

## Chapter 1 : Democracy | United Nations

*The review argues that Talisse's epistemic defense of democracy in his "Democracy and Moral Conflict," albeit novel and interesting, falls prey to an epistemic analogue of the problem of reasonable moral pluralism that Rawls famously posed for moral justifications of democracy.*

Although volumes have been written about the theory and practice of democracy, the concept remains difficult to define. Etymologically the term is simple enough: This basic definition can be extrapolated in many different ways. At its core, however, most scholars agree that democracy refers to a political practice in which individuals govern themselves through some form of equitable decision-making process. This leaves open two fundamental issues: Historically, democracy first took hold in the ancient city states of Mesopotamia and Greece through direct mechanisms such as sortition Keane Since the 18th Century, though, the ideal of democracy has become wedded to rise of the nation-state. The modern state is a distinctive form of political organization based on sovereign autonomy over a delimited territory and population. Through a centrally organized government, the state wields a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence as well as the right to taxation Giddens In exchange for these coercive powers, the state generates its legitimacy through democratic mechanisms: National democracy is typically institutionalized as a representative system that involves competitive elections and a publicly determined rule of law. Although there are many different national voting systems majority rule, proportional representation, etc. In recent years, however, the supposed alliance between democracy and the nation-state has come unstuck. This is due predominantly to globalization: Globalization intensifies social, political, and economic relations through technological changes and the flow of people, resources and ideas across state lines. The expansion of global connections has gone hand-in-glove with increased efforts to govern global affairs. Countless formal measures, informal norms and overarching discourses for regulating global affairs are now formulated and implemented through complex transnational networks that combine substate agencies, nation-states, regional bodies, global institutions, and non-state actors Scholte , 4. Although the state is often an active participant in globalization, many scholars have argued that increased transnational activity undermines national democracy Sassen Globalization pierces the sovereignty of nation-states by subjecting domestic affairs to transnational decision-making. Moreover, citizens of each state are often said to be problematically excluded from global activities in ways that lead to a democratic deficit expanded upon below. Formal institutions include international organizations IO , intergovernmental organizations IGO , non-governmental organizations NGO , and private bodies Tallberg et al. Many scholars have noted that this authority often enables international institutions to wield pervasive forms of public power that impact and potentially constrain the lives of individuals Macdonald This occurs through international law-making, regulatory standard-setting, and the promotion of new norms. As decisions are taken outside the state, national leaders are unable to control the forces which impact domestic institutions and citizens. Correspondingly, and resultantly, individuals within each state have no direct say in how global rules are forged. This undermines the notion that individuals can collectively govern their joint affairs. This gapâ€”between individual rule-takers and transnational rule-makersâ€”is referred to as the global democratic deficit. The global democratic deficit is compounded by at least three additional factors. First is an issue of procedure: This makes it difficult to identify the steps in a causal chain which link transnational rule-makers with rule-takers. The second factor is scope: Third is an issue of constituency: As Andrew Linklater notes, globalization generates postnational communities of fate not based on national boundaries but upon shared problems and mutual allegiances. Although a full survey is neither possible nor necessary here, two prominent responses have been advocated in the literature Goodin First, all individuals subjected to rules, laws, and regulations should take part in writing those rules. Second, all individuals significantly affected by a decision-making process should have an equal say in how that power is exercised. While these two positions provide a basis for delineating the people in a globalizing world, there are clear differences between them. The former is relatively narrow: By contrast, the latter is much broader: To take a simple example: Should these individuals be entitled to a democratic right of participation in WTO decisions? From this, we can see that

whether we chose subjectedness or affectedness matters because each criterion entails a significantly different domain of democratic inclusion. As such, further research is required to shed light on how, or even if, the boundary problem can be resolved, and its implications for global democracy. Global democrats thus share the view that individuals should collectively rule themselves. To the extent that decision-making power migrates beyond the state, democracy should follow. There is, of course, a prior question about why individuals should have roughly equal say in decision-making in the first place. On one level, it is a simple definitional requirement of democracy. But this point simply begs the question: As with theoretical discussions of democracy, a variety of intrinsic and instrumental reasons for global democracy can be discerned in the literature. Intrinsic justifications point to democracy as a valuable method of decision-making in-and-of-itself. Instrumental claims hinge upon the outcome of democracy being beneficial, especially compared to alternatives. The most common intrinsic claim relates to cosmopolitanism, which many proponents of global democracy have drawn upon as a moral foundation motivating the project Kant []. Global democracy helps realize this cosmopolitan ideal by treating all individuals as moral beings capable of exercising equal control over shared destinies. It is important to note, however, that differences between global democrats exist in terms of the scope of their cosmopolitan commitment. While almost all global democrats see individuals as the fundamental object of concern, many proponents argue that relational qualities still matter in generating normative prescriptions Miller Several other intrinsic arguments, though, have been made in literature. These claims all suggest that global democracy is morally desirable irrespective of the benefits generated. For instance, many scholars have suggested that global democracy embodies equality, autonomy, non-domination, and human rights see respectively: Erman ; Held ; Bohman ; Goodhart These fundamental rights should be valued for their own sake and therefore provide an additional moral foundationâ€”related to, but sometimes distinct from, cosmopolitanismâ€”for pursuing democracy beyond borders. These arguments are most common amongst liberal democrats and neo-Roman republicans Pettit Other scholars put instrumental considerations at the fore. In this vein, proponents have maintained that global democracy is required for epistemic, problem-solving, justice, and legitimacy-based reasons. Similarly, scholars in the pragmatist tradition of John Dewey have suggested that global democracy is required to generate compliance with international rules and thus solve collective action problems such as climate change Bray By participating in the formation of law-making, individuals are more likely to comply with the agreement. Laura Valentini has claimed that global democracy is required for global justice. Democratic mechanisms need to be in place to sort out reasonable disagreements as to how resources should be allocated. Models of Global Democracy There are many different proposals for global democracy and, correspondingly, many different taxonomical divisions have been developed. Models represent idealized theoretical constructions designed to express the normative qualities of a democratic system as well as its constitutive institutions. Models tend to fit together as whole pieces, and are thus relatively discrete and well-developed proposals. The following subsections outline five prominent models. Specific attention is paid to the normative underpinnings, institutional design, and problems of feasibility and desirability associated with each model. Citizens thus have democratic representation beyond the state through their national government. The crucial normative ideal underpinning this model is liberal and cosmopolitan in orientation: This is necessary for citizens to have liberty and self-determination. Unlike other cosmopolitans, though, these theorists argue that the nation-state plays a key normative and practical role in global democracy. Befitting a model that has a long history in democratic thought, different institutional designs have been offered. In *Perpetual Peace*, for instance, Kant [] argued for a global federation of peoples composed of republican i. In this federation, states would observe a cosmopolitan right to hospitality, aid, and territory. Some scholars in this line, such as Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Stephen Macedo , have gone even further and suggested that IOs can help keep peace between states a core Kantian claim , and safeguard democracy, deliberation, and human rights. Transnational activities are democratically legitimate from the perspective of citizens so long as each nation-state maintains autonomy and sovereignty in global affairs. Although this model has been prominent in the global democracy field, it has several problems. First, only around 50 per cent of nation-states today are democratic. Second, nation-states do not have complete control over international institutions. This means that actors within IOs diplomats,

bureaucrats, and so on are able to carve out their own space for action. This power cannot easily be controlled or recaptured by member-states. Finally, transnational networks and private forms of governance have proliferated beyond the state. These agents often have the capacity to create global regulations which impact on domestic citizens. Nation-states typically have no direct say in these bodies. As such, the intergovernmental model provides many interesting insights, but has failed to keep pace with empirical developments. The core idea is to lift statist institutions to the global level in an on-going effort for democratization. Normatively, the model rests on a foundation of autonomy: This requires, at the least, a system which protects human rights and provides democratic mechanisms for citizen input Goodhart This model is also explicitly cosmopolitan as it is supposed to apply to all individuals across the globe. Institutionally, cosmopolitan democracy stops short of a fully-fledged world government. Rather it seeks to entrench and develop political institutions at regional and global level as necessary complements to those at the level of the state. These institutions provide a framework to shield human rights and exercise individual autonomy by voting in global elections. Moreover, these institutions are charged with effectively regulating transnational problems that national institutions cannot tackle alone: This particular model has given rise to a long-running campaign for the creation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly see Other Internet Resources section.

