

Chapter 1 : Fire Disasters: what have We Learned?

The face of the mobile phone industry had changed forever, all because of a fire that had been contained in ten minutes. That was an exciting story, but so what? Since early , stories about the fire have appeared in many publications and forums.

Essentially, this meant that governmental authorities should not interfere in private business. Decisions relating to working hours, working conditions, health, and safety were entirely a matter between employer and employee. This was the private business of individuals, not a public matter for the state. In practice, this meant that workers often toiled in unimaginably dangerous conditions at serious risk of death or serious injury. The prevailing economic philosophy of the time was laissez-faire. In practice, this meant that workers often toiled in unimaginably dangerous conditions at serious risk of death or serious injury. Employers were not legally required to provide basic safety standards such as sprinkler systems, adequate ventilation, or fire escapes. It was this system of legalized negligence that led to the appalling loss of life in the Triangle disaster. In the aftermath of the tragedy, there was a widespread sense among the general public that something needed to be done. The Triangle fire alerted people to a side of life they had either previously ignored or never even knew existed. The lid had been ripped right off a previously hidden way of life, revealing a dark underbelly of poverty, callousness, and rampant exploitation. In examining the impact of the fire, Von Drehle emphasizes both the operation and necessity of political power to effect radical social change. Campaigners for improved worker safety undoubtedly had a strong moral case, but Von Drehle is at pains to point out that, in order to get things done within the American political system, you need power and influence. In the case of the Triangle fire, that power was provided by the notoriously corrupt Tammany Hall political machine of New York. Murphy had previously taken the side of management in labor disputes. It was this cynicism that led to the establishment of the Factory Investigation Commission, led by ambitious Tammany lawmakers Alfred E. We can see a direct link between the Triangle disaster and the eventual passing of comprehensive federal labor reform legislation. What we also see, however, is another impact the fire had on society and, arguably, the most important one at that: More and more workers came to join unions, increasing both their numerical and political strength. By organizing, influencing, and exercising influence at both a state and federal level, labor unions were effectively beating private business at their own game. For the first time, labor was now a serious political power, one that employers could no longer afford to ignore. This, more than anything else, is the greatest single legacy of that terrible day in

Chapter 2 : The Fire That Changed an Industry | Essay Example

The Fire That Changed an Industry: A Case Study on Thriving in a Networked World By: Amit S. Mukherjee About 8 p.m. on March 17th , a lightning bolt struck a high-voltage electricity line in New Mexico.

What were the causes and subcauses of the chief job? Put it in the right sequence. All started with a lightning bolt struck a high-potential electricity line in March. Fire produces fume and trigger sprinklers. As a consequence fire. The subcause is that at first Philips idea that killing would take at least a week but two hebdomads after the fire. Philips admitted it would necessitate more clip to repair the job. The works remained out of action for six hebdomads. How Nokia managed with the job? At a Nokia works outside Helsinki. They passed on word of a possible job to Tapio Markki. Markki knew that the killing would take more than one hebdomad so on March 20 he informed his foremans. Nokia began look intoing the position of the five parts made in New Mexico one time a twenty-four hours alternatively of the customary one time a hebdomad. Nokia took three cardinal stairss: Philips responded by rearranging its mills as far off as Eindhoven and Shanghai. Two current providers responded within five yearss. How Ericsson managed with the job? Ericsson got a call from Philips. At the terminal of March Ericsson eventually came to appreciate the gravitation of its job. However it sill did non move quickly. Jan Warby did non acquire involved till early April. They had really few options left. What were the concluding effects of that job for these two companies? The one-year study for did non even advert the fire. What would you make if you were a director in Ericsson Company? I would set higher quality controls to observe production failures rapidly. When they realized about the job. I would seek for other workss which can offer the same or similar bit to utilize in the nomadic phones or seek to develop other in their workss in a different manner which could work. Choose Type of service.

Chapter 3 : Ericsson's proactive supply chain risk management approach after a serious sub-supplier accident

The Fire That Changed an Industry Essay Sample. 1. What were the causes and subcauses of the main problem? Set it in the right sequence, you can also use Ishikawa Diagram or other useful tool.

