

Chapter 1 : Plato on Poetry PDF Penelope Murray

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This collection includes writings from Plato, Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus. Feb 06, Lorraine rated it it was amazing Trans. Dorsch, Penelope Murray, Ed. Penelope Murray I thought that this was really good. The central fear that Pluto had was of literary affect -- the power of poets to move people. So here divinity, according to Murray, is not necessarily a good thing. But this holds only if you assume that madness is a BAD thing. She says that in Plato it is, but one wonders really. Plato is a lot more poetic in terms of style than anyone else in this book including Horace! Now re the Aristotle, which is as Murray says a formalist critique. It is commonly held as a response to Plato, and I suppose in some sense it is, but it attributes the cause of poetry somewhat vaguely? From this, man learns and learning is a source of pleasure. The second virtue of poetry I think is the cathartic value. The Horace, in my view, is sadly the most boring in terms of ideas. The main valuable thing which we get from here is the view and this has been repeated time again that literature should please as well as instruct. This keeps getting repeated -- I suppose Samuel Johnson is the most famous repeater of this notion. The Longinus is very enlightening. I daresay he is a great critic. That it is a matter of inspiration as well as of skill. Of course the 2 go together. Just, the exact relation, hmm. Granted, the Poetics is based upon his lecture notes.

**Chapter 2 : Plato's Myths (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*What the ancient Greeks "at least in the archaic phase of their civilization" called muthos was quite different from what we and the media nowadays call "myth". For them a muthos was a true story, a story that unveils the true origin of the world and human beings. For us a myth is something to.*

However, Plato announces in the same chapter that if anyone can prove to him that poetry has a place in a well-run society he will allow the poets in. Due to the unrivalled craft of poetry, it did have a valid place in society. I think to remind us of the intellectual and economic pressures poets work within. This essay will discuss the arguments from Plato to Murray and provide examples of poetry that reflect its status throughout each period. I will conclude by citing and discussing a contemporary Australian poem that signifies the position of poets and poetry in modern society. Overall, it appears that intellectual arguments may be driven to the point of being arbitrary, since the act of poetry has never ceased. Plato claims that reality can be categorised in three ways: The gods create the ideal, for example what everyone understands as being a bed – the IDEA of a bed. The real is what is actually materialised in the object. Hence, the mimesis of the object is twice removed from the ideal: Plato places primacy on reason and intellect. He accuses the poet of inciting emotions that are normally disallowed in the public domain. Critics such as Aristotle, Sidney and Shelley have taken up the challenge of defending poetry as a legitimate craft. Plato demoted poets to a position lower than servants. Poets had to argue for the legitimacy and value they deserved. I will now briefly discuss the arguments presented by Sidney and Shelley and provide examples of the sense and style of poetry that existed alongside these arguments at the time. Sidney begins his defence of poetry by describing that throughout history poets have been ill considered. He points out that many examples of influential literature, such as the Psalms are in-fact poetry. As makers, Sidney then compares poets to other scientists concluding that poetry has value as a thing-in-itself. Here Sidney concludes that the poet is the moderator of both historian and philosopher within the life-school of learning. What emerges is a picture of the poet whose craft draws from all the other sciences. The poet is capable of describing the present, the future and the past through empirical judgement or through the divine intervention of his or her muse. The value of poetry is not only cemented in his critiques, but also in his poem *Astrophil and Stella*: Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to show, That the deare She might take some pleasure of my paine: Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know, Knowledge might pitie winne, and pitie grace obtaine, I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe. Here we see Sidney not only articulating the foundations for the rest of the poem but also making reference to the value of poetry as a thing-in-itself. Moreover lines such as this serve as subtle indicators of the intellectual framework that Sidney is working within. Hitherto, he defends poetry through prose and poetry, which is more than Plato required a defence in prose. He asks us to believe him rather than constructing his defence as a waterproof argument. An example of this sentiment is where he says: At this point Shelley argues for the significance of poets throughout the world. Redefinition of the word poet is a necessary stimulus in the context of every society due to the dynamic nature of the society and therefore of the art form. Shelley outlines a direct relationship between poet, the community and nature, a relationship that is integral to the intellectual and spiritual advancement of mankind. I met a traveller from an antique land Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone Stand in the desert. The final line exemplifies the importance of poetry as an immortal craft or eternal truth. Shelley shapes the functionality of poetry in two ways; it creates new materials of knowledge, power, and pleasure; and it engenders in the mind a desire to reproduce and arrange these powers in a positive manner. Quality poetry according to Shelley is not subsumed within periods of social decay, that is, it does not subscribe to the present contextual drama without imagination. It is the quality crafting of imagination that provides the reader with an avenue to transcend all present dramass and therefore understand the principles that give rise to meaning and to look with hope towards the future. These last points, I contend, are the reasons why we need reminding of the importance of poetry, not necessarily in a milieu of decay, but in a rapidly dynamic age susceptible to confusion. Her essay, *Plato On Poetry*, not only serves as a medium to redefine Platonic ideas within the context of modern scholarship, but also as a reminder of the arguments of

