

Chapter 1 : The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - Wikipedia

The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World and millions of other books are available for Amazon Kindle. Learn more Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Gray and Jeffrey G. Barlow
I I t is the thesis of this article that the legacy of the s has been-and indeed remains-a potentially very dangerous mismatch between U. Furthermore, we contend that the cumulatively very substantial adverse shift in the complex military balance between East and West during the s: The Carter Administration has to be the particular, though far from exclusive , target of the charge of neglecting U. Recognition of adverse trends in relative military capability and, more arguably, consequent dangers of political disadvantage was by no means confined to the conservative campaign rhetoric of or to the many publications of The Committee on the Present Danger. On the contrary, it is instructive to note what two well-respected senior officials of the Carter Administration had to say in about American defense and arms control performance over a period that included, at that time of writing and speaking, three years of their "watch. Critical turning points in the histories of nations are difficult to recognize at the time. Usually, they become clear only in retrospect. Nonetheless, the United States may well be at such a turning point today. We face a decision that we have been deferring for too long; we can defer it no longer. We must decide Colin S. Gray w a s Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute from to , and is the author of numerous books and articles on U. Barlow is a senior military analyst with National Security Research, Inc. From to , Dr. The section on strategic forces in this article was written by Dr. Gray, and the section on general purpose forces is by Dr. The alternative is to let ourselves slip into inferiority. Arms control has essentially failed. Three decades of U. In his final Annual Report as Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown demonstrated, with almost painful clarity, that the proximate problem was U. Statistics can lie or mislead, but two figures tell the essential story. See Figures 1 and 2. The unarguable fact is that the Reagan Administration, in , confronted a decade-long pattern of a higher level of Soviet defense investment. Judgments as to the superiority or inferiority of forces must always be rendered specific to time, place, and issue You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Chapter 2 : The Decline of American Power | The New Press

Obama, while continuing to trumpet "American exceptionalism", regularly prefaces remarks on foreign affairs by acknowledging the limits of US power, again with little public outcry.

Ready to fight back? Sign up for Take Action Now and get three actions in your inbox every week. You can read our Privacy Policy here. Thank you for signing up. For more from The Nation, check out our latest issue. Support Progressive Journalism The Nation is reader supported: Travel With The Nation Be the first to hear about Nation Travels destinations, and explore the world with kindred spirits. Sign up for our Wine Club today. Did you know you can support The Nation by drinking wine? This piece originally appeared at TomDispatch. A soft landing for America 40 years from now? The demise of the United States as the global superpower could come far more quickly than anyone imagines. If Washington is dreaming of or as the end of the American Century, a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends suggests that in , just 15 years from now, it could all be over except for the shouting. Ad Policy Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at their history should remind us that they are fragile organisms. So delicate is their ecology of power that, when things start to go truly bad, empires regularly unravel with unholy speed: However, instead of the bloodshed that marked the end of so many past empires, with cities burning and civilians slaughtered, this twenty-first century imperial collapse could come relatively quietly through the invisible tendrils of economic collapse or cyberwarfare. But have no doubt: As a half-dozen European nations have discovered, imperial decline tends to have a remarkably demoralizing impact on a society, regularly bringing at least a generation of economic privation. As the economy cools, political temperatures rise, often sparking serious domestic unrest. Available economic, educational, and military data indicate that, when it comes to US global power, negative trends will aggregate rapidly by and are likely to reach a critical mass no later than The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and fading by , its eighth decade, and could be history by By , according to current plans, the Pentagon will throw a military Hail Mary pass for a dying empire. Ordinary Americans, watching their jobs head overseas, have a more realistic view than their cosseted leaders. The future scenarios include: While these are hardly the only possibilities when it comes to American decline or even collapse, they offer a window into an onrushing future. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself. Similarly, American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. A harbinger of further decline: Add to this clear evidence that the US education system, that source of future scientists and innovators, has been falling behind its competitors. After leading the world for decades in to year-olds with university degrees, the country sank to 12th place in The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the US are now foreigners, most of whom will be heading home, not staying here as once would have happened. By , in other words, the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. Suddenly, the cost of imports soars. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad, Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. Under pressure at home and abroad, Washington slowly pulls US forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. By now, however, it is far too late. Meanwhile, amid soaring prices, ever-rising unemployment, and a continuing decline in real wages, domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates, often over remarkably irrelevant issues. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence. Compounding the problem, the Chinese and Indians have suddenly become far heavier energy consumers. Other developed nations are meeting this threat aggressively by plunging into experimental programs to develop alternative energy sources. The United States has taken a different path, doing far too little to develop alternative sources while, in the last three decades, doubling its dependence on foreign oil imports. Scenario The United States remains so dependent upon