A bookkeeper on the eighth floor was able to warn employees on the tenth floor via telephone, but there was no audible alarm and no way to contact staff on the ninth floor. Other survivors were able to jam themselves into the elevators while they continued to operate. Elevator operators Joseph Zito [24] and Gaspar Mortillalo saved many lives by traveling three times up to the ninth floor for passengers, but Mortillalo was eventually forced to give up when the rails of his elevator buckled under the heat. Some victims pried the elevator doors open and jumped into the empty shaft, trying to slide down the cables or to land on top of the car. The weight and impacts of these bodies warped the elevator car and made it impossible for Zito to make another attempt. William Gunn Shepard, a reporter at the tragedy, would say that "I learned a new sound that day, a sound more horrible than description can picture" the thud of a speeding living body on a stone sidewalk". I was deeply engrossed in my book when I became aware of fire engines racing past the building. By this time I was sufficiently Americanized to be fascinated by the sound of fire engines. Along with several others in the library, I ran out to see what was happening, and followed crowds of people to the scene of the fire. When we arrived at the scene, the police had thrown up a cordon around the area and the firemen were helplessly fighting the blaze. The eighth, ninth, and tenth stories of the building were now an enormous roaring cornice of flames. Word had spread through the East Side, by some magic of terror, that the plant of the Triangle Waist Company was on fire and that several hundred workers were trapped. Horrified and helpless, the crowds "I among them" looked up at the burning building, saw girl after girl appear at the reddened windows, pause for a terrified moment, and then leap to the pavement below, to land as mangled, bloody pulp. This went on for what seemed a ghastly eternity. Occasionally a girl who had hesitated too long was licked by pursuing flames and, screaming with clothing and hair ablaze, plunged like a living torch to the street. Life nets held by the firemen were torn by the impact of the falling bodies. The emotions of the crowd were indescribable. Women were hysterical, scores fainted; men wept as, in paroxysms of frenzy, they hurled themselves against the police lines. The remainder waited until smoke and fire overcame them. The fire department arrived quickly but was unable to stop the flames, as there were no ladders available that could reach beyond the sixth floor. The fallen bodies and falling victims also made it difficult for the fire department to approach the building. Bodies of the victims being placed in coffins on the sidewalk People and horses draped in black walk in procession in memory of the victims Aftermath[edit] Although early references of the death toll ranged from [28] to , [29] almost all modern references agree that people died as a result of the fire: In some instances, their tombstones refer to the fire. Originally interred elsewhere on the grounds, their remains now lie beneath a monument to the tragedy, a large marble slab featuring a kneeling woman. Steuer argued to the jury that Alterman and possibly other witnesses had memorized their statements, and might even have been told what to say by the prosecutors. The prosecution charged that the owners knew the exit doors were locked at the time in question. The investigation found that the locks were intended to be locked during working hours based on the findings from the fire, [45] but the defense stressed that the prosecution failed to prove that the owners knew that. In , Blanck was once again arrested for locking the door in his factory during working hours. She used the fire as an argument for factory workers to organize: We have tried you good people of the public and we have found you wanting! We have tried you citizens; we are trying you now, and you have a couple of dollars for the sorrowing mothers, brothers and sisters by way of a charity gift. But every time the workers come out in the only way they know to protest against conditions which are unbearable, the strong hand of the law is allowed to press down heavily upon us. Public officials have only words of warning to us "warning that we must be intensely peaceable, and they have the workhouse just back of all their warnings. The strong hand of the law beats us back, when we rise, into the conditions that make life unbearable. Too much blood has been spilled. I know from my experience it is up to the working people to save themselves. The only way they can save themselves is by a strong working-class movement. In

