

Chapter 1 : RACE - The Power of an Illusion . Background Readings | PBS

Berkeley Law Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship Race Preferences and Race Privileges Michael K. Brown Martin Carnoy Marjorie M. Shultz.

Things that are unproblematic seem natural and tend to go unnoticed. Fish take the water they swim in for granted, just as European Americans take their race as a given, as normal. White Americans may face difficulties in life—problems having to do with money, religion, or family—but race is not one of them. White Americans can be sanguine about racial matters because their race has not been until recently visible to the society in which they live. They cannot see how this society produces advantages for them because these benefits seem so natural that they are taken for granted, experienced as wholly legitimate. Blacks, Latinos, and other people of color in the United States are racially visible, and everyone seems to notice their race. For them, the same culture, law, economy, institutions, and rules of the game are not so automatically comfortable and legitimate. In a white-dominated society, color brings problems. And if people of color cry foul, if they call attention to the way they are treated or to racial inequality, if they try to change the distribution of advantage, if they try to adjust the rules of the game, white Americans whose race and racial advantage are invisible see them as asking for special privileges. They are seen as troublemakers. Whites routinely misperceive the reality of black lives. For example, even though blacks are about twice as likely as whites to hold low-paying jobs and are more than twice as likely to be unemployed, 50 percent of whites say the average black is about as well off as the average white person. Blacks, on the other hand, tend to be more realistic and accurate in their perceptions of their economic status relative to whites. If white Americans make no effort to hear the viewpoints and see the experiences of others, their awareness of their own privileged racial status will disappear. They can convince themselves that life as they experience it on their side of the color line is simply the objective truth about race. But while this allows them to take their privileged status for granted, it also distorts their understanding. Of course, individual views within racial groups vary. Not everyone who shares the same subjective perspective will draw the same conclusions about policy. But any perspective that is unreflectively locked inside its own experience is limited, and this is particularly so when that perspective reflects the dominant culture. White privilege, like the water that sustains fish, is invisible in their analysis. This chapter is about perspective, and how definition—the power to name—determines perception, and ultimately, prescription. Apostles of the new perspective on race insist that racism is primarily a thing of the past. They come to this conclusion because they filter their evidence and their judgment through an outdated, discredited understanding of racism as intentional, obvious, and individual. These misconceptions are not unique to any particular writer or writers. Many white Americans and American institutions, including the current Supreme Court majority, hold parallel views. Because racial conservatives ignore the variability of racial reality in America, they do not recognize that racism is lodged in the structure of society, that it permeates the workings of the economic, political, educational, and legal institutions of the United States. Without that recognition, however, we will be unable to resolve the pernicious problems of race that confront us as Americans. Conceptions of Race and Racism after the Civil Rights Revolution In the new conventional wisdom about race, white racism is regarded as a remnant from the past because most whites no longer express bigoted attitudes or racial hatred. The Thernstroms note that despite black riots and crime in the streets in , "nowhere in the voluminous polling evidence available for these years is there any sign that whites were drifting in the direction of the virulent anti-black sentiments so prevalent in the s and s. Marianne Means flatly asserts, "We all agree that slavery was evil. But the blood of slavery does not stain modern mainstream America. But the haters have become a tiny remnant with no influence in any important sphere of American life. For example, more than half of all whites once believed that blacks were intellectually inferior. In , however, only 13 percent of whites believed that blacks had "less in-born ability to learn" than whites. Whites also used to favor school segregation by overwhelming majorities, but now 90 percent favor school integration. In the s whites believed they should be favored in competition for jobs. Today, on the other hand, whites unanimously agree that "blacks and whites should have an equal chance to compete for jobs. To racial

