

Chapter 1 : Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Instead of holding that the perceptual content derives from the content of belief, one might instead hold that the contents of perception and the contents of belief are in some sense analogous, and more generally that experiences and beliefs are similarly structured by contents on the one hand, and a relation to those contents, on the other.

What are Perceptual Experiences? This entry will focus exclusively on the contents of perceptual experiences. It is definitional of experience, as the term is used here, that they have some phenomenal character, or more briefly, some phenomenology. The phenomenology of an experience is what it is like for the subject to have it. At any given waking moment, one normally has experiences in some perhaps all of the five sense modalities, along with proprioceptive experience of some sort. Each of five sense modalities seems to be accompanied by a distinctive kind of phenomenology. Sometimes the boundaries between them can be hard to draw, for example between olfactory and gustatory phenomenology, kinesthetic experience and haptic-tactile experience that is, tactile experiences involving movement rather than just pressure sensation, and perhaps, in some cases, between the latter two and visual experience on the last point see Press et al. Despite these difficulties, some rough distinctions can be drawn: In the analytic tradition, most of the questions discussed in this entry have been addressed with regard to visual experience and pain. In contrast, the phenomenological tradition explored similar questions with respect to other modalities. In principle, however, the questions addressed here could be raised with respect to any kind of experience. Contents as Accuracy Conditions When one speaks of the contents of a bucket, one is talking about what is spatially inside the bucket. In contrast, when one speaks of the contents of a newspaper, one is talking about what information the newspaper stories convey. One influential version of the idea that the contents of perception are analogous to the contents of a newspaper story holds that the contents of an experience are given by the conditions under which it is accurate. What an experience conveys to the subject, according to this conception, is that those conditions are satisfied. On the conception of contents as given by accuracy conditions, there is a broad analogy between the contents of experience and the contents of thoughts and utterances, in that both contents are assessable for accuracy. The content of my utterance is what I assert, and the content of my belief is what I believe – in both cases, that dogs are lively, loyal creatures. Usually these contents are thought of as some kind of proposition – an abstract object that is the kind of thing that can be true or false see the entry on structured propositions. Notice that both the utterance and the belief are assessable for truth: In the case of beliefs and utterances, it is not just their contents that are assessable for accuracy where accuracy is truth; the beliefs and utterances themselves are as well. A belief or utterance inherits its truth-value from the truth-value of its content. This stands in contrast to desires or hopes, which may have contents that are assessable for accuracy, but are not themselves so assessable. If experiences have accuracy conditions, then they are like beliefs and utterances in this respect, and unlike desires and hopes. Suppose you see a fish while unwittingly looking in a mirror. It may look as if there is a red fish in front of you, when in fact the red fish you see is behind you and there is no fish at all in front of you. Similarly, in auditory or olfactory hallucinations, one may seem to hear voices when in fact no one is speaking, or to smell an odor when in fact nothing is emitting that smell. It is a further claim, because one might be misled by something that is not itself assessable for accuracy: So the fact that something plays the role of misleading you does not show that it is assessable for accuracy. But in the case of experiences, this further claim is motivated in the following way. To this extent, we seem to be able to assess experiences for accuracy. When we assess an experience as accurate or inaccurate, we consider how things are in the world. This suggests that experiences which can be assessed for accuracy are associated with accuracy conditions: When we have intuitions about whether an experience is accurate, we at least sometimes also have intuitions about the conditions under which it would be accurate. For discussion of such intuitions, see Siewert, chapter 7. Going with this, we seem to have intuitions about when experiences are incorrect. In large part, our intuitions about when experiences are accurate concern objects and properties. For instance, many have the intuition that the following experience is falsidical: Intuitively, for the experience to be accurate, the fish in question must really be blue. It is an open question how specific and how extensive such

intuitions are, hence to what extent such intuitions can reveal which accuracy conditions experiences have, assuming that they have accuracy conditions at all. But so long as there are some such intuitions, there is a prima facie case for experiences having accuracy conditions. Some philosophers deny that experiences have accuracy conditions. A natural way to do so is to confine accuracy and inaccuracy to the level of belief, further downstream from experience. There are a number of positions that deny that experiences have accuracy conditions. All these positions deny this claim on the grounds that it is not supported by either the metaphysics of experience or by its phenomenology. The positions differ, however, on their positive views of the metaphysics and phenomenology of experience. The first position is the view that experiences are raw feels, or sensory affectations of the subject, that do not purport to represent the world in any way at all. The eighteenth-century philosopher Thomas Reid held a view of this sort: Reid argued that experiences have a sensory part that is a mere raw feel, and that is independent of judgments about how things are in the environment. He took the latter essentially to involve concepts. One might, on this view, speak more broadly about experiences as having two parts, sensory part and a judgment part; or one might speak more narrowly about experience as being limited to the sensory part that is typically accompanied by judgment. Which way one speaks is merely a matter of terminology. The core feature of the view is its cleavage between the sensory aspect of experiences, on the one hand, and assessability for accuracy, on the other. Given a judgement that occurs simultaneously with a sensation, one could in principle make that very same judgment without having any sensation, and one could in principle have those very sensations without making any judgments. That is the force of saying that these two aspects, sensation and judgment, are independent. If experiences are understood narrowly as being limited to the sensory part, then they are not assessable for accuracy; and if they are understood broadly as having both a sensory part and a judgmental part, then it is only the latter that is assessable for accuracy. Visual experience, on this view, does not by itself even purport to present one with objects or their properties. There are thus no accuracy conditions associated with such experiences. For further discussion of adverbialism, see the problem of perception ; also Chisholm , Ducasse , Tye , Sellars , and for critical discussion, Jackson Strictly speaking, it should be noted that so long as the core thesis of adverbialism is that experiences are modifications or properties of the subject, adverbialism leaves open whether experiences are assessable for accuracy or not. For all that core thesis says, being appeared-to F-ly could be a way of representing that something is F. Early formulations of view presented it as a view according which experiences were not assessable for accuracy. There is a third position that denies that experiences have accuracy conditions. This position starts with the claim that some experiences consist in a chunk of the environmentâ€”for instance, a lavender bushâ€”being perceptually presented to a subject, so that both the lavender bush and the perceptual relation between it and the subject are constituents of the experience. That view is silent on what the nature of perceptual experience is. According to one version of this view, when you see a lavender bush, some of its properties are presented to you, and your experience consists in your being so related to the bush and those of its properties that are presenting themselves to you. You could have an experience that was indistinguishable from one of so seeing that very lavender bush: But neither of these experiences, according to this view, would be the same sort of experience as the experience of seeing the original lavender bush. Another version of this approach, developed by Johnston and , develops the idea that perceivers are presented with instances of properties rather than with universals. Note that both versions are simply silent on the nature of hallucinatory experiences. A version of the view, however, explicitly denies this. This version holds that experiences are analogous to chunks of the environment that clearly lack accuracy conditions. He also offers further reasons for denying that experiences have accuracy conditions. Travis agrees that in having an experience one may represent that such-and-such is the case. Accuracy conditions come into the picture only after you take the environment as it is presented to you to be some specific, potentially repeatable way. So according to Travis, the experience does not map onto any unique set of accuracy conditions. A fourth position that denies that experiences have accuracy conditions says that experiences are raw feels, but also holds that all experiences have the same structure as perception of objects. On this view, experience consists in immediately perceiving private objects known as sense-data. According to sense-datum theories, when your experience is a case of perceiving a public object, such as a white wall that looks red, you

