

Chapter 1 : SparkNotes: Babylon Revisited: Themes

So the multiple contents thesis is to be rejected, as is the existential thesis. What remains is the singular (when filled) thesis, and this is the thesis I embrace. The thesis is a form of disjunctivism, in that it concedes that the content of visual experience in hallucinatory cases is different from the content of visual experience in veridical cases.

Feel free to tear the following to shreds: You believe in God and spend your whole life spreading the gospel, thinking that you will be rewarded for all eternity in heaven. You become disillusioned with this belief, and discover that your whole life has been a sham and you will die as a lump of meat in the ground that will soon be forgotten. I think we can all agree that some negative feelings will surround this person for a period of time. They have lost a beautiful past, present, and future, and will spend some time mourning that loss. A depressed person may not see the point of getting out of bed and feels worthless. There are two different ways that nihilists address both of those issues. It mostly seems to depend on whether you believe in free will or determinism. If you believe in free will, you say that you get to decide your reasons to get out of bed. You invent the meaning in your life. And when it comes to worth, well there is no objective standard by which to measure your worth, so you get to choose your worth too! So be worth a lot and be merry! If you realize that you are the sole arbiter of your value, and still choose to call yourself worthless, the source is definitely clinical depression. The adjustment period for this may be instantaneous or may take time. We all return to our normal happiness levels after 6 months of anything. Unnecessary self inflicted pain. There are other somewhat valid reasons a person may say that nihilism is causing their depression. For instance, you are working a dead end job that sucks. Lots of other people work with you, but they are all happy because of their beliefs. But the truth is that the job is the cause of your suffering. New job, support system, become homeless, whatever There is another way that someone who is a nihilist will remain in a depression-like state, that might be diagnosed clinically and incorrectly. The only path to peace here is that you let go of that desire. If you have done all of the necessary nihilism mind realignments, and you eat really well, exercise very frequently, and sleep really well, but are still depressed, then you need to talk to a doctor. I realize that free will and determinism will not always indicate the positions I assigned to them. Feel free to elaborate on this in the comments.

Add tags for "Consciousness revisited: materialism without phenomenal concepts". Be the first.

It has been something I have resisted, because I do not have fond memories of the experience of writing it. I had in mind that it was a poor piece of work, contaminated by adverse experiences, and one that barely scraped through the marking process. I have tried to read a lot of theses, and I have rarely succeeded. They are mostly boring and badly written. That is a pity because so often the content should be fascinating. So much fabulous research lost to us because there has been no will to make it accessible. I am not pretending for a moment that my efforts are in the same class as the outstanding PhDs he wrote about. I completed my thesis after 8 years of struggling to write it. It is sufficient to say that against my better judgment in early I was persuaded to submit rather than quit. I subsequently was obliged to do a rewrite after my paper was sent to an academic whose work I had dealt with harshly. My university was wreaking havoc upon Social Ecology school and the quality of my supervisors diminished radically, leading to that cock up. The title of my paper was An inquiry into animism as a source of meaning in response to radical and disruptive non-ordinary experiences. From my discharge in February to my return to work in late September the same year I rewrote the paper and resubmitted. Writing the thing was such a trauma that I had not revisited it since. By trauma I mean that I went through an existential hell processing the ideas. It took me over 18 months to formulate what my research question was. For many months nothing worked as an idea, and yet I felt compelled to persist. What started out as an intellectual exercise became a strange kind of personal initiation journey. The fact that it was supposedly a formal academic exercise seemed to be irrelevant. This was more personal and much deeper than that. I can look back now, still, on ways the university failed to support me, and that still rankles. But really all it did was create the context for a formal game. It set rules I agreed to play by. It was the exercise of having to account for what was really a fundamental existential crisis for me within a set of rules that made the thesis writing business such a drama – and so valuable. I grew up in a game playing culture, and I was pretty adept at most of the games I played. Good games are a test of character as well as game skill. The thesis, for all the shitty failings of the university, was a good game. I had the intellectual goods. I could write well enough. I can look back now, a decade later, and see how copping the GBS was actually a proper follow on. For many people that is going to sound like complete madness. As a consequence of the GBS I am left with residual disability that means I cannot walk without aids at the moment Canadian crutches and my manual capacity has turned to crap. But disability has transformed my life. True, it has taken away a lot of things I had. It has been character building in a serious way. The link between animism and disability will not be obvious. Indeed it may be no more than my quirky interpretation. A sudden and acquired disability completely disrupts your normal relationship with the material world. For 3 months I was in an Intensive Care Unit on a respirator. I was paralysed from the neck down and that left me conscious and inhabiting a large lump of inert flesh. It was pretty obvious to me, in this state, that I was not my body. I inhabited an imaginal world that was more real than what I could see through my waking eyes. I had become a giant baby in physical terms. As my recovery progressed I had to rediscover how to be in a body in the physical world. After I was mercifully discharged from hospital I engaged in long daily routines of physiotherapy on the back verandah at home. The year progressed into autumn and then winter. I struggled to handle a camera again and took photographs of the seasonal transition in my garden. These images still affect me deeply. The home screen on my iPhone shows the very first photograph I took when I was finally able to visit my favourite open garden at Mt Wilson in the Blue Mountains. That was in the autumn of . . . A few of the images do a little justice to my sense of deep immersion and communion. As I reformatted the chapters for the blog I recovered memories of the final stages of the rewrite. I had forgotten how much of my personal journey I had exposed. I had confessed my perilous encounter with psychiatry as I struggled to comprehend the tsunami of paranormal events flooding over me. I revealed entries from my journals and diaries that charted the trauma of uncontrolled paranormal experiences. I had to defer my rewrite because of the GBS. After the resubmit I got a terse letter confirming I would graduate. It was as if that was all that mattered. There was no feedback. It was