New York City, a Committee on Public Safety was formed, headed by eyewitness Frances Perkins [49] who 22 years later would be appointed United States Secretary of Labor to identify specific problems and lobby for new legislation, such as the bill to grant workers shorter hours in a work week, known as the "hour Bill". Murphy, realized the advantage to be had from being on the side of the angels. They held a series of widely publicized investigations around the state, interviewing witnesses and taking 3, pages of testimony. They hired field agents to do on-site inspections of factories. They started with the issue of fire safety and moved on to broader issues of the risks of injury in the factory environment. Their findings led to thirty-eight new laws regulating labor in New York state, and gave them a reputation as leading progressive reformers working on behalf of the working class. As a result of her experience, she became a lifelong supporter of unions. The commemoration drew thousands of people, many holding aloft "Shirtwaist-Kites" conceived by artist Annie Lanzillotto and designed and fabricated by members of The Remember the Triangle Fire Coalition, with the names of the victims on sashes, as they listened to speakers. From July through the weeks leading up to the th anniversary, the Coalition served as a clearinghouse to organize some activities as varied as academic conferences, films, theater performances, art shows, concerts, readings, awareness campaigns, walking tours, and parades that were held in and around New York City, and in cities across the nation, including San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Minneapolis, Boston and Washington, D. For this commemorative act, the Remember the Triangle Fire Coalition organized hundreds of churches, schools, fire houses, and private individuals in the New York City region and across the nation. The Coalition maintains on its website a national map denoting each of the bells that rang that afternoon. A reflective steel beam will extend from the corner of the building to the eighth floor, the place of origin for the fire. Three Miracles premiered on PBS, focusing on the life of year-old Rose Freedman died, who became the last living survivor of the fire. Murphy explored the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire through movement, text, video, photography and original music. The Diary of Angela Denoto. The comic book The Goon issue 37 tells the story of a similar fire at a girdle factory that takes the lives of women who worked there. After the fire, the surviving women attempt to unionize and the Goon comes to their aid after union busters try to force them back to work. Author Eric Powell specifically cites the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire as an inspiration for the story.

Chapter 4 : The hospital fire that changed the industry - The Advisory Board Daily Briefing

Fifty years ago this week, a devastating hospital fire in Connecticut cost more than a dozen lives but ultimately changed the industry for the better, through more stringent safety standards. On Dec. 8, , a fire ripped through Hartford Hospital and killed 16 people. According to an.

One of the most famous or rather infamous cases is the fire at the Philips microchip plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in , which simultaneously affected both Nokia and Ericsson. Ericsson, on the other hand, is another story. Nokia In the late s, Swedish-owned Ericsson was one of the big international players in the mobile phone industry, together with the Finnish company Nokia. My first mobile phone in was in fact a Nokia, but I switched to Ericsson in , because they made much better phones, so I thought. The Albuquerque fire On March 17, , a small fire hit a microchip plant owned by Philips, the Dutch company. Nokia versus Ericsson Nokia acted swiftly and moved to tie up spare capacity at other Philips plants and every other supplier they could find. They even re-engineered some of their phones so they could take chips from other Japanese and American suppliers. Ericsson, meanwhile, had accepted early assurances that the fire was unlikely to cause a big problem, and settled down to wait it out. When they realized their mistake it was too late: Since Ericsson a few years earlier had decided to buy key components from a single source to simplify its supply chain, Ericsson now had to face the bitter realization that it had no other source of supply. Nokia had already taken it all. Single sourcing may have its benefits, but it has its costs, too. Ericsson lost many months of production, and hence many sales in a booming market that could now be dominated by Nokia. Eventually Ericsson merged with Sony in order to survive, and eventually I too had to switch back to Nokia. It starts with mapping all the components and products many tiers upstream the supply chain and identifies critical suppliers and sites that have to be prioritized and assessed further. After a rough assessment on how shortage will affect the supply chain, a more thorough investigation into probability and impact of different accidents at different suppliers is conducted to assess the impact on the supply chain as a whole, particularly the impact on business recovery time. Finally, risk management actions protection are evaluated against risk costs impact and consequences , to avoid over-action or over-insurance against incidents. Lessons learned Not only Ericsson, but many other companies have also learned from this incident. Supply chain risk management SCRM is a necessary component of any supply chain. SCRM may lead to increased costs in the form of prevention measures, and SCRM may lead to increased lead time, in order to have buffers, should something happen. In essence though, risk exposure always has a price, and as a company one should think through what price or rather cost, as in disruption cost that is acceptable or not. Lessons not learned This article was written in , when Nokia was still a major player in the mobile market. While Nokia may have learned a lesson in supply chain resilience , Nokia did not learn what it would have taken to stay a major player. That is unfortunate, because Nokia phones have always been my favourite, and I would have loved to see Nokia continue making phones. The Wall Street Journal, January 29,

Chapter 5 : Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire - Wikipedia

Organization of the Book. In the rest of Part I, "Why Change?," I build the case for transforming the modern enterprise by addressing its key limitations and the impact they have on performance.

