of responsibility and incompatibilists who held the merit-based view. However, a number of authors have suggested of late that at least some disagreements about the most plausible overall theory might be based on a failure to distinguish between different but related concepts of responsibility. Broadly speaking, a distinction has been made between responsibility as accountability and responsibility as attributability. In other words, an agent is responsible, if and only if it is appropriate for us to hold her responsible, or accountable, via the reactive attitudes. This highlights a main theme in Strawson--namely, that our responsibility practices are inherently social. Through the reactive attitudes e. Relatedly, this line of thought may help explain the historical preoccupation with whether responsibility for an action requires the ability to have done otherwise. That is, the normative concern for a fair opportunity to avoid blame and sanction may lie behind the felt need to have access to alternatives. Notably, some accounts of responsibility make no essential reference to the reactive attitudes or their accompanying practices. According to such views, the practice of ascribing responsibility involves assigning a credit or debit to a metaphorical ledger associated with each agent Feinberg: In other words, an agent is responsible if a fault or credit is properly attributable to her. Ledger views belong to a broader class of views which regard responsibility to be a matter of proper attributability. Satisfying some baseline conditions of responsibility as attributability would appear to be necessary in order to be responsible in the sense of accountable. For example, it would seem unfair to hold someone accountable for an action via reactive attitudes such as resentment or indignation, if the action was not properly attributable to the agent--say, because she succumbed to a genuinely coercive psychological compulsion. Yet being responsible in the attributability sense is not sufficient for being responsible in the accountability sense. As

Watson points out, it may make no sense to hold the agent responsible for the action in question, since it may not be the sort of thing for which they are accountable to us. For example, one may think that in making a career decision, an acquaintance failed to give due consideration to what would most fully develop and exercise his talents. Though this is not a moral judgment in the narrow sense favored by accountability theorists that is, it is unconnected to any interpersonal demand, or mutual expectation, of the sort presupposed by the reactive attitudes it is a case of finding fault in the way an agent has exercised his judgment. If responsibility as accountability and attributability can come apart in this way, then there appear to be at least two distinct concepts of responsibility. Such a viewâ€"call it the "answerability" modelâ€"appears to combine aspects of the attributability and accountability models see discussion by Watson and Shoemaker The self-disclosure aspect of the attributability model is reflected in emphasizing that the target of appraisal must be judgment-sensitive. The interpersonal emphasis characteristic of Strawson-inspired accountability models is reflected in the demand for justification though answerability theorists tend to reject a necessary connection between these demands and the reactive attitudes. In this way, the answerability model offers the possibility of re-unifying discussions of responsibility Smith , but some see further grounds for distinguishing an additional sense of responsibility Shoemaker The recognition of diversity within the concept or amongst concepts of moral responsibility has generated new reflection on whether the conditions on being morally responsible are in tension with one another Nagel ; G. Strawson , â€", â€"; Honderich

The presence of the word "concepts" in my assigned subject raises immediately the question of the nature of biblical theology. Is biblical theology propositional and systematic or is it the recital or proclamation of the redemptive acts of God in a.

