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## Chapter 1 : Transcendence (philosophy) - Wikipedia

Heilbron, Johan () *French Moralists and the Anthropology of the Modern Era: On the Genesis of the Notions of "Interest and Commercial Society"*, in Johan Heilbron, Lars Magnusson and Björn Wittrock (eds) *The Rise of the Social Sciences and the Formation of Modernity: Conceptual Change in Context*, , pp.

Leading scholar in the sociology of religion and the sociology of knowledge. Frequent contributor to public policy debate. President, Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, *Developing a Sociology of Religion*

Berger first gained a national profile in the United States with the publication of two books in . He accused Protestant clergy of failing to meet the challenge of offering individuals in modern America a means for understanding and living in accordance with Christian beliefs. In attacking what many saw as the smug conservatism and spiritual emptiness of the Protestant establishment, Berger also drew attention to the social control functions it willingly performed. He viewed the church as giving legitimacy to the social fictions and injustices of the time. The power of a Christian faith rooted in transcendent experience and meanings was not being called upon in offering individual believers a more authentic existence. He had captured their concerns about the direction of mainstream Christianity in a rapidly changing world. Although he would later question the neo-orthodox content and "stern, quasi-Barthian" style of the theological perspective advocated in these early books, Berger nevertheless had begun expressing a number of important themes that would become central to his later works: Underlying all of these efforts was what would eventually become a highly influential theoretical perspective. During the first half of the s, Berger had begun to identify and integrate, in collaboration with Thomas Luckmann, among others, the key elements of this approach. Drawing upon influences as diverse as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Gehlen, and Pareto, and heavily indebted to members of the growing school of phenomenologists, most notably Alfred Schutz, this sociology of knowledge framework focused upon the meanings and social processes through which individuals construct reality in everyday life. In *The Sacred Canopy* Doubleday , he argued that, from a sociological perspective, religion must be understood as a social construction, a human projection of a sacred cosmos. Yet Berger characteristically reached beyond what might otherwise have been a strictly functionalist interpretation of religion to explore its social psychological implications. Religion, according to Berger, is essentially a set of alienated and alienating realities that become "internalized" within individual identity. Through religion, believers are offered crucial explanations and ultimate meanings needed for making sense of their lives and the surrounding universe, especially during times of personal or social crisis. Religion is a kind of "canopy" that shields individuals and, by implication, society from the ultimately destructive consequences of a seemingly chaotic, purposeless existence. *Methodological and Theoretical Positions With Sacred Canopy* , Berger outlined the analytical framework that would guide many of his subsequent efforts in the sociology of religion. He also identified some of the central methodological and theoretical questions and issues facing the discipline. Religious truth claims must always be "bracketed" in the sense that they cannot be verified using the tools of the social scientist. Berger has consistently maintained his commitment to these methodological principles in explaining and promoting his understanding of an interpretive sociology. On the level of theory, however, Berger has changed his views somewhat. *Sacred Canopy* , like many of his publications in the mid- to late s, examined in depth the challenges posed to religion in the modern world by secularization and pluralism. Berger focused on the dialectical relationship between these two phenomena. Secularization generates pluralism by undermining the plausibility structure of monopolistic religious institutions and beliefs. Pluralism, on the other hand, relativizes the taken-for-granted or "objective" nature of religious meaning systems, thereby encouraging secularization. Partly because of the Western bias then prevalent in sociological circles in the United States, secularization was seen by many sociologists, including Berger, as representing the more serious problem for religion. Beliefs and symbols had apparently become hollowed out, stripped of their former religious significance. The canopy that protected individuals and societies from the terrors of a chaotic, anomic cosmos

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no longer appeared so sacred or intact. Through the years, Berger has shifted much of his attention away from the secularization thesis to the study of pluralism. In the late s and early s, travel to non-Western religious cultures led him to question the inevitability of secularization. Even in the most "modern" societies, there was strong evidence of countersecular developments. Although secularization was not a spent force, it was less pervasive than once thought. Pluralism, however, seems to have raised critical problems for religion. The coexistence within a pluralistic society of multiple meaning systems, each with its own truth claims, has weakened the plausibility or certainty of religious traditions and beliefs. In many modern societies, religion has receded or been pushed almost entirely into the private sphere. For individuals living in those societies, religious commitment has become a highly personal choice what Berger has called "the heretical imperative" and subject to revisions resulting from ever changing sociocultural and biographical factors. Applying the sociological perspective with which he had analyzed religion, he now "relativized the relativizers" of religious beliefs by examining the socially constructed nature of modern consciousness. Modernity has not, Berger argued, negated the possibility of the supernatural. Rather, the secularism and pluralism of the modern age have made the theological task of uncovering religious truths more difficult. Berger proposed an "inductive approach," a return to the spirit of the liberal theology initiated by Friedrich Schleiermacher and his followers. With the benefit of phenomenological theory, this strategy would seek out "signals of transcendence" within modern human experience. Some question whether pluralism is a particularly new phenomenon in human history. Others believe that he has exaggerated its supposed unsettling effects on modern consciousness. Berger himself has not disputed the existence of pluralism in earlier eras. His argument has been that the scope and intensity of modern pluralism are historically unprecedented. Like any other social construction, however, pluralism and modernity itself is not inevitable. Even while speaking metaphorically about the "homeless mind" of modern individuals, Berger has consistently pointed to evidence of countermodern trends and the need for a critique of modernity that is informed by a multidisciplinary approach. In carrying out these tasks, they should avoid repeating their earlier failure to recognize countersecular developments and other indications of religious resurgence throughout the world. Theologians especially must not allow themselves to become conceptually or methodologically blinded to signals of transcendence. And, as one of the most frequently cited authors of the twentieth century, his influence has now extended far beyond the social sciences and religion. Perhaps a key reason for this phenomenon lies in the accessibility of his writing and the ultimately hopeful message in his thought. With a skillful and seemingly effortless style, he has applied a complex analytical framework to the core questions and dilemmas facing modern individuals and institutions. Unlike those of his contemporaries who see little of value in modernity, Berger has tempered his criticisms of modern excesses with an informed awareness that this age also brings with it significant human and spiritual possibilities.

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## Chapter 2 : The Po-Mo Page: Postmodern to Post-postmodern

*Wagner, modernity and the problem of transcendence-- 5. Memory, history and eternal recurrence: the aesthetics of time-- 6. Towards a physiological aesthetic-- 7.*

