

Chapter 1 : The subject, by Bernard Lonergan | National Library of Australia

The Subject. The Aquinas Lecture, Paperback - June 1, by Bernard J. F. Lonergan (Author) Be the first to review this item. Book 6 of 11 in the Aquinas.

The school opened in with forty-nine freshmen. Bishop Buddy blessed the new facility on November 11, In the school year facility upgrades began. In the spring of the football field was refurbished, bringing in a new playing surface and lighting. A new fence, entry walls, student drop-off area, and landscaping were completed in This was followed by the construction of the Fr. This facility provided Aquinas with six lit courts for their league champion Lady Falcon tennis team. Other improvements include the remodeling of the Bill Lemann Baseball Complex, the Lady Falcon softball field, the renovation of the quad area, and remodels of most of the restrooms on campus. Both facilities allow students the use of technology to enhance their educational experience. A landscaping wall was constructed around the north and east side of the gym allowing for a new landscaped entry way. This entry is accessed through the Jim Ragan Parent Patio. The patio serves as a new entrance to the athletic facilities as well as providing a sitting area for parents, students and visitors. Adjacent to the parent patio is a new outdoor basketball court that allows students to play before, during and after school. This court also serves as a practice court for the junior varsity teams. A state of the art all-weather synthetic track surface located in Reisch Stadium. In the fall of , thanks to the generosity of the Knights of Columbus, Aquinas dedicated a completely remodeled St. Thomas Aquinas Chapel The new pews in the chapel now seat approximately 60 students. Also included in the remodel was an altar, flooring, lighting, stained glass, entry doors and extensive woodwork throughout. A new exterior facade was also constructed. This prayer garden located on the north side of campus was donated by the family of Principal Chris Barrows in memory of his late father. The garden features a Stations of the Cross prayer walk. The amphitheater seats over students and can be used for a myriad of activities from mass and assemblies to classes and theater productions. The amphitheater proved to be immediately useful during the beginning of the school year. At this time the gymnasium was undergoing a major renovation causing the school to lose the only place on campus where the entire student body could gather. Thanks to the generosity of the Scafiddi family the amphitheater provided a new gathering place for the Falcon community. The first phase of the gymnasium renovation was completed in mid-October. This first phase consisted of entirely new locker rooms, football and coaches offices, gym floor, additional bleachers, lighting, air conditioning and interior and exterior doors. During the Homecoming game the gymnasium was officially renamed The Gogo-Aquinas Gymnasium in honor of the generosity of the Gogo family. Also new for the school year was an additional state-of-the-art science lab constructed within The Matich Science Center. The school year saw the beginning of the largest building project in the history of the school. The 60 Years of Success project consists of the construction of a new sqft. The facility will also provide the ability to teach classes in lighting and sound design. Academics[edit] Aquinas offers 18 AP courses and 11 honors courses. These programs offer students a four-year course of study which includes certain academic courses and internships at St. Bernadine Hospital, various law and engineering offices located throughout downtown San Bernardino. In the fall of Aquinas was recognized as an Apple Distinguished School for its comprehensive use of the iPad and technology in the classroom and within the curriculum. In the fall of Aquinas was once again recognized as an Apple Distinguished School for another two year term. In the summer of Aquinas was chosen as an official Nike school which allows for the outfitting of the Falcon athletic teams exclusively in Nike apparel. Aquinas athletic teams have won over league championships, 7 CIF championships, and 2 state championships. The center is a modern, energy efficient facility, which houses the offices of the primary leadership of the school. San Manuel Performing Arts Center - Opened in the center contains seating for approximately in the main auditorium and contains a music classroom, offices, dressing rooms, and a scene shop. The center is one of the most state-of-the-art venues in the inland empire. Bernardine Hall - One of the original classroom buildings constructed in Bernardine Hall houses world language and ethics classrooms. Throughout the years the building has undergone several renovations, the most recent coming in Scafiddi Family Amphitheater - Constructed in the seat amphitheater

provides space for large student gatherings and can host masses, concerts, and various student performances. Thomas Aquinas Chapel - Small chapel with room for approximately 60 students. Aquinas-Gogo Gymnasium - Opened in the main athletic center of the school serves as home to the Falcon basketball, volleyball and wrestling teams. The gymnasium also houses the football facilities and athletic offices. In the gymnasium received a major renovation which consisted of entirely new locker rooms, football and coaches offices, gym floor, additional bleachers, lighting, air conditioning and interior and exterior doors. In a new 4, sq. The stadium is home to the Falcon football, soccer, and track teams. Located in the lower level of the stadium is the weight room and wrestling practice facility. Andre Field and the Falcon baseball teams. Devine Tennis Center - Opened in the center provides a state-of-the-art facility for the champion Lady Falcons tennis teams.

Chapter 2 : Aquinas: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Aquinas Lecture The Subject was delivered on March 3 in the Peter A. Brooks Memorial Union by Rev. Bernard Lonergan, S.J., professor of Dogmatic Theology, Regis College (Ontario) and Gregorian University (Rome).