**Chapter 2 : Justification of Democracy - Bibliography - PhilPapers**

*Most who believe in democracy's intrinsic value ALSO hold it has instrumental value (while also holding the intrinsic value is one that gives rise to most demanding democratic requirements - see dimensions).*

The purpose of such varied interactions is to balance democracy with striving for security. Implicit in it seems to be a form of social contract inspired by the fairness principle contributing to societal stability. It helps to create a common ground on which political communities with the nation states being their highest expression can build an ideology of understanding and cooperation. But without a deep commitment of the leadership to justice as the basic principle of fairness in both policymaking and policy implementing, i. Ensuring human rights and the due process of lawâ€”two most important dimensions of justiceâ€”could transform a static state, which sometimes becomes regressive, into a dynamic state of just policies and good governancetwo sustainable anchors of development. In that context the legal system, which for developing countries still carries the baggage of colonialism, must be reformed. Cambridge, 3rd Printing, Upholding this fairness principle would involve limits on power, preventing excessive concentration and resulting misuse by individuals, groups, associations and institutions. Here I submit that most of the factors connected with the Bengali struggle for freedom, mostly involving a growing demand for state rights stemming from their hopes and aspirations for a better life have defined their demand for justice as basic fairness. Thus Bengali movement for freedom in Pakistan culminating in the creation of a new nation played on two conceptual levels: The right of dissent captures the basic freedoms providing the essence of Democracy, without which a democratic state cannot properly function. But in the name of security most states have infringed this basic human right, undermining the core principle of justice. Using this framework and a cross-cultural dimension I wish to explore the strategies and options for reforms of political, economic and social systems in Bangladesh. Unfortunately democratization without a deep leadership commitment to justice tends to break down at the altar of narrow political and group interests. Similar incidents happened in a number of African and Asian nations over the last six decades, including Pakistan. It was a catalyst for the liberation war creating a new nation of Bangladesh. Following liberation, like many developing nations with weak institutionsa legacy of colonial rule, the bureaucracy, both civil and military, gained strength due to inexperience of political leaders with the concept of justice, particularly its application for policymaking and governance. Trying to make up for weak governance with strong political power led to corruption of power and mismanagement of scarce resources, to the dismay of a liberated people with great expectations. Underlying Democratic Values Here the underlying principle of justice as basic fairness could have at least reduced if not bridged the gap between public expectations and harsh realities. I believe through an institution building and reforming process involving educational, legal-judicial, socio-economic and politico-administrative entities, the values of tolerance of others with different views and beliefs together with the acknowledgement of their capability and contributions will go a long way in reducing that gap. In advancing these values along with the right of dissent a fledgling democracy like Bangladesh must make its HRC a high powered, non-partisan institution with legally guaranteed political non-interference and needed administrative support for its investigating, deliberating and reporting duties. As well implementing the constitutional provision of Ombudsman might help mitigate the alleged inhuman treatment some have allegedly received while in custody of police and military intelligence agencies. Both the caretaker and elected governments must consider whether or not these Commissions will be authorized to hold Hearings on grievances from aggrieved citizenry. The fact is without having Subpoena and Contempt powers, and requisite resourcesâ€”material and personnelthese Commissions would be toothless. Interlinked with the right of dissent is the right of opposition to voice its concerns at every level of policymaking process. In order to make a democracy really workable serious efforts must be undertaken by elected leaders to build stakes for opposition parties to meaningfully participate in parliament. It could involve, for example, apportioning time to opposition parties in parliamentary deliberations and committee assignments in proportion to their representation, preferably by combining the percentages of electoral votes and parliamentary seats. Also for a balanced approach to assuring the main opposition party a

meaningful role in parliamentary deliberations an important institutional change could be considered whereby the Deputy Speaker of Parliament as well as Associate Chairs of Parliamentary Committees would be selected by the opposition. This strategy might prevent future deadlocks caused by intransigence of the majority party to give the opposition enough time to actively participate in parliamentary deliberations. A change in the electoral system may be tried on a trial basis replacing WTA with proportional representation PR in which percentage of votes by different parties in the general election would reflect the number of parliamentary seats won by respective parties. Social Contract, Justice and Power Concerted efforts by public and private sectors are needed to renewing the spirit of Social Contract, which I believe is an important dimension of justice. Such a renewal would contribute to a vital socio-economic-political balance by mixing human rights with accountability at every societal level. It would call upon institutional reformers to become transforming change agents, striving to be leaders and teachers at the same time, raising the consciousness of their followers to a higher level at which spontaneous mobilization of human and material resources could happen. In this regard fundamental reforms of religious institutions are in order for reviving the spirit of Islam about an open quest for knowledge and peace. Buttressed by returning Bangladeshi Jihadists from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, some radicalized Mullahs and their pupils continue unabated to distort Islam in private or quami Madrassas to justify violence against secular minded Muslims, disadvantaged women and religious minorities in Bangladesh. There is also an important question about justice and power. Given the political reality that institutionalization of power is an arduous, painful and long-drawn process, what new strategies or rethinking of existing ones must be applied to check human propensity to personalize and perpetuate power positions by any means undermining justice itself? Unrestrained power invariably impedes freedom and justice vital for multifaceted development. I believe transforming leadership and enduring institutionalization of power relationships can make a real difference in the struggle for justice and against poverty and unfreedoms. This became the legal as well as moral basis of affirmative action programs in America and elsewhere. But it takes deep commitment of leaders - executive, legislative, judicial or any combination - to translate justice from legal acts to operational reality. Justice and Leadership As always the difficult and complex work of applying justice for human development inevitably falls on the shoulders of leaders and followers at every level. Leadership, therefore, has been a special focus in the literature on political development in its various facets. And without it fundamental changes could never take place and well-intentioned reforms would seldom have their desired results. Regardless of the typemoral, constitutional, legal, bureaucratic, charismatic or any combination, leaders become ineffective without their ability to transform vital goals into tangible programs of action. In the new information age of face books and twitters, leaders must not only bypass screening of negative feedbacks but also learn how to leverage the deluge of information classifying and clarifying with the specific purpose to engage and motivate citizens and functionaries for improving governance, and by a feedback loop policymaking itself. Electoral Justice Indeed, electoral justice is the foundation of any democratic government. However, it needs a firm institutional framework to prevent electoral fraud and violence, which routinely claims lives in elections in most developing countries. The process of choosing leaders by free and fair elections has eluded most third world nations, most recent case being in Iran during June where questionable elections resulted in mass protests and government crackdown claiming a number of innocent lives, not to mention the troubled and questionable elections held in Afghanistan in July-August, under the security umbrella of US led ISAF, consisting chiefly of NATO countries. An enforceable guideline for holding all elections must have a tested method to prepare an above board electoral roll, verify fiscal accountability of candidates, provide impartial monitoring of polling stations, and impose heavy fines and imprisonment for fraudulent voting. A non-partisan Election Commission, headed by a strong willed, politically neutral Chief Election Commissioner, with Subpoena and Contempt powers under the constitution to rule on disputed electoral outcome on a case by case basis, allowing judicial appeal as a last resort, can be more effective. An unquestionable, above-board election gives elected leaders the legitimacy to mobilize public support, even among segments of opposition parties, for a myriad of important policies. As well by upholding electoral justice leaders could then begin a transforming process in which free and fair elections become a routine political phenomenon in more developed and not-so-developed emerging nations. Among