realists, this evidence means that the color line has been radically altered. Although many whites still accept one or more negative stereotypes about African Americans, a recent study by Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza asserts that only 2 percent of the population could be considered old-fashioned bigots who subscribe to a large number of racist stereotypes. The evidence cited by racial realists indicates that they, like many whites, use a particular understanding of racism. This notion assumes that racism is motivated, crude, explicitly supremacist, and typically expressed as individual bias. Racism, in short, is a form of "prejudice. After all, virulent antiblack sentiments have diminished, formal barriers based on malicious intent have in large part been dismantled, and few Americans would accept publicly sanctioned racial barriers today. Were these its undisputed characteristics, one might be tempted to agree that racism is obsolete. The law institutionalizes the American ideal of equality, and it provides remedies for those hurt by bias. Current law embraces the concept of racism as intentional individual prejudice, and also its corollary—that whites today are often unfairly accused. Evolving doctrine in racial discrimination cases reflects what Angela Harris has called an "essentially moralistic" view. In several reverse discrimination lawsuits, for example, the Supreme Court has explicitly worried that affirmative action plans impose unacceptable burdens on "innocent" third parties read whites. In equal protection cases, the Court has increasingly emphasized invidious intention as a necessary element for finding actionable discrimination. But this perspective has its critics. Twenty-five years ago, Alan Freeman documented how, after a brief period of attention to what he called a "victim perspective" in the jurisprudence of equality, the Court moved decisively to adopt a "perpetrator perspective" on issues of race. Adopting the perpetrator perspective means looking at contested race issues from the vantage point of whites. It largely ignores whether people of color have suffered injury or loss of opportunity because of their race. Other critics have raised analogous arguments, paying attention to group subordination or disadvantage. Ignoring these analyses, the courts have extended and deepened their attachment to the perpetrator perspective as the racial law of the land. Before the modern civil rights era, the Supreme Court often insisted that analysis of motive was inappropriate in constitutional adjudication. To be successful, plaintiffs must prove specific and conscious bad intentions, the equivalent of the concept of racism as personal prejudice. Under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court holds it is not enough to show that people would reasonably know the discriminatory consequences of their actions. Nor is it enough that actors foresaw the predictable effects of their actions and still proceeded in spite of them. To gain or sustain a remedy for racial injustice, litigants must meet a very high standard: Reva Siegel argues on the basis of credible evidence that the Court knew this was a level of responsibility plaintiffs would "rarely be able to prove. The Court has sometimes said that proof of employment discrimination may be based on a demonstration that policies have a disparate impact rather than on a showing of intent—proving, for example, that African Americans or other racial groups are more likely to be disadvantaged by an employment practice than whites. Although the courts give lip service to unintentional bias in cases involving claims of discriminatory treatment, particularly in employment, most of the governing precedents require that plaintiffs prove intentional bias. In the Supreme Court further extended that requirement. It held that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits the discriminatory use of federal money, proving disparate impact would no longer be sufficient to win discrimination suits by private parties against federally funded contractors or institutions. The Court now requires proof of invidious intention in most cases of racial discrimination. It does not apply this standard of intent in age discrimination cases where the relevant statutory language is identical to that in Title VII. In these cases, the courts have accepted a distinction between motive a factor in causing action and intent a specifically proven state of mind that is more favorable to plaintiffs alleging discrimination. In other settings that address harms caused by others, such as personal injury law, courts assess liability and compensate victims not simply for intentional harms but also for injuries caused accidentally, that is, negligently. Plaintiffs do not have to prove malice or purpose unless they seek punitive damages. Choosing to make the specific intentions of identifiable individuals the criterion of racism is neither neutral nor appropriate. It is self-aggrandizing and misguided to judge others by their actions but ourselves only by our intentions. If we are deciding whether to put someone in jail, then assessing his intentions may be appropriate. However, where disputes do not involve criminal charges but rather decisions about social, educational, welfare, or employment policy, questions of guilt, innocence and

punishment are not the issue. No one goes to jail for discrimination. In discrimination litigation, the focus is on the legitimacy and fairness of the distribution of scarce opportunities and resources. To ameliorate injustice and achieve a more desirable state of civil affairs, it is more important to examine the problems of discrimination, injuries, and unfairness than to evaluate the culpability and motives of particular perpetrators. This definition tends to exonerate whites, blame blacks by default, and naturalize and render unobjectionable the broad realities of race-based subordination in the United States. This definition of racism, as we have already noted, is also empirically and conceptually flawed. It depends almost exclusively on attitudinal evidence uncovered by opinion polling. This poses two problems. First, even on its own terms, this interpretation of racism ignores significant research that shows how racist attitudes have persisted. In his recent book *The Ordeal of Integration*, Orlando Patterson examined a variety of evidence and concluded that "all things considered, it is reasonable to estimate that about a quarter of the Euro-American population harbors at least mildly racist feelings toward Afro-Americans and that one in five is a hard-core racist. Second, by relying on survey questions written in the 1950s, this research ignores possible changes in the character of racism and is, therefore, incorrectly measuring modern expressions of it. Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders write that "a new form of prejudice has come to prominence, one that is preoccupied with matters of moral character, informed by the virtues associated with the traditions of individualism. Today, we say, prejudice is expressed in the language of American individualism. There are also abundant survey data documenting the persistence of widespread racial prejudice forty years after the civil rights revolution. Many writers who use polling data to show the decline of racism cherry pick among these surveys and omit this evidence. Some of the most compelling evidence of tenacious prejudice comes from studies of residential discrimination. In 1970, the Detroit Area Survey found that 16 percent of whites said they would feel uncomfortable in a neighborhood where 8 percent of the residents were black, and nearly the same percentage said they were unwilling to move to such an area. If the black percentage rose to 20 percent, 40 percent of all whites indicated they would not move there, 30 percent said they would be uncomfortable, and 15 percent would try to leave the area. Were a neighborhood to be 53 percent black, 71 percent of whites would not wish to move there, 53 percent would try to leave, and 65 percent would be uncomfortable. A more recent study of four cities Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles yielded similar results. Camille Zubrinsky Charles found that more than half of whites in these four cities expressed a preference for same-race neighborhoods, while blacks expressed a strong preference for integrated neighborhoods. Contrary to the optimism of racial realists, one finds precious little evidence, even in the polling data they use, that many white Americans believe in integrated neighborhoods, especially if that means a neighborhood with more than a very few black families. They continue to be fundamental to white American culture. Another report suggests that white Americans are still substantially opposed to intimate contact with African Americans. In one national survey conducted in 1992, 70 percent of whites rejected interracial marriage on principle. Both the meaning of survey data and the way they are used by these cheerleaders for racial progress are also problematic.