Political theory and philosophy of history. Decline of political science and restoration 2. The destruction of political science through positivism. The subordination of relevance to method. The nature of positivism. Accumulation of irrelevant facts. Misinterpretation of relevant facts. The movement of methodology. Objectivity through exclusion of value-judgments 3. The transitional position of Max Weber. The demonism of values. The reintroduction of values. The taboo on classic and Christian metaphysics. Positivism with regrets 4. The restoration of political science. Obstacles and success 1. Symbols in reality and concepts in science 2. Representation in the elemental sense 3. Insufficiency of the elemental concept of representation 4. Representation in the existential sense. Society in form for action. Representative and agent distinguished 5. Representation and social articulation. Writs of summons to Parliament. Western theory of representation. The consolidation of the realms in the fifteenth century. The myth of Troy. Constitutional and existential representative 9. Provincialism of contemporary theory of representation. Social symbolization and theoretical truth 2. Society as the representative of cosmic order. The Mongol Order of God. The monadism of imperial truth 3. The challenge to imperial truth. As a principle for the interpretation of society. As an instrument of political critique. The true order of the soul as a standard 5. The meaning of theory. Theory as an explication of experiences. The experiential basis of theory 6. The authority of theoretical truth. The opening of the soul. The psyche as the sensorium of transcendence. Plato on the types of theology 7. The meaning of action. The decision for Dike. From tragedy to philosophy 9. Representation in the transcendental sense. Theory as the science of order. The criterion of truth in science 3. The competing types of truth. Anthropological and soteriological truth 2. Varro and Saint Augustine on the types of theology 3. The political function of the Civitas Dei. The attack on the Roman cult. The affair of the Altar of Victoria. The pleas of Symmachus and Saint Ambrose. The Roman cult as a living issue. The existential issue in Roman civil theology. The truth of Rome against the truth of philosophy. The princeps as the existential representative. The principes as military and political leaders in the late republic. The imperial principate 6. The sacramental weakness of the imperial principate. Experiments in imperial theology. The experiment with Christianity 7. Celsus on the revolutionary character of Christianity 8. The metaphysical monotheism of Philo. The political theology of Eusebius of Caesarea. The end of political theology through trinitarianism 4. The victory of Christianity. De-divinization of the political sphere and re-divinization. Spiritual and temporal representation. The survival of the Roman idea in Western society 2. The symbolism of re-divinization. The trinitarian speculation of Joachim of Fiore. The National-Socialist Third Realm. Western recognition of the Russian problem. The Russian type of representation 3. The theoretical content of the new symbols. The eidos of history a fallacious construction. The types of fallacious immanentization of the eschaton: Motives and range of gnostic immanentism. The desire for certainty and the uncertainty of faith. The social success of Christianity and fall from faith. The recourse to gnostic self-divinization. The psychological range of types: The range of radicalization: The course of modernity. Origins in the ninth century. The problem of simultaneous progress and decline. The premium of salvation on civilizational action. Immortality of fame and the holes of oblivion. Spiritual death and the murder of God. Totalitarianism as the end form of progressive civilization 5. The Periodization of Western history. Modernity as the growth of Gnosticism. Modern age as a gnostic symbol. Modern age as gnostic revolution 2.

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## Chapter 3 : Nietzsche, aesthetics, and modernity in SearchWorks catalog

*ABSTRACT. Although philosophical and biographical accounts of Nietzsche and Wagner abound, the musical issues at stake in the late text *Der Fall Wagner (The Case of Wagner, )* have rarely been addressed within their wider cultural context.*

This is contrasted with immanence, where a god is said to be fully present in the physical world and thus accessible to creatures in various ways. In religious experience transcendence is a state of being that has overcome the limitations of physical existence and by some definitions has also become independent of it. Transcendence can be attributed to the divine not only in its being, but also in its knowledge. Thus, a god may transcend both the universe and knowledge is beyond the grasp of the human mind. Although transcendence is defined as the opposite of immanence, the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some theologians and metaphysicians of various religious traditions affirm that a god is both within and beyond the universe panentheism; in it, but not of it; simultaneously pervading it and surpassing it. Transcendental idealism and Transcendental arguments In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant introduced a new term "transcendental," thus instituting a new, third meaning. In his theory of knowledge, this concept is concerned with the condition of possibility of knowledge itself. He also opposed the term transcendental to the term transcendent, the latter meaning "that which goes beyond" transcends any possible knowledge of a human being. Transcendental philosophy, consequently, is not considered a traditional ontological form of metaphysics. Kant also equated transcendental with that which is "Ordinary knowledge is knowledge of objects; transcendental knowledge is knowledge of how it is possible for us to experience those objects as objects. Kant argues that the mind must contribute those features and make it possible for us to experience objects as objects. In the central part of his Critique of Pure Reason, the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories", Kant argues for a deep interconnection between the ability to have self-consciousness and the ability to experience a world of objects. Through a process of synthesis, the mind generates both the structure of objects and its own unity. A metaphilosophical question discussed by many Kantian scholars is how transcendental reflection is itself possible. Contemporary philosophy[ edit ] In phenomenology, the "transcendent" is that which transcends our own consciousness: Noema is employed in phenomenology to refer to the terminus of an intention as given for consciousness. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre uses transcendence to describe the relation of the self to the object oriented world, as well as our concrete relations with others. For Sartre, the for-itself is sometimes called a transcendence. Additionally if the other is viewed strictly as an object, much like any other object, then the other is, for the for-itself, a transcendence-transcended. When the for-itself grasps the other in the others world, and grasps the subjectivity that the other has, it is referred to as transcending-transcendence. Thus, Sartre defines relations with others in terms of transcendence. Holz liberated transcendental philosophy from the convergence of neo-Kantianism, he critically discussed transcendental pragmatism and the relation between transcendental philosophy, neo-empiricism and the so-called postmodernism. Colloquial usage[ edit ] In everyday language, "transcendence" means "going beyond", and "self-transcendence" means going beyond a prior form or state of oneself. Mystical experience is thought of as a particularly advanced state of self-transcendence, in which the sense of a separate self is abandoned.

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## Chapter 4 : Adam Seligman » Department of Religion | Boston University

*Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity analyses Nietzsche's response to the aesthetic tradition, tracing in particular the complex relationship between the work and thought of Nietzsche, Kant and Hegel. Focusing in particular on the critical role of negation and sublimity in Nietzsche's account of art.*

In culture and the arts, interpreters of this era describe the kinds of cultural hybrids that emerge from mixing or rendering inoperative the categories of "high" and "low" cultures, and hybrids in cultural forms that have developed in regions where local identities seek definition against, or in dialog with, Western "hegemonic" cultures the mixing of "official" cultures and those defined as "other" in modernist ideologies. Postmodern views of history and national identity typically cancel a commitment to modern "master narratives" or "metanarratives" like progress and goal-directed history, and disrupt myths of national and ethnic identities as "natural" foundations of "unity. In all the discourse, we need to differentiate the terms and concepts of the postmodern as a condition of a historical era or postmodernity as simply what we are in whether we know it or not , and postmodernism reflected in movements with varying levels of intention and self-awareness , When interpreters of culture discuss postmodern strategies or features in architecture, literature, philosophy, and the arts, this usually includes uses of irony, parody, sampling, mixing "high" and "low" popular cultural sources, horizontal vs. The global economic system since the s has moved toward the international merging of cultures and the global marketing of cultural goods. Many see the features of postmodernism that are associated with the self-reflexive critique of society, culture, politics, and economics as already part of modernism, and thus an extension of "modernism. The post-postmodern viewpoint wherever we are today after having absorbed the issues in postmodernism seems to be taking the "postmodern condition" postmodernity as a given and creating new remixed works disassociated from the modern-postmodern arguments and oppositions. The post-postmodern takes the "always already" mixed condition of sources, identities, and new works as a given, not a question or problem. The metaphors of "network" and "convergence" in creative subcultures e. From this more recent perspective, living in remixed hybridity is thus obligatory, not a choice, since it is the foundation for participating in a living, networked, globally connected culture. We could also argue that the terms in the discourses about the postmodern are no longer be useful, or need to be redefined to be useful for today. Either way, the point is thinking through the problems and seeing if there are terms that do useful cultural work for us. And since around , a new debate on the "post-postmodern" has opened up. There is a shared sense in many areas of cultural practice and university research that many of the issues in postmodernism are over or assumed, and the we are now in a different global moment, however that it to define. As we know, each discourse concerned with history constructs its own historical objects. Postmodern theory constructs an image of modernism. Was there ever a pre-postmodern consensus about history, identity, core cultural values? A Report on Knowledge. Postmodernism as a movement in arts and culture corresponding to a new configuration of politics and economics, "late capitalism": Postmodernity as a phase of knowing and practice, abandoning the assumptions, prejudices, and constraints of modernism to embrace the contradictions, irony, and profusion of pop and mass culture. The grand linear narrative of art history and Western cultural history is exposed as ideological and constructed for class interests. These terms that insistently gesture to the beyond, only embody its restless and revisionary energy if they transform the present into an expanded and ex-centric site of experience and empowerment. Postmodernity, History, Mediation, and Representation Crises in the Representation of History Postmodern historians and philosophers question the representation of history and cultural identities: Art works are likewise caught up in the problem of representation and mediation--of what, for whom, from what ideological point of view? History requires representation, mediation, in narrative, a story-form encoded as historical. Dissolution of the transparency of history and tradition: Can we get to the unmediated referents of history? Multiculturalism, competing views of history and tradition. History and identity politics: Hence empathy with the victor invariably benefits the rulers. Historical materialists know