the not-so-developed emerging nations Bangladesh offers a case in point. Given the weakness of institutions in most emerging nations, a constitutionally empowered election commission may not be strong enough to withstand increasing pressure from an incumbent government to tilt the balance in its favor. Much as any ruling party would like to end the Caretaker Government innovation of Bangladesh by repealing its 13th Constitutional Amendment, it might be a prudent political move to continue for a few more general elections. In fact, two highly respected Chief Elections Commissioners of India have suggested replicating the non-partisan Caretaker Government experiment in emerging nations, particularly in state elections in India, if not at the federal level. Representational Justice Closely connected with electoral justice is Representational Justice. Is it just to have representation in parliament that is grossly disproportionate to votes won by a political party in general elections? The issue of representational justice, namely basic fairness in determining parliamentary seats on the basis of popular votes won by respective political parties has captured the attention of the British voters, who will vote on majority vs. Depending on the outcome of that referendum interested parties in Bangladesh may get the opportunity to take a closer look at WTA and compare with the European PR system with a view to understanding the possible impact of each on representation in parliament. More often than not the WTA mentality has been responsible for parliamentary dysfunction. A change in the electoral system may be tried on an experimental basis replacing WTA with PR in randomly selected constituencies in which percentage of votes by different parties in the general election would reflect the number of parliamentary seats won by them. Or at least a majority rather plurality voting rule could be tested in randomly chosen constituencies. Whether by a continuous public debate or by a constitutional convention, it is important to build a national consensus for resolving the issue of appropriate electoral system for a stable Democracy in not only Bangladesh but other emerging countries as well. Also for representational justice there must be a process by which the elected can be held accountable between general elections. This Swiss electoral innovation has been incorporated in a majority of American State Constitutions 37 out of 50 and a number of European countries with positive outcome. Perhaps a future bicameral legislature in Bangladesh could significantly alleviate the felt problem of representation, particularly for women, in the highest policy making body. Representational justice demands much more than what the 45 nominated women parliamentarians could hope to accomplish. For example, in a future upper house the method of proportional representation could significantly give women, smaller political parties and occupational-professional groups a sure way to increase participation in the national-cum-sub-national policymaking processes, helping to check any excesses of the other house and to build policy consensus on national goals as well. To that end, Japan has effectively combined the two electoral methods, namely single member districts and multimember proportional representation constituencies in the lower house of its legislative body Diet. Justice and Development Both Representational Justice and Development as Freedom can be further ensured by devolution of authority to the grassroots. It would make the local government system more self reliant. For sustainable human development strategic tolerance for survival, control and progress has been a positive influence throughout history. Lack of relative tolerance has led to the fall of empires, civilizations and nation states Chua, Basically among emerging nations with Muslim majority or large minority Bangladesh has been and is a relatively tolerant nation, which some religious extremists have sought to change overtly by terrorism and covertly using certain militant parties as vehicles to spread a distorted interpretation of a great world religion Islam. To ensure justice, averting possible incidents of injustice, violent fanatics must be brought under control. An effective, sustainable way to do it will be through the restoration of the tolerant and knowledge based thrust of education, which shapes a nation Plato, Republic. Particularly religious education in Bangladesh, as in many other emerging countries, cries out for significant curricular reform to strike a balance between theological and scientific focus in most religious schools called Madrassas in South Asia, particularly private or Quami ones chiefly supported by Wahhabi charities whose trainees or Talibs emerged as Pakistani, Afghani, Bangladeshi and other nationality based extremist Talibans. This trend has unfortunately been sustained by double standards of some western democracies. Conclusion Leaders must make concerted and determined efforts at alleviating endemic poverty having dehumanizing effects on peoples in three fourth of the world, denying them access to life saving and life enriching systems. This would require

coordinated actions by industrialized, resource rich and developing countries to invest in human development socially, economically and politically. In specially convened sessions of the world body followed by regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations leaders at different levels could come up with acceptable action plans and needed resources to implement them. These global confidence and trust building efforts would likely have a positive impact on leadership at regional, national and local levels. Yet the fact remains unless the two nuclear rivals - India and Pakistan - settle their long drawn out territorial disputes, Bangladesh and other SAARC countries would be deprived of peace dividends, if any. As global leadership for dynamic human development would be an important precondition for global peace, so would the regional and national leadership for regional peace, which would require fundamental changes in the perception of long term mutual benefits over short term apprehensions of mutual threats. This could help create a sound framework for concerted, integrated decision making and implementing for societal advancement. Public-private policy forums and projects jointly sponsored by government and civil society groups would help clarify problems and issues being faced and how best to address them in order to achieve consensus for national development by bridging security and freedom with justice and greatly facilitating the process of implementation of just policies. Pursuing the principle of basic fairness in inter-personal and inter-group dealings Bangladesh could play a primordial role in facing challenges not only with poverty alleviation but also with other intra-regional issues and concerns. After all, Bangladesh did start the regional movement for cooperation in both fields among South Asian countries. A Prophet For Our Time. Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh. Islam, Democracy, and the West. The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh. The Day of Empire. The War of the World. Jihad in South Asia, Cambridge, Mass: Political Dimensions of National Development. Leadership in the Least Developed Nation:

**Chapter 3 : Contextual Justification for Democracy | Philosophy Archive**

*The liberty approaches to the justification of democracy provide alternative approaches to the idea of the authority of democracy. The idea here is that democracy has authority to the extent that people freely bring about the democratic decision.*

Dan Henderson The Contextual Justification for Democracy The American tradition of democracy, while not perfect, has been effective in meeting the demands of the people. To us, the democratic process is so natural that we do not question its legitimacy. To us, democracy appears to be the inevitable result of reason applied to politics. Instead, its justification is contextual; it is contingent on an antecedent agreement of other fundamental beliefs. My conclusion is that, even though the justification for democracy may be circular, democracy is the political system which best facilitates the scientific method and leads to fixation of true beliefs. Both Dewey and Hook formulate definitions of democracy that emphasize the role of the individual. Considering the historical context of their two essays and , respectively , we can infer that part of the stimulus for this discussion about democracy was the eminence of totalitarian states in Europe. Out of concern for maintaining the democratic system in the United States and abroad, Dewey is seeking to invigorate the democratic lifestyle. Dewey believes that thinking of democracy as external physical entity is dangerous because it removes the responsibility from the individual and reduces their political influence. With this formulation, Dewey introduces the pragmatist idea that experimentation and trial and error are the best method of fixing belief. These two formulations combine to form a complete definition of pragmatic democracy. Hook details four important conditions that are needed for a sustainable democracy—participation, mechanisms for delegated authority, purposive skepticism, and economic freedom. A participatory democracy requires that the governed have access to accurate and unbiased information by all mediums of cultural exchange. Citizens must, with complete knowledge, consent to following the rules that result from the democratic process, but it is also necessary that they contribute to the enforcement of these rules. Maintaining a sense of duty and ownership prevents the democratic system from growing stale and breeding indifference. The second condition for democracy that there must be mechanisms for delegating authority in times of emergency. In matters of national defense, a public referendum may be too slow to effective counter aggression from enemies. Therefore, a democracy must elect some leaders to exercise military and diplomatic discretion on behalf of the governed. On the verge of the Second World War, this condition could not be more relevant! The third condition is that the governed must be skeptical of all demands for enlargement of power. Citizens should consider the intentions behind every expansion government power, as well as the role that each expansion plays in the progression towards a less democratic society. The fourth condition is that the economic organization of the democracy be freely determined. The governed, as rational economic agents, are capable of determining the desired objectives. Hook argues that economic freedom requires private property as a means to ensure efficient use of resources. Furthermore, the economic organization should be such that economic inequality does not cause the political disenfranchisement of the less fortunate. Examples of economic power influencing the democratic process are mechanisms such as poll taxes and lobbying. These four conditions make the pragmatic conception of democracy so demanding that it becomes an ideal rather than a reality. However, even if democracy is never complete in practice, it is still thought to be the most equitable political system. Richard Rorty begins by introducing the enlightenment theory of justification as a foil to his contextual theory. He explains that science has blurred the distinctions between rationality and acculturation, conscience and emotions, and morality and prudence, thus breaking the link between truth and justifiability. This theory holds that our fundamental agreements are ethnocentric, determined by consensus in our particular community. Rorty is suggesting that the principles that form the foundation of our political structure are not universally valued, but are contingent upon historical context. From this we can infer that other political structures throughout history could have been independently justifiable given their context; we cannot necessarily rationalize other political structures using our conceptual scheme. First, does the contextual approach make moral values contingent all the way down. That is, are there any principles that are in universal