The Nature of Metaphysics Saint Thomas, that is, Aquinas, clarifies the nature of metaphysics through ascertaining its particular subject-matter, its field of investigation. In order to ascertain the subject-matter of any particular science, Thomas distinguishes between the different intellectual operations that we use when engaged in some particular scientific endeavor. Broadly speaking, these fall into two categories: There are thus correspondingly two distinct classes of science: Speculative sciences are those that contemplate truth whereas practical sciences are those that apply truth for some practical purpose. The sciences are then further distinguished through differentiating their various subject-matters. Insofar as the speculative sciences merely contemplate truth but do not apply it for some practical purpose, the subject-matter of the speculative sciences is that which can be understood to some extent. Working within the Aristotelian tradition, Thomas holds that something is understood when it is separated from matter and is necessary to thing in some respect. For instance, when we understand the nature of a tree, what we understand is not primarily the matter that goes to constitute the tree in question, but what it is to be a tree, or the structuring principle of the matter that so organizes it and specifies it as a tree rather than a plant. Furthermore, assuming our understanding is correct, when we understand a thing to be a tree, we do not understand it to be a dog, or a horse, or a cat. Thus, in our understanding of a tree, we understand that which is necessary for the tree to be a tree, and not of anything that is not a tree. Hence, our understanding of a thing is separated from its matter and is necessary to it in some respect. Now, what is in motion is not necessary, since what is in motion can change. Thus, the degree to which we have understood something is conditional upon the degree to which it is separated from matter and motion. It follows then that speculative objects, the subject-matter of the speculative-sciences, insofar as they are what are understood, will be separated from matter and motion to some degree. Any distinctions that obtain amongst speculative objects will in turn signify distinctions amongst the sciences that consider those objects; and we can find distinctions amongst speculative objects based upon their disposition towards matter and motion. There are three divisions that can apply to speculative objects, thereby permitting us to differentiate the sciences that consider such objects: Given these three classes of speculative objects, the speculative sciences that consider them can be enumerated accordingly: Before going on to consider the subject-matter of metaphysics in a little more detail, it is important to point out that Thomas takes this division of the speculative sciences as exhaustive. For Thomas, there could be no fourth speculative science; the reason for this is that the subject-matter of such a science would have to be those things that depend on matter and motion for their being understood but not for their being, for all other combinations have been exhausted. Now, if a thing depends on matter and motion for its being understood but not for its being, then matter and motion would be put into its definition, which defines a thing as it exists. Hence, all things that include matter and motion in their definitions are dependent on matter and motion for their being, but not all things that depend on matter and motion for their being depend on matter and motion for their being understood. There could be no fourth speculative science since there is no fourth class of speculative objects depending on matter and motion for their being understood but not for their being. Thomas thus sees this threefold division of the speculative sciences as an exhaustive one. The third class of speculative objects comprises the objects of metaphysics or theology. Now Thomas does not equate these two disciplines, but goes on to distinguish between the proper subject-matter of metaphysics and the proper subject-matter of theology. Recall that this third class of speculative objects comprises those things depending on matter and motion neither for their being nor for their being understood. Such things are thus immaterial things; however, Thomas here draws a distinction. There are things that are immaterial insofar as they are in themselves complete immaterial substances; God and the angels would be examples of such things. To give the latter a title, let them be called positively immaterial. On the other hand there are things that are immaterial insofar as they simply do not depend on matter and motion, but can nevertheless be sometimes said to be found therein. In other words,

