Chapter 1 : Social Movements, Individual Rights, and Democratic Transitions - Oxford Scholarship

The November 15 weekly seminar at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies focused on the question of Arab social movements and their contribution to democratization.

Historical cases[edit] In Great Britain, there was renewed interest in Magna Carta in the 17th century. The English Civil War â€" was fought between the King and an oligarchic but elected Parliament, [36] during which the idea of a political party took form with groups debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of The Glorious Revolution in established a strong Parliament that passed the Bill of Rights , which codified certain rights and liberties for individuals. The American Revolution â€" created the United States. The new Constitution established a relatively strong federal national government that included an executive , a national judiciary , and a bicameral Congress that represented states in the Senate and the population in the House of Representatives. The German Empire was created in The Kingdom of Italy , after the unification of Italy in , was a constitutional monarchy with the King having considerable powers. Italian fascism created a dictatorship after the World War I. The Meiji period , after , started the modernization of Japan. Limited democratic reforms were introduced. Since [edit] According to a study by Freedom House , in 67 countries where dictatorships have fallen since , nonviolent civic resistance was a strong influence over 70 percent of the time. In these transitions, changes were catalyzed not through foreign invasion, and only rarely through armed revolt or voluntary elite-driven reforms, but overwhelmingly by democratic civil society organizations utilizing nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance, such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, and mass protests. Freedom House, today an institution and a think tank, produces one of the most comprehensive "freedom measures" nationally and internationally and by extension a measure of democratization. Freedom House categorizes all countries of the world according to a seven-point value system with over questions on the survey and multiple survey representatives in various parts of every nation. The total raw points of every country places the country in one of three categories: Free, Partly Free, or not Free. However it has been argued that the expansion of liberal economic reforms has had mixed effects on democratization. In many ways, it is argued, democratic institutions have been constrained or "disciplined" in order to satisfy international capital markets or to facilitate the global flow of trade. Huntington defined three waves of democratization that have taken place in history. It was followed by a rise of dictatorships during the Interwar period. The second wave began after World War II , but lost steam between and the mids. The latest wave began in and is still ongoing. Democratization of Latin America and the former Eastern Bloc is part of this third wave. A very good example of a region which passed through all the three waves of democratization is the Middle East. During the 15th century it was a part of the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, "when the empire finally collapsed [However, what Posusney and Angrist argue is that, "the ethnic divisions [This raises interesting questions about the role of combined foreign and domestic factors in the process of democratization. Moreover, he states that "the Middle East and North Africa lack the prerequisites of democratization". Zakaria has suggested that the society in which Al-Qaeda terrorists lived provided easy money, and therefore there existed little incentive to modernize economically or politically. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its violent expression on September 11, illustrates an inherent need to express oneself politically, and a democratic government or one with democratic aspects such as political openness is quite necessary to provide a forum for political expression. Larry Pardy observed that governments are motivated by political power, which is generated by two factors: The legitimacy of a democratic government is achieved through the consent of the population through fair and open elections while its financial means are derived from a healthy tax base generated by a vibrant economy. Economic success is based on a free market economy with the following elements: The core elements that support economic freedom convey the same basic rights onto individuals. Conversely, there can be no rule of law for investors when governments crack down on political opponents and no property rights for industry when personal wealth can be arbitrarily seized. Scott argues that governments may find it difficult to claim a sovereignty over a population when that population is in motion. These responses can include planting crops that are more difficult for states to count, or tending