foreign oil that a few adverse developments in the global energy market in spark an oil shock. By comparison, it makes the oil shock when prices quadrupled in just months look like the proverbial molehill. That only hikes the cost of US oil imports further. At the same moment, while signing a new series of long-term delivery contracts with China, the Saudis stabilize their own foreign exchange reserves by switching to the Yuan. All the elements that long assured the United States limitless supplies of low-cost oil from that region—logistics, exchange rates, and naval power—evaporate. The oil shock that follows hits the country like a hurricane, sending prices to startling heights, making travel a staggeringly expensive proposition, putting real wages which had long been declining into freefall, and rendering non-competitive whatever American exports remained. With thermostats dropping, gas prices climbing through the roof, and dollars flowing overseas in return for costly oil, the American economy is paralyzed. With long-fraying alliances at an end and fiscal pressures mounting, US military forces finally begin a staged withdrawal from their overseas bases. Within a few years, the US is functionally bankrupt and the clock is ticking toward midnight on the American Century. Present Situation Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures. These operations, irrational even from an imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power. Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until defeat becomes debacle. In 1571, a dying imperial Spain dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in Morocco. In 1882, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by attacking Suez. And in 1953 and 1961, the US occupied Afghanistan and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to 100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and extended its commitment to Korea and beyond, courting disasters large and small in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires. With the US military stretched thin from Somalia to the Philippines and tensions rising in Israel, Iran, and Korea, possible combinations for a disastrous military crisis abroad are multifold. Soon, mullahs are preaching jihad from mosques throughout the region, and Afghan Army units, long trained by American forces to turn the tide of the war, begin to desert en masse. Taliban fighters then launch a series of remarkably sophisticated strikes aimed at US garrisons across the country, sending American casualties soaring. In scenes reminiscent of Saigon in 1975, US helicopters rescue American soldiers and civilians from rooftops in Kabul and Kandahar. With gas prices soaring and refineries running dry, Washington makes its move, sending in Special Operations forces to seize oil ports in the Persian Gulf. This, in turn, sparks a rash of suicide attacks and the sabotage of pipelines and oil wells. With its growing resources, Beijing is claiming a vast maritime arc from Korea to Indonesia long dominated by the US Navy. To check China and extend its military position globally, Washington is intent on building a new digital network of air and space robotics, advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, and electronic surveillance. Military planners expect this integrated system to envelop the Earth in a cyber-grid capable of blinding entire armies on the battlefield or taking out a single terrorist in field or favela. By 2025, if all goes according to plan, the Pentagon will launch a three-tiered shield of space drones—reaching from stratosphere to exosphere, armed with agile missiles, linked by a resilient modular satellite system, and operated through total telescopic surveillance. Last April, the Pentagon made history. It extended drone operations into the exosphere by quietly launching the X-47B unmanned space shuttle into a low orbit 250 miles above the planet. The X-47B is the first in a new generation of unmanned vehicles that will mark the full weaponization of space, creating an arena for future warfare unlike anything that has gone before. Scenario The technology of space and cyberwarfare is so new and untested that even the most outlandish scenarios may soon be superseded by a reality still hard to conceive. While cyber-shoppers pound the portals of Best Buy for deep discounts on the latest home electronics from China, US Air Force technicians at the Space Surveillance Telescope SST on Maui choke on their coffee as their panoramic screens suddenly blip to black. The first overt strike is one nobody predicted. It suddenly fires all the rocket pods beneath its enormous foot wingspan, sending dozens of lethal missiles plunging harmlessly into the Yellow Sea, effectively disarming this formidable weapon. Determined to fight fire with fire, the White House authorizes a retaliatory strike. In near panic, the Air Force launches its Falcon Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle into an arc 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean and then, just 20 minutes later, sends the computer codes to fire missiles at seven Chinese