as if nobody gave a damn, save that I was not yet another fail to finish. I had done enough to give the university sufficient grounds to give me a passing grade, and it cared about nothing else. I had escaped hospital, done the rewrite and had returned to work. I thought I had done a lousy job, and nobody had said anything because that would not have been kind. But now I have had a chance to revisit what I wrote I can see I did a decent job. It is an account of an existential drama. It is about how one knits experience into a cultural discourse in a way that preserves membership and sanity. This is a paper from the heart, not just the head. There are 85 pages all up. There are 4 chapters and a conclusion Chapter One is accompanying these introductory remarks. From it I have excised the Methodology, which is an important part of a thesis for academic purposes, but it is utterly boring if you have no compelling reason to wade through it. However, if you have a perverse interest in it, let me know I will send you an untouched version of the chapter I write this confident that nobody will do that. I will, post the other chapters progressively. I hope to intersperse them with other posts for anybody who does not have the stamina for such a read. Can you block, copy and paste from the blog into your own document? So why bother put up the thesis? Animism is kinda what I am about, as the blog name suggests. This is the reason why. That forced me to yield to the promptings to do something with the thesis chapters. You gotta get your hands dirty. I hope those who endure the read are inspired.

Chapter 3 : babylon revisited great gatsby disillusionment - Research Database

-- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience: the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing.

Summary[edit] "I heard that you lost a lot in the crash. While in conversation with Alix the bartender, he inquires about his old friends whom he use to drink and attend parties with. He leaves the bartender with an address to where his friends might be able to find him, later on he realizes that as a mistake. During the years of the Roaring Twenties , Charlie Wales spent his days drinking and partying and seemed to not have a single care in the world. At the time the story is set, Charlie sees the world differently as he is no longer consumed by the extravagant lifestyle of the s he once lived. He was a frequent drinker and party goer but now only allows himself to have one drink per day. He eventually leaves the bar and observes the streets of Paris with a sense of nostalgia now that the party days are over but also acknowledges how much his previous behavior and lifestyle has impacted his life in negative ways. During the Roaring Twenties, Charlie had lost everything from money to his family. Honoria is now in custody of her aunt Marion because her mother Helen had died during the party years and Marion blames Charlie for the death of her sister. Charlie and Helen were frequent party goers and as the story progresses, the reader learns that one night Charlie got angry about his wife kissing another man and left her out in the snow. Marion blames Charlie for the death of her sister and constantly sees him as a bad person. The story reveals that she has this grudge against him because she hated that her sister and Charlie were out spending so much money on unnecessary partying while she and her husband Lincoln were barely getting by. His main priority is his daughter, and he wants her to live with him in Prague. Honoria even begins to question him about why is it that she is not living with him. Marion, seeing his efforts, has finally changed her mind and has decided to let Honoria live with her father. On the other side is his old friends Duncan and Lorraine which he had asked the bartender Alix about. His friends are very obviously drunk and keep insisting that Charlie go to dinner with them, he turns down their offer two times until they finally go away not happy with him. Marion observing this, after dinner, completely takes back her offer to let Charlie take his daughter back to Prague with him for she fears that he is not completely over his drunken days. Charlie feels devastated and sees his efforts have gone down the drain. He then goes back to the same bar The Ritz, he thought he would run into Lorraine and Duncan there but instead he finds another bartender he knew very well from his partying days. They have a short conversation, and then Charlie continues to reminisce about his old partying days and about all of the bad times in his marriage with Helen. He is consumed with thoughts about the s, where people were so careless, drunk and on drugs all the time. Lincoln informs him that he cannot because Marion is far too upset at what happened and that he is going to have to wait another six months to try to get his daughter back. He feels trapped and excessively thinks about how much time will have to pass until Marion stops making him pay for his former lifestyle and mistakes. He keeps thinking and was certain that Helen would want him to be with his daughter and not alone. Time[edit] A major theme of the story is of time and the inevitability of past mistakes resurfacing. Charlie recognizes the mistakes he made in the past that caused him to lose his daughter in the first place, and his constant longing for a future with her results in his past coming back to haunt him. After losing his wife, and then eventually his daughter, Charlie feels an overwhelming sense of loneliness. Following the Great Depression and the stock market crash, he is confronted with the consequences of his foolish and incautious past, causing him to find the motivation to win custody of his daughter to ease the pain of his miserable solitude. Charlie made his life better for himself and then had his goals and dreams taken away from him by the failure to take his daughter back under his own wing. At the end of the story, he is faced with the disappointment of losing this chance to rekindle the relationship between himself and his daughter. When Zelda suffered a breakdown and was committed to a sanitarium in Switzerland, Rosalind felt that Scott was unfit to raise their daughter and that Rosalind and Newman should adopt her.

--Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions --Consequences for a priori physicalism --The admissible contents of visual experience: the existential thesis --The singular (when filled) thesis --Kaplanianism --The multiple contents thesis --The existential thesis revisited --Still more on existential contents --Consciousness, seeing and knowing.