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This often involves the subjugation of groups defined as racially inferior, as in the one-drop rule used in the 19th-century United States to exclude those with any amount of African ancestry from the dominant racial grouping, defined as "white". For instance, African-American English is a language spoken by many African Americans, especially in areas of the United States where racial segregation exists. Furthermore, people often self-identify as members of a race for political reasons. Socioeconomic factors, in combination with early but enduring views of race, have led to considerable suffering within disadvantaged racial groups. This use of racial categories is frequently criticized for perpetuating an outmoded understanding of human biological variation, and promoting stereotypes. Because in some societies racial groupings correspond closely with patterns of social stratification, for social scientists studying social inequality, race can be a significant variable. As sociological factors, racial categories may in part reflect subjective attributions, self-identities, and social institutions. In the social sciences, theoretical frameworks such as racial formation theory and critical race theory investigate implications of race as social construction by exploring how the images, ideas and assumptions of race are expressed in everyday life. A large body of scholarship has traced the relationships between the historical, social production of race in legal and criminal language, and their effects on the policing and disproportionate incarceration of certain groups. Historical origins of racial classification See also: Historical race concepts The three great races according to Meyers Konversations-Lexikon of The subtypes of the Mongoloid race are shown in yellow and orange tones, those of the Caucasoid race in light and medium grayish spring green - cyan tones and those of the Negroid race in brown tones. Dravidians and Sinhalese are in olive green and their classification is described as uncertain. These features are the distinguishing features of how the concept of race is used today. In this way the idea of race as we understand it today came about during the historical process of exploration and conquest which brought Europeans into contact with groups from different continents, and of the ideology of classification and typology found in the natural sciences. The rise of the Atlantic slave trade, which gradually displaced an earlier trade in slaves from throughout the world, created a further incentive to categorize human groups in order to justify the subordination of African slaves. A set of folk beliefs took hold that linked inherited physical differences between groups to inherited intellectual, behavioral, and moral qualities. Brutal conflicts between ethnic groups have existed throughout history and across the world. But the scientific classification of phenotypic variation was frequently coupled with racist ideas about innate predispositions of different groups, always attributing the most desirable features to the White, European race and arranging the other races along a continuum of progressively undesirable attributes. The classification of Carl Linnaeus, inventor of zoological taxonomy, divided the human species *Homo sapiens* into continental varieties of *europaeus*, *asiaticus*, *americanus*, and *afers*, each associated with a different humour: It was further argued that some groups may be the result of mixture between formerly distinct populations, but that careful study could distinguish the ancestral races that had combined to produce admixed groups. He saw Africans as inferior to Whites especially in regards to their intellect, and imbued with unnatural sexual appetites, but described Native Americans as equals to whites. Polygenism was popular and most widespread in the 19th century, culminating in the founding of the Anthropological Society of London, which, during the period of the American Civil War, broke away from the Ethnological Society of London and its monogenic stance, their underlined difference lying, relevantly, in the so-called "Negro question": Multiregional hypothesis and Recent single origin hypothesis Today, all humans are classified as belonging to the species *Homo sapiens*. However, this is not the first species of homininae: *Homo erectus* evolved more than 1. Virtually all physical anthropologists agree that Archaic *Homo sapiens* A group including the possible species *H. Wilson* then challenged the concept from the perspective of general animal systematics, and further rejected the claim that "races" were equivalent to "subspecies". Subspecies The term race in biology is used with caution because it can be

