

*In this article I argue that until the full complexity of the psychology of moral personality, moral action, and moral learning is recognized, the prospect of physical education, and team sports in particular, being utilized for moral and social development is slim. Similarly a recognition of the.*

Learn more about us. But what is the focus of that power? Athletes bring crowds to their feet, defy our human weaknesses and make us believe in the impossible. Yet sometimes the athletic courts seem to be breeding grounds for crime, scandal and violence. Is the character of sports eroding away to the vices of unbound competition? On one hand and for good reason sports will always be held up as a way to promote virtues such as perseverance, responsibility and teamwork. Over two-thirds of our student body played sports growing up, which adds a special element to our community that few other universities can match. On the other hand, teamwork can be a one-sided, destructive force. In the book, *Lessons of the Locker Room*: In this competitive society, sportsmanship becomes increasingly important in keeping our sports firmly grounded in character. Where does this put Notre Dame, a bastion for both ethical and athletic excellence? When asked during a talk in Keough Hall about the professions where he would like to see more Notre Dame graduates, Father Edward Malloy gave the reply one may expect from a university president: But on the end of this academic list, Monk tacked on coaching. This shifts the focus to player development before winning. Then one name comes to the surface: Since his early high school coaching days in South Bend, he has intently focused on developing players according to their ability. Last week at the Air Force Academy, the poet at heart quoted lyrics that explained his rationale: Teams are ultimately united by shared scars from common struggles. Bill Yoast, coach of the T. He tells audiences about the racial tensions pulsing in the Alexandria, Va. The integrated football team was ironically the source of acclaimed community solidarity as the team advanced to win the state championships. Sports programs have the power to revolutionize communities. They give inner city youth alternatives to crime and drugs. If you are skilled at basketball, you have tremendous power in the city. Being a baller can earn you the respect of many hardcore players off the street. Sports can bring unity even across national borders. You have tremendous power on the international scene if you are skilled at soccer. While teaching in Uganda during the World Cup, I could relate to people anywhere in the country through this one sport. Recognizing the value of sports, the U. In renewing a focus on the character of sports, athletics can continue to be a force that brings communities together on all playing fields. Andrew DeBerry is a tenth semester senior counting down the 90 days till graduation. His column usually appears every other Thursday.

**Chapter 2 : Athletics and Sports - Ethics and Virtue Web Resources**

*Under a sportsmanship model, healthy competition is seen as a means of cultivating personal honor, virtue, and character. It contributes to a community of respect and trust between competitors and in society.*