Tim, who is cold, says something false; but Tom, who is hot, says something true. The content of a sentence containing an indexical is a structured proposition having as its constituents the content of the indexical the agent, place, object demonstrated, etc. The sentence is false in the context, given that Tim is cold. In the case of sentences containing indexicals, their characters are functions from contexts to the structured propositions which are the contents of the sentences in those contexts. One case not explicitly discussed by Kaplan which is relevant to the theory below is that of demonstratives used in failed demonstrations. But what counts as a context here? Each context has associated with it at least an agent or subject, a time, and a location. So where there is no demonstrated object, there is no context. But it does have a linguistic meaning. This is a function that maps contexts of demonstration onto the objects demonstrated in those contexts. As for the case of the content of visual experience, I shall begin my development of a Kaplanian approach here by saying a little more about the case of illusion. Here there is a seen object. That object appears other than it is. The case is one of misrepresentation. Thus when I see a straight stick in water, and it appears bent to me, my experience represents it, the seen object, as bent. The difference between this case and the veridical one is not that in the latter I am in direct contact with an object whereas in the former I am not, but rather that the singular content into which the seen object enters is accurate in the latter case but not in the former. If it is indeed true that veridical and illusory perceptual experiences have singular contents, then one possible view to take of cases of hallucination is that their phenomenology is misleading. It is for the subject of a hallucination as if the experience has a singular content, but in reality there is no content there at all. Thus hallucinations are like cases of failed demonstration. Thus where there is no object demonstrated, there is no context in the relevant sense. In the case of perceptual experience, what experiences fundamentally aim to do is to put us in contact with objects around us. Where there is no object, as in the case of hallucination, there is no contact and so, as one might say, no context of experiential contact. The experience is a failed experience. On this view, each token experience has a phenomenal character, but not every token experience has a representational content. Again the model is that of demonstratives. I am disinclined to accept this view, though it does have some appeal. My reasons are two. For one certainly does think something in such a case. Of course, the Kaplanian could reply that even though there is no linguistic content in this case, the subject is expressing a thought which does have content. But if one does say this, it is very hard to see why one would not then be prepared to grant that the sentence one utters has content too. If that is the case, then there no longer seems any reason to deny that visual experiences have content in hallucinatory cases. Secondly, the view requires a denial of a basic presupposition of any sort of intentionalism or representationalism with respect to visual phenomenal character, namely, that all visual experiences have representational content. However, as I have argued elsewhere at length, this presupposition is extremely plausible. It is this assumption which the multiple contents thesis MCT challenges. What drives MCT is really two thoughts. First, it seems natural to suppose that vision involves direct contact with external things in standard veridical cases. In those cases, the objects seen are just as they appear. One straightforward explanation of this fact, perhaps the most straightforward explanation, is to hold that visual experiences in such cases have accurate singular contents into which the seen objects enter. This, in turn, seems best further understood in terms of the experience representing that something is F. So experiences have a layer of content that is existential, according to MCT. This layer is to be found in all perceptual experiences, accurate or not, whereas singular contents are missing in some perceptual experiences namely, the hallucinatory ones. Singular contents, thus, are not essential to perceptual experiences, whereas existential contents are. Obviously there is room for disagreement among those who advocate MCT about how rich this layer of existential content is and whether it requires the subject of the experience to possess the concepts needed to state the conditions under which it is accurate. This issue is one

that I shall pass over in this paper. In the mirror case, my visual experience is accurate with respect to its existential content and inaccurate with respect to its singular content. It appears to me that there is before me an object of a certain shape and size and colour at a certain distance away and in a certain direction and, as it happens, there is an object with the relevant apparent features, namely, the yellow cube hidden behind the mirror. So my experience has an accurate existential content. However, the cube I am actually seeing is not as it appears to be. It is white rather than yellow, as I am led to suppose on the basis of my experience. So my experience has an inaccurate singular content. In the case of a veridical hallucination, the subject undergoes an experience with an accurate existential content. The world appears to contain a blue round bouncing object before the subject, for example, and there is such an object. But the subject does not see the object, being the subject of a hallucination. So there is no singular content. One interesting question is whether the multiple contents theorist needs to acknowledge a gappy SWF content in addition to an existential content in the case of hallucinatory experiences. One argument for this view is that we need to suppose that there is a gappy SWF content for such experiences in order to explain the deceptive nature of hallucinations and further to explain the actions hallucinations generate. Suppose for, example, that Sebastian has a hallucination of a large furry spider crawling up his leg. He forms the belief that that spider is dangerous. In great fear, he reaches for a nearby book to hit it with. That is why he reaches for the book. Unsurprisingly, then, they give rise to false beliefs and thus they deceive their subjects. They are also failed experiences in that they do not succeed in putting their subjects in contact with things in the world even though their subjects typically suppose otherwise. However, it is true that the supposition that some experiences have gappy SWF contents provides a straightforward explanation of the action performed by the victim of the hallucination. Sebastian did not want to kill a spider. He wanted to kill one particular spider – the spider which, according to his hallucination, was on his leg. Still, this consideration seems to me indecisive. Suppose I say to you that Winston believes that there is a burglar in the house. I may then continue by remarking that Winston wants to find him and shoot him. That is why Winston is going upstairs, gun in hand. What Winston believes has an existential content. On this view, it is perfectly acceptable to say both that Sebastian has a visual experience of a spider on his leg and that he wants to kill it. Perhaps it will be replied that even if the example does not tell definitely in favour of the admission of gappy contents, it is none the less the case that the supposition that there is gappy content in hallucinatory cases preserves as much similarity as can be preserved between those cases and the veridical ones. So given the overall introspective similarity between the two sets of cases, this is a point in favour of the view that some visual experiences have gappy contents. I shall return in the next section to the question of whether gappy contents are needed in an account of the admissible contents of visual experience. The first point I intend to make in this section is that granting this point about what is directly seen does not necessitate that we also accept that ordinary objects enter into the contents of our experiences. Indeed, consistently with this point, we could even deny as, for example, adverbial theorists do that perceptual experiences have contents. The strongest support for the view that perceptual experiences have singular contents into which the seen objects enter is the thought that when we see those objects they look some way to us, together with the further thought that an object can only look some way if it is experienced as being that way. This in turn, seems to require that the object be represented as being that way. In the case of an illusion, then, there is misrepresentation since the seen object is not as it is represented as being. Here the seen object looks other than it is. Thus one might hold that what it is for an object to look F is for it to cause in the distinctive way appropriate to seeing an experience of an F, where the experience so caused has an existential content. If this response is cogent I return to it later, then existential theorists have a way of handling the mirror case discussed earlier: So the content is accurate, even though the case is one of misperception. So this, existential content theorists may say, is a case of veridical illusion. The case is thus a counterpart to the earlier case of veridical hallucination. The latter case did not demand an inaccurate or falsidical content, so why suppose the former does? Here is an answer. Having a hallucination, Sebastian tries to grab what he takes to be a spider crawling up his leg. Suppose the hallucination is veridical: Did Sebastian manage to grab the spider in the hallucination? It seems not, for that spider is unreal. Nevertheless, that is the spider he tried to grab – the one which, according to his hallucination, was on his leg. That content is inaccurate or falsidical.