livestock that are more mobile. In fact, the entire political arrangement of a state is a result of individuals adapting to the environment, and making a choice as to whether or not to stay in a territory. It rests on a solid foundation of economic and political freedom that, for Western nations, had to be pried from governments over centuries. It goes back at least to when King John accepted limits on his powers and conceded certain rights in the Magna Carta. It does not arise with idealistic notions of democracy and freedom, implied fiscal contracts with citizens, exhortations from donor states or pronouncements from international agencies. It represents a mechanism whereby our free market system efficiently allocates resources in our economy while co-existing in a symbiotic relationship with our democratic system of government. Our governments are incentivized to protect the economy while the foundations for that economy create the conditions for democracy. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to provide public goods , outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence. Examining the history of all democratizations since , I show that such deliberate choice arguments may help explain up to one third of cases. In about two thirds, democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. These mistakes reflect well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence and the illusion of control. International bodies[edit] International bodies e. Corporations[edit] The concept of democratization can also be applied in corporations where the traditional power structure was top-down direction and the boss-knows-best even a " Pointy-Haired Boss " ; This is quite different from consultation, empowerment of lower levels and a diffusion of decision making power throughout the firm, as advocated by workplace democracy movements. The Internet[edit] The loose anarchistic structure of the Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet itself have inspired some groups to call for more democratization of how domain names are held, upheld, and lost. They note that the Domain Name System under ICANN is the least democratic and most centralized part of the Internet, using a simple model of first-come-first-served to the names of things. Ralph Nader called this "corporatization of the dictionary. Design[edit] The trend that products from well-known designers are becoming cheaper and more available to masses of consumers. Also, the trend of companies sourcing design decisions from end users.

Chapter 2 : Social movements and democratic transitions in Kenya â€" Northern Arizona University

An influential conventional wisdom holds that democratic movements respond to windows of opportunity engendered by both domestic and international environments. We show that all democratic transitions in Kenya since independence are conditioned by and are a function of the expansion and contraction of the window of opportunity.

However, most of these efforts failed during the 19th century, in which dictatorships and oligarchic rule were the norm in the region. In his useful classification of electoral regimes in Latin America, Peter Smith distinguishes among electoral democracies, electoral semi-democracies, oligarchic republicanism, and nondemocracies see Smith , cited under Explaining Transitions to Democracy. Between and there were only three electoral democracies that lasted between one and fourteen years: Argentina â€" , Mexico â€" , and Uruguay â€" Between and there were processes of democratization and de-democratization in the whole region. The Latin American cases are a central contradiction to modernization theory, which connected the emergence of democracy with certain economic and social background conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence. We saw the demise of democratic regimes in the most affluent countries of Latin America: Argentina in , Brazil in and then again in , Chile in , and Uruguay in
  The last twenty years of the 20th century, however. Most of the nineteen Latin American countries experienced processes of electoral democratization. The literature on democratization in Latin America has followed a tendency in political science to emphasize the role of elites and pacts. The most recent works on democracy and democratization in Latin America are trying to analyze both structure and agency in the processes of democratization. Foundational Works Mahoney distinguishes three major research programs on democracy; see Moore Jr. Linked to that program, I would add Dahl That fourth program is closest to the elitist school on democracy, but instead of emphasizing the problem of legitimacy, the scholars using that approach concentrate on procedural democracy, and recently, on rational choice and game theory. Bobbio and Tilly synthesize the most important debates around the concept of democracy, democratization, and de-democratization as historical processes. Rustow developed a strong critique of modernization theory Huntington and culturalist theories of democracy and proposed instead a genetic model of democracy. The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game. In this book the political philosopher Norberto Bobbio analyzes the evolution of the concept of democracy and the agenda of democracy as a political system. Yale University Press, Although it does not have a regional approach, it provides a typology of regimes, and most of the literature on Latin American transitions has used its insights to analyze the processes of regime change. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, There are many factors that explain regime change, and therefore explanations vary. Edited by Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, â€" In particular, he describes the main characteristics of authoritarian regimes. The Case of Democracy and Authoritarianism. Edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer, â€" Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Using a structuralist perspective, it shows how different configurations of social coalitions the peasantry, the landed upper classes, and the bourgeoisie led to different outcomes: Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Johns Hopkins University Press, Toward a Dynamic Model. Rustow develops a dynamic model to analyze the emergence of a democratic regime, criticizing the economic and cultural determinants of previous models. Cambridge University Press,

Chapter 3 : Arab Social Movements and the Democratic Transition: an ACRPS Seminar

Social movements and the transition to democracy Anthony Oberschall Anthony Oberschall is a Professor in the Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Pages