satellites in nearby orbits. The launch codes are suddenly inoperative. Carrier fleets begin steaming in circles in the mid-Pacific. Fighter squadrons are grounded. Reaper drones fly aimlessly toward the horizon, crashing when their fuel is exhausted. Within hours, the military power that had dominated the globe for nearly a century has been defeated in World War III without a single human casualty. A New World Order? Even if future events prove duller than these four scenarios suggest, every significant trend points toward a far more striking decline in American global power by than anything Washington now seems to be envisioning. As allies worldwide begin to realign their policies to take cognizance of rising Asian powers, the cost of maintaining or more overseas military bases will simply become unsustainable, finally forcing a staged withdrawal on a still-unwilling Washington. With both the US and China in a race to weaponize space and cyberspace, tensions between the two powers are bound to rise, making military conflict by at least feasible, if hardly guaranteed. Complicating matters even more, the economic, military, and technological trends outlined above will not operate in tidy isolation. As happened to European empires after World War II, such negative forces will undoubtedly prove synergistic. They will combine in thoroughly unexpected ways, create crises for which Americans are remarkably unprepared, and threaten to spin the economy into a sudden downward spiral, consigning this country to a generation or more of economic misery. As US power recedes, the past offers a spectrum of possibilities for a future world order. At one end of this spectrum, the rise of a new global superpower, however unlikely, cannot be ruled out. Yet both China and Russia evince self-referential cultures, recondite non-roman scripts, regional defense strategies, and underdeveloped legal systems, denying them key instruments for global dominion. At the moment then, no single superpower seems to be on the horizon likely to succeed the US. In a dark, dystopian version of our global future, a coalition of transnational corporations, multilateral forces like NATO, and an international financial elite could conceivably forge a single, possibly unstable, supra-national nexus that would make it no longer meaningful to speak of national empires at all. While denationalized corporations and multinational elites would assumedly rule such a world from secure urban enclaves, the multitudes would be relegated to urban and rural wastelands. In *Planet of Slums*, Mike Davis offers at least a partial vision of such a world from the bottom up. In this neo-Westphalian world order, with its endless vistas of micro-violence and unchecked exploitation, each hegemon would dominate its immediate region—Brasilia in South America, Washington in North America, Pretoria in southern Africa, and so on.

Chapter 3 : The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World - Immanuel Wallerstein - Google

The problem of American power in the twenty-first century, then, is not one of decline but what to do in light of the realization that even the largest country cannot achieve the outcomes it wants without the help of others.

Share via Email Everyone plays favorites. This is a deep and worsening flaw in our collective character, as telling a sign of American decline as our terrible math skills, our tragic and preventable high infant mortality rate or the depreciation of our GDP vis-a-vis China. Baseball is the most individualist of our major team sports: Especially in its central competition pitcher vs. The outcome of every pitch of every game a hundred one-on-one micro-battles of wit, timing and accuracy is determined as much by savvy and feint of hand as it is by speed and strength. Think of the submarine relief pitcher, scraping his knuckles on the mound as he throws a deceptive sinker. Or the knuckleballer, floating butterfly pitches at a tantalising 60mph. Baseball is a complicated, quirky endeavour that rewards kooks who do things their own way. My least favourite thing about football well, at least until recently, when medical research has proven that its gladiatorial and criminalising are beyond my moral comfort zone has always been that the players wear helmets that cover their faces. It offers a fascinating window into human psychology, and allows for easier emotional connection with the otherwise meaningless games that we project our workaday hopes and fears and anger and miseries onto. Sports are essentially escapist, right? Why else would we watch? This facelessness of football falls in line with its overall ethos. Far more team-oriented in its play, the sport is based on the subjugation of the self to a collective effort. A group of men pushing in a single direction, directing all their will and power towards a shared goal: The all-for-one-and-one-for-all aspect of the game buffers the militaristic metaphors so often employed to describe it. How many wars has America fought over the past 50 years? How many of them still rage on in one form or another? How many quagmires do we find ourselves stuck in? How much harm have they done to us? Might makes right in this ugly worldview, as it does in football. Watch a group of defenders tackle a running back at the line of scrimmage. Individual expression, steamrolled by a horde. An America that worships football and ignores baseball is one choosing its worse angels over its better ones. It is we are a dumb, floundering nation.