Sidney and Shelley lightly touched upon within this present study. Murray confines her study to the ancient Greek notions of mimesis and poetic inspiration. If the value of the poet in a social hierarchy is questioned, the craft of poetry itself must necessarily come under scrutiny. A poets writing is based on instinct and inspiration, it does not contain the rationality demanded by Plato in *The Republic*. In part because of the existing economic pressures and the shift in rationale from religious, moral, or pure reason to economic value. In order to determine the craft, skill, technique and overall worth of poetry means to develop a clear understanding of mimesis and poetic inspiration. The inability to gauge the value of the creation and craft of poetry regardless of the outcomes it produces means that those allocating funding to poets must decide whether or not mimesis and poetic inspiration are as valuable as the techniques of other professions for instance. It is possible to argue that the value of a poet can be registered in regards to sales, but the subjective nature of poetry renders this problematic.

Chapter 3 : Works by Penelope Murray - PhilPapers

*/ Penelope Murray --Myth, history, and dialectic in Plato's Republic and Timaeus-Critias / Christopher Rowe --Myth and Logos in Aristotle / Thomas K. Johansen --The use of purple in cooking, medicine, and magic: an example of interference by the imaginary in rational discourse / Mireille B  lis --Mythical production: aspects of myth and.*

For them a muthos was a true story, a story that unveils the true origin of the world and human beings. In archaic Greece the memorable was transmitted orally through poetry, which often relied on myth. However, starting with the beginning of the seventh century BC two types of discourse emerged that were set in Edward N. Lanier Anderson opposition to poetry: These two types of discourse were naturalistic alternatives to the poetic accounts of things. This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- in his philosophical endeavor. He thus seems to attempt to overcome the bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP traditional opposition between muthos and logos. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited. Plato is both a myth teller and a myth maker. Myth as a means of persuasion storm of dust or hail driven by the wind, the philosopher  seeing others 4. Myth as a teaching tool filled with lawlessness  is satisfied if he can somehow lead his present 5. Myth in the Timaeus life free from injustice and impious acts and depart from it with good 6. He was certainly very bitter about 7. In his controversial interpretation Strauss argues that 8. Bibliography This interpretation is too extreme. The philosopher should try to transmit his knowledge and Academic Tools his wisdom to the others, and he knows that he has a difficult mission. He preferred to address Related Entries the public at large through his written dialogues rather than conducting dialogues in the agora. He did not write abstruse philosophical treatises but engaging philosophical dialogues meant to appeal to a less 1. Who was his readership? A very good survey participants to the dialogue are, when, where and how they presently met, of this topic is Yunis from which I would like to quote the following and what made them start their dialogue. The participants are historical illuminating passage: Whether historical or fictional, they meet in in technical treatises that had no appeal outside small circles of experts. Plato wanted his dialogues to look prose, some in verse, were demonstrative, not protreptic. Plato, on the like genuine, spontaneous dialogues accurately preserved. How much of other hand, broke away from the experts and sought to treat ethical these stories and dialogues is fictional? It is hard to tell, but he surely problems of universal relevance and to make philosophy accessible to the invented a great deal of them. Other scholars, such as Morgan , have also argued that mythical characters occur throughout the dialogues. However, starting Plato addressed in his writings both philosophical and non-philosophical with the Protagoras and Gorgias, which are usually regarded as the last of audiences. His myths are c5 and logos d2. The myths Plato invents, as well as the traditional myths he uses, are 2. Myths are also Gyges Republic d  b , the myth of Phaethon Timaeus 22c7 or fantastical, but they are not inherently irrational and they are not targeted that of the Amazons Laws e4. Sometimes he modifies them, to a at the irrational parts of the soul. There are also in Plato myths that are his own, such as the myth of Plato uses and the myths he invents. Many of the analogy, not a myth. The construction of the ideal from the traditional ones. Most argues that there are eight main features of the Platonic myth. However, muthos is not an d they cannot be empirically verified; e their authority derive from exclusive label. It is efficient in making the precede or follow a dialectical exposition. Most acknowledges that these less philosophically inclined, as well as children cf. The preambles to a number of laws in concludes that the Oracle story is not only a Platonic fiction, but also a the Laws that are meant to be taken as exhortations to the laws in question Platonic myth, more specifically: Who invented the and that contain elements of traditional mythology see c3, a2, examination of the opinions of others by the means of elenchus? But Simmias confesses that he that he learned an incantation a metaphor for the elenchus from still retains some doubt a  b , and then Socrates tells them an Zalmoxis; see also the Philebus 16c. The myth does not provide evidence that the soul is immortal. It assumes that the soul is immortal and so it may be said that it 3. Myth as a means of persuasion is not entirely false. The myth also claims that there is justice in the afterlife and Socrates hopes that the myth will convince one to believe that For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from the soul is immortal and that there is justice in the afterlife. But the