Philosophy and Christian Theology In the history of Christian theology, philosophy has sometimes been seen as a natural complement to theological reflection, whereas at other times practitioners of the two disciplines have regarded each other as mortal enemies. Some early Christian thinkers such as Tertullian were of the view that any intrusion of secular philosophical reason into theological reflection was out of order. Thus, even if certain theological claims seemed to fly in the face of the standards of reasoning defended by philosophers, the religious believer should not flinch. Other early Christian thinkers, such as St. Augustine of Hippo, argued that philosophical reflection complemented theology, but only when these philosophical reflections were firmly grounded in a prior intellectual commitment to the underlying truth of the Christian faith. Thus, the legitimacy of philosophy was derived from the legitimacy of the underlying faith commitments. It was during this time however that St. Thomas Aquinas offered yet another model for the relationship between philosophy and theology. According to the Thomistic model, philosophy and theology are distinct enterprises, differing primarily in their intellectual starting points. Philosophy takes as its data the deliverances of our natural mental faculties: These data can be accepted on the basis of the reliability of our natural faculties with respect to the natural world. Theology, on the other hand takes as its starting point the divine revelations contained in the Bible. These data can be accepted on the basis of divine authority, in a way analogous to the way in which we accept, for example, the claims made by a physics professor about the basic facts of physics. Since this way of thinking about philosophy and theology sharply demarcates the disciplines, it is possible in principle that the conclusions reached by one might be contradicted by the other. According to advocates of this model, however, any such conflict must be merely apparent. Since God both created the world which is accessible to philosophy and revealed the texts accessible to theologians, the claims yielded by one cannot conflict with the claims yielded by another unless the philosopher or theologian has made some prior error. Since the deliverances of the two disciplines must then coincide, philosophy can be put to the service of theology and perhaps vice-versa. How might philosophy play this complementary role? First, philosophical reasoning might persuade some who do not accept the authority of purported divine revelation of the claims contained in religious texts. Thus, an atheist who is unwilling to accept the authority of religious texts might come to believe that God exists on the basis of purely philosophical arguments. Second, distinctively philosophical techniques might be brought to bear in helping the theologian clear up imprecise or ambiguous theological claims. Thus, for example, theology might provide us with information sufficient to conclude that Jesus Christ was a single person with two natures, one human and one divine, but leave us in the dark about exactly how this relationship between divine and human natures is to be understood. The philosopher can provide some assistance here, since, among other things, he or she can help the theologian discern which models are logically inconsistent and thus not viable candidates for understanding the relationship between the divine and human natures in Christ. For most of the twentieth century, the vast majority of English language philosophyâ€"including philosophy of religionâ€"went on without much interaction with theology at all. While there are a number of complex reasons for this divorce, three are especially important. The first reason is that atheism was the predominant opinion among English language philosophers throughout much of that century. A second, quite related reason is that philosophers in the twentieth century regarded theological language as either meaningless, or, at best, subject to scrutiny only insofar as that language had a bearing on religious practice. The former belief i. Since much theological language, for example, language describing the doctrine of the Trinity, lacks empirical content, such language must be meaningless. The latter belief, inspired by Wittgenstein, holds that language itself only has meaning in specific practical contexts, and thus that

religious language was not aiming to express truths about the world which could be subjected to objective philosophical scrutiny. In the last forty years, however, philosophers of religion have returned to the business of theorizing about many of the traditional doctrines of Christianity and have begun to apply the tools of contemporary philosophy in ways that are somewhat more eclectic than what was envisioned under the Augustinian or Thomistic models. In keeping with the recent academic trend, contemporary philosophers of religion have been unwilling to maintain hard and fast distinctions between the two disciplines. As a result, it is often difficult in reading recent work to distinguish what the philosophers are doing from what the theologians and philosophers of past centuries regarded as strictly within the theological domain. In what follows, we provide a brief survey of work on the three topics in contemporary philosophical theology thatâ€"aside from general issues concerning the nature, attributes, and providence of Godâ€"have received the most attention from philosophers of religion over the past quarter century. We thus leave aside such staple topics in philosophy of religion as traditional arguments for the existence of God, the problem of evil, the epistemology of religious belief, the nature and function of religious language. We also leave aside a variety of important but less-discussed topics in philosophical theology, such as the nature of divine revelation and scripture, original sin, the authority of tradition, and the like. Trinity From the beginning, Christians have affirmed the claim that there is one God, and three personsâ€"Father, Son, and Holy Spiritâ€"each of whom is God. Although we profess three persons we do not profess three substances but one substance and three persons â€¦ If we are asked about the individual Person, we must answer that he is God. No doubt this is an understatement. Indeed, it looks like we can derive a contradiction from the doctrine, as follows: Either way, however, we have a problem. If the Father is identical to God and the Son is identical to God, then by the transitivity of identity the Father is identical to the Son, contrary to the doctrine. On the other hand, if the Father is divine and the Son is divine and the Father is distinct from the Son, then there are at least two divine personsâ€"i. Either way, then, the doctrine seems incoherent. At first blush, it might seem rather easy to solve. The answer, in short, is that the Christian tradition has set boundaries on how the doctrine is to be explicated, and these sorts of models fall afoul of those boundaries. Modalism confounds the persons. It is the view that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are mere manifestations, modes, or roles played by the one and only God. Ruling out modalism thus rules out analogies like the Superman analogy just given. Tritheism divides the substance. It is a bit tricky because controversial to say exactly what tritheism, or polytheism more generally, is. For discussion, see Rea But whatever else it might be, it is certainly implied by the view that there are three distinct divine substances. Assuming the items in your shopping cart count as multiple distinct substances, then, the problem with the shopping cart analogy is that it suggests polytheism. In what follows, we will consider several more sophisticated models of the trinity: These do not exhaust the field of possible solutions, but they are the ones to which the most attention has been paid in the recent literature. For more detailed surveys, see Rea and, at book length, McCall This suggests the analogy of a family, or, more generally, a society. Thus, the persons of the trinity might be thought of as one in just the way that the members of a family are one: Since there is no contradiction in thinking of a family as three and one in this way, this analogy appears to solve the problem. Those who attempt to understand the trinity primarily in terms of this analogy are typically called social trinitarians. This approach has been controversially associated with the Eastern Church, tracing its roots to the Cappadocian Fathersâ€"Basil of Caesarea, his brother Gregory of Nyssa, and their friend Gregory Nazianzen. Against this practice, see especially Ayres and Barnes b. Consider, for example, the children of Chronos in Greek mythology, of whom Zeus was the liberator. These children included Zeus, Hera, Ares, and a variety of other Olympian deitiesâ€"all members of a divine family. Nobody, however, thinks that the fact that Zeus and his siblings nor even, say, Zeus and his begotten daughter Athena count in any meaningful sense as one god. For this reason, social trinitarians are often quick to note that there are other relations that hold between members of the trinity that contribute, along with their being members of a single divine family, to their counting as one God. Richard Swinburne, for example, has defended a version of this view according to which the unity among the divine persons is secured by several facts in conjunction