Chapter 4 : Donald Trump Might Set a Record for the Biggest Decline of American Power in History | The

"Today, the United States is a superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control." —From The Decline of American Power.

These new transportation routes also will connect China with the participating nations and Europe. China today faces the problem of insufficient demand for its products and limited prospects for profitable domestic investment. Beijing is responding to these problems pretty much as Britain and the United States did in the latter part of the 19th century: As both Britain and the United States demonstrated, economic expansion begets geopolitical expansion. Economic clout can buy a lot of political influence. But the lines of communication linking the home country to its overseas markets must be protected. And political stability must be maintained where the home country is investing. For Britain and the United States, economic expansion resulted in the inexorable expansion of their military power and diplomatic sway. It is a powerful incentive for China to expand its military projection capabilities. Beijing will be compelled to assume an increasingly active role in managing regional security in places affected by OBOR—especially in Central Asia and Pakistan, which are plagued by political instability and terrorism. When discussing the Sino-American rivalry, attention is focused on the military balance between the United States and China and to flashpoints between the two countries that could spark a conflict—the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula. Though Huntsman has plenty of company on this issue in the foreign policy establishment, we would do better to heed the advice of the great Hall of Fame pitcher Satchel Paige. In 1929, the United States accounted for about 25 percent of gross world product. Today it accounts for around 18 percent. Some analysts have come up with clever arguments to discount the importance of these economic trends. But the reality of U. A strain of thinking called hegemonic stability theory holds that a liberal, open international economy requires an overarching power to manage and stabilize the system by creating a political and security order that permits economic openness. Having declined to grasp the mantle of leadership during the 19th century, Washington seized it decisively after World War II. Johns Hopkins professor Michael Mandelbaum has argued that, following the Cold War, the United States essentially acted as a de facto government for the international system by providing security and managing the global economy. After all, an economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. But America plunged the world into economic crisis when its financial system seized up with the sub-prime mortgage crisis. During the Great Recession, however, the U. Instead, he said, the world would have to look to China and other emerging market states plus Germany to be the motors of global recovery. Another example of how the U. Obama administration economic policymakers were guided by the Keynesian lessons learned from the 1930s Great Depression: Washington wanted Germany to export less and import more. German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that for states—especially ones already deeply in debt—to accumulate more debt in an effort to spend themselves out of the Great Recession would only set the stage for an even greater crisis down the road. The Great Recession spurred calls for a major overhaul of the international institutional order as evidenced by the emergence of the G20, demands for IMF and World Bank reform, and a push for expanded membership of the UN Security Council. As Beijing rolled out its AIIB plans, the Obama administration kicked into high gear diplomatically in an attempt to squelch it. Those joining included U. America has been slowly, almost imperceptibly, losing its grip on global leadership for some time, and the Great Recession merely accelerated that process. But Paul Kennedy was correct when he noted in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* that in the history of the modern international system since around 1650 no state has managed to remain permanently atop the great power pyramid. Only America could project air and naval power globally. And, of course, the United States alone had atomic weapons. Additionally, the United States kept the Soviet Union at bay until that artificial regime collapsed of its own weight. All this represented a remarkable achievement, ensuring relative peace and prosperity for more than half a century. Washington said it opposed AIIB because of doubts that it would adhere to the same environmental, governance, lending, transparency, labor, and human rights standards practiced by the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank. In fact, the U. Among American security studies scholars, even

those who once firmly believed that unipolarity would last far into the future now grudgingly concede that the era of American hegemony may be drawing to a close. His argument is superficially attractive because it posits that, even if the material foundations of U. This almost certainly is incorrect. On the contrary, the evidence suggests China wants to reshape the international order to reflect its own interests, norms, and values. As Martin Jacques puts it: The main plan of American soft power is democracy within nation-states; China by way of contrast emphasizes democracy between nation-statesâ€”most notably in respect for sovereigntyâ€”and democracy in the world system. They believe that rules and institutions are politically neutral and thus ipso facto beneficial for all. In this world, great power competition and conflict are transcended by rules, norms, and international institutions. The problem is that this misconstrues how the world works. Great power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In global politics, the rules are made by those who rule. But Beijing, by all the evidence, does not see it that way. Instead of living within the geopolitical, economic, and institutional confines imposed by Pax Americana, an increasingly powerful China will seek to revise the international order so that it reflects its own political and economic interests.

