

**Chapter 1 : State violence and the illusions of modernity in Egypt | openDemocracy**

*By: Ramin Jahanbegloo* *Modernity has often been seen in connection with the ideas of liberty, equality, progress and rationality. These concepts merged in the mottos of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and later on split up and expressed in the two political doctrines of liberalism and socialism.*

The Violence of Modernity  
Essya M. Nabbali  
Simon Fraser University  
Abstract  
Scholarship in feminism, anticolonialism, Disability and Mad studies, have repositioned storytelling as instructive to the present and to the ethics of care. Emplotted with time and space, like the acts and lives of others, stories make discernible those everyday encounters, sites of practices, and material conditions that usher power and pain. They destabilize essentialism, so, too, the asymmetries that ensue, and are therefore pivotal in the politics toward self-definition. It has even been argued that the concept of the story garners much of the attention once assigned to that of identity. But here, I juxtapose, I entwine, no, I embody competing multivalent social scripts, each a verse in itself, to nuance—albeit creatively—the story in this current age of governmentality and concomitant surveillance technologies. Paying homage to Patricia Hill Collins, I evoke intersectionality and endeavour to bring us back to identity politics—analytically. What Hill Collins comes to describe as intersectionality privileges subjectivities as ground for knowledge, shifting epistemic space, so, too, a precondition or approach to social change. Storytelling assumes a captive audience, ergo a respected storyteller. Authority inheres by course in the ability to hold and engage fora, including that which may be implied for political practice. The stories handed down from generations have played a salient role in the resistance of colonization and genocide Denomme, ; Nagy, ; Wilson, They give voice to those lives and times silenced, negated, ostracized, or outlawed, usurped, distorted, if not altogether erased. There are many more examples of storytellers speckled through history e. Both medicine and, to a lesser extent, nursing have witnessed a mushroom of interest in storytelling Berkenkotter, ; Brody, ; K. Hunter ; Williams, Bioethicists, in particular, have placed great importance on stories in the development of therapeutic, emancipatory, and educational strategies Arras, ; Beresford, ; Brody, ; Murray, Hence, it has been argued that the concept of the story garners much of the attention once assigned to that of identity Hyden, Such an alarm was rung some few years ago in Toronto, Canada, when an alliance of stakeholders—many, storytellers themselves—gathered to query the dangers of disclosure across the psy industry specifically Costa et al. To much regret, the proceedings have been pegged against a backdrop of relentless colonial violence, presumably as no surprise to Cherokee professor Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder , p. Canadian coloniality is at once maintained and masked behind the veil of the Intersectionalities , Vol. But here, I juxtapose, I entwine, no, I embody competing multivalent social scripts, each column a verse in itself, to further nuance the story in the politics toward self-definition. This reads unmistakably across such reports as those in November when Ellen Richardson was refused from boarding a flight to the United States of America as part of a Caribbean cruise with family CBC News, ; Solomon, Immigration and Nationality Act, Section Hauch, Even well-known psychologist Andrew Feldmar was indefinitely banned from entering the United States in as a result of a journal article in which he admitted to having tried hallucinogenics forty years earlier Solomon, The geography of such mechanisms of state control not only remains elusive and opaque, but also reifies particular moments, often-ambiguous hypotheticals, and becomes a putative source of social misinformation operating at every level e. Integral to empowerment is less the story than it is the process of decolonization and subsequent true democratization, that relinquishing of superimposed ideologies to the privileging and protecting of the sum not few, with equal and equitable access, like benefits. Intersectionalities , Vol. Young, queer and trans, homeless, and besieged: University of Toronto, Toronto, ON. Reflexivity, queer theory, and autoethnography. Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies, 11 2 , — Four pamphlets, — pp. Nice story but so what? Narrative approaches to bioethics pp. Racialized social workers negotiating professional scripts of whiteness. Toward a view of privilege- cognizant white character. Identity, difference and agency, pp. Narrative and the reconfiguration of social work ethics. Narrative Works, 2 2 , 1 — From private choice to public trust: A new social basis for welfare. Public Money and Management, 16 4 , 51 — Private lives as public policy.

Containing, a letter to Dr. A receipt to make a lunatic, and seize his estate; and a sketch of a true smiling hyena, *British Journal of Social Work*, 30 4 , â€” Memory, politics, and nation among Cubans in Spain. Case histories and the uses of narrative in psychiatry. University of South Carolina. Canadians with mental illnesses denied U. Data entered into national police database accessible to American authorities: Retrieved on 20 October from *Intersectionalities* , Vol. Can you help me fix it? *Literature and Medicine*, 13 1 , 79â€” Who gets to tell the story? Narrative in postmodern bioethics. Electroshock as a form of violence against women. *Women Against Violence*, 12 4 , â€” A rose by any other name: Naming and the battle against psychiatry. Giving an account of oneself. The ethics of informed consent amongst storyteller cultures. *International of Circumpolar Health*, 57 1 , 41â€” Healthcare and social services in the face of complex and plural identities. Canadian woman refused U. Retrieved on 20 October from [http:](http://) Retrieved on 02 December from [http:](http://) Process and temporality in ethnographic fieldwork. Patient-controlled alternatives to the mental health system. Critical autobiography as social science. A small act of resistance. *Studies in Social Justice*, 6 1 , 85â€” Government apologies, truth commissions, and indigenous self-determination in Australia, Canada, Guatemala, and Peru. *Human Rights Review*, 9 4 , â€” Indigenous storytelling, truth- telling, and community approaches to reconciliation. *English Studies in Canada*, 35 1 , â€” The social life of stories: Narrative and knowledge in the Yukon Territory. University of British Columbia. Story- telling it like it is: Narrative approaches to disease, disability, and trauma pp. Towards a transgressive pedagogy. Racist Nanaimo newspaper letter rebuttal: Educate Canadians to be knowledgeable citizens. Retrieved on 15 September from [http:](http://) The poetics, politics, and performance of first person narratives of people with schizophrenia. The edge of experience pp. Chemical incarcerations under community treatment orders. Psychiatric Survivor Pride Day: Community organizing with psychiatric survivors. *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, 35 3â€”4 , â€” The history of sexuality: The birth of the prison. *Studies in governmentality* pp. The birth of biopolitics: Stolen from our embrace: The abduction of First Nations children and the restoration of Aboriginal communities. Two decades of dialogue on disability, biography, and being female. Stories, fantasies and subjectivity.

Chapter 2 : Project MUSE - Sapphic Slashers: Sex, Violence, and American Modernity (review)

*The calm voice at the helm says, "Make it so " and with it, the mantra of modernity is invoked. The philosophy that governs our culture is rooted in violence, the ability to make things happen and to control the outcome. It is a deeply factual belief. We can indeed make things happen, and, in.*