with one another. First, the divine persons share all of the essential characteristics of divinity: Second, unlike the deities of familiar polytheistic systems, their wills are necessarily harmonious, so that they can never come into conflict with one another. Third, they stand in a relationship of perfect love and necessary mutual interdependence. On this sort of view, there is one God because the community of divine persons is so closely interconnected that, although they are three distinct persons, they nonetheless function as if they were a single entity. One might think that if we were to consider a group of three human persons who exhibited these characteristics of necessary unity, volitional harmony, and love, it would likewise be hard to regard them as entirely distinct. And that is, of course, just the intuition that the view aims to elicit. Still, many regard the sort of unity just described as not strong enough to secure a respectable monotheism. Thus, some social trinitarians have attempted to give other accounts of what unifies the divine persons. Perhaps the most popular such account is the partâ€"whole model. Moreland and William Lane Craig have argued that the relation between the persons of the Trinity can be thought of as analogous to the relation we might suppose to obtain between the three dog-like beings that compose Cerberus, the mythical guardian of the underworld. One might say that each of the three headsâ€"or each of the three souls associated with the headsâ€"is a fully canine individual, and yet there is only one being, Cerberus, with the full canine nature. At this point, therefore, it is natural to wonder what exactly it is that makes both proposals count as versions of social trinitarianism. Unfortunately, this is a question to which self-proclaimed social trinitarians have not given a very clear answer. However, this answer is less than fully illuminating. What is needed is some characterization of the common core underlying the diverse views that are generally regarded as versions of social trinitarianism. The following two theses seem to capture that core: One of the more serious problems is that it is inconsistent with the Nicene Creed. Likewise, the Creed says that Father and Son are consubstantial. This claim is absolutely central to the doctrine of the trinity, and the notion of consubstantiality lay at the very heart of the debates in the 4th Century C. But the three souls, or centers of consciousness, of the heads of Cerberus are not in any sense consubstantial. Other versions of the partâ€"whole model raise further worries. A cube, for example, is a seventh thing in addition to its six sides; but we do not want to say that God is a fourth thing in addition to its three parts. The reason is that saying this forces a dilemma: Either God is a person, or God is not. If the former, then we have a quaternity rather than a trinity. If the latter, then we seem to commit ourselves to claims that are decidedly anti-theistic: Bad news either way, then. Thus, many are motivated to seek other models. Historically, the use of psychological analogies is especially associated with thinkers in the Latin-speaking West, particularly from Augustine onward. Augustine himself suggested several important analogies, as did others in the medieval Latin tradition. However, since our focus in this article is on more contemporary models, we will pass over these here and focus instead on two more recently developed psychological analogies.