At any rate, it is not accurate. So the claim that cases of veridical hallucination do not demand inaccurate or falsidical contents is mistaken. Again, however, the existential theorist has a reply. Winston believes that there is a burglar upstairs, whom he is trying to catch. That seems a perfectly good explanation of why he is running up the stairs, gun in hand, even if there is no burglar. But his belief certainly does not have a gappy content.

Chapter 5 : Babylon Revisited - Wikipedia

Review: Canon Revisited models, explains and critiques each one, and then puts forth a case for adopting the "self-authenticating" model that forms the foundation for.

Conclusion and Application Now that I have clarified what the appropriate assessment framework for the risk society thesis is, I will propose an application of it. The idea of linking Badiou to the risk society argument has first been developed by Coker in *War in an Age of Risk*. I will claim that our understanding of risk and anxiety would benefit from it, not only in abstract conceptual terms, but also in terms of its capacity to be applied to concrete issues of security and terrorism. In a nutshell, my argument is that future has been filled with anxiety only because it has been emptied of project and that one cannot fully understand the dynamics and consequences of the risk society without re-including that aspect in the analysis. What I argue is the exact opposite. There is nothing paradoxical here. It is this unknown future, this frightening vacuity that allows it to be and partially causes it. This desire forms the basis of the risk society. More, these two processes are not two different ones, they are both are parts of a single dialectical one. Let me try to demonstrate this link. The classic here summarised risk society narrative is as follows. Modernity has been generating more and more manufactured risks which, like nuclear power and global warming, soon became unbounded temporally, spatially and socially, uncontrollable, with potentially catastrophic effects for the very survival of our species. Beck, In addition to that, with the growing complexification of the world caused by globalisation, the future has become more and more unpredictable. We are then left with uncontrollable and unforeseeable risk. A classic corollary version proposed by scholars like Jarvis or Scott adds the following idea: This broken promise would be another part of the explanation for our collective angst. These are the classic narratives. What I argue is that the consciousnesses of immeasurable threats, of unpredictable future and of this broken promise are by no means sufficient to explain anxiety. The logical link is incomplete and the projectless nature of our societies is the missing part. If modern societies were still oriented towards a collective goal whether religious, ideological, political. For the future would be full, and possibly full of hope. The future would be colonised by our positive representations of it, and not left open to negative fears of the unknown. Classic determinants of the risk society are therefore merely half of the story. Indeed, the lack of project alone arguably causes depression as claimed by Ehrenberg, not anxiety, as there is in it no element that warrants to be fearful of the future. The future is empty but not full of uncontrollable risks. Anxiety is then only fully explained by both elements: To further prove my point I will try to evidence that not only is this new element a driver of the emergence of the risk society but is an integral part of its functioning. By doing so, I also intend to show the enhanced explanatory power this new dimension gives to the thesis. Through the example of terrorism I will show that it concerns both the threats per se and how risk societies respond to them. Let us start with the threat, terrorism. How is the concept of projectless society relevant to the terrorist risk? To a certain extent, non-western originated terrorism can be analysed as a rejection of the western projectless world. This is obviously the case of Islamist terrorism, Islamism being, according to many scholars, a value-based rejection of western modernity. Bull, Tibi, Finally, this approach specifically helps us comprehend why it is so difficult for us westerners to understand suicide attacks. As for the response risk societies give to terrorism, both components of anxiety also matter. One cannot fully understand it without both. But this approach does not fully capture the dilemmas and the seeming incapacity of our democracies to fight terrorism. We are facing enemies who are willing to destroy our future, without us knowing what we want this future to be about. Liberal democracies are no longer enthusiastic about their present as suggested by the so-called democracy crisis or representation crisis and growing abstention from voting phenomenon in every old democratic country and no longer have a project for the future. Then, when it comes to the response to give to those threats, we simply do not know what future we want to defend and protect. And the reflex may be to turn to the past. This, and this only, can account for the rise of reactionary and nationalistic policies frequently witnessed in countries hit by terrorist attacks. Returning to the previous perceived as well defined, pure and stable identity is a way to retrieve security in the risk age. To recap, the question asked to risk societies facing terrorism is

the following: Securitisation is "that was already obvious" but conservative identity policies are too. Indeed, Beck claims that his overarching theory includes previous accounts on individualisation and derives legitimacy from this reliance on widely recognized tendency. I argue this lens should be added to the risk society general framework. This essay aimed at drawing a basic assessment of the risk society theory. I first tried to clarify the nature of the risk society thesis and to devise the appropriate assessment ground parts I and II and then, on this basis, proposed a critical analysis of it part III. Having found that analyzing it as a social science theory revealed serious shortcomings, I showed it was better defined as a philosophical commentary on the zeitgeist, which commentary I then contrasted with another compatible one: Two things can thus be taken out from this analysis. First, the risk society should not be taken as a purely analytical theory and confidently applied to the empirics as such, nor should it be blindly taken as a source of policy recommendations. One should rather see it as an interpretation of our times, a powerful lens which sees only what its premises allows to see but has proved to be an original and perceptive one. Second, as this thesis aims at capturing the spirit of our age and thus seeks comprehensiveness, I argue that it would benefit from being completed by a compatible work of a similar nature, i. References Alexander, Jeffrey and Smith, Phillip. Badiou, Alain, and Alberto Toscano. *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order*. Critical Issues for Social Theory, pp. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. *The Expansion Of International Society. The Disenchantment Of The World. Justice In The Risk Society. Thinking, Fast And Slow*. Penguin Keohane, Robert O. *Neo realism And Its Critics. Young People, Risk and Leisure. A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society. Telescopic Sight Or Myopic Vision? Theory Of International Politics. The American Political Science Review*84 3: *The Sociology Of Religion. Brining Domestic Institutions back In*" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Wilkinson, Iain. *Anxiety In A Risk Society*. Singapore Journal Of Tropical Geography21 3: I am aware that numerous are those who will argue that there is between history as a social science and philosophy of history nothing but a difference of degree, not of nature see for example, on international history, Wight, Broaching this debate would be beyond the scope of that essay, which is written under the assumption that that the traditional distinction is at least substantive enough to be used as valid analytical categories. It by no means implies that we should refrain from trying to devise such broad theories, nor does it mean social scientist should not pay attention to them. On the contrary, some of the most influential pieces of social sciences have drawn on previous philosophical works. But the alternative way of reading his statement was to see it as a reference to the existential question asked to the West by islamists who are you, or more precisely, what, if anything, do you want to be?