agreement with the human essence? In our community we would agree to this proposition. I hypothesize that as advancements in transportation, trade, and communication increase cultural integration the world will begin to resemble a single community and universally shared beliefs will become a possibility. If the world were to become perfectly acculturated, there would only be one context and one value system. Would the principles remaining after such a convergence become universal truths? The contextual justification for democracy does not supply the strong universal validity that would satisfy Immanuel Kant, but Rorty would argue that it is sufficient for a pragmatist. Works Cited Dewey, John. Princeton University Press,

## Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - Justice and Democracy

*What is democracy and what makes it just or fair? The orthodox answer to both questions holds that democracy is reducible to the idea and ideal of procedural equality. On this view, democracy is a.*

Democracy, Youth, and the United Nations Democracy: Overview Democracy is a universally recognized ideal and is one of the core values and principles of the United Nations. It provides an environment for the protection and effective realization of human rights. Democracy has emerged as a cross-cutting issue in the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits since the s and in the internationally agreed development goals they produced. At that summit governments renewed their commitment to support democracy and welcomed the establishment of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations. The International Day of Democracy On 8 November , the General Assembly proclaimed 15 September as the International Day of Democracy , inviting Member States, the United Nations system and other regional, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to commemorate the Day. The International Day of Democracy provides an opportunity to review the state of democracy in the world. Democracy is as much a process as a goal, and only with the full participation of and support by the international community, national governing bodies, civil society and individuals, can the ideal of democracy be made into a reality to be enjoyed by everyone, everywhere. This was hardly surprising. Others laid claim to it but did not practise it. And yet, in the seven decades since the Charter was signed, the UN as an institution has done more to support and strengthen democracy around the world than any other global organization -- from fostering good governance to monitoring elections, from supporting civil society to strengthening democratic institutions and accountability, from ensuring self-determination in decolonized countries to assisting the drafting of new constitutions in nations post-conflict. This brings home the fact that democracy is one of the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations. It is based on the freely expressed will of people and closely linked to the rule of law and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. People have a say in decisions that affect their lives and can hold decision-makers to account, based on inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices that govern social interactions. Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life and decision-making, and all people are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute. In essence, therefore, democratic governance is the process of creating and sustaining an environment for inclusive and responsive political processes and settlements. It is also important to note that the United Nations does not advocate for a specific model of government, but promotes democratic governance as a set of values and principles that should be followed for greater participation, equality, security and human development. The Secretary-General tasked the Democracy Working Group of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security " established in May " to ensure regular follow-up on the issue of democracy and, more specifically, on strategy development. Since its adoption, the Declaration has inspired constitution-making around the world and has contributed greatly to the global acceptance of democracy as a universal value and principle. The Covenant is binding on those States that have ratified it. As of July , the number of parties to the Covenant was , which constitutes approximately 85 per cent of the United Nations membership. The political work of the United Nations requires that it promote democratic outcomes; the development agencies seek to bolster national institutions like parliaments, electoral commissions and legal systems that form the bedrock of any democracy; and the human rights efforts support freedom of expression and association, the right to peaceful assembly, participation, and the rule of law, all of which are critical components of democracy. They resolved to strive for the full protection and promotion in all countries of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all and to strengthen the capacity of all countries to implement the principles and practices of democracy and respect for human rights. Democracy and Human Rights The human rights normative framework The values of freedom, respect for human rights and the principle of holding periodic and genuine elections by universal suffrage are essential elements of democracy. In turn, democracy provides the natural environment for the protection and effective realization of human rights. This led to the articulation of several landmark resolutions of the former

Commission on Human Rights. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms Freedom of association Freedom of expression and opinion Access to power and its exercise in accordance with the rule of law The holding of periodic free and fair elections by universal suffrage and by secret ballot as the expression of the will of the people A pluralistic system of political parties and organizations The separation of powers The independence of the judiciary Transparency and accountability in public administration Free, independent and pluralistic media Since its establishment in 1993, the Human Rights Council successor to the Commission has adopted a number of resolutions highlighting the interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy and human rights. Addressing democracy deficits Democracy deficits, weak institutions and poor governance are among the main challenges to the effective realization of human rights. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OHCHR and the United Nations Development Programme UNDP seek to address these challenges through their advisory services and programmes, which focus on strengthening the legal framework for human rights protection and promotion institutional and legal reform ; capacity building for stronger national human rights systems; implementation of the Universal Periodic Review recommendations, promoting human rights-based approaches, including empowering vulnerable and disadvantaged segments of the society to claim their rights; advocacy, awareness raising and human rights education. In transitional democracies and countries emerging from conflicts, OHCHR collaborates with national governments and actors to build a strong and independent judiciary, a representative, efficient and accountable parliament, an independent and effective national human rights institution, and a vibrant civil society. Promoting democratic governance Democratic governance, as supported by the United Nations emphasizes the role of individuals and peoples "all of them, without any exclusion" in shaping their human growth and the human development of societies. But individuals can only make such contributions when their individual potential is unleashed through the enjoyment of human rights. UNDP supports one in three parliaments in the developing world and an election every two weeks. In 2010, UNDP programmes strengthened electoral processes around the world and helped register 18 million new voters. UNDP also works to foster partnerships and share ways to promote participation, accountability and effectiveness at all levels, aiming to build effective and capable states that are accountable and transparent, inclusive and responsive "from elections to participation of women and the poor. OHCHR promotes democratic governance by providing sustained support to democratic institutions, including national actors and institutions involved in the administration of justice; enhancing the capacity of parliamentarians to engage in human rights protection, supporting civil society, facilitating constitution-making, and conducting human rights monitoring in the context of electoral processes. Supporting transitional democracies Popular uprisings across the world were led by youth, women, and men from all social strata and are opening greater space for civic engagement in decision making. These events have reaffirmed the pivotal importance of democratic governance as a system premised on inclusion, participation, non-discrimination and accountability. In transitional democracies and countries emerging from conflict, OHCHR collaborates with national governments and other actors to confront the past in order to rebuild public confidence and restore peace and the rule of law. OHCHR has actively supported transitional justice programmes in more than 20 countries around the world over the past decade. Its support includes ensuring that human rights and transitional justice considerations are reflected in peace agreements; engaging in the design and implementation of inclusive national consultations on transitional justice mechanisms; supporting the establishment of truth-seeking processes, judicial accountability mechanisms, and reparations programmes; and enhancing institutional reform. The Council called upon States to make continuous efforts to strengthen the rule of law and promote democracy through a wide range of measures. Further to this resolution, OHCHR, in consultation with States, national human rights institutions, civil society, relevant intergovernmental bodies and international organizations, published a study on challenges, lessons learned and best practices in securing democracy and the rule of law from a human rights perspective. OHCHR also works to underline the close relationship between human rights and democracy within the United Nations system. The round table discussed democracy movements and their characteristics in a number of States, including those involved in the Arab Spring. It underlined the importance of working with regional and sub-regional organizations when dealing with