Chapter 4 : What has the author Emma Hedman written

Psychotherapeutic and philosophical-theological concepts of responsibility: a critical evaluation by Fride Hedman (Book)
God Needs Salvation A New Vision of God for the Twenty First Century by Hugh Rock (Book).

An Ethical Analysis There are many who suggest that from an ethical point-of-view, freedom and responsibly are in essence one and the same thing. In other words, this refers to the view that freedom implies responsibility in a moral and ethical sense and that true freedom cannot be understood without a concomitant and relational connection to an understanding of the meaning of responsibility. This view also has theological and philosophical antecedents. From this point-of-view or stance the understanding of freedom is also dependent on responsibility in that freedom is never truly freedom when it is selfish or suppresses or deprives the rights and freedoms others. Therefore, this discussion and ethical analysis of freedom and responsibility will be undertaken for the point-of-view that these two terms are intimately linked from an ethical, as well as philosophical and theological point-of-view and that an understanding of the one impacts on the other. Ethics and the concept of freedom and responsibility There are many definitions and views about what constitutes ethics and ethical actions. From a very basic and rather simplistic point-of-view, ethics is the study and understanding of certain forms of behavior as either right or wrong. One could also turn to more traditional views of ethical actions and insight - such as the writings of the philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the 19th Century. This refers to the view of ethics as providing for the. The greatest balance of good over evil. The ethics of freedom falls within the ambit of these various debates but has also been understood as being determined by ethical limits and constraints in terms of how it affects others. Freedom is in common parlance a state where there are no unnecessary obstruction to human aims, goals and desires. However, there is also the realization and acceptance of the view that freedom is not ethically neutral. Tielman Freedom that is not contained by ethical factors can easily become a form of tyranny - as history has shown time and again - when the freedom of one individual or society becomes the slavery of another. Therefore, in the first instance, the relationship between responsibility and freedom is understood as the need to prevent freedom from becoming ethically unbalanced. Solomon in this sense responsibly and freedom falls into the ambit of the fundamental ethical debate about right and wrong. Ethically, freedom can exist only to the extent that it is co-existent with a sense of responsibly and does not negatively affect others. In this context, the meaning of freedom in an ethical and philosophical sense should be examined. Freedom is usually seen as the opposite of determinism. This refers to the view that we do not live in a mechanistic or deterministic world and that as human beings we have free will. Total Self-Determinism We are not limited by constraints and are born essentially free. Therefore, from this perspective, " In other words, the acceptance of the reality of freedom begins with the ethical aspects of right and wrong and the understanding that freedom cannot morally or ethically be used to subjugate or harm others. This negative use of freedom is seen as a failure to understand the component of responsibility, and in fact reduces the value and meaning of freedom. This is a view that will be explored further below. The relationship between freedom and responsibility can also be understood from a more theological and philosophical standpoint. Therefore, freedom only attains its true value in relation to religion or God. This relationship also determines the meaning of responsibly. For the philosopher Levinas, the ethics of freedom is much more than just an intellectual inquiry into the nature of actions and behavior. It is an "existential" response which must take into account the full range of human rights and justice as well as the larger relationship with religious reality. The work of justice -- the uprightness of the face-to-face -- is necessary in order that the breach that leads to God be produced. Rather it is through human relationships that we understand the higher theological ethics. Drazenovich points out that, "Levinas is interested in developing a phenomenology of the Other, and resting all other structures on the ethical response. In this context it follows that our responsibility is to a higher order of understanding. This is an extremely important aspect to understand if the link between freedom and responsibility is to be understood in terms of the history of ethics

