

**Chapter 1 : Philosophical anthropology - Wikipedia**

*Philosophical anthropology, sometimes called anthropological philosophy, is a discipline dealing with questions of metaphysics and phenomenology of the human person, and interpersonal relationships.*

Christian anthropology Augustine of Hippo was one of the first Christian ancient Latin authors with a very clear anthropological vision,[ need quotation to verify ] although it is not clear if he had any influence on Max Scheler , the founder of philosophical anthropology as an independent discipline, nor on any of the major philosophers that followed him. Augustine has been cited by Husserl and Heidegger as one of the early writers to inquire on time-consciousness and the role of seeing in the feeling of "Being-in-the-world". In no wise are the bodies themselves to be spurned. For these pertain not to ornament or aid which is applied from without, but to the very nature of man. After the fall of humanity they are now experiencing dramatic combat between one another. They are two categorically different things: It sufficed for him to admit that they were metaphysically distinct. To be a human is to be a composite of soul and body, and that the soul is superior to the body. The latter statement is grounded in his hierarchical classification of things into those that merely exist, those that exist and live, and those that exist, live, and have intelligence or reason. Immanuel Kant " taught the first lectures on anthropology in the European academic world. He specifically developed a conception of pragmatic anthropology, according to which the human being is studied as a free agent. At the same time, he conceived of his anthropology as an empirical, not a strictly philosophical discipline. Although the majority of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy can be said to have a distinctive " anthropology " that undergirds their thought, philosophical anthropology itself, as a specific discipline in philosophy, arose within the later modern period as an outgrowth from developing methods in philosophy, such as phenomenology and existentialism. From Scheler laid the foundation for philosophical anthropology as a philosophical discipline, competing with phenomenology and other philosophic disciplines. Husserl and Martin Heidegger " , were the two most authoritative philosophers in Germany at the time, and their criticism to philosophical anthropology and Scheler have had a major impact on the discipline. Scheler defined the human being not so much as a " rational animal" as has traditionally been the case since Aristotle but essentially as a loving being. He breaks down the traditional hylomorphic conception of the human person, and describes the personal being with a tripartite structure of lived body , soul , and spirit. Love and hatred are not psychological emotions , but spiritual , intentional acts of the person, which he categorises as "intentional feelings. From the s[ edit ] Ernst Cassirer , a neo-Kantian philosopher, has been the most influential source for the definition and development of the field from the s till the s. In , future pope Karol Wojtyla based his dissertation thesis on Max Scheler, limiting himself to the works Scheler wrote before rejecting Catholicism and the Judeo-Christian tradition in Wojtyla used Scheler as an example that phenomenology could be reconciled with Catholicism. Anthropology of interpersonal relationships[ edit ] A large focus of philosophical anthropology is also interpersonal relationships, as an attempt to unify disparate ways of understanding the behaviour of humans as both creatures of their social environments and creators of their own values. It analyses also the ontology that is in play in human relationships " of which intersubjectivity is a major theme. Intersubjectivity is the study of how two individuals, subjects, whose experiences and interpretations of the world are radically different understand and relate to each other. Jackson is another important philosophical anthropologist. His research and fieldwork concentrate on existential themes of "being in the world" Dasein as well as interpersonal relationships. His methodology challenges traditional anthropology due to its focus on first-person experience. In his most well known book, *Minima Ethnographica* which focuses on intersubjectivity and interpersonal relationships, he draws upon his ethnographic fieldwork in order to explore existential theory. In his latest book, *Existential Anthropology*, he explores the notion of control, stating that humans anthropomorphize inanimate objects around them in order to enter into an interpersonal relationship with them. In this way humans are able to feel as if they have control over situations that they cannot control because rather than treating the object as an object, they treat it as if it is a rational being capable of understanding their feelings and language. Good examples are prayer to gods to alleviate drought or to help a

sick person or cursing at a computer that has ceased to function.

**Chapter 2 : Masters in Anthropology | Anthropology Masters Programs**

*Get this from a library! Studies in philosophical anthropology. [Nicholas Rescher] -- The place of humans in nature's scheme of things and the conditions and circumstances of our existence have been at the forefront of philosophical deliberation since the very dawn of the subject.*