indirectly perceive the wall by immediately perceiving a red sense-datum. In general, sense-data really have the properties that public objects look to have. In this way your having *i*. It should be noted that if the core commitment of sense-datum theories is that one immediately perceives mental objects in experience, then sense-datum theories are neutral on whether experiences are assessable for accuracy. From the fact that one perceives or immediately perceives a particular object be it a public object or a private mental one, nothing at all follows about whether the experience of so perceiving is assessable for accuracy or not for more on sense-datum theories, see the entries on sense data and the problem of perception. Jackson defends a version of the sense-datum view according to which experiences are not assessable for accuracy. Such construals contrast with the newspaper model of perceptual contents, and more specifically with the conception of contents as the accuracy conditions of experience. The claim that experiences have contents in this sense is substantive, and, as we have seen, is denied by some philosophers. But many philosophers accept that experiences have contents in this sense, and this conception of the contents of experience dominates the recent philosophical literature on perception. Defenses of the thesis that experiences have contents can be found in Byrne, Pautz, Schellenberg, and Siegel a and b, and criticisms of those defenses in Breckenridge and Locatelli and Wilson forthcoming. One idea is that the contents of experience derive in some fashion from the contents of beliefs, so that experiences bear some constitutive link to beliefs. Three sorts of constitutive links to belief have been discussed in the literature. The first is that experiences are acquisitions of beliefs; the second is that they are dispositions to form beliefs; the third is that they are grounds of dispositions to form beliefs. A fourth position simply identifies experiences with beliefs about how things look Gluer, or even more simply, with beliefs whose content characterizes the way things look Byrne. First, suppose experiences are acquisition of beliefs formed by a standard use of a perceptual apparatus. When applied to visual experiences, this view says that for as long as you see something that looks like a red, shiny fish in front of you, you are acquiring a belief that there is a red, shiny fish in front of you. The content of experience, on this view, will be the same as the content of the beliefs with whose acquisition the experience is identical. And what makes a content the content of an experience, as opposed to some other kind of mental state, will be whatever makes it the content of those beliefs. This view is critically discussed by Pitcher in his, chapter 2. A standard objection to so identifying experiences with the acquisition of beliefs is that one may not believe that things are the way they appear. This objection is discussed by Pitcher, op cit, and by Armstrong. For instance, if you have background knowledge that despite appearances there is no red shiny fish in front of you, then you will not believe that there is one.

Chapter 2 : Project MUSE - Peirce's Theory of the Perceptual Judgment: An Ambiguity

Improving perceptual judgement can aid people immensely, and so work may be done, especially during childhood, to enable this. Developing a substantial bank of sensory experiences to draw from allows an individual greater ability to make perceptual judgements, and means that automatic judgements are made successfully more often.

My initial question was, what do these philosophers mean by "nonconceptual content," and its contrast, "conceptual content"? What kinds of objects are these different types of content, and how are they used to characterize perception and thought? It is controversial among those who talk of nonconceptual content whether there is such a thing, and whether perceptual states have a kind of content that is different from the kind that characterizes belief states and speech acts. But Evans gives us no direct and explicit characterization of the notion of nonconceptual content that he introduces - at least none that I can find. And it is not clear to me that the different philosophers using this term mean the same thing by it. Without some account of what nonconceptual and conceptual contents might be, it is difficult to have more than a general impression of what this controversy is about. Some things Evans says suggest that it is mental states, rather than their contents, that are conceptual or non-conceptual, and sometimes he substitutes "non-conceptualized" for non-conceptual, but it is clear that he thinks there are two kinds of content, and not just two kinds of states that content is used to characterize, or two ways in which content might be expressed. All page references to Evans are to this book] John McDowell, on the other hand, argues that the process of judgment does not introduce a new kind of content, but "simply endorses the conceptual content, or some of it, that is already possessed by the experience on which it is grounded. Let me confess at the beginning that I will not propose answers to my questions about how these philosophers should be understood. So my strategy will be indirect: I will begin with what I take to be some platitudes about content, assumptions that I would expect to be disputed only by a philosopher who rejected the whole idea of representational or intentional content. After a while, more controversial assumptions may emerge, but I hope we will be able to identify the point at which disagreement begins. The notion of propositional content begins with the idea that what is said in a speech act - the proposition expressed - can be abstracted from two different aspects of the way it is said: The same proposition can be expressed by different sentences of the same or different languages, and the same proposition can be the content of an assertion in one context, and of a supposition, a component of a disjunctive assertion, or a request in other contexts. Furthermore, the contents expressed in speech acts with different force are the same kinds of things as the contents of mental states of different kinds, such as belief, desire, intention, hope and fear. Just as what is said can be separated from how it is said, so what is thought can be separated both from the means of mental representation and from the kind of mental state belief, wish, tacit presupposition, hope or fear that the proposition is used to specify. Just as you and I might say the same thing, even though you say it in French and I say it in English, so you and I might believe the same thing even though the systems of mental representation in which the information is encoded in our respective minds is different. And just as I may assert what you merely suppose, so I might believe what you doubt, but hope for. So what might these things be - things that are the contents of speech acts and mental states of various kinds? There are many different theories about what propositional content is, but two things seem common to all theories that take content seriously at all: Perhaps they are truth conditions, perhaps something more fine-grained that allows for the possibility that different propositional contents may have the same truth conditions. Either way, what is assumed is that for any state, act or object with propositional content, one can ask whether or not things are as the state represents things to be, and this is to ask whether the truth conditions of the propositional content are satisfied. What are truth conditions? Different things might be meant by this expression; here is one: The recursive semantic structure of the sentence encodes such a procedure. One might identify the recipe with the truth conditions, since it spells out the procedure, or conditions, for determining whether the sentence is true. Here is a contrasting explanation: Such statements will have different truth conditions in one sense, but the same truth conditions in the other. I will make only the weaker assumption that propositional contents have truth conditions in the second sense. Now there are many kinds of abstract