non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives noble oneâ€”that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. Myth represents a sort may sometimes not follow his arguments, Plato is ready to provide of back-up: Myth, as it is claimed in the grasp what the argument failed to tell them. Myth can embody in its philosophy fails to do so. In the *Phaedo*, Plato develops the so-called theory of recollection 72eâ€”78b. The theory is there Sedley argues that the eschatological myth of the *Gorgias* is best expounded in rather abstract terms. The *Phaedrus* myth of the winged in this world. Gonzales claims that the myth of Er offers a soul, however, does. The that the myth is not actually a dramatization of the philosophical reasoning *Phaedrus* myth does not provide any proofs or evidence to support the that unfolds in the *Republic*, as one might have expected, but of everything theory of recollection. Since this theory the stubbornly remains dark and irrational: Myth as a teaching tool logos 30b, 48d, 53d, 55d, 56a, 57d, 90e. The *Timaeus* cosmology, Cornford argues, answers. But why does Plato call it a piece analysis. But also, and mainly, because its object, namely the muthos? Because, Burnyeat argues, the *Timaeus* cosmology is also a universe, is always in a process of becoming and cannot be really known. No cosmologist can deduce these reasons from various be really known. The standard alternative is to say that the problem lies in premises commonly accepted. He has to imagine them, but they are the cosmologist, not in the object of his cosmology. It is not that the neither fantastical, nor sophistic. The cosmologist exercises his universe is so unstable so that it cannot be really known. It is that we fail imagination under some constraints. He has to come up with reasonable to provide an exact and consistent description of it. A proponent of this and coherent conjectures. And in good Socratic and Platonic tradition, he view is Taylor , Rowe has argued that the emphasis at has to test them with others. This is what *Timaeus* does. They are highly skilled and experienced philosophers: Socrates, term a view also held by Vlastos , â€”3. The of becoming more accessible. In the *Philebus*, in a tight dialectical *Demiurge*, Burnyeat claims, works with given materials, and when he conversation, the genesis of the realm of becoming is explained in abstract creates the cosmos, he does not have a free choice, but has to adjust his terms the unlimited, limit, being that is mixed and generated out of those plans to them. Although we know that the *Demiurge* is supremely two; and the cause of this mixture and generation, 27bâ€”c. But the benevolent towards his creation, none of us could be certain of his *Timaeus* aims at encompassing more than the *Philebus*. Sometimes, however, he seems to interweave philosophy 6. The eschatological myths of the *Gorgias*, In the *Protagoras* d a distinction is made between muthos and logos, *Phaedo* and *Republic*, for instance, are tightly bound with the where muthos appears to refer to a story and logos to an argument. This philosophical arguments of those dialogues cf. Annas ; and the distinction seems to be echoed in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. Some other times he uses myth as a supplement to philosophical muthos. And later on, at c4, Socrates calls a muthos the teaching discourse cf. Kahn who argues that in the myth of the Statesman according to which active and passive motions generate perception and Plato makes a doctrinal contribution to his political philosophy. And one perceived objects. In the *Sophist*, the Visitor from Elea tells his time, in the *Timaeus*, he appears to overcome the opposition between interlocutors that Xenophanes, Parmenides and other Eleatic, Ionian muthos and logos: In the recognizes our human limitations, andâ€”perhapsâ€”the fact that our natures *Republic* Plato is fairly hostile to particular traditional myths. If we had strong reasons for avoiding the use of myths: Porphyry, Proclus, Damascius and Olympiodorus human utterance, as provisional, inadequate, and at best approximating to gave allegorical interpretations of a number of Platonic myths, such as the the truth, will infect Platonic writing at its deepest level, below other and *Phaedo* and *Gorgias* eschatological myths, or the myth of Atlantis. It is difficult to say attitude to visual representationâ€”claiming so often that the highest which one of these two readings is a better approximation of what Plato philosophical knowledge is devoid of it, and attacking poets and artists in thought about the interplay between myth and philosophy. The interpreter general more than onceâ€”inhibited and discouraged attempts to capture in seems bound to furnish only probable accounts about this matter. Perhaps artists simply felt themselves unequal to the 7. McGrath reviews and analyzes the rare illustrations of Platonic mythical figures and landscapes in Renaissance iconography: He might have used and the spindle of the universe handled by Necessity and the Fates of the a myth or two in his early dialogues, now lost. But in general he seems to *Republic*. Bibliography On the philosophical use of myth before Plato there are a number of good

studies, notably Morgan

**Chapter 4 : Penelope Murray (Author of Classical Literary Criticism)**

*Penelope Murray is an expert in ancient history with an interest in ancient poetics and the [www.nxgvision.com](http://www.nxgvision.com) research posts at King's College London and St Anne's College, Oxford, she was a founder member of the department of Classics at the University of Warwick, with promotion to Senior Lectureship in*

Who was his readership? A very good survey of this topic is Yunis from which I would like to quote the following illuminating passage: Other scholars, such as Morgan, have also argued that Plato addressed in his writings both philosophical and non-philosophical audiences. It is true that in the Republic Plato has the following advice for philosophers: This interpretation is too extreme. For him philosophy has a civic dimension. The one who makes it outside the cave should not forget about those who are still down there and believe that the shadows they see there are real beings. The philosopher should try to transmit his knowledge and his wisdom to the others, and he knows that he has a difficult mission. But Plato was not willing to go as far as Socrates did. He preferred to address the public at large through his written dialogues rather than conducting dialogues in the agora. He did not write abstruse philosophical treatises but engaging philosophical dialogues meant to appeal to a less philosophically inclined audience. The participants are historical and fictional characters. Plato wanted his dialogues to look like genuine, spontaneous dialogues accurately preserved. How much of these stories and dialogues is fictional? It is hard to tell, but he surely invented a great deal of them. References to traditional myths and mythical characters occur throughout the dialogues. His myths are meant, among other things, to make philosophy more accessible. Sometimes he modifies them, to a greater or lesser extent, while other times he combines them—this is the case, for instance, of the Noble Lie Republic 382d, which is a combination of the Cadmeian myth of autochthony and the Hesiodic myth of ages. There are also in Plato myths that are his own, such as the myth of Er Republic 1091b or the myth of Atlantis Timaeus 26e4. Many of the myths Plato invented feature characters and motifs taken from traditional mythology such as the Isles of the Blessed or the judgment after death, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish his own mythological motifs from the traditional ones. The majority of the myths he invents preface or follow a philosophical argument: Plato refers sometimes to the myths he uses, whether traditional or his own, as *muthoi* for an overview of all the loci where the word *muthos* occurs in Plato see Brisson ff. However, *muthos* is not an exclusive label. The myths Plato invents, as well as the traditional myths he uses, are narratives that are non-falsifiable, for they depict particular beings, deeds, places or events that are beyond our experience: Myths are also fantastical, but they are not inherently irrational and they are not targeted at the irrational parts of the soul. Strictly speaking, the Cave is an analogy, not a myth. Most argues that there are eight main features of the Platonic myth. Most acknowledges that these eight features are not completely uncontroversial, and that there are occasional exceptions; but applied flexibly, they allow us to establish a corpus of at least fourteen Platonic myths in the Phaedo, Gorgias, Protagoras, Meno, Phaedrus, Symposium, Republic X, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias and Laws IV. Dorion concludes that the Oracle story is not only a Platonic fiction, but also a Platonic myth, more specifically: Who invented the examination of the opinions of others by the means of *elenchus*? We have a comprehensive book about the people of Plato: Nails; now we also have one about the animals of Plato: Bell and Naas. Anyone interested in myth, metaphor, and on how people and animals are intertwined in Plato would be rewarded by consulting it. They are used to portray not just Socrates [compared to a gadfly, horse, swan, snake, stork, fawn, and torpedo ray] but many other characters in the dialogues, from the wolfish Thrasymachus of the Republic to the venerable racehorse Parmenides of the Parmenides. Myth as a means of persuasion For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do. But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children cf. In the Republic the Noble Lie is supposed to make the citizens of Callipolis care more for their city. Philosophy, claims Schofield, provides the guards with knowledge, not with love and devotion for their city. There is some truth in them. But Simmias confesses that he still retains some doubt 591b, and then

Socrates tells them an eschatological myth. The myth does not provide evidence that the soul is immortal. It assumes that the soul is immortal and so it may be said that it is not entirely false. The myth also claims that there is justice in the afterlife and Socrates hopes that the myth will convince one to believe that the soul is immortal and that there is justice in the afterlife. Myth represents a sort of back-up: The myth blurs the boundary between this world and the other. To believe that soul is immortal and that we should practice justice in all circumstances, Gonzales argues, we have to be persuaded by what Socrates says, not by the myth of Er. Myth as a teaching tool The philosopher should share his philosophy with others. But since others may sometimes not follow his arguments, Plato is ready to provide whatever it takes—“an image, a simile, or a myth”—that will help them grasp what the argument failed to tell them. The myth—“just like an image, or analogy”—may be a good teaching tool. Myth can embody in its narrative an abstract philosophical doctrine. In the *Phaedo*, Plato develops the so-called theory of recollection 72e—78b. The theory is there expounded in rather abstract terms. The *Phaedrus* myth of the winged soul, however, does. In it we are told how the soul travels in the heavens before reincarnation, attempts to gaze on true reality, forgets what it saw in the heavens once reincarnated, and then recalls the eternal forms it saw in the heavens when looking at their perceptible embodiments. The *Phaedrus* myth does not provide any proofs or evidence to support the theory of recollection. Since this theory the myth embodies is, for Plato, true, the myth has pace Plato a measure of truth in it, although its many fantastical details may lead one astray if taken literally. Myth in the *Timaeus* The cosmology of the *Timaeus* is a complex and ample construction, involving a divine maker assisted by a group of less powerful gods, who creates the cosmos out of a given material dominated by an inner impulse towards disorder and according to an intelligible model. The standard interpretation is promoted by, among others, Cornford, 31ff. The *Timaeus* cosmology, Cornford argues, is a *muthos* because it is cast in the form of a narration, not as a piece-by-piece analysis. But also, and mainly, because its object, namely the universe, is always in a process of becoming and cannot be really known. The cosmology, Brisson argues, is a non-verifiable discourse about the perceptible universe before and during its creation. The standard alternative is to say that the problem lies in the cosmologist, not in the object of his cosmology. It is not that the universe is so unstable so that it cannot be really known. It is that we fail to provide an exact and consistent description of it. A proponent of this view is Taylor, *The Demiurge*, Burnyeat claims, works with given materials, and when he creates the cosmos, he does not have a free choice, but has to adjust his plans to them. Although we know that the Demiurge is supremely benevolent towards his creation, none of us could be certain of his practical reasons for framing the cosmos the way he did. But why does Plato call it a *muthos*? No cosmologist can deduce these reasons from various premises commonly accepted. He has to imagine them, but they are neither fantastical, nor sophistic. The cosmologist exercises his imagination under some constraints. He has to come up with reasonable and coherent conjectures. And in good Socratic and Platonic tradition, he has to test them with others. This is what *Timaeus* does. They are highly skilled and experienced philosophers: The judges, however, says Plato, have to be tolerant, for in this field one cannot provide more than conjectures. It may be argued that its creationist scenario was meant to make the difficult topic of the genesis of the realm of becoming more accessible. In the *Philebus*, in a tight dialectical conversation, the genesis of the realm of becoming is explained in abstract terms the unlimited, limit, being that is mixed and generated out of those two; and the cause of this mixture and generation, 27b—c. But the *Timaeus* aims at encompassing more than the *Philebus*. It aims not only at revealing the ultimate ontological principles accessible to human reason, cf. These reasons are to be imagined because imagination has to fill in the gaps that reason leaves in this attempt to disclose the reasons for which the cosmos was created the way it is. Myth and philosophy In the *Protagoras* a distinction is made between *muthos* and *logos*, where *muthos* appears to refer to a story and *logos* to an argument. This distinction seems to be echoed in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. And later on, at c4, Socrates calls a *muthos* the teaching according to which active and passive motions generate perception and perceived objects. By calling all those philosophical doctrines *muthoi* Plato does not claim that they are myths proper, but that they are, or appear to be, non-argumentative. In many dialogues he condemns the use of images in knowing things and claims that true philosophical knowledge should avoid images. He would have had strong reasons for avoiding the use of myths: The eschatological myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*, for

instance, are tightly bound with the philosophical arguments of those dialogues cf. Some other times he uses myth as a supplement to philosophical discourse cf. One time, in the *Timaeus*, Plato appears to overcome the opposition between *muthos* and *logos*: It is difficult to say which one of these two readings is a better approximation of what Plato thought about the interplay between myth and philosophy. The interpreter seems bound to furnish only probable accounts about this matter. Fowler surveys the *muthos*–*logos* dichotomy from Herodotus and the pre–Socratic philosophers to Plato, the Sophists, and the Hellenistic and Imperial writers, and provides many valuable references to works dealing with the notion of *muthos*, the Archaic uses of *mythos* words, and ancient Greek mythology; for the *muthos*–*logos* dichotomy in Plato see also Miller , 76 He might have used a myth or two in his early dialogues, now lost.

**Chapter 5 : Classical Literary Criticism by Penelope Murray**

*The mythic or muthos had, according to Plato in the Republic, an element of falseness (pseudos) to it. But that idea of falsehood, according to Penelope Murray in her essay in a great collection of essays, From Myth to Reason, is not so much about whether something happened or not, whether it was factual.*

Bryn Mawr Classical Review Cambridge University Press, Reviewed by Velvet Yates, Princeton University, vlyates princeton. This very useful compilation contains the Ion in full and selections from the Republic Books II and III, eb; Book X, b with commentary, a bibliography, short indices in English and Greek, and an appendix of important Platonic passages on poetic inspiration. While it is not entirely true that "no commentaries have appeared in English on the Ion, or on the opening books of the Republic This very strength, however, could create the false impression that Plato had a system of aesthetics, which can be extracted and compiled from the Platonic corpus. Murray does her best to counter this impression right away, pointing out that aesthetics as a field did not exist until the 18th century, while claiming Plato as the starting point for many questions that continue to be asked in aesthetics. She also remarks that "we cannot speak of a Platonic theory of poetry, but rather a collection of texts in which various attitudes, images and myths about poetry are expressed"; and that "his discussions of poetry are always embedded in some wider context" 2. This wider context is necessarily sacrificed in such a collection. And what of the passages selected or omitted? There is no way to make everyone happy; I, for one, would very much like to see something more from the Phaedrus in this volume. The appendix contains Phaedrus a without commentary. Plato was aware of this impasse and his assessment of it must be taken into account. She duly notes the range, complexity and flexibility of the word, both in and out of Plato. Murray defends the relevance of Book X against those who view it as "little more than an afterthought" and observes that "in the course of book 10 a more complex view of mimesis is developed with reference to the Platonic theory of Forms" 6. The deeper understanding of the defective inferiority inherent in all mimesis informs the decision to ban all mimetic poetry in Book X a. Still, mimesis serves a valuable and even constructive purpose in Plato. Using mimesis as his basis, he may have been the first to define something which approaches our concept of the "fine" arts. Poets are described as divinely inspired in the Ion, but this concept is replaced in the Republic by that of poets as imitators. One might ask what, if anything, lies behind this strategy; Murray rightly remarks that the approach of the Ion allows Plato to criticize poets without commenting upon the subject-matter of poetry, which, on the other hand, is closely scrutinized in the Republic. Murray also follows Tigerstedt in claiming that "in one passage, and one alone, P. The commentary for the Ion and Republic texts is, like the introduction, concise yet informative. There is an abundance of historical and cultural notes, such as a description of rhapsodic contests, especially at the Great Panathenaea. One very helpful section among several is one grappling with such concepts as lying and fiction, in the Republic commentary pp. There are plenty of cross-references to other Platonic dialogues, as well as references to other ancient authors, earlier and later. The bibliography is broad and fairly extensive, supplemented by further references in the commentary, though there are bound to be some favorites missing when there is such a huge mass of scholarship to choose from. I have only one small quibble to make on the interpretation of a particular passage, and that is the comment on p. Murray writes that "this passage suggests that Corybantic ritual involved the use of different types of music for diagnostic purposes, since participants would only respond to the music of the god by whom they were possessed. The two commentaries are obviously meant for different audiences, and so do not compete with each other. This book will be valuable both for specialists in ancient aesthetics, and for those teaching advanced undergraduate or graduate courses in Greek, who wish to focus on a particular theme in Plato rather than on a single dialogue. Ford, "Aesthetics, Classical," in D.

**Chapter 6 : Plato on Poetry: Ion; Republic eb9; Republic b10 - Plato - Google Books**

*What Is a Muthos for Plato? Penelope Murray Myth, History, and Dialectic in Plato's Republic and Timaeus-Critias*  
*Christopher Rowe Myth and Logos in.*

Bryn Mawr Classical Review Teoria della composizione e prassi della ricezione. International Plato Studies Vol. Much of the material is familiar, but the overall interpretation which emerges from this book is rather radical. Although Giuliano had not completed the final preparation of his text for publication before his untimely death in a task which was undertaken by colleagues at the University of Pisa, his vision is nevertheless clear: If Plato really wished to eradicate poetry from society why did he not practise what he preached and erase all traces of it from his own writings? In the Republic Plato endorses the traditional importance of mousike in education but shows that not every type of mimesis, not every type of poetry, should be included. Contrary to what is sometimes maintained, tragedy, the most imitative of genres in terms of its form, is not banned tout court, but only certain tragedies, or sections of tragedies, which offer paradigms of men and women behaving badly. As examples of plays containing offensive material G. On the other hand a passage such as that towards the end of Oedipus Rex where the final downfall of the protagonists is narrated in the third person by the messenger would apparently have been admitted though G. Similarly in the Republic tragedies which offered examples of fine behaviour for the young to imitate and internalize would have their place. But what would such tragedies look like? Perhaps, then, as many have suggested before, we should look to Socrates as the true tragic hero. But in that case we are looking at a redefinition of tragedy rather than an incorporation of its essential features into the educational programme of the city. On the notorious problem of the relationship between the discussions of mimesis in Republic books 3 and 10 G. Mimesis has an important function in the formation of character provided that the right objects are imitated, a theme which is fundamental to the Republic and developed at length in the Laws. Poetry can on occasion grasp the truth, at least in relation to the phenomenal world, and in that sense can be useful in guiding us in the pursuit of knowledge. This idea can be expressed in a negative way poets merely imitate the world of appearances or more positively through the concept of inspiration or enthousiasmos. If Plato seems to oscillate between negative and positive evaluations of poetry, that is not because of any conflict or ambivalence in himself but is inherent in the nature of poetry. Inspiration guarantees quality, but, since inspiration is by definition occasional and transitory, most poetry most of the time is the product of mimesis. Poetry can thus be conceptualized both as a divine gift and as an imperfect human creation, and Plato alternates between these views without difficulty. The famous story of how Phrynichus was fined for reminding the audience of their sufferings and reducing them all to tears with his tragedy on the Sack of Miletus Hdt. The fact that Aristotle shared these attitudes see e. At the same time his treatment of poetry is deeply rooted in tradition, as we see from the ubiquitous use of poetic quotation in the dialogues, where poetic texts can offer an important starting point for discussions of ethical issues. Socrates is especially fond of interrogating the poets to tease out the true meaning of their sayings, applying logic in his exegeses and showing us how to interpret their words correctly. Taking theory and practice together G. Plato treats poetry as the basis of paideia because of the culture in which he lived, but he does not regard the poets uncritically as a guide to life, nor does he think that poetry can impart that true wisdom which the pursuit of philosophy can alone provide. Rather the value of poetry lies in the knowledge it can give us of the imperfect world which we inhabit. No summary can do justice to the detailed working out of G. But I remain unconvinced of the general picture he paints of a Plato whose relationship with the poets is unambiguous. It is difficult, for example, to take everything that Plato says about poetic inspiration at face value, given the irony that is so often lurking in his texts. In the Ion the great central speech on poetic inspiration at de is prefaced by the image of the magnet which emphasises the interconnexion between the various elements in the chain of communication: Muse, poet, rhapsode and audience. In the Meno 99b-d poets and politicians alike are said to be divinely inspired. Can we really take this statement seriously? In the Phaedrus, despite the eulogy of the inspired poet in the famous passage on poetic mania at a, the life of the poet is nevertheless rated sixth in order of merit after the philosopher, the

king, the man of affairs, the trainer or the doctor, and the seer, which suggests that the attitude to poets and poetry in this dialogue is just as equivocal as in the *Ion*. But it is one thing to say that poetry was a public art form sponsored by the state, another to say that poets were actually told what they could and could not say. Plato may well have envied Homer the poetry that he left behind, but that did not prevent him from wishing to replace him as the educator of Greece.

#### Chapter 7 : Penelope Murray - Wikipedia

*Penelope Murray read Classics at Newnham College, Cambridge, where she also took her Ph.D. She held Research Fellowships at King's College London and St. Anne's College, Oxford, before becoming a founder member of the Department of Classics at the University of Warwick.*

#### Chapter 8 : Bryn Mawr Classical Review

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#### Chapter 9 : Plato and Poetry " Novel

*Plato founded the Academy, an educational institution dedicated to pursuing philosophic truth. The Academy lasted well into the 6th century A.D., and is the model for all western universities. Its formation is along the lines Plato laid out in *The Republic*.*