Chapter 5 : The decline of US power? - BBC News

The New Press has published After Liberalism, The Decline of American Power, and a collection of his works, The Essential Wallerstein. He lives in New Haven, Connecticut, and Paris, France. He lives in New Haven, Connecticut, and Paris, France.

Summary[edit] Kennedy argues that the strength of a Great Power can be properly measured only relative to other powers, and he provides a straightforward and persuasively argued thesis: Great Power ascendancy over the long term or in specific conflicts correlates strongly to available resources and economic durability; military overstretch and a concomitant relative decline are the consistent threats facing powers whose ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base can provide for. He concludes that declining countries can experience greater difficulties in balancing their preferences for guns, butter and investments. The relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society than to another. It briefly discusses the Ming page 4 and Muslim worlds page 9 of the time and the rise of the western powers relative to them page The book then proceeds chronologically, looking at each of the power shifts over time and the effect on other Great Powers and the " Middle Powers ". Kennedy uses a number of measures to indicate real, relative and potential strength of nations throughout the book. He changes the metric of power based on the point in time. Chapter 2, "The Habsburg Bid for Mastery , â€œ" emphasizes the role of the "manpower revolution" in changing the way Europeans fought wars see military revolution. There are no stunning contrasts in evidence here; success and failure are to be measured by very narrow differences. All states, even the United Provinces, were placed under severe strain by the constant drain of resources for military and naval campaigns The victory of the anti-Habsburg forces was, then, a marginal and relative one. They had managed, but only just, to maintain the balance between their material base and their military power better than their Habsburg opponents. Kennedy presents a table page 81, Table 2 of "British Wartime Expenditures and Revenue"; between and is especially illustrative, showing that Britain was able to maintain loans at around one-third of British wartime expenditures throughout that period Total Wartime Expenditures, â€œ" This chapter ends on the Napoleonic Wars and the fusion of British financial strength with a newfound industrial strength. The United Kingdom grows from 10 in , to 16 in , 25 in , 64 in , 87 in , to in page Relative shares of world manufacturing output also first appearing on page are used to estimate the peaks and troughs of power for major states. China, for example, begins with Kennedy also emphasizes productivity increase, based on systematic interventions, which led to economic growth and prosperity for great powers in the 20th century. He compares the great powers at the close of the 20th century and predicts the decline of the Soviet Union, the rise of China and Japan, the struggles and potential for the European Economic Community EEC , and the relative decline of the United States. He predicts that continued deficit spending , especially on military build-up, will be the single most important reason for decline of any great power. During this time the U. From the s onward, the U. In the space of a few years, the U. He comments that the map of U. Part Two, Strategy and Economics Today and Tomorrow Stability and Change in a Bipolar World, To the Twenty-first Century Maps, tables and charts[edit] The book has twelve maps, forty-nine tables and three charts to assist the reader in understanding the text. It reached number six on the list of best-selling hardcover books for

Chapter 6 : Project MUSE - Inexcusable Restraint: The Decline of American Military Power in the s

Ahead of the LSE North America Forum in New York City, LSE Professors Michael Cox, Danny Quah, and Peter Trubowitz discuss the future of American power in the changing world order.