Arab Social Movements and the Democratic Transition: Held under the auspices of the Program to Study the Arab Democratic Transition within the Center, this latest meeting was divided into two separate sessions of two speakers each. Lahmar further explored how the role of the UGTT changed from the combatting of foreign occupation to the challenging of the tyranny of the post-colonial state. In this regard, the UGTT enjoyed a number of advantages compared to similar organizations in other Arab countries. These include its unassailable independence from the state and its century-long role as a focus of social power. Titled, "Four Aspects to the Transformation of Palestinian Civil Society," Dana touched on how Palestinian society has changed since the signing of the Oslo Agreements, which also shifted how Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories related to the Israelis. In the new post-Oslo reality, said Dana, brought changes to the overall political economy of the Palestinians and to the work of civil society institutions: During his presentation, Dana illustrated how Palestinian civil society groups went from a grassroots political movement committed to national liberation to a globalized economic caste looking after its own interests. Dana also explored how the institutions in question, foreign-funded civil society bodies in the Palestinian territories, typified many of the features which they claimed to combat in Palestinian politics, and specifically the autocracy of their leaders and the personalization of power within these bodies. Such practices, Dana said, served to show the dichotomy between the supposed commitment to democratic ideals and the failure to implement them. In sum, said Dana, the changes to Palestinian society since Oslo meant that Palestinians were far less politicized, and less likely to ask questions of their political leaders. Additionally, Palestinian "indigenous knowledge" was increasingly replaced by the knowledge of the "new imperialism" exemplified by foreign donors. A second session, chaired by Haider Saeed of Siyasat Arabiya, similarly hosted two interventions. The first of these, by ACRPS researcher Abdou Moussa, provided a broad critique of the "new social movements" which ostensibly drove the Arab Spring and which defined "collective action" within it. Moussa explained how the Arab Spring was born of the Arab Spring was born of two twin refusals: Moussa also explained how the functioning of Arab social movements was constricted, and therefore defined, by the repression of the post-colonial Arab state. This was through both direct, physical suppression by state authorities and also the prohibitive bureaucratic environment which made the work of such organizations impossible. Moussa also described how the "new social movements" fed into the de-politicization of the Arab masses, favoring a piecemeal and gradual rights-based approach to advancement rather than an overall political change. The second paper, by Doha Institute visiting lecturer Sabah Al Nassery, was titled "What civil society in the lack of a nation-state? In his presentation, Al Nassery gave an overview of the development of the myth of the liberal civil society over the preceding five decades which, he says, it would be a mistake to accept wholeheartedly. Al Nassery suggested that the failure of present-day, Western inspired "civil society" institutions could be overcome by furthering cooperation between the various social and political movements operating in the Arab world today. These include not only well established class conscious movements but also the more recent activist groupings. According to Al Nassery, the neoliberal agenda in de-politicizing the nature of fair and sustainable economic development has led not only to the protection of corruption, but also prevent the prospect of any real change in society. Al Nassery claims that the neoliberal credo now spread throughout Arab societies has made it difficult to create a consciousness that could precipitate a genuine democratic transition.

Chapter 4 : Democratization - Wikipedia

Social movements are increasingly considered as relevant actors in theorizations about democracy. Recently, an empirical linkage between movements and democratization processes has also been.