This study discusses a particular approach in modern science that could be described as desacralization of the brain. Classical philosophy considered the brain an amazing work of God. The brain was seen as a source of rationality and memory and also as a sign of human greatness. However, the defects, observed in the brain during its study, denounced its value of a great triumph of evolution. A number of current studies charge the brain with a variety of serious faults. Thus, philosophy needs to reconsider such concepts as man, consciousness, brain and evolution. The author refers to different neurological studies and tries to link their results with the philosophical-anthropologic insight. This study is the first to analyze the brain desacralization phenomenon. The author is critical of those researchers who intend to eliminate psychology and reduce all psychological processes to physical reflexes. He also disagrees with those who reject human free will relying on partly incorrect researches. Many of the problems introduced in this study require a more thorough philosophical study. Since ancient times, the brain was treated as the seat of the soul. The soul understood as a subtle matter is able to travel through the brain faster than lightning. However, learning the functioning of this wonder of the universe was extremely hard for people. It was only in Renaissance that the Church allowed dissection. With a lancet, one was determined to penetrate the human brain and to disclose its mysteries. Learning the workings of the brain seemed to bring people on the brink of outstanding discoveries. Though even in our times when science has studied almost every brain gyrus and ganglion, the mysteries of the brain remain unrevealed and the transcendent horizons do not expand. We are still amazed by the enormous speed of information flow in grey cells, still surprised by the number of thoughts that come to the vigorous minds of common earthlings, still fascinated by the depths of memory. The power of the brain, even of a sleeping one, is astonishing. The brain is the symbol of incredible discoveries, a storage center of an unbelievable range of ideas. The brain is at its best when creating something new and unseen. However, the further progress in brain studies brought more and more disappointments. Those men of science who invented the lightning rod probably felt the same. At first they believed they could tame the lightning, but it never happened. The scientists appeased their enthusiasm and even suggested that fireballs possess rationality. Anyway, the belief that the brain is unique and untamable seemed to be undermined. With the accumulation of groundbreaking knowledge on the human brain, its mystic aura began to fade. The magic disappeared as the brain turned out to be just another kind of machine, just another gadget. Though still regarded as powerful and fast, unique and capacious, with the invention of computers the brain was thought to be easily constructible. The conflict between brain and computer added some arguments for the significance of the brain. It has many inherent defects though at first view it seems to have perfect features. However, the brain is a rough sketch, a preliminary outline. It looks as if nature has been working hard to endow it with positive features but failed and lost all interest in its own miraculous creation. Surprisingly, whenever a new discovery in neuroscience is about to reestablish the conviction in the holiness of the brain, it starts to resemble a powerful but defective machine that could even destroy humanity. Moreover, today the very process of studying the brain mysteries is devoid of that veneration which we observe on the faces of spectators, pictured in the Renaissance paintings of anatomy lessons. The brain is no longer a planet injudicious amidst the planets calculated. It no longer raises numinosity, for now it is treated as an object with quantitative and qualitative characteristics equally to any other physical object. Scientists mostly discuss brain clusters, biorhythms and structures. The magic turns into an engineering and neuroscience project. However, today the idea of inherent and evolutionary viciousness of the brain surprisingly gains popularity. Actually, where does the belief in the reason and impeccability of evolution comes from? Indeed, today in neurospecialists do their best to demystify brain. They blame God as a universal designer who could not directly create a perfect mechanism that would be a worthy present to humanity. Whereas evolution implies incongruities, rejection and even extreme