He was, after all, the candidate who sensed it first. And he swore that he and he alone was the best shot Americans, or at least non-immigrant white Americans, had at ever seeing the best of days again. Ad Policy This article originally appeared at TomDispatch. To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the latest updates from TomDispatch. Meanwhile, at home, despite all that wealth, despite billionaires galore , including the one running for president, despite the transnational corporate heaven inhabited by Google and Facebook and Apple and the rest of the crew, parts of this country and its infrastructure were starting to feel distinctly to use a word from another universe Third Worldish. He sensed that, too. He regularly said things like this: We have obsolete airports. We have obsolete trains. We have bad roads. Not as they were experiencing it. And because of that, Donald Trump won the lottery. He entered the Oval Office with almost 50 percent of the vote and a fervent base of support for his promised program of doing it all over again, s-style. It had been one hell of a pitch from the businessman billionaire. He had promised a future of stratospheric terrificness , of greatness on an historic scale. He promised to keep the evil onesâ€”the rapists , job thieves, and terroristsâ€”away, to wall them out or toss them out or ban them from ever traveling here. And early as it is in the Trump era, it seems as if, on one score at least, he could deliver something for the record books going back to the times when those recording the acts of rulers were still scratching them out in clay or wax. It could prove to be a fall for the ages. Admittedly, that other superpower of the Cold War era, the Soviet Union, imploded in , which was about the fastest way imaginable to leave the global stage. It was never Rome, or Spain, or Great Britain. It stood by itself at, as its proponents liked to claim at the time, the end of history. Wars, invasions, occupations, the undermining or overthrow of governments, brutal acts and conflicts of every sort succeeded one another in the years of American glory. Past administrations in Washington had a notorious weakness for autocrats, just as Donald Trump does today. It is, as Vladimir Putin has been only too happy to point out of late, an irony of our moment that the country that has undermined or overthrown or meddled in more electoral systems than any other is in a total snit over the possibility that one of its own elections was meddled with. To enforce their global system, Americans never shied away from torture , black sites , death squads , assassinations , and other grim practices. In those years, the US planted its military on close to 1, overseas military bases, garrisoning the planet as no other country ever had. Nonetheless, the canceling of the Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal, the withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, threats against NAFTA, the undermining of NATO, the promise of protective tariffs on foreign goods and the possible trade wars that might go with them could go a long way toward dismantling the American global system of soft power and economic dominance as it has existed in these last decades. If such acts and others like them prove effective in the months and years to come, they will leave only one kind of power in the American global quiver: While, in the Trump era, a drive to cut domestic spending of every sort is evident, more money is still slated to go to the military, already funded at levels not reached by combinations of other major powers. Ready to Fight Back? They are not only notoriously incapable of thinking outside the box about the application of military power, but faced with the crisis of failed wars and failing states , of spreading terror movements and a growing refugee crisis across that crucial region, they can evidently only imagine one solution to just about any problem: More troops , more mini-surges , more military trainers and advisers, more air strikes , more drone strikes â€¦ more. Since, in addition, the Trump administration is filled with Iranophobes, including a president who has only recently fused himself to the Saudi royal family in an attempt to further isolate and undermine Iran, the possibility that a military-first version of American foreign policy will spread further is only growing. Take the CIA, for instance. The agency also recently named a new chief of counterterrorism, who has begun pushing for greater latitude to strike militants. In other words, more! If a Trump presidency achieves a record for the ages when it comes to the precipitous decline of the American global system, little as The Donald ever cares to share credit for anything, he will undoubtedly have to share it

for such an achievement. Had this not been so, Donald Trump would never have won the election. It seemed too self-evident to mention. When the Trump years months? Will the last American Firster turn out to have been the first American Laster? Will it truly be one for the record books? To submit a correction for our consideration, click here. For Reprints and Permissions, click here.

Chapter 7 : Is the United States in Decline? | The American Conservative

Since the early s there has been an ongoing conversation among scholars, policymakers, and members of the broader American foreign policy establishment about whether U.S. power is in decline.

Chapter 8 : Donald Trump and the Decline of US Soft Power by Joseph S. Nye - Project Syndicate

Donald Trump Might Set a Recordâ€”for the Biggest Decline of American Power in History When the Trump years come to an end, will the United States be a pariah nation? By Tom Engelhardt.

Chapter 9 : The Decline and Fall of the American Empire | The Nation

Kagan's article, which draws on his new book, The World America Made, contests the emerging consensus in foreign-policy circles that American primacy is eroding thanks to the shift in global power.