Inanimate objects could have arete, since they were assumed to have a telos, that is, a purpose. Thus, the arete of a knife would be its sharpness. Animals could also have arete; for example, the strength of an ox was seen as its virtue. Though an animal could possess arete, the Greeks assumed natural potentialities in men and women to be virtues requiring enhancement through habits of skill. Because there are many things that "our nature" as humans inclines us to do, Aristotle argues, there can be many human virtues. How particular virtues are constituted can vary with different understandings of "human nature" and the different social roles and their correlative skills. Yet the virtues, according to Aristotle, are distinguished from the arts, since in the latter excellence lies in results. In contrast, for the virtues it matters not only that an act itself is of a certain kind, but also that the agent "has certain characteristics as he performs it; first of all, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he does, and he must choose it for its own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable character" Aristotle, 254a. The word hexis, which Aristotle uses for "character," is the same word that denotes the habitual dispositions constitutive of the virtues. Character, therefore, indicates the stability that is necessary so that the various virtues are acquired in a lasting way. Character is not simply the sum of the individual virtues; rather, it names the pattern of thought and action that provides a continuity sufficient for humans to claim their lives as their own Kupperman. However, the material form associated with character may vary from one society to another. Therefore any definition of virtue, the virtues, and character can be misleading because it can conceal the differences between various accounts of the nature and kinds of virtues as well as character. The Role of Virtue in Recent Moral Philosophy Ancient philosophers as well as Christian theologians, though offering quite different accounts of the virtues, assumed that any account of the well-lived life had to take virtue into consideration. Modern moral philosophy, in contrast, treats virtues "if it treats them at all" as secondary to an ethics based on principles and rules. The attempt to secure an account of morality that is not as subject to variations as an ethics of virtue certainly contributed to this displacement of virtues. The first edition of the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, for example, had no entry on virtue or character. In his widely used and influential introduction to philosophical ethics, William Frankena manifests the approach to ethics that simply assumed that considerations of virtue were secondary. According to Frankena, ethical theory should be concerned primarily with justifying moral terms and clarifying the differences between appeals to duty and consequences. The virtues, to the extent they were discussed by theorists such as Frankena, were understood as supplements to the determination of right and wrong action. The virtues in such a theory were seen more as the motivational component in more basic principles, such as benevolence and justice. As Frankena put it, We know that we should cultivate two virtues, a disposition to be beneficial i. But the point of acquiring these virtues is not further guidance or instructions; the function of the virtues in an ethics of duty is not to tell us what to do, but to insure that we will do it willingly in whatever situation we may face. Unless one knows what constitutes acts of truth-telling or lying, one has no way to specify what the virtue of truthfulness or honesty might entail. Ethical theories were assumed to be aids to help people make good decisions on the basis of well-justified principles or rules. Virtues were secondary for that endeavor. This account of ethics seemed particularly well suited to the emerging field of bioethics. It was assumed that the task of medical ethics was to help physicians and other healthcare providers make decisions about difficult cases created by the technological power of modern medicine. Whether a patient could be disconnected from a respirator was analyzed in terms of the difference between such basic rules as "do no harm" and "always act that the greatest good for the greatest number be done. Beauchamp and James F. Childress retain the structure of ethics articulated by Frankena. Their account of biomedical ethics revolves around the normative alternatives of utilitarian and deontological theories and the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. Each of these fundamental principles has correlative primary virtues "that is, respect for autonomy, nonmalevolence, benevolence, and

justice” but these “virtues” play no central role. Beauchamp and Childress justify leaving an account of virtue to the last chapter by saying that there are no good arguments for “making judgments about persons independent of judgments about acts or ‘making virtue primary or sufficient for the moral life” p. Both philosophers Pincoffs and theologians Hauerwas have challenged the assumption that ethics in general and biomedical ethics in particular should be focused primarily on decisions and principles. It is a mistake, they argue, to separate questions of the rightness or goodness of an action from the character of the agent. To relegate the virtues to the motivation for action mistakenly assumes that the description of an action can be abstracted from the character of the agent. Those who defended the importance of virtue for ethics argued, following Aristotle, that how one does what one does is as important as what one does. The renewed interest in the nature and significance of virtue ethics has been stimulated by the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, in particular his book *After Virtue*. MacIntyre agrees that principles and rules are important for ethics, but he rejects any attempt to justify those principles or rules that abstracts them from their rootedness in the historical particularities of concrete communities. The narratives that make such communities morally coherent focus attention on the virtues correlative to those narratives. For the Greeks, for example, the *Odyssey* acted as the central moral text for the display of the heroic virtues. To separate ethics from its dependence on such narratives is to lose the corresponding significance of the virtues. Renewed interest in the ethics of virtue has accompanied a renewed appreciation of the importance of community in ethics. Those commentators who emphasize the importance of community presume that morally worthy political societies are constituted by goods that shape the participants in those societies to want the right things rightly. Therefore ethics, particularly an ethics of virtue, cannot be separated from accounts of politics. Bioethics and the Ethics of Virtue In the past the practice of medicine was thought to be part of the tradition of the virtues. As Gary Ferngren and Darrel Amundsen observe, “If health was, for most Greeks, the greatest of the virtues, it is not surprising that they devoted a great deal of attention to preserving it. As an essential component of arete, physical culture was an important part of the life of what the Greeks called *kalos kagathos*, the cultivated gentleman, who represented in classical times the ideal of the human personality” p. It should not be surprising, therefore, that not only was health seen as an analogue of virtue but medicine was understood as an activity that by its very nature was virtuous. In medical ethics, the “ethics of virtue” approach tends to focus on the doctor-patient relationship. The trust, care, and compassion that seem so essential to a therapeutic relationship are virtues intrinsic to medical care. Not only compassion but also honesty, fidelity, courage, justice, temperance, magnanimity, prudence, and wisdom are required of the physician. Not every one of these virtues is required in every decision. What we expect of the virtuous physician is that he will exhibit them when they are required and that he will be so habitually disposed to do so that we can depend upon it. He will place the good of the patient above his own and seek that good unless its pursuit imposes an injustice upon him, or his family, or requires a violation of his own conscience. According to Veatch, there is no uncontested virtue ethic. The Greeks had one set of virtues, the Christians another, the Stoics another; and there is no rational way to resolve the differences among them. This is a particularly acute problem because modern medicine must be practiced as “stranger medicine,” that is, medicine that is practiced among people who are essentially strangers. It would include medicine that is practiced on an emergency basis in emergency rooms in large cities. It would also include care delivered in a clinic setting or in an HMO that does not have physician continuity, most medicine in student health services, VA Hospitals, care from consulting specialists, and the medicine in the military as well as care that is delivered by private practice general practitioners to patients who are mobile enough not to establish long-term relationships with their physicians. The ethics of “stranger medicine” is best construed, Veatch contends, on the presumption that the relationship between doctor and patient is contractual. Such a relationship is best characterized by impersonal principles rather than in terms of virtue. The virtues make sense only within and to particular communities, and therefore only within a “sectarian” form of medicine. He thinks medicine is increasingly becoming a form of technological competence, bureaucratically institutionalized and governed by impersonal ethical norms. MacIntyre simply wishes to challenge the presumption that this is a moral advance. Put more strongly, MacIntyre challenges the presumption that such a medicine and the morality that underlies it can be justified in the terms Veatch offers.