unconstitutional changes of Government, and when promoting democratic movements and democracies more generally. Elections sit at the heart of this, making possible the act of self-determination envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. During the subsequent era of trusteeship and decolonization, it supervised and observed plebiscites, referenda and elections worldwide. Today, the United Nations continues to be a trusted impartial actor providing electoral assistance to approximately 60 countries each year, either at the request of Member States or based on a Security Council or General Assembly mandate. Electoral assistance is based on the principle established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the will of the people, as expressed through periodic and genuine elections, shall be the basis of government authority. Electoral assistance also recognizes the principles of state sovereignty and national ownership of elections, and that there is no single model of democracy. The main goal of United Nations electoral assistance is to support Member States in holding periodic, inclusive and transparent elections that are credible and popularly perceived as such and establishing nationally sustainable electoral processes. The provision of electoral assistance by the United Nations is a team effort involving a number of programmes, funds, agencies and departments under the mandate provided by the General Assembly. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs is designated by the Secretary-General as the UN Focal Point for Electoral Assistance Activities, with a leadership role in ensuring system-wide coherence and consistency and in strengthening the institutional memory and the development, dissemination and issuance of United Nations electoral assistance policies. This includes undertaking electoral needs assessments, recommending parameters for all United Nations electoral assistance, advising on the design of projects, developing electoral policy, maintaining institutional memory, and providing technical guidance and support in the implementation of electoral projects. In peacekeeping or post-conflict environments, electoral assistance is generally provided through components of field missions under the aegis of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations DPKO or the DPA. Military and police components of peacekeeping missions support national law enforcement agencies in providing security for electoral processes. UNDP provides electoral assistance to develop sustainable electoral management capacities, to foster inclusive participation in elections, particularly of women and youth and other underrepresented groups, and to coordinate donor support to electoral processes. This includes seven countries where special political missions are deployed, and eight where peacekeeping missions are deployed. United Nations electoral assistance has been a crucial and successful component in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and in establishing and deepening democratic governance. As democracy has spread, so has the role of elections as the means to establish legitimate government. The United Nations has been engaged in elections in all regions of the world, with assistance provided recently in the Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, Jordan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Iraq, to name just a few. In Tunisia for example, the UN supported civil society in the October National Constituent Assembly elections and continues to provide technical assistance to the national authorities. In , the United Nations provided technical and logistical support to Malian authorities in the conduct of Presidential elections. In addition, the United Nations is currently in the the process of supporting electoral reform in Afghanistan. Other partners are the many international non-governmental organizations working in the field of electoral assistance. These relationships provide opportunities for collaboration on electoral support activities as well as for sharing lessons and experiences. It is recognized that addressing the capacity of an electoral management body in isolation will not necessarily produce credible elections. There also needs to be a focus on the overall political environment in which the elections take place. The United Nations therefore also makes efforts to build capacity outside the electoral authorities. This involves working with voters, the media, political parties and civil society, as well as other actors and institutions of democratic governance such as parliament and the judiciary. This is the basis for regular training for field and headquarters based staff. However, for civil society activists and organizations in a range of countries covering every continent, space is shrinking “ or even closing. Governments have adopted restrictions that limit the ability of NGOs to work or to receive funding. As the Secretary-General has said, the hallmark of successful and stable democracies is the presence of a strong and freely operating civil society -- in which Government and civil society work together for common goals for a better future, and at the same time, civil society helps keep Government accountable. Since Secretary-General Kofi A. These have ranged from supporting civil

society efforts for accountability and transparency to building capacity for strengthening good governance and the rule of law. The large majority of UNDEF funds go to local civil society organizations in countries in both the transition and consolidation phases of democratisation. It targets the demand side of democracy, rather than the supply side. UNDEF projects are in seven main areas:

**Chapter 5 : The Concept of Justice and Democracy - RC37 - Rethinking Political Development**

*Abstract. To justify a practice like democracy is to show either how the practice conforms to a principle or how the consequences of the practice lead to a state of affairs that can be judged good in principled terms.*

Intrinsically or instrumentally valuable? Or so I will argue in this post. It also left open a view on which a supermajoritarian democracy has intrinsic value. Now I want to suggest that we should doubt any view, majoritarian or supermajoritarian, according to which democracy has intrinsic value. Broad political activity, on the other hand, includes the whole panoply of ways in which citizens exert influence in the civic realm: All these things, and many more besides, are in a sense political activity, but they go far beyond narrow political activity. I can now introduce a dilemma. Either the intrinsic value of democracy includes only narrow political activity, or it also includes broad political activity. The normative significance of a majority or supermajority selecting a policy has to come from somewhere. Does it come from the fact that citizens voted for it? Or do other ways in which they influence the choice of policy matter? The first option draws a sharp normative boundary between narrow and broad political activity: Paul Krugman and Ross Douthat have far more political influence through their New York Times columns than by voting in presidential elections. A similar point probably holds for most of us as well. We have more influence by just talking with friends and neighbors than we do by marking a ballot. So much, then, for the first option. The second option is also problematic. Suppose that both narrow and broad political activity are intrinsically valuable. This in itself does not seem problematic to me, but it does seem to loosen the connection between the value of political activity and the value of democracy. Broad political activity is of course possible in any political system, provided it allows a sufficient degree of First Amendment type freedoms. If broad political activity is intrinsically valuable and in principle possible in any political system, its value does not in any way ground the intrinsic value of democracy. As I argued above, however, that position is indefensible given that it draws an inexplicable contrast between broad political activity as intrinsically valueless and narrow political activity as intrinsically valued. Both options, then, have been found wanting. Whether the democracy is question is majoritarian or supermajoritarian, the claim that such a system has intrinsic value must be rejected. We thus have an even stronger argument than given in the last post. If democracy has value, it must have it instrumentally.

**Chapter 6 : The Consternation of Philosophy: Democracy: Intrinsically or instrumentally valuable?**

*The full text of this Book Review may be found by clicking on the PDF link to the left. Still, the critique of equality is longstanding, ardent, seductive, and very much ongoing. Like the idea of equality, it is richly complex and diverse. I don't want to offer a potted summary or overview of the.*