The paper studies the relationship between political violence and biological life in the thought of Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault. I follow Foucault in arguing that understanding political violence in modernity means rethinking the ontological boundary between biological and political life that has fundamentally ordered the Western tradition of political thought. I show that while Arendt, Agamben and Foucault all see the merging of the categories of life and politics as the key problem of Modernity, they understand this problem in crucially different terms and suggest different solutions to it. This results in different understandings of the relationship between violence and the political. It is my contention that the violence of modern biopolitical societies is not due to originary ties between sovereign power and biopower, as Agamben claims. Sovereign states use biopolitical methods of violence, but this violence is not an originary or necessary aspect of political power. In order to criticise the forms of violence specific to modern biopolitical societies we must expose the points of tension, as well as of overlap between two types of power biopower and sovereign power. Understanding their distinctive rationalities is crucial for developing effective strategies against current forms of political violence. The story follows his inner turmoil as he observes the ferocious violence of ant life and the disconcerting parallels between their stratified society and his own Victorian class society. Yet, when he is questioned on what we might be learn from a comparison between human societies and those of social insects he is quick to insist that analogy is a slippery tool Men are not ants. Nevertheless, the story raises haunting questions fundamental to Western political thought: Why are men not like ants? Why is human political violence not just another deterministic struggle for survival in which individuals carry out their biologically predestined functions for the survival of the species, their individual lives dispensable and endlessly replaced? Violence The classical philosophical answer has been to insist on the specificity of the political. Ants might be social insects, but only man is a political animal. Whereas human bodily existence and biological life are inextricably tied to the violent struggle for survival and the cycle of birth and death, the defining feature of Western tradition of political thought has been the separation of the political from the biological. Aristotle famously connects the specificity of human politics to our ability to speak, arguing in the first book of Politics that human society is distinguished from that of bees or other gregarious animals in that it is founded on a political community that is capable of speech. Through language it is possible to express not simply what is pleasant and painful, but what is good and evil as well as just and unjust it is the peculiarity of man, in comparison with other animals, that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, and other similar qualities; and it is association in these things which makes a family and a city. Politics is the means of separating and placing in opposition human society to other animals, but also to its own biological existence. An influential strand of contemporary political thought claims that what characterises Modernity is the disappearance of the boundary that separates a political community from its biological existence. My aim in this paper is to follow Foucault and argue that understanding the relationship between violence and the political in Modernity means rethinking the ontological distinction between biological and political life that has fundamentally ordered the Western tradition of political thought. I will show that whereas Arendt, Agamben and Foucault all see the merging of the categories of life and politics as the key problem of Modernity, they understand this problem in crucially different terms and suggest different solutions. This results in different understandings of the relationship between violence and the political. In conclusion I argue that it is vital to fully understand the governmental rationality of modern biopolitical societies in order to develop effective strategies against their specific forms of political violence. Oxford University Press, , Penguin, , The social also functions as an ontological concept, however. It denotes a distorted domain in which the life process has been brought into the political realm. The social is not strictly public or private, but is a hybrid realm in that it is concerned with the public

administration of biological life: Arendt claims that in the social sphere man does not exist as a human being, but only as a specimen of the animal species mankind. Modern society is like ant society: Modern society is not a properly political organisation, it is a public organisation of the life process itself. Labour is the activity that man shares with other forms of animal life because all life depends on it. Her central claim in *The Human Condition* is that in the modern age, labour, and with it the maintenance of biological life, has become the most important activity: We are not satisfied with securing the necessities of life in order to be free to engage in higher, specifically human 3 Her feminist critics have seen it as another expression of her masculinism and her hostile attitude to the feminine, private realm. Hanna Pitkin has compared it to a monstrous Blob that is gobbling up our freedom and politics. Pennsylvania State University Press, , On the criticism of the distinction between social and political realms, see also e. *Essays in a Pragmatic Mode* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, , The University of Chicago Press, , Freedom from need does not mean that we have more free time for other things than consumption, the satisfying of increasingly sophisticated and complex appetites. Our whole economy has become a waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world. Arendt repeatedly insists that in ancient Greece the sphere of politics, polis, excluded from its sphere of public concern the biological necessities of life, which were confined to the private sphere of the household, oikos. The distinction was essential not just for maintaining the distinctiveness of the political as a sphere of public deliberation and speech, but also, by negation, for excluding the inevitable violence of biological life. Men lived together in a household, just as ants lived together, in order to master the necessities of life and survive as individuals and as a species. Violence was justified and inescapable in this sphere, but it was prepolitical, as opposed to political, violence. The realm of the polis, on the contrary, was the sphere of freedom untainted by the necessities of life: She notes that the Greek polis, the city-state, defined itself explicitly as a way of life that was based exclusively upon persuasion and not upon violence. In Greek self-understanding, to force people by violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with people characteristic of life outside of polis, of home and family life. It opens up the realm of specifically human commonality, the political: She carefully safeguards the political as a realm of non-violence, speech and action by cutting it loose from the body and from biological life. In her thought, the unprecedented violence of modernity can therefore be seen as another consequence of the dominance of the social over the political: She argues that every attempt to solve the social question by political means has inevitably led to terror. In *On Revolution* she famously attributes its failure to found a stable political regime, as well as the horrendous violence that accompanied it, to the fact that the poor, driven by the needs of their bodies, burst onto the scene of the French Revolution. Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictatorship of necessity as all men know from their most intimate experience and outside of all speculations. It was under the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolution, inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, for this was the multitude of the poor. When they appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with them, and the result was that the new republic was still born; freedom has to be surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life process itself. The political demands of the people were made on behalf of sheer survival and their decisions were determined by the overwhelming needs of their bodies. The objective of the revolution was no longer to liberate men from oppression or to found freedom; the primary aim was now to rid the life process of scarcity and to guarantee the satisfaction of the needs and happiness of the people. For her, it is the source of the politically most pernicious doctrine of the modern age, namely that life is the highest good, and that the life process of society is the very centre of human endeavour. The promise of a revolution, an absolutely new beginning, cannot be fulfilled by the violent acts of hungry bodies, but requires concerted action of citizens. It requires their common deliberation on a set of shared principles, as well as the pledging of mutual promises that binds them together. Revolutions will inevitably fail to constitute political power as long as they identify it simply with the monopoly of the means of violence. Political power can only come into being when and where people act together and bind themselves through promises, covenants, and mutual pledges. In her late

essay *On Violence*, she explicates the categorical distinction between power and violence, vehemently arguing against what she claims was the consensus among political theorists from Left to Right at the time that violence was nothing more than the ultimate kind of power. She argues that whereas power the concerted action of a group forms the essence of all government, violence is always instrumental. It is undeniably part of politics 14 Ibid. Violence because it can be used as a means of pursuing various political goals and causes but, crucially, it is ontologically apolitical. As a mere means it always needs justification through the political end or cause that it espouses. On its own violence remains apolitical: The reason why violence is understood as a political question at all is because it is so often fused with power, even though by its very nature it is fundamentally antithetical to power. Under threat of violence, the capacity to realise the human possibility of acting in concert is diminished and potentially destroyed. Power and violence are opposites where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance. Politics should not be reduced to an instrumental means to the apolitical ends of natural life: It has to remain an end in itself and therefore to retain its specificity as public action and speech. The distinction between the social and what is truly political is thus fundamental for her philosophical response to the crisis and decline of the public realm of politics in modern societies. It is a resurrection of the ancient answer to the question of why men are not ants. The restoration of the ancient distinction between polis and oikos could restore not only the specificity but also the dignity of politics, and by the same token separate it from the realm of biological life and inescapable violence. This fortification of the political does not imply the strengthening of the state, but rather heralds the revitalisation of public life, political debate and participation. The price we pay is the radical narrowing of the realm of the political, however. All issues belonging to the social such as poverty, sexuality and gender are economic, biological or technological questions rather than appropriately political questions. Political and social equality must remain distinct issues. As her critics have pointed out, in protecting the sui generis character of her politics and the purity of the public realm, Arendt effectively prohibits the politicisation of issues of social justice. Harcourt Brace, , She describes the emergence of the sphere of human works as a form of constitutive violence: The world, understood as more than nature, can thus be understood to be born of originary violence against the givenness of nature. Routledge, , Agamben and the Originary Violence of Sovereignty In their respective analyses of biopower, both Foucault and Agamben follow Arendt in maintaining that the political realm in Modernity has become more and more preoccupied with the management of biological life. They both deny that we should or could restore the classical political categories, as proposed by Arendt, however. This denial brings violence back to the heart of politics, but in fundamentally different ways. Whereas Foucault considers the birth of biopower a contingent historical fact, which he dates to the second half of the eighteenth century, Agamben sees it as an originary phenomenon contemporaneous with the entire history of Western metaphysics. *Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, builds on some of the key ideas of Arendt and Foucault, but the way he appropriates them for his own theory is highly original and challenging. He breaks sharply with Arendt, however, in denying that the distinction between biological and political life has, ever since its very inception, held fast. Life has always been a definitive object of politics. The explicit preoccupation with life in modern politics only brings to light the way in which politics has always been founded on power over natural life. In taking biological life as its primary target, the modern state only exposes the hidden but originary bond between sovereign power and bare life. Agamben acknowledges that politics was, since the time of Aristotle, explicitly separated from natural life.