eccentricities. Evolution and preestablished perfection are incompatibles. Further the article discusses the theory according to which consciousness is not necessarily a product of the brain. Stanislav Grof doubts the logics of this conclusion, made by the mechanistic science. Indeed, other theoretic systems would interpret the given data differently. He illustrates it with a simple example of television. Only all the components working properly provide high-quality image and sound while any defect or damaged component brings a specific distortion. Considering these arguments the discussion on the defects of the brain is almost dismissed, as it turns out that the brain is only a translator for the psyche and not its generator. Perhaps, our brain is not the perfect instrument to transmit information which rushes upon us from other sources. This would mean that the brain is not the source of human thoughts and passions. There are no grounds to attribute to it the astonishing discoveries, praised by poets and philosophers. Great mysteries are now divided from the brain, and it has lost its aura of sanctity and righteousness. Is the soul of Socrates eternal? On the problem of explanation of the individual qualities in Plotinus. If I and each one of us have a way of ascent and return to the intelligible, the principle of each of us is there. That is, if the soul of Socrates is eternal, there must be the idea of Socrates and all other individuals. Before turning to the arguments in favor of the ideas of individuals, let us try to find the preconditions for the origin of such a theory. Plotinus needs to explain not only the question of ascent, but also different individual qualities, i. He could not attribute the differences in the individual qualities to matter, as Aristotle did. The first matter cannot be considered as a source of individuation, since it does not have any qualities, it is able to report things nothing but numerical differences for example, there are two fires, while the idea of fire is just one. Nonnumeric differences require further explanation. These differences may be explained by the lack of realization of the forms in matter. The source of all individual differences should be intelligible, because the world of intelligible contains everything, which really exist. Does it mean that Plotinus was to take the ideas of particulars? If we study his philosophical system, we see that it is designed as follows: As a result, the development of original unity gives a diverse and spatially separated sensual world. Thus, an explication of higher principles cannot assume the presence of ideas of individuals. The only basis for development of the theory of ideas of particulars is the principle of completeness of the intelligible world, which means that there could be nothing that would not have a place in the intelligible, so the possibility of the ideas of particulars still remains. Let us consider the main arguments in favor of the ideas of particulars. Plotinus raises the question of the existence of ideas of particulars in the context of the possibility of return to the intelligible. For Plotinus not only every person, but also every living being can return to the intelligible world, it means that all creatures have some base there. Is the individual soul such a base? Moreover, if it is eternal there is the idea of such soul. However, Plotinus sees the difficulty in this theory, because it contradicts with conception of reincarnation: We know that Plotinus believes in the idea of reincarnation. Therefore, there will be no ideas of Socrates and other particulars. Plotinus shifts focus from the idea of particular to the particular soul. The reborn soul contains all the individual characteristics of all people, which it animated. It is not enough to postulate just one idea for all man. We must look for intelligible principles of the individual qualities in the particular soul. Plotinus does not take the position that each particular needs its own idea, but all particular qualities should be in the particular soul. Therefore, Plotinus argues that individuation is not a product of the difference in the place or the matter; it is the result of differences that have a place in the intelligible. The aim of this short and controversial treatise is to revise the school known problem of the existence of ideas of particulars. Plotinus does so in the context of his well-developed metaphysical system. Plotinus has never considered the concept of ideas of individuals as a solution of problem of the presence of person in intelligible realm, considering that such a foundation is "unfallen part" of the soul.

**Chapter 3 : Studies in Indian Thought Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti**

*7. Studies in philosophical anthropology -- v. 8. Studies in value theory -- v. 9. Studies in metaphilosophy -- v. Studies in the history of logic -- v.*

Context Only four of his seventy-five years were spent outside Northern Africa, and fifty-seven of the remaining seventy-one were in such relatively out of the way places as Thagaste and Hippo Regius, both belonging to Roman provinces, neither notable for either cultural or commercial prominence. However, the few years Augustine spent away from Northern Africa exerted an incalculable influence upon his thought, and his geographical distance from the major intellectual and political capitals of the Later Roman Empire should not obscure the tremendous influence he came to exert even in his own lifetime. Here, as elsewhere, one is confronted by a figure both strikingly liminal and, at times, intriguingly ambivalent. He was, as already noted, a long time resident and, eventually, Bishop in Northern Africa whose thought was transformed and redirected during the four brief years he spent in Rome and Milan, far away from the provincial context where he was born and died and spent almost all of the years in between; he was a man who tells us that he never thought of himself as not being in some sense a Christian [Confessions III. Perhaps most striking of all, Augustine bequeathed to the Latin West a voluminous body of work that contains at its chronological extremes two quite dissimilar portraits of the human condition. In the beginning, there is a largely Hellenistic portrait, one that is notable for the optimism that a sufficiently rational and disciplined life can safely escape the ever-threatening circumstantial adversity that seems to surround us. Nearer the end, however, there emerges a considerably grimmer portrait, one that emphasizes the impotence of the unaided human will, and the later Augustine presents a moral landscape populated largely by the massa damnata [De Civitate Dei XXI. The sheer quantity of the writing that unites these two extremes, much of which survives, is truly staggering. There are well over titles [listed at Fitzgerald , pp. It is arguably impossible to construct any moderate sized and manageable list of his major philosophical works that would not occasion some controversy in terms of what is omitted, but surely any list would have to include Contra Academicos [Against the Academicians, 1893 C. Born in C. He subsequently taught rhetoric in Thagaste and Carthage, and in he made the risk-laden journey from Northern Africa to Rome, seeking the better sort of students that was rumored to be there. Disappointed by the moral quality of those students academically superior to his previous students, they nonetheless had an annoying tendency to disappear without paying their fees , he successfully applied for a professorship of rhetoric in Milan. After this separation, however, Augustine abruptly resigned his professorship in claiming ill health, renounced his professional ambitions, and was baptized by Bishop Ambrose of Milan on Easter Sunday, , after spending four months at Cassiciacum where he composed his earliest extant works. Shortly thereafter, Augustine began his return to Northern Africa, but not before his mother died at Ostia, a seaport outside Rome, while awaiting the voyage across the Mediterranean. Not too long after this, Augustine, now back in Thagaste, also lost his son The remainder of his years would be spent immersed in the affairs and controversies of the Church into which he had been recently baptized, a Church that henceforth provided for Augustine the crucial nexus of relations that his family and friends had once been. In , Augustine was reluctantly ordained as a priest by the congregation of Hippo Regius a not uncommon practice in Northern Africa , in he was made Bishop, and he died August in Hippo, thirty-five years later, as the Vandals were besieging the gates of the city. However, when Augustine himself recounts his first thirty-two years in his Confessions, he makes clear that many of the decisive events of his early life were, to use his own imagery, of a considerably more internal nature than the relatively external facts cited above. From his own account, he was a precocious and able student, much enamored of the Latin classics, Virgil in particular [Confessions I. For Augustine, the problem was of a more general and visceral sort: In this sense, the wisdom that Augustine sought was a common denominator uniting the conflicting views of such Hellenistic philosophical sects as the Epicureans, Stoics, Skeptics, and Neoplatonists though this is a later title such as Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as many Christians of varying degrees of orthodoxy, including very unorthodox gnostic sects such as the Manicheans. Augustine himself comes to spend nine years as a hearer among the Manicheans [see Brown , pp.