How can we make sure it works for all? In the wake of the convulsive election, there may be no more pressing question. Nor will likely be the last such eruption. American politics has stagnated for years, locked in arid debate on old ideas. Political parties have become increasingly tribal. Elections are drenched in money and marked by intense polarization. Government dysfunction has created an opening for racially divisive backlash politics, while ignoring long-range economic, social, and environmental challenges. It is time for fresh thinking, which is why the Brennan Center for Justice is producing *Solutions*, a series of three reports setting out democracy and justice reforms that are intended to help break the grip of destructive polarization. This volume lays out proposals to ensure free and fair elections and curb the role of big money in American politics. Others show how we can end mass incarceration, and protect constitutional freedoms, vulnerable communities, and the integrity of our democracy amid new threats. We hope these proposals are useful to candidates, officeholders, activists, and citizens. The election should be more than a chance to send a message. It should be an opportunity to demand a focus on real change. What counts is not what we are against, but what we are for. Voter participation is distressingly low. The last midterm election saw the lowest voter turnout in 72 years. Pervasive gerrymandering fixes outcomes in many elections before voters even show up to the polls. The explosion of political spending by a tiny fraction of Americans is staggering; the amount contributed by mega-donors who gave six figures or more increased more than fold between and Dark money now floods into all levels of our elections, including state judicial races. The Supreme Court gutted a century of campaign finance law and a half-century of voting rights protections, all by a slim five-to-four margin. A hostile foreign government manipulated the presidential campaign and tried to interfere with our voting systems. Millions of Americans from all political points of view feel that their voices are not heard, that the government fails to represent their concerns or meet their needs. At a time of stagnating opportunity and deeply polarized government, the system is susceptible to demagoguery. Trump and Trumpism are symptoms, not the cause, of our democratic dysfunction. Our system now faces new and unnerving challenges. A working system of self-government requires the rule of law as well as robust democracy. This ideal is increasingly being challenged in the United States, as it is across the world. The norms of constitutional democracy – the unwritten rules that curb power and prevent abuse – are regularly flouted. It turns out that many seemingly solid protections guiding our political actions and behaviors were, in fact, flimsy. No laws prevent a president from hiding his taxes, from using the powers of government to bully news organizations or others that displease him, and possibly even from firing the prosecutors who investigate him. The erosion of democracy is also playing out in the states. In recent years, the state enacted an array of anti-democratic rules. When incumbent Republicans lost control of the governorship, legislators sought to entrench party power, passing a law that effectively put Republicans in charge of the state election board in perpetuity. North Carolina provides a particularly grotesque version of trends seen throughout the country. The efforts to manipulate the electoral system are so pervasive they could prevent the voice of the people from being heard in November. Yet gerrymandering is now so severe that Democrats would need a nearly unprecedented landslide to win the House of Representatives by even one seat. Voting restrictions in many states continue to thwart thousands of voters – and could be the determinative factor in close elections. Dark money continues to balloon, reaching new highs this year. The crisis of American democracy, in short, is urgent. This report proposes solutions to address that crisis and revitalize our system of self-government so it works for all people. To do so, we must move the issue of democracy itself to the center of our politics. After all, we will be able to address few pressing problems if we do not repair our democracy. The need for change is clear. Indeed, the threats to democracy are so vivid and undeniable that they have begun to be the source of political energy and organizing enthusiasm. This year, citizens are advancing ballot measures to end partisan gerrymandering in

Michigan, to end lifetime felony disenfranchisement in Florida, and to adopt automatic voter registration in Nevada. Even amid partisan voting wars, bills to expand voting are now moving through state legislatures with bipartisan support — far more than bills to restrict access. Automatic voter registration was adopted unanimously by the Illinois legislature, and by 60 percent of Alaska voters even as they backed Donald Trump. An impressive bipartisan coalition of elected officials urged the Supreme Court to end extreme partisan gerrymandering. When the new president claimed widespread voter fraud, Republican and Democratic election officials spoke out to debunk the false claim, and the commission he created to search for fraud imploded. This agenda seeks to turn that energy into answers. It sets out changes that can be enacted and implemented at the federal and state level. These changes promote full political participation; truly representative and accountable elected legislatures; a functional government freed from the distorting effect of big money; and a system in which the voice of the people is heard without being blocked by entrenched political forces. Most of these proposals have, in various forms, been tried on a small scale and succeeded.

**Chapter 7 : Democracy | Definition of Democracy by Merriam-Webster**

*A Call for Inclusion in the Pragmatic Justification of Democracy Dewey's accounts of democracy and of inquiry are said to rest on a developed metaphysics of experience and to assume a vision of human flourishing within a community bounded by unquestioned ideals.*

A sure sign that a philosophical movement has reached maturity is that it takes a moment to stop fighting enemies from without and sets its sights on enemies from within. When absolutists, realists, idealists and postmodernists are at the gate, we pragmatists have to stand united. Once secure, we begin to take roll to find who fits within the movement and who does not. This appears to have happened in one area of contemporary pragmatic thought. Until recently, if thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, and Richard Posner are to be believed, it was an open question whether pragmatism has any particular relevance for politics. Now, it is accused of having a commitment to democracy so thick that it is no longer appropriate for a pluralistic nation. In this article, I discuss a recent turn inward among those who seek a pragmatic, epistemic defense of democracy and argue that there is sufficient room for the contending strands of the pragmatic tradition. The recent attempt to derive a pragmatic-epistemic defense of democracy is part of the broader effort to develop an argument on behalf of democracy while acknowledging that our world is increasingly pluralistic. We may not assume that citizens of modern, democratic nation-states will share an image of the good life. For democrats, this poses a special problem, since they want to believe that their position is rationally defensible at the same time that they want to respect those who reasonably disagree. Habermas and Apel argue that principles of justice “requiring that we seek mutual agreement rather than sheer victory, that there be the greatest possible inclusion of speakers, and that communication be undistorted by any power other than that of the better argument” are embedded in communicative action itself, and any communicator who denies them is engaged in a performative contradiction, whether they are aware of it or not. To act undemocratically is to act irrationally, or to colonize the lifeworld in the name of instrumental rationality. For Rawls, whom we will discuss further, deliberation constrained by a Kantian public reason results in a conception of freedom, equality and rights amenable to a democratic welfare state. A new and intriguing advance in pragmatic thought is the attempt to derive a defense of democratic principles from the nature of pragmatic inquiry alone. Perhaps the most systematic and compelling argument is that offered by Cheryl Misak in her *Truth, Politics, Morality*. Misak Proper inquiry entails a commitment to democratic values. Misak has been joined by Robert Talisse, a driving force in the attempt to develop a pragmatic and deliberative model of democracy. Talisse has built upon her foundation to create a more comprehensive account of the failures of liberal democratic theory, including those deliberative theories that rely, ultimately, on unquestioned liberal beliefs Talisse , a. The Peircean image of a community of inquiry is inherently democratic. Proper inquiry requires that believers be continually open to revising their beliefs in light of new reasons, arguments, and evidence. And this requires that believers exhibit a perpetual readiness to engage in the process of reason-exchanging and argument In short, proper inquiry can be practiced only within a democratic political order. Peirce is not the only source of inspiration for a pragmatic-epistemic philosophy of democracy. However, a split is forming between Peircean and Deweyan advocates. I am largely sympathetic to the Rawlsian argument that, under conditions of pluralism, any attempt to justify democracy on the basis of one image of the Good is suspect. I conclude with an argument for interpretive charity that would allow us to bring Dewey back into the fold as a pluralistic, democratic thinker. *Inquiry and Reasonable Pluralism: Excluding Dewey* The epistemic defense of democracy bears a resemblance to the transcendental defense of Habermas and Apel and to the procedural defense of John Rawls. The common concern is that of admitting the variety of reasonable moral doctrines, respecting them when we can and yet defending democracy against its radical enemies. The pragmatist does not seek such principles from the transcendental structure of argumentation, but from more modest empirical claims about how people assert beliefs. We may not assume that communication necessarily strives toward mutual agreement. However, we may argue that people have beliefs, they hold these beliefs to be true, and that they desire beliefs that are resistant to scrutiny. To hold that a belief is true is also to assert that the belief will resist