ambiguous. Generally, when it is used it is effectively a synonym of subspecies. Traditionally, subspecies are seen as geographically isolated and genetically differentiated populations. Ancestrally differentiated populations clades Some researchers[who? A clade is a taxonomic group of organisms consisting of a single common ancestor and all the descendants of that ancestor a monophyletic group. Every creature produced by sexual reproduction has two immediate lineages, one maternal and one paternal. Philosopher Robin Andreason proposes that cladistics can be used to categorize human races biologically, and that races can be both biologically real and socially constructed. Evolutionary biologist Alan Templeton argues that while "Much of the recent scientific literature on human evolution portrays human populations as separate branches on an evolutionary tree," multiple lines of evidence falsify a phylogenetic tree structure, and confirm the presence of gene flow among populations. They claim that "the molecular and biochemical proponents of this model explicitly use racial categories in their initial grouping of samples". For example, the large and highly diverse macroethnic groups of East Indians, North Africans, and Europeans are presumptively grouped as Caucasians prior to the analysis of their DNA variation. This is claimed to limit and skew interpretations, obscure other lineage relationships, deemphasize the impact of more immediate clinal environmental factors on genomic diversity, and can cloud our understanding of the true patterns of affinity. They suggest that the authors of these studies find support for racial distinctions only because they began by assuming the validity of race.

Morphologically differentiated populations Population geneticists have debated whether the concept of population can provide a basis for a new conception of race. To do this, a working definition of population must be found. Surprisingly, there is no generally accepted concept of population that biologists use. Although the concept of population is central to ecology, evolutionary biology and conservation biology, most definitions of population rely on qualitative descriptions such as "a group of organisms of the same species occupying a particular space at a particular time". Examples of such definitions are: A group of individuals of the same species that co-occur in space and time and have an opportunity to interact with each other. A group of individuals of the same species living in close-enough proximity that any member of the group can potentially mate with any other member.

Clines One crucial innovation in reconceptualizing genotypic and phenotypic variation was the anthropologist C. To this day, skin color grades by imperceptible means from Europe southward around the eastern end of the Mediterranean and up the Nile into Africa. From one end of this range to the other, there is no hint of a skin color boundary, and yet the spectrum runs from the lightest in the world at the northern edge to as dark as it is possible for humans to be at the equator. This point called attention to a problem common to phenotype-based descriptions of races for example, those based on hair texture and skin color: The former refers to any distinction in gene frequencies between populations; the latter is "a matter of judgment". He further observed that even when there is clinal variation, "Race differences are objectively ascertainable biological phenomena They differ on whether the race concept remains a meaningful and useful social convention. Skin color above and blood type B below are nonconcordant traits since their geographical distribution is not similar. Scientists discovered a skin-lighting mutation that partially accounts for the appearance of Light skin in humans people who migrated out of Africa northward into what is now Europe which they estimate occurred 20, to 50, years ago. The East Asians owe their relatively light skin to different mutations. This pattern of variation, known as clinal variation, is also observed for many alleles that vary from one human group to another. Another observation is that traits or alleles that vary from one group to another do not vary at the same rate. This pattern is referred to as nonconcordant variation. Because the variation of physical traits is clinal and nonconcordant, anthropologists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries discovered that the more traits and the more human groups they measured, the fewer discrete differences they observed among races and the more categories they had to create to classify human beings. The number of races observed expanded to the s and s, and eventually anthropologists concluded that there were no discrete races. Nature has not created four or five distinct, nonoverlapping genetic groups of people.

Genetically differentiated populations Main articles: Race and genetics and Human genetic variation Another way to look at differences between populations is to measure genetic differences rather than physical differences between groups. The mid-century anthropologist William C. Boyd defined race as: For this reason, there is no current consensus about whether racial categories can be considered to have significance