Chapter 6 : CiteSeerX " Citation Query Expletives as arguments: Germanic existential sentences revisited

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No the use of italics are not good enough! So the use of colour keeps them visually and mentally ungarbled. Singular propositions thisnesses are ontologically dependent upon contingent objects exemplifications Part of the argument against the Existential Thesis: My confusion is with the denial of 6 , the Pollock or Pollockian Existentialism, or anti-serious existential actualism, or serious anti-actualism with existential flavour, or "€", objection. Plantinga tries to clarify the position by adding another slew of premises, but I think 12 is supposed to sum it up: I get 12 and I get 6 , but it gets a little hazy when you use existence as the property in the support of 12 in order to deny 6. Which seems to be what is going on, at least I think? Perhaps I shall back up a bit and plug-in Socrates into premise This seems to sound okay. That would mean that the contingent object Socrates is dependant on the singular proposition does not exist. Exemplifications are not dependent on thisness. If your following the bouncing coloured ball, red is not dependent on green, but green is dependent on red. Take any thisness t and the object x of which t is the thisness; t could not have existed if x had not. More exactly, the thesis in question is that it is necessary that every thisness has that property; it is not as if there could have been thisness that could have lacked the property in question. A randomly selected person, may, when asked, say that he believes that marriage exists, but deny that fictional characters exist. If we say that abstract things such as marriage and promises exist, ought we to admit that fictional characters exist as well? The answer to this question may lie in figuring out WHY a person would admit the existence of marriage and deny the existence of fictional characters. There are several possible components to this reasoning: It treats marriage as a property, e. In the same way we can say, "Blaine is tall": Existence of properties is unclear, and may require a Platonic ideal to understand. B "I say marriage exists because it is a concept that can be actualized". Resp This response treats marriage in the proper way. But this response leans towards Platonism. What grounds does a Platonist have for believing in the existence of abstractia without being a fictionalist? C "Because fictional characters resemble concrete objects that may or may not exist, I am scared to admit that fictional characters exist". Resp I believe this is a common reason why people deny the existence of fictional objects - I shall call fictional characters humanoids because they claim to have disregard van Inwagen properties that humans have. Most laypeople would fear being called a fool if they would say that Henry IV does not exist because he is dead, and then go on to say Falstaff does exist because Shakespear created him. In the same way, people may be scared to admit that fictional objects exist because of their similarity to mythical objects: Of course, fear is not a good reason to decide the way things actually are. But no other reasons have been given to say why we should accept one and not the other. That is why I believe that all Platonists should be inclined to be fictionalists. Of course, if one is a Platonist, one should be sure that they hold their views because of B and not A. In any case, his argument against the inference from actualism to serious actualism confused the heck out me. But playing along, where did 18 come from? And more importantly, why does he have a problem with it? By 13 there are no nonexistent objects to fill the first clause of 18 anyway. Also, he states that Socrates is one of the things that are, but perhaps not in W. Is he using something other than common domain semantics? Or did I miss something? There are some issues not directly relevant to our main concern in these papers. This is a lot of stuff to work through. So it is not necessary to read every word of every paper. Also, this issue is hard. Colin McGinn is a noneist and van Inwagen is criticizing him. The objection can be extended to Priest, however. Non-noneists accept the following: But notice that noneists cannot go on to define E! So noneists employ a predicate that does not make sense to non-noneists. Or if sense is made of it, sense can no longer be made of U and G. He says, "They mean to assert that there are, there really are, certain objects that have, among attributes such as jollity and rotundity , the attribute of non-existence". Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, writes "BEING is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it.

Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement". Because the Ontological Argument appears fishy to most people, we should accept that Kant was right in his assessment of the existence predicate. I have not yet thought out the consequences for Van Inwagen, among others, nor am I convinced that he thinks this way. However, I put forth the concern. We just read *Ix* as applying to all worlds, and only commit to existence in the use of Backwards Ex. Pickwick--has he an even number of hairs on his head? Pickwick existed he would have either an even or odd number of hairs on his head, but a Meinongian cannot say this. Van Inwagen faults Meinongians for this--yet his own solution is to say that when an author writes about some attribute of a character, e. I believe Van Inwagen wants to say that Creatures of Fiction exist in the general sense of existence. He says "Anyone who said that there were such things as characters in novels, and went on to say that there was no such thing as Mrs. Gamp would simply be factually ignorant. He would be like someone who said that there were such things as irrational numbers, but no such thing as [pi]" I am not sure that his solution guarantees this, though. First, notice how he phrases the above sentence. He always says "characters in novels". Now, it seems that even a Meinongian will say that characters would exist if the world of the novel was the actual world. This response, of course, does not entail that we say Mrs. Gamp exists in this world. See, for example, all of his logical renderings of sentences So it seems we NEED to locate the character within his proper world. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the character exists in our own. I have a confession to make--most of my confusion while reading *Towards Non-Being* stems from the odd sentence or two not the whole thing as a conjunction thereof, ha! He takes for granted certain claims as undeniable, then leaves things the way they are full stop and carries on. Today, I shall harp on one of these priceless Priestly moments which can be found in the chapter on Fiction second paragraph of 6. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning which represents the object together with appropriate enabling conditions. So they managed to hitch a ride on a boat that was carrying a bunch of circus, or zoo, or something, animals on it. But, the boat sank and the kid had to survive on a dingy for like months with a bunch of animals. Then the conversation goes on: So where did you hear this? An who was the kid? Someone wrote a book about it a few years ago called *The Life of Pi*. There is no kid named Pi Patel who endured a heroic journey as described from India to Canada. And my intentional state about some object, in this particular case the kid Pi, has dramatically changed. The admiration for, sadness for, etc. One is not immaterial to the other. To compound the issue further, if Priest wishes to define existence as just another thing in the set of properties as seen in the Proof of Arbitrary Existing Entities below to get out of the mess that CP causes for Meinongians, then he will have to give an account as to how the existence property can be prized out of the set before, during, whenever, it is connected with a representation. Properties, intentional states, and representations are all connected by virtue of each other. In this case virtue does make a world of difference! Take an arbitrary x in the domain which includes all existent things. It is not necessary that x be in the domain that x exist 2. It is possible for x to not be in the domain 4. It is possible for everything in the domain to be distinct from x 6. There is something such that possibly, absolutely everything is distinct from it 8. It is possible that there is something such that possibly, absolutely everything is distinct from it Why is this argument able to fly in the face of the good reasoning that gave us premise 2? I think the answer lies in the notion of "possible".