As power fluctuated across the state, a fire broke out in a fabrication line of the Royal Philips Electronics radio frequency chip manufacturing plant in Albuquerque. At first blush, it was clear that eight trays of silicon wafers on that line were destroyed. When fully processed, these would have produced chips for several thousand cell phones. A setback, no doubt, but definitely not a calamity. The cleanest of such facilities have no more than one speck of dust per cubic foot. Stated differently, these facilities are ten thousand times cleaner than hospital operating rooms. Fire produces smoke and triggers sprinklers. Fire and smoke take lives, and sprinklers save them, but allâ€™fire, smoke, and waterâ€™wreak havoc on property. As they dug deeper, plant personnel found that smoke and water had contaminated millions of chips that had been stored for shipment. Damage this extensive was definitely a calamity. Four thousand miles away, at a Nokia plant outside Helsinki, a production planner who was following a well articulated process for managing chip inflows from Philips failed to get a routine input he needed from Philips. The failure could well have been an anomaly. Even so-called Six Sigma facilities of which, despite the hype about the term, there are very few anywhere produce 3. In Albuquerque, Philips engineers and managers grappled with the aftermath of the fire. They realized that cleanup would take at least a week, which meant that customers would be affected, at least temporarily. Philips management decided that their orders would be filled first when the plant returned to normal. On March 20, Philips called its customers, including Mr. He recalls that Philips said that the disruption would last about a week. The Wall Street Journal article cited earlier and published months later implied that Philips had underestimated the extent of the problem. Markki had, early in his career, worked for five years at a small semiconductor company that supplied Nokia. Nokia had developed this enhanced monitoring process over the prior five years. A few hundred miles away, executives at Ericsson also got a call from Philips. They certainly did not perceive a need for concern or stepped-up action. Its executives began regularly urging their counterparts at Philips to take stronger action. They also moved toward adopting the response routines they had developed for such eventualities. On March 31, exactly two weeks after the fire, Philips admitted it would need more time to fix the problem; ultimately, the plant remained out of action for six weeks. One team of executives and engineers focused on Philips, seeking a major role in developing alternative plans. Philips responded by rearranging its plans in factories as far away as Eindhoven and Shanghai. A second cross-continental team redesigned some chips so that they could be produced in other Philips and non-Philips plants. Where appropriate, it consulted with Philips to assess the possible impact of its actions. A third group worked to find alternative manufacturers to reduce pressure on Philips. Two current suppliers responded within five days. The magnitude of the cooperation between Nokia and Philips cannot be fully appreciated without a few words on Philips. Once considered a leading-edge technology company, by the mids Philips was being criticized by many an analyst. Boonstra ignored their calls to dismember the company and instead spent three years reshaping it and rebuilding its reputation. Helping Nokia required managerial and technical effort equivalent to pulling a rabbit out of a hat. Component makers, ranging from chip to liquid crystal display producers, were working at capacity. By midyear, Sony, Micron Technology, Dell, Sun, and even Philips itself had announced that component shortages would rein in their very strong financial performances. Shortages were expected to continue unabated till year-end. At the end of March, in this market environment, Ericsson finally came to appreciate the gravity of its problem. However, for reasons about which one can only speculate, it still did not act speedily. Jan Warby, the executive who headed the mobile phone division, did not get involved till early April. By then Ericsson had very few options left. Its quarterly statements and annual report for did not even mention the fire. In April , it signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create Sony Ericsson; the informal negotiations that led to this step had started at the height of the crisis in July , though Ericsson had denied it in public. The deal was finalized in October It finally returned to health in , but as a much smaller company. The face of the mobile phone industry had changed forever, all because of a fire that