for understanding human genetic variation. Human genetic clustering A study of random biallelic genetic loci found little to no evidence that humans were divided into distinct biological groups. Edwards argued that rather than using a locus-by-locus analysis of variation to derive taxonomy, it is possible to construct a human classification system based on characteristic genetic patterns, or clusters inferred from multilocus genetic data. Does that mean we should throw it out? It was thought that such large geographic distances would maximize the genetic variation between the groups sampled in the analysis, and thus maximize the probability of finding cluster patterns unique to each group. In light of the historically recent acceleration of human migration and correspondingly, human gene flow on a global scale, further studies were conducted to judge the degree to which genetic cluster analysis can pattern ancestrally identified groups as well as geographically separated groups. They found that many thousands of genetic markers had to be used in order for the answer to the question "How often is a pair of individuals from one population genetically more dissimilar than two individuals chosen from two different populations? This assumed three population groups separated by large geographic ranges European, African and East Asian. The entire world population is much more complex and studying an increasing number of groups would require an increasing number of markers for the same answer. The authors conclude that "caution should be used when using geographic or genetic ancestry to make inferences about individual phenotypes. Loring Brace , [] the philosophers Jonathan Kaplan and Rasmus Winther, [] [] [] and the geneticist Joseph Graves , [11] have argued that while there it is certainly possible to find biological and genetic variation that corresponds roughly to the groupings normally defined as "continental races", this is true for almost all geographically distinct populations. The cluster structure of the genetic data is therefore dependent on the initial hypotheses of the researcher and the populations sampled. When one samples continental groups, the clusters become continental; if one had chosen other sampling patterns, the clustering would be different. Weiss and Fullerton have noted that if one sampled only Icelanders, Mayans and Maoris, three distinct clusters would form and all other populations could be described as being clinally composed of admixtures of Maori, Icelandic and Mayan genetic materials. They conclude that while racial groups are characterized by different allele frequencies, this does not mean that racial classification is a natural taxonomy of the human species, because multiple other genetic patterns can be found in human populations that crosscut racial distinctions. Moreover, the genomic data underdetermines whether one wishes to see subdivisions i. In earlier work, Winther had identified "diversity partitioning" and "clustering analysis" as two separate methodologies, with distinct questions, assumptions, and protocols. Each is also associated with opposing ontological consequences vis-a-vis the metaphysics of race.

Chapter 3 : Race (human categorization) - Wikipedia

On Matters of Race, Power, and Privilege There are few conversations that stir the souls of virtually everyone in the U.S. like the question of race.

With base pair comparisons possible across the individuals sequenced, the estimate that any two humans are Paradoxically, the evidence of vast numbers of DNA base pairs at which humans differ also became known at this time. It is estimated currently that any two people will differ at approximately 3 million positions along their genomes. Previous chapters have discussed the contributions of the social environment, behavior, psychological factors, physiological mechanisms, and genetic variation to health. These complex traits are multifaceted, and the goal is to tease apart the facets at different levels of organization in order to identify which of them directly modulate health. Failing to distinguish these different facets, both in the aggregate and within each level of analysis, will compromise the ability to obtain a more fine-grained understanding of how the different aspects of these fundamental individual traits interact to influence health. Sex is a classification based on biological differences—for example, differences between males and females rooted in their anatomy or physiology. By contrast, gender is a classification based on the social construction and maintenance of cultural distinctions between males and females. Differences in the health of males and females often reflect the simultaneous influence of both sex and gender. Not only can gender relations influence the expression of biological traits, but also sex-associated biological characteristics can contribute to amplify gender differentials in health Krieger, The relative contributions of gender relations and sex-linked biology to health differences between males and females depend on the specific health outcome under consideration. In other instances, gender relations account substantially for observed gender differentials for a given health outcome—for example the higher prevalence of needle-stick injuries among female compared to male health care workers, which is in turn attributed to the gender segregation of the health care workforce. The prevalence of HIV infection through needle-stick injury is higher among female health care workers because the majority of doctors are men, the majority of nurses and phlebotomists are women, and drawing blood is relegated to nurses and phlebotomists who are mostly women Ippolito et al. In yet other instances, gender relations can act synergistically with sex-linked biology to produce a health outcome. For example, the risk of hypospadias is higher among male infants born to women exposed to potential endocrine-disrupting agents at work. In this example, maternal exposure to the endocrine-disrupting agent e. Once exposure occurs, the risk of the outcome is predicated on sex-linked biology and is different for women and men, as well as for female and male fetuses, because only women can be pregnant, and exposure can lead to the outcome hypospadias only among male fetuses all examples cited in Krieger, Finally, in some instances, sex-linked biology can be obscured by the influence of gender relations in producing health differentials between women and men. Arber and colleagues demonstrated the presence of such bias in a randomized experimental study involving video-vignettes of a scripted consultation in which patients presented with standardized symptoms of CHD. Women were asked fewer questions and received fewer diagnostic tests compared to men. Besides the behavior of health care providers, a number of other social processes are recognized as contributing to gender inequalities in health. At the macro or societal level, these include the gender segregation of the labor force alluded to above and gender discrimination. Gender segregation of the workforce and gender discrimination together contribute to the persistence of the gender wage gap—that is the fact that women earn less than men in paid employment Reskin and Padavic, The gender wage gap in turn contributes to the feminization of poverty. Women—particularly female heads of households—are over-represented among poor households in virtually every society. The adverse health effects of poverty see Chapter 2 of this report therefore fall disproportionately on women and their children. Within households, gender relations also are characterized by the unequal division of labor e. The stresses associated with care giving, particularly providing care for ill spouses, have been linked to adverse health outcomes, such as cardiovascular disease Lee et al. Men and women differ biologically because their primary reproductive hormones are different. Less well recognized are the sex differences in certain aspects of immune function that stem from the fact that