objects that have, or determine, truth conditions in this sense - different candidates for a kind of representational content. Some of them may be appropriately called "conceptual" in some sense; others might appropriately be called "nonconceptual". The ultimate constituents of such structures might consist wholly of senses or concepts. Maybe conceptual content is an object of this kind, though it remains to be said what senses or concepts are. Alternatively, one might take the ultimate constituents of such structures to be individual objects and properties and relations the referents of names and the properties and relations expressed by the predicates in the relevant sentences. Perhaps this is a kind of nonconceptual content. And there might be mixed cases - structures that contain concepts or senses associated with predicates and individuals associated with names. These different candidates for a kind of content are not independent; there will be correspondences between contents of the different kinds. In some cases there will be straightforward ways of determining a content of one kind as a function of a content of one of the other kinds. In particular, whatever senses are, they determine referents; whatever concepts are, it seems reasonable to say that concepts of the appropriate kind determine properties. A concept of cat determines, I assume, the property of being a cat. If this is right, then a structure that is made up of senses or concepts will determine a unique structure of the kind made up of individuals, properties and relations, though the reverse will not be true. So there is a clear sense in which structures made of senses or concepts are more fine-grained than those made of individuals and properties and relations, with the mixed cases falling between the two. All of the candidates considered so far build into the content a recipe for determining truth conditions. One might instead take the recipe determined by some sentence as part of the means by which content is determined, rather than as essential to the content itself. One might, that is, identify the content with the truth conditions themselves - the possible circumstances that must be realized in order for some expression or thought with that content to be true. This is the most coarse-grained conception of content - the outer limit on a conception of content that meets the minimal conditions that we are requiring that any conception of representational content meet. Any conception of representational content meeting these conditions will determine a unique content of this most coarse-grained kind, so this is a kind of content that everyone should agree can be used to characterize mental and linguistic states, acts and events that can be said to have representational content of any kind. I will use the label "informational content" for content as truth conditions, propositions as functions from possible circumstances to truth values, or equivalently, as sets of possible situations. I suppose that if this is a kind of content, it is a kind of nonconceptual content, although since it can be used to characterize any kind of representational act or state, its use says nothing one way or another about whether any kind of act or state essentially involves the exercise of conceptual capacities whatever this might mean. Thus far I have been talking about the kinds of abstract objects that might be thought to be the representational contents of acts and states that have representational content, but I have said nothing about the states themselves, or about what it is about a cognitive, perceptual, or motivational state, or a speech act or act of judgment in virtue of which it has some particular representational content. Recall that part of the initial motivation for developing a conception of content at all was the idea that content could be abstracted from the force with which it is expressed and from the attitudes that are characterized in terms of content - a conception that might be used to describe states and acts of different kinds, and that was intelligible independently of its use to describe any representational states or acts. But of course the interest of these abstract objects will derive from their use for describing in a revealing way the phenomena they are used to describe, and for bringing out the relationships between different acts and states that are involved in representation. So I turn now to questions about the role of content in characterizing representational events and properties, beginning, again, with some platitudes. Statements involving sentential complements for example, statements of the form x believes that P , it appears to x that P , x asserted that P , state that a certain relation holds or held between x and something denoted by the term "that P ". The puzzlement is exacerbated by the causal metaphors philosophers often use to describe the ways we are related to propositions: Content travels in vehicles. Information saturates our thoughts, [Evans, p. But the sober reality behind the metaphors need not be so mysterious. To be related to an abstract object is just to have a property that can be determined as a function of such an object, in the way that to use a now familiar analogy the property of weighing 75 kilograms can be determined as a function of the number One way to get

at the question, what is content? I see that the cat is sleeping. Perhaps I suspect or speculate that the cat is a favorite of Queen Elizabeth. Various properties are ascribed to me with the help of reference to some kind of abstract object that has truth conditions. Whatever is going on in me when I entertain the possibility that this cat is a favorite of Queen Elizabeth, we can describe it by attributing to me a relation to the proposition that the cat is a favorite of Queen Elizabeth a proposition that is true in possible worlds in which that cat is one of her favorites and false in possible worlds in which it is not. The problem is to say what the world must be like for me to be related in the right kind of way to such an abstract object. The thought episodes and belief states in such cases are, Evans notes, based on some information that the subject receives. These platitudes locate perception, communication, and memory in a system - the informational system - which constitutes the substratum of our cognitive lives. Some objects are sensitive to a range of alternative states of the environment in a way that makes them apt for transmitting or storing detailed information about some aspect of the environment. The pattern of light and dark on the ground on a sunny day, for example, carries information about the shape of the tree since there are systematic counterfactual dependencies between a range of alternative possible shapes of the tree and a corresponding range of alternative patterns on the ground. Obviously, artifacts such as thermometers and cameras are designed to be sensitive to the environment in just this way, and they are naturally described as devices designed to carry information. Equally obviously, animals have evolved a diverse range of systems - perceptual systems as well as internal monitoring systems of various kinds that carry and use information in this sense. For a philosopher looking for a naturalistic account of intentionality, this conception of information and informational states provides a natural starting point. Of things that carry information, we can say what information they carry. Information itself is something described with that-clauses - the information that a black and white cat is sleeping on a mat, or that this black and white cat is sleeping on a mat, or the information that the tree trunk is shaped roughly like a Y, that the temperature is seventeen degrees centigrade. Informational states have content - presumably at least in some cases a kind of content that is in some sense nonconceptual, since it would not be reasonable to attribute conceptual capacities to the patterns of light on the ground in virtue of the counterfactual dependencies that make it the case that those patterns have informational content. Of course things that lack conceptual capacities such as books still might carry conceptualized information, and so might be correctly describable in terms of some notion of conceptual content. But whatever conceptual content turns out to be, it seems reasonable to think that for anything that has conceptual content, the fact that it does must have its origin in something with conceptual capacities, as the information contained in books has its origin in the thoughts and intentions of the members of the community in which they are written. Pace George Washington, who is alleged to have said that all knowledge has its origin in the knowledge in books. If the notion of an informational system is, as Evans suggests, to "constitute the substratum of our cognitive lives," and if the notion of information is to contribute to an explanation of the source and nature of the content of full blooded intentional states - acts of judgment, states of belief - then it is important that our account of what constitutes the carrying of information not presuppose, or be derivative from, states of mind. Artifacts that are designed to record, display or store information fuel gauges, thermometers, cameras, compact disks are among the best examples of information carrying systems, and are often used to illustrate the strategy for explaining intentionality in terms of systems that function to carry information. Since the design of such things is explained in terms of the intentions of the designers, their information carrying capacities are in a sense dependent on the intentional states of persons. But it would be a mistake to think that the information such artifacts carry is derivative in the same way as the capacity of a book to carry the information expressed by the sentences written in it. Thermometers and cameras are designed with an information carrying purpose in mind, but facts about the way such devices happened to come by their informational capacities are inessential to the explanation of what it is that constitutes those capacities. A natural thermometer or camera brought into being by some fortuitous process Swamp-thermometer, or Swamp-camera would carry the same information in the same way as actual thermometers and cameras. The former is parasitic on the latter " [p. Information is by definition veridical. According to the simple story I have sketched, x cannot carry the information that P unless it is true that P. If this concept is to provide a basis for an account of representational content, we need

to complicate the story, but the strategy for doing so is straightforward. As Fred Dretske has emphasized, even in the simple story, any characterization of the information carried by some object will presuppose a distinction between the facts that form the background conditions or channel conditions for the causal structure in virtue of which the object carries information and the facts that constitute the information carried. The correctness of the characterization of the content of the information carried will be relative to such presuppositions. So we say that the thermometer which is in fact functioning normally, and which registers 17 carries the information that the temperature is 17 degrees centigrade, even though if, contrary to fact, the temperature were 27 degrees, and certain particular anomalous conditions also obtained, the thermometer would still be in the state it is in. The presupposed background conditions must obtain for information to be carried in the strict sense, but one can use the same content ascriptions, and the same distinction, without making the assumption that relevant conditions in fact obtain. One can say, that is, that x indicates that P if it is in a state that would carry the information that P if the appropriate background conditions obtained. If the conditions do not obtain, then what is indicated may be misinformation rather than information. But the essentials of the story remain the same. Perceptual systems are paradigm cases of systems apt for receiving information, and statements about perceptual achievements are cases of content attribution that most straightforwardly fit the information theoretic picture. In this kind of straightforward perceptual statement there is no question of misinformation or misperception: It is probably just the way the sunlight is filtering through the trees that makes it look that way. It really is a striped zebra that he sees; lighting is normal, and things are just as they appear to be.

Chapter 3 : What Is Perceptual Judgment? | Synonym

Perceptual judgements are, by nature, a product of both sensation and the cognitive processes responsible for interpreting and reporting subjective experiences. Changed perceptual judgements may thus result from changes in how the world appears (perception), or subsequent interpretation (cognition).