Influenced by Bernstein, following the split between reformists and revolutionary socialists in the Second International , social democratic parties rejected revolutionary politics in favor of parliamentary reform while remaining committed to socialization. Under the influence of politicians like Carlo Rosselli in Italy, social democrats began disassociating themselves from Marxism altogether and embraced liberal socialism , [16] appealing to morality instead of any consistent systematic, scientific or materialist worldview. It brought together socialists of various stances and initially occasioned a conflict between Karl Marx and the anarchists led by Mikhail Bakunin over the role of the state in socialism, with Bakunin rejecting any role for the state. Lassalle viewed the state as a means through which workers could enhance their interests and even transform the society to create an economy based on worker-run cooperatives. Marx and Engels responded to the title Sozialdemocrat with distaste, Engels once writing: Marx agreed with Engels that Sozialdemokrat was a bad title. The party adopted stances similar to those adopted by Marx at the First International. In spite of such militant rhetoric to appeal to the working class, the Commune also received substantial support from the middle class bourgeoisie of Paris, including shopkeepers and merchants. The Commune, in part due to its sizable number neo- Proudhonians and neo-Jacobins in the Central Committee, declared that the Commune was not opposed to private property, but rather hoped to create the widest distribution of it. This being the case, we must also recognize the fact that in most countries on the Continent the lever of our revolution must be force; it is force to which we must someday appeal in order to erect the rule of labor. Marx was not optimistic that Germany at the time was open to a peaceful means to achieve socialism, especially after German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had enacted Anti-Socialist Laws in If in England, for instance, or the United States, the working class were to gain a majority in Parliament or Congress, they could, by lawful means, rid themselves of such laws and institutions as impeded their development, though they could only do insofar as society had reached a sufficiently mature development. However, the "peaceful" movement might be transformed into a "forcible" one by resistance on the part of those interested in restoring the former state of affairs; if as in the American Civil War and French Revolution they are put down by force, it is as rebels against "lawful" force. He and his supporters urged the Social Democratic Party of Germany to merge Kantian ethics with Marxian political economy. The method of this great philosopher [Kant] can serve as a pointer to the satisfying solution to our problem. Our critique must be direct against both a scepticism that undermines all theoretical thought, and a dogmatism that relies on ready-made formulas. Bernstein noted that the working class was not homogeneous but heterogeneous, with divisions and factions within it, including socialist and non-socialist trade unions. As such, Bernstein was strongly opposed to dogmatism within the Marxist movement. Luxemburg associated Bernstein with " ethical socialists " who she identified as being associated with the bourgeoisie and Kantian liberalism. In spite of this attempt by Engels to merge gradualism and revolution, his effort only diluted the distinction of gradualism and revolution and had the effect of strengthening the position of the revisionists. I told myself secretly that this could not go on. It is idle to reconcile the irreconcilable. The vital thing is to be clear as to where Marx is still right and where he is not.

Chapter 5 : Social democracy - Wikipedia

Movements for change, like popular struggles for democracy, must therefore be placed within the larger socio-political environment that they seek to change. According to McAdams, the conditions for growth of social movements include.

Held under the auspices of the Program to Study the Arab Democratic Transition within the Center, this latest meeting was divided into two separate sessions of two speakers each. Lahmar further explored how the role of the UGTT changed from the combatting of foreign occupation to the challenging of the tyranny of the post-colonial state. In this regard, the UGTT enjoyed a number of advantages compared to similar organizations in other Arab countries. These include its unassailable independence from the state and its century-long role as a focus of social power. Titled, "Four Aspects to the Transformation of Palestinian Civil Society," Dana touched on how Palestinian society has changed since the signing of the Oslo Agreements, which also shifted how Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories related to the Israelis. In the new post-Oslo reality, said Dana, brought changes to the overall political economy of the Palestinians and to the work of civil society institutions: During his presentation, Dana illustrated how Palestinian civil society groups went from a grassroots political movement committed to national liberation to a globalized economic caste looking after its own interests. Dana also explored how the institutions in question, foreign-funded civil society bodies in the Palestinian territories, typified many of the features which they claimed to combat in Palestinian politics, and specifically the autocracy of their leaders and the personalization of power within these bodies. Such practices, Dana said, served to show the dichotomy between the supposed commitment to democratic ideals and the failure to implement them. In sum, said Dana, the changes to Palestinian society since Oslo meant that Palestinians were far less politicized, and less likely to ask questions of their political leaders. Additionally, Palestinian "indigenous knowledge" was increasingly replaced by the knowledge of the "new imperialism" exemplified by foreign donors. A second session, chaired by Haider Saeed of Siyasat Arabiya, similarly hosted two interventions. The first of these, by ACRPS researcher Abdou Moussa, provided a broad critique of the "new social movements" which ostensibly drove the Arab Spring and which defined "collective action" within it. Moussa explained how the Arab Spring was born of the Arab Spring was born of two twin refusals: Moussa also explained how the functioning of Arab social movements was constricted, and therefore defined, by the repression of the post-colonial Arab state. This was through both direct, physical suppression by state authorities and also the prohibitive bureaucratic environment which made the work of such organizations impossible. Moussa also described how the "new social movements" fed into the de-politicization of the Arab masses, favoring a piecemeal and gradual rights-based approach to advancement rather than an overall political change. The second paper, by Doha Institute visiting lecturer Sabah Al Nassery, was titled "What civil society in the lack of a nation-state? In his presentation, Al Nassery gave an overview of the development of the myth of the liberal civil society over the preceding five decades which, he says, it would be a mistake to accept wholeheartedly. Al Nassery suggested that the failure of present-day, Western inspired "civil society" institutions could be overcome by furthering cooperation between the various social and political movements operating in the Arab world today. These include not only well established class conscious movements but also the more recent activist groupings. According to Al Nassery, the neoliberal agenda in de-politicizing the nature of fair and sustainable economic development has led not only to the protection of corruption, but also prevent the prospect of any real change in society. Al Nassery claims that the neoliberal credo now spread throughout Arab societies has made it difficult to create a consciousness that could precipitate a genuine democratic transition.