things of the latter category are neutral with respect to being found in matter and motion, and hence they are neutrally immaterial. Thus, the neutrally immaterial seem to signify certain aspects or modes of being that can apply equally to material and to immaterial things. The question then arises: Nevertheless, direct knowledge of the positively immaterial is possible, but this will not be on the basis of unaided human reason; it will require that the positively immaterial reveal themselves to us in some way, in which case direct knowledge of the positively immaterial will be dependent on some sort of revelation. As it is a purely rational science, not dependent on or presupposing the truths of revelation, metaphysics will be a study of the neutrally immaterial aspects of things, that is, a study of those modes of being that apply to all beings, whether they are material or immaterial. Such a study will be in accord with the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics as a study of being qua being, insofar as the neutrally immaterial apply to all beings and are not restricted to a certain class of beings. However, Thomas does not adopt the Aristotelian phrase being qua being as the subject-matter of metaphysics, he offers his own term. According to Thomas, *ens commune* common being is the proper subject-matter of metaphysics. Through an investigation of *ens commune*, an investigation into the aspects of being common to all beings, the metaphysician may indeed come to a knowledge of the causes of being and might thereby be led to the affirmation of divine being, but this is only at the end of the metaphysical inquiry, not at the beginning. Thus, metaphysics for Aquinas is a study of *ens commune* where this is understood as the common aspects of being without which a thing could not be; it does not presuppose the existence of divine being, and may not even be led to an affirmation of divine being though Thomas of course offers several highly complex metaphysical arguments for the existence of divine being, but this should not be taken to be essential to the starting point of Thomistic metaphysics. Metaphysics then is a study of the certain aspects common to all beings; and it is the task of the metaphysician to uncover the aspects of being that are indeed common and without which a thing could not be. There are certain aspects of being that are common insofar as they are generally applicable to all beings, and these are essence and existence; all beings exist and have an essence, hence metaphysics will be primarily concerned with the nature of essence and existence and their relationship to each other. Having completed an investigation into essence and existence, the metaphysician must investigate the aspects of being that are common to particular instances of being; and this will be a study of i the composition of substance and accident, and ii the composition of matter and form. The format of Thomistic metaphysics then takes a somewhat dyadic structure of descending generality: The format of the remainder of this article will be an investigation into these dyadic structures. Essence and Existence A general notion of essence is the following: Quite generally then, the essence of a thing is signified by its definition. The immediate question then is how the essence of a thing relates to its existence. The context is a discussion of immaterial substances and whether or not they are composed of matter. In that passage, Thomas is concerned with a popular medieval discussion known as universal hylemorphism. Thus, creatures, even immaterial creatures, must be material in some respect, even if this materiality is nothing like our corporeal materiality. Thomas takes up this issue in *De Ente* Chapter 4, pointing out that the Jewish thinker Avicenna seems to have been the author of this position. Thomas takes the notion of universal hylemorphism to be absurd. Not only does it conflict with the common sayings of the philosophers, but also it is precisely as separated from matter and all material conditions that we deem separate immaterial substances separate, in which case they cannot be composed of matter. But if such substances cannot be composed of matter, what accounts for their potentiality? Such substances are not God, they are not pure act, they are in potentiality in some respect. So, if they are not material, then how are they in potency? Thomas is thus led to hold that they have an element of potentiality, but this is not the potency supplied by matter; rather, immaterial substances are composed of essence and existence, and it is the essence of the thing, standing in potency to a distinct act of existence, that accounts for the potentiality of creatures and thereby distinguishes them from God, who is not so composed. In the first stage Thomas argues as follows. Whatever does not enter into the understanding of any essence is composed with that essence from without; for we cannot understand an essence without understanding the parts of that essence. But we can understand the essence of something without knowing anything about its existence; for instance, one can understand the essence of a man or a phoenix without thereby understanding the existence of either. Hence, essence and existence are distinct. This little paragraph

has generated considerable controversy, insofar as it is unclear what sort of distinction Thomas intends to establish at this stage. Is it merely a logical distinction whereby it is one thing to understand the essence of a thing and another to understand its existence? On the other hand, does Thomas attempt to establish a real distinction whereby essence and existence are not only distinct in our understanding, but also in the thing itself? Commentators who hold that this stage only establishes a logical distinction focus on the fact that Thomas is here concerned only with our understanding of essence and not with actual real things; such commentators include Joseph Owens and John Wippel. In the second stage of argumentation, Thomas claims that if there were a being whose essence is its existence, there could only be one such being, in all else essence and existence would differ. This is clear when we consider how things can be multiplied. A thing can be multiplied in one of three ways: Thomas claims that a being whose essence is its existence could not be multiplied in either of the first two ways he does not consider the third way, presumably because in that case the thing that is received or participated in is not itself multiplied; the individuals are multiplied and they simply share in some single absolute reality. A being whose essence is its existence could not be multiplied i through the addition of some difference, for then its essence would not be its existence but its existence plus some difference, nor could it be multiplied ii through being received in matter, for then it would not be subsistent, but it must be subsistent if it exists in virtue of what it is. Overall then, if there were a being whose essence is its existence, it would be unique, there could only be one such being, in all else essence and existence are distinct. Notice that Thomas has once again concluded that essence and existence are distinct. John Wippel takes this to be the decisive stage in establishing that essence and existence are really distinct. He argues that insofar as it is impossible for there to be more than one being whose essence is its existence, there could not be in reality many such beings, in which case if we grant that there are multiple beings in reality, such beings are composed of essence and existence. On the other hand, Joseph Owens has charged Wippel with an ontological move and claims that Wippel is arguing from some positive conceptual content, to the actuality of that content in reality. Owens argues that we cannot establish the real distinction until we have established that there is something whose essence is its existence. A thing cannot be the cause of its own existence, for then it would have to precede itself in existence, which is absurd. Everything then whose essence is distinct from its existence must be caused to be by another. Now, what is caused to be by another is led back to what exists in itself per se. There must be a cause then for the existence of things, and this because it is pure existence *esse tantum* ; otherwise an infinite regress of causes would ensue. It is here that Owens believes that Thomas establishes the real distinction; since Thomas establishes to his own satisfaction that there exists a being whose essence is its existence. Consequently, we can contrast the existence of such a being with the existence of finite entities and observe that in the latter existence is received as from an efficient cause whereas in the former it is not. Thus, essence and existence are really distinct. Having established at some stage that essence and existence are distinct and that there exists a being whose essence is its existence, Thomas goes on to conclude that in immaterial substances, essence is related to existence as potency to act. The latter follows insofar as what receives existence stands in potency to the existence that it receives. But all things receive existence from the being whose essence is its existence, in which case the existence that any one finite thing possesses is an act of existence that actuates a corresponding potency: Thomas has thus shown that immaterial substances do indeed have an element of potency, but this need not be a material potency. Notice that here Thomas correlates essence and existence as potency and act only after he has concluded to the existence of a being whose essence is its existence God. One wonders then whether or not essence and existence can be related as potency and act only on the presupposition of the existence of God. Regardless of his preferred method in the *De Ente* Chapter 4, Thomas could very well have focussed on the efficiently caused character of existence in finite entities as he does in the opening lines of the argument for the existence of God , and argued that insofar as existence is efficiently caused whether or not this is from God , existence stands to that in which it inheres as act to potency, in which case the essence that possesses existence stands in potency to that act of existence. As a definition of participation, Thomas claims that to participate is to take a part in *partem capere* something. Following this definition, Thomas goes on to explain how one thing can be said to take a part in and thereby participate in another; this can happen in three ways. Secondly, a subject is