The Manicheans proposed a powerful, if somewhat mythical and philosophically awkward explanation of the problem of evil: By means of sufficient insight and a sufficiently ascetic life, however, one could eventually, over the course of several lives, come to liberate the Light within from the surrounding Darkness, thus rejoining the larger Light of which the soul is but a fragmented and isolated part. As Augustine recounts it in the Confessions [see Confessions V. De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae 1], he became disenchanted with the inability of the Manichean elect to provide sufficiently detailed and rigorous explanations of their cosmology. As a result, he began to drift away from the sect during his sojourn in Rome, flirting for awhile with academic skepticism [Confessions V. When Augustine eventually comes to write about the Manicheans, there are three features upon which he will focus: According to Augustine, this latter identification not only serves to render the human soul divine, thereby obliterating the crucial distinction between creator and creature, but it also raises doubts about the extent to which the individual human soul can be held responsible for morally bad actions, responsibility instead being attributed to the body in which the soul itself quasi material is trapped. These uncertainties notwithstanding, Augustine himself makes it clear that it was his encounter with the books of the Platonists that made it possible for him to view both the Church and its scriptural tradition as having an intellectually satisfying and, indeed, resourceful content. In his earliest writings [e. Contra Academicos, C. But by the time he composes the Confessions – C. Part of this gradual change of attitude is attributable to his detailed study of scriptural texts especially the Pauline letters , as well as his immersion in both the daily affairs of his monastic community and the rather focused sorts of controversies that confronted the Church in the fourth and fifth centuries. Beyond his already noted, protracted battle with Manicheanism, there is also his involvement in the North African Donatist controversy [see Brown , pp. In this latter case, serious issues arose regarding the role of grace and the efficacy of the unaided human will, issues that, as we will see, played an important role in shaping his views on human freedom and predestination. These important qualifications notwithstanding, the fact remains that this Platonism also provided Augustine with a philosophical framework far more pliable and enduring than he himself is willing to admit in his later works. Moreover, this framework itself forms an important part of the philosophical legacy that Augustine bequeathed to both the medieval and modern periods. Sometimes this feature is easy to overlook, but its significance is obvious enough: Without this, the work would be rather like a map that is as large as of that of which it is intended to be a map, thus making it not a map at all. In order to bring some coherence to the material at hand, there must be some effort to provide an interpretive framework for the material, focusing on relevant and important highlights while omitting others that would obscure those highlights. The second reason is more specific to Augustine: Presented as an extended prayer to God, Augustine is not merely telling the tale of his own life, but also using his life as a concrete example of how an isolated individual soul can extricate itself from this state and Neoplatonically ascend to a unity that overcomes this isolation and attains to rest in God. Also important are the means by which he seeks to accomplish this task: With respect to his relations with others, he begins with his ruminations upon infancy and the isolation of the infant, which initially seems to be overcome by the acquisition of language. But as he tells the story in Confessions I, language is itself a double-edged sword: Although Augustine is aware by the time he writes the Confessions that there are differences between Christianity and Neoplatonism, he nonetheless makes it clear that the latter makes it possible for him to regard the former as intellectually credible. The overarching Neoplatonic strategy of the first nine Books goes a long way toward explaining what might otherwise be a strange shift in the remaining four books, in which the autobiography recedes into the background. This strategy, combined with the related themes of the role of language and texts in his spiritual progress, also explains the fact that Books XII and XIII are devoted to exegesis of the first chapters of Genesis. As noted above, Augustine at first disdained biblical texts owing to their rhetorical inelegance. Now, however, having a framework that enables him to discern their actual inner depth, these texts acquire a prominence and indicate the culmination of that long journey which began with his immersion into the double-edged domain of human speech and written word. Moreover, these final Books, along with the Neoplatonic framework he discovers in Book VII though, as we have seen, it also governs the structure of the Confessions as a whole , enable him to further probe the puzzles that he raised in the first five chapters of Book I. In short, what once struck Augustine as the texts least worthy of attention have now