in the West. This view is clearly outlined as follows: The absolutely other God does not at all limit our freedom, it calls it to responsibility, founds it and justifies it. Drazenovich However, in a more modern, humanist and secular context the analysis of freedom and responsibility has taken on a more social and less religious flavor in modern society. Modern ethical critics and thinkers view a central aspect in contemporary society as the loss of meaning that pervades the world and which is result of modern types of determinism that reduce our sense of freedom and responsibly. This refers to the modern view that we have little freedom or responsibly in the light of aspects such as economic determinism and genetics - which we can no nothing about as Sardar, remakes. The loss of meaning From Marx and Freud to neuroscience and evolutionary psychology, western thought has systematically undermined responsibility. We have no choice, we are constantly told, because of economic forces, our unconscious, or our genes. Our obsession with individuality and self-interest further erodes personal and collective responsibility. In terms of modern ethics this means that there is an ethical imbalance that must be adjusted. For example, we are free in most countries to exercise economic actions and activities but at the same time we also have the responsibility to ensure that these actions do not adversely affect others. The modern view of the ethics of freedom and its relationship to responsibly can be summarized as follows: Why do we act? We choose because we form intentions. We form intentions because we are free. And because we are free, we have responsibility. Freedom is both a gift and a challenge. It has value only when we respect it and enhance it individually and collectively. Sardar The above extract suggests that freedom implies and even necessitates responsible action - otherwise it is not freedom but merely self-indulgence. As one critic writes; "The best answer I know to the meaning and meaninglessness of life A good example is academic freedom and responsibility. On the one hand the researcher is allowed the freedom to purse research and this freedom is seen as important for the advancement of knowledge. From an ethical point-of-view research is positive and adds to the common good. However, researchers and institutions also recognize that with freedom comes responsibility, including the responsibility to ensure that research involving human subjects meets high scientific and ethical standards.

Chapter 5 : Department of Clinical Psychology < Azusa Pacific University

A philosophical movement stressing individual responsibility for creating one's ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Freedom An inescapable aspect of the human condition; we are the authors of our lives and therefore are responsible for our destiny and accountable for our actions.

Social Responsibility and the Responsible Society. Edited and with an introduction by Jerome Kohn. Action, Intention, and Reason. You Can Make a Difference: Labor et Fides, The Kingdom of Individuals: Baker, Tom, and Jonathan Simon, eds. Social Theory and Responsible Action. London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Too Good for Her Own Good: Breaking Free from the Burden of Female Responsibility. Ethische Postulate der Kulturvermittlung: Frankfurt am Main; NY: Conceptions of the Future and Education for Responsibility. Liturgy of the Neighbor: Emmanuel Levinas and the Religion of Responsibility. Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette. Open Court, p. The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations. The Clock of the Long Now: Self-Reliance and the Accountable Life. The Bounds of Choice: Unchosen Virtues, Unchosen Commitments. The Temptation of Innocence: Living in the Age of Entitlement. Social Accountability in Communication. Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility: Upper Saddle River, NJ: Moral Responsibility in Conflicts: Essays on Nonviolence, War, and Conscience. Essays for George Grant. Getting Results through Individual and Organizational Accountability. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Free to be Responsible: How to Assume Response-Ability. Foreword by Roger Shinn. Archives and the Public Good: Accountability and Records in Modern Society. The Gift of Death. Fundamental Rights Demand Fundamental Duties: Medicinska Etika in Deontologija: Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation. Some Thoughts on Social Responsibility. Press of America, Rev. Rights and the Common Good: The Dread of Responsibility. NY and London, G. Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility. Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza, eds. Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Fischer, John Martin, ed. The Metaphysics of Free Will: The Time-Span of Discretion Theory: Institute of Personnel Management, Frank, Robert Worth, and Harrison T. Center for Continuing Liberal Education, p. Press of Kansas, The Spectrum of Responsibility. Friedrich, Carl Joachim, ed. Liberal Arts Press, Spinoza, Past and Present. The Mental Basis of Responsibility. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Paul; NY, Humanities P. Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. Foreword by Bayard L. With the collaboration of Elizabeth M. The Art of the Impossible: Politics as Morality in Practice: Speeches and Writings, Psychotherapeutic and Philosophical-Theological Concepts of Responsibility: Presses universitaires de France, The Crisis of Responsibility: Man as the Source of Accountability. Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Translation by Arthur Szylewicz. Responsibility for Virtue and Vice. Citizenship and Civil Society: Tavistock Publications, ; London: Jaspars, Joseph Maria Franciscus, et al, eds. Attribution Theory and Research: Conceptual, Developmental, and Social Dimensions. The Imperative of Responsibility: Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics. Foreword by James M. The Significance of Free Will. Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics. Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation. Freedom and Accountability at Work: Applying Philosophical Insight to the Real World. Rights, Wrongs, and Responsibilities. Effects of Accountability on Groupthink and Intergroup Relations: Laboratory and Field Studies. Ethics and Law for a Collective Age. American Academy of Religion,