said to participate in the accidents that it has for instance, a man is a certain colour, and thereby participates in the colour of which he is , and matter is said to participate in the formal structure that it has for instance, the matter of a statue participates in the shape of that statue in order to be the statue in question. Thirdly, an effect can be said to participate in its cause, especially when the effect is not equal to the power of that cause. The effect particularises and determines the scope of the cause; for the effect acts as the determinate recipient of the power of the cause. The effect receives from its cause only that which is necessary for the production of the effect. It is in this way that a cause is participated in by its effect.

Chapter 3 : Course Catalog | Aquinas College

The Subject has 9 ratings and 1 review: Published July 15th by Marquette University Press, 48 pages, Hardcover.

Origins[edit] In , the future University of Paris was a student-teacher corporation operating as an annex of the Notre-Dame cathedral school. Albans and his acceptance into "the fellowship of the elect Masters" there in about , [13] and it is known that Pope Innocent III completed his studies there in at the age of The corporation was formally recognised as an " Universitas " in an edict by King Philippe-Auguste in Arts , Medicine, Law, and Theology. The Faculty of Arts was the lowest in rank, but also the largest, as students had to graduate there in order to be admitted to one of the higher faculties. The students were divided into four nationes according to language or regional origin: France, Normandy, Picardy, and England. The last came to be known as the Alemannian German nation. Recruitment to each nation was wider than the names might imply: The faculty and nation system of the University of Paris along with that of the University of Bologna became the model for all later medieval universities. Under the governance of the Church, students wore robes and shaved the tops of their heads in tonsure , to signify they were under the protection of the church. This presented problems for the city of Paris, as students ran wild, and its official had to appeal to Church courts for justice. Students were often very young, entering the school at 13 or 14 years of age and staying for six to 12 years. Organization[edit] Three schools were especially famous in Paris: The decline of royalty brought about the decline of the first. The other two were ancient but did not have much visibility in the early centuries. The glory of the palatine school doubtless eclipsed theirs, until it completely gave way to them. These two centres were much frequented and many of their masters were esteemed for their learning. These two schools attracted scholars from every country and produced many illustrious men, among whom were: Humanistic instruction comprised grammar , rhetoric , dialectics , arithmetic , geometry , music, and astronomy trivium and quadrivium. To the higher instruction belonged dogmatic and moral theology , whose source was the Scriptures and the Patristic Fathers. It was completed by the study of Canon law. Its most famous professors are Hugh of St. Victor and Richard of St. The plan of studies expanded in the schools of Paris, as it did elsewhere. A Bolognese compendium of canon law called the Decretum Gratiani brought about a division of the theology department. Hitherto the discipline of the Church had not been separate from so-called theology; they were studied together under the same professor. But this vast collection necessitated a special course, which was undertaken first at Bologna, where Roman law was taught. However, civil law was not included at Paris. In the twelfth century, medicine began to be publicly taught at Paris: Professors were required to have measurable knowledge and be appointed by the university. Applicants had to be assessed by examination ; if successful, the examiner, who was the head of the school, and known as scholasticus, capiscol, and chancellor, appointed an individual to teach. This was called the licence or faculty to teach. The licence had to be granted freely. No one could teach without it; on the other hand, the examiner could not refuse to award it when the applicant deserved it. The diocese and the abbey or chapter, through their chancellor , gave professorial investiture in their respective territories where they had jurisdiction. The number of students in the school of the capital grew constantly, so that lodgings were insufficient. French students included princes of the blood , sons of the nobility, and ranking gentry. The courses at Paris were considered so necessary as a completion of studies that many foreigners flocked to them. The chroniclers of the time called Paris the city of letters par excellence, placing it above Athens , Alexandria , Rome, and other cities: Poets extolled the university in their verses, comparing it to all that was greatest, noblest, and most valuable in the world. The Sorbonne covered by snow. As the university developed, it became more institutionalized. The masters, as well as the students, were divided according to national origin,. Thomas of Canterbury, wanted to submit his cause to a tribunal composed of professors of Paris, chosen from various provinces Hist. This was likely the start of the division according to "nations," which was later to play an important part in the university. Celestine III ruled that both professors and students had the privilege of being subject only to the ecclesiastical courts, not to civil courts. Henry Denifle and some others hold that this honour is exclusive to the school of Notre-Dame Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis , but the reasons do not seem convincing. He