In particular, he asks, how can one account for the trust that seems a necessary component of the doctor-patient relationship without relying on an ethic of virtue? Contrary to Veatch, James Drane and others argue that medicine does not exist within a relationship between strangers, but in fact depends on trust and confidence, if not friendship, between doctor and patient. Ethics, they hold, is not based on principles external to medical care and then applied to medicine; rather, medicine is itself one of the essential practices characteristic of good societies. Medicine thus understood does not need so much to be supplemented by ethical considerations based on a lawlike paradigm of principles and rules; on the contrary, medical care becomes one of the last examples left in liberal cultures of what the practice of virtue actually looks like. Those who work from an ethics of virtue do not come to medicine with general principles justified in other contexts, to be applied now to "medical quandaries"; rather, they see medicine itself as an exemplification of virtuous practices. Here medicine is understood in the Aristotelian sense, as an activity—that is, as a form of behavior that produces a result intrinsic to the behavior itself Aristotle. Put simply, the practice of medicine is a form of cooperative human activity that makes us more than we otherwise could be. Thus virtue is not acquired by a series of acts—even if such acts would be characterized as courageous, just, or patient—if they are done in a manner that does not render the person performing the actions just. As Aristotle says, "Acts are called just and self-controlled when they are the kinds of acts which a just and self-controlled man would perform; but the just and self-controlled man is not he who performs these acts, but he who also performs them in the way that the just and self-controlled men do" (9). There is an inherently circular character to this account of the virtues that cannot be avoided. We can become just only by imitating just people, but such "imitation" cannot be simply the copying of their external actions. Becoming virtuous requires apprenticeship to a master; in this way the virtues are acquired through the kind of training necessary to ensure that they will not easily be lost. How such masters are located depends on a social order that is morally coherent, so that such people exhibit what everyone knows to be good. Medicine, because it remains a craft that requires apprenticeship, exemplifies how virtue can and should be taught. May suggests that the very meaning of a profession implies that one who practices it is the kind of person who can be held accountable for the goods, and corresponding virtues, of that profession. Medicine as a profession functions well to the extent that medical training forms the character of those who are being initiated into that practice. This does not imply that those who have gone through medical training will be virtuous in other aspects of their lives; it does imply, however, that as physicians they will exhibit the virtues necessary to practice medicine. In *Becoming a Good Doctor*: Drane, in contrast to Robert Veatch, argues that medicine must remain a virtuous practice if it is to be sustained in modern societies. According to Aristotle, ethics deals with those matters that can be other; a virtuous person not only must act rightly but also must do so "at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reasons, and in the right manner" (20). Similarly, physicians must know when to qualify what is usually done in light of the differences a particular patient presents. From this perspective, medicine is the training of virtuous people so they are able to make skilled but fallible judgments under conditions of uncertainty. The increasing recognition of the narrative character of medical knowledge Hunter reinforces this emphasis on virtue and character. That the disease entities used for diagnosis are implicit narratives means medicine is an intrinsically interpretative practice that must always be practiced under conditions of uncertainty. Accordingly, patient and physician alike bring virtues and vices to their interaction that are necessary for sustaining therapeutic relationships. Continuing Problems for an Ethics of Virtue To construe medicine as a virtue tradition establishes an agenda of issues for investigation in medical ethics. How are the virtues differentiated? Are there some virtues peculiar to medicine? How are different virtues related to one another? How is the difference between being a person of virtue and character, and the possession of the individual virtues, to be understood? Can a person possess virtues necessary for the practice of medicine without being virtuous? Can a person be courageous without being just?