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what that means. Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. According to traditional practice, the spoils are carried along in the procession. They are called cultural treasures, and a historical materialist views them with cautious detachment. They owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries. There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. Debord and Baudrillard 2 "the fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual presents" "the erosion of the older distinction between high culture and so-called mass or popular culture" Jameson. Pastiche and parody of multiple styles: No individualism or individual style, voice, expressive identity. All signifiers circulate and recirculate prior and existing images and styles. The postmodern in advertising: Some features of postmodern styles: History has become one of the styles; historical representations blend with nostalgia. The information function of the media would thus be to help us to forget, to serve as the very agents and mechanisms of our historical amnesia" Jameson. Did this ever exist? Culture on Fast Forward: Time and history replaced by speed, futureness, accelerated obsolescence. The Modern and the Postmodern: Contrasting Tendencies The features in the table below are only often-discussed tendencies, not absolutes. In fact, the tendency to see things in seemingly obvious, binary, contrasting categories is usually associated with modernism. The tendency to dissolve binary categories and expose their arbitrary cultural co-dependency is associated with postmodernism. For heuristic purposes only. Myths of cultural and ethnic origin accepted as received. Progress accepted as driving force behind history. Suspicion and rejection of Master Narratives for history and culture; local narratives, ironic deconstruction of master narratives: Faith in "Grand Theory" totalizing explanations in history, science and culture to represent all knowledge and explain everything. Rejection of totalizing theories; pursuit of localizing and contingent theories. Master narrative of progress through science and technology. Skepticism of idea of progress, anti-technology reactions, neo-Luddism; new age religions. Idea of "the family" as central unit of social order: Alternative family units, alternatives to middle-class marriage model, multiple identities for couplings and childraising. Polysexuality, exposure of repressed homosexual and homosocial realities in cultures. Hierarchy, order, centralized control. Subverted order, loss of centralized control, fragmentation. Faith and personal investment in big politics Nation-State, party. Trust and investment in micropolitics, identity politics, local politics, institutional power struggles. Faith in "Depth" meaning, value, content, the signified over "Surface" appearances, the superficial, the signifier. Attention to play of surfaces, images, signifiers without concern for "Depth". Relational and horizontal differences, differentiations. Crisis in representation and status of the image after photography and mass media. Culture adapting to simulation, visual media becoming undifferentiated equivalent forms, simulation and real-time media substituting for the real. Faith in the "real" beyond media, language, symbols, and representations; authenticity of "originals. Dichotomy of high and low culture official vs. Imposed consensus that high or official culture is normative and authoritative, the ground of value and discrimination. Disruption of the dominance of high culture by popular culture. Mass culture, mass consumption, mass marketing. Demassified culture; niche products and marketing, smaller group identities. Art as unique object and finished work authenticated by artist and validated by agreed upon standards. Art as process, performance, production, intertextuality. Art as recycling of culture authenticated by audience and validated in subcultures sharing identity with the artist. Knowledge mastery, attempts to embrace a totality. Quest for interdisciplinary harmony. The Library and The Encyclopedia. Navigation through information overload, information management; fragmented, partial knowledge; just-in-time knowledge. Broadcast media, centralized one-to-many communications. Digital, interactive, client-server, distributed, user-motivated, individualized, many-to-many media. Internet file sharing, the Web and Web 2.

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## Chapter 5 : Vol.5 Modernity without Restraint

*'The Ring's problems and flaws are those of the terrestrial, human world.' deaf to the first whispers of modernity. That is the transcendence that is such an integral part of genius.*

This article has been viewed times. This article been downloaded 0 times. Dit artikel wordt geciteerd in 1 Introduction The Board of Trustees of the Hans Kelsen Institut HKI has decided, after much hesitation, consultation and deliberation, to publish one more posthumous work by Hans Kelsen – a book he himself withdrew from the press several times, the last time in from the University of California Press, and after due payment of considerable compensations to the publishing house. References to this book in the text are by the siglum SR plus page number. We do not know exactly why Kelsen withdrew the manuscript at the very last moment. There is some evidence that he eventually left the decision whether to publish it or not after his death, to some of his close friends, most notably Lewis Feuer. His daughter Maria has confirmed this to the HKI. But it was Richard Potz the author of a brief Introduction to the edition who finally convinced the HKI that the text should be published after new research of both the manuscript and the archives that were meanwhile trusted to the HKI. The main reason for accepting this proposal was that the trustees believed it to be topical again , against the backdrop of contemporary developments in science, politics, and religion. Nor will I dispute the somewhat remarkable decision by the HKI Trust to have this text published separately from the Hans Kelsen Werke and with a different publisher. Such attempts do not just try to re-describe these works in their own terms, as if, for instance, Marxism or liberalism were peculiar phenomena. Nor do they purport to merely chart interesting analogies between religion and these works. Nor do they point out the continuities between, for instance, medieval Christian philosophy and modern metaphysics as Heidegger did. Their purpose, Kelsen diagnoses, is a specific type of orthodoxy. They hold, in a manifold of variations on the same theme, that a well-ordered political community is impossible without the concept of transcendence;4xRichard Potz, in SR, VII. Far be it from Kelsen to defend, e. This is why I think that main thesis of SR can be summarized in a rather brief paragraph, even if the evidence that Kelsen submits in support of it is very elaborate indeed. He explains time and again that concepts like progress, perfection, redemption, salvation, sovereignty, and their ilk, are perfectly understandable in secular terms and should be assessed by secular criteria. The first edition was published in Wien, , but Voegelin complains in the preface to the second edition that the publisher was a national-socialist, who did not much to sell it because he says it was critical of Nazi ideology. The source of political critique lies elsewhere. It is not just a deficient mode of being, something negative, but rather a positive force that attracts and fascinates us. It can only be resisted if it is identified, first and foremost, at a level beyond our moral concerns, i. Voegelin points to, in particular, the dimensions of hierarchy, community, and apocalypse. Here one will find the political pertinence of religion, indeed all genuine religion. Around the middle of the twentieth century Voegelin made a further step. MIT Press, , More in particular, he took the view that the answers of Modernity amounted to a renaissance of second-century Gnosticism. Gnosticism is considered an esoteric Christian heresy, preaching salvation through the pursuit of mystical knowledge that would sort out, ultimately, the dichotomy between good and evil as co-original and co-equal forces of creation. As Hans Jonas observed: Finally, they posit a radical dualism of ontic realms – God and world, spirit and matter, light and darkness, good and evil, life and death – hence an extreme polarization of existence; not just of human existence but of reality as a whole. Het Spectrum, , 46 [my translation; italics in the original]. But Voegelin holds that this conception of transcendence is false. If the two forces are radically immanent to creation, gnostic mysticism basically claims to have access to transcendent reality after all, and to pursue a form of knowledge that encompasses reality in toto, thus absorbing a transcendent world into the immanent one. He aims to show that any theoretical endeavor that erases transcendent principles of world order; that pretends to explain the whole world by immanent laws of causation in science ; and that orders the whole world according to entirely immanent values in politics , must