excludes Saint-Victor because, at the request of the abbot and the religious of Saint-Victor, Gregory IX in authorized them to resume the interrupted teaching of theology. Consequently, the schools of Saint-Victor might well have contributed to its formation. This is debatable and through the period, theology was taught. Expansion[edit] Meeting of doctors at the University of Paris. From a 16th-century miniature. In , King Philip II issued a diploma "for the security of the scholars of Paris," which affirmed that students were subject only to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The provost and other officers were forbidden to arrest a student for any offence, unless to transfer him to ecclesiastical authority. His action followed a violent incident between students and officers outside the city walls at a pub. To teach the arts, a candidate had to be at least twenty-one, to have studied these arts at least six years, and to take an engagement as professor for at least two years. For a chair in theology, the candidate had to be thirty years of age, with eight years of theological studies, of which the last three years were devoted to special courses of lectures in preparation for the mastership. These studies had to be made in the local schools under the direction of a master. In Paris, one was regarded as a scholar only by studies with particular masters. Lastly, purity of morals was as important as reading. The licence was granted, according to custom, gratuitously, without oath or condition. Masters and students were permitted to unite, even by oath, in defence of their rights, when they could not otherwise obtain justice in serious matters. No mention is made either of law or of medicine, probably because these sciences were less prominent. University of Paris strike of In , a denial of justice by the queen led to suspension of the courses. The pope intervened with a Bull that began with lavish praise of the university: Gregory IX then addressed a Bull of to the masters and scholars of Paris. Most importantly, the pope granted the university the right to suspend its courses, if justice were denied it, until it should receive full satisfaction. The pope authorized Pierre Le Mangeur to collect a moderate fee for the conferring of the license of professorship. Also, for the first time, the scholars had to pay tuition fees for their education: Rector[edit] The university was organized as follows: The office was elective and of short duration; at first it was limited to four or six weeks. Simon de Brion , legate of the Holy See in France, realizing that such frequent changes caused serious inconvenience, decided that the rectorate should last three months, and this rule was observed for three years. Then the term was lengthened to one, two, and sometimes three years. The right of election belonged to the procurators of the four nations. Four "nations"[edit] Map showing the territories covered by the four nations of the University of Paris during the Middle Ages. Nation university The "nations" appeared in the second half of the twelfth century. Later, they formed a distinct body. By , the four nations existed with their procurators, their rights more or less well-defined , and their keen rivalries: The four nations constituted the faculty of arts or letters. The territories covered by the four nations were: This was a Romance-speaking territory, but it was not included within the French nation. It was estimated that about half of the students in the Picard nation were Romance-speakers Picard and Walloon , and the other half were Germanic-speakers West Flemish , East Flemish , Brabantian and Limburgish dialects. Professors of the same science were brought into closer contact until the community of rights and interests cemented the union and made them distinct groups. The faculty of medicine seems to have been the last to form. But the four faculties were already formally established by , when the university described in a letter "theology, jurisprudence, medicine, and rational, natural, and moral philosophy". The masters of theology often set the example for the other facultiesâ€™e. The faculties of theology, canon law, and medicine, were called "superior faculties". The title of " Dean " as designating the head of a faculty, came into use by in the faculties of law and medicine, and by in the faculty of theology. It seems that at first the deans were the oldest masters. The faculty of arts continued to have four procurators of its four nations and its head was the rector. As the faculties became more fully organized, the division into four nations partially disappeared for theology, law and medicine, though it continued in arts. Eventually the superior faculties included only doctors, leaving the bachelors to the faculty of arts. At this period, therefore, the university had two principal degrees , the baccalaureate and the doctorate. It was not until much later that the licentiate and the DEA became intermediate degrees. Colleges[edit] Rue Saint-Jacques and the Sorbonne in Paris The scattered condition of the scholars in Paris often made lodging difficult. Some students rented rooms from townspeople, who often exacted high rates while the students demanded lower. It was upheld in the Bull of Gregory IX of , but with an important modification: The aim was to offer the students a shelter

where they would fear neither annoyance from the owners nor the dangers of the world.