Chapter 6 : Thesis: Freedom and Responsibility an Ethical Analysis â€¦ | 5 Pages

Rethinking our ideas about suffering, responsibility and whether God was following Adam and Eve around Eden swatting away malarial mosquitoes. Sins Against the Holy Spirit No one seems to have a very good explanation of what might count as a sin against the Holy Spirit.

Is biblical theology propositional and systematic or is it the recital or proclamation of the redemptive acts of God in a particular history? SCM Press, , pp. The Clarendon Press, , pp. Deuteronomy is the starting point for those scholars G. Regardless of how one solves the problem of the nature of biblical theology, two things seem evident. The Book of Deuteronomy is certainly not a compendium of systematic theology, nor is it a series of old Israelite confessions of faith although some old confessions are incorporated in it cf. It is a series of sermons explaining how Israel is to live within the covenant in the Land of Canaan. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, , II, What are the main theological themes or concepts in the Book of Deuteronomy? One recent writer has said that S. Matthew Black and H. Driver said, The author wrote, it is evident, under a keen sense of the perils of idolatry; and to guard Israel against this by insisting earnestly on the debt of gratitude and obedience which it owes to its Sovereign Lord, is the fundamental teaching of the book. Accordingly the truths on which he loves to dwell are the sole Godhead of Jehovah, His spirituality c. Clark, , pp. Of course, this is what Deuteronomy is about. Ernest Wright, commenting on the character of the Book of Deuteronomy, said, The basic questions of the faith are here faced. What are the peculiar temptations of the nation in its land, and wherein lies its true security. In giving answer to these questions Deuteronomy attains a sober, earnest and moving eloquence which sets the book apart from all other literature in the Bible. I have chosen to summarize what I consider the main message of the book and to select the most important themes for further study. The message of the Book of Deuteronomy can be summarized as follows: Yahweh, God of gods and Lord of lords He chose their descendants 4: He made a covenant with them at Horeb 4: He was to be their God. Israel was to love, fear, and serve him 6: God gave them laws to guide them in their conduct and worship 5: He led them through the great and terrible wilderness to humble and test them 8: Now on the verge of the fulfillment of the promise to the patriarchs, the possession of the land, an eloquent appeal is made for the people to love the Lord their God with all their hearts, and keep all his commandments. Great and wonderful blessings are promised for the covenant keepers From the above summary of the message of the Book of Deuteronomy, perhaps we can select the major theological concepts for further consideration. I think some of these major theological concepts are: SCM Press, , p. Wright, God Who Acts, p. It only tells us what God is like as he meets with, confronts, and reveals himself to his people. Thus Deuteronomy contains no philosophical pronouncements about the nature of God, but it does use a good many terms to describe what God has done and how he has done it. Five aspects especially prominent in Deuteronomy are: One of the basic assumptions of this book which finds positive expression often is that God is sovereign. He controls everything in heaven and on earth. Behold to the Lord your God belong heaven and the heaven of heavens, the earth with all that is in it. Or has any god ever attempted to go and take a nation for himself from the midst of another nation, by trials, by signs, by wonders, and by war, by a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, and by great terrors, according to all that God did for you in Egypt before your eyes? To you it was shown, that you might know that the Lord is God; there is no other beside him. Know therefore this day, and lay it to your heart, that the Lord is God in heaven above and on earth beneath; there is no other. The sovereignty of God is implied in the statements that Yahweh allotted to other nations their territories and objects of worship cf. In order for the covenant to work in a meaningful way the master or ruler must be sovereign. Israel thought of God as the sovereign ruler of the universe who had made a covenant with her. Very closely related to the idea of the sovereignty of God is the concept of his solity he is one and only. SPCK, , p. Every pious Jew begins and ends the day with the affirmation that God is One. Traditionally, Jews have understood the text Deut. Jocz believes that the undue emphasis on the Unity of God on the part of the Synagogue is the result of the controversy with