become the texts of all texts, because they contain the answers to the questions and problems that have propelled him from the very beginning of the Confessions. As Augustine recounts it Confessions VI. It is also quite possible that it would serve him in the pursuit of a more worldly career. But it could serve as an impediment to social advancement unless it was replaced by the more formal arrangement of matrimonium. Hence, the obvious questions: Why the abruptness of the dismissal? Why not enter with his companion of thirteen years into the more respectable relation of matrimonium? Why anonymity for someone with whom he had spent thirteen years in a monogamous relationship? Why the headlong rush into another, temporary relationship, whereas his companion returned to Northern Africa vowing never to enter into another relationship? Was their devotion to one another as asymmetrical as Augustine seems to suggest? Was he as callous and as indifferent as the text seems to present him? If one examines the text closely enough, there do seem to be answers to these questions: Also, what was the social class of his companion? Differences in social class could often prevent the transition from a relation of concubinatus to one matrimonium. On a more textual level, it is obvious that Monica played a significant role in the arrangement of the more respectable marriage for which Augustine was obliged to wait. More importantly, Augustine makes it clear at VI. As for the anonymity of his companion, this is not unusual in the Confessions as a whole. When he does mention names e. Alypius, Nebridius, Faustus, Ambrose, Monica, they are names that would have been known to contemporary readers of the text. But they also serve as character types: A prime example is his protracted discussion of an anonymous friend in Book IV, a pathos-ridden account that leaves no doubt about the importance of the relationship to Augustine. But perhaps of most importance are two textual points which indicate the significance of this relationship to Augustine. The first is that the episode he recounts is of an intensely personal nature, not necessary to the rhetorical strategy of the Confessions as a whole. But even more important is the imagery employed in his account of the separation. There are only two passages in the entire Confessions which employ similar imagery: Given the imagery employed here, there does look to be some philosophical import in this otherwise intensely personal passage: Needless to say, this does not completely exonerate Augustine. And if the choice was his own, then he appears even more culpable. In the Confessions, where Augustine gives his most extensive discussion of the books of the Platonists, he makes clear that his previous thinking was dominated by a common-sense materialism [Confessions IV. It was the books of the Platonists that first made it possible for him to conceive the possibility of a non-physical substance [Confessions VII. In addition, the books of the Platonists provided him with a metaphysical framework of extraordinary depth and subtlety, a richly-textured tableau upon which the human condition could be plotted. It can both account for the obvious difficulties with which life confronts us, while also offering grounds for a eudaimonism notable for the depth of its moral optimism. In this respect, the ontology that Augustine acquired from the books of the Platonists is, in terms of its intent, not all that different from the materialism of the Epicureans, Stoics, and even the Manicheans. What sets the Neoplatonic ontology apart, however, is both the resoluteness of its promise and the architectonic grandeur with which it complements the world of visible appearances. In spite of the dualistic implications, this is clearly not intended to be a dualistic alternative to the moral dualism of the Manicheans and other gnostics [see, e. Instead, the divide is situated within what is supposed to be a larger, unified hierarchy that begins with absolute unity and progressively unfolds through various stages of increasing plurality and multiplicity, culminating in the lowest realm of isolated and fragmented material objects observed with the senses [see Bussanich, pp. Thus, for Augustine, God is regarded as the ultimate source and point of origin for all that comes below. Augustine, especially in his earlier works, focuses upon the contrast between the intelligible and the sensible, enjoining his reader to realize that the former alone holds out what we seek in the latter: Indeed, in the vision at Ostia at Confessions IX. The intelligible realm, with God as its source, promises the only lasting relief from the anxiety prompted by the transitory nature of the sensible realm. Despite its dualistic overtones, the overall unity of the picture is central to its ability to provide a resolution of the problem of evil. The sensible world, for example, is not evil, nor is embodiment itself to be regarded as straightforwardly bad. The problem that plagues our condition is not that we are trapped in the visible world as it is for the Manicheans; rather, it is a more subtle problem of perception and will: Thus, we have a tendency to focus only upon the sensible, viewing it as a self-contained

arena within which all questions of moral concern are to be resolved. Because we fail to perceive the larger unity of which the sensible world is itself a part, it easily becomes for us though not in itself a realm of moral danger, one wherein our will attaches itself to transitory objects that cannot but lead to anxiety [Confessions VII. Given the essentially rational nature of the human soul and the rational nature of the Neoplatonic ontology, there is nonetheless room for optimism.