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be gnostic in principle if not in practice. Thus he concludes that, in the final analysis, these theories are religious ideologies in disguise. By attributing secular, hence immanent values to what are, at bottom, transcendent variables, such theories are virtually totalitarian. They usher in the thought that man is justified in crowning himself as the great creator of the world in toto, and the king of its political order. Science and democracy should therefore be regarded as established paradigms of the Modern Age. What is it, one may ask, that drove him to level such an extensive form of criticism against Voegelin and his fellow-travelers? However, transcendence does not carry the same meaning for Schmitt and for Voegelin. For the former, it means essentially the radical heteronomy of a decision with regard to any form of legal rationality. For Voegelin, it refers back to the subsuming of the legal order to a higher ethical and metaphysical order in which its original meaning is to be found. The two political models are dependent upon radically different theological models. The decisionist political model of Schmitt analogically corresponds to the theology of the *potentia absoluta Dei*, the model for which may be found in late medieval Scotist and Occamist theologies. Voegelin, for his part, refers to a theology of Platonic inspiration in which the divine is understood not as radical otherness but as the transcendent good to which the human soul remains naturally open. The problem is that, in spite of its transcendence, it has to register in the immanent world where it is to be obeyed and responded to by enactment of norms. This again is precisely why, for Voegelin, this model does not articulate genuine transcendence. For him the relationship between religion and politics is not that of a structural analogy, but of a fundamental openness to what is all-encompassing good and true. Man in the polity is inherently geared to a realm of transcendence. This experience preserves the finiteness of the political, preempts its self-constitution as a mundane theology irrespective, moreover, of the precise institutional form, while conserving the fundamental restlessness of mankind and its openness to the question of foundational transcendence. Schmitt, in turn, rejects such a model of transcendence as it hinges on a form of spontaneous anticipation of and participation in a transcendent reality. For him this is an extension of immanence rather than transcendence. So what for Schmitt is transcendent is immanent for Voegelin and vice versa. They remain perennial antagonists. It comes with splitting the whole of mankind in two; the redeemed destined to enter the perfect world and the rest destined to stay behind. It proposes to discriminate the latter from the former, at a stage as early as possible. It calls for drawing a dividing line by an appeal to divine authority, as well as for guardians who claim to be empowered by such authority to draw and defend this line. These guardians will acknowledge no reason whatsoever to hold back or to step back, as they will see themselves as the sole promoters of eternal truth and eternal peace. Gallimard, [], IV, 8. He intends to enlighten Enlightenment, so to speak. Perhaps this explains why he so vigorously charges them out of his study, only to hesitate whether his annoyance should be sufficient reason to publish his attack. Meanwhile, however, we are left with a serious problem about the conception of transcendence in a philosophical account of politics. As these two models are radically different to the point where they become mutually exclusive, it is tempting to think that they exhaust the options. This remains to be seen. Is the scission between the two realms really inherent to the concept of transcendence? Is it possible to develop an alternative model? It seems desirable to try for at least two reasons. One of the conceptual challenges posed by the resurgence of religious fundamentalism in Modernity is to articulate transcendent dimensions of the immanent world in ways that avoid the dichotomy between immanence and transcendence, i. The project may have failed, for many of the reasons that Kelsen advanced. But it was not necessarily ill-directed. While the former reason is mainly reactive, the latter is much more proactive. So let me point, in the briefest of words, to some examples from very different regions of philosophy. The first one hails from esthetic experience, that crucially hinges on the apprehension of so-called depth-clues in, e. The experience of such clues which, in painting, may be lines, shades of color, scattered patches, etc. Oxford University Press, , In one sense the work of music has no identity: For the work is what we hear or are intended to hear in a sequence of sounds, when we hear them as music. And this "the intentional object of musical perception" can be identified only through metaphors, which is to say, only through descriptions that are false. There is nothing in the material world of sound that is



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the work of music. But this should not prompt those metaphysical fantasies that lead philosophers to situate the work of music in another world, or another dimension, or another level of being. Clarendon Press, , 3. But this does not entail that there exists a second world corresponding to our representations. A third example has to come from, indeed, religious belief. But for many of them, this does not necessarily imply the belief in a transcendent world. In many African religions, for instance, ancestors who passed away are very much present in the world their worshippers live in. In Buddhism, what transcends suffering and death is a way rather than a world, a path of self-transcendence. George Grimm, *Die Lehre des Buddha. Die Religion der Vernunft und der Meditation*. Hoppe, New Edition Baden-Baden: Holle Verlag, , 5, 15 and passim. Kelsen SR 24 n. The sense of direction needed to follow this path does not entail the projection of a world by any standard, as it is indicated by what one has to leave behind rather than what one desires to achieve. These short notes suffice to show that there may be scope for a conception of transcendence that evades the pitfalls of hypostatizing a transcendent world. Rousseau started out in a Kelsenian vein. Hereinafter CS, with the number of the book and the chapter. It is the kind of question that the Middle Ages put on the table of thought and which they answered by the category of creation "creation from nothing. Antiquity did not know that question. And he really goes for reoccupation when he adds: Let us call on the philosopher to answer a question that the theologian has treated only to the detriment of mankind.