had been contained in ten minutes. That was an exciting story, but so what? Since early , stories about the fire have appeared in many publications and forums. Someâ€”but only a fractionâ€”of the articles that have appeared are listed in the endnotes of this and subsequent chapters. Collectively, these stories perpetuated several myths: Nokia succeeded because it relied on individual effort, while Ericsson relied on teams. No individualâ€”or even a group of individuals acting independentlyâ€”could have pulled off the cross-continental, cross-organizational response that Nokia took. Nokia succeeded because it used superior information technology. Like most large companies, Nokia could not have functioned without IT. However, IT played a supporting role, and the specific benefit it gave Nokia was so prosaic that no technology partisan that I know ever wrote about it. Nokia succeeded because Finns are less cautious than Swedes. An explanation rooted in unfounded national stereotypes has little to teach us and is undoubtedly wrong. In any case, national culture played no role; a French executive, Jean-Francois Baril, who had spent many years in the U. Nokia succeeded because Mr. Korhonen was a brilliant crisis manager. Academics use the story to illustrate types of crises that companies must be able to withstand and to cajole them to upgrade their supply chains. Risk management professionals use it to scare potential clients into buying appropriate insurance. In realityâ€”and despite the fact that the Wall Street Journal article quoted Mr. A long way into our conversation, perhaps after he felt that I understood what Nokia had really done, Mr. Externally, the fire has been a much bigger thing than internally. For us, it has been business as usual. We have had to manage many such things. Korhonen did play a key roleâ€”but mostly during the prior five years, when Nokia created the capabilities that enabled it to shrug off a challenge that has captivated the business world. These capabilitiesâ€”built into its strategy, processes, and values and supported by technologyâ€”enabled it to adapt rapidly to huge changes in the assumptions embedded in its business plans. Even today, seven years after the fire and almost eleven years after Nokia began transforming itself, only a handful of large companies can do what Nokia did in Such a capability is exceedingly important, because we live in a networked world in which each company partners with a set of other companies. While such networks are critical to modern businesses, they enable shifts in market or operating conditions to rapidly propagate far beyond their origins. If a company is unable to sense such a shift and respond effectively, it can lose tremendous amounts of value, see the reputations of its senior executives tarnished, and destroy the livelihoods of thousands. Companiesâ€”like Nokiaâ€”that can intelligently and effortlessly adjust to major shifts in market or operating conditions are Adaptive Businesses. Design Principles for Adaptive Businesses This book presents four Design Principles that senior executives can apply to transform their companies into businesses that will thrive in a networked world. A Design Principle is a guideline for policy, rather than a template to stamp out identical sets of tools and procedures. Indeed, I do not believe it is possible to provide replicable templates; companies must use the Principles to create their own unique solutions. The Principles are as follows: Embed sense-and-respond capabilities within normal plan-and-execute processes. The ability to detect a problem or opportunity early and correctly and the ability to react effectively are key determinants of competitive advantage. Unless these abilities are a part of everyday work, companies will lurch from crisis to crisis, be they big or small. Adopt strategies that promote collaborative action among network partners. As they globalize and as their supply-and-demand networks fracture, companies lose visibility into aspects of their competitive landscape. Unless they develop cooperative relationships with their partners, they will not get preferential assistance with either crisis or opportunity. Value and nurture organizational learning. Companies must collect, analyze, and share across their networks knowledge about what works and what does not. Deploy technologies that enable intelligent adjustment to major environmental shifts. To adjust to changed conditions effectively and efficiently, companies must apply information technologies that support the prior principles. The four Principles are deceptively simple; stating them is far easier than applying them day after day. For example, despite embarking on its transformation in , Nokia has only recently become comfortable with the idea that its adaptive capabilities are inextricably interwoven into the fabric of its organization. Hewlett-Packardâ€”another company that I will profile extensivelyâ€”also began changing at the same time and is still institutionalizing the capabilities it has built. The difficulty of implementing the Principles is what gives them their great power; collectively they change how work is performed on a day-to-day basis. For example, to sense and respond, one might need the

preferential help of a partner company. Technology aids the ability to sense and respond, but unless people can make sense of what they are sensing, all the effort will be for naught. Companies also must consider major organizational changes in order to marshal and deploy people with the skills needed to design, create, and manage their networks. Many may decide to centralize these people in a coherent group, while others may decide to keep them dispersed but well linked. In either case, they must consider appointing a senior executive to give them a voice in top management deliberations.

Chapter 6 : Why the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire Is Important Today | HuffPost

The Fire That Changed an Industry: A Case Study on Thriving in a Networked World By Amit S. Mukherjee Date: Oct 1, Return to the article.