Reviewed by Gabrielle B. Jackson, Stony Brook University I watch my two-year-old daughter quietly gazing off the deck of the ferry. She is looking toward the water. Off to the right, still in her field of vision, is the last reach of land, a small peninsula, where trees line the ridge and houses occupy the sandy shore. To her left is nothing but ocean and sky and the occasional bird. I wonder, what does she see? Come to think of it, what do I see? As soon as the reverie ends, the academic in me not to be outdone asks the same questions, but in the technical language of philosophy: This much seems right. But what exactly is given to the subject by perceptual experience, if anything at all? But does she see them as birds or as blues? Unlike me, she does not yet know the words "seagull" or "cerulean. What overlap is there, if any, between what is presented in our perceptual experiences? Within the philosophy of perception, answers to these questions are abundant, prismatic, and at times inscrutable. And their interface constitutes the debate about perceptual content. The book, however, is only for a unique subset of readers: It is not really for newcomers. What the volume does well is give us a sampling of the state of the art today. I did find myself asking, on more than one occasion, what exactly is at stake as we refine these positions and arguments -- for empirical science, for our conception of ourselves and others in the world, and for the role of perception in our lives and in its relation to cognition, emotion, and action? Answers to those questions were not readily forthcoming. There were a few exceptions. He begins with a brief history of how western analytic philosophy came to the view that perceptual experience has content, a view based on natural assumptions about the relations among appearances, perception, and knowledge. As the story goes, our senses generate images, these images enable us to perceive the world, and these perceptions allow us to know things. This would seem to imply that, as Matthen puts it, "the perceiving subject is presented with a proposition -- the proposition that the world is a certain way. This proposition is often entitled the content of a perceptual state" But he explains that the path traversing appearance, perception, and knowledge has rifts that must be filled. Perhaps it is unreasonable to wish, of a highly technical book, that all the contributors give compelling provocation for their views, as Matthen does. But philosophers working on such uncommon ground might want to point out the footing better, for the rest of us, before they begin to grapple. The volume contains 14 distinct contributions, and is divided into five parts: Brogaard does a remarkable job of summarizing all the chapters in her introduction. This turned out to be a most valuable part of the book, to which I returned many times. The introduction transforms the book from a rather picaresque collection of articles into a coherent itinerary by connecting authors, views, arguments, and concepts. In what follows, I offer my own glosses on the individual chapters. Content Views, we find defenses of the view that perception has content. Bence Nanay presents some empirical challenges to the view that perception does not have representational content in the chapter "Empirical Problems with Anti-Representationalism. He supposes that this phenomenon is an instance of the multimodality of perception -- whereby information processing from one sense modality e. Nanay argues that this requires matching two representations from the different sense modalities at early stages in perceptual processing. But "if we cannot talk about perceptual representation, how we can we talk about what is being matched? The content of perceptual experience must be representational. In "Affordances and the Contents of Perception," Susanna Siegel also supports the view that the content of perceptual experience is representational and extends this interpretation to affordances, or features of the environment that solicit actions from the perceiver. In other words, she claims that affordances -- along with other features of the environment like color, smell, texture -- are represented in the content of perceptual experience. For example, many theorists claim that the properties of affordances are more properly at variance with the properties of representations. Nevertheless, Siegel attempts to make the case that there is nothing in principle about affordances or "experienced mandates," as she calls them that would prevent them from being represented in perceptual experience Against Strong

Content, we find different defenses of the view that perception lacks content. Mark Johnston argues in "The Problem with the Content View" that strong content views cannot account for how perceptual experiences justify perceptual judgments about the world. In "The Preserve of Thinkers," Charles Travis also argues against the strong content view, taking a different tack and distinguishing among different kinds of representational content viz. If this is correct, Travis notes, then the content of perceptual experience is at best minimally representational, or representational in name only. In "Disjunctivism, Discrimination, and Categorization," Diana Raffman calls into question a key concept used to establish the strong content view: She reviews a familiar argument that because veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are indiscriminable from one another, they must all have something in common; call it "perceptual content. The upshot, I think, is that we cannot meaningfully talk about whether two experiences could be told apart were they to occur simultaneously or in immediate succession. Such concerns work to undermine the indiscriminability argument in favor of strong content. Reconciliatory Views, we find articulations of how the perceptual content debate might be predicated on false dichotomies, vaguenesses, or misunderstandings. Association Theory names the view that every perceptual experience can be associated with but need not have propositional content. Schellenberg uses this insight to argue for a view that sits somewhere between treating the content of perception as representational and as relational. Benj Hellie also argues against the strong content view in "Love in the Time of Cholera. Closely connected is "perceptual experience", which names an aspect of the stream of consciousness that is attended to that has content Comparisons across perception and perceptual experience eo ipso cannot have common content, potentially invalidating indiscriminability arguments. Imagistic and Possible-World Content, we find views that the content of perception is not propositional or representational, but something else. In "What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? What then is the content of hallucinatory experiences? An interesting upshot of his view seems to be that we cannot have perceptual experiences of absences e. The content of perceptual experience consists in only what exists, with simple features, in that location. So if I seem to see a hole in the floorboards, it is because I see the visual boundaries upon which a judgment is made, namely, that there is an absence where there should be a presence. The Constituents of Perceptual Content and the Role of Perception, we find views that attempt to specify the components of perceptual content and the relation of perception to other forms of experience. In "Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: They suggest that there is no common view about the content of perceptual experience across the senses and perhaps even within a single sense. Lycan concurs with Budek and Farkas and many others in pointing out that vision seems to be the best candidate for having representational content. Other senses touch, sound, smell, taste, even proprioception are candidates, too, Lycan claims, though only arguably so. This leads him to point out, at the start of the chapter "What Does Vision Represent? Lycan even acknowledges the possibility that vision does not represent at all. But, assuming it does represent, Lycan posits that vision may represent many aspects of experience: Can "A cloud â€" be seen as the head of Thomas Eakins" or "a wineglass â€" be seen as H. While Lycan is "reasonably sure" we do not represent the cloud as a head or the wineglass as a ship in perceptual experience, he admits not being able to defend his reasonable assurance against the rhetorical question: By the end of his chapter, Lycan asserts that there seems to be no clear line between perception and cognition and so no straightforward way to settle whether the content of perception could also be the content of cognition -- that is, to what extent there is "cognitive penetration" in perceptual experience This leads Lycan to conclude with something of a conundrum: And so he leaves us without definitive answers to the question of what vision does or does not represent. But what does this conclusion have to do with the perceptual experience we had must have had? This concern about the perturbations effected by reflection on perception is one of the deepest insights we owe to the phenomenological tradition and is arguably its methodological foundation. Hellie distinguishes between sensitivity to the environment and those experiences as they manifest in the stream of consciousness. Both Logue and Shellenberg concede there is no guarantee that the content of a perceptual experience is the same as the content of the judgment based on that experience. And Lycan goes further and rightly points out that we must acknowledge the possibility that, in exploring perceptual experience, "attention alters the first-order state, or that it adds content" It seems quite easy to describe experiences in such a way that they demand a content

explanation. And depending on how you describe the experiences, different content explanations are called for. Much harder, it seems, to describe experiences in such a way that they do not. Yet I see no way to avoid feeling deeply uneasy at this point. So what will settle whether some description is the right one, especially if these descriptions as a group serve to ground the view of content being espoused? What of the broader concern that perception apart from description lacks content and it is only our attempts to explain it which lead us to think otherwise? Much of what we use to adjudicate various positions within this debate can be construed as question-begging by someone else. Introspection, reflection, psychosemantics, misperception, linguistic practice, phenomenal contrast, even phenomenology -- these settle nothing. My main thesis remains, that it is hard to see what could establish a claim as to what vision does or does not represent. Another thing that remains is the possibility that the question is a bad one. All this, I fear, is grist to the mill of the skeptics who deny that vision represents in the first place. I probably should not have written this chapter. I am glad he did -- remaining hopeful that though we may have settled nothing, we are gradually advancing towards something. For example, Siegel writes: Even if you are hallucinating rather than seeing, the same basic phenomenological point holds " The point being that: This use is terminologically restrictive, ignoring its original and also current meaning in the continental tradition owed to Edmund Husserl -- namely, the method of describing the invariant structures and features of different types of experiences in a way that is undisturbed by reflection, introspection, or judgment. Considering its quite specific use in this book, the term "phenomenal" seems more appropriate.