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### Chapter 6 : Opera and Modern Culture by Lawrence Kramer - Paperback - University of California Press

*The problem is that, in spite of its transcendence, it has to register in the immanent world where it is to be obeyed and responded to by enactment of norms. It can only count as 'an intramundane realization of the divine.'* 18 x Gontier, 'From "Political Theology" to "Political Religion,"'

His father died in 1844, and the family relocated to Naumburg, where he grew up in a household comprising his mother, grandmother, two aunts, and his younger sister, Elisabeth. Nietzsche had a brilliant school and university career, culminating in May 1869 when he was called to a chair in classical philology at Basel. At age 24, he was the youngest ever appointed to that post. Before the opportunity at Basel arose, Nietzsche had planned to pursue a second Ph.D. When he was a student in Leipzig, Nietzsche met Richard Wagner, and after his move to Basel, he became a frequent guest in the Wagner household at Villa Tribschen in Lucerne. His first book, *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*, was not the careful work of classical scholarship the field might have expected, but a controversial polemic combining speculations about the collapse of the tragic culture of fifth century Athens with a proposal that Wagnerian music-drama might become the source of a renewed tragic culture for contemporary Germany. These essays are known collectively as the *Untimely Meditations*. When he sent the book to the Wagners early in 1872, it effectively ended their friendship: As a result, he was freed to write and to develop the style that suited him. He published a book almost every year thereafter. These works began with *Daybreak*, which collected critical observations on morality and its underlying psychology, and there followed the mature works for which Nietzsche is best known: *In later years*, Nietzsche moved frequently in the effort to find a climate that would improve his health, settling into a pattern of spending winters near the Mediterranean usually in Italy and summers in Sils Maria, Switzerland. His symptoms included intense headaches, nausea, and trouble with his eyesight. Recent work Huenemann has convincingly argued that he probably suffered from a retro-orbital meningioma, a slow-growing tumor on the brain surface behind his right eye. In January 1890, Nietzsche collapsed in the street in Turin, and when he regained consciousness he wrote a series of increasingly deranged letters. His close Basel friend Franz Overbeck was gravely concerned and travelled to Turin, where he found Nietzsche suffering from dementia. After unsuccessful treatment in Basel and Jena, he was released into the care of his mother, and later his sister, eventually lapsing entirely into silence. He lived on until 1896, when he died of a stroke complicated by pneumonia. *Critique of Religion and Morality* Nietzsche is arguably most famous for his criticisms of traditional European moral commitments, together with their foundations in Christianity. This critique is very wide-ranging; it aims to undermine not just religious faith or philosophical moral theory, but also many central aspects of ordinary moral consciousness, some of which are difficult to imagine doing without. By the time Nietzsche wrote, it was common for European intellectuals to assume that such ideas, however much inspiration they owed to the Christian intellectual and faith tradition, needed a rational grounding independent from particular sectarian or even ecumenical religious commitments. Then as now, most philosophers assumed that a secular vindication of morality would surely be forthcoming and would save the large majority of our standard commitments. Christianity no longer commands society-wide cultural allegiance as a framework grounding ethical commitments, and thus, a common basis for collective life that was supposed to have been immutable and invulnerable has turned out to be not only less stable than we assumed, but incomprehensibly mortal—and in fact, already lost. The response called for by such a turn of events is mourning and deep disorientation. Indeed, the case is even worse than that, according to Nietzsche. Not only do standard moral commitments lack a foundation we thought they had, but stripped of their veneer of unquestionable authority, they prove to have been not just baseless but positively harmful. Unfortunately, the moralization of our lives has insidiously attached itself to genuine psychological needs—some basic to our condition, others cultivated by the conditions of life under morality—so its corrosive effects cannot simply be removed without further psychological damage. Still worse, the damaging side of morality has implanted itself

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within us in the form of a genuine self-understanding, making it hard for us to imagine ourselves living any other way. Thus, Nietzsche argues, we are faced with a difficult, long term restoration project in which the most cherished aspects of our way of life must be ruthlessly investigated, dismantled, and then reconstructed in healthier form—all while we continue somehow to sail the ship of our common ethical life on the high seas. The most extensive development of this Nietzschean critique of morality appears in his late work *On the Genealogy of Morality*, which consists of three treatises, each devoted to the psychological examination of a central moral idea. In the First Treatise, Nietzsche takes up the idea that moral consciousness consists fundamentally in altruistic concern for others. He begins by observing a striking fact, namely, that this widespread conception of what morality is all about—while entirely commonsensical to us—is not the essence of any possible morality, but a historical innovation. In such a system, goodness is associated with exclusive virtues. There is no thought that everyone should be excellent—the very idea makes no sense, since to be excellent is to be distinguished from the ordinary run of people. Nietzsche shows rather convincingly that this pattern of assessment was dominant in ancient Mediterranean culture the Homeric world, later Greek and Roman society, and even much of ancient philosophical ethics. It focuses its negative evaluation evil on violations of the interests or well-being of others—and consequently its positive evaluation good on altruistic concern for their welfare. Such a morality needs to have universalistic pretensions: It is thereby especially amenable to ideas of basic human equality, starting from the thought that each person has an equal claim to moral consideration and respect. The exact nature of this alleged revolt is a matter of ongoing scholarly controversy in recent literature, see Bittner ; Reginster ; Migotti ; Ridley ; May Afterward, via negation of the concept of evil, the new concept of goodness emerges, rooted in altruistic concern of a sort that would inhibit evil actions. For Nietzsche, then, our morality amounts to a vindictive effort to poison the happiness of the fortunate GM III, 14 , instead of a high-minded, dispassionate, and strictly rational concern for others. That said, Nietzsche offers two strands of evidence sufficient to give pause to an open minded reader. Second, Nietzsche observes with confidence-shaking perspicacity how frequently indignant moralistic condemnation itself, whether arising in serious criminal or public matters or from more private personal interactions, can detach itself from any measured assessment of the wrong and devolve into a free-floating expression of vengeful resentment against some real or imagined perpetrator. The First Treatise does little, however, to suggest why inhabitants of a noble morality might be at all moved by such condemnations, generating a question about how the moral revaluation could have succeeded. The Second Treatise, about guilt and bad conscience, offers some materials toward an answer to this puzzle. Nietzsche begins from the insight that guilt bears a close conceptual connection to the notion of debt. The pure idea of moralized guilt answers this need by tying any wrong action inextricably and uniquely to a blamable agent. As we saw, the impulse to assign blame was central to the resentment that motivated the moral revaluation of values, according to the First Treatise. Thus, insofar as people even nobles become susceptible to such moralized guilt, they might also become vulnerable to the revaluation, and Nietzsche offers some speculations about how and why this might happen GM II, 16— These criticisms have attracted an increasingly subtle secondary literature; see Reginster , as well as Williams a, b , Ridley , May In such cases, free-floating guilt can lose its social and moral point and develop into something hard to distinguish from a pathological desire for self-punishment. Ascetic self-denial is a curious phenomenon indeed, on certain psychological assumptions, like descriptive psychological egoism or ordinary hedonism, it seems incomprehensible , but it is nevertheless strikingly widespread in the history of religious practice. One obvious route to such a value system, though far from the only one, is for the moralist to identify a set of drives and desires that people are bound to have—perhaps rooted in their human or animal nature—and to condemn those as evil; anti-sensualist forms of asceticism follow this path. As Nietzsche emphasizes, purified guilt is naturally recruited as a tool for developing asceticism. Suffering is an inevitable part of the human condition, and the ascetic strategy is to interpret such suffering as punishment, thereby connecting it to the notion of guilt. Despite turning her own suffering against her, the move paradoxically offers certain advantages to the agent—not only does her suffering gain an