Chapter 7 : Denial of Death

"Babylon Revisited" is a short story by F. Scott Fitzgerald, written in and first published on February 21, in the Saturday Evening Post and free inside The Telegraph, the following Saturday.

Death Studies 23, no. After receiving a Ph. He published 10 books and numerous scholarly articles on subjects related to mental health and social science. In , Becker began to develop a thesis that conscious and unconscious reactions to death anxiety could function as a unifying principle for the social sciences. Brown to recast the major categories of Freudian psychoanalysis in broadly existential terms. Becker demonstrated that the repressed psychological energy seething under the surface of the subconscious was not primarily sexual, aggressive, material, or conformity drives. Ernest Becker died in , the same year that his book won a Pulitzer Prize for non-fiction. The insights Becker set forth in this book were clearly stunning to readers, so stunning that it was not always clear what to do with them in professional work. Nevertheless, a steady stream of people from a broad range of disciplines have been quietly applying these insights to their own particular fields of interest. Fortunately, The Free Press has provided the next best thing, a new printing with an extremely useful and concise introductory foreword, written by philosopher and lecturer Sam Keen. Keen identifies four major strands of emphasis. The world is a terrifying place. Becker was not simply morbid. He presented his views as a corrective to easily optimistic versions of evolutionary philosophies that would posit some sort of Omega Point of perfection as our natural inheritance. As to teleology, Becker thought we must plead humble ignorance. What we do know is that we are inextricably bound up in what must be seen as a nightmarish system in which living organisms sustain themselves only by ingesting other living organisms. For all but a very few of its organisms, this is a system of constant terror, not equanimity. Recent anthropological literature suggests that is especially true for humans--that the transition from prey to predator took place only very recently in our evolutionary history. The basic motivation for human behavior is the need to control our basic anxiety, to deny the terror of death. The most basic anxiety is not sexuality or aggression but the terror produced in an animal that has attained self-awareness and knows that it will die. Because the terror of death is so overwhelming, we conspire to keep it unconscious. Death anxiety is not simply uncomfortable. It does not simply make us uneasy. It has to be positively repressed. Individual and social character emerge from a dynamic unconscious that must expend an enormous amount of energy in this positive repression of the terror of death from conscious awareness. Our heroic projects that are aimed at destroying evil have the paradoxical effect of bringing more evil into the world. Because it remains unconscious and repressed, human beings will displace and scapegoat the terror of death almost willy-nilly. We are able to focus on almost any perceived threat, whether of people, political or economic ideology, race, religion, and blow it up psychologically into a life and death struggle against ultimate evil. We lose the very faculties that would cause us to place limits on the violence we will use against this perceived threat. This is the dynamic of spiraling violence that characterizes so much of human history. If the ultimate struggle is an unconscious fight against mortality itself, ergo doomed to repeated defeat, it is hard to see how the spirals of violence could ever be ended. On the other hand, if we are able to recognize the true nature of our struggles against evil, this may assist us in demythologizing the real threats posed by "evil empires" and other perceived enemies. This may give us some handle of rationality for setting controls and limits on our violence. Keen calls Ernest Becker "the great spiritual cartographer of our age and a wise physician of the soul. The heroics of everyday life: A theorist of death confronts his own end. Psychology Today, 7 11 ,

Chapter 8 : Jean Paul Sartre's Humanism is an Existentialism

Humanistic vs. Existential. After reading Psychological Data and Human Values by Maslow; The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality Change by Rogers; and Logotherapy and Existentialism by Frankl, complete the following 1.