Chapter 4 : A History of Economic Thought: The LSE Lectures - Lionel Robbins - Google Books

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No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher. He has taught at various British and American Universities, including Oxford University from to , the University of Essex from to , Brandeis University from to , Boston University from to , and Wellesley College from to Most recently he has taught at Vanderbilt University from to and in at Yale University where he was Henry R. Visiting Scholar at the Whitney Humanities Center. Among his books are: *An Interpretation , The Unconscious. Essays on Ideology and Philosophy* ; repr. He has over one hundred articles and reviews in learned journals, encyclopedias and books. Standpoints mutually at odds with each other in so many other ways, of analytic or continental or pragmatic provenance, agree in this rejection. And yet the concept of a first principle seems to have been for Aquinas, just as it had been for Aristotle, and before him for Plato, in itself unproblematic. For both Aquinas and Aristotle, of course, difficult questions do arise about such issues as the relationship of subordinate principles to first principles, the nature of our knowledge of first principles and the differences between the first principles of the different sciences. But in their writings debate even about such complex issues seems always to presuppose as not to be put in question, as never yet having been seriously put in question, the very idea of a first principle. Hence, it seems that, if this central Aristotelian and Thomistic concept is to be effectively defended, in key part it will have to be by drawing upon philosophical resources which are themselves -- at least at first sight -- as alien to, or almost as alien to, Thomism as are the theses and arguments which have been deployed against it. We inhabit a time in the history of philosophy in which Thomism can only develop adequate responses to the rejections of its central positions in what must seem initially at least to be unThomistic ways. It is rather that, in order to restate and to defend those positions in something like their original integrity, it is necessary in our time to approach them indirectly through an internal critique of those theses and arguments which have displaced them, a critique dictated by Thomistic -2ends, but to be carried through in part at least by somewhat unThomistic means. Let me begin with the latter. For us a principle is something expressed in language, something which in the form of either a statement or an injunction can function as a premise in arguments. For when we do indeed have a principium, we have to comprehend the principle and that of which it speaks in a single act of comprehension; we can only comprehend the principle as it refers us to that of which it speaks and we can only comprehend that of which it speaks as articulated and formulated in the principle. The habits of speech required of us to say this go against the contemporary linguistic grain. A concept with a similar structure is that of aitia or causa. We in the idioms of our contemporary speech distinguish sharply causes from explanations, but cause is always explanation-affording and aitia qua explanation is always cause-specifying. So it is that causa and principium are to be adequately elucidated only within a scheme of thought in which the mind moves towards its own proper end, its telos, an achieved 7 state in which it is informed by an understanding of its own progress towards that end, an understanding completed by an apprehension of first principles. The meaning of these expressions is not independent of the context of theory within which they are employed. In recognizing this we encounter a familiar truth about radical philosophical disagreements. Theory and idiom are to some significant degree inseparable. Insofar as I try to deny your theory, but continue to use your idiom, it may be that I shall be trapped into presupposing just what I aspire to deny. And correspondingly the more radical the disagreement over theory, the larger the possibility that each party will find itself misrepresented in the idioms of its rivals, idioms which exclude rather than merely lack the conceptual resources necessary for the statement of its position. So it has been to some significant degree with Thomism in its encounter with post-Cartesian philosophies. To treat a principle as a first principle is always, on this view, to choose to do so for some particular purpose within some particular context. So we in one type of formal system may wish to treat as a derived theorem what in another is 8 treated as an axiom. Justificatory chains of reasoning generally

terminate with what members of some particular social group are willing, for the moment at least, to take for granted; this type of agreement is all that is necessary to serve our contemporary justificatory purposes. But it is not just that the firstness of first principles has been relativized to social contexts and individual purposes. It is also that the range of such purposes is taken to be indefinitely various. And what the purposes of each of us are to be is taken to be a matter of our individual temperaments, interests, desires and decisions. This contemporary universe of discourse thus has no place within it for any conception of fixed ends, of ends to be discovered rather than decided upon or invented, and that is to say that it has no place for the type of telos or finis which provides the activity of a particular kind of being with a goal to which it must order its purposes or fail to achieve its own specific perfection in its activity. Genuinely first principles, so I shall argue, can have a place only within a universe characterized in terms of certain determinate, fixed and unalterable ends, ends which provide a standard by reference to which our individual purposes, desires, interests and decisions can be evaluated as well or badly directed. Since such and such is the telos and the best VI a , says Aristotle; and Aquinas comments that this reference to the end in the first principle of practical syllogisms has a parallel in the way in which the first principle of theoretical syllogisms are formulated Commentary on the Ethics VI, lect. For it will turn out that the considerations which in the context of contemporary discourse are taken to either support or presuppose denials of the possibility of there being either first principles or final ends are in fact theses which for the most part a Thomist should have no interest in denying. What he or she must have the strongest interest in denying are the 10 implications which are commonly nowadays supposed to follow from these. The first of such theses denies that there are or can be what I shall call epistemological first principles, the type of first principle of which the Cartesian cogito, as usually understood, provides a paradigmatic instance. Such a first principle was required to fulfill two functions. On the one hand, it had to warrant an immediate justified certitude on the part of any rational person who uttered it in the appropriate way, perhaps in the appropriate circumstances. It belongs, that is, to the same class of statements as "I am in pain," "This is red here now" and "I am now thinking. Only in virtue of their derivation from it could other statements meet the challenge: How do you know that? And the importance of being able to answer this question is not just to rebut those who express scepticism. Yet, as by now has often enough been pointed out, no statement or set of statements is capable of fulfilling both these 11 functions. The kind of substantive content required for statements which could function as the initial premises in a deductive justification of the sciences, theoretical or practical, precludes the kind of justified immediate certitude required for this kind of epistemological starting-point, and vice versa. Epistemological first principles, thus conceived, are mythological beasts. Two kinds of reflection may be provoked in a Thomist by these by now commonplace antifoundational arguments. For where the protagonists of the type of foundationalist epistemological first principle, which is now for the most part, even if not universally rejected, characterized those principles so that they had to meet two sets of requirements, each of which could in fact only be met by some principle which failed in respect to the other, Aquinas, as a result of having reflected upon both Aristotle and Boethius, distinguished two different types of evidentness belonging to two different kinds of principle See, for example, S. There are, on the other hand, principles which are to be understood as evident only in the context of the conceptual framework of some more or less large-scale theory, principles expressed in judgments known as evident only to those with an intellectual grasp of the theoretical framework in which they are embedded, that is, as Aquinas puts it, to the wise. It is such judgments which are used to state first principles with substantive content, and their function and the requirements which they have to meet are very different from those of the former type of principle. We should, of course, note that even the former type of principle can, in the light of its applications, be understood in greater depth by those who are theoretically sophisticated than it is by the merely competent language-user. But with the distinction between what is immediately apprehended, but not substantive in content, and what is substantive in content, but known as evident only through theoretical achievement, the Thomist distinguishes what the protagonist of epistemological first principles misleadingly assimilates and so remains untouched by this thrust at least of contemporary antifoundationalism. Yet there is an even more fundamental way in which contemporary hostility to epistemological foundationalism misses the point so far as Thomistic first principles are concerned. For if the Thomist is faithful to the intentions of Aristotle and