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explanation and moral justification, but her own activity can be validated by being enlisted on the side of punishment self-castigation: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; still more precisely, a perpetrator, still more specifically, a guilty perpetrator who is susceptible to suffering, and the ascetic priests says to him: GM III, 15 Thus, Nietzsche suggests, The principal bow stroke the ascetic priest allowed himself to cause the human soul to resound with wrenching and ecstatic music of every kind was executedâ€”everyone knows thisâ€”by exploiting the feeling of guilt. Consider, for example, the stance of Schopenhauerian pessimism, according to which human life and the world have negative absolute value. From that standpoint, the moralist can perfectly well allow that ascetic valuation is self-punishing and even destructive for the moral agent, but such conclusions are entirely consistent withâ€”indeed, they seem like warranted responses toâ€”the pessimistic evaluation. That is, if life is an inherent evil and nothingness is a concrete improvement over existence, then diminishing or impairing life through asceticism yields a net enhancement of value. While asceticism imposes self-discipline on the sick practitioner, it simultaneously makes the person sicker, plunging her into intensified inner conflict GM III, 15, 20â€” While this section has focused on the Genealogy, it is worth noting that its three studies are offered only as examples of Nietzschean skepticism about conventional moral ideas. Nietzsche tried out many different arguments against pity and compassion beginning already in Human, All-too-human and continuing to the end of his productive lifeâ€”for discussion, see Reginster , Janaway forthcoming , and Nussbaum Nietzsche resists the hedonistic doctrine that pleasure and pain lie at the basis of all value claims, which would be the most natural way to defend such a presupposition. From that point of view, the morality of compassion looks both presumptuous and misguided. It is misguided both because it runs the risk of robbing individuals of their opportunity to make something positive individually meaningful out of their suffering, and because the global devaluation of suffering as such dismisses in advance the potentially valuable aspects of our general condition as vulnerable and finite creatures GS ; compare Williams For him, however, human beings remain valuing creatures in the last analysis. It follows that no critique of traditional values could be practically effective without suggesting replacement values capable of meeting our needs as valuers see GS ; Anderson , esp. Nietzsche thought it was the job of philosophers to create such values BGE , so readers have long and rightly expected to find an account of value creation in his works. There is something to this reaction: It is common, if not altogether standard, to explain values by contrasting them against mere desires. If I become convinced that something I valued is not in fact valuable, that discovery is normally sufficient to provoke me to revise my value, suggesting that valuing must be responsive to the world; by contrast, subjective desires often persist even in the face of my judgment that their objects are not properly desirable, or are unattainable; see the entries on value theory and desire. We [contemplatives] â€” are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: Only we have created the world that concerns man! Some scholars take the value creation passages as evidence that Nietzsche was an anti-realist about value, so that his confident evaluative judgments should be read as efforts at rhetorical persuasion rather than objective claims Leiter , or relatedly they suggest that Nietzsche could fruitfully be read as a skeptic, so that such passages should be evaluated primarily for their practical effect on readers Berry ; see also Leiter Others Hussain take Nietzsche to be advocating a fictionalist posture, according to which values are self-consciously invented contributions to a pretense through which we can satisfy our needs as valuing creatures, even though all evaluative claims are strictly speaking false. First, while a few passages appear to offer a conception of value creation as some kind of legislative fiat e. Second, a great many of the passages esp. GS 78, , , , connect value creation to artistic creation, suggesting that Nietzsche took artistic creation and aesthetic value as an important paradigm or metaphor for his account of values and value creation more generally. While some Soll attack this entire idea as confused, other scholars have called on these passages as support for either fictionalist or subjective realist interpretations. In addition to showing that not all value creation leads to results that Nietzsche would endorse, this observation leads to interesting questionsâ€”e. If so, what differentiates the two modes? Can we say anything about which is to be preferred? Nietzsche praises many different values, and in the main, he does not

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follow the stereotypically philosophical strategy of deriving his evaluative judgments from one or a few foundational principles. A well-known passage appears near the opening of the late work, *The Antichrist*: Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. Everything that is born of weakness. The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. That doctrine seems to include the proposal that creatures like us or more broadly: The same conception has been developed by Paul Katsafanas, who argues that, qua agents, we are ineluctably committed to valuing power because a Regier-style will to power is a constitutive condition on acting at all. His account thereby contributes to the constitutivist strategy in ethics pioneered by Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman. On this view, what Nietzsche values as power understood as a tendency toward growth, strength, domination, or expansion Schacht Leiter is surely right to raise worries about the Millian reconstruction. Nietzsche apparently takes us to be committed to a wide diversity of first order aims, which raises prima facie doubts about the idea that for him all willing really takes power as its first-order aim as the Millian argument would require. It is not clear that this view can avoid the objection rooted in the possibility of pessimism. Given his engagement with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche should have been sensitive to the worry. According to Regier I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful.



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## Chapter 7 : Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity : Matthew Rampley :

*humanity's redemption lie in the (music of the) future, so, in the predicament of the modern now, Wagner supplies a substitute through the delirious, expressive, 'extraverbal' manner-*

On September 28, , he married Brigitte Kellner, herself an eminent sociologist who was on the faculty at Wellesley College and Boston University where she was the chair of the sociology department at both schools. Brigitte was born in Eastern Germany in . She moved to the United States in the mids. She was a sociologist who focused on the sociology of the family, arguing that the nuclear family was one of the main causes of modernization. Although she studied traditional families, she supported same-sex relationships. Brigitte Kellner Berger died May 28, National Security in Germany and Japan . He attended a British High school, St. Following the German bombings of Haifa , he was evacuated to Mt. Carmel , where he developed his life-long interest in religion. From to Berger was an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro ; from to he was an associate professor at Hartford Theological Seminary. He retired from BU in . It is a world-center for research, education, and public scholarship on religion and world affairs. Some of the questions it attempts to answer are: How do religion and values affect political, economic, and public ethical developments around the world? Defying earlier forecasts, why have religious actors and ideas become more rather than less globally powerful in recent years? CURA has over projects in 40 countries. This reality includes things from ordinary language to large-scale institutions. Our lives are governed by the knowledge about the world that we have and use the information that is relevant to our lives. We take into account typificatory schemes, which are general assumptions about society. Social structure is the total of all these typificatory schemes. Everyday life is contrasted with other spheres of reality " dreamworlds, theatre " and is considered by a person to be the objective, intersubjective shared with others and self-evident. Life is ordered spatially and temporally. The reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not require additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and compelling facticity. Humans perceive the other in these interactions as more real than they would themselves; we can place a person in everyday life by seeing them, yet we need to contemplate our own placement in the world as it is not so concrete. Berger believes that although you know yourself on a much deeper scale than you would the other person, they are more real to you because they are constantly making "What he is" available to you. It is difficult to recognize "What I am" without separating oneself from the conversation and reflecting on it. People understand knowledge through language. The knowledge relevant to us is the only necessary knowledge to our survival, but humans interact through sharing and connecting the relevant structures of our lives with each other. At the subjective level, people find reality personally meaningful and created by human beings in aspects such as personal friendships. Society as objective and subjective[ edit ] Objectively, social order is a product of our social enterprise: Institutions are a product of the historicity and need to control human habituation the repeated behaviours or patterns. The shared nature of these experiences and their commonality results in sedimentation, meaning they lose their memorability. Many behaviours lose sedimented institutional meanings. Institutional order involves specified roles for people to play. These roles are seen as performing as this objective figure " an employee is not judged as a human but by that role they have taken. The process of building a socially-constructed reality takes place in three phases. Initially, externalization is the first step in which humans pour out meaning both mental and physical into their reality, thus creating things through language. In externalization, social actors create their social worlds and it is seen through action. In this third phase, internalization, the external, objective world to a person becomes part of their internal, subjective world. Our identity and the society are seen as dialectically related: People have the ability to do whatever they want in these spheres, but socialization causes people to only choose certain sexual partners or certain foods to eat to satisfy biological needs. It is considered as a view that relates more to the humanities " literature, philosophy " than to social science. Its ultimate purpose lies in freeing society of