evidence and arguments brought against it, that it is responsive to the world. Those who assert that their beliefs are true, yet close off the path of inquiry by a priori excluding the experience, evidence and arguments of others, are contradicting themselves. Certain modest democratic principles are therefore entailed by a pragmatic account of belief and inquiry. Rawls acknowledges that we live under conditions of reasonable pluralism. Unless we want to resort to violence and propaganda, we must ground our society in certain mutually accepted principles of justice. These principles arise out of deliberation under certain argumentative restrictions. Out of respect for other citizens as free and equal beings and out of the practical needs of forming a stable, overlapping consensus, we must not derive these principles from any one substantive moral vision. Any argument that requires that my interlocutor convert to my CMD in order to accept it as just is illegitimate. I must appeal to reasons that I may reasonably expect members of other CMDs to accept. Or Rawls recurs to a Kantian model of autonomy or metaphysics of the self as a free chooser unencumbered by substantive moral commitments. For all of his intent to isolate the moral from the political, Rawls ultimately relies on a comprehensive liberal doctrine. Talisse, 58 and 50 The pragmatist counters by providing an epistemic rather than substantive defense of democracy. She does not appeal to any comprehensive moral vision, but to the nature of inquiry, of seeking truth or knowledge. From this vantage point, Talisse argues that Dewey is insufficiently pragmatic. Rather than basing his argument for democracy on a commitment to inquiry, Dewey relies on a substantive liberal vision doomed to fail under conditions of reasonable pluralism. This vision cannot secure the overlapping consensus that grounds a stable, pluralistic society. Let us see how Talisse makes this argument. Dewey, however, did not accept this restriction on the scope of democracy. He believed that political democracy, a set of institutions or procedures such as frequent, open and fair elections, is not the full meaning of democracy. Democracy runs, perhaps latently, through all associated endeavors. His thick account of nature, humanity and community are too substantive for a pluralist democracy and undercut his supposed commitment to free inquiry. Deweyan democracy is antipluralist in that it places decisive constraints upon the kinds of voices we need to include. Consider that the Deweyan-democratic commitment to inquiry excludes not only those who refuse to inquire, but also those who hold views that are incompatible with the fallibilism and experimentalism at the heart of inquiry. And, to the extent that he is not a proceduralist and upholds a pre-deliberative account of the good, his defense of democracy is not sufficient for a pluralistic world. Like Rawls, Dewey ultimately relies on a substantive moral doctrine. Insofar as Dewey brings such ideals to inquiry from outside, he abandons his pragmatic theory of inquiry. Questions of which philosophical system is best, or which are the correct metaphysical, epistemic, and moral propositions, are questions to be settled by means of inquiry. Any conception of inquiry that even implicitly presupposes decisive answers to such questions is, in the end, not a conception of inquiry at all. Pragmatists who want to theorize about democracy must look elsewhere. Talisse concludes that only a Peircean, epistemic defense like that reconstructed by Misak is true to a pragmatic model of inquiry and provides an adequate defense against radical anti-democrats, 21 The Place of Substantive Arguments It is a virtual certainty that Talisse knew that such a claim would stir a sharp response from the Deweyan community. This is quite ironic, given that Dewey spent much of his career defending himself against those who tired of vague calls to use the method of intelligence in moral and political life. When critics demanded absolute ideals, Dewey offered only growth. When they wanted absolute Ends to guide the ship of state, he provided flexible, fallible ends-in-view that were found only within the context of inquiry. Russell, 10; Horkheimer; Adler There is some weight to this criticism. Dewey clearly had robust commitments ranging from metaphysics to politics: But the question is not whether he had deeply held beliefs. Any inquirer or political agent will. Rather, as we will see, the criticism is that he brings these to inquiry from without. Insofar as Dewey bounds inquiry by some image of the democratic community, rather than develops ends from within inquiry, his arguments do not speak to all humanity and are less legitimate. However, in this section I argue that, according to both liberal and pragmatic proceduralists, democrats may make use of substantive arguments in certain contexts. Even the staunchest advocate for public reason does not deny that there is a place for argument from substantive moral doctrines. Once we acknowledge this, then the question is not whether Dewey makes use of appeals to liberal values, since he certainly does. As Westbrook notes, Dewey made use of virtually any argument he could find over

the course of his long life Westbrook , Rather, the real issue is whether it is appropriate to make such appeals in the public sphere “ during campaigns, on the floor of the legislature, in the courtroom, etc. Without going too far into this concept, Kant distinguished the public from the private use of reason. Reason is public insofar as it answered to no authority other than itself. The private use of reason is heteronomous, answering to some authority such as the Church or the Crown. It is restricted in the scope of its premises and what conclusions it is willing to accept. Only insofar as I am willing to set aside these restrictions am I able to speak across traditions and A Call for Inclusion in the Pragmatic Justification of Democracy institutions and speak to all humanity on the basis of autonomous reason alone. The language of public reason is the tongue of angels, compelling others by virtue of their universal reason alone. Carried into the context of political justification, the conclusion is that only those political norms that transcend a prior commitment to some image of the Good or some political ideal are universal and binding. Normativity arises entirely within the process of political deliberation, not from the approximation of norms to some pre-political ideal. Rawls argues that we must refrain from basing our arguments on our comprehensive moral doctrine CMD out of respect for others as free and equal beings with comprehensive moral doctrines of their own. In any free society of sufficient size, there will be a plurality of reasonable moral worldviews. If another must share my Catholicism or liberalism, or Marxism, or any other CMD in order to find my argument persuasive, then my argument is not fit for public debate. Rather, debate about fundamental principles of justice must respect all. This might seem to imply that arguments from substantive moral belief are simply disrespectful. However, it is a matter of context. To eliminate such arguments in all contexts would be to destroy our moral traditions. It would be absurd to claim that Jesuits must refrain from arguing about Church doctrine and on the basis of their long hermeneutic tradition “ unless, of course, we wanted that moral tradition to end. Rawls makes room for substantive argumentation. Though all must use public reason when arguing in the public sphere and across doctrinal divides, believers of whatever doctrine are not required to use public reason when arguing among themselves. Nor are they required to affirm the principles of justice on the basis of public reasons. A Protestant may affirm them in the basis of a respect for the created individual, a Catholic because of an interest in social justice, a Muslim because of a belief in the values of mutual consultation shura and stewardship khalifah , a liberal because of a commitment to liberty and equality, and so on. But the process of internal argumentation that leads one to affirm these principles need not be the same for all traditions and it need not refrain from moral appeals. Misak frequently and openly uses both substantive and epistemic arguments in her defense of democracy.

**Chapter 8 : Democracy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*The Contextual Justification for Democracy The American tradition of democracy, while not perfect, has been effective in meeting the demands of the people. To us, the democratic process is so natural that we do not question its legitimacy.*