*The Violence of Modernity turns to Charles Baudelaire, one of the most canonical figures of literary modernism, in order to reclaim an aesthetic legacy for ethical inquiry and historical critique. Works of modern literature are commonly theorized as symptomatic responses to the trauma of history.*

This violence goes largely unnoticed. Here is an average morning inside of this culture. First, you wake up on top of a foam mattress offgassing toxic VOCs that will not biodegrade in 10, years. You walk downstairs and fill a glass with water from the tap. The water comes from a local river that was dammed years ago. Ever since, native species in the watershed have been in decline. You drink the water. You pour yourself a bowl of cereal. The cereal is made of wheat and corn grown in what was once the tallgrass prairie of the eastern Great Plains. Ninety nine percent of that habitat “millions of acres” was plowed and utterly destroyed to grow those crops. The soil is gone now; your meal is only possible through fossil fuel fertilizers. You add milk; it comes from a factory farm nearby, where cattle are packed in next to each other in squalor and pumped full of antibiotics and rBGH genetically modified growth hormone to increase production. The cows are in pain; their imprisonment is fouling the land around them. The cereal tastes good. It makes you feel a lot better. The car has pounds of lithium-ion batteries under the hood. You get inside the car and start the engine. You drive on paved streets to your destination. Under those streets are indigenous burial grounds. You pass a police officer. The precursor of the modern police force was the slave patrol in the antebellum South. They continue their mission of terrorizing black and brown communities today. Many people live in constant fear of them. The fear is justified. They beat, rape, and murder everyday. The radio is on a news station. The news person is talking about the latest bombing campaign your government is conducting. You work at a hospital. The hospital is on a hill. Before the concrete and buildings, there was a meadow here. It was full of flowers in the spring. Insects came from a long way away to eat from the flowers. It made the flowers happy. Many people walked through the meadow in those days. There was a good view from there. Sometimes lovers would walk there to be alone. That all changed when the settlers came with their earth-movers and road-builders. You park your car, then walk inside. The sun is shining. You pass the gardeners working outside, spraying herbicide on the weeds. The gardeners have brown skin. They came from Mexico. They became refugees and crossed the border. Inside the hospital, there are people waiting to be seen for appointments. Most the magazines have pictures of women in them. A girl is reading one of the magazines. She looks about 10 years old. The leading cause of death for girls a few years older than her is eating disorders. Another woman is hoping to have an abortion. She is only 19 years old. You walk past them, past examination rooms and surgical rooms and recovery rooms. There are receptacles everywhere for gloves, needles, and other medical waste. The incinerator is located in the middle of a poor neighborhood two states away. The smoke that comes out of its smokestack contains some of the most toxic substances known to science. There is a school a block away from the incinerator. They keep their windows closed and keep the kids inside when the smoke is rising from the facility. You get to your office. You touch the door as you walk in. The wood in the chipboard used to be an old-growth boreal forest. Formaldehyde and other chemical glues hold it together. Like the light switch, the computer, the examination table, the chairs, the desk, the floor tiles, and the light fixtures, the paint on the door is made from oil. The oil used in these specific light fixtures and floor tiles came from Saudi Arabia and Niger and Texas and Canada. You sit down and get to work. This was a very partial description of the violence in modern society. When we are honest about the level of violence in this culture, not resisting becomes a sickening thought. But false solutions abound; almost all of the solutions put forth to solve these problems of violence continue it in another form, or simply displace it to another area of the world or a new type of impact. True solutions undermine the ability of industrial civilization to continue its destruction. A longtime military maxim has been that victory requires removing the ability or will of the enemy to continue their fight. This is a situation of planetary self-defense. All options are on the table, from revolutionary law-making to strategic non-violence to coordinated sabotage of industrial infrastructure.

*The calm voice at the helm says, "Make it so " and with it, the mantra of modernity is invoked. The philosophy that governs our culture is rooted in violence, the ability to make things happen and to control the outcome. It is a deeply factual belief. We can indeed make things happen, and.*

Power of representation[ edit ] In high culture[ edit ] High culture forms such as fine art and literature have aestheticized violence into a form of autonomous art. In , University of Georgia literature professor Joel Black stated that " if any human act evokes the aesthetic experience of the sublime, certainly it is the act of murder". Black notes that " This conception of an aesthetic element of murder has a long history; in the 19th century, Thomas de Quincey wrote that "Everything in this world has two handles. Murder , for instance, may be laid hold of by its moral handle Sexual Murder in Weimar Germany analyzes murders in pre-Hitler Germany and their artistic representations, investigating "the chilling motives behind representations that aestheticize violence, and that turn the mutilated female body into an object of fascination". For example, Chouliaraki argues that the "bombardment of Baghdad in during the Iraq war was filmed in long-shot and presented in a quasiliterary narrative that capitalized on an aesthetics of horror, on sublime spectacle Boltanski. She says that the "aestheticization of suffering on television is thus produced by a visual and linguistic complex that eliminates the human pain aspect of suffering, whilst retaining the phantasmagoric effects of a tableau vivant ", producing an "aestheticization of suffering [that] manages simultaneously to preserve an aura of objectivity and impartiality, and to take a pro-war side in the war footage". According to James Fox, filmmaker Donald Cammell " In the films adapted from his work, The Silence of the Lambs and Hannibal , directors Jonathan Demme and Ridley Scott , respectively intentionally generate excitement and anticipation when Lecter is about to kill and eat a victim. Lecter was portrayed by Anthony Hopkins. In the film Man on Fire , which tells the story of a burnt-out former Black Ops agent who seeks to avenge the kidnappers of a young girl he was bodyguarding, a character says that the agent is an "artist" in killing. He says the man is about to "paint his masterpiece" as he seeks out and kills all of the members of the criminal organization who were connected with the child abduction. Volume 1 , entitled "Beauty and violence", he calls the film "a groundbreaking aestheticization of violence". Morales says that the film, which he calls "easily one of the most violent movies ever made", "a breathtaking landscape in which art and violence coalesce into one unforgettable aesthetic experience". Tarantino is able to transform an object of moral outrage into one of aesthetic beauty When the female sword-wielding protagonist " Critics who see depictions of violence in film as superficial and exploitative argue that it leads audience members to become desensitized to brutality, thus increasing their aggression. On the other hand, critics who view violence as a type of content, or as a theme, claim it is cathartic and provides "acceptable outlets for anti-social impulses". Martin claims that critics who value aestheticized violence defend shocking depictions onscreen on the grounds that "screen violence is not real violence, and should never be confused with it". It has its own changing history, its codes, its precise aesthetic uses. She argues that "aestheticized violence is not merely the excessive use of violence in a film". Movies such as the popular action film Die Hard 2 are very violent, but they do "not fall into the category of aestheticized violence because it is not stylistically excessive in a significant and sustained way". In movies with aestheticized violence, she argues that the "standard realist modes of editing and cinematography are violated in order to spectacularize the action being played out on the screen"; directors use "quick and awkward editing", "canted framings", shock cuts, and slow motion, to emphasize the impacts of bullets or the "spurting of blood". Bruder argues that films with aestheticized violence such as "Hard Target, True Romance and Tombstone are [filled] with Garner concludes that the film was a "coal-black satire" in which "dire comedy mixes with Grand Guignol. Tony Soprano , Walter White from " Breaking Bad ", Hannibal Lecter who predates "American Psycho" "here are the most significant pop culture characters of the past 30 years Plato believed that poetry that was "unregulated by philosophy is a danger to soul and community". He warned that tragic poetry can produce "a disordered psychic regime or constitution" by inducing "a dream-like, uncritical state in which we lose ourselves in As such, Plato was in effect arguing that "What goes

on in the theater, in your home, in your fantasy life, are connected" to what one does in real life. Aristotle mentions catharsis at the end of his *Politics*, where he notes that after people listen to music that elicits pity and fear, they "are liable to become possessed" by these negative emotions. However, afterwards, Aristotle points out that these people return to "a normal condition as if they had been medically treated and undergone a purge [catharsis] All experience a certain purge [catharsis] and pleasant relief. The 16th-century artist Pieter Brueghel the Elder depicted " His painting of the Crucifixion "