## Chapter 3 : Virtues and Vices of Modern Sports // The Observer

*For sports to build moral character, we have to commit to them as part of a moral practice and understand them for what they are – a microcosm of life that yields an opportunity to move beyond knowledge into the possession and exercise of virtue.*

While ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and their descendants opined that justice cannot be defined and that it was a divine mystery, Valluvar positively suggested that a divine origin is not required to define the concept of justice. In the words of V. Nedunchezhiyan, justice according to Valluvar "dwells in the minds of those who have knowledge of the standard of right and wrong; so too deceit dwells in the minds which breed fraud. Men should seek the sovereign good that Descartes, following Zeno, identifies with virtue, as this produces a solid blessedness or pleasure. The only aspect that makes a human truly virtuous is to behave in accordance with moral principles. Kant presents an example for more clarification; suppose that you come across a needy person in the street; if your sympathy leads you to help that person, your response does not illustrate your virtue. In this example, since you do not afford helping all needy ones, you have behaved unjustly, and it is out of the domain of principles and true virtue. Kant applies the approach of four temperaments to distinguish truly virtuous people. According to Kant, among all people with diverse temperaments, a person with melancholy frame of mind is the most virtuous whose thoughts, words and deeds are one of principles. Nietzsche promotes the virtues of those he calls "higher men", people like Goethe and Beethoven. According to Nietzsche these higher types are solitary, pursue a "unifying project", revere themselves and are healthy and life-affirming. Finally, a Higher type affirms life because he is willing to accept the eternal return of his life and affirm this forever and unconditionally. In the last section of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche outlines his thoughts on the noble virtues and places solitude as one of the highest virtues: And to keep control over your four virtues: He had a checklist in a notebook to measure each day how he lived up to his virtues. Eat not to Dullness. Drink not to Elevation. Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself. Let all your Things have their Places. Let each Part of your Business have its Time. Resolve to perform what you ought. Perform without fail what you resolve. Make no Expense but to do good to others or yourself; i. Be always employed in something useful. Cut off all unnecessary Actions. Use no hurtful Deceit. Think innocently and justly; and, if you speak, speak accordingly. Wrong none, by doing Injuries or omitting the Benefits that are your Duty. Forbear resenting Injuries so much as you think they deserve. Tolerate no Uncleanliness in Body, Clothes or Habitation. Be not disturbed at Trifles, or at Accidents common or unavoidable. Imitate Jesus and Socrates. Contemporary views[ edit ] Virtues as emotions[ edit ] Marc Jackson in his book *Emotion and Psyche* puts forward a new development of the virtues. He identifies the virtues as what he calls the good emotions "The first group consisting of love, kindness, joy, faith, awe and pity is good" [40] These virtues differ from older accounts of the virtues because they are not character traits expressed by action, but emotions that are to be felt and developed by feeling not acting. In *Objectivism*[ edit ] Ayn Rand held that her morality, the morality of reason, contained a single axiom: All values and virtues proceed from these. To live, man must hold three fundamental values that one develops and achieves in life: Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem. The first three represent the three primary virtues that correspond to the three fundamental values, whereas the final four are derived from the virtue of rationality. She claims that virtue is not an end in itself, that virtue is not its own reward nor sacrificial fodder for the reward of evil, that life is the reward of virtue and happiness is the goal and the reward of life. Man has a single basic choice: Moral perfection is an unbreached rationality, not the degree of your intelligence but the full and relentless use of your mind, not the extent of your knowledge but the acceptance of reason as an absolute. List of virtues The opposite of a virtue is a vice. Vice is a habitual, repeated practice of wrongdoing. One way of organizing the vices is as the corruption of the virtues. As Aristotle noted, however, the virtues can have several opposites. Virtues can be considered the mean between two extremes, as the Latin maxim dictates in *medio stat virtus* - in the centre lies virtue. For instance, both cowardice and rashness are opposites of courage; contrary to prudence are both over-caution and insufficient caution; the opposites of pride a virtue are undue humility and