Justification Key Facts USAID considers effective governance and accountable institutions the foundation of its theory of change for extreme poverty reduction. Many countries struggle to consolidate democratic gains and are vulnerable to economic and political deterioration due to weak governance institutions, lack of rule of law, corruption, and inequality. Democratic backsliding in these places risks dire consequences. Several countries maintain the outward appearance of democracy; meanwhile, their leaders restrict freedoms of association and expression, thereby closing the space for an independent civil society. Governments are increasingly imposing more legal restrictions and administrative hurdles for both domestic and international organizations to operate. In addition, there are growing efforts to limit access to information and independent media, and to label and criminalize rights defenders and democracy promoters as foreign agents. However, as the need for more DRG programming has increased in recent years, U. This is a necessary step, as the U. The full funding of DRG programs is necessary to properly address democratic backsliding, to consolidate gains from economic development efforts, and to contribute to a more stable and prosperous world. DRG assistance supports new and fragile democracies, in particular by helping them develop policies and practices to build effective, transparent, and accountable governments that can deliver political and socioeconomic benefits to their citizens. To support and defend the freedoms of association, assembly, expression, and information, as well as other human rights necessary for the functioning of a vibrant civil society worldwide, programs provide technical assistance to help in-country partners enhance their capacity on civil society law and to undertake research on cutting-edge legal issues that affect civil society. To counter political violence in Guatemala, USAID programs provided electoral risk mapping tools; technical assistance to improve interinstitutional coordination among electoral security stakeholders; analysis and support in the implementation of electoral dispute resolution mechanisms; trainings for electoral officials to increase conflict resolution skills; and a civic education campaign promoting a transparent, peaceful and tolerant electoral process. InterAction supports a robust increase in DA funding for Democracy, Rights, and Governance, particularly to support free and fair elections, protect freedom of association, promote economic growth and the rule of law, and enhance citizen participation. Programs address the economic despair and lack of political participation that violent extremist groups exploit among youth, the unemployed, and marginalized members of society. DRG assistance empowers citizens to ensure broad-based participation; strengthens the rule of law; mitigates conflict; cultivates respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; promotes credible elections; and fosters economic growth. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ESF programming continues to provide the community 53 media outlets in 12 provinces and support to journalists as they prepare for the local and national election cycle. Programming also supports local advocates and civil society to press for reform and advocate for stronger open access to information and the media laws. To promote inclusive dialogue among stakeholders in Ukraine, USAID programs supported the establishment of an Election Reform Group that has united civil society organizations and strengthened their influence in policy debates. Members of the Election Reform Group have developed joint proposals and advocated specific reforms of election-related legislation, including laws governing different kinds of elections, political finance, and voter bribery. InterAction supports a robust increase in ESF funding for Democracy, Rights, and Governance, particularly to help address the alienation of youth and the unemployed who are targeted by violent extremism, increase rule of law, build local capacity to conduct credible elections, strengthen civil society, and promote economic growth. National Endowment for Democracy: To reduce corruption in Thailand, a partnership with the Institute of Directors IOD in Thailand developed an antibribery initiative in which businesses pledge not to pay or accept bribes. The initiative, known as the Private Sector Collective Action Coalition Against Corruption , works with member businesses to assist them in instituting the necessary policies, procedures, monitoring, and compliance mechanisms to enable them to enforce their anti-bribery stance across their

operations. Increased funding for the NED would support the strengthening of democratic institutions around the world. To improve workplace safety conditions, programs in Bangladesh have worked to empower thousands of garment workers in factories to use collective voice as a tool to engage management on occupational, safety, health issues, and the enforcement of minimum work and pay standards in accordance with Bangladeshi law and international standards. To deliver crucial information to voters in Cambodia, USAID programming provided for the development of an interactive voice response system to provide information to voters. This system received , calls during the election period. Increased funding for the Democracy Fund would enable both a more rapid response to changing political situations and human rights abuses, and the continued support of regional approaches to migration and combat trafficking in persons. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: Rampant corruption and weak justice systems are often barriers to sustainable development; they inhibit the development of democratic institutions, human rights, and governance capability. Department of State, often in collaboration with the U. Department of Justice and other U. INCLE funding helps build transparent and accountable government and civil society institutions, combats gender-based violence and hate crimes, and aids survivors, among many other areas of assistance. This allows participants to share best practices between nations. These partnerships have addressed many important political and human rights issues, such as access for persons with disabilities, women and youth empowerment, and civic and voter education: The She Leads program, implemented by local partner Yaung Chi Thit in 17 locations across 14 states and regions, provides women with knowledge of the electoral process, develops leadership skills and emphasizes the important role that women play in the political process. The program reached over women, and six of the participants went on to run as candidates. Youth Engagement and Voter Education. For many in Myanmar, the November 8, elections were their first opportunity to vote, and many citizens were unaware of basic electoral procedures. This was particularly true among the youth. For example, a PDI voter education album posted on November 1 reached , people, receiving nearly 45, likes. International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

**Chapter 9 : Democracy, Rights and Governance | InterAction**

*Chief Justice John Roberts's favorite target, affirmative action, is likely to disappear under his slogan that to end racial discrimination, one must end all forms of racial discrimination. And a woman's right to abortion will probably disappear in red states, either through an outright overturning of Roe v.*

Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which I mean decisions that are made for groups and that are binding on all the members of the group. Second, this definition means to cover a lot of different kinds of groups that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight to it. It is quite compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to an assembly where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building. It may involve direct participation of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions. The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. For instance, Joseph Schumpeter argues, chap. XXI, with some force, that only a highly formal kind of democracy in which citizens vote in an electoral process for the purpose of selecting competing elites is highly desirable while a conception of democracy that draws on a more ambitious conception of equality is dangerous. Others have argued that democracy is not desirable at all. To evaluate their arguments we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of humanity and society from which they proceed.

The Justification of Democracy

We can evaluate democracy along at least two different dimensions: John Stuart Mill argued that a democratic method of making legislation is better than non-democratic methods in three ways: Strategically, democracy has an advantage because it forces decision-makers to take into account the interests, rights and opinions of most people in society. Since democracy gives some political power to each, more people are taken into account than under aristocracy or monarchy. The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor. Epistemologically, democracy is thought to be the best decision-making method on the grounds that it is generally more reliable in helping participants discover the right decisions. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and critical assessment of laws and policies. Democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. Furthermore, the broad based discussion typical of democracy enhances the critical assessment of the different moral ideas that guide decision-makers. Many have endorsed democracy on the basis of the proposition that democracy has beneficial effects on character. Many have noted with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on them more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. In addition, democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference whether they do or not. Finally, some have argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they come genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and

against other forms of rule Mill , p. Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects. More detailed knowledge of the effects of political institutions can be used to discriminate in favor of particular kinds of democratic institutions or modifications of them. For instance in the United States, James Madison argued in favor of a fairly strong federal government on the grounds that local governments are more likely to be oppressive to minorities Madison, Hamilton and Jay , n. Of course the soundness of any of the above arguments depends on the truth or validity of the associated substantive views about justice and the common good as well as the causal theories of the consequences of different institutions. Plato Republic, Book VI argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to properly governed societies. In a democracy, he argues, those who are expert at winning elections and nothing else will eventually dominate democratic politics. Democracy tends to emphasize this expertise at the expense of the expertise that is necessary to properly governed societies. The reason for this is that most people do not have the kinds of talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. XIX argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects. But his skepticism is not based in a conception that most people are not intellectually fit for politics. On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. For Hobbes, then, democracy has deleterious effects on subjects and politicians and consequently on the quality of the outcomes of collective decision making. Many public choice theorists in contemporary economic thought expand on these Hobbesian criticisms. They argue that citizens are not informed about politics and that they are often apathetic, which makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone else. Some of them argue for giving over near complete control over society to the market, on the grounds that more extensive democracy tends to produce serious economic inefficiencies. More modest versions of these arguments have been used to justify modification of democratic institutions. There are a number of different kinds of argument for instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from a certain kind of moral theory. For example classical utilitarianism simply has no room in its fundamental value theory for the ideas of intrinsic fairness, liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing utility understood as pleasure or desire satisfaction guarantees that it can provide only instrumental arguments for and against democracy. And there are many moral theories of this sort. But one need not be a thoroughgoing consequentialist to argue for instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally. One argument states that political power involves the exercise of power of some over others. And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process Arneson , pp. Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference. No general rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair Riker , p. Dworkin argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality, so it cannot be intrinsically fair or just Dworkin , ch. In later work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing instrumentalism Dworkin , ch. Some argue in addition, that some forms of

decision making are morally desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value. The most common of these come broadly under the rubrics of liberty and equality. Democracy, it is said, extends the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life to the domain of collective decision making. Second, only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould , pp. Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. This right is established at least partly independently of the worth of the outcomes of democratic decision making. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share. Here we can see the makings of an argument against instrumentalism. But if the liberty argument is correct our right to control our lives is violated by this. One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision. The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement. The idea behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals. Citizens justify laws and policies to each other on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions. The aim of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested to this kind of worry. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.