*traditional philosophical anthropology.*<sup>4</sup> *It is this identity and critique which at the same time offers the ultimate justification for the fact that until today psychoanalysis deserves the attention of philosophy in general.*

His father, Max Sr. His mother, Helene, came from the Fallenstein and Souchay families, both of the long illustrious Huguenot line, which had for generations produced public servants and academicians. His younger brother, Alfred, was an influential political economist and sociologist, too. Also, his parents represented two, often conflicting, poles of identity between which their eldest son would struggle throughout his life – worldly statesmanship and ascetic scholarship. Educated mainly at the universities of Heidelberg and Berlin, Weber was trained in law, eventually writing his Habilitationsschrift on Roman law and agrarian history under August Meitzen, a prominent political economist of the time. Greeted upon publication with high acclaim and political controversy, this early success led to his first university appointment at Freiburg in to be followed by a prestigious professorship in political economy at Heidelberg two years later. Weber was also active in public life as he continued to play an important role as a Young Turk in the Verein and maintain a close association with the liberal Evangelische-soziale Kongress especially with the leader of its younger generation, Friedrich Naumann. It was during this time that he first established a solid reputation as a brilliant political economist and outspoken public intellectual. His routine as a teacher and scholar was interrupted so badly that he eventually withdrew from regular teaching duties in , to which he would not return until Although severely compromised and unable to write as prolifically as before, he still managed to immerse himself in the study of various philosophical and religious topics, which resulted in a new direction in his scholarship as the publication of miscellaneous methodological essays as well as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* testifies. Also noteworthy about this period is his extensive visit to America in , which left an indelible trace in his understanding of modernity in general [Scaff ]. After this stint essentially as a private scholar, he slowly resumed his participation in various academic and public activities. At first a fervent nationalist supporter of the war, as virtually all German intellectuals of the time were, he grew disillusioned with the German war policies, eventually refashioning himself as one of the most vocal critics of the Kaiser government in a time of war. As a public intellectual, he issued private reports to government leaders and wrote journalistic pieces to warn against the Belgian annexation policy and the unlimited submarine warfare, which, as the war deepened, evolved into a call for overall democratization of the authoritarian state that was Wilhelmine Germany. By , Weber was campaigning vigorously for a wholesale constitutional reform for post-war Germany, including the introduction of universal suffrage and the empowerment of parliament. When defeat came in , Germany found in Weber a public intellectual leader, even possibly a future statesman, with relatively solid liberal democratic credentials who was well-positioned to influence the course of post-war reconstruction. He was invited to join the draft board of the Weimar Constitution as well as the German delegation to Versaille; albeit in vain, he even ran for a parliamentary seat on the liberal Democratic Party ticket. In those capacities, however, he opposed the German Revolution all too sensibly and the Versaille Treaty all too quixotically alike, putting himself in an unsustainable position that defied the partisan alignments of the day. By all accounts, his political activities bore little fruit, except his advocacy for a robust plebiscitary presidency in the Weimar Constitution. Frustrated with day-to-day politics, he turned to his scholarly pursuits with renewed vigour. All these reinvigorated scholarly activities ended abruptly in , however, when he succumbed to the Spanish flue and died suddenly of pneumonia in Munich. Max Weber was fifty six years old. Philosophical Influences Putting Weber in the context of philosophical tradition proper is not an easy task. For all the astonishing variety of identities that can be ascribed to him as a scholar, he was certainly no philosopher at least in the narrow sense of the term. His reputation as a Solonic legislator of modern social science also tends to cloud our appreciation of the extent to which his ideas were embedded in the intellectual tradition of the time. In other words, Weber belonged to a generation of self-claimed epigones who had to struggle with the legacies of Darwin, Marx, and Nietzsche. As such, the philosophical backdrop to his thoughts will be outlined here along two axes: Neo-Kantianism Weber encountered the pan-European