Today, too many employers are failing to obey the labor and workplace safety laws that were enacted in the years following the tragedy. And in part because our government is not adequately enforcing these laws, workers are still needlessly losing their lives on the job. There is a lot that we can and must do to ensure that the wellbeing of workers is put above profits. The Triangle Shirtwaist incident is remembered for its shocking brutality: Some of the exits and stairwells had been locked to prevent workers from taking breaks or stealing, leaving many unable to get out. As a result, workers, mostly young immigrant women, died within 20 minutes. They were burned alive, asphyxiated by smoke or died trying to escape out of the windows and balcony. The horrific event generated a nationwide outcry about working conditions and spurred efforts to improve standards. Thanks to the efforts of the ILGWU and all who fought for workplace reforms, real changes got underway immediately; in 1914, New York State initiated the most comprehensive investigation of factory conditions in U.S. Their conclusions informed new standards that other states across the country replicated and built upon in subsequent years. After all, workplace safety issues are hardly a thing of the past. It seems like nearly every year, another workplace disaster happens somewhere in the United States. Like last year, when a fertilizer plant in Texas exploded, killing 14 and injuring over 100. Or in 2010, when an explosion at a West Virginia coal mine run by Massey Energy killed 29 miners and the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion left 11 workers dead and caused an enormous environmental disaster. Thankfully, none of these events matched the human cost of the Triangle Shirtwaist fire -- or the devastating factory collapse in Bangladesh last year where 1,134 people died -- but they should send a similar message. No one should lose his or her life because companies are putting profitmaking ahead of worker protections, and because our government is not performing its critical watchdog role. Experts say that in each of the cases cited above, proper safety precautions could have prevented the devastating accidents. But companies are not consistent in their practices of adhering to worker safety precautions. This issue of worker safety is of particular concern for undocumented workers who often receive the worst treatment of all. While working in some of our most physically demanding and low-paying jobs -- from construction to landscaping, and from housekeeping to daycare and nursing -- many of their employers also cut corners when it comes to their safety, knowing they are less likely than other workers to stand up for their rights. How can we avoid these kinds of safety problems and exploitation to begin with? We can start by reinvigorating the role of unions. While unions continue to do everything they can to curb these abuses, the proportion of the workforce that is unionized has eroded dramatically since its peak in the 1950s. To ensure both safety and fairness on the job, workers need to join together on the job to improve their working conditions. Institutional investors and other shareholders of publicly traded companies also have an important role to play. By pursuing corporate governance reforms when needed and lawsuits when companies commit serious wrongdoing, investors can spur changes from the inside out. Government also needs to step up. Our elected officials need to fight for resources for workplace inspections through agencies like OSHA -- which has consistently faced cuts in recent years -- and ensure thorough investigations when problems are brought to their attention. For citizens, that means making our voices heard about the importance of workplace safety, and voting for elected officials who represent those views. But we can prevent others from suffering similar fates -- and work to ensure both safety and fairness in the workplace -- now and in the future.

Chapter 7 : Jimmy Alyea, MBA: Supply Chain Management

The Fire That Changed an Industry Essay Sample. 0. Free Essays. 1. What were the causes and subcauses of the chief job? Put it in the right sequence. you can besides.

Distributed computer networks are driving the present epochal change by fragmenting work across time and space, engendering extreme product customization, and blurring industrial boundaries. In order to succeed in a world of corporate networks, companies must develop three capabilities to augment their traditional plan-and-execute skills. They must be able to sense changes in their environments, respond to these seamlessly, and learn from their experiences and apply the lessons in other situations. Senior executives should take responsibility for guiding this transformation, because research shows that financial markets are penalizing companies and executives for perceived failures more severely than ever before. Embed sense-and-respond capabilities within normal plan-and-execute processes. Without embedding, a company cannot be adaptive; at best, it can be great at managing crises. Embedding requires changing work practices, just as becoming truly quality-focused requires making quality the responsibility of individual employees. Adopt strategies that promote collaborative action among network partners. The fragmentation of work will require companies to create win-win partnerships with their partners, because no company can succeed while its network is ailing. Research shows that executives recognize the need for collaboration, but this does not always lead to action. Understanding why companies act against their best interests can help executives change such behavior. Value and nurture organizational learning. The failure to learn keeps companies from intelligent and effortless adaptation. It impedes both the effective use of the prior Principles and the interpretation of environmental signals to take action. Deploy technologies that enable intelligent adjustment to major environmental shifts. It asserts that companies must invest in technologies that provide visibility, support analysis, facilitate collaboration, or enable mobility. Technologies that do not build these capabilities may be essential for security or legal reasons, but they will not provide competitive advantage. This discussion focuses on technology strategy what, why and not technical details how. Managing internal and external networks must become a focal point for key decisions. People who are superb at designing, creating, and managing human networks will undertake this task and increasingly become highly prized by their employers. A Chief Network Officer, who may or may not be formally designated as such, should lead them. Companies must adopt what I call holographic change management. This approach advocates the implementation of all four Design Principles in one business area and subsequent replication in other areas. It also advises against implementing one Design Principle at a time across the entire company. The Epilogue brings closure by describing two perspectives on an Adaptive Business. Given my focus on corporate transformation, many of the issues I discuss fall within the bailiwicks of top managers. Starting with Chapter 2, I make specific recommendations for them.