Aquinas, he 13 or she will not be engaged, except perhaps incidentally, in an epistemological enterprise. The refutation of skepticism will appear to him or her as misguided an enterprise as it does to the Wittgensteinian. Generations of neoThomists from Kleutgen onwards have, of course, taught us to think otherwise, and textbooks on epistemology have been notable among the standard impedimenta of neoThomism. What in part misled their writers was the obvious fact that Aquinas, like Aristotle, furnishes an account of knowledge. What they failed to discern adequately was the difference between Aristotelian or Thomistic enterprise and the epistemological enterprise. How can I, so the epistemologist enquires, be assured that my beliefs, my perceptions, my judgments connect with reality external to them, so that I can have justified certitude regarding their truth and error? A radical sceptic is an epistemologist with entirely negative findings. He or she, like other epistemologists, takes him or herself to speak from within his or her mind of its relationship to what is external to it and perhaps alien to it. But the Thomist, if he or she follows Aristotle and Aquinas, constructs an account both of approaches to and of the achievement of knowledge from a third-person point of view. My mind or rather my soul is only one among many and its own knowledge of my self qua soul has to be 14 integrated into a general account of souls and their teleology. Insofar as a given soul moves successfully towards its successive intellectual goals in a teleologically ordered way, it moves towards completing itself by becoming formally identical with the objects of its knowledge, so that it is adequate to those objects, objects that are then no longer external to it, but rather complete it. So the mind in finding application for its concepts refers them beyond itself and themselves to what they conceptualize. The mind knows itself only in the second-order knowledge of its own operations and is known also by others in those operations. But even such knowledge when achieved need not entail certitude of a Cartesian sort. And Aquinas glosses this by saying that "It is difficult to discern whether we know from appropriate principles, which alone is genuinely scientific knowing, or do not know from appropriate principles" Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, lib. The contrast with Cartesianism could not be sharper. All knowledge even in the initial stages of enquiry is a partial achievement and completion of the mind, but it nonetheless points beyond itself to a more final achievement in ways that we may not as yet have grasped. Hence, we can know without as yet knowing that we know, while for the Cartesian, as I remarked earlier, if we know, we must know that we know, since for the Cartesian it is always reference backwards to our starting-point that guarantees our knowledge and, hence, it is only through knowing that we know that we know. In this relationship of what we now know to what we do not as yet know, a relationship in which what we only as yet know potentially is presupposed by what we already know actually, there is to be observed a certain kind of circularity. This is not, of course, the type of circularity the presence of which vitiates a demonstrative argument. Were it not so, that particular type of starting-point would not be pointing us towards this particular type of conclusion Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate 11, 1. Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that one reason why the young are incapable of adequate reflective moral theorizing is that they have not as yet that experience of actions which would enable them to frame adequate moral and political arguments N. I, 3, a, Commentary on the Ethics, lect. But not any experience of human actions will provide adequate premises for sound practical reasoning. Only a life whose actions have been directed by and whose passions have been disciplined and transformed by the practice of the moral and intellectual virtues and the social relationships involved in and defined by such practice will provide the kind of experience from which and about which reliable practical inferences and sound theoretical arguments about practice can be derived. But from the outset the practice of those virtues in an adequately and increasingly determinate way 17 already presupposes just those truths about the good and the best for human beings, about the telos for human beings, which it is the object of moral and political enquiry to discover. So the only type of moral and political enquiry through which and in which success can be achieved is one in which the end is to some significant degree presupposed in the beginning, in which initial actualities presuppose and give evidence of potentiality for future development. It is, I suspect, a feature of any large-scale philosophical system which embodies a conception of enquiry, albeit an often unacknowledged feature. And it could only be thought a flaw from a standpoint still haunted by a desire to find some point of origin for enquiry which is entirely innocent of that which can only emerge later from that enquiry. It is this desire -- for an origin which is not an origin -which plainly haunts much of the work of Jacques Derrida 2 and which thus informs, even if