Chapter 6 : Arab Social Movements and the Democratic Transition

Integrating deliberative democratic theory and empirical analysis, Deliberative Democracy and Social Movements offers a fresh analysis of the Transition movement through case studies in Australia and Italy.

Nevertheless, they pointed out that emerging democratic governments would have to confront a legacy of poverty, illiteracy, militarization, and underdevelopment produced by incompetent or corrupt governments. Some wondered if the new demands being placed on African nations by international donor institutions as well as heightened individual expectations for better lives could be met by the nascent democracies. Participants indicated that, although contemporary authoritarian regimes in Africa have taken a number of forms, they fall within the general models of one-party systems, personal dictatorships, and military regimes. The postcolonial trend toward one-party systems in Africa was justified on a number of grounds, including the alleged tradition of a single unchallenged chief, the idea of a democratic majority expressed through a single party, and the need for unity in the face of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences. Competitive politics was rejected as an imported luxury neither needed nor affordable in developing countries. In Malawi, for example, the idea of an opposition was rejected on quasi-theological grounds: African Views, African Voices. The National Academies Press. Why should Kamuzu [President Banda] have opposition? Access to power was through the party organization and its rule was enforced through ideological persuasion or coercion. The governing party became the instrument of elite groups that held onto power at all costs and were unwilling to tolerate dissent or serious competition. In the three workshops, much consideration was given to how, over time, the postcolonial government of newly independent African states had evolved into domination by a single party in a one-party system, which in turn often became a personal dictatorship. It was pointed out that power in the state had depended on access or proximity to, dependence on, or support from the dictator. The military leaders exercised power on an institutional basis, governing collegially as a junta or by circulating top government positions among military generals. There was clear agreement that, whatever the form, one-party states and other forms of dictatorships suppressed both competition and participation, undermining the potential for a healthy civil society and the necessary institutions for democracy. Participants recognized that in many African countries the institutions of civil society and democratic government are weaker today than they were in the immediate postindependence period, making the transition to democracy a daunting challenge. Some argued that, in order for democracy to succeed, power must shift from authoritarian and military rulers to leaders who would be representative of and sensitive to the diverse ethnic groups in African societies. These new leaders, they said, must direct a move to the protection of civil rights, establishment of agreed-upon modes of governance, and greater political accountability in order to sustain the move to democracy. There was agreement among participants that the period of postcolonial suppression had produced a broad-based popular understanding of the need to share power and to have the ability to hold governments accountable for their actions. Nevertheless, some thought that this new thinking, although necessary, was not a sufficient basis on which to start building democracy. If progress is made toward developing democratic government, it is likely to be gradual, messy, fitful and slow, with many imperfections along the way. Transitions from above occur when functioning rulers respond to an impending or actual crisis by initiating democratic reforms. Some scholars argue that transitions from above are more promising in terms of their ability to "deliver" democracy, because they tend to be more specific about their time frame, procedural steps, and overall strategy. Transitions from below are said to be plagued with a great deal of uncertainty. Other writers contend that every historical case of regime change has involved some negotiation—explicit or implicit, overt or covert—between government and opposition groups. Transitions may also begin as one type and become another, particularly if the government is unsure of how far it wants to go in opening up the country. In many cases, however, they combine elements of the two transition processes. The participants analyzed the behavior of entrenched leaders with reference to transitions that had occurred elsewhere, finding that some African leaders still had the ability to suppress or, at least, retard democratic transitions. One observed that "much will depend on the government leaders who will be in power during the transition phase