cultural crisis of his time mainly as filtered through the jargon of German Historicism [Beiser ]. Arguably, however, it was not until Weber grew acquainted with the Baden or Southwestern School of Neo-Kantians, especially through Wilhelm Windelband, Emil Lask, and Heinrich Rickert his one-time colleague at Freiburg , that he found a rich conceptual template suitable for the clearer elaboration of his own epistemological position. In opposition to a Hegelian emanationist epistemology, briefly, Neo-Kantians shared the Kantian dichotomy between reality and concept. Not an emanent derivative of concepts as Hegel posited, reality is irrational and incomprehensible, and the concept, only an abstract construction of our mind. Nor is the concept a matter of will, intuition, and subjective consciousness as Wilhelm Dilthey posited. According to Hermann Cohen, one of the early Neo-Kantians, concept formation is fundamentally a cognitive process, which cannot but be rational as Kant held. If our cognition is logical and all reality exists within cognition, then only a reality that we can comprehend in the form of knowledge is rational â€” metaphysics is thereby reduced to epistemology, and Being to logic. As such, the process of concept formation both in the natural Natur- and the cultural-historical sciences Geisteswissenschaften has to be universal as well as abstract, not different in kind but in their subject matters. The latter is only different in dealing with the question of values in addition to logical relationships. For Windelband, however, the difference between the two kinds of knowledge has to do with its aim and method as well. Cultural-historical knowledge is not concerned with a phenomenon because of what it shares with other phenomena, but rather because of its own definitive qualities. For values, which form its proper subject, are radically subjective, concrete and individualistic. Turning irrational reality into rational concept, it does not simply paint abbilden a picture of reality but transforms umbilden it. Occupying the gray area between irrational reality and rational concept, then, its question became twofold for the Neo-Kantians. One is in what way we can understand the irreducibly subjective values held by the historical actors in an objective fashion, and the other, by what criteria we can select a certain historical phenomenon as opposed to another as historically significant subject matter worthy of our attention. Value-judgment Werturteil as well as value Wert became a keen issue. In so positing, however, Rickert is making two highly questionable assumptions. One is that there are certain values in every culture that are universally accepted within that culture as valid, and the other, that a historian free of bias must agree on what these values are. An empirical study in historical science, in the end, cannot do without a metaphysics of history. Kant and Nietzsche German Idealism seems to have exerted another enduring influence on Weber, discernible in his ethical worldview more than in his epistemological position. This was the strand of Idealist discourse in which a broadly Kantian ethic and its Nietzschean critique figure prominently. The way in which Weber understood Kant seems to have come through the conceptual template set by moral psychology and philosophical anthropology. In conscious opposition to the utilitarian-naturalistic justification of modern individualism, Kant viewed moral action as simultaneously principled and self-disciplined and expressive of genuine freedom and autonomy. On this Kantian view, freedom and autonomy are to be found in the instrumental control of the self and the world objectification according to a law formulated solely from within subjectification. Furthermore, such a paradoxical compound is made possible by an internalization or willful acceptance of a transcendental rational principle, which saves it from falling prey to the hedonistic subjectification that Kant found in Enlightenment naturalism and which he so detested. Kant in this regard follows Rousseau in condemning utilitarianism; instrumental-rational control of the world in the service of our desires and needs just degenerates into organized egoism. Instrumental transformation of the self is thus the crucial benchmark of autonomous moral agency for Kant as well as for Locke, but its basis has been fundamentally altered in Kant; it should be done with the purpose of serving a higher end, that is, the universal law of reason. All in all, one might say that: Weber was keenly aware of the fact that the Kantian linkage between growing self-consciousness, the possibility of universal law, and principled and thus free action had been irrevocably severed. Kant managed to preserve the precarious duo of non-arbitrary action and subjective freedom by asserting such a linkage, which Weber believed to be unsustainable in his allegedly Nietzschean age. Although they deeply informed his thoughts to an extent still under-appreciated, his main preoccupation lay elsewhere. He was after all one of the founding fathers of modern social science. GARS forms a more coherent whole since its editorial edifice was the work of Weber himself; and yet, its relationship to his other sociologies of,