But how deep do the filial connections run? If we are to fully amortize these debts, then it seems that we must do some accounting. But, at the same time, such an audit offers an important opportunity to return to the ontologically rich roots of the analytic tradition. I will then turn to a comparative examination of Quine and Russell on ontological theorizing, and propose a method for formally distinguishing their views. I conclude by framing a problem for analytic ontology. I cannot name an individual who actually spells out this view, nevertheless it is a picture which, I think, informs most casual thinking about Russell. Russell on this view is generally regarded as a good philosopher and a great logician, but over the years, many think, he missed more than one philosophical boat. Russell is almost never read systematically, probably due to his tendency to shift positions. But the piecemeal--almost mosaic--picture of Russell can obscure some things which we ought to find quite clear. Russell was an ontologist. In , Russell published three relevant ontological pieces: First, the Object or Gegenstande which concerned Meinong was anything toward which thought could be directed. These were objects of possible knowledge. Second, some objects, e. The former class includes the latter but also includes all possibilia and impossibilia as well. All Objects were said to subsist. Real things exist, are actual, while merely subsistent Objects are possible. These are Meinongian Objects. So too is the present King of France. All are meaningful "names" but none names a real thing, something existing. For Meinong, one way in which the golden mountain differs from Mont Blanc is that Mont Blanc exists and subsists while the golden mountain merely subsists but is non-existent. The ordinary sense, type a existence is: The meaning of existence which occurs in philosophy and daily life is the meaning which can be predicated of an individual: The entities dealt with in mathematics do not exist in this sense: That is type b existence. According to this second sense of existence: To say that A exists means that A is a class which has at least one member. Thus whatever is not a class e. Socrates does not exist in this sense; and among classes there is just one which does not exist, namely the class having no members, which is called the null class. In this sense, the class of numbers e. In fact, everyone knows this already! In response, I have two remarks. First, Wittgenstein once remarked that one way of doing philosophy consists in assembling reminders of what we already know for a particular purpose. We must recognize it as relevant to our particular purpose, but it seems that we do not naturally think of Russell when we think about ontology. Why might we need to be reminded? Perhaps this was because this sort of ontology was treated as part and parcel of logic, and Russell never thought to fully distinguish the disciplines. Or perhaps history stepped in. Indeed, for a time the subject of metaphysics all but dropped out of analytic philosophy; its work was simply farmed out to science. But where did metaphysics go? Propositions bearing its mark were exiled to the corral of mad philosophical cows: By the time 10 Russell a, pp. Wittgenstein , section I, paragraph In short, I want to suggest, bad timing combined with the short institutional memory that comes hand-in-hand with iconoclasm to erase the ontological Russell. Quine or Ontology Found Somewhat like a lost umbrella, Quine picks up these ontological themes where Russell left them. The equally simple answer is: The difficulty comes when we try to say what does not exist, for we must mention what we deny, by name. And if all names denote objects, we cannot deny that A exists without being committed to its existing. On the supposition that to every name there corresponds an entity, mentioning the name of what you want to deny will commit you to the reality of what you want to deny. The issue of whether every significant name must name an entity is the same issue which animated Russell in Further, this particular problem also arises for Meinong when he attempts to assert that a particular Object subsists but does not exist. Thus, Quine is really returning to the same old question. The characters of McX and Wyman are introduced in order to represent two views about existence that Quine rejects. The former defends the ideal existence of named 6 objects that lack concreteness. More interestingly, Wyman or Meinong? Actual things are allowed to exist, while non-actual things merely subsist. No entity without identity, after all. This threat of

ontological commitment to universals is answered by treating predicates extensionally as classes. Existence, for Quine, is grounded in the use of bound variables of quantification within Russellian descriptions: We can very easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by saying, for example, that there is something bound variable which red houses and sunsets have in common; or that there is something which is a prime number larger than a million. But this is, essentially, the only way we can involve ourselves in ontological commitments: The differences between logicians, intuitionists, and formalists are indistinct from the differences between the medieval realists, conceptualists, and nominalists. Disagreement about what is, for Quine, is disagreement in conceptual schemes. A conceptual scheme, roughly, is like a language an inter-related set of sentences all understood to be true. And the conceptual scheme determines the content of our ontology according to the standard of ontological commitment. But our choice of conceptual schemes will, in the end, be guided by other criteria, for more than one conceptual scheme is consistent with all the experiences we have and things we might want to say about the world. All conceptual schemes must be empirically adequate in this sense. Individual conceptual schemes differ in regard to what we consider to be ontologically basic, and 14 Quine , p. This much seems a brief but fair precis of what Quine wrote. Structural and Descriptive Ontology To facilitate a comparison between Quine and Russell, I want to make a couple of schematic observations. In Quine, we can make a distinction between the structural elements of an ontological theory and its content, its form and its matter. Roughly, an account of the form or structure will describe how the bits and pieces of the universe fit together, its logic and order, and how our theory formally relates to what the theory says there is. What the theory says there is, is the content. Let us call the former subject structural ontology and the latter descriptive ontology. Likewise, the operative standard of ontological commitment, is also a part of the structural ontology, this is because it is perfectly general, and hence formal. This combination of a web-like framework and a standard of commitment is a general form into which descriptive ontological content may be added. The ontologically basic elements of the descriptive ontology become the values for the bound variables of quantification employed by the standard of ontological commitment. But the structural ontology is indifferent to the various descriptive ontological options. On this view, a full ontological theory must, therefore consist, of at least a framework, a standard of ontological commitment, and descriptive content. Quine focuses on the underdetermination of content. Various assignments of content might all be adequate to the totality of empirical evidence that we want our theory to account for. Thus, some descriptive ontologies will be ruled out on the basis of whether they are able to account for the totality of our evidence, or whether they require the existence of entities which are not inferable from that evidence. We revise our conceptual schemes to keep them consistent with the totality of evidence. But, when Quine argues that we can shift conceptual schemes on the basis of empirical evidence, what he means is that we might shift from one assignment of content to another. Importantly however, Quine does not seem to seriously consider whether the structural elements might also be revisable. This continuity thesis requires that adequacy to empirical evidence be the ultimate arbitrator of acceptable theory, but it also entails the principle that there multiple, equally valid, ways of revising theory to make it empirically adequate. But he does not hold that this is necessarily the case. But, the continuity thesis is a contingent hypothesis. It follows directly that just as descriptive ontology is contingent, structural ontology might also be contingent. There may be alternatives to holistic frameworks at the level of ontological frameworks. I further analyzed the structural part into, at least, the framework of the structure its logic , and the standard of ontological commitment its rule for assigning entities to the framework. I further suggested that some of these elements are consequences of his thesis that philosophy is continuous with science. Ontological Commitment It is fairly clear that the Quinean standard for what exists and the Russellian standard are almost identical, if they differ at all. For Quine, to be is to be the value of a bound variable. For Russell, to exist is to 11 satisfy a propositional function, and be a member of the class defined by the function. This view persists in his Lectures. You may express it by saying that there is at least one value of x for which that propositional function is true. Independent Variability of Content In the case of Quine, we saw that the sentences of a conceptual scheme tell us what must exist, through the mechanism of the theory of descriptions and the standard of ontological commitment, if the theory is considered to be true. We might refer explicitly to tables and people, and thereby be committed to people; or we might make explicit reference to

tables and people, but implicitly refer to sets of more basic entities. For every conceptual scheme, there will be more than one way of grouping the entities to make the sentences of the conceptual scheme come out true.