Chapter 4 : Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments : Metaphy

It is a structured way of observing and describing a patient's psychological functioning at a given point in time, under the domains of appearance, attitude, behavior, mood, and affect, speech, thought process, thought content, perception, cognition, insight, and judgment.

Theories of Experience For our purposes, a theory of perceptual experience aims to identify a feature that is constitutive of perceptual experience: In this section, we will consider various potential links between theories of experience and the epistemology of perception that can be captured with the following template: The idea here is that experiences have to be a certain way in order to justify beliefs. Now, philosophers might accept a particular instance of the E-M Link, but disagree about whether experiences are the way they need to be in order to justify beliefs about the external world. For example, Davidson and McDowell agree that experiences justify beliefs about the external world only if experiences have contents that can be assessed for truth. Davidson argues that experiences do not justify beliefs about the external world on the grounds that they lack truth-assessable contents, whereas McDowell argues that experiences must have truth-assessable contents given that they justify beliefs about the external world more on their dispute in subsection 1. We can organize our discussion of such agreements and disagreements around the following trio of claims: Epistemology Our experiences justify beliefs about the external world. Something will have to go. Approaches will vary according to their verdict on what exactly must go. In what follows we survey the most prominent instances of the trio. We will start with sense-data theories, then turn to raw feel theories, and theories on which experiences have propositional contents. We will close the part by considering the conscious character of experiences. So sense-data are either going to be mental objects or at any rate very strange non-mental objects. More generally, a sense-datum theory is any view that accepts the following: Here the direction of flow is from epistemology to the philosophy of mind. We can find it in the following famous quote from H. When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt â€” One thing however I cannot doubt: When Price sees a tomato, he may be certain that there is something red and round present. According to critics of the argument, Price is not entitled to be certain of any such thing. For example, his experience might merely represent that there exists something red and round present, where such representation can occur even if nothing red and round is present for more on this objection see the entry on the problem of perception section 3. We can organize our discussion under the following instance of the trio: Epistemology Experiences justify beliefs about the external world. Epistemology-Mind Link 1 If experiences justify beliefs about the external world, then experiences are not relations to sense-data. Mind 1 Experiences are relations to sense-data. In principle, a sense-datum theorist might accept E-M Link 1 and Mind 1, and conclude that Epistemology is false. For example, she might take up a coherence theory of justification, on which our beliefs about the external world are justified by their coherence with each other and not by experiences for more on this move, see the entry on sense-data section 3. Sense-datum theories tell us that the things we are directly aware of in perceptual experience are not ordinary external objects. As the commonly used metaphor has it, sense-data theories draw a veil of ideas over the world. The usual objection holds that this veil makes it impossible for us to gain knowledge or justified belief from experience about the external world. Philosophers such as Berkeley and Reid reject sense-datum theories on the grounds that we do have epistemic access to the world. In response, the sense-datum theorist might deny E-M Link 1. In particular, the theorist might say that experiences justify beliefs about the external world when complemented with reflection on how they are best explained Russell Call this the IBE approach since it concerns Inferences to the Best Explanation of our experiences see Vogel for more contemporary discussion. Setting aside debate about how such an explanation might go, and why it might be the best, the response might not go far enough. To see why the IBE approach might not go far enough, consider the idea that experiences provide non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. If experiences provide non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world, they justify beliefs through a route that does not involve further beliefs. Compare how your sharp pain might justify you directly in believing that you are in pain, without further beliefs playing any role. Contrast how your thermometer might justify you in

believing you have a fever only in conjunction with your having reason to believe the thermometer works. Non-inferential justification is justification that does not involve auxiliary beliefs see Pryor for more detail. On the IBE approach, it seems that experiences at best give us inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. Experiences arguably do better Johnston The veil of ideas objection might then be better put as follows: Epistemology1 Experiences give non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. Epistemology-Mind Link 2 If experiences give non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world, then experiences are not relations to sense-data. So, not-Mind 1 Experiences are not relations to sense-data. Even still, it is unclear why sense-datum theories should rule out getting non-inferential justification from experiences. Perhaps if a sense-datum theory is true, we at best see external objects indirectly, by means of seeing sense-data. But this is a point in the philosophy of mind about seeing and not yet a point about epistemology. Our justification for beliefs could still be non-inferential Moore ; Silins The crucial question for epistemology is about the role of background beliefs, and the mental process of indirect perception need not make use of background beliefs. For instance, whether you indirectly perceive objects by means of sense-data might instead just be a matter of how the sense-data are caused, leaving open the possibility that you gain non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world from sense-data. The thought driving the veil of ideas worry is that if experiences fail to put us in direct contact with reality, then they cannot justify beliefs about external reality. This thought is meant to get us to the conclusion that sense datum theory is false. But it might go too far. The first ramification concerns seeing objects. According to many views, we see ordinary extended objects by seeing their surfaces, rather than seeing them directly see Moore or Broad , and Clarke or Campbell for dispute. As far as seeing objects goes, their facing surfaces play the same role as sense-data did on many versions of the sense-datum theoryâ€™intermediaries not identical with objects that still permit us to see objects by seeing them. But now, if we endorse the veil of ideas objection, the facing surfaces of objects would be a veil over the rest of external reality. Call this the veil of surfaces. Our experiences would fail to give us access to whether we live in a world of ever shifting facades or instead a world of three-dimensional objects as they are ordinarily conceived. Descartes arguably states this problem when he writes: I remember that, when looking from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I see is men, just as I say that I see wax. And yet what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines? It is not clear whether the objection can get us that far. The veil of ideas objection also has controversial ramifications for cases of illusion or hallucination. According to many approaches, your experience might stillâ€™misleadinglyâ€™justify you in believing that reality is the way it visually appears to be. However, if the thought driving the veil of ideas objection is correct, experiences only justify in those cases when you are seeing things as they are. This is quite a demanding view, one that rules out justification in a wide range of cases where many think it is present. For more discussion of views that exclude perceptual justification from cases of illusion or hallucination, see section 2. According to some views, your experience here is a mere sensation, failing to present your surroundings to you cf. According to raw feel theory, all visual experiences are in fact like this, not just exceptional ones. The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified. To get to conclusions about epistemology, some sort of linking principle is needed. For important precedents to Davidson here, see Sellars and Popper We can sketch the issues raised by Davidson with the following instance of our trio: Epistemology-Mind Link 3 If experiences justify beliefs about the external world, then experiences have propositional content. Mind 2 Experiences are raw feels without propositional content. This position was occupied by McDowell and Brewer although they later revised their views in Brewer and McDowell It can be resisted by raw feel theorists, as well as by non-raw feel theorists who fall short of attributing propositional contents to experiences. Why believe E-M Link 3 at all? The experience might still justify the belief that you are having that particular experience, whether or not it is a raw feel. Analogously, if pains are best understood as raw feels, they arguably could still justify you in believing that you have them. In particular, at least if