Chapter 8 : Historic Fires that Changed Fire Codes - Building Technologies - Siemens

The Fire That Changed an Industry About 8 p.m. on March 17, , a lightning bolt struck a high-voltage electricity line in New Mexico. As power fluctuated across the state, a fire broke out in a fabrication line of the Royal Philips Electronics radio frequency chip manufacturing plant in Albuquerque. [1].

Get Full Essay Get access to this section to get all help you need with your essay and educational issues. What were the causes and subcauses of the main problem? Set it in the right sequence, you can also use Ishikawa Diagram or other useful tool. All started with a lightning bolt struck a high-voltage electricity line in March 17, , it caused a fire broke in a manufacturing plant. Fire produces smoke and trigger sprinklers. As a result fire, smoke and water had contaminated millions of chips that had been stored for shipment. The subcause is that at first Philips thought that cleanup would take at least a week but two weeks after the fire, Philips admitted it would need more time to fix the problem. The plant remained out of action for six weeks. How Nokia managed with the problem? At a Nokia plant outside Helsinki, a production planner who was following a well articulated process for managing chip inflows from Philips failed to get a routine input he needed from Philips. They passed on word of a possible problem to Tapio Markki, the top component purchasing manager. Markki knew that the cleanup would take more than one week so on March 20 he informed his bosses. Nokia began checking the status of the five parts made in New Mexico once a day instead of the customary once a week. Nokia took three key steps: Two current suppliers responded within five days. How Ericsson managed with the problem? Ericsson got a call from Philips. However it still did not act speedily. Jan Warby did not get involved till early April. They had very few options left. What were the final consequences of that problem for these two companies? The annual report for did not even mention the fire. Six month later, it reported divisional annual losses of 1. What would you do if you were a manager in Ericsson Company? I would put higher quality controls to detect production failures quickly. When they realized about the problem, I would search for other plants which can offer the same or similar chip to use in the mobile phones or try to develop other in their plants in a different way which could work. More essays like this:

Chapter 9 : Jimmy Alyea, MBA: A Supply Chain Case Study on Thriving in a Networked World

After the fire, panic bars were introduced to make emergency exits more accessible, maximum seating capacities were enforced to prevent crushing crowds, ventilation standards were changed to prevent fireballs and smoke buildup, and numerous regulations were passed to ensure that buildings have clear pathways, clearly marked exits, and doors.

Baltimore - San Francisco - Something important happened after each of the fires listed laid waste to a city: The purpose of this article is to show that progress in the American Fire Service has been based upon a series of historic catastrophes. In the wake of each succeeding disaster, improvements were made. Chicago has been the scene of many historic fires. The city was rebuilt following the conflagration. Improvements were made in construction styles and methods. By , the Great Fire had become a fading memory to all, as the city was swept by succeeding waves of immigrants from the Old World. The Iroquois Theater was one of the great entertainment venues in this thriving industrial center. It was one of the big stops on the vaudeville circuit, drawing the great performers of its day. So it was on Dec. The comedian Eddie Foy was starring in a matinee performance of the musical comedy, "Mr. The fire that ensued spread quickly through the flammable backstage rigging. Workers attempted to beat the fire out with sticks in a vain attempt to extinguish the blaze. A piece of flaming cloth fell to the stage. In a vain attempt to calm the crowd, Foy had the band continue playing. Suddenly, a woman cried out and the audience made a mad dash for the exits. As the firemen moved in to extinguish the flame, they were met with a tangle of human bodies, all entwined and badly burned. The cause of death for many came from the terrible smoke and flames. Most, however, had been trampled and crushed in the rush to leave the hall. Authorities considered it a miracle that only people succumbed to the fire. The Iroquois Theater was built of fire-resistive materials. Experts agree that it was well-built, but they also point out that many important fire protection features were missing or inoperable at the time of the fire. Installed ventilators that were not in operation. Exits not properly marked. Exits blocked with draperies, wood and glass doors. No installed alarm system. No fire protection devices such as extinguishers and standpipes. No automatic sprinklers in the stage area, even though it was a municipal requirement. The investigation that followed led to a variety of fire safety improvements, all of which addressed the problems listed above. In fact, many cities still provide a uniformed firefighter or group of firefighters for major entertainment events. The fire service has long viewed old-style factory buildings as a serious fire hazard. Many of the worst fires during the late s and early s happened in factory buildings. Some are more famous than others. A fire in a Newark, NJ, clothing factory killed 24 workers, and there were countless others. All had code-related problems at their heart. It is the fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company in New York City, however, that marked a turning point in how fire codes addressed this type of occupancy. Chief Edward Croker of the New York Fire Department had long sought improvements in the building codes and factory laws, because of such early fires as the Parker Building. Three firemen were killed in a massive collapse within this story fireproof building. His pleas fell on deaf ears and the resulting catastrophe, which killed scores of innocent young immigrants, will long live in the annals of firefighting lore. The work force was primarily made up of young, female immigrants, who labored under classic "sweatshop" conditions. More than workers were jammed into the eighth and ninth floors of the story building, which was supposedly built from fire-resistive materials. It was about 4: A fire started in a rag bin on the eighth floor. It spread rapidly through the mix of combustible cloth, and soon cutting tables and other fixtures were ablaze. One group of workers grabbed the standpipe hoseline and attempted to extinguish the fire. They quickly found that the hose was rotted and the valves frozen shut. Word of the fire soon began to pass through the workers jammed into the loft building. Workers surged toward the exits with which they were familiar. They were met with a wall of fire racing up the stairs. Others moved toward another exit, but were blocked by a locked door. When they were finally able to force it, they found that it opened inward. By this time, there were so many people pushing toward the door that the door was jammed shut; people began piling up at this point. Very few workers knew that the freight elevator was still working. A number of young girls faced with the prospect of a horrible death by fire chose to leap to their deaths from windows on the eight and ninth floors. Others managed to make it to the roof, and a small number