to democracy. They can set the stage for a peaceful and democratic change, or can obstruct the entire process. Most are unlikely to give up their position of power and advantage. One com 4 Diamond, L. Prospects for democracy in Africa. Beyond Autocracy in Africa, p. The Carter Center of Emory University. Page 15 Share Cite Suggested Citation: In the Namibia workshop, participants identified four such models of transitionâ€"national conferences, popular revolutions, pact formations, and actions by the militaryâ€"that have been used in African countries to remove dictators from office and to create or restore political pluralism. In the last three years, national conferences, particularly in Francophone countries, have emerged as vehicles for representation, accountability, and consensus formation. These conferences have been convened as a result of citizen and elite pressures for public dialogue about the democratization process in countries such as Benin, Mali, Gabon, Zaire, Congo, Nigeria and Zambia. In some cases, national conferences have unceremoniously reduced or eliminated the powers of incumbent rulers. In Benin, for example, where the first national conference was held, Mathieu Kerekou broke down and wept as a national conference of ruling-party members and other leaders pronounced his repressive regime corrupt, incompetent, and illegal and even rejected an interim leadership role for him. Participants underlined the importance of viewing national conferences as the beginning of an ongoing struggle toward democracy, rather than as an end. As such, national conferences should be regarded as part of a broad process resulting from a crisis situation. They would be best understood as opportunities to define and classify issues, establish accountability, and mobilize a broad cross-section of popular constituencies. Participants stressed that national conferences do not establish functioning democracies. Some participants in the Benin workshop noted that because the surprise effect of national conferences had vanished, it is unlikely that entrenched rulers would permit future national conferences to be held. The common threads among successful national conferences were identified: They indicated that national conferences have produced either constitutional review or a new constitu- Page 16 Share Cite Suggested Citation: After examining national conferences, participants also identified other alternative routes to democracy: Although each route was said to be loaded with problems, it was suggested that pact formations give the impression of a deal achieved undemocratically, thereby undercutting subsequent democratic legitimacy. The Cult of Personality African politics has been described as a matter of personality, not programs, especially under single-party systems. In the Ethiopia workshop, one participant indicated that rulers have tended to encourage personality cults by having their portraits prominently and extensively displayed, assuming folk titles, and encouraging the use of slogans: Another participant illustrated how this practice had manipulated the electorate: Participants in the three meetings proposed that bargaining become the new political culture in Africa: It is important for the consolidation of democracy that losers believe in the system and think that they can get back into the game. In the Namibia workshop, one participant described how former President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, after the election, went to the radio station to broadcast his resignation, and then personally removed the presidential flag from his car. Participants argued that the notion of winner take all had heightened ethnic tensions, especially in countries with many ethnic groups. In such countries, it was suggested that there should be coalition building, bargaining, and a sharing of the rewards of power, which normally is what civilian politicians elsewhere in the world have to do in order to gain and keep power. As one participant put it: There must be bargaining, some give and take, because we cannot put the ethnic genie back into the bottle. In Mauritius, because the "best losers" are reserved seats in parliament, they do not lose everything, a fact that, to some extent, reduces the zero-sum game. One participant argued that reserving seats in parliament for the opposition can hardly be regarded as a major innovation in the continent. However, participants stressed that the period of transition must include bargaining and essential compromises between state and society for the existent problems of political competition in Africa to be resolved. Participants agreed that there no longer should be a systematic throwing out of parties when they lose. In discussions of regional and local devolution of power, participants explored the relative advantages of these arrangements as a means of providing a power base for parties that lose at the national level. Page 18 Share Cite Suggested Citation: Participants argued that, if the military is not transformed in the process of democratization, it would be difficult to have a dynamic civil society, because some actors would have an inordinate access to force: There are difficulties in affecting democratic transitions in Africa when there are