women and men face different immune challenges. Moreover, as is the case for many other mammalian species, other aspects of male and female biology also may differ because they have different roles in caring for offspring or function in different ecological niches, thus reducing parental competition. For example, a brief stressor mimicking a burrow collapse results in a more pronounced long-term innate inflammatory response in female rats than in male rats exposed to the same stressor Hermes et al. Given that females become aggressive during lactation and may likely suffer from wounding, selection would favor those who can mount an inflammatory response that is effective enough to enable them to survive at least long enough to wean their nursing pups. Given that males do not behave paternally in this species, a selection pressure at this juncture of the reproductive lifespan would not be as strong. The central point is that sex differences in health and risk for disease are not simply minor correlates of differences in reproductive hormones. They also result from deeply embedded highly coordinated physiological systems that have evolved to serve sex-specific functions. For example, women must have sufficient energy reserves to sustain the huge metabolic demands of pregnancy and lactation. Thus, it is not surprising to see sex differences in energy metabolism. Sex hormones have both genomic and nongenomic effects on the accumulation, distribution, and metabolism of adipose tissue, including the regulation of leptin Mayes and Watson, Leptin has long-term effects on the regulation of body weight, mediated through appetite, energy expenditure and body temperature. Marked sex differences can be seen in levels of leptin, which in men but not women are associated with hypertension Sheu et al. Moreover, leptin stimulates cellular components of innate immunity, stimulating T-cells, macrophages, and neutrophils, as well as preventing the programmed cell death of neutrophils apoptosis Bruno et al. Indeed, leptin is increased during infections. Thus, fat metabolism and immune functions are differentially controlled in men and women, and the implications for disease risk and treatment are only now beginning to be explored. In recent years, there has been an increased focus on understanding the differences and similarities between females and males at the societal level i. There is, of course, huge variation in the degree of overlap in the physical traits of men and women. Sexual dimorphism is typically reserved for traits for which the difference is relatively large, such as height population overlap of one standard deviationâ€”10 percent of men are smaller than the average woman , while smaller differences are typically termed as sexually differentiated, such as hand shape Williams et al. A significant number of studies have documented the differences between sexes across the lifespan. This may be the result of differences in exposure to the risk factors, the routes of exposure and processing of a foreign agent, and cellular responses to the body. Differences cannot simply be attributed to hormones. Sex affects behavior, perception, and health in multiple complex ways. Differences in the sex chromosomes are but one factor, although a significant one for a small number of diseases influenced by gene dosage i. Rather, it is a multifaceted variable, biologically, psychologically and socially, with each facet having different effects on health and risk for disease. However, there can be variance, if not sex reversals, along a given dimension without comparable variation in the others. This disassociation clearly demonstrates their independence. Thus, future research on the impact of interactions among social, behavioral, and genetic factors on health must determine which of these facets and dimensions contribute directly to sex differences in health and which are merely correlates. An example helps to illustrate human variation. There are XY individuals with a genetic variant of the androgen receptor who are unambiguously heterosexual women and who are engaged in feminine social roles ranging from actresses to Olympic athletes. They have testes and hormone levels higher than those of pubertal boys. But, because their androgen receptors do not bind androgen, their genitalia, secondary sex characteristics, and musculature are fully differentiated as women. Until the Olympic committee changed its definition of sex from genetic to hormonal sex, such women had to compete as men. These women share the health risk of gonadal cancer, and typically their testesâ€”their source of estrogensâ€”are removed. However, their social rolesâ€”as actresses or Olympic athletes, for exampleâ€”are better predictors of cardiovascular health and risk for muscle injury. The Science of Early Childhood Development The constructs of race and ethnicity, which have similar limitations and complexity as sex and gender, are explored in the following section. According to Shields and colleagues , with the exception of the health disparities context, in which self-identified race remains a socially important metric, race should be avoided or used with caution and clarification, as its meaning encompasses both ancestry â€”