somewhat paradoxically, the second major contemporary philosophical rejection of any substantive conception of first principles, one very different from its analytic antifoundationalist counterpart. The most obvious difference is, of course, that, whereas the analytic rejection focusses upon epistemological considerations, the deconstructionist rejection formulated by Derrida focusses upon questions of meaning. It is in and through binary relationships of opposition and difference that such identity and meaning are constituted. The stability of meaning is thus taken to depend upon the character of the oppositions and differences between terms. Insofar as this is so, any stable meaning is dependent upon something not yet said, and since these metaphysical oppositions are in the relevant respects no different from the binary oppositions which on this type of poststructuralist view constitute language-in-use in general, it is a general truth that the meaning of what is uttered is always in a similar way dependent on some further not yet provided ground for meaning, but there is no such ground waiting to be attained, so that stable meaning is never achieved. So a deconstructive denial of first principles emerges from an analysis of meaning, as part of the denial of the possibility of metaphysical grounding for anything. But why does Derrida believe that there can be no such ground? For sometimes it seems that it is from the way in which the terms of his metaphysical pairs each presuppose the other, so that neither member of such pairs can provide an independent grounding for the meaning, identity and applicability of the other, that Derrida is arguing to the conclusion that there can be no grounding for metaphysical thought and theory of the kind which he takes it to require. But at other times he seems to move from the denial of the possibility of such a grounding, on occasion referring us to Heidegger and to Nietzsche, towards conclusions about the consequent instability of meaning exemplified in such terms. Yet in either case what Derrida presents us with is a strange mirror-image inversion of Thomism. For the Thomist has no problem either with the notion that, where such pairs as form and matter or potentiality and act are concerned, each term is and must be partially definable by reference to the other, or with the view that when such terms are applied at some early or intermediate stage in an enquiry the full meaning of what has been said is yet to emerge and will only emerge when the relevant set of first principles is as fully specified as that particular enquiry requires. So that stability of meaning, on a Thomist view, is tied to a metaphysically conceived ground, just as Derrida asserts, and the denial of that ground, it follows equally for the Thomist and the deconstructionist, could not but issue in systematic instability of meaning. Yet, if the entailments are the same, the direction of the arguments which they inform is, of course, different.

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Chapter 6 : The Subject. The Aquinas Lecture, by Bernard J. F. Lonergan (): www.nxgvision.com: Books

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Etymology[edit] Golan Levin lecturing using a projected slide The noun "lecture" dates from 14th century, meaning "action of reading, that which is read," from the Latin lectus, pp. The verb "to lecture" is attested from The noun "lectern" refers to the reading desk used by lecturers. History[edit] The practice in the medieval university was for the instructor to read from an original source to a class of students who took notes on the lecture. The reading from original sources evolved into the reading of glosses on an original and then more generally to lecture notes. Throughout much of history, the diffusion of knowledge via handwritten lecture notes was an essential element of academic life. Many lecturers were, and still are, accustomed to simply reading their own notes from the lectern for exactly that purpose. Nevertheless, modern lectures generally incorporate additional activities, e. The use of multimedia presentation software such as Microsoft PowerPoint has changed the form of lectures, e. Most commonly, however, only outlines composed of "bullet points" are presented. Critics such as Edward Tufte contend that this style of lecture bombards the audience with unnecessary and possibly distracting or confusing graphics. Nevertheless, lecturing is not the most effective method for promoting student thought, changing attitudes, or teaching behavioral skills. He relates his own research on arousal during lectures to suggest a decrement in attention during the first 25 minutes. Lloyd and Scerbo et al. Bligh shows that after a short break filled by buzz group discussion, attention will recover somewhat. Early editions of the book contained a reply paid evaluation card. This research showed that the section on alternative teaching methods within lectures was the most highly praised. Some advantages of lecturing include: Commonly cited disadvantages of lecture include: Many university courses relying on lectures supplement them with smaller discussion sections, tutorials , or laboratory experiment sessions as a means of further actively involving students. Often these supplemental sections are led by graduate students , tutors , teaching assistants , or teaching fellows rather than senior faculty. In schools , the prevalent mode of student-teacher interaction is lessons. The term " parlor lecture" gained currency throughout the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States of America during the midth century. It referred to the custom of inviting noted speakers to deliver private lectures, which were typically hosted in the parlors of wealthy and socially influential families.

Chapter 7 : Bernard Lonergan â€“ Wikipedia

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