excessive vanity. A more "modern" virtue, tolerance, can be considered the mean between the two extremes of narrow-mindedness on the one hand and over-acceptance on the other. Vices can therefore be identified as the opposites of virtues - but with the caveat that each virtue could have many different opposites, all distinct from each other.

*Sportsmanship, as an ideal, is all about character. It's about humility, honesty, loyalty, respect and generosity. It is not a quest for perfection but, like a faith journey, is a quest for virtue.*

Australian tennis gun Nick Kyrgios has made headlines again this week, for all the wrong reasons. Kyrgios quipped, "Kokkinakis banged your girlfriend, sorry to tell you that mate. What was wrong about the sledge is obvious to most, and has been discussed widely. One commentator suggested he "needs help," while a less tactful review called him an "asshole. Australians have generally turned against Kyrgios. The tone of commentary suggests more than public discontentment at poor behaviour. Australians seem to feel betrayed when a professional athlete fails to live up to ethical expectations. Every breathtaking shot filled us with hope that finally we had hit the tennis jackpot. It would be more than a passing tragedy if all that talent and all our hope was squandered by the inability of a prodigious talent to exercise self-control. It is accurate is because many believe there are particular moral obligations that apply to athletes. These go beyond the ordinary duties to which we are all held. As such, we feel especially betrayed when athletes "drop the ball. Sport, he believed, was an excellent way of achieving that. Today, many practices give testament to the connection between sport and the good life. Some private schools still insist students enrol in a sport, and many parents have their children do the same. Furthermore, sport is still one of the few spaces where moral ideas like honour and sportsmanship are accepted on face-value. There is a good argument to suggest sport is inseparable from virtue. The Greeks believed excellence arete were qualities that would allow one to triumph over struggles or contests agon. These excellences could be physical - such as strength or stamina - or moral - such as courage or cool-headedness. Sport, then, is moral character writ large - athletes seeking out contest to prove their virtue. Yet many try to do exactly this, and athletes are foremost among them. I am not paid to be a role model. I am paid to wreak havoc on the basketball court. Parents should be role models. The "athletes are paid to play sport" argument is more tenuous today than it was in Morality clauses in modern contracts suggest players are paid to be role models. The Greek approach gives us cause to question this, and to understand why the commonly-held belief that athletes should embody good behaviour is defensible. In fact, there is an obvious challenge to the Greek conception: The value of winning in sport stems from the fact it requires virtue. Forgetting the contest is only a pedagogical tool threatens to corrupt sport in its entirety. Support for the shoulder charge despite the well-established health risks; continued calls for drug legalisation in sport; or the personal lives of players being fair game as sledges. This seems to be most common in sports that have a clearly-defined opponent. And, once again, golf has been the focal point of high sportsmanship. Likewise, recall golfer Darren Clarke, who in refused to take advantage of an improved lie after a rain delay, and in doing so cost himself a greatly desired title. It was a much better lie than when I left it. Unlike many other prominent sports, golfers struggle against technique and mindset, the environment and occasionally good fortune. These factors, rather than a personal opponent, provide the source of struggle. To preserve a connection between sport and ethics, we might explore ways to cultivate virtue in oppositional sports. One possible option would be to increase the number of sportsmanship awards given to professional athletes. This would serve at least two purposes. First, it would reinforce the value and importance of good character by identifying it as something to aspire toward. Second, it would identify which athletes would be the most appropriate to serve as role models for the community. Matthew Beard is a writer and content producer with The Ethics Centre , an independent, not-for-profit organisation focused on the promotion and exploration of ethical questions. You can follow him on Twitter.