Chapter 9 : Existence and Nonexistence

Writing the thing was such a trauma that I had not revisited it since. By trauma I mean that I went through an existential hell processing the ideas. It took me over 18 months to formulate what my research question was.

During WWII he was deported to a work camp. I am told, the rest of his family members, save a few ones who managed to escape, were directly deported to Auschwitz Concentration Camp. About sixty members on that side of the family perished in the Holocaust. My Grandfather was married to my Grandmother, who was Catholic. He survived the Holocaust, but he never talked about his experiences as I was growing up. There were letters, objects, and relatives. There were stories that my parents told me never to tell outside the family. This is how I grew up, in a sheltered, happy home, the oldest of seven children. In the early 70s my father completed his doctoral degree in neuro-psychiatry as a student of Dr. I am told that I was introduced to Dr. Actually, that is how I started to learn German. I embraced logotherapy with all of my being. Now, growing up, there comes a time in life when we are individually challenged to choose, and to stand for our convictions, or flee. One such occasion happened to me when I was 17 years old. At that time I was attending the Secondary Medical School in my home town. We had regular lectures at the school, and attended rotations at various departments of the hospital as student nurse attendants. It was the time when political meetings were organised more and more frequently in the center of our city, and one such meeting was taking place that afternoon. The meetings were nationalistic gatherings, which fueled intolerance and hate, and which were ideologically fueled by those who sought the destruction of peace, unity and solidarity. The principal came to our class and informed us that our school will attend this meeting. Many greeted the opportunity as a free afternoon. The principal had the doors of the school and the classroom locked, so as none of the students could leave the property, but had to wait to be collectively part-taking in the demonstrations. I had a dilemma: I did not want to participate in any way in meetings that I judged to be based on wrong ideology. But I did not want any reprisals or punishment for non-conforming either. With a sudden determination I rose from my seat, I opened the window, and I climbed through and jumped down to the soft green grass. I went to the bicycle racks, I got my bike, and carefully went around the block to avoid the school heading home. On my way, throngs of workers came out of the factories heading toward the center. I had to push myself against the crowd to make my way home. All the way through I was breathing in the fresh air, and I had this wonderful warm feeling in my heart that I did the right thing. I had a keen awareness of my freedom, at least freedom in spirit. My spirit soared above the situation, and led me home, my body obeyed. All my senses were very alert and concentrated on the task. It was the meaningful choice my conscience dictated I was reaching for freedom, I was choosing freedom, and I was acting in my area of freedom, choosing hope. As I moved, I was aware that I have been protected, wanted, and loved. I was very grateful that I could, in my own small ways be part of a "greater struggle," and secretly, I felt proud of it. Many years have passed since then. My parents and I moved to Canada, where a new life with new challenges awaited us. I had it solidly anchored in my soul that we have a body, and a mind, and we are spirit. While our body and mind are fragile, and subject to the environment and its limitations, our spirit is free to take a stand toward our circumstances. It is indestructible and lives forever. Even if the access to it may be temporarily blocked, it is there. Nobody and nothing can take away or destroy our spirit, and as a healthy resource it is always there. This thought helped me immensely when I was a fresh immigrant, when I even had to struggle to express myself in words. I felt my spirit alive, and fresh, guiding me to persist, to show courage, to not despair. I eventually graduated from University with a Major in psychology. Barnes, who is a proponent of logotherapy in the US. I have been blessed with the opportunity of completing my PhD degree in counselling psychology with Professor Dr. My Doctoral Thesis used a phenomenological-hermeneutic inquiry to explore the philosophical and practical uses of Logotherapy in counselling psychology. It was accepted for fulfillment of the requirements in September, , the year when Dr. Elisabeth Lukas, the foremost recognised student of Dr. I registered a psychologist, and worked in clinical practice, using logotherapy. He was a psychiatrist with an interest in logotherapy. We got married and we lived in England together. In , we immigrated back to Canada continuing our work on logotherapy and

practicing as psychotherapists. We founded the Canadian Association of Logotherapy and Existential Analysis Canadian Institute of Logotherapy , to promote the study and practice of logotherapy. We have five children ages 8, 7, 5, 4, and 2. This is our private psychotherapy practice where we offer courses on logotherapy. We authored two books together: Review of the Tenets of Viktor E. Frankl. Experiences with Viktor E. Frankl. Viktor Frankl witnessed that our spirit is the source of our search for meaning, every day, linked to Ultimate Meaning, which shines into our world through everyday events, people, and circumstances. I try to keep this in mind every day, whether I am in my office, serving my clients, or at home, serving my husband and my children. This is my story in a nutshell. This is my life as it has been this far. While we all have our own struggles, I feel gratitude for the prophetic words of Viktor Frankl, who reminded me of these truths, and provided some helpful guidelines for the journey ahead. Certainly Viktor Frankl is one of those "prophets" and one of those friends who accompanied my life, and who accompanies the lives of all those who seek to know his life-giving and enriching thought and work. She completed her Diplomate in Logotherapy credential with Dr. She is psychotherapist in private practice at the Ottawa Institute of Logotherapy, an accredited member of the International Association of Logotherapy and Existential Analysis, Vienna. She and her husband are founders of the Canadian Association of Logotherapy and Existential Analysis, and authors of two books on logotherapy: Ottawa Institute of Logotherapy. Both books are available at: