## Chapter 1 : The Right To Be Different: Muslims In The Public Sphere Â» Brill Online

*Modood demands equal respect for, and acceptance of, Muslims and equal rights in terms of recognition of their culture. The codification of Islamic exceptionalism in law is not only extremely difficult, but well-nigh impossible, even if it were desirable.*

The goal of the book is to understandably account for the greater visibility of Islam by analysing the transfer of Islamic practices and symbols to the public realm. The authors refer to this phenomena as the "second phase of Islamism," which initially sounds confusing, as Islamism is usually associated with radical political groups and movements. However, these activities, claim the authors, are characteristic of the "first phase of Islamism. Their demands were not aimed against the system, but rather they sought to gain access to participation in public life. The naturally innate category of "Muslim" gave rise to that of the "Islamist," which refers to those who consciously choose the different lifestyle offered by Islam, all the while accepting modernity. No uniform Islamic identity The stance of the Islamist is not merely that of quiet acceptance. Recourse to Islam offers a positioning and an "oppositional empowerment" in the modern world. As a result, Islam penetrates deeply into the social structures of everyday life, in contrast to radical demands posed by first phase Islamists, who stood outside of the system. The emerging and lived "Islams" are so multifarious and hybrid that they resist a collective description that points to a uniform Islamic identity. In order to clearly present these multifarious Islamistic identities and the mechanisms involved, the editors have divided the anthology into three parts. The heart of the book consists of case studies from the secular Republic of Turkey, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and pluralistic Europe. The predominantly empirical studies aim to elucidate the nature of public and corporeal manifestation of Islamic symbols. Three chapters â€" meant to be taken as an overview â€" complete the book. Eisenstadt depicts the role of the public in Islamic history, Simonetta Tabboni refers to the interplay between identity and alterity, and Charles Taylor illuminates the role played by religion in the struggle for identity in modernity. Belief offers orientation The complexity and density of the issues facing the team of authors hereby becomes apparent. In order not to remain at a merely general level of discussion, one aspect from the case studies had to be picked out that concerned living together with Muslims within a European context. The contributions offer precise accounts of how belief provides orientation and self-confidence, serving as a "springboard to the non-Islamic majority society. The turn to Islam is a way of coming to terms with experiences as a stigmatized minority in a majority society. The function of religion in this respect is in no way fixed, but rather is defined anew according to the specific situation in order to best come to terms with everyday life. The need for "equality" Against this background, Islamic cultural associations fulfill various functions. They serve as a meeting place, where young people can get together and exchange experiences on the daily challenges posed by the majority society. The development of a feeling of solidarity endows individuals with inner strength on the one hand and, on the other, enables the person to articulate interests and needs out in the open, in public. This maxim holds true even for secular organizations. The demands of Muslims for recognition thereby follow the logic of equality along with other sections of the majority society. As a result, Islamic religious communities form, just as do all religions, on the basis of confessional differences. Islamic cultural associations offer an alternative sphere, which mediates between the personal and the public worlds, and thereby empowers members not only to act towards achieving religious demands, but also in terms of a wider civil engagement. In sight or further off in the distance? At this point, a critical question must be asked. What happens when alternative spheres turn into spheres of opposition? What if the main concern is not integration, but rather demarcation and superiority? It is desirable that when Muslims achieve visibility, they are also accessible through their public demands. What happens, however, when their aim is to exclude themselves from the majority society, with the effect that Muslims are pushed further off in the distance? In my opinion, the mere recognition of difference conceals the fundamental problem of asymmetry, the struggle for supremacy within a cultural sphere. The article by Guelen is the only

one to raise this issue, and it questions whether the model of symmetrical recognition of various positions is a meaningful possible solution or if other approaches must be found in order to establish true co-existence within a society. Majority society questioned The question posed above is not asked by the team of authors, who nonetheless owe their readers an answer. What they do work out in a detailed and precise manner, however, is a final farewell to the nightmare image of Islam. Islam is presented as a source to cope with everyday life and a means of orientation in a majority society. It appears in various facets, especially in the public sphere. National principles of consensus are destabilized and questioned to the degree to which Muslims and Islamists, respectively, are empowered to act by turning to Islam. The majority society is challenged to come up with a new way to relate to minorities and then integrate this into its concept of modernity. The fear of a monolithic Islam has proved to be of no help. This collection of essays provides a first intensive examination of the "various Islams. Dossier The Headscarf Debate West and the Islamic world alike, the headscarf is the subject of heated discussions. We take a closer look at various aspects of the debate and highlight its background and social reality.

*sphere of life means the domestic sphere within the premises of house and family while the 'public' sphere is considered the social and political sphere for women in Muslim societies. This gendered division of society into public and private.*

September 07,  In the debate that followed the lecture, the most important issue that was raised related to the relationship between modernisation and secularisation. For a long time it was held that a close link existed between the modernisation of society and the secularisation of the population. Consequently, it was argued that the influence of religion declined in post-enlightenment society. This assumption, Professor Habermas suggests, was based on three considerations. First, the progress in science and technology made causal explanation possible and more importantly, for a scientifically enlightened mind it was difficult to reconcile with theocentric and metaphysical worldviews. Secondly, the churches and other religious organisations lost their control over law, politics, public welfare, education and science. Finally, the economic transformation led to higher levels of welfare and greater social security. The impact of these developments, it is argued, has led to the decline of the relevance and influence of religion. Opposed to the modernisation-secularisation paradigm is the view that the influence of religion in the public sphere has not only not declined, but in fact, has increased. It is held by many scholars that the modernisation thesis has lost its validity in the contemporary world, as there are tendencies which suggest that there is a worldwide resurgence of religion. Such an impression is based on three factors: This is particularly so in India. A national survey conducted by the Centre for Developing Societies, New Delhi, testifies to the growing influence of religion in Indian society. According to this survey, four out of 10 people are very religious and five out of 10 are religious. That is to say that 90 per cent of the respondents claimed to be religious â€" performing rituals, visiting places of worship and undertaking pilgrimages. Among them, 30 per cent claimed to have become more religious during the last five years. An increase in the number of religious institutions is also an indication of the greater hold of religion on society. Enlightenment and modernity in India have not led to the decline of the influence of religiosity. If anything, it has only increased. The public sphere emerged in Europe in the 18th century within the bourgeoisie society as a discursive space in which private individuals came together to discuss matters of public interest. The separation of powers of the state and the church and the enlightenment virtues of reason and humanism, and the economic changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution, contributed to the formation of the public sphere and shaped the transactions within it. The existence of the public sphere was contingent upon the access of all citizens to, and protection of individual rights by, the rule of law. In essence, the character of the public sphere as it evolved in Europe in the 18th century was secular and democratic. The formation and development of the public sphere in India during the 19th and 20th centuries had a different trajectory. This was primarily because India was under colonial domination and Indian society did not have the necessary independence to shape its destiny. The political, economic and intellectual conditions were qualitatively different from the one in which the public sphere in Europe took shape. The passage to an uninhibited state of enlightenment and modernity was not part of its experience. The constraints of colonialism warped the economic development, inhibited the efflorescence of renaissance and enlightenment, suppressed democratic aspirations and tried to undermine secular consciousness. Yet, within these constraints emerged what has come to be described as colonial modernity, which was at best a caricature of what was witnessed in Europe. The contradictions within this modernity, existing as an island in a traditional pool, induced the Indian intelligentsia to seek an alternative, the endeavours of which were articulated through the highly restrictive transactions in the public sphere. For a variety of reasons, the ability of the agencies which contributed to the formation of the public sphere in India â€" such as the media, voluntary organisations and social and religious movements â€" to constitute a public sphere was restricted. Unlike in Europe the public sphere in India was not the product of a free bourgeois society; it took shape within the political, social and economic parameters set by the colonial government. Its social base was very weak, consisting of the nascent middle class emerging

out of the structures of colonial governance. The media were constantly under the surveillance of colonial rule; the reach of the voluntary organisations was limited and the social and religious movements could not transgress their respective caste and religious boundaries. As a consequence, the public sphere was not vibrant, nor could it acquire a fully democratic and secular character. This in a way emerged out of the ambivalence of the colonial state: As a result, it could not but monitor the transactions within the public sphere. The legacy of colonial rule imparted to the public sphere in independent India an internally contradictory character. In terms of conception and constitution the public sphere was democratic and secular, but it was not so in practice. Several sections such as women and Dalits were excluded, and by and large it remained a preserve of the educated upper castes. Moreover, either created or controlled by the colonial bureaucracy, their democratic rights were considerably restricted. Yet, the public engagements within the public sphere indicated a continuous struggle for democratic ideals and practice. As an institution mediating between civil society and the state, debating issues of public interest, the public sphere is secular in character. In India, however, the public sphere reflected the co-existence of the secular and the religious. The media were essentially secular, but an undercurrent of religious consciousness was reflected in their concerns. For instance, the contributors to the Letters to the Editor column of Bombay Gazette in the 19th century described themselves with their religious-denominational descriptions â€" Hindu, Muslim, Parsee and so on. They were all debating public and secular issues, but while doing so carried with them their religious baggage. The religious identity was true of voluntary associations also as was evident from their denominational names. Many of them were organised on religious terms. If religion is a private matter, as considered by the Indian state, would it be proper to allow it to be active in the public sphere? The Indian state has not successfully resolved this contradiction. The official policy of equal recognition of all religions has only led to the reinforcement of this contradiction, because it has opened up more and more public space to all religions. As a result, what has become prominent in the public sphere is not secular reason but religious celebration. The public sphere has succumbed to the celebration of religiosity, based on rituals and superstitions. Two conclusions are in order about the transactions in the public sphere in India. The universal experience of the modernisation-secularisation connection appears to be true of India. It is particularly so because the renaissance, enlightenment and scientific revolution being either borrowed or weak, the capacity of modernisation in India to impact on secularisation and marginalisation of religion is itself not pronounced. Instead, religion remains a powerful force in civil society. Secondly, the use of religion for political ends has substantially increased during the last few decades. Such a development has serious implications for a secular state and society. Retrieving the secular character of the public sphere is therefore imperative; otherwise its religious character is likely to impinge upon the functions of the state. These are excerpts from the valedictory address delivered at the Silver Jubilee celebration of the Department of Christian Studies, University of Madras, on September 4. Professor Panikkar can be e-mailed at knp8 rediffmail.

*Respondents were asked to give their opinion on Muslim women wearing headscarves in the German public sphere, on Islamic education in German public schools, on the building of mosques by Muslim communities, and on a Islamic public holiday (see Appendix A for exact question wording).*

Spatial disciplines define the physical human interactions in open spaces of the city like parks, recreational areas, festival spaces, streets, playgrounds etc. Spatial planning has always been used as a paradigm shaper. Habermas, in a self-aware academic limitation, describes a bourgeois, male, white, upper-middle class, educated and adult public sphere. He claims that once a person is in that idealized public sphere he is allowed to speak, interact and take action in collective decisions or refer to hegemonic structures manipulating the discussion ground to re-set the discussion. The public sphere is a civil arena where public opinions take shape and strong circulation of public opinions can pressure authority groups and limit their actions. That is why, most of the time, public sphere is defined as the place where decisions are made without violence. And finally, ideal public opinion takes shape rationally, not with negotiation. The most important thing about the Habermasian public sphere is that it is based on discussion, and especially discussion of print material. It is a public sphere founded a priori on words but not actions. The Habermasian public sphere based on critical-rational discussion has four essential elements: Every contributer should have an equal chance to start the conversation, ask questions, discuss, examine and propose. Everyone should have the right to question the determined discussion topics. Everyone should have equal chance to declare their wants, desires and emotions. Speakers should have the right to declare their statements on the procedures of discourse and the practice of these procedures, and if they are excluded through the discussions they should have the freedom to express their position and the relations of hegemony which limited their expression. His framing approach even though this theory is criticized rightfully from angles of class, race and feminism [2] too managed to stay as an important source book in social sciences. Kluge explains their point of departure to re-define public sphere as follows: Our point of departure always remains the public sphere of that could be conquered by the National Socialists. This must be fortified in different ways so that it cannot be conquered. If the public sphere, that is, the container for the political, was inadequate and therefore conquered by the Nazis, then it is useless to study the achievements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to repeat and defend the old conception of the public sphere, as Habermas does, for no moral resistance was objectively possible within it. The real social experiences of human beings, produced in everyday life and work, cut across such divisions. We originally intended to write a book about the public sphere and the mass media. This would have examined the most advanced structural changes within the public sphere and the mass media, in particular the media cartel. The loss of a public sphere within the various sectors of the left, together with the restricted access of workers in their existing organizations to channels of communication, soon led us to ask whether there can be any effective forms of a counterpublic sphere against the bourgeois public sphere. This is how we arrived at the concept of the proletarian public sphere, which embodies an experiential interest that is quite distinct. The dialectic of bourgeois and proletarian public sphere is the subject of our book. Historical fissuresâ€"crises, war, capitulation, revolution, counterrevolutionâ€"denote concrete constellations of social forces within which a proletarian public 1 sphere develops. Since the latter has no existence as a ruling public sphere, it has l to be reconstructed from such rifts, marginal cases, isolated initiatives. To study substantive attempts at a proletarian public sphere is, however, only one aim I in our argument: An Interview with Alexander Kluge. Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, and the Social Sciences. Habermas and the Public Sphere. David, Isabel, and Kumru F. Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1 and 2 Harvey, David. From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. Kluge, Alexander, and Stuart Liebman. Rethinking the Habermas of Historians. The City in History: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Negt, Oskar, and

Alexander Kluge. Public Sphere and Experience: U of Minnesota P, The Body and the City in Western Civilization. The Perspective of Experience. The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest: The Arab Spring and beyond. This page has tags:

## Chapter 4 : A Summary of Public Sphere Theories

*Religion and the Public Sphere: New Conversations, edited by James Walters and Esther Kersley, brings together a series of lectures, dialogues, and essays organized by the London School of Economics (LSE) Faith Centre.*

Findings from the annual British Social Attitudes survey published this month sent secularists into a mild panic. A number of academics were quick to point out that the wide difference in religiosity between older and younger generations meant that this is likely to be only a pause before the plummet, as the older, more devout cohort dies out. The decline of religion can in this way become a self-fulfilling prediction, as dwindling affiliation is used to justify the dismantling of its public presence, which only further accelerates its decline and ensures any visibility of its revival is stifled. This is a crucial moment to stand up for freedom of religion in this country. But do we know what that looks like? In particular, do we know whether religious freedom includes freedom to be religious in the public realm? I believe they are wrong, very wrong in fact, and that religious freedom, so far from excluding public religion, requires it. But it is a debate which Christians must engage, if we are not to see our ability to express our faith in the public sphere continue to be eroded before our eyes. This debate is not new, of course. We can see it, for instance, in the contrasting attitudes taken to public religion by two of the first Presidents of the United States, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington. This metaphor was subsequently taken as authoritative by the US Supreme Court as it began to rule on public religion matters during the 19th century, eventually culminating, in and , in the banning of prayer and Bible reading in state schools and this despite education being historically considered not state but church business. George Washington, an Anglican, clearly was not reading from the same script as Jefferson, when, in , he proclaimed the first National Day of Thanksgiving in the following terms: Whereas it is the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey his will, to be grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favour â€" and whereas both Houses of Congress have by their joint Committee requested me to recommend to the People of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many signal favors of Almighty God especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness. Now therefore I do recommend and assign Thursday the 26th day of November next to be devoted by the People of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being, who is the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be â€" That we may then all unite in rendering unto him our sincere and humble thanks â€¦ for all the great and various favors which he hath been pleased to confer upon us. This was presumably not quite the wall of separation Jefferson had in mind. Yet even as late as the Supreme Court saw fit to opine: Or, to the contrary, are Washington and the Court right to insist on seeing religion, and indeed God, honoured at the heart of the public life of a free nation? Is religious freedom about allowing people, government, and every association in between, to express religion freely, or is it about keeping the public realm religion free? One big problem that arises for the idea of permitting the free public expression of religion is that many people today fear religion, they see it as dangerous, or at least offensive. Does all this, we must ask, promote religious freedom or impede it? So again, a special restriction on religion â€" is this really for the sake of religious freedom, or is it not rather because religion is being treated as peculiarly dangerous and in need of keeping in check? One rather begins to suspect it is more from fear if not outright prejudice than freedom that such policies and regulations derive. But why, it will be asked, should we tolerate public religion at all? What is it about religion that warrants its presence in the public realm and not, instead, being kept politely behind closed doors? Politics we permit in the public sphere because it is about the common good and our arrangements for living together. But religion, it will be said, is about private belief, private devotion and personal salvation. Why does that have a claim on the public space? It has an important claim because religion is in fact the source of some key public goods and benefits. Religion has a private dimension, certainly, but it also has a public dimension, a dimension which forms the basis of the religious dimension of

public culture, which is a crucial part of human culture more generally. What are those public benefits? Seen in this light, it is absurd to suggest that religious freedom mandates the wholesale jettisoning of public religion, since that both places suffocating restrictions on ordinary religious expression which is not freedom while at the same time deprives society of the manifold benefits of public religion. But how would this work? Certainly the canons of decorum must be observed, and in particular we need a conception of the public good, which draws limits around freedom of all kinds including religious, not least because the state is the secular power, not being itself a church. We need also to take into account the relative prevalence of religions in the society or culture, which makes different kinds of religious expression more or less appropriate. Religious freedom requires public religious expression, and that necessarily favours the more prevalent religions in society, and it is quite proper for it to do so. It would be impossible for freedom to benefit all religions equally, irrespective of how mainstream or marginal they are, and neither would it be appropriate â€" just as it would be neither possible nor right for political freedom to benefit all political parties equally, as though minor parties should enjoy the same political clout as major parties. Freedom requires public expression, and public expression properly varies with social and cultural prevalence. What does this mean in practice? It means, for one thing, a resistance to further moves to make God and faith in effect unwelcome in large arenas of human activity, such as schools and workplaces, and law and public policy, and an effort to reverse those which have already been implemented. It means standing up against a culture which regards prayer as a suspect activity and proscribes it wherever possible; which treats the promotion of the Gospel and the Christian faith as a grubby proposition unsuitable for public arenas and ineligible for public funds ; which treats the exclusion of religion from an area as a neutral and even-handed approach, when of course it is no such thing, but straightforwardly hostile to religion. As we continue at this time to think about the future of religion in our less religious, certainly, but not quite yet post-religious society, it is, I believe, time to dust down our concept of religious freedom and make it fit for the 21st century. We need to remember our proud history of religious freedom, and how such freedom was not until recently one which sought to exclude religion from the public sphere, but which respected competing claims on the public space for the sake of the public good. Most of all, we need to recall from somewhere in our collective consciousness that religion is not our enemy but a treasured part of our national life and culture, one which is under threat and is in urgent need of some friendly attention if it is to continue to provide us with its benefits for many years to come. He has a keen interest in all things to do with public religion and social theology. More from my site.

## Chapter 5 : Religion in the public sphere - The Hindu

*public realm, but we must also re-examine the notion of religion as a â€˜sovereignâ€Ÿ sphere in which the principles of reason, freedom, and equality that govern the public realm do not apply.*

This winter of discontent in the United States and in Europe is not yet over: Nevertheless, there are new shoots of resistance sprouting out of the frozen soil even in some American states: In Madison, Wisconsin, where public sector workers are fighting against losing their collective bargaining rights, their resistance is entering its second week and similar actions are under way in Indiana and Ohio, among other American states. The photo of a poster being held by an Egyptian demonstrator is making the rounds in the internet. Of course, the Wisconsin protesters and the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries are battling for different goals: Arab revolutionaries are struggling for democratic freedoms, a free public square, and joining the contemporary world after decades of lies, isolation, and deception. But in both cases, transformative hopes have been kindled: Yet we know that the spring of revolutions is followed by the passions of summer and the chilling discord of fall. Such warnings were expressed not only by Hillary Clinton in the first days of the Egyptian uprising, but many commentators who have hid their distrust in the capacity of the Arab peoples to exercise democracy, are now rejoicing that the first signs of contention between religious and secular groups are breaking out in Egypt and Tunisia. None of this is inevitable: What we have witnessed is truly revolutionary, in the sense that a new order of freedom â€” a novo ordo saeclorum â€" is emerging transnationally in the Arab world. Until very recently, it was often said that the political options not only in the Arab world but in the Muslim world, were restricted to three: Just as followers of Martin Luther King were educated in the black churches in the American South and gained their spiritual strength from these communities, so the crowds in Tunis, Egypt and elsewhere draw upon Islamic traditions of Shahada â€" being a martyr and witness of God at once! There is no necessary incompatibility between the religious faith of many who participated in these movements and their modern aspirations! The youth of these countries, who themselves have been students or workers in Europe, Australia, Canada and the USA; whose parents, cousins or relatives have been guest workers in these countries, as well as in the rich Gulf states of the region, knew very well what lay beyond their borders, and they revolted in order to join the contemporary world and not to turn their backs upon it. The transnational media revealed the lies that the state-owned televisions and some newspapers in these countries had been spewing for years. Much has been made of the force of the new media such as Facebook and Twitter in these revolutions, and this is undoubtedly true. He undoubtedly knew, although no one commented upon it, that Mark Zuckerberg is Jewish! It is the biggest loser of these revolutions; it has little legitimacy or following on the Arab street, which does not mean that it may not become more dangerous in the near future. In fact, it is likely that Al-Qaeda will attempt to recapture some of the glamour it has lost by engaging in some spectacular actions: Why are we not celebrating this? Why are we so incapable of seeing that Al-Qaeda will end up in the dustbin of history? Although it will surely cause some additional pain and violence, it will expire not because of American bombs and troops but because Arab peoples have rejected its reactionary and nihilist politics. What about Islamicist movements and parties in these countries? It is remarkable how many commentators already pretend to know the outcome of these political processes: They are convinced that these revolutions will be hijacked and transformed into theocracies. These are not only deeply partisan speculations, motivated by equally deep-seated cultural prejudice against Muslims and their capacity for self-governance. They are also deeply anti-political speculations of weary elites, who have forgotten the civic republican contentiousness out of which their own democracies once emerged. In Egypt as well as Tunisia, hard negotiations and confrontations will now start among the many groups who participated in the revolution. What are the institutional alternatives then: Malaysia, Turkey, or Iran? But Malaysia on the one hand, with its more authoritarian and closed Islamic society, which controls women and the public sphere, and Turkey, on the other, with its Muslim majority, a pluralist society and a vibrant multi-party democracy,

with its own legacy of state-authoritarianism, are real examples for these societies. The historic bonds between countries such as Tunisia and Egypt and also Libya that were part of the Ottoman Empire, and some of whose elites and cities still bear Turkish names, are deep and extensive. And the example of Turkey has been mentioned many times by the Egyptian youth. In recent years, in order to retain its growing influence upon these countries Turkey itself has been silent about human rights violations in these countries, but now the indefatigable Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, is in the region, promising institutional as well as intellectual help in enabling the transition to democracy. A further unknown in this process is the role of the military, particularly in Egypt. Will it exercise restraint in the constitutional process now in motion and not misuse it? Will it peacefully hand over the reins of the country to the civilian political parties when the time comes? Much of this answer depends upon the vigilance and political savvy of those who initiated the revolution to keep watch over it. There are thus multiple historical and institutional models to choose from in reconciling Islam and democracy. We should celebrate the contentious debate which will now break out in these countries â€" with the possible exception of Libya that is likely to be mired in violence for a while â€" as an aspect of pluralist democratization rather than shying away from it. There is no single model for combining religion and democracy, nor is there a single model for defining the role of faith in the public square. It is altogether possible that these young revolutionaries who stunned the world with their ingenuity, discipline, tenaciousness and courage will also teach us some new lessons about religion and the public square, democracy and faith, as well as the role of the military. Despite his pessimism about the course of the French Revolution, Hegel never stopped raising his glass to celebrate the revolutionaries every July 14th, the day of the storming of the Bastille. I intend to follow his example and raise my glass to the young revolutionaries every February 11thâ€" Mabruk!!!

## Chapter 6 : Benhabib | Public Sphere Forum

*ABSTRACT. This article addresses European Muslims' public engagement in the arts by applying the concept of counterpublics. It examines two case studies of young German Muslims whose involvement in the public sphere can be described as soft counterpublics.*

## Chapter 7 : Project MUSE - Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, The

*Religion in the European public sphere. One of the main domains of religious change presenting a challenge to Europe and the EU is that of a growing Muslim presence: a snapshot of European society today reveals a number of controversies revolving (if only superficially) around Islam.*

## Chapter 8 : Project MUSE - Religion in the Greek Public Sphere: Nuancing the Account

*Rocketing right along here, let me give you another example of this relationship of the public sphere to imagining a new source of sovereignty, that is the nation, and give you an example of how that works.*

## Chapter 9 : Is anti-Muslim bigotry a form of racism? - The National

*One should make no mistake: critique and criticism of Muslims in the public sphere is, indeed, "racialised", even if there is no "race" per se that is involved.*