were able to make their way over ladders to the New York University Law School next door. Bells in New York fire stations began to toll the alarm. But the problems were many. The streets were littered with bodies, making apparatus placement difficult. Ladders could not reach the fire or the roof. Once lines were in position, the fire was quickly extinguished. The horrible toll was people who leaped to their deaths or were burned or crushed to death in the panic. The public was outraged. This fire had proved Croker correct. More was needed than just fire suppression. After an intense investigation, a number of changes were instituted. A new bureau of fire prevention was created in the fire department. Labor laws were passed outlawing many of the practices which led to the fire. The ironic part of this story is that the building remained in use for decades after this tragedy. As we all know, change takes time. Less than a year after the Triangle fire, another major blaze struck New York, taking the lives of six men. The Equitable Building was a giant story structure composed of five individual buildings linked together, which covered the better part of a city block in the financial district. Sad to say, the fire began in a wastebasket and spread throughout the building. It seems that the employee who found it was frightened, and chose to run away. The building was literally riddled with dumbwaiter shafts, elevators and multiple unstopped entrances and passages. As the fire grew in intensity, it made its way upward through these shafts. Fire personnel quickly moved lines down into the basement and pressed home an aggressive attack, not aware of the fire burning above their heads. Soon after discovering the fire above them, a second alarm was transmitted. As the fire escalated, the number of alarms increased. The weather could not have been worse, with heavy gale winds blowing freezing, wind-driven spray back onto the firefighters, who were pouring tons of water onto the blaze. The debris from this collapse also trapped three men in the basement. Unbeknownst to the fire department, these men had made their way into the basement of the building to rescue millions of dollars in negotiable bonds which, if they had burned, would have created financial chaos for their owners. Only through the heroism of Seneca Larke Jr. While laying on his belly over the grate where the men were trapped, under torrents of freezing water and falling rubble, he worked with a hacksaw to cut them free. The toll from this disaster included the three civilian workers, one of the basement occupants and two fire department members. One of the major lessons learned from this fire was that the latest method of fireproofing structural members had been proven useless. The lessons from the earlier Parker Building fire had been ignored. In that era, engineers and architects had specified cast iron as the supporting members for a number of large buildings. To protect them from the weakening effects of fire, they had been encased in hollow tie blocks. These just did not work. In the wake of these fires, improved fireproofing of structural members was developed. Schools have never been immune to fire tragedy. Three of great historical interest are: Our Lady of the Angels School in Chicago 95 dead. These fires occurred for different reasons. In Ohio, it was a cellar fire of unknown origin that roared up the main stairway of the school, trapping the existing students and killing them. They only knew one way out. The fire department was not trained or equipped to fight a fire in the school. The victims of the Texas fire were killed in a massive gas explosion. The fatal fire in the Our Lady of the Angels School began as a small trash fire in the basement.