and ethnicity. Both race and ethnicity can be potent predictors for disease risk; however, it is important to emphasize the distinction between correlation and causation and to explore interactions among factors, while rejecting a unidirectional model that moves from genotype to phenotype. With the increased attention being given to racial disparities in health, the definition of race has come under increased scientific scrutiny. Race continues to be one of the most politically charged subjects in American life, because its associated sociocultural component often has led to categorizations that have been misleading and inappropriately used. Kittles and Weiss, Definitions of race involve descriptions that are embedded in cultural as well as biological factors, and a careful distinction must be made between race as a statistical risk factor and as causal genetic variables. Thus, genetics cannot provide a single all-purpose human classification scheme that will be adequate for addressing all of the multifaceted dimensions of health differentials. It may be found that some alleles associated with destructive or protective factors related to disease and health are created, modified, or triggered by cultural and contextual factors. Race also is notoriously difficult to define and is inconsistently reported in the literature and in self-reports. Self-report has been the classic measure for race and is still reliable in some cases given certain caveats. The usefulness of the data derived from self-reports of race in health research, however, has been the subject of much debate. Risch et al. In , Burchard and colleagues wrote the following: Excessive focus on racial or ethnic differences runs the risk of undervaluing the great diversity that exists among persons within groups. However, this risk needs to be weighed against the fact that in epidemiologic and clinical research, racial and ethnic categories are useful for generating and exploring hypotheses about environmental and genetic risk factors, as well as interactions between risk factors, for important medical outcomes. Erecting barriers to the collection of information such as race and ethnic background may provide protection against the aforementioned risks; however, it will simultaneously retard progress in biomedical research and limit the effectiveness of clinical decision-making. Although there are requirements for reporting race in specific categories in federally sponsored research, the Office of Management and Budget directive that set out this requirement notes that these are not scientific categories. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has reiterated that researchers should collect any additional data that would be more useful or appropriate for their specific projects. Researchers would advance our understanding of race and ethnicity by addressing factors that are related to race such as geographic area of ancestry or by providing greater detail about ancestors. In the Census, less than 3 percent. However, even those who report one race may have very complex backgrounds in terms of geography. NIH has prescribed that all research projects will involve a good faith effort to include minorities when appropriate. By requiring funded research to make appropriate accommodations for minority subject recruitment, NIH has encouraged scientists to begin to consider issues of race, ethnicity, and culture in research as never before. Some of the emphasis on learning more about minority populations arises from the acknowledgement of the stark disparities in health when comparisons are made across racial groups. Asians on many accounts are found to have more positive health profiles but are not without disadvantages in comparison with Caucasians. Whitfield et al. The gap in health seems to be greatest between the ages of 51 and 63. Hayward et al. Despite the year trend toward convergence, the age-adjusted mortality rate from all causes of death for African Americans remains 1. This differential produces a life expectancy gap between African Americans and Caucasians of 5. Furthermore, it also appears that African Americans are less likely to survive to middle age, and if they do, they are more likely to have health problems. Hayward et al. Health disparities are a major public health concern and are a major emphasis of research across the country and across many disciplines. Genetic, social, and behavioral studies have shown that there are a large number of correlated differences across ethnic groups at the genetic, cultural, and environmental levels. From a methodological point of view, any comparison across ethnic groups from a single disciplinary vantage point will have a tremendous confounding issue. It is only by studying the multiple levels and risk factors simultaneously within subgroups defined by ethnicity, geography, genetic backgrounds, and exposures to the environment that we will begin to understand how specific combinations of environmental factors combine with specific combinations of genetic factors to give rise to health differences. Race and Genetic Variation Geographic origin, patterns of migration, selection, and historic events can lead to development of populations with very different genetic allele frequencies. Historically, to the extent that

barriers such as large deserts or bodies of water, high mountains, or major cultural factors impeded communication and interaction of people, mating was restricted within group, producing genetic marker differences and thus, differences in the presence of specific disease-related alleles see Box Kittles and Weiss, In line with this, Burchard and colleagues found that population genetic research of the last 20 years shows that the largest genetic differences occur between groups separated by continents. However, an analysis of meta-analyses of genetic association studies by Ioannidis et al.

Chapter 4 : "Race Preferences and Race Privileges" by Michael K. Brown, Martin Carnoy et al.

"Whitewashing Race is the most important social science statement on race in more than a decade. It lays bare the expressly conservative, ideological, and deeply flawed analyses of those pundits pressing for 'color-blind' social policy.