background beliefs are allowed to play a role, it seems perfectly possible for beliefs about the external world to be justified thanks to the availability of inferences linking particular raw feels with particular conditions of the external world. The justificatory structure here would look like this: One also might try to meet the spirit of the demand that justifiers increase probability or entail without attributing propositional contents to experiences. Many of these ways need not involve propositional content. First, even if experiences lack contents that are assessable for truth, experiences might still have contents that are assessable for accuracy. Alternatively, consider how a map or picture might be accurate or inaccurate without being true or false. When experiences are accurate in either of these ways, other contents of beliefs will be true. So experiences could lack propositional contents, but still count as close enough to entailing the contents of beliefs or to increasing the probability of the contents of beliefs. Second, experiences might lack contents altogether, and not be assessable for truth or accuracy, but still be related in important ways to relations to the world such as seeing Campbell ; McDowell ; Brewer , According to these approaches, your experience justifies a belief about the world only when your experience is a case of seeing the world as it is. You can see the world as it is only if it is in fact that way. Here many of your experiences might be supremely positioned to justify whether or not they have any content.

Chapter 5 : Mental status examination - Wikipedia

From low-level perception of color to higher-level judgments of ethics, there is a robust tendency for perceptual and judgmental standards to "creep" when they ought not to. For example, when blue dots become rare, participants start calling purple dots blue, and when threatening faces become rare, participants start calling neutral faces.

Theoretical foundations[edit] The MSE derives from an approach to psychiatry known as descriptive psychopathology [4] or descriptive phenomenology , [5] which developed from the work of the philosopher and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers. In practice, the MSE is a blend of empathic descriptive phenomenology and empirical clinical observation. It has been argued that the term phenomenology has become corrupted in clinical psychiatry: It is a key part of the initial psychiatric assessment in an out-patient or psychiatric hospital setting. The purpose is to obtain evidence of symptoms and signs of mental disorders, including danger to self and others, that are present at the time of the interview. Appearance[edit] Clinicians assess the physical aspects such as the appearance of a patient, including apparent age, height, weight, and manner of dress and grooming. Colorful or bizarre clothing might suggest mania , while unkempt, dirty clothes might suggest schizophrenia or depression. If the patient appears much older than his or her chronological age this can suggest chronic poor self-care or ill-health. Observations of physical appearance might include the physical features of alcoholism or drug abuse , such as signs of malnutrition , nicotine stains, dental erosion, a rash around the mouth from inhalant abuse , or needle track marks from intravenous drug abuse. Observations can also include any odor which might suggest poor personal hygiene due to extreme self-neglect, or alcohol intoxication. Abnormal movements, for example choreiform , athetoid or choreoathetoid movements may indicate a neurological disorder. A tremor or dystonia may indicate a neurological condition or the side effects of antipsychotic medication. There are a range of abnormalities of movement which are typical of catatonia , such as echopraxia , catalepsy , waxy flexibility and paratonia or gegenhalten [20]. Stereotypies repetitive purposeless movements such as rocking or head banging or mannerisms repetitive quasi-purposeful abnormal movements such as a gesture or abnormal gait may be a feature of chronic schizophrenia or autism. More global behavioural abnormalities may be noted, such as an increase in arousal and movement described as psychomotor agitation or hyperactivity which might reflect mania or delirium. An inability to sit still might represent akathisia , a side effect of antipsychotic medication. Lack of eye contact may suggest depression or autism. Alexithymic individuals may be unable to describe their subjective mood state. An individual who is unable to experience any pleasure may be suffering from anhedonia. Affect may be described as appropriate or inappropriate to the current situation, and as congruent or incongruent with their thought content. For example, someone who shows a bland affect when describing a very distressing experience would be described as showing incongruent affect, which might suggest schizophrenia. The intensity of the affect may be described as normal, blunted affect , exaggerated , flat, heightened or overly dramatic. A flat or blunted affect is associated with schizophrenia, depression or post-traumatic stress disorder ; heightened affect might suggest mania, and an overly dramatic or exaggerated affect might suggest certain personality disorders. Mobility refers to the extent to which affect changes during the interview: The person may show a full range of affect, in other words a wide range of emotional expression during the assessment, or may be described as having restricted affect. The affect may also be described as reactive, in other words changing flexibly and appropriately with the flow of conversation, or as unreactive. This heading is concerned with the production of speech rather than the content of speech, which is addressed under thought process and thought content see below. A structured assessment of speech includes an assessment of expressive language by asking the patient to name objects, repeat short sentences, or produce as many words as possible from a certain category in a set time. Simple language tests form part of the mini-mental state examination. In practice, the structured assessment of receptive and expressive language is often reported under Cognition see below. People with autism spectrum disorders may have abnormalities in paralinguistic and pragmatic aspects of their speech. A person with schizophrenia might use neologisms , which are made-up words which have a specific meaning to the person using them. Speech assessment also contributes to assessment of mood, for example people with