the Church. The effect of the controversy with the Church was to shift the emphasis from an affirmation of loyalty to a philosophical concept of unity. As a bastion against idolatry she has no equals. Her uncompromising attitude on this point raises her to a position of special witness in history. Not only does the Book of Deuteronomy give expression to the concept of the unity of God, but it furnishes us with a clear statement about the formlessness of God. Driver sees in this passage the teaching of the spirituality of God. Jehovah is, moreover, a spiritual Being, dissimilar in kind to any and every material form: Yet the God of Israel preserved his mystery. Even though Israel was not to make a graven image in the likeness of male or female man or woman, 4: We read often in Deuteronomy about God speaking. His mouth is mentioned in 8: He has a mighty hand and an outstretched arm 4: He walks through the war camp to inspect it He has eyes that are always on the land He rides through the heavens on a cloud All of these expressions are used not to describe his appearance but his conduct. They serve to give form to his mystery and formlessness. Yet his formlessness does not mean that he is a diffuse, indefinite, or unfocused object. He is a definite Being, but since nothing in heaven or on earth may be used to picture God, the only possible image of him is the mental image of a person. The anthropomorphisms of the Bible are indispensable. God is Lord of history even though he is invisible. A fourth aspect of the character of God as seen in the Book of Deuteronomy is his righteousness. One cannot hope to understand this book, particularly the matters regarding election and holy war, without keeping in mind constantly this basic assumption that God is good. Two passages do set out very clearly that God is righteous. The Rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are justice. A God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and right is he One of the greatest passages in the book The idea of election will be dealt with below. Perhaps the most difficult problem to reconcile with the righteousness of God is the problem of the conquest of Canaan and the command in the name of Yahweh to destroy all the inhabitants of the land God himself is represented as going over before them 1: How can one reconcile such acts of God with his righteousness? To do so one must learn to look at the conquest of Canaan through the eyes of ancient Israel. They were convinced both that God was good righteous and that he was lord of history. The University Press , p. Here is a perfect example of how God was able to use sinful human agents and sinful human means to accomplish his purpose. Wars exist because of human sin; yet even in war man can hope for salvation because God is actively and righteously at work in it. In the ruthless, militaristic expansion of Assyrian and Babylonian empires, the prophets searched for meaning in the terrifying events. If we are to understand the conquest of Canaan we must remember that it was a part of the promise and purpose of God to give the nation a land; yet this gif t involved a conquest. Israel was the human instrument chosen to execute the judgment. God was using human agents and methods to fulfill his redemptive purpose. Perhaps at this point a word of caution is in order. Ernest Wright says, To say this, however, does not mean that the institution of holy war is to be emulated in modern times or that it ceases completely to be a problem for the Christian. To us the ferocity of the destruction borders on fanaticism, and theologically the institution must be evaluated in keeping with what it was possible for God to accomplish with the people as they existed at that time. God is at work in history and does not remove his servants from it into a sinless vacuum. Nowhere else in the Pentateuch is the love of God specifically mentioned. In Deuteronomy it is the love of God for the patriarchs that led to their election to be his chosen people 4: The love God has for Israel is free and spontaneous 7: Yet there is no weakness, sentimentality or quiesence in it. It cannot be presumed upon or trifled with. God is a righteous and jealous God, a consuming fire to those who set themselves at enmity with him.

Chapter 7 : Theological Concepts â€" Updated! Â« The Upside Down World

Existential psychotherapy is a style of therapy that places emphasis on the human condition as a whole. Existential psychotherapy uses a positive approach that applauds human capacities and.