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illusions to help make it more humane. In this sense, we are the "puppets of society," but sociology allows us to see the strings that we are attached to, which helps to free ourselves. The study of sociology, Berger posits, should be value-free. Research should be accrued in the same manner as the scientific method, using observation, hypothesis, testing, data, analysis and generalization. The meaning derived from the results of research should be contextualized with historical, cultural, environmental, or other important data. Sociologists are a part of a multitude of fields, not just social work. Berger stated that sociology is not a practice, but an attempt to understand the social world. These understandings could be used by people in any field for whatever purpose and with whatever moral implications. He believed that sociologists, even if their values varied greatly, should at the very least have scientific integrity. Sociologists are only humans and will still have to deal with things such as convictions, emotions, and prejudices, but being trained in sociology should learn to understand and control these things and try to eliminate them from their work. Sociology is a science, and its findings are found through observation of certain rules of evidence that allow people to repeat and continue to develop the findings. This is upheld through legitimacy, either giving special meaning to these behaviors or by creating a structure of knowledge that enhances the plausibility of the nomos. This, in turn, spread capitalism and its ideals and beliefs of individualism and rationalization and separated Christians from their Gods. With globalization, even more beliefs and cultures were confronted with this. There is no plausibility structure for any system of beliefs in the modern world; people are made to choose their own with no anchors to our own perceptions of reality. This lowers feelings of belonging and forces our own subjectivities onto themselves. Berger called this a "homelessness of the mind. Berger believed resolving community in modern society needs to emphasize the role of "mediating structures" in their lives to counter the alienation of modernity. Human existence in the age of modernity requires there to be structures like church, neighbourhood, and family to help establish a sense of belonging rooted in a commitment to values or beliefs. This builds a sense of community and belonging in an individual. In addition, these structures can serve a role in addressing larger social problems without the alienation that larger society creates. The role of mediating structures in civil society is both private and public, in this sense. Berger believes pluralism exists in two ways. The first being that many religions and worldviews coexist in the same society. The second is the coexistence of the secular discourse with all these religious discourses. Some people avoid pluralism by only operating within their own secular or religious discourse, meaning they do not interact with others outside of their beliefs. Pluralism generally today is that it is globalized. Berger sees benefits in pluralism. One is that pluralism makes complete consensus in beliefs very rare, which allows people to form and hold their own beliefs without trying to conform to a society that holds all the same beliefs. This ties into the second benefit which is that pluralism gives freedom and allows people free decisions. Another benefit is that if pluralism is connected to religious freedom, religious institutions now become voluntary associations. Lastly, pluralism influences individual believers and religious communities to define the core of their faith separately from less central elements, which allows people to pick and choose certain aspects of their chosen form of belief that they may or may not agree with, while still remaining true to the central parts of it. Berger calls these "rumours of angels". People feel in times of great joy, in never-ending pursuit of order against chaos, in the existence of objective evil, and in the sense of hope that there exists some supernatural reality beyond that of human existence. People who choose to believe in the existence of a supernatural other require faith "a wager of belief against doubt" in the modern rationalised world. Knowledge can no longer sufficiently ground human belief in the pluralized world, forcing people to wager their own beliefs against the current of doubt in our society. Nicholas Abercrombie begins by examining his reformation of the sociology of knowledge. Shifting his focus on the subjective reality of everyday life, Berger enters a dialogue with traditional sociologies of knowledge "more specific, those of Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim. Abercrombie digs deeper into this dialogue Berger brings up, and he considers ways in which Berger goes beyond these figures. He views it as a result of what was known as the middle class into two groups: Weber focused on the empirical realities of rationality as a characteristic of action and rationalization. Therefore, much of the

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empirical work of Berger and Weber have revolved around the relationship between modern rationalization and options for social action. Weber argued that rationalism can mean a variety of things at the subjective level of consciousness and at the objective level of social institutions.

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## Chapter 8 : Friedrich Nietzsche (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*The real legacy of Wagner, one with which we are still living today, is nothing less than the sweeping imprint of racial ideology across the length and breadth of modern classical music.*

It consists of a series of images, interviews, and vignettes that sketch the life of a bourgeois housewife who is also a part-time prostitute. The woman does not, of course, "just happen" to be a prostitute. Like many others, she is working to support a habit— in this case precisely the habit of being a bourgeois housewife. The desire she withdraws from her sexual performances is reinvested in the material pleasures of ownership and consumption. In content, however, the movie is positively nostalgic, despite an abundance of ostentatious hard edges. It can be seen as a variation on an old theme from nineteenth-century opera. Variants of the underlying logic proliferate across the spectrum of nineteenth-century narratives: *La Traviata* had long since shown the intimate connections between prostitution and bourgeois yearnings—the yearnings of being bourgeois, the yearning to be a bourgeois. It had given those connections palpable, not to say palpating, substance in its seductive music. And Godard notwithstanding, those connections are still being mystified as the stuff of true love and romance. With operas less explicit than this one, the same connections may underwrite the impression of profundity. He can settle down as a pillar of polite society with an attractive wife and a couple of good after-dinner stories about a dragon and some magic fire. But in order for that to happen there must first be a mutual commodity exchange: Since the nineteenth century, such normality has generally hinged on the centrality of one version or another of bourgeois identity, from which other modes of identity may be understood to deviate by degrees. I take this fact, however, to be more exemplary than definitive; my overarching concern is not with the content of normality but with normality itself as a social and psychological function. At the same time I may seem to ally myself with recent revaluations that take operatic extravagance as a medium of freewheeling opposition to social and sexual norms. It is precisely in not making that assumption that my own effort begins. Following Michel Foucault, I regard the device of the norm and the associated concepts of the normal and abnormal not as elements intrinsic to all social organization, but as historical formations specific to modernity. My suggestion is that opera, at least since the nineteenth century, has been actively involved in the production of normality and abnormality as mechanisms of social regulation, especially in the arenas of sex roles, the vicissitudes of desire, and the classification of human types. Exploiting the power of music to mold itself to any and every occasion, Opera deconstructs the field of values and desires structured by the regime of the norm. It discloses itself as alienating, questioning, or redefining both normality and abnormality in the very act of helping to produce them by various combinations of enforcement and defiance. The result tends to be that the combinations themselves, revealed or rendered as volatile, tortuous, and electric, grand love-hate romances in their own right, upstage the values whose demands set them in motion. My aim in this chapter is to offer some reflections on this process which will contribute to an understanding of its specificities, both historical and theoretical. First, however, I will have to reflect a little on the possibilities of such reflection itself, both in general and in relation to other recent efforts to reconceptualize opera. That done, I will return to opera proper—or improper, oblique to the proper in every sense of the term—and try to convey two or three things I know about her. Three things, actually, each of which emerges from a different scene in which opera is construed. The scenes depend, successively, on images, interviews, and vignettes from the world of nineteenth-century normality and abnormality. In the first, Walt Whitman listens; in the second, Sigmund Freud reads; in the third, Hagen sings a song. But first the curtain raiser. Prelude To begin with I would like to float a simple, even naive, idea, then submit it to a series of refinements. The object is to get a generic fix on the notion of opera from, roughly, Mozart to Puccini, with emphasis on the term "notion. The result is not a statement about an empirical phenomenon, but about a cultural fiction, which in this case I have proposed to call Opera—capital O, like the big Other—and to understand as a symptom of modernity. Which is a symptom of what, exactly? The three spheres of