people who can and are playing the ethnic game of winner take all with guns. Where such force exists, the nightmare scenario of societal fragmentation into a series of armed warlords, such as in Liberia and Somalia, can emerge. As a matter of fact, the first coup in sub-Saharan Africa occurred in Togo in , that is, three years after most states became independent. Some thought the military threat is more severe today than in prior periods because the large-scale militarization that resulted from the cold war competition. Participants agreed that the arms race in Africa left tragic results. For example, prolonged periods of warfare and collapsing economies have left large numbers of young men with no skills, other than warfare, and few opportunities for civilian employment, even if they had the skills. Participants argued that the presence of formidable military forces in newly democratic or democratizing countries poses an ever-present temptation for intervention: The real issue we face, then, is violence, as potentially exercised by the military. Various nonconsensual suggestions that were advanced are discussed below. Managing Ethnicity The ethnic variable, as participants labeled it, proved to be a contentious issue during the three workshops. There was a recognition that ethnic tensions in countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, and Zimbabwe have led to violence and even civil wars. A widespread view evident among participants was that ignoring or suppressing ethnicity had failed in Africa. Page 19 Share Cite Suggested Citation: They argued that African countries currently undergoing transitions to democracy must find ways to deal with diversity among various ethnic groups, by managing ethnicity and recognizing the rights of individuals to promote their ethnicity. Manage it, recognize the strength of it, but provide guarantees against the dreadful side of it, which can include patronage, expulsion, and massacres. In other words, tame it, because tribalism can be both satisfying and terrifying at the same time. Participants identified two possible outcomes when leaders of ethnically diverse countries fail to address ethnicity during the transition period. First, a continued suppression of ethnic identities might lead to the emergence of open conflict, in which groups demand equal treatment and equal access to development. Second, in cases in which the state imposes an assimilation policy, depending on whether the needs of various elements are met adequately, there would be a distinct possibility that the groups would reject the imposed national identity. In this instance, either the assimilation policy would fail or a bargaining process wherein multiethnicity is recognized would begin. In addition, a number of participants voiced the opinion that multiethnic societies do not necessarily result in violence or exclusion of conflict, pointing out that "in most African societies, there is a fluid interaction among ethnic groups, through marriage and the marketplace. To promote ethnic coexistence, a bargaining process would have to recognize differences by striking a balance among groups. Participants advocated equal opportunities for all individuals, regardless of their ethnicity, and suggested also that the state transcend ethnic divisiveness and remain above all groups in society. Similarly, they argued that merit and professionalism, rather than ethnicity, should be the primary criteria for promotion to national offices or to the civil service. Because some groups had been advantaged at the expense of others, the sense among participants was that equal access to education, the recognition of ethnic languages, and some interim affirmative action would be needed to ensure that hitherto disadvantaged groups and regions would not be excluded from meaningful participation in society. Although there was agreement on democracy providing a framework within which Page 20 Share Cite Suggested Citation:

Chapter 7 : Democratic Transitions in Latin America - Political Science - Oxford Bibliographies

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AMIDST DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: BRAZIL 61 regimes, and (b) the redefinition of institutional linkages that bind state and society.

Chapter 8 : Download [PDF] deliberative democracy and social movements

Examining the relationships between activists and the changing political environment, this book analyzes the trajectories of three major social movements in Taiwan during the country's democratic transition between and In doing so, it explores why the labor and environmental movements.