Introduction[edit] In Chapter 1 Introduction , the author presents three views of the prototype of intrapsychic conflict in the individual: He points out the influence of European psychoanalysts who emigrated to America as to highlighting particular aspects: Death with Chapters 2â€"5 , Part II: Isolation with Chapters 8 and 9 , and Part IV: Meaninglessness with Chapters 10 and It has been noted that Yalom uses the term ultimate concern differently compared to Tillich and Kierkegaard: In Parts I to IV, the author discusses, for each of these concerns, the changes that occur in the course of the development of the individual, his view on psychopathology in relation to the respective concern, and proposed psychotherapeutic strategies for assisting patients in a crisis. As other books by Yalom, this book includes descriptions of numerous case studies that illustrate his arguments. Death[edit] In Part I, the author addresses the fear of death and discusses theoretical and empirical findings with regard to the fear of death. He offers explanations on its widespread omission in the theory and practice of psychotherapy â€" in particular also by Sigmund Freud who saw it as a mere disguise for a deeper source of concern. He points out that individuation co-occurs with psychopathy less often and appears to be a more effective defense compared to fusion. Furthermore, he views the dialectic of the poles of "specialness" versus "the ultimate rescuer" as being similar to that of the cognitive styles of field dependence versus field independence and to that of interior versus exterior locus of control. One of the methods he describes is a "disidentification" exercise, in which an individual first notes down answers to the question "Who am I" and then meditates on giving each of these up, one by one. Freedom[edit] In Part II, the author outlines the role of freedom , responsibility and the will. Responsibility is "a deeply frightening insight". In more illustrative terms, he states: Nothing is as it seemed The very ground beneath one seems to open up. Indeed, groundlessness is a commonly used term for a subjective experience of responsibility awareness. He adds however that Perls, although requesting patients to assume responsibility, had a so active and powerful style that he placed patients in a contradictory situation, leading to a double bind. In this context, he discusses limits of responsibility, yet points out that "when [He also outlines research by O. Carl Simonton and others that go as far as to ascribe an influence of a patient onto the progression of cancer. One who fails to live as fully as one can, experiences a deep, powerful feeling which I refer to here as "existential guilt". He cites one example among his patients who experienced existential guilt as regret, which in the course of therapy gave place to a sense of possibility, another example of a patient who experienced existential guilt as self-contempt which later gave place to a sense of choicefulness, to self-confidence and to self-love. He discusses clinical observations on the will made by Rank, Leslie H. Farber , and May. He then illustrates "what, in the best of ways, a relationship can be" in terms of need-free love, recalling similar thoughts expressed by Martin Buber Ich-Du relationship , Abraham Maslow being-love, a love for the being of another person, in distinction from deficiency-love, a selfish love which relates to others in terms of usefulness and Fromm need-less love , and then addresses interpersonal psychopathology. He points out that fusion is a common escape from existential isolation and that this has a high overlap to the "ultimate rescuer" belief. Meaninglessness[edit] In Part IV, the author discusses meaninglessness and its role in psychotherapy. He discusses various answers related to questions around the "meaning of life", distinguishing between "cosmic" and "terrestrial" meaning, and noting that "most Western theological and atheistic existential systems agree [that] it is good and right to immerse oneself in the stream of life", describing hedonism and self-actualization , which have a main focus on the self, and altruism , dedication to a cause, and creativity , which focus more on transcending oneself. In terms of clinical research, he speaks of two psychometric instruments designed to measure purpose in life, summarizing criticism and results with regard to the "Purposeâ€"inâ€"Life Test" and briefly mentioning the "Life Regard Index". He states that, if a patient reports a lack of meaning in life, it is

important for the therapist to first learn whether there are possibly other underlying issues cultural issues, or issues relating to the concerns of death, freedom, and isolation , and addressing such issues, for example by helping the patient develop curiosity and concern for others within the framework of group therapy. Regarding "pure meaninglessness", Yalom states that the desire to engage life is "always there within the patient"â€”to engage in satisfying relationships, in social or creative engagement, in satisfying work, in religious or self-transcendent strivings, and other forms of engagement.

Chapter 8 : Mikael Stenmark, Theological pragmatism: A critical evaluation - PhilPapers

Psychotherapeutic and philosophical-theological concepts of responsibility: A critical evaluation (Publication - Institutionen fÃ¶r praktisk teologi vid Ã…bo akademi ; nr. 11) A checklist of doctoral dissertations on American Presbyterian and Reformed subjects,

Chapter 9 : Philosophy and Christian Theology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The central goal of existential psychotherapy is to: a. decrease selfÂ-awareness. b. increase awareness. c. h elp clients reject the responsibility of choosing.