A Long History of Racial Preferences - For Whites Many middle-class white people, especially those of us who grew up in the suburbs, like to think that we got to where we are today by virtue of our merit - hard work, intelligence, pluck, and maybe a little luck. And while we may be sympathetic to the plight of others, we close down when we hear the words "affirmative action" or "racial preferences. Here are a few ways in which government programs and practices have channeled wealth and opportunities to white people at the expense of others. Affirmative action in the American "workplace" first began in the late 17th century when European indentured servants - the original source of unfree labor on the new tobacco plantations of Virginia and Maryland - were replaced by African slaves. In exchange for their support and their policing of the growing slave population, lower-class Europeans won new rights, entitlements, and opportunities from the planter elite. White Americans were also given a head start with the help of the U. The Indian Removal Act, for example, forcibly relocated Cherokee, Creeks and other eastern Indians to west of the Mississippi River to make room for white settlers. The Homestead Act followed suit, giving away millions of acres - for free - of what had been Indian Territory west of the Mississippi. The Naturalization Act permitted only "free white persons" to become naturalized citizens, thus opening the doors to European immigrants but not others. Only citizens could vote, serve on juries, hold office, and in some cases, even hold property. In this century, Alien Land Laws passed in California and other states, reserved farm land for white growers by preventing Asian immigrants, ineligible to become citizens, from owning or leasing land. Immigration restrictions further limited opportunities for nonwhite groups. Racial barriers to naturalized U. Only once was monetary compensation made for slavery, in Washington, D. When slavery ended, its legacy lived on not only in the impoverished condition of Black people but in the wealth and prosperity that accrued to white slaveowners and their descendents. Jim Crow laws, instituted in the late 19th and early 20th century and not overturned in many states until the s, reserved the best jobs, neighborhoods, schools and hospitals for white people. The Advantages Grow, Generation to Generation Less known are more recent government racial preferences, first enacted during the New Deal, that directed wealth to white families and continue to shape life opportunities and chances today. The landmark Social Security Act of provided a safety net for millions of workers, guaranteeing them an income after retirement. But the act specifically excluded two occupations: As low-income workers, they also had the least opportunity to save for their retirement. Their children had to support them. Like Social Security, the Wagner Act helped establish an important new right for white people. By granting unions the power of collective bargaining, it helped millions of white workers gain entry into the middle class over the next 30 years. But the Wagner Act permitted unions to exclude non-whites and deny them access to better paid jobs and union protections and benefits such as health care, job security, and pensions. Many craft unions remained nearly all-white well into the s. In , for example, every single one of the 3, members of Los Angeles Steam Fitters Local was still white. But it was another racialized New Deal program, the Federal Housing Administration, that helped generate much of the wealth that so many white families enjoy today. These revolutionary programs made it possible for millions of average white Americans - but not others - to own a home for the first time. The government set up a national neighborhood appraisal system, explicitly tying mortgage eligibility to race. Integrated communities were ipso facto deemed a financial risk and made ineligible for home loans, a policy known today as "redlining. Of the , new homes built with federal support in northern California between and , fewer than went to African Americans. These government programs made possible the new segregated white suburbs that sprang up around the country after World War II. Government subsidies for municipal services helped develop and enhance these suburbs further, in turn fueling commercial investments. Freeways tied the new suburbs to central business districts, but they often cut through and destroyed the vitality of non-white neighborhoods in the central city. According to the Census, whites are more likely to be segregated than any other group. Reaping the Rewards of Racial

Preference One result of the generations of preferential treatment for whites is that a typical white family today has on average eight times the assets, or net worth, of a typical African American family, according to New York University economist Edward Wolff. Even when families of the same income are compared, white families have more than twice the wealth of Black families. Those with wealth pass their assets on to their children - by financing a college education, lending a hand during hard times, or assisting with the down payment for a home. Some economists estimate that up to 80 percent of lifetime wealth accumulation depends on these intergenerational transfers. White advantage is passed down, from parent to child to grand-child. As a result, the racial wealth gap - and the head start enjoyed by whites - appears to have grown since the civil rights days. In 1964, just after Emancipation, it is not surprising that African Americans owned only 0.1 percent of national wealth. But by 1992, a full century after the abolition of slavery, Black Americans still possessed only a meager 1 percent of national wealth. As legal scholar John Powell says in the documentary series *Race - The Power of an Illusion*, "The slick thing about whiteness is that whites are getting the spoils of a racist system even if they are not personally racist. Instead, we chastise others for not achieving what we have; we even invert the situation and accuse non-whites of using "the race card" to advance themselves. Or we suggest that differential outcomes may simply result from differences in "natural" ability or motivation. The "performance gap" between whites and nonwhites is a product not of nature, but unequal circumstances. But colorblindness today merely bolsters the unfair advantages that color-coded practices have enabled white Americans to long accumulate.