**Chapter 5 : The Inherent Violence of Modernity | A Russian Orthodox Church Website**

*The calm voice at the helm says, "Make it so " and with it, the mantra of modernity is invoked. The philosophy that governs our culture is rooted in violence, the ability to make things happen and to control the outcome.*

I am grateful to the university for this opportunity to live in India and reflect upon these questions. I would like to thank the Institute director, Aditya Mukherjee, for his intellectual support and generous help during my stay. I would also like to thank Mridula Mukherjee and Bipan Chandra, both of whom offered intellectual guidance and inspiration. I received the help of a community of colleagues and friends while writing this book. I would like to thank Anindo Sahar for long conversations that helped shape the direction of this book, and for his many fruitful research suggestions. At an early stage in the research, Katerine Neal-Phleng and the late Paul Fletcher provided important inputs. My long-time collaborator and friend, Ali Mirsepassi, was an important inspiration and source of ideas in writing this book. He provided important encouragement. The comments and suggestions of all of these people gave the book its shape. I would like to thank Sandy Casado for her patience and kind support during the time of writing this book. Within this context, the value of progress, science and political organization has been interrogated. The heterogeneous experiences of modern nation-making provide the material for visualizing the historical patterns and collective social institutions that demonstrate the often conflicting kinship patterns of the Enlightenment heritage. The central historical thesis departs from certain comparative reflections of the historian Bipan Chandra. This necessarily entailed a nation-making course of non-violence based upon an ethic of reconciliation. The Indian experience, in this respect, differed from the predominant paradigmatic experience embodied in the Russian or Chinese Revolutions, which claimed a historical—ontological link to the French revolutionary precedent. In the revolutionary aftermath, the Indian people did not become the victims of the means they had used to obtain emancipation. There are, in this, implications for the Enlightenment heritage as a philosophical problematic. The tradition, at its best, transcends the dichotomous and teleological metaphysics defining it [Page xiv]in conventional philosophical discourses. Its 20th-century cumulative and interactive formations suggest neither alternative modernity nor history as a single unbroken line hinting at hidden transcendental intent. Nor do Romantic constructions of Enlightenment as an imprisoning and invasive alien discourse—or valorizations of the fragment—survive historical scrutiny. The Enlightenment heritage is analyzed through variable elements in the diverse and interactive nation-making experiences of Western Europe modernity and Enlightenment between England and France and in three situations of colonial and semi-colonial domination and national struggle: This book is the study of these different moments—and possible horizons—in the Indian, Turkish and Iranian Enlightenment formations: The Enlightenment, however tacitly, is a heritage which profoundly shaped 20th-century nation-making developments. It is a broadly discursive—practical—rather than specifically religious or cultural—heritage. The 20th century manifested its power and self-contradiction in momentous world revolutions fusing its disparate elements in varied combinations. Decolonization—in varying discursive—practical constructions of violence—highlighted the power of multi-class mass political participation motivated by opposition to existing conditions and widespread goal consensus in the French Revolutionary pattern. Traditional solidarity values integrated with socialist frameworks, i. The Enlightenment is therefore not—despite dominant claims to the contrary in the 18th-century French experience—a unified or contained ontology or epistemology. It has the living reality of a problem, or assemblage of problems, and not the singular inanimate reality of a stone—or the lifeworld terrain of meaning production rather than merely immutable natural law. The problems are universal: These elements relate, in turn, to a heritage of cumulative struggle for [Page xvi]freedom requiring unceasing protection; and a universal if hierarchally apportioned vulnerability providing the underlying logic for non-violence. Universal History grounded within the closed logic of a metaphysically dichotomous time horizon. The death of such vivid metaphors signals the more subtle and fundamental demise of an underlying dichotomy between evaluation and description with implications for political action and the rank-ordering of social goods. The major lessons of the 20th-century Enlightenment heritage were: As ideal types, the alternatives are the immanent—reconciliation or the

transcendentalâ€™totalization horizons. The core Enlightenment problem concerns immense global wealthâ€™poverty disparities, hierarchic class dynamics and the problematic of development between authoritarian and democratic discursiveâ€™practical legacies. Democratic development constitutes collectively empowering human interaction systems and generates new existentialâ€™ethical understandings of the [Page xvii]human place in the world. The driving principle of Nehruism linked economic development and political freedom in democratic nation-making. Both Ataturk and Nehru derived their politicsâ€™in profoundly differing manifestationsâ€™from the secular Enlightenment heritage. They highlight the diverging transcendentâ€™authoritarian and immanentâ€™pluralist potentialities of the heritage. The Nehruvian paradigm demonstrates that development harbours a wider practical potentiality than merely a nihilistic and absurd mass uprooting of populations. It discloses a meaningful development mode: It recognizes the value of the lifeworlds, embeddedness and the everyday within the development process, rather than forcing these elements into a secondary category where they may be sacrificed to a so-called higher end. The theoretical resources for rearticulating the Enlightenment heritage in light of 20th-century learnings were largely produced during the 20th century, and require a synthetic re-interpretation of radical pluralist innovators in Enlightenment interpretation like John Dewey, Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, Mohammed Arkoun, Abdul An-Naim and Amartya Sen. All of these thinkers have confronted the lifeworld-meaning dimension, or embeddedness, as a central problem in modern development experiences. Methodologically, we must interpret Enlightenment patterns and structures employing heterogeneous multiplicitiesâ€™the pluralistic production of order, irreducible to a pre-established unityâ€™rather than dualistically opposed pairs [Page xviii]bounded within closed and homogenous frames structuralism or an essenceâ€™object correspondence metaphysics. This region of density shows the Enlightenment heritage as predominantly linkedâ€™in a violenceâ€™practice discursive compoundâ€™to nationalism through the paradigmatic experience of the French Revolution. It is here, in relation to this compound, that the Indian nation-making experience created through its successful practices an alternate region of discursiveâ€™practical density in horizon-possibilities for mass political mobilizations. It is, however, partly indebted to both methodological innovators. Foucault employed two methodologies in the history of ideas. Collingwood, Max Weber and Amartya Senâ€™in varying but related waysâ€™have also emphasized the lifeworld meaning-dimension over natural laws in social science and historical methodology. The agentive subject should be embedded within the wider material world of everydayness, but need not evaporate like a structure puppet imprisoned within intermeshing frameworks of theoretical discourse. For the present analysis of the [Page xxi]Enlightenment heritage, such analytical limits are methodologically impossible. The only feasible basis for a history of ideas linked to mass social movements are the material realities poverty, ignorance, gender subordination and other subjugating experiences that have moved the dispossessed majority in modern mass movements. The material is not external to imagination, but a meaningfully full reality only as embedded within human and cultural contexts. While these phenomena constrain human empowerment and progress, they have also moved historical change from below. But, as the subaltern methodological intervention emphasized, these powers remain unrecorded except as residual traces of silenced, fractured and damaged experiences of disempowered majorities. Embedding a history of ideas within social movements entails breaking away from conventions focused exclusively on the central state, elite terminologies and elite perceptions of modernization. The historical record shows important and meaningful differences in how varying discursiveâ€™practical formations have emerged and interacted with mass movements to produce alternative social and political realities. The modern worldâ€™far from an ethical voidâ€™contains meaningful differences. Discursiveâ€™practical regions of densityâ€™as analytical tools for historicizing ideas through their immanent and material formationsâ€™should divest social movement theory of the atemporal textures of Judgement Day. Mass movements and revolutions enshrine the unique revolutionary status of nationalism becauseâ€™as a unique historical horizonâ€™it involves an ensemble of temporally compatible motivations among classes, status groups, communities, etc. These historical moments continuously re-constitute regions of density in combining levels of elite self-consciousness and the invisible vistas of the popular in ever new forms. The articulation of regions of density, therefore, requires an analytic of temporal horizons, not totality. There is no final revolution with the

aura of Judgement Day. The ensemble of temporally compatible motivations that create national revolutions are merely temporal horizons upon a larger and relatively unforgettable scale, but blend into the multitude of historically invisible and intimate temporal horizons of phenomenological everyday life, i. The French Revolutionary heritage is the central region of discursiveâ€”practical density because the radically violent deterritorialization inflicted upon the global majority by expanding capitalismâ€”a mass of bodies reduced to worthlessness by overabundance, labour disembedded and forced into migration, curtailed capacities, exclusion from representationâ€”has pulled them towards its vortex with the force of a black hole. The French Revolution, from this perspective, is a material rather than merely discursive problematic of embeddedness, embodiment and the unthought. Great pressure is required to force populations to risk violent death in revolt against authority. Following Karl Polanyi, the Enlightenment heritage as a political phenomenonâ€”inevitably linked to its other manifestations in science, war, technology, culture, etc. What should be avoided, in this connection, are fanciful methodological tendencies to ontologically sublimate either violence or communityâ€”i.