mania or anxiety may have rapid, loud and pressured speech ; on the other hand depressed patients will typically have a prolonged speech latency and speak in a slow, quiet and hesitant manner. Form of the thought is captured in this category. Thought may be described as circumstantial when a patient includes a great deal of irrelevant detail and makes frequent diversions, but remains focused on the broad topic. I love to eat peaches, beach beaches, sand castles fall in the waves, braves are going to the finals, fee fi fo fum. Alternatively an individual may be described as having retarded or inhibited thinking, in which thoughts seem to progress slowly with few associations. Poverty of thought is a global reduction in the quantity of thought and one of the negative symptoms of schizophrenia. It can also be a feature of severe depression or dementia. A patient with dementia might also experience thought perseveration. Thought perseveration refers to a pattern where a person keeps returning to the same limited set of ideas. Circumstantial thinking might be observed in anxiety disorders or certain kinds of personality disorders. One should separate the thought content into pathological thought, versus non-pathological thought. Importantly one should specify suicidal thoughts as either intrusive, unwanted, and not able to translate in the capacity to act on these thoughts mens rea , versus suicidal thoughts that may lead to the act of suicide actus reus. For instance an alliance to a particular political party, or sports team would not be considered a delusion in some societies. There are several other forms of delusions, these include descriptions such as: I was a goat last year among others. Delusions should be reported as primary coming from no particular source , secondary sourced from another delusion or hallucinations , tertiary sourced from a secondary delusion , or a delusional system a network off associated delusions. Delusional symptoms can be reported as on a continuum from: Delusions can suggest several diseases such as schizophrenia , schizophreniform disorder , a brief psychotic episode , mania , depression with psychotic features, or delusional disorders. One can differentiate delusional disorders from schizophrenia for example by the age of onset for delusional disorders being older with a more complete and unaffected personality, where the delusion may only partially impact their life and be fairly encapsulated off from the rest of their formed personality. Whereas schizophrenia typically arises earlier in life with a disintegration of personality and a failure to cope with work, relationships, or education. Other features differentiate diseases with delusions as well. Delusions may be described as mood- congruent the delusional content in keeping with the mood , typical of manic or depressive psychoses , or mood-incongruent delusional content not in keeping with the mood which are more typical of schizophrenia. Delusions of control, or passivity experiences in which the individual has the experience of the mind or body being under the influence or control of some kind of external force or agency , are typical of schizophrenia. Examples of this include experiences of thought withdrawal , thought insertion , thought broadcasting , and somatic passivity. Schneiderian first rank symptoms are a set of delusions and hallucinations which have been said to be highly suggestive of a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Delusions of guilt, delusions of poverty, and nihilistic delusions belief that one has no mind or is already dead are typical of depressive psychoses. Overvalued Ideas[edit] An overvalued idea is an emotionally charged belief that may be held with sufficient conviction to make believer emotionally charged or aggressive but that fails to possess all three characteristics of delusionâ€”most importantly, incongruity with cultural norms. Therefore, any strong, fixed, false, but culturally normative belief can be considered an "overvalued idea". Obsessions are typically intrusive thoughts of violence, injury, dirt or sex, or obsessive ruminations on intellectual themes. A person can also describe obsessional doubt, with intrusive worries about whether they have made the wrong decision, or forgotten to do something, for example turn off the gas or lock the house. In obsessive-compulsive disorder , the individual experiences obsessions with or without compulsions a sense of having to carry out certain ritualized and senseless actions against their wishes. Phobias[edit] A phobia is "a dread of an object or situation that does not in reality pose any threat", [43] and is distinct from a delusion in that the patient is aware that the fear is irrational. A phobia is usually highly specific to certain situations and will usually be reported by the patient rather than being observed by the clinician in the assessment interview. Clinically significant preoccupations would include thoughts of suicide , homicidal thoughts, suspicious or fearful beliefs associated with certain personality disorders, depressive beliefs for example that one is unloved or a failure , or the cognitive distortions of anxiety and depression. Suicidal thoughts[edit] The MSE contributes to clinical risk assessment by including a thorough

exploration of any suicidal or hostile thought content. The most important questions to ask are: Do you have suicidal feeling now; have you ever attempted suicide highly correlated with future suicide attempts ; do you have plans to commit suicide in the future; and, do you have any deadlines where you may commit suicide i. A hallucination is defined as a sensory perception in the absence of any external stimulus, and is experienced in external or objective space i. An illusion is defined as a false sensory perception in the presence of an external stimulus, in other words a distortion of a sensory experience, and may be recognized as such by the subject. A pseudohallucination is experienced in internal or subjective space for example as "voices in my head" and is regarded as akin to fantasy. Hallucinations can occur in any of the five senses, although auditory and visual hallucinations are encountered more frequently than tactile touch , olfactory smell or gustatory taste hallucinations. Auditory hallucinations are typical of psychoses: Visual hallucinations are generally suggestive of organic conditions such as epilepsy , drug intoxication or drug withdrawal. Many of the visual effects of hallucinogenic drugs are more correctly described as visual illusions or visual pseudohallucinations, as they are distortions of sensory experiences, and are not experienced as existing in objective reality. Auditory pseudohallucinations are suggestive of dissociative disorders. Unlike other sections of the MSE, use is made of structured tests in addition to unstructured observation. Alertness is a global observation of level of consciousness i. Orientation is assessed by asking the patient where he or she is for example what building, town and state and what time it is time, day, date. Attention and concentration are assessed by several tests, commonly serial sevens test subtracting 7 from and subtracting 7 from the difference 5 times. Memory is assessed in terms of immediate registration repeating a set of words , short-term memory recalling the set of words after an interval, or recalling a short paragraph , and long-term memory recollection of well known historical or geographical facts. Visuospatial functioning can be assessed by the ability to copy a diagram, draw a clock face, or draw a map of the consulting room. Executive functioning can be screened for by asking the "similarities" questions "what do x and y have in common? The mini-mental state examination is a simple structured cognitive assessment which is in widespread use as a component of the MSE. Mild impairment of attention and concentration may occur in any mental illness where people are anxious and distractible including psychotic states , but more extensive cognitive abnormalities are likely to indicate a gross disturbance of brain functioning such as delirium, dementia or intoxication. Visuospatial or constructional abnormalities here may be associated with parietal lobe pathology, and abnormalities in executive functioning tests may indicate frontal lobe pathology. This kind of brief cognitive testing is regarded as a screening process only, and any abnormalities are more carefully assessed using formal neuropsychological testing. Frontal lobe pathology is suggested if the person cannot repetitively execute a motor sequence e. Pathology in the basal ganglia may be indicated by rigidity and resistance to movement of the limbs, and by the presence of characteristic involuntary movements. Focal neurological signs such as these might reflect the effects of some prescribed psychiatric medications, chronic drug or alcohol use, head injuries , tumors or other brain disorders. In this context, insight can be said to have three components: One should frame judgement to the functions or domains that are normal vs impaired. Traditionally, the MSE included the use of standard hypothetical questions such as "what would you do if you found a stamped, addressed envelope lying in the street? Impaired judgment is not specific to any diagnosis but may be a prominent feature of disorders affecting the frontal lobe of the brain. Culturally normative spiritual and religious beliefs need to be distinguished from delusions and hallucinations - these may seem similar to one who does not understand that they have different roots. In this group, tools such as play materials, puppets, art materials or diagrams for instance with multiple choices of facial expressions depicting emotions may be used to facilitate recall and explanation of experiences.

Chapter 6 : The Contents of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Lateralization of perception of various facial attributes (age, attractiveness, gender, lip-reading and expression) was studied using chimaeric faces in which the sides of the face differed along one dimension (e.g. the left side was male and the right side female).

Rebugio Abstract Since the inception of the intelligence discipline, there have always been problems associated with the collection and analysis of information. Several of these problems occur because the human mind is easily influenced by internal and external factors. Biases and perceptions can lead to a misconstrued view of reality and the way we process information. In the case of the Cold War, these factors contributed to challenges and failures in intelligence. The primary research question is to find out how do bias and perception affect our judgment? This paper will seek to answer the research question by looking at the intelligence failures and the causes for those failures during the Cold War. The purpose of this case study is to allow the reader to better understand the factors that ultimately led to errors in analysis by the US Intelligence Community IC. In doing so, the reader can be better aware of errors that can be prevented in the future and ultimately lead to better intelligence analysis. The study site of research was the event of the Cold War including the actual engagements that occurred. The primary players in this study were members of the intelligence community. Due to the different countries of interests during the Cold War, United States policymakers and intelligence analysts held varying degrees of bias and perception towards the adversaries. However, this research has shown that the phenomenon of the rational actor theory, Western perception, risk aversion, underestimating the enemy, politicized intelligence, and image theory was all evident throughout this multiple-case study. At the outset of this research, the focus was to see how bias and perception affects intelligence analysis. However, the findings have shown that the decision makers are also affected. When you combine the negative effects of bias and perception on both ends of the relationship, the error in judgment is compounded and makes for a dangerous outcome; thus leading to inevitable intelligence failure.