## Chapter 5 : Character in Sport – a virtuous act, or mere bouncebackability? – virtue insight

*VIRTUE AND CHARACTER – “Virtue” is the translation of the ancient Greek arete, which meant any kind of excellence. Virtues are qualities that are valued as a foundation of principle and good moral being. www.nxgvision.com*

From this viewpoint, sport is viewed as an embodiment of freedom and equality and is a context in which the participant chooses to engage. This argument is supported by the regular incidence of negative activity such as collegiate recruiting scandals, aggressive behavior or assault, hazing rituals, and the use of performance-enhancing drugs. Sport then began to be shaped by the capitalist and patriarchal values that were prominent in the United States. Currently, the "sport builds character" claim is highly debated, most often in the ideological sense rather than based on any reliable and valid empirical evidence (Shields et al.). The experience of sport participation is one that provides an opportunity for the athletes to develop moral virtues. Defining Character Identifying a singular and concise definition of character is difficult as it is a vague and socially constructed notion. The definition of character has been shaped and modified throughout time, originally defined as a distinctive mark, evolving into the equivalent of "personality" (Shields et al.). Character has been defined by sport and exercise scientists as: With these definitions in mind, Shields and Bredemeier offer four virtues that can be used to describe character within the sport context. The virtues included are: Fairness involves equal consideration of others. Theories of moral development attempt to describe how moral virtues and conceptions are learned. Further Insights Structural development theorists believe that there is a definite sequence of development that individuals undergo in order to acquire the specific cognitive abilities necessary to make moral judgments and actions. Constructivist approaches are the most utilized theoretical frameworks used in sport. For the purpose of this summary the theories of Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Haan will be briefly summarized, including the moral action models of Rest and Shields and Bredemeier. Three levels are comprised of two stages each. Characterized by an egocentric social perspective where one follows rules that then shifts from viewing issues as black and white, to a more right is relative perspective. For example, consider an athlete is faced with the decision of whether or not to skip practice. For example, the athlete may decide to skip practice because there is something else that she wants to do such as hang out with friends. Involves viewing relationships with others with an awareness of shared agreements. In this case the athlete may choose to attend practice, reasoning that it is what is considered "good" and is expected by the coach and parents. These have led to many modifications and extensions of his theory by other theorists including those by his own students, such as Carol Gilligan. According to Gilligan, males experience separation from the female caregiver as they establish gender identity, while females establish this identity through attachment to their caregivers. The entire section is 4, words.

## Chapter 6 : The Rules of the Game: Can Sport Improve the Character of its Bratty Stars? - ABC Religion &

*Virtue (Latin: virtus, Ancient Greek: ἀρετή, "arete") is moral excellence. A virtue is a trait or quality that is deemed to be morally good and thus is valued as a foundation of principle and good moral being.*

## Chapter 7 : Virtue of Sport - St. John Paul II

*Character in Sport - a virtuous act, or mere bouncebackability? In the Flourishing From the Margins research report published by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues last week, one of the less notable findings deserves some greater attention.*

## Chapter 8 : The Character Of Virtue | WUNC

*Sport, Virtue, and the Olympics Sport and virtue have been linked since ancient times, when the two were often interchangeable. The Greeks believed that sport helped cultivate virtue, and that virtue in turn helped one excel as an*

*athlete.*

## Chapter 9 : Virtue - Wikipedia

*Our vision is to build a culture of sport where virtue and world-class performance meet. Sport, properly directed, develops character, makes a man courageous, a generous loser, and a gracious victor; it refines the senses, gives intellectual penetration, and steels the will to endurance.*