**Chapter 6 : (4/22) POLITICAL VIOLENCE & MODERNITY by Sofia Shank on Prezi**

*The Violence of Modernity is divided into two sections that straddle literary analysis, theories of cultural production and gender studies. Part 1 opens with a.*

Posted on 12 April Ali Mirsepassi 1. What are the conceptual and discursive underpinnings of modern violence? Each was also an experience of traumatic violence, bringing into question the relation between rapidly changing existence and traditions of value, requiring radical adjustments in institutional accretions, the authority of ideals, imaginings and thought over choice and conduct. Locke justified the exploitation and coercion of the New World in a new secular Providence of productivity – even as he derived a conception of modern political rights under Christian inspiration. The French Revolution was a global event, linked to the loss of French imperial footholds to England in India, China and Canada in three worldwide scale wars. We see the unconscious transmission of underlying discursive structures: The French Revolutionary actors themselves, while shifting their focus from transcendence to the socio-political order, borrowed religious language and conceptual orientations while also pursuing political action as a quest for ultimate meaning. Finally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presents a rationalized legal framework – following the catastrophic trauma of the Second World War and the Holocaust -crystallizing the prerequisites for human dignity previously expressed through internally contradictory discursive universes in the major world religions. This fact has profoundly complicated our understanding of historical relations between the West and non-Western countries, bringing the dichotomy itself into doubt. It seems that the principle of non-identity, expressed tacitly in the open structure of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is more appropriate to the creation of democratic modernity than specific metaphysical claims implying bounded identities. Neither modernity nor tradition have a monopoly on violence: This is what we have learned from these three defining moments of modernity: If we define modernity in terms of the disappearance of traditionally established authorities, we are on more stable empirical ground than if we talk about any fundamental rupture with traditional culture. Yet the interaction of institutions and lifeworlds, in all of its ambiguity, constitutes an integral dimension in the problematic of modern violence. At the level of everyday life the dilemma of modern power is matter of protection, which in turn refers to a condition of vulnerability that is at once universal and appallingly unequally divided. Growth and dynamism have their counterpart in violence and deprivation: From this perspective, we might define democracy as a modern political mode committed to human equality of political and social rights vis a vis the state i. An emerging intellectual constellation can be read through the lens of non-violence as the guiding value. The vision linking these thinkers is also allied to the fundamental insight moving the twentieth century revolution in political practice introduced by Gandhi in the Indian National Independence movement. In analyzing the problem of modern violence historically in terms of its discursive and institutional dimensions, we can see that much has been learned through the hard passage of historical time and new frameworks for thinking about democratic modernity do exist – but require systemic analysis to uncover their thematic and intellectual links. Although this continuous need for the re-examination of values was conceived by Nietzsche as the domain of the elite, the implications were extended by thinkers such as Weber, Dewey, the Frankfurt School and Amartya Sen to the workings of modern mass societies. This implies a radical rethinking of the nature of what power is, and the multiple ways in which it functions. The formative post-Enlightenment debates, with their tacit concern over the problems of modern violence, bring into view three dialectically interdependent aspects: The broader and real world context for these debates is the political problem of power linked to macro-institutional changes in the modern world: In this sense democratic modernity is linked to a humanist ethic. These mundane realities of life and death are manipulated – exploiting what Johann Galtung called structural violence – by people seeking power everyday life. The lifeworld is the oldest problem in the Enlightenment: While Descartes rejected history as a mass of errors, Vico emphasised history as the world of the humanly made and bearer of values. These debates were at the origin of the phenomenological concern, originally articulated by Schopenhauer, the body, and the violence done to it in everyday life in the name of competing modern ideological claims to the future. We might

identify three thematic categories: Culture " between tradition and modernity. What should be kept in mind is that the Kant-Hegel theoretical construction was itself a reckoning with a seminal modern experience that was both emancipating and tragically violent, in the Industrial-French Revolutions and their nineteenth century aftermath in the repressive Concert of Europe culminating in the Revolutions. They are implicated in differing conceptions of secularism i. Three " sometimes overlapping and sometimes distinct " predominant experiences of modern violence were articulated out of the Enlightenment-Romanticism debates: It may seem that Kant, and the critical intellectual revolution he initiated, is remote from the problem of violence. But certain elements in his complex legacy " which shaped central debates in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries " facilitated the political imagining of non-violent and dialogic modes of conflict resolution, while others hardened into new dogmas justifying political violence. Generally speaking, we can say that Kantian thought " despite its failings " represents a force for a dialogic politics of non-violence. There are three major Kantian contributions: These contain two important and conflicting tendencies with respect to the problem of modern violence that Kant himself never successfully resolved or even recognized, between openness and totality. Following the Lisbon earthquake, he rejected the eighteenth century view of nature as a benevolent source of values. This insight, compounded significantly by the experience of the French Revolution, shattered the confident Enlightenment belief in modern objective knowledge leading to a final and fixed universal pattern resolving social conflict through natural knowledge. Thus ended the dream of a Utopia where two right views, whether in aesthetics or politics, cannot contradict one another, making it a matter of putting the right pieces together in a vision where freedom is a totality. Kant, against the totalizing schemes of such Leibniz-inspired Rationalism, affirmed the intellectually modest notion of the imperfection of human knowledge. Reason, Kantian dualism suggested, also has a cultural history: He thereby implied that values are created rather than discovered, and that freedom is a plural rather than unitary phenomenon i. This presupposes the permanence of differing and varied points of view. The weakness, however, is in the tendency to totalization in the Kantian view of history: His obsession with reconciling free will and the determinate physical laws of nature produced a dichotomy between empirical and a priori, the contingent and the necessary, the accident and the pure structure. This transcendental necessity, linked to an ethical Platonism, was to impose its laws from outside as a totality upon ordinary experience, and transformed world history into a determined theodicy dividing the rational future from the irrational past. This second tendency counteracted the creative and pluralist potential for learning opened up in the first tendency, through the positing of a Transcendent Subject synthesizing the diversity of lifeworlds as foreign matter from a higher outside perspective. They argued that Enlightenment universalism abstracts from context, and that its values are only apparently universal and eternal. Such universals, they argued, conceal amnesia about origins in specific historical conditions and are hence ethnocentric. Language is linked to a specific community, history, beliefs and values, and can never be raised to a level of universal abstraction. Seeing violence against local cultures in Enlightenment universalism, Herder expressed a denial of unity on the basis of pure temporality in which values growing from differing cultural contexts are entirely incompatible. He suggested that the nation is a complete figure of sovereignty prior to historical development, entailing in essentialist fashion that all change is prefigured in the origin. As an ontological stance, it rejects the polar opposite of the eighteenth century jigsaw puzzle conception of universal knowledge in favor of localized knowledges. Rejecting first principles in favor of metaphysical systemicity, he rejected Kantian non-foundationalism i. For Kant, the other remains the other, while for Hegel identity is absolute and the other is absorbed yet, having said this, Kant had little appreciation for the other if he was not white and European. We see opposed views of the role of the state: Concerning the category of culture between modernity and tradition, we see the same logic of dialectical supersession that applies to civil society on the road to the conflict free society. For Kant, the negative logic of the Categorical Imperative should permit the participation of all cultural values and meanings provided that they respect the limits of the Golden Rule; yet, because the a priori is a uniform logic grounded in the head rather than multiple democratic practices grounded in the world, it tends not to see the emancipatory potential in already existing social forms. Non-violence It is clear that within the Enlightenment-Romanticism traditions the problem of violence is more implicit than explicit " rather as all of the world religions discuss the power