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knowledge "science," Wissenschaft , morality, and aesthetics disengaged from each other and became autonomous. If that is more or less rightâ€”and it seems plausible enoughâ€”Opera can be understood as one of the consequences. Wotan is overtly more and other than a Norse god, Salome overtly more and other than a Judean teenager. Opera emphasizes the gap internal to allegory by embedding dramatic action and words in an all-embracing but nonspecific support system, namely music, the semiotic openness of which both articulates the gap and fills or even overfills it. In this sense Opera is the antitype of the European novel that flourished during the same era. To oversimplify, but not as much as it may seem, opera constructs itself out of a divided allegiance to morality and the aesthetic, giving judicial and rational priority to the first and subjective priority to the second. This does not necessarily involve a conflict: Opera does not confine itself to embodying the typical modern condition of the head and heart at odds. The construction is a dynamic one, one of mutual interference in the service of mutual support. The Foucauldian idea that the normative as such is itself an invention of modernity does not controvert this point; it restates the point from a reverse perspective, no matter that Habermas branded Foucault a conservative antirationalist. But Opera proposes a modernity without revolt. Opera embraces morally the norms it spurns affectively. It embraces those norms morally in order to spurn them affectively. Opera reinforces the moral norm with the strength of renunciation or denial that the norm imposes. Opera reinforces deviation from the moral norm by the degree of transgressive pleasure, including guilt and libidinal excess, that repudiation of the norm affords. The result is a "spiral of power and pleasure" like the one Foucault described for nineteenth-century sexuality: Key to the operation of these Foucauldian spirals is their not being acknowledged by their participants, whether as a result of pretense or real disavowal. They are the perpetual subtext of regulatory exchanges between "parents and children, adults and adolescents, educator and students, doctors and patients, the psychiatrist with his hysteric and his perverts"

But this Habermasian model remains too simple, even with a Foucauldian overlay. This preservation can indeed be said to occur, but only in splinters. Each term in the system leaves fragmentary remainders in the others; each is always already invested by claims, images, rhetorics, and dispositions to communicative action typical of the others. So, to suggest a provisional protocol for such a reading, which the rest of the volume will develop, I will turn to some classic statements by Derrida and link them to Opera through the critical initiatives, originally provoked by questions of gender and sexuality, that in the decade of the s substantially reconfigured the study of opera across the board. Derrida, to be sure, may be a problematic resource. For some, he has already dated, and dated badly, in ways, for example, that Habermas has not. To some degree the concepts under review are more artifacts than current tools. I will return to this point in a little while. But this business of dating is more complex than it appears. As Derrida says of what he calls overturning see below , "It is not a question. The time for overturning is never a dead letter. An extended quotation will be necessary here: On the one hand, we must traverse a phase of overturning. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook this phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of opposition. Therefore one might proceed too quickly to a neutralization that in practice would leave the previous field untouched. We know what have always been the practical particularly political effects of immediately jumping beyond oppositions, and of protests in the simple form of neither this nor that. On the other hand, to remain in this phase is still to operate. We must also mark the interval between inversion, which brings low what was high, and the irruptive emergence of a new "concept," a concept that can no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous regime. The reason for this new gap or interval it is in no sense a failure is that the disseminal phase does not constitute a unified fieldâ€”as, on its own terms, it ought not to do. On the one hand, Derrida outlines what we might call a phase of mixture, in which an opposition breaks down when it encounters a concept it cannot assimilate. The result is to scramble and conjoin the terms that the opposition is meant to keep separate. Mixture is marked by the appearance of "undecidables": Yet it is not purely contingent because the production of difference and deferral is unremitting. As Avital Ronell observes, "In the demand that their encounter make sense, opera figures the irreducible difference between words and music. Language, for its part, is left a little emptied by the



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encounter, for it discovers that it can never hear itself unless music plays the other of itself. At a certain point Derrida simply invokes a floating "then" , "the operator of generality named dissemination insert[s] itself into the open chain" of undecidables. In contrast to the phase of mixture, which is said to produce resistance and disorganization within a conceptual field, the more radical phase of dissemination "explodes" the semantic horizon. The way was led by feminist critiques of operatic representation based on critical concern with the same problem that preoccupied opera itself in the s: The "phase" of such mixture is ideally that of a principled ambivalence that cannot, and should not, be overcome. It is an ambivalence that must be practiced. The practice of it in opera studies has given rise not only to accounts of gender, sexuality and sexual orientation, and the body, but also of theatricality, subjectivity, the supersensual and numinous, and more. The initial concern with, broadly speaking, questions of desire and identity has continued, but it has also diversified and inspired diversity. In sum, there was, there has been and continues to be, a shift in priority from opera as music to opera as musical theater. Music, to be sure, remains the sine qua non: But opera as a conglomerate form and a barometer of cultural styles in subjectivity has become the center of attention. Opera is no longer art, exactly; it is a heterogeneous patchwork of media contributions, no one of which has automatic priority in shaping either aesthetic value or cultural meaning. What is still missing from this heady mixture is the force of dissemination, the force that makes Opera something intractably strange, something unfolded through music but never fully rationalized or normalized by it. To some degree, the very acts of focus on gender, sexuality, noumenal subjectivity, and so on that have opened up the study of opera to new, increasingly sophisticated modes of understanding have tended to edge the unruly operatic patchwork toward the more monolithic status of the Gesamtkunstwerk, even without anyone wanting or intending that outcome. There is really no way to avoid this, but there is also no need to rest content with it. The disseminal force, which is to say the multifaceted, thick-description-seeking, intertextually dense activity of opera, the experience of opera, and writing about opera, can also be made available. It can be let loose. Which is also, surprising as it may seem, to let history loose. The concept of dissemination belongs to a short-lived era of high theory that has been superseded largely because of its insufficient attentiveness to history. Part of the intent of recent opera scholarship has certainly been to restore the historical that is, the worldly and contingent import so often blunted by too exclusive a focus on strictly musical questions. Yet that intent has itself been somewhat blunted, as just noted, by the idealizing tendencies of its own discourse—something for which dissemination is a well-known pharmacy item. Dissemination, I would suggest, can help us comprehend opera historically because there is a sense in which the disseminal is the historical, the very phenomenon it is commonly denounced for opposing. Dissemination is the mode of operation of historical contingency at the level of meaning.

### Chapter 9 : Content Pages of the Encyclopedia of Religion and Social Science

*I explore how the modern construction of childhood is problematic in and of itself, as well as the light it sheds on the deeply embedded ambiguities and aporia (Wagner in A sociology of modernity).*