for instance, law, city, music, domination, and economy, remains controvertible. Accordingly, his overarching theme has also been variously surmised as a developmental history of Western rationalism Wolfgang Schluchter , the universal history of rationalist culture Friedrich Tenbruck , or simply the *Menschentum* as it emerges and degenerates in modern rational society Wilhelm Hennis. The first depicts Weber as a comparative-historical sociologist; the second, a latter-day Idealist historian of culture reminiscent of Jacob Burckhardt; and the third, a political philosopher on a par with Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Important as they are for in-house Weber scholarship, however, these philological disputes need not hamper our attempt to grasp the gist of his ideas. Suffice it for us to recognize that, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis, these different interpretations all converge on the thematic centrality of rationality, rationalism, and rationalization in making sense of Weber. A child of modern European civilization *Kulturwelt* who studies problems of universal history shall inevitably and justifiably raise the question *Fragestellung*: Taken together, then, the rationalization process as Weber narrated it seems quite akin to a metahistorical teleology that irrevocably sets the West apart from and indeed above the East. At the same time, nonetheless, Weber adamantly denied the possibility of a universal law of history in his methodological essays. It was meant as a comparative-conceptual platform on which to erect the edifying features of rationalization in the West. If merely a heuristic device and not a universal law of progress, then, what is rationalization and whence comes his uncompromisingly dystopian vision? For instance, modern capitalism is a rational mode of economic life because it depends on a calculable process of production. This search for exact calculability underpins such institutional innovations as monetary accounting especially double-entry bookkeeping , centralization of production control, separation of workers from the means of production, supply of formally free labour, disciplined control on the factory floor, and other features that make modern capitalism qualitatively different from all other modes of organizing economic life. The enhanced calculability of the production process is also buttressed by that in non-economic spheres such as law and administration. Legal formalism and bureaucratic management reinforce the elements of predictability in the sociopolitical environment that encumbers industrial capitalism by means of introducing formal equality of citizenship, a rule-bound legislation of legal norms, an autonomous judiciary, and a depoliticized professional bureaucracy. Further, all this calculability and predictability in political, social, and economic spheres was not possible without changes of values in ethics, religion, psychology, and culture. The outcome of this complex interplay of ideas and interests was modern rational Western civilization with its enormous material and cultural capacity for relentless world-mastery. Rational action in one very general sense presupposes knowledge. It requires some knowledge of the ideational and material circumstances in which our action is embedded, since to act rationally is to act on the basis of conscious reflection about the probable consequences of action. As such, the knowledge that underpins a rational action is of a causal nature conceived in terms of means-ends relationships, aspiring towards a systematic, logically interconnected whole. Modern scientific and technological knowledge is a culmination of this process that Weber called intellectualization, in the course of which, the germinating grounds of human knowledge in the past, such as religion, theology, and metaphysics, were slowly pushed back to the realm of the superstitious, mystical, or simply irrational. It is only in modern Western civilization, according to Weber, that this gradual process of disenchantment *Entzauberung* has reached its radical conclusion. Rationalization, according to Weber, entails objectification *Versachlichung*. For another, having abandoned the principle of Khadi justice i. Modern individuals are subjectified and objectified all at once. Scientific and technical rationalization has greatly improved both the human capacity for a mastery over nature and institutionalized discipline via bureaucratic administration, legal formalism, and industrial capitalism. Second, and more important, its ethical ramification for Weber is deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, exact calculability and predictability in the social environment that formal rationalization has brought about dramatically enhances individual freedom by helping individuals understand and navigate through the complex web of practice and institutions in order to realize the ends of their own choice. Thus his famous lament in the *Protestant Ethic: Modern Western society is, Weber seems to say, once again enchanted as a result of disenchantment. How did this happen and with what consequences? Disenchantment had ushered in monotheistic religions in the West. In practice, this means that ad hoc maxims for life-conduct had been*

gradually displaced by a unified total system of meaning and value, which historically culminated in the Puritan ethic of vocation. Here, the irony was that disenchantment was an ongoing process nonetheless. Disenchantment in its second phase pushed aside monotheistic religion as something irrational, thus delegitimizing it as a unifying worldview in the modern secular world. Why should one do something which in reality never comes to an end and never can? In short, modern science has relentlessly deconstructed other sources of value-creation, in the course of which its own meaning has also been dissipated beyond repair. Irretrievably gone as a result is a unifying worldview, be it religious or scientific, and what ensues is its fragmentation into incompatible value spheres. Weber, for instance, observed: Weber is, then, not envisioning a peaceful dissolution of the grand metanarratives of monotheistic religion and universal science into a series of local narratives and the consequent modern pluralist culture in which different cultural practices follow their own immanent logic. His vision of polytheistic reenchantment is rather that of an incommensurable value-fragmentation into a plurality of alternative metanarratives, each of which claims to answer the same metaphysical questions that religion and science strove to cope with in their own ways.

### Chapter 5 : Outline of anthropology - Wikipedia

*Philosophical anthropology* , Vol. 1, No. 1. CONTENTS. FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF. ESSENCE OF MAN. Pavel Gurevich. Desacralization of brain. This study discusses a particular approach in modern science that could be described as desacralization of the brain.

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### Chapter 8 : Max Weber (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

As Augustine recounts it in the Confessions [see Confessions V and V] and elsewhere [e.g. De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae 1], he became disenchanted with the inability of the Manichean elect to provide sufficiently detailed and rigorous explanations of their cosmology.

### Chapter 9 : Nicholas Rescher, Collected Papers - PhilPapers

*Anthropology can be described as all of the following: [citation needed] Academic discipline - body of knowledge given to - or received by - a disciple (student); a branch or sphere of knowledge, or field of study, that an individual has chosen to specialise in.*