Introduction Since the inception of the intelligence discipline, there have always been problems associated with the collection and analysis of information. The term policy maker and decision maker will be used interchangeably throughout this study. A research was conducted regarding motivational bias and its effects on international crisis, the outcome was surprisingly high. The author claims motivated bias as the primary reason for why decision makers are hesitant to change their original statements on policies, which ultimately leads to poor decision making. The motivational explanation goes something like this "the intelligence information should have suggested that decision makers consider a certain alternative but the decision makers freeze previous images and remain path-dependent, which precludes the consideration of such alternatives. Motivationally, policy makers manage to minimize data that do not conform to the accepted narrative. The paper Intelligence Analysis is written by William E. First, he defines what the scopes of responsibilities are within the intelligence analyst. Second, how evolving technology has affected intelligence collection and analysis. Third, the author identifies the limits of the intelligence analyst and suggestions on how to improve the production of better intelligence. If that were the case then their sole reason for existence as policy and decision makers would be irrelevant. Historical examples are given in this paper where pressure, in this case, from higher authority has caused intelligence to conform to the position of power. This is a dangerous occurrence that has cost thousands of American lives. The author does pose the question of whether there are any instances where the intelligence officer has had any success in persuading the decision maker to change his mind from their original biased perception of a situation. Most certainly these instances have occurred yet the author does not cover any specifics. Odom makes the argument that some degree of bias and perception is inevitable and all a person can do is to mitigate it as best as one can. Odom claims that the US Army and politicians had a propensity to simplify the recent wars in the Middle East as such: Obviously these are the same things that senior political leaders in Washington also needed to know. If they had a better understanding about the Vietnamese people and their culture, their negative bias and perception could have been mitigated. This would have allowed them to gain a better perspective of their area of operations which leads to better

decision making. The author provides a good solution that can help mitigate intelligence analysis failures. Odom suggests analysts need to have a good understanding of the constraints amongst political and military decision makers. Analysts need to understand how the systems and processes work within the political and military system. By doing so, they can better prepare their analysis and present the information to the decision makers that allow them to choose from reduced uncertainties. The author seems to take a pragmatic view that bias is inevitable and that it will always be present in intelligence analysis. However, the author never really states his thoughts on why it is inevitable other than it being human nature. Is there really more to bias than just being an innate trait? Thus far, this gap still remains as to why bias is inevitable. In the paper Error, Folly, and Policy Intelligence the author discusses three main points that lead to poor policy and decision making. For rational decision making, it would make sense for the individual to gather as much information about a situation prior to making a judgment call. According to Stempel, rational choice theorists do the exact opposite. They only see the situation from their own biases. There are other explanations for what leads to errors in decision making. When one compounds arrogance with stubbornness the path to ill decision making is inevitable. Even if given all the facts and information, decision makers will maintain their stance based on irrational thinking. A person with humility makes little room for arrogance and stubbornness. It would do away, not completely, with the tendency to ignore warning signs that may contradict with what policy makers believe based on loose facts and information. Methodology The strategy to be used in this research will be a case study while utilizing the multiple-case study design. The purpose of this multiple-case study is to understand how bias and perception affects our judgment with regards to intelligence during the Cold War. This descriptive design is restricted within the confines of history. The multiple-case study design will be used in order to replicate the end result in each study. A case study strategy is appropriate for this research because we will be observing a specific phenomenon in a given period of time. Due to my past experiences from serving in the military, I have seen on multiple occasions when bias and perception has affected the decision making process. What my experience brings is the similar relationship between the superior and the subordinate. The term leader and commander will be used interchangeably. Although I have not had experience working directly with policy and other decision makers of the like, a comparison can be made to military commanders. Commanders are ultimately responsible for making decisions in both garrison and combat environment. Like policy makers, they too are subject to bias and perception. The first three years of my military experience consisted of holding relatively junior officer positions: Since I am in the military, my view is also somewhat biased against policy makers who make decisions that ultimately affect the lives of the men and women in uniform. With that being said, I will try my best to look at the findings objectively without incorporating my own bias. The setting of this study will be conducted primarily in an office and personal room location due to the restrictions imposed by currently residing in a combat zone. The persons under study will be the policy and decision makers who either resided stateside or overseas. This also includes the military commanders in charge or held a position of authority and influence regarding the different events. The others under study will be the subordinate intelligence analysts and officers involved in providing the information and intelligence to the policy and decision makers. Due to environmental constraints previously mentioned, there will not be any direct interaction with the actors involved in the study. Therefore, there is minimal ethical consideration since all the actors to be studied will be solely from documents collected. Despite multiple reporting from several intelligence sources that the Chinese would indeed involve themselves in the Korean War, the US analysts refused to believe it. This Korean War intervention completely surprised the US because they did not think it was a rational action by the Chinese. The other problem regarding judgment in analysis and decision making is viewing the issue from a Western perspective. To an American, intervening in the Korean War was irrational but from the Chinese perspective, it was obviously a rational move. The only time this is beneficial, and still not always applicable, is when dealing with internal American problems. In the profession of intelligence and foreign policy, we must constantly view the issues from our allies and adversaries mind. Hedley concludes that the mistake of analysts and decision makers to rely on a rational actor contributed to the intelligence failures of the Cold War. In September 19, a prominent intelligence analyst within the IC, Sherman Kent, predicted that it was unlikely for the Soviets to send nuclear missiles across the

Atlantic and into Cuba. How could someone of such highly regarded analytical skills be so wrong in his prediction? Sherman Kent and his colleagues had predicted Nikita Khrushchev to be a rational actor. Therefore this led Kent to predict the only rational move for Khrushchev was to maintain the missiles in Russia. The problem with this perception is that the human mind can be very unpredictable. Kent and his colleagues further obscured the predicament by viewing it solely from an American perspective. In the early s, the IC conducted a study of twelve events that at a minimum resulted in unfavorable outcomes for the United States. This study covered the significant events that occurred from the roughly previous twenty years. Analysts had the proclivity to establish and maintain the consensus of thought and did very little in terms of challenging the status quo. This also led to a single path of thinking; therefore any challenging analysis fell off the wayside. A primary purpose for conducting predictions is to forecast multiple outcomes in order for analysts to determine the variables and to inform the decision makers on the presented options. Both Hanoi and Peiping are almost certainly anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry might be brought to bear against them, and they almost certainly feel "under present circumstances at least" that they will not have to initiate actions carrying great risk of such US response in order to win the day in time. This perception was most likely shared amongst the policy makers back in Washington. History has shown that Americans have repeatedly underestimated their enemies, especially when the adversaries were seen as inferior and unintelligent people. It could be argued that the interaction between the policymakers and intelligence community during the Cold War was a foreshadowing of how the events would unfold regarding Iraq WMDs in to The policymakers of the Cold War put such political pressure on the intelligence analysts that eventually they succumbed. In the essay Vietnam: In the case of the Cold War, good and unbiased analysis never truly came to fruition due to the fostering of an environment that suppressed countering views imposed by the politicians. Image theory according to M. This means that the US viewed them as being culturally equal but also a military threat. History has shown that the US has viewed most Asian adversaries as inferior and unintelligent yet in fact it has been quite the exact opposite.

Chapter 7 : Mental Status Examination in Primary Care: A Review - - American Family Physician

What Makes Perceptual Content Non-conceptual? Sean D. Kelly [1] In The Varieties of Reference (; hereafter VOR), Gareth Evans argues that the content of our perceptual experiences is unlike the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements about the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application.

Chapter 8 : Clinical Practice Guidelines : Mental state examination

If the Necessity thesis is true, it allows for rich connections between theories of perceptual experience and theories of perceptual justification. Consider for instance the debate about "high-level" content.