of non-violence in some of their aspects while often affirming violence in separate currents within the same historical tradition. Non-violence as an explicit practical philosophy has been voiced on the margins from the very beginning of the historical trajectory described here – for example, the Diggers in the English Civil War identified the contradiction in war as a road to freedom just as Cromwell justified violence in terms of the signs of Providence. But it was only in the twentieth century that non-violence became the self-conscious center of mass social movements in the precedent first established by Gandhi in the Indian national independence movement and later employed by Martin Luther King in the American Civil Rights Movement. This self-conscious philosophical and practical line later re-emerged in the Velvet Revolutions of Eastern Europe Poland, Czechoslovakia and freedom struggles from South Africa to Myanmar, before its more recent appearance in the mass protests that toppled authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. It is possible to link these political experiences of non-violence to those intellectual tendencies that took shape in the nineteenth century and blossomed in the early part of the twentieth century – in certain neo-Kantian tendencies in Europe including Dilthey but expressed most forcefully in the anti-positivist sociology of Max Weber and later the Frankfurt School conceived broadly to include Hannah Arendt and Antonio Gramsci. In the American context, the Pragmatist writings of John Dewey laid the philosophical groundwork linking democratic political life to an ideal of conceptual pluralism. This intellectual tendency has found subtle and powerful expression in the philosophical worldview of Amartya Sen. As previously noted, it is focused on the unrealized power of civil society to transform collective values, meanings and practices in a struggle against domination grounded in either historical tradition or the violence of the modern state. The philosophical stakes seem to be: Modernity, rather, must be embedded within a context specific and dialogic framework if it is to realize its democratic and participatory potential, in the spirit of egalitarian Enlightenment and humanist values. These intellectual tendencies emerged in considerable part in response to the failings of the political revolutions of and While the revolutions saw the victory of political reaction and the revocation of the constitutions fought for and obtained during the victorious initial period, as a consequence of these experiences a deep change took place in the lives of the European populations. This change crystallized ideas and projected the pattern of things to come in European democratic politics. The experience showed the temporal character of democratic politics and struggle, such that the long range impact was felt in multiple events over the next fifty years. Meanwhile, the traumas of the Franco-Prussian War and the two World Wars that followed in its aftermath confirmed the horror of violence linked to asymmetrical power interests. The globally profound significance of the Russian Revolution, firstly as the euphoric flash of hope expressed by Lukacs in *History and Class Consciousness*, subsequently revealed the tragic limits of a lightning fast seizure of state power and dictatorship based on a purported doctrine of historical scientific certainty. Finally, the complex experiences of decolonization movements around the world, from Spanish America to the traditional land empires i. Ottoman and the Western colonial empires, introduced a complex of new organizational methods and conceptual mappings incorporating new issues of geography, religion and culture. The critique of violence is linked to a critique of totality, i. In his theory of deliberative democracy, Dewey asserted that complete democracy entails not merely voting rights but also the creation of a fully formed public dialogical space grounded in effective communication and participation among citizens, experts, and politicians through multiple institutional formations i. Our values and institutions immanently and critically inform the collective struggle toward change into a non-violent democratic society. Civil society, along the same lines, should remain open. These three points express the central idea behind the Gandhian revolution in political practice. Now, if we compare this intellectual tendency to Gandhian thought and practice, we immediately notice strong linkages: In the absence of absolute knowledge, he argued, no one may justifiably impose their view on others through violence. It follows that Gandhi placed central emphasis upon freedom of conscience, and the rule of law to protect rather than subvert it. Satyagraha itself was understood by him as a form of dialogue, intended to persuade. The real battle against violence, fascism, and so on, is inside of us. It follows that there was, for him, no enemy. He insisted upon the illegitimacy of any fixed definition of the nation, or Hinduism, or the West, or God, and so forth. If we look at the Indian National Movement, we see a self-conscious process of spreading a consciousness of democratic values and ideas on the ground among the mass of the Indian population. This

spanned over decades, involving countless actors and manifestations of civil society under the political limits of the Raj, and this prepared the Indian population to participate in the post-independence political system through its numerous trials. He urged that we allow these to remain multiple and contradictory. No future utopia, he argued, can redeem the sufferings of the past: He rejected the identical subject-object of history advanced by Lukacs because of the violence it implied to the other. In the same vein he rejected Romanticism, for it posits an absolutization of the collective subject "an inherent tyranny over those who are different. This was the ground for his confrontation with Heidegger and existentialism. The aesthetization of politics implies totalitarianism, a closed world.

*The constant state of denial that is a feature of the urban middle class and the regime is a necessity to maintain a deeply paradoxical ideological construct.*

Ramin Jahanbegloo Modernity has often been seen in connection with the ideas of liberty, equality, progress and rationality. These concepts merged in the mottos of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and later on split up and expressed in the two political doctrines of liberalism and socialism. On the other hand, political and ideological figures such as Hitler and Stalin provoked a different perspective on the connection between ideals of the Enlightenment and political modernity. From a pessimistic point of view one can say that modernity also paved the way for twentieth century totalitarianism, namely Nazism, through its dreams about Volksgemeinschaft, holistic community and the final solution. In his post-modern approach Zygmunt Bauman shares this pessimistic view in order to explain the Holocaust, as a consequence of modernity and its Zweckrationalitat. According to Philip K. Lawrence, in his book *Modernity and War: The individual is individualistic: He has stopped thinking about the spiritual meaning of life. His life is divided between purposes which are contingently thrust upon him by his environment, requiring fulfillment with speed and efficiency which occlude any evaluation of their meaning for life as a whole. As MacIntyre in his most perceptive discussion of the contemporary scene observes: So work is divided from leisure, private life from public life, the corporate from the persona. So both childhood and old age have been wrenched away from the rest of human life and made over into distinct realms. Moreover, the social no longer demands conduct in which human relationships are informed by virtues. Modernity which brought freedom from the authority of various non-secular traditions went too far and liberated the hidden greed lying curled up in the human heart. In this culture of greed-satisfaction, rational violence plays a role in the process of ideological brainwashing and the marginalization of those who refuse to surrender to power relations of dominant epistemic discourse. In short, the modern dynamic of civilizing process has created a close link between the modern individual personality and the political formation of the modern state. In this relation, most social historians and political scientists would accept the rough outline of what Norbert Elias has argued: He also reminds us that nation-states only gradually emerged from the fragmented political landscape of the early Middle Ages, and that their emergence can be described as a process of the monopolization of violence and the centralization of authority. Elias was acutely aware that the civilizing process could be reversed and lead to acute periods of decivilizing, such as World Wars and the Third Reich. As he says, the emergence of the modern state, with its monopoly on violence and the growing interdependence of its members, necessitated greater degrees of individual self-control. As Elias suggested, people began to modify their approach to everything from eating and scratching to spitting and sex. But the most important was that modern rationality used the violence of the state to punish so as to force citizens to act in a civilized manner creating a sort of pseudo-civilized citizen. Foucault points out the duality of the political individual as subject shaped through normalizing practices and as a citizen with rights and liberties. What Foucault is aiming at by exposing the movement of power and violence within the structures of domination is to render this consolidation less effective and less dangerous. Power relations can neither be eradicated nor suspended, but their escalation into structures of violence can often be neutralized. In modern political theories, the political is identified with the State. The idea of the State is often linked to the notion of an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order with the capability of administering violence and controlling the individuals. For him, politics, like warfare, is a vicious struggle to gain control, to dominate and to conquer opposing force. That art alone is necessary for glory in politics. The organizer of the Florentine civil militia also knows that there is no comparison between the armed and the disarmed man, success in war requires a knowledge of crafty assault as well as of armed combat. For Machiavelli, well-used cruelty would be a good moral decision in that it enforces the power of the Prince. If the Prince was to kill many people without reason, he would not gain the support of the people. For Machiavelli, man is dominated by his passions. He is acquisitive, shortsighted and imitative. His desires are unlimited and bear little relation to his abilities. This selfishness leads to conflict between those who desire to*

dominate and those who desire to be free from domination. Domination is itself the most powerful of emotional desires. The conflict is conducted both on the civil level between men on the international level between groups of men. Since conflict stems from the fundamentals of human nature, it is at least latent in all human societies and therefore inevitable. One of the fundamental concerns of politics for Machiavelli is the control and application of violence in the interest of the State. In other words, war and politics form an organic whole. While war is a political instrument, politics itself is warlike activity. We are all familiar with the famous dictum of Clausewitz that war is politics conducted by other, more violent means. This idea has also been adapted by Leninists in modern times. The Leninists actually come closer to the original view of Machiavelli, which is that it is politics that is war conducted by other, less violent means. Hobbes was also among the first modern political thinkers who recognized the role of violence in a creation and conservation of a public power. For Hobbes politics is a form of violence preserving and protecting the installment of a Leviathan which is the result of a rational choice of individuals against the universe of fear and instability. Through a theory of human nature, sovereign authority and political obligation, Hobbes ought to prove that the state must be regarded as the ultimate violence, both absolute and legitimate, in order that the worst of evils, anarchy, might be permanently averted. In so arguing, Hobbes produced a political philosophy which is a fascinating point of departure for reflection on the modern theory of violence. The result is a constant struggle for survival. Therefore, individuals should surrender their rights by transferring them to a powerful authority which can force them to keep their promises and covenants. A unique relation of authority results: A unique political power is created: The image of an all-powerful and violent Leviathan is a remarkably contemporary one. Hitler, Stalin and Mao. For Hobbes, the main problem is to impose limits on the violence of all against all. The limits are effectively imposed by a sovereign with a monopoly of the right to coerce and the violent power to use that right. In other words, the Hobbesian sovereign is the exclusively authorized agent of violence in the society. The use of modern violence is logically constructed by Hobbes out of the observed condition of an individualist society where there is an equality of desires. For Hobbes the only way to rationalize and to control the violence that is generated by equality of desires is to create a much stronger violence by covenant. By calling the state an ethical community, Hegel means to endow it with something other than the mere use of violence or the power to coerce. Therefore, one is obligated to the Hegelian state not because of its violent nature but because it is a community of persons united around some shared conception of the good life. Yet, the Hegelian state cannot preserve its ethical unity without an external violence. In other words, war is for Hegel a moment in the ethical life of the state. The positive value of war is that it transcends attachment to things by uniting men for the purpose of a common ideal Phenomenology, Page In the Philosophy of Right, war comes to have a specific function within the Rechtsstaat. It appears that war is no longer a means of founding, but of preserving, stages from the internal tensions generated by the marketplace and civil society. Put another way, Hegel believes that war is a vital moral resource because it relieves the deadly pressure arising from the divisions within civil society by bringing together all of the members and providing them with the basis of an integrative existence as citizens of their state. Thirdly, that full benefits of the communal perspective can be only obtained by obedience to the state. So if Hegel does not glorify war, he nevertheless seems not to have zealously related modern politics to the idea of nonviolence and peace. This is where Mahatma Gandhi remains a relevant thinker. Mahatma Gandhi remains a relevant thinker, not only because of his theory and practice of autonomy, but because of what he defended all his life, in other words, religious and political pluralism. He is trying to find a path towards social and individual goals. Let us refer to the formula he borrowed from H. Gandhi is one of the resolute critics of modernity in the 20th century. In his view modern civilization is wrong to make a fetish out of the scientific rationality and ignore its limitations. It does not value the full range of human freedom, but only the freedom to pursue self-interest. For Gandhi modern civilization is based on a flawed view and it suffers from several basic and interrelated limitations: By grasping an important truth and turning it into a falsehood. For Gandhi, the truth is the spirit of search for the truth. There are two points which bother Gandhi with modern science: So what is to be done? According to Gandhi, modernity must be checked and it must be tamed. How is it to be done? This is because for Gandhi there is a difference between modern civilization and European civilization. In his writings Gandhi attacks the

west without criticizing necessarily the modern civilization. In other words, Gandhi borrows important principles from modernity without letting modernity set the terms of his thought and discourse. He interrogates modern science, modern economy, modern politics, with standards outside of themselves. This can be seen in his treatment of modern technologies. Gandhi challenges modern technology because he believes it diminishes "autonomy" and "freedom" and it destroys "self-governance". But he also challenges the Indian traditions, because he finds that obstacles to autonomy reside also in the tradition. Untouchability is a good example. Gandhi fights for the right of untouchables as individuals and citizens though he never advocates the destruction of Varnashrama as a mode of social organization. Why does he take this initiative? Because his aim is not to destroy the concept of the four Ashramas or stages of life, which are useful according to him, but to awaken the Hindus about the limits of their traditions. For Gandhi, Swaraj implied not only formal independence, but also cultural and moral autonomy. It can conduct its affairs in the light of its traditions and values while remaining alert to their limitations. Quoting the Rigvedic prayer he says:

*What Kafka reveals us creates is an awareness that, in modernity, power as violence is intimately bound to both law and justice. Just as power can be the source of violence, law and justice also share this ambiguous inheritance.*

The philosophy that governs our culture is rooted in violence, the ability to make things happen and to control the outcome. It is a deeply factual belief. We can indeed make things happen, and, in a limited way, control their outcome. But we soon discover and have proven it time and again that our ability to control is quite limited. Many, many unforeseeable consequences flow from every action. If I am working in a very, self-contained environment, then the illusion of total control can be maintained for a very long time. If, say, I am building a watch, my actions and their results can remain on a desktop. However, when the scale of action begins to increase, the lack of true control begins to manifest itself. Actions on the level of an entire society or culture are beyond our ability to manage. A culture is not a very large watch. But we think it is. That delusion lies at the very heart of the philosophy of modernity. The arguments supporting the success of modernity are always misleading. The single desired effect e. But every unplanned consequence is ignored the massive displacement of black families, etc. Certain actions are extremely desirable such as ending slavery , but every action carries its unforeseen cost. Modernity always wins, because it cooks the books. We take what is not so and force it to be otherwise. The field and the parking lot, as innocuous and innocent as they may be, also create consequences that were not part of the plan. The only means of dealing with these consequences are to employ more violence to alter things yet again requiring yet more violence, ad infinitum , or to treat the consequences as an acceptable change. In this sense, to be an active part of the world is to employ violence. We do not sit lightly on the surface of our planet. Most human societies across history, have made a moderate peace with the world in which they live, using forms of violence whose consequences have been well-enough tolerated and accounted for so as to be bearable. The rate of change in such societies was modest, and within the limits that a culture could easily accommodate. Large and rapid change is another thing entirely. Modernity is not about how to live rightly in the world, but about how to make the world itself live rightly. The difference could hardly be greater. The inception of modernity, across the 18th and 19th centuries, was marked by revolution. The Industrial Revolution, the rise of various forms of capitalism, the birth of the modern state with its political revolutions, all initiated a period of ceaseless change marked by winners and losers. Of course, success is measured by statistics that blur the edges of reality. X-number of people find their incomes increased, while only Y-number of people suffer displacement and ruination. So long as X is greater than Y, the change is a success. The trick is to be an X. The ceaseless re-invention of the better world rarely takes stock of its own actions. That large amounts of any present ruination are the result of the last push for progress is ignored. It is treated as nothing more than another set of problems to be fixed. As the fixes add up, a toxic culture begins to emerge: As the toxicity rises, so the demand for ever more action and change grows, and, with it, the increase in violence of all types. The amount of our human existence that now requires rather constant technological intervention is staggering. The entire modern pattern of dating, marriage, family and procreation are impossible without chemical and biological intervention. The abortion of nearly one-third of all children conceived is but a single example. The foundations of our present society are built on doing profound violence to human nature. And this is but a single example. It should be noted that I have not suggested some mode of existence that is free of violence. Human beings make things happen, as does most of creation. Modernity, however, is another matter. Its better world has no limits, its project is never-ending. What are the proper limits of violence? Are there boundaries that must not be crossed? Modernity has as its goal the creation of a better world with no particular reference to God – it is a secular concept. The approach of classical Christianity does not oppose change there is always change , nor does it deny that one thing might be better than another. There are other elements within the commandments of Christ that minimize and restrict the use of violence. There is, for example, no commandment to make the world a better place, nor even to make progress towards a better world. Only God controls the outcome of history. Keeping the commandments of Christ is not doing nothing. It is, however, the refusal to use violence to force the world into ever-changing

imaginary versions of the good. I will cite a somewhat controversial example all examples would be controversial, for modernists love nothing better than to argue about how to next use violence to improve the world. Consider the task of education. Teaching children to read, write and do numbers is not a terribly modern thing. It has been done for centuries, and, occasionally, done rather successfully. But the education industry a subset of government exists as an ever-changing set of standards, techniques, and procedures, whose constantly changing results occasion ever-increasing testing, change, control, management and violence to yield frequently lesser results. This example could be, *mutatis mutandis*, multiplied over the whole of our increasingly dysfunctional culture. Every problem is greeted only with the question of how it might be fixed, with no one ever suggesting that the fixing of the world might be our largest problem. Again, this is not an all-or-nothing thing. The classical world was not passive nor was there an absence of change. Modernity has chosen economics as the measure of the good, treating increasing productivity as the engine of progress and prosperity and the primary measure of a better world. Debates over the best means of driving such productivity, whether through command-and-control or passive market forces, have been the primary arguments within modernity. There are many, many other goods that could be, and have been the measure of a culture. The only reason for using economic productivity is the false belief that material prosperity is the fount of all blessings. If we are rich enough, we will be happy. Remaking the Middle East has not only failed completely but cost hundreds of thousands of lives, a large proportion of which were complete innocents. The resulting chaos has been, at best, a distraction from our unrelenting pleasure in the entertainment industry, though our wars have generated a very popular genre of video game. Violence itself has become a consumer product. This picture of the modern world can, in the modern Christian mind, provoke an immediate response of wondering what can be done to change it. The difficult answer is to quit living as though modernity were true. How should we live? First, live as though in the coming of Jesus Christ, the Kingdom of God has been inaugurated into the world and the outcome of history has already been determined. Quit worrying Second, love people as the very image of God and resist the temptation to improve them. Third, refuse to make economics the basis of your life. Your job is not even of secondary importance. It gives it power that is not legitimate and enables a project that is anti-God. Fifth, learn to love your enemies. God did not place them in the world for us to fix or eliminate. If possible, refrain from violence. Sixth, raise the taking of human life to a matter of prime importance and refuse to accept violence as a means to peace. Every single life is a vast and irreplaceable treasure. Seventh, cultivate contentment rather than pleasure. It will help you consume less and free you from slavery to your economic masters. Eighth, as much as possible, think small. You are not in charge of the world. Love what is local, at hand, personal, intimate, unique, and natural. Ninth, learn another language. Very few things are better at teaching you about who you are not. Tenth, be thankful for everything, remembering that the world we live in and everything in it belongs to God. It is worth noting that when Roman soldiers approached John the Baptist and asked him how they should live, he told them to be content with their wages and to do violence to no one. They were in charge of the world in their day – or so they could mistakenly think.

**Chapter 9 : Violence in Society**

*The problem of violence in the modern world J. J. Carney May 17, The skulls of victims of the genocide in Rwanda are seen at the Kigali Memorial Center in Kigali, Rwanda, in this*

Maged Mandour 15 October The constant state of denial that is a feature of the urban middle class and the regime is a necessity to maintain a deeply paradoxical ideological construct. Mass repression in Egypt and the use of state violence has been growing since the coup of It was inaugurated with a series of massacres committed by the Egyptian security forces against the supporters of the deposed President, Mohamed Morsi, the most infamous of which is the Rabaa massacres, where , at least, protestors were killed in the worst incident of state violence in modern Egyptian history. This wave of repression would later expand to include members of all different parts of the political spectrum, including liberal, leftist and secular activists and bloggers, as well as, non-political citizens that happened to be in the wrong place and the wrong time. This has swelled the prison population to almost 60, political prisoners. This is coupled with mass forced disappearances , and what appears to be clear evidence of extra-judicial killings in Sinai and the use of heavy weaponry in civilian areas, which leads to heavy casualties among the local population. Interestingly, even though state violence has become a permanent feature of the lives of many Egyptians, the government and many of its urban middle class supporters have gone to considerable length to deny the existence of this phenomenon. Those denials were not only aimed at the international community, as one would expect autocratic regimes to do, but it also includes denials targeted at the local population, most notably the literate urban middle class, as one can distinguish by the source of the method of communication. For example, there are the several statements made by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in response to criticisms from the International human rights community, where it has denied the findings of the reports, as well as, criticized the objectivity of the different human rights organizations. On the other hand, there are other statements that are made by local politicians, Parliamentarians, and members of the National Council for Human Rights that are circulated locally and are intended for domestic consumption. For example, the stern denials issued by members of Parliament, when the HRW issued a report condemning the wide spread use of torture in Egyptian prisons. This went as far, as to claim that there are no political prisoners in Egypt, and, naturally, there is not torture. When it comes to mass disappearances, the same denials were issued, however, in a less decisive form, where there was an acknowledgment of some cases, however, it was not recognized as a mass phenomenon. Thus, even though the regime is following a deliberate policy of mass repression and violence, it is going through considerable length to deny this, and to communicate to its supporters its nominal adherence to Human Rights. This can be attributed to a number of factors that relate to the nature of the regime, the Brotherhood, the regional development and the urban middle class that intertwines to create an ideological construct that makes such denials necessary, even though the truth is in plain sight. First, in order to gain an initial understanding, one needs to analyse the genesis of the neo-military regime currently ruling the country and its contrast with its foe, namely, the Muslim Brotherhood. In , as the political crisis in Egypt was reaching its climax, the Brotherhood shifted its political discourse to the right, relying more on the support of hard-line Salafists. This shifted the rhetoric of the under-siege Brotherhood towards sectarian rhetoric and clear threats of violence. This, only, reinforced an image of the Brotherhood as the harbinger of extremist violence, an image that was already firmly developed in the minds of the urban middle class, which was mixed with class based prejudices due to the rural support base of the Brotherhood, which was seen by the urban middle class as uncivilized and barbaric. This fear was also compounded with the developments in Syria, where the rise of radical groups spawned a cycle of horrific violence, raising alarm bells in the minds of the urban middle class of the possible violence that can erupt if the Islamists, namely the Brotherhood and its increasingly vocal Salafi supporters are not kept in check. In reality, of course, this was not the case, as the military embarked on a campaign of mass repression and violence that targeted the mass of the population. However, as one can see from the ideological construct that the military created for itself as a force of modernity, there is a constant need to deny this, rather deliberate and obvious policy, of mass repression. Finally, one can argue that the

reception of the urban middle class to these arguments stems from the nature of this class and its genesis , which allowed it to create an image of itself as the harbinger of modernity in the mindset of the barbaric masses. As such, it saw the Islamist as an existential threat to its historic civilizing mission and the military as the tool to restore the balance. It also, could not, completely, condone the use of state violence at such a mass scale. Placing it in a delicate paradox, between the need to repress the Brotherhood, without excessive violence. Thus, the need for constant denial of what is a permanent feature of Egyptian social and political life, namely, the increased intensity of indiscriminate state repression. One can argue that the constant state of denial that is a feature of the urban middle class and the regime is a necessity for their existence. It is needed in order to maintain an ideological construct that is deeply paradoxical, where the use of repression is deemed necessary, however, it needs to be kept out of sight. As such, the constant exposure of human rights violations is not only needed to redress these violations, however, it is necessary since it exposes the entire ideological construct and forces the regime supporters to face their own hypocrisy. It also shows that, in fact, the violence being perpetuated by the regime is much more devastating than any imagined violence that could have been carried out by the Brotherhood. Follow